STATEMENT BY JEAN-PIERRE LACROIX, UNDER-SECRETARY-GENERAL
SECURITY COUNCIL BRIEFING
New York
07 SEPTEMBER 2023
I welcome this opportunity to brief the Security Council in the context of resolution 2378 (2017), on the progress made and the challenges encountered in the implementation of Action for Peacekeeping (A4P) initiative and its implementation strategy, Action for Peacekeeping Plus.
We are five years into A4P. The Declaration of Shared Commitments stands as a testimony to a global consensus and ambition to strengthen missions and make our peacekeepers safer and more effective. A4P+, launched in 2021, focuses our energy on catalytic issues that are critical for achieving A4P’s aims.
Today I will briefly speak to results thus far. For more details, I refer members to our latest A4P+ progress report, circulated to the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, to the brief summary in front of members and to the Secretary-General’s report on peacekeeping performance, recently submitted to the Council.
I would also like to take this opportunity to underscore the extent to which we need stronger, more consistent and unified support by Member States to fulfil the ultimate goals of United Nations peacekeeping, that is, helping to establish and provide the space for durable peace.
As we have always conveyed, A4P is a collective effort, and peacekeeping is only as strong as the unity and support of our Member States. Growing divisions among Member States, combined with the increased complexity of today’s conflicts, poses a formidable challenge to peacekeeping and the broader task of maintaining peace and security.
Peacekeeping is not a magic wand to help a country return to stability, but with the support of a unified international community, political processes and peace agreements have been successfully implemented. It also took the assistance of peacekeeping missions in the various countries that I will mention. As a result, countries such as Sierra Leone, Cambodia, Namibia, Côte d’Ivoire, Timor-Leste and many more were able to transition from conflict to peace with the support of United Nations peacekeeping. Of course, it took not only peacekeeping missions, but also the strong and united support of Member States for those political processes.
Even where political solutions to conflicts seem distant, which is much more often the case nowadays, peacekeepers continue to protect the lives of hundreds and thousands of civilians in the countries and regions in which they are deployed. It is the case, for example, with the United Nations Mission in South Sudan and with the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO), which protects hundreds of thousands of civilians under direct threat of violence, in spite of daunting challenges and limitations.
United Nations peacekeeping is also working to keep civilians out of harm’s way by preserving ceasefires and preventing the resumption of hostilities in places such as southern Lebanon and Cyprus. As we are all too aware, incidents in those regions can easily escalate into the resumption of hostilities. I encourage the Council to consider the alternative and to imagine how those situations would evolve if peacekeepers were not present to undertake those daily efforts. With that said, I must note that while peacekeeping plays a critical role in reducing violent conflict, as outlined in the New Agenda for Peace, peace enforcement is a step too far for peacekeeping and needs to be carried out under different modalities.
In an era of increasing complexity, the environment in which our peacekeepers are deployed is ever evolving. Last year, the number of conflict-related deaths worldwide reached a 20-year high. A convergence of global phenomena — geopolitical tension, climate change and transnational organized crime point to a future of overlapping crises. But we must continue to strengthen the effectiveness of peacekeeping, which is one of the most powerful multilateral tools at our disposal to manage and help resolve conflict. And as the reports I mentioned earlier attest to, we are doing our utmost.
Political strategies that have coherent and collective support from key actors are a cornerstone of A4P and A4P+. Political solutions must be at the heart of all efforts. That approach is evident in the engagements undertaken by our missions, often in conjunction with regional organizations and other partners leading on political processes.
In the Central African Republic, the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) is advancing the peace process through the implementation of a multi-year political strategy, coupled with a robust and proactive security approach to deter armed groups.
In Mali, the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) was instrumental in its assistance to the international mediation team supporting the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali, particularly in negotiations among the parties. And here, I wish to affirm that even as the Mission pursues its withdrawal in line with resolution 2690 (2023), the United Nations has expressed its readiness to continue its support to the implementation of the peace agreement, which remains critical for peace and stability in Mali.
Even where peacekeeping mandates do not explicitly confer the task of supporting political processes, missions often have a pivotal role in enabling conditions conducive to the pursuit or resumption of negotiations. That is the case in Cyprus, for example, where the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus works closely with the Secretary-General’s good-offices mission to foster intercommunal cooperation and facilitate trust and confidence-building measures.
Effective peacekeeping also requires the right capabilities and mindset. We continue to utilize the Peacekeeping Capability Readiness System (PCRS) to accelerate deployment timelines. Since November, seven units have been deployed from the PCRS, including two to the United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei as part of the mission’s reconfiguration.
We also continue to adapt training and deployment to the needs of missions, for instance through implementing the recommendations of the Independent Strategic Review of the United Nations Response to Explosive Ordnance Threats (see S/2021/1042). Among other actions, that has included revising requirements for units deploying to three missions to ensure that contingents can effectively operate in their threat environments.
However, our work is far from complete. Caveats, especially when undeclared by troop- and police-contributing countries’ can significantly hamper our missions’ effectiveness and lead to operational setbacks. They also create risk for troop- and police-contributing countries that are willing to do their utmost to implement the mandate. I would like to reiterate our position that undeclared caveats have no place in United Nations peacekeeping.
I also appeal to Member States to fill existing capability gaps. The Peacekeeping Ministerial meeting in Accra on 5 and 6 December will be a pivotal opportunity to reaffirm and make new commitments to peacekeeping. I invite all Member States to review the pledging guide and capability requirement paper we have issued in order to tailor their pledges at the Ministerial meeting to the precise needs we have. The Ministerial meeting will also be a critical opportunity for Member States to express their political support for United Nations peacekeeping.
Accountability to United Nations peacekeepers remains a core priority, in line with resolutions 2518 (2020) and 2589 (2021). As documented in the three A4P+ progress reports published to date, we continue to make notable strides in enhancing the safety and security of United Nations peacekeepers, despite the increasingly complex security environments in which we operate.
Efforts such as the Action Plan to Improve the Security of Peacekeepers and the implementation of the review on explosive ordnance threats have fostered progress in areas such as force protection, integrated base defence and countering improvised explosive devices. Advances in peacekeeping intelligence and situational awareness are helping missions foresee and address threats, whereas enhanced field crisis management capabilities, such as regular casualty evacuation trainings and stress-testing, contribute to improving the safety and security of peacekeepers. Further progress hinges on sustained Member State support, especially in the form of specialized skills, equipment and expertise.
But the death of one peacekeeper is always one too many. We must remember and honour the sacrifices made by our peacekeepers worldwide, including the 18 peacekeepers killed by malicious acts since my briefing last September (see S/PV.9123). In the context of MINUSMA’s drawdown, the Mission’s operating environment remains particularly dangerous. The risk of attacks by non-State armed groups persists. Five out of seven peacekeepers killed by malicious acts so far, in 2023, were serving in Mali. I appeal to all Council members to help ensure that we can proceed with the drawdown of MINUSMA in a safe and orderly manner.
The accountability of peacekeepers aims for the highest level of performance by all personnel, uniformed and civilian. That includes responsible action towards host countries and their populations, not only in conduct and discipline, but in missions’ environmental footprints.
In line with resolution 2436 (2018) and as documented in the most recent report of the Secretary-General on the overall performance of United Nations peacekeeping operations, we continue our efforts to strengthen the performance of United Nations peacekeeping at all levels, including at Headquarters, within missions and within uniformed and civilian components. Performance-assessment tools have been improved, as has the way we actively follow up on underperformance reports and take remedial actions.
We also continue to take all necessary measures to address allegations of all forms of misconduct, both past and present. Ending impunity for all forms of misconduct remains a central goal and we have taken drastic measures in the case of serious allegations, including through repatriation of units where needed. Consistent numbers of allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse continue to be reported annually, although many of these have related to events from past years. Together with Member States, we must work to ensure preventive measures, enforce zero-tolerance of all misconduct and, most importantly, uphold the rights and dignity of victims.
As we mark the seventy-fifth anniversary of United Nations peacekeeping, we are reflecting not only on milestones achieved, but also on how we communicate and engage with the public and communities, explain our mandates and dispel falsehoods.
The recent strategic review of strategic communications across United Nations peacekeeping operations (S/2023/282) highlighted that effective and proactive strategic communication helps to manage expectations among host Governments and populations. Several missions are now implementing regular perception surveys to better understand the attitudes and expectations of local populations, and we are working to further build capacity and expertise in that area. Communicating peacekeeping’s aims and achievements also supports collaboration with national actors, which can enhance our effectiveness.
As a proactive measure, our global communications Peace Begins with Me campaign demonstrates our tangible impact on those we serve and our collective commitment to peace. We are also working to step up this kind of proactive media engagement at Headquarters and within our missions. And we are taking robust action against all forms of mis- and disinformation that interfere with the work of our missions. For example, within hours of its coming out, MINUSCA recently identified and debunked a false online story claiming that a peacekeeper had been arrested for arms trafficking. More needs to be done, including by ensuring that we have the right skill sets both at Headquarters and in our missions to adequately address mis- and disinformation.
The final A4P+ priority, cooperation with host States, is undergirded by transparency, mutual respect and open dialogue. Through proactive discussions with national authorities, we have often been able to address critical challenges, such as detentions of United Nations personnel or restrictions on their freedom of movement, but it is not always enough. As reaffirmed by resolution 2518 (2020), reducing violations of status-of-forces agreements across missions is critical. In order to strengthen our cooperation with host States, we are working to better document and communicate with the Council on status-of-forces violations. To that end, it is essential to ensure the political engagement of Member States and of the Security Council in particular. I urge Council members to engage with host countries where needed, to help us proceed with the effective and unimpeded implementation of Security Council mandates.
Advancing the women and peace and security agenda, a core priority in peacekeeping, increases peacekeeping effectiveness. Women’s participation in political processes is critical to efforts to achieve sustainable political solutions, and we are continuing our efforts in support of that engagement. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, for example, MONUSCO actively supported the participation of women in the Nairobi process, leading to 40 per cent representation in its third round of consultations between the Government and representatives of armed groups and communities. We also continue to make great strides in the Uniformed Gender Parity Strategy. As of May, women constituted 25.6 per cent of individual uniformed personnel. As of today, 38 per cent of Heads and 33 per cent of Deputy Heads of civilian-led peacekeeping operations are women. We have also worked to foster gender-responsive working and living conditions. I once again call on Member States to intensify efforts to remove barriers at the national level and increase the participation of women in peacekeeping, including at the civilian level. Technology and data are also critical to the future of peacekeeping. Central to that is the ongoing implementation of the Strategy for the Digital Transformation of United Nations Peacekeeping. While we have made progress towards ensuring tech-savvy, data-informed peacekeeping forces, further investment in data capabilities among personnel is required to ensure that data can be properly leveraged for effective decision-making.
We continue to proactively advance A4P and A4P+ but also remain seized of the need to continually review and expand our efforts to ensure that peacekeeping remains fit for purpose. In the past few years the Security Council has mandated us to do so, notably through resolutions 2518 (2020) on the safety and security of peacekeepers, 2589 (2021) on accountability for crimes against peacekeepers, 2436 (2018) on peacekeeping performance and 2594 (2021) on peacekeeping transitions. Most, if not all, of the work I have mentioned is therefore indeed mandated by Member States. As the drawdown from Mali creates greater pressure for scalability, I would like to take this opportunity to emphasize that upholding and fulfilling our responsibilities, as stipulated in the resolutions, requires both resources and political will. At its core, peacekeeping is a political instrument. Its efficacy is linked to robust political support from the Council. While clear mandates with adequate resources are the foundation for success, host nations’ cooperation and a genuine desire among the parties to seek peace are also crucial.
As we reflect on the past 75 years, there are many examples of successful political processes supported by United Nations peacekeeping. Currently, as the international community has grown increasingly divided, peacekeeping efforts in support of political processes are looking at a less consistent track record. Nonetheless, the intermediate goals of our missions, including in protecting the lives of countless civilians, preserving ceasefires and preventing escalations and resumptions of hostilities, remain extremely meaningful. For many populations at the front lines of conflict, the presence of peacekeeping missions is an important deterrent to an even grimmer reality. As we continue to work to improve and update peacekeeping to meet the evolving nature of threats to peace, we must be diligent in assessing our added value and ensuring that our capabilities and resources are aligned with our objectives. The dedication of all stakeholders during five years of A4P has brought results. But we cannot be complacent. Let us recommit to peacekeeping reform and build further on our shared successes. In conclusion, I would like to thank the Member States for championing A4P and the priority areas of A4P+.