M. le Président, Mesdames et Messieurs,
1. C’est un honneur pour moi de participer à un débat du Conseil de Sécurité sur les transitions et stratégies de sortie des opérations de maintien de la paix. C’est une discussion qui tombe à point nommé. Comme l’a souligné le Secrétaire général, il est aujourd’hui plus pertinent que jamais d’échanger sur cette question d’importance. Au cours des dernières années, nous avons collectivement fait face à des difficultés répétées de déploiement et de mise en route. Dans la période à venir, j’anticipe que nous allons diriger davantage notre attention vers la consolidation des progrès réalisés sur le terrain et une transition en douceur vers une paix durable, alors que nous réduirons la taille de nos Missions.
2. Le débat d’aujourd’hui s’inscrit dans la discussion plus large entreprise par la communauté internationale sur la consolidation de la paix. Le Secrétaire général a exposé les liens clés entre maintien et consolidation de la paix. Le document interne Nouvel Horizon décrit les efforts de consolidation de la paix que les missions de maintien de la paix des Nations Unies mettent en œuvre dès le début des opérations. Leur aspect peut-être le plus important est qu’elles assurent une sécurité de base, essentielle pour construire la paix à venir. Ces efforts incluent de manière plus large la protection des civils, l’état de droit, la démobilisation et la réinsertion des anciens combattants, la réforme du secteur de sécurité et l’action anti mine. Les opérations multidimensionnelles sont aussi mandatées de soutenir des processus politiques vitaux et des accords de paix, ce qui entraine un soutien aux processus électoraux, réforme constitutionnelle et réconciliation nationales et locale. En outre, les opérations de maintien de la paix sont fréquemment chargées d’appuyer la restauration de fonctions gouvernementales essentielles telles que la police, la justice et le système correctionnel. Les opérations de maintien de la paix offrent un cadre intégré à tous les efforts du système des Nations Unies. Elles soutiennent d’autres interventions essentielles à la consolidation de la paix comme la restauration de services de base et la revitalisation de l’économie.
3. Arriver à une compréhension commune, un consensus autour du lien maintien – consolidation de la paix est crucial. Cela nous permettra de planifier sur des bases claires les transitions de manière cohérente. En se basant sur ces bases claires et capitalisant sur les avantages comparatifs et les secteurs d’expertise des uns et des autres, le système des Nations Unies peut s’allier avec d’autres acteurs de manière efficace pour soutenir des pays à se relever des conflits. Les liens entre consolidation et maintien de la paix sont aussi une des questions examinées par le Comité spécial des opérations de maintien de la paix.
4. Comme je l’ai souligné lors du débat du Conseil de sécurité sur le maintien de la paix d’août 2009, le personnel de maintien de la paix est un consolidateur de paix de la première heure. Mais une fois que nous avons atteint une première stabilisation, nous devons assurer que l’effort collectif de rétablissement continue pour que les opérations de maintien de la paix passent le relais et se retirent.
5. La question est, comment identifions-nous ce point de basculement? Comment savons-nous quand la sécurisation ou la stabilisation apportée par une mission de maintien de la paix n’est plus requise?
6. Y a-t-il une tendance à rester trop longtemps ? La longue durée des missions traditionnelles de maintien de la paix comme la MINURSO, l’ONUST et l’UNFICYP n’est pas une indication d’échec. Ces opérations démontrent plutôt qu’une mission de maintien de la paix ne peut se substituer à un processus politique ou à la volonté des parties. Elles nous mettent tous au défi de définir un engagement politique plus créatif et plus constructif qui fasse avancer les processus de paix. Y a-t-il une tendance à partir trop tôt ? Dans sa déclaration, le Secrétaire général a souligné les risques inhérents à un départ avant que la paix n’ait été consolidée. Nous en avons fait l’expérience au Timor-Leste et en Haïti. Il y a aussi des instances où le consentement aux opérations de maintien de la paix des Nations Unies est soudainement retiré, comme dans les cas d’UNMEE et de l’ONUB.
7. Il y a bien sûr des exemples, comme la Sierra Leone, où les autorités nationales et le Conseil de sécurité ont travaillé ensemble pour continuellement ajuster la présence des Nations Unies à l’évolution des conditions sur le terrain. Les Nations Unies ont conclu une opération de maintien de la paix et créé, d’abord une mission intégrée, puis un bureau de consolidation de la paix.
8. Dans tous les cas, le progrès n’est pas linéaire. La consolidation de la paix se heurte inévitablement à des obstacles. Il peut lui arriver de reculer avant qu’un point de non-retour ne soit atteint.
9. Dans tous les cas, l’alignement des fonctions opérationnelles et de support est, comme Mme. Malcorra va l’exposer, essentiel.
Mr. President,
10. Debates on staying too late versus leaving too soon is only one dimension. Getting the mission mandate and structure right from the outset is also critical for a successful transition and eventual exit. We need the right tools to address quickly-evolving dynamics and adjust accordingly. For example, more Formed Police Units rather than troops were needed in Haiti to manage public order and to address the challenge of gangs and policing. But when the challenge is institutional transformation of national police institutions Formed Police Units are not the right tool. Instead, institutional transformation requires a combination of individual police officers and civilian capacities that can support and advise the national police and authorities and assist in strategic planning.
11. We need reliable capacities and capabilities in a range of sectors, including rapidly deployable civilian capacities accompanied by adequate resources. In this regard we are seeking to expand the capacity of the Standing Police Capacity complemented by small justice and corrections expertise. Making sure we have the right tools requires continuous and constructive dialogue between the Secretariat, the Council and the troop and police contributing countries.
12.The early initiation of peacebuilding efforts may enable an earlier exit for peacekeeping. But we must be clear that the exit of a peacekeeping operation should be part of a coherent strategy to support a country emerging from conflict and not an end in itself. To use a medical analogy, we need to be sure it is safe to leave the emergency room that is peacekeeping, before leaving others to ramp up longer term recovery. This entails a partnership and shared vision among many actors, including regional and bilateral players. This is a heavy burden placed on national governments as well as the Special Representatives and their leadership teams. And it is a challenge for the Security Council and other Member State bodies. A durable peace requires progress on many fronts – a reasonably stable security environment that protect the rule of law, a legitimate political order that can mediate differences and avoid renewed violence, improved governance and strengthened institution building, the resumption of basic services and the start of socio-economic recovery. And a number of these areas will not be directly mandated tasks of peacekeeping operations. But they could be referenced nonetheless as conditions for a safe drawdown and exit.
13. Ultimately the defining factors for the drawdown of a peacekeeping operation are progress in the peace process and in the capacity of national institutions, including civil society. However, the strengthening of national capabilities cannot be enforced or imposed. States already made fragile from conflict nonetheless expected are asked to achieve radical and deep reforms across their entire governance systems in a matter of a few years. Expectations need to be realistic. Building capacity is not simply a numbers game. Strengthening civil society is not about holding a set number of workshops. Training hundreds of police becomes meaningless if there is no effective Interior Ministry to plan and support their work, or no legal and judicial structure for them to operate within. The absorption capacity of national authorities can vary across different sectors and geographic areas. Timing and sequencing need to be carefully considered, particularly with regard to the security sector. MONUC, for example, is challenged by the need to plan for and respond to different degrees of peace consolidation across the vast country. We need to be able maintain flexibility to respond to changing circumstances and capacities on the ground while providing timely information to the Security Council and contributors. This allows us to respond to shifting obstacles and maximize opportunities as they arise.
14. We need to ensure that critical gaps in peacebuilding are reflected in reports to the Security Council. But, as the Secretary General noted, there also needs to be new thinking on how best to measure actual progress on the ground, given the importance of subjective aspects such as legitimacy, expectations, and authority. Einstein noted, “not everything that counts can be counted, and not everything that can be counted counts.” Capturing the ebbs and flows of a peace process needs to go beyond benchmarking and strategic guidance from the Security Council needs to be based on as comprehensive picture as possible.
Mr. President,
15. National authorities must play a pivotal role in the actual planning for the exit of a peacekeeping operation. Transitions may be sign of successful peace consolidation but they are also a very sensitive period. National authorities may have concerns that with the exit of the peacekeeping mission may have unintended impacts or may coincide with a huge drop in political support or donor attention. The country may need a security guarantor, as was the case with Sierra Leone. We need to listen to and understand the expectations and perceptions of both national authorities and civil society. The Peacebuilding Commission can also plays a key role.
16. Peacebuilding activities also need to be continued beyond the life span of a peacekeeping operation or the risk is that gains made in peace consolidation could be lost. One continuing challenge is the mis-match between assessed budget and voluntary funds available for peacebuilding, which can limit the capacities of other actors to step in or increase activities as a peacekeeping mission draws down.
17. I would like to conclude by setting out some of initiatives underway in DPKO aimed at strengthening transition strategies. We are working to initiate transition planning earlier. We are conducting a study on approaches to transitions in peacekeeping settings, which considers the cases of Liberia and Timor Leste. It also examines the experiences of Haiti as the study was initiated before the devastating earthquake, which took one month ago the lives of so many colleagues and Haitians. As you are aware, considerable progress was made in Haiti in terms of peace consolidation through MINUSTAH and under the leadership of Mr. Hédi Annabi and Mr. Luiz Carlos da Costa. Their contributions to the peace and security agenda were invaluable and their insights and wisdom will be sorely missed.
18. In Haiti, as elsewhere we are continuing our work to build stronger partnerships with critical UN actors, Member States, as well as external partners such as the EU, the World Bank, AU and others so that we can contribute to efforts to build coherent strategies in peacebuilding. We believe that strategic discussions with the World Bank, as called for in the Secretary General’s report on peacebuilding, could be a useful tool to enhance transition planning. We are also looking carefully at the experiences of past and ongoing missions and countries that have managed transitions, so that we draw on good practices and better articulate how peacekeeping can contribute to longer-term peacebuilding.
19. I will now turn to Ms Malcorra to address the support dimensions and then to the Special Representatives Alan Doss, Ellen Margrethe Løj and Michael von der Schulenburg to give you a real sense and flavour of how challenges play out on the ground in their specific post conflict settings.