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Photo caption: Voters look for their names on registration lists outside a polling station at Zam Zam Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) Camp on the first day of Sudan’s national elections, Zam Zam, North Darfur, Sudan, 11 April 2010. (UN Photo/Albert Gonzalez Farran)

Cover photo: UN peacekeeper in Haiti. 17 September 2010. (UN Photo/Marco Dormino)
A YEAR OF COMPLEX CHALLENGES FOR UN PEACE OPERATIONS

2010 was in many ways a watershed one for UN peace operations. Several long-standing peacekeeping missions, including in Liberia and Timor-Leste, took decisive steps towards extending initial stability and security gains into longer-term peacebuilding, allowing UN peacekeepers to begin to withdraw or to plan to do so. In other theatres of operations such as Chad, Darfur and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, political and operational factors have made it harder for the peacekeepers to live up to expectations. The year ended with thousands of peacekeepers caught in the middle of a tense stand-off in Côte d’Ivoire following contested presidential elections.

While there may be a reduction in the numbers of peacekeepers in 2011, peacekeeping will be no less crucial. And the political role of the UN, through its political field missions and special envoys conducting peacemaking, preventive diplomacy and peacebuilding, is bound to grow even more.

As Sudan prepared for the historic referendum that would decide if the largest country in Africa splits into two, the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) assisted and supported the national authorities in planning for and carrying out this critical poll.

Limited consent from the national authorities and differences within the international community regarding strategy necessitated the downsizing and eventual closure of the UN peacekeeping mission in Chad and the Central African Republic (MINURCAT).

Despite continued insecurity in the east, over 1,500 blue hel-
mets began to pull out of the Democratic Republic of the Congo as the operation transformed into a stabilization mission known as MONUSCO. And following the earthquake of 12 January 2010, the UN Mission in Haiti – itself horrifically affected by the tragedy – began the process of undertaking an entire new set of stabilization tasks.

After a decade of surge in demand for UN blue helmets, it appears that peacekeeping may now be headed towards a period of consolidation and even contraction. But the new environment promises to be complex, the tasks daunting and the work dangerous. Any reduction in numbers of peacekeepers in no way indicates that the challenges are diminishing.

To better service its operations, the UN Secretariat has been developing its global field support strategy, transforming recruitment processes and strengthening regional hubs to further systemize and economize support to peace operations and political missions and to better cope with logistical challenges.

Yet peacekeeping continues to confront a range of substantive challenges and issues. These include maintaining the consent of the parties to a peacekeeping operation; trying to keep peace when there is no peace to keep; upholding UN impartiality; and deciding when to use force within the scope of a mission’s means and mandate.

The fundamental requirement that peacekeeping must sustain international political support throughout the entire lifespan of the mission, and that it must accompany but not substitute for a vibrant and
inclusive political process, also remain critical to success.

UN peacekeeping operations continue to deploy to inhospitable environments that are remote and dangerous with scant resources and considerable logistical challenges. The numbers of peacekeepers on the ground may be shrinking, but both the expectations and the complexity of mandates continue to grow. While some missions retain the traditional ceasefire support, observation and monitoring tasks, today’s operations are increasingly called upon to perform a wide range of multi-dimensional and exceptionally sensitive tasks—such as supporting peace processes, building sustainable institutions of governance, reforming security sectors and building the rule of law, protecting civilians, combating sexual and gender-based violence, assisting national elections, promoting security of UN staff and helping to nurture the often fragile seeds of peace. In the immediate aftermath of conflict, peacekeepers are increasingly peacebuilders.

In a complementary development, the UN Secretariat and Security Council have put new emphasis on preventative diplomacy as a low-key, long-term and cost-effective way to encourage peace and stability.

The UN Department of Political Affairs has been expanding its presence in the field, in the form of regionally-focused political offices. UN political missions are operating in obvious hotspots such as Afghanistan, Iraq and the Middle East, but also in areas that are not in the headlines but where the potential for conflict remains constant, such as West Africa, Central Asia and soon Central Africa. The UN’s 12 political missions range from small mediation teams to large and multi-faceted field operations—all deployed with the belief that lasting political solutions are the ultimate necessity for peace.
The number of United Nations peacekeepers has increased dramatically over the past decade and now more than 120,000 military, police and civilians serve worldwide under the UN flag. Do you think that the surge in UN peacekeeping has peaked and that we have entered a phase of consolidation?

Le Roy: Yes, I believe peacekeeping has entered a phase of consolidation after nearly a decade of expansion. The peak was in May 2010 when we reached 126,000 peacekeepers.

Since then we have seen a slight decrease, mainly due to the closure of MINURCAT at the end of 2010. We may see a further drawdown in 2012 in Timor-Leste and Liberia. Although I don’t anticipate any new operations in the months ahead, we have just increased the strength of our mission in Côte d’Ivoire and our presence in Sudan will need to be reviewed in light of the referendum. However, any reduction in terms of num-
ibers by no means indicates that the challenges we are facing are diminishing. At the same time, we are focusing more attention on the specific requirements and challenges related to the successful conduct and transitioning of peacekeeping operations.

Several United Nations peacekeeping missions now have mandates to ensure the protection of civilians. Nevertheless, civilians continue to be preyed upon in countries such as the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), with a number of international media and watchdog organizations blaming the United Nations. Are there limits to what the UN can be expected to achieve in this area? What more can the United Nations system, including the “blue helmets,” do?

Le Roy: We currently have protection of civilians mandates in seven of our operations. Nonetheless, everywhere we are deployed, the expectation to protect civilians is there, even when we don’t have it in the mandate. It is our most important and perhaps most visible task. Yet, it is also the most difficult task to achieve. Protecting civilians in a country like the Democratic Republic of the Congo with 60 million people, or in Darfur, where there are two and a half million internally displaced persons, or in Côte d’Ivoire where millions of people are at risk these days is, of course, an extremely difficult challenge. The police in the US or European countries who have to protect their people are also not able to protect everyone from everything. We are asked to protect millions of people at risk, often in very large areas with harsh terrain. Sometimes we are unable to do it — we cannot protect everyone from everything. But we know the expectations are very high, especially on our peacekeepers. We do our utmost to meet these expectations and every day we protect, and in some cases save the lives of, thousands if not millions of people at risk. We have developed strategies and tools in the Sudan, the Congo, Haiti and elsewhere to protect civilians, but it remains an ongoing and difficult task.

The rape of civilians as a tactic of war hit the headlines once again in 2010, this time in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. What more can United Nations peacekeeping do to fight this scourge? How are DPKO and the recently created post of the Special Representative on Sexual Violence in Conflict cooperating in response to this problem?

Le Roy: It is a horrendous fact that rape is still used as a tactic of war. We see that in particular in the DRC. Again, we do our utmost to try to fight this, by increasing patrols, giving satellite and cell phones to the local communities, and deploying what we call “community liaison officers.” And we try to have as many female police officers as possible to interact with the local population and undertake preventive actions. We interact closely with the newly appointed Special Representative on Sexual Violence in Conflict, Margot Wallström. We have very good relations with her and her staff and we are together trying to develop the best answers to this terrible problem.

This year marked the tenth anniversary of Security Council resolution 1325 on women, peace and security — a landmark text which recognized the role of women not just as victims of conflict but also as peacemakers. DPKO has worked hard with Member States to increase the number of women serving in the military and police components of United Nations peacekeeping operations. Are you satisfied with the progress made so far?

Le Roy: We still do not have enough women in leadership positions, or enough women involved in peace negotiations as “peace-makers,” but we have made clear progress. For example, three of our 15 peacekeeping operations are now under the leadership of a woman — Ellen Margrethe Løj in Liberia, Ameera Haq in Timor-Leste and Lisa Buttenheim in Cyprus. Several of our deputy heads of mission are also women. In addition, we have made progress in terms of the number of women in UN Police — almost nine per cent worldwide. We plan to reach the level of 20 per cent women police by 2014. I am confident that we will get there.

DPKO launched the “New Horizon” initiative last year to help the UN Secretariat and Member States shape a common agenda and to strengthen the peacekeeping partnership. How would you assess the progress made in this area?

Le Roy: I decided to launch the New Horizon initiative immediately after my arrival as the head of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations in August 2008. The “Holy Book” of peacekeeping operations was, and still is, the Brahimi Report. However, the Brahimi Report was written in the year 2000 when
only 20,000 peacekeepers were deployed worldwide. New questions and new challenges have arisen in the last 10 years. The main reason for the New Horizon report, which we issued in July 2009, was to shape a vision of what peacekeeping is today and in the coming years and to reach a consensus among all stakeholders – the Security Council, TCCs, PCCs, financial contributors and other partners. I think we have achieved quite a lot and we are progressing on many issues. We have a better common understanding of issues like the protection of civilians, for example. On the question of “robust peacekeeping” there is still debate, but I think positions are converging. We have also made progress on planning and oversight. The first progress report was issued in October 2010 and others will follow.

European countries have for several years deployed thousands of well-equipped and well-trained troops to serve with the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). However, the number of European troops serving elsewhere for the UN, especially in Africa, is relatively small. Do you sense any movement in Europe to boost and diversify its deployments in the future?

Le Roy: It is encouraging that European countries are present in UNIFIL in Lebanon as troop contributors, and they are doing a great job. UNIFIL is a robust and capable force. I wish we could have more troops from European and other developed countries in UN peacekeeping, especially in Africa. We fully
understand and appreciate that these countries have heavy commitments in Afghanistan, Kosovo and elsewhere. But we think that it is important – also as a political signal – that they participate in greater numbers in UN peacekeeping, especially in Africa.

Helicopters, especially tactical helicopters, are an operational requirement for UN peacekeeping missions, especially in areas where conflicts continue to fester such as the DRC and Sudan. Despite the clear need, few Member States are willing to contribute such assets to the UN. How does the United Nations cope with this shortfall and what is DPKO doing to try to overcome this challenge?

Le Roy: That’s an enormous challenge. It is clear that when we have a mandate to protect civilians over huge territories where there is no real infrastructure such as eastern DRC or Darfur, the mobility and agility of the force and the mission as a whole is a key factor. So helicopters, and in particular tactical helicopters, are key. We have been asking for 18 utility military transport helicopters for Darfur for more than two years and have not yet received a single one of them. We have received some support from Member States – for example we received five tactical helicopters from Ethiopia for Darfur, and Russia also recently transferred military utility helicopters from our mission in Chad to South Sudan. We also have tactical helicopters from Ukraine in Liberia. But we need many more. We had significant numbers of helicopters from India, but New Delhi has decided that they are needed at home. We are not in an easy position at this stage. We must widen the pool of countries that are able to provide us these assets and we are trying to do this by all means. The Secretary-General himself has raised the issue with many heads of state and I am raising it at my level. Some countries are helping us, but this remains one of our bottlenecks.

Presidential elections were finally held in Côte d’Ivoire after several years of delay. Did you anticipate that the election results would be ignored by one of the candidates?

Le Roy: It is always a risk that someone will not accept the results. At the same time, in Côte d’Ivoire, the commitment from all parties to have an election was clear and the outcome was unambiguous – 54 to 46 per cent. This has been acknowledged by almost all observers, by the Independent Electoral Commission and certified by the Head of Mission YJ Choi.

It is very important that the UN Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI) continues to play its impartial role. The certification mandate was given by the Security Council at the request of President Gbagbo, President Ouattara, President Bédié and Mr. Soro in 2005 in the Pretoria Agreement. It was a direct request, and the UN has played its role impartially. We checked the figures. And the figures are extremely clear. We will implement our mandate which has been renewed unambiguously by the Security Council to support and to assist the Ivorian people - whatever their ethnic and political affiliations - and to try to reduce the number of civilians being attacked.

A shooting incident between the Lebanese Armed Forces and the Israeli Defense Force in early August resulted in the deaths of several Lebanese and Israelis. Do you think that the presence and actions of UNIFIL helped prevent this incident from escalating into a more serious conflict? More generally, how has UNIFIL helped maintain calm in the region?

Le Roy: Yes, I consider that our presence in Lebanon has had a very positive effect. First, because of our presence, reinforced in 2006, the Lebanese Armed Forces have been well established south of the Litani River for the first time in decades. That is a big achievement. Second, the number of incidents along the Blue Line between Israel and Lebanon has been reduced dramatically. With the sad exception of the August incident, no one has been killed along the Blue Line since 2006. That is a great achievement due in no small part to the presence of UNIFIL. As regards the August incident, our presence helped prevent the incident from escalating.

2010 was a tremendously difficult year for Haiti, which had to cope first with a devastating earthquake and then a cholera epidemic. The people of Haiti and the peacekeepers appeared to draw closer together in the aftermath of the earthquake, but suspicions over the cause of the cholera epidemic seemed to erode this relationship – several anti-UN
demonstrations were held. How can the UN ensure that the relations between the mission and the people they are there to help grow strong once again?

Le Roy: Before the earthquake and in its immediate aftermath, the relationship between our mission and the Haitian people was very good. In fact, the five years before the earthquake were some of the best years Haiti had experienced in decades in terms of economic growth and stability. This was a great achievement for the mission. After the earthquake, everyone acknowledged how the mission helped bring assistance to the people.

Unfortunately, the earthquake was followed by the outbreak of the cholera epidemic and accusations that UN peacekeepers had brought it to the country. We have made it very clear, since the first day, that we want to be transparent. We conducted many tests of the soldiers against whom the accusations were directed – all the tests came out negative. In addition, the Secretary-General appointed an independent panel of some of the best experts in the world to assess the source of the outbreak of the epidemic in Haiti. This panel has started its work and the results will be transparent. More and more reports show that the outbreak may have come from a completely different source.

The mandate of the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT) concluded in 2010. In
hindsight, how successful was MINURCAT in fulfilling its mandate to contribute to the protection of civilians, promote the rule of law, and promote regional peace?

**Le Roy:** Many people, including the local authorities, praised the work that MINURCAT did in eastern Chad to ensure safety and security for the refugees and the internally displaced persons, promote rule of law and train the Chadian police – Détachement de Sécurité Intégré. Unfortunately, the mission had to close for political reasons, but the mission has left its mark in Chad and we can be proud of what it did to protect the people in eastern Chad.

**Looking ahead, what do you expect to be the main challenges and opportunities facing UN peacekeeping in 2011? What keeps you up at night and what gives you cause for hope?**

**Le Roy:** We still face huge challenges. We have 15 operations and many of them face extremely difficult challenges. You mentioned Lebanon – as you know the political situation in Lebanon is difficult, especially due to reactions to the Special Tribunal. You mentioned the Democratic Republic of the Congo – to protect so many civilians where so many groups are attacking them in the most brutal way. That will remain a huge challenge for the coming years. Let me mention three other situations where we are being tested to the limit: Haiti, Côte d’Ivoire and the Sudan. In Haiti, we are facing a political crisis, and we have to ensure security in the absence of political stability. The cholera epidemic has also tested us. We will remain completely transparent on this issue. Second, we are being tested in Côte d’Ivoire. Our mission took a firm and principled stance. President Gbagbo requested the departure of our forces and the people loyal to him are instigating the population – notably through the national radio – to act against UNOCI personnel. Our peacekeepers are very much tested to the limit and they are taking big risks. That is very worrying. The third place where we are being tested is in the Sudan. In Darfur, it is very clear that UNAMID has to be robust every day because there are attacks against civilians on a regular basis. In southern Sudan, the referendum was held peacefully. The UN mission played a tremendous role in achieving this.

Three or six months ago, very few people could imagine having a peaceful referendum and an outcome accepted by everyone – by Khartoum and by Juba. That is very much to the credit of the mission and especially, I would say, to one man, the Head of Mission, Haile Menkerios. He has played a discreet but essential role. There are still many things to be sorted out – post-referendum issues and state-building in southern Sudan. The assistance of the Department of Field Support made it possible for the referendum to take place all over the country, which covers a huge terrain. I think we passed the test in the Sudan.

In general, 2010 put us to the test as almost never before – in Haiti, Côte d’Ivoire, the DRC, Darfur, southern Sudan, Lebanon and elsewhere. Sometimes, peacekeepers got blamed when things did not go well. But I must say that I found the overall performance of peacekeepers in 2010 encouraging: we contributed to maintaining peace and protecting civilians in all these cases, averting deeper crises with potentially disastrous consequences for the civilian populations. Sometimes, we could have done better, and we remain committed to improving our performance. However, everyone recognizes that – in all these challenging cases - the situation would have been much worse had peacekeepers not been there. I am proud of and grateful to all the men and women serving in peacekeeping, as well as to Member States for their unfailing support during these trying times.
THE GLOBAL FIELD SUPPORT STRATEGY “WILL MAKE US MORE AGILE, MORE EFFECTIVE AND MORE EFFICIENT”

INTERVIEW WITH SUSANA MALCORRA, THE UNDER-SECRETARY-GENERAL FOR FIELD SUPPORT

How will the Global Field Support Strategy bring about improvements to the functioning of UN peacekeeping missions and bring down costs?

Malcorra: The Global Field Support Strategy (GFSS) is trying to build on the lessons learned from the most recent large deployments we’ve had in places such as Darfur and Chad. We are trying to come up with an approach that will help us be more agile and react faster and more efficiently to the new demands on the ground. This will help us deploy and redeploy faster, as we are doing in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, where we are establishing small mobile bases in hot-spots in the country.

The notion of the GFSS is attached to the idea of serving our missions better. It is based on four pillars.

One pillar is related to the “modularization” approach. This essentially has to do with creating a toolkit that will allow us to establish camps and, again, deploy and re-deploy faster and better, as well as in a more environmentally friendly manner. But, also, hopefully in a manner that will help us bring down the overall cost of deployment.
The second pillar on which we are working is shared resources. Missions have historically been established and built individually, with the full range of resources. It became increasingly obvious as we approached an $8 billion operational budget that there are opportunities to share resources between missions. So, we have two concepts that are very important to me: one is the concept of the regional service centre, which will serve the missions in a given region with what we call back-office functions – personnel, payroll, accounting – functions that are needed in the missions but are not necessarily required within mission theatre. This will give us the opportunity to lower our presence in the mission area, have a lighter footprint, something which the Brahimi report emphasized more than 10 years ago. It will mean less investment in serving ourselves, because we will have less people on the ground in the missions’ theatre of operations. At the same time, it will give us the opportunity to have more of our staff established in family duty stations, which will help us rotate our staff in different settings and will provide better career development opportunities.

The third pillar is financial strengthening. This is very much in line with the modularization approach. It will allow us to have a better use of resources and a better budget cycle when we establish a mission. We will be going back to Member States about the strategic framework model in this coming General Assembly session.

The fourth pillar is human resources, part of which has just been approved by the General Assembly. It is a critical change to the way that we support our staff in the field.

I believe that the GFSS will make a big difference. It will make us more agile, more effective and more efficient. And it will enhance the quality of the staff that we deploy in the field.

What role will the proposed regional hubs play in this process and how many are foreseen?
Malcorra: We have for the time being one regional service centre in Entebbe, Uganda. We chose Entebbe because nearly 50 per cent of operations are located around the area. The Entebbe centre supports the peacekeeping mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the two missions in the Sudan, as well as the UN Support Office for AMISOM (UNSOA) and some of the special political missions in the region. We foresee that service centre being utilized for back office functions. Again, we are speaking about transnational functions - such as accounting, payroll, personnel and administrative functions - that need to be performed for a mission, but don’t need to be performed within the mission area. We are going to do that with resources shared among the missions in the region, which will enable us to generate economies of scale. We do not have plans yet for a second or a third centre. That will come as we move. We first want to try this in Entebbe and we will see what comes after.

Are Member States fully backing the global strategy including the regional hubs?

Malcorra: The strategy was endorsed by Member States. They asked us to come back on the financial framework issue. In fact, we did say that we wanted their initial endorsement and that we would come back with a detailed model. We are building that model as we speak. In the meantime, the General Assembly gave us much more latitude with resources on how we manage the strategic deployment stocks and the peacekeeping reserve fund. This was a show of trust by the Member States. They also asked us to establish the global service centre in Brindisi to serve all field missions. We are now coming back with a more developed concept in this next round of discussions.

The UN has been trying very hard to stamp out sexual exploitation and abuse and other misconduct by its peacekeepers in recent years. What progress has been made in this regard and do you have any new plans under consideration?
Malcorra: First of all, this is a matter of very, very serious concern for us. You never make enough progress until you can say that you have zero cases. As the Secretary-General always states, we have a zero tolerance policy. We are not there yet, but I think we have made progress. We now show quarterly statistics on the web on how we are tracking the different type of allegations; and, we can track those figures. That in itself is progress, because it demonstrates transparency.

We have also started to receive more feedback from Member States’ diplomatic missions in New York regarding what steps they have taken back in their home countries regarding the allegations. So, we have started to see that the loop is starting to close. I think this is a cultural change that takes a lot of time and investment. We are starting to see the payback on that investment.

Are we satisfied? We are not. We are working hard to keep this issue at the top of our priorities, and at the top of the troop and police contributing countries’ priorities. We will continue to work closely with them.

The concept of “greening” the blue-helmets has been talked about a lot in recent years – from relying more on renewable and sustainable energy to having a smaller environmental footprint and improving waste management and sanitation systems. As “greening” has both environmental and safety imperatives, what new proposals are in the pipeline?

Malcorra: The answer to this question goes hand-in-hand with the Global Field Support Strategy. Modularization will look at the size of the camp that needs to be built and at having each one of those parts being designed having a very “green” approach in mind. This will help us have a much better impact on the ground. Sometimes when I look at what we leave behind it isn’t so pretty. We need to work on that. It will also help us be less dependent on fuel for example, which is always a very weak link for our missions. The heavy dependency on fuel means that the safety and security of our own missions, as well as our ability to deliver on the mandates can be sometimes at risk. So we are working on that. Anything we can do – renewable energy, solar panels, treatment of water and waste – is included in our modularization approach.

Some UN peacekeeping missions are having problems filling staff vacancies in crucial posts in a timely manner. What steps are being taken to make progress on the recruitment front?

Malcorra: First of all, the system has been overhauled starting in mid-2009, when the General Assembly took the decision that our mission staff once and for all will not be second-class citizens, but will be part of the global Secretariat. As part of this initiative, we had to change the process. As people are aware, we now have field central review boards (FCRBs) that review the selection of our staff. This created a bottleneck at the beginning and it has really been a difficult process to go through. But, I can say that, by now, almost 3,000 people have already been cleared by the FCRBs. This means that people who have been certified as part of the global Secretariat can move from mission to mission, or from a mission to the Headquarters in New York, Geneva or wherever. So the overhaul has been, in my view, very important for staff. I also have news to say that the overall vacancy rate has been reduced. We have improved by several per centage points – around five per cent. That is still far from what we want, or what is ideal. We hope that some of the recent developments with the General Assembly, in which the package for our staff has been enhanced and harmonized with the rest of the system, will help us make it more attractive for people to work in the field.

What more can be done to improve the welfare and living conditions of UN personnel serving in often dangerous and difficult environments far away from their homes and families?

Malcorra: First of all, safety and security of staff is of paramount importance for us, and we put high priority on any matter related to safety and security. Again, part of the design of the new camps brings this into consideration, to make them much more self-contained and much more secure. We are also taking into consideration things like gender in our designs. One thing I always take into consideration is ablutions and bathrooms when I visit camps. I realized that most of the time they have been designed with a solid engineering approach, but not necessarily taking into account the user’s perspective. It is not very appealing for a woman to have to walk 250 meters in the middle of the night to get to the bathroom. We are now taking these things into closer consideration – gender, green, safety and security – to help make...
places, which in themselves are very difficult, a little bit more attractive. We can add to that all the proposals that have been considered and approved by the General Assembly, like the harmonization of family duty stations, harmonization of conditions of service and the payment of rest and recuperation travel. All of these things should help add a financial incentive for people to move into places that are difficult, but that, on the other hand, are very attractive because those are the places where you can really make an important difference.

Although DFS is part of the “UN peacekeeping family” it also provides support to the organization’s political missions. How is that role different?

Malcorra: In certain ways it is different, and in other ways it is pretty much the same. It is different because the number of staff you require in those missions most of the time is much lower in numbers, but you need very precise profiles. I always say that the peacekeeping missions are sort of a “wholesale” operation, and the special political missions are sort of a “boutique” operation. One needs to make sure that processes that have been thought of to serve large operations are adapted to these very specific needs. If you miss the profile in one post in a special political mission, you have probably missed the boat. You don’t have another post to fill with that profile. There are needs that are unique. But in my view, the Department of Field Support needs to have a “customer service” orientation. We need to react to the needs of our customers and do what they require, and address what is common to both.

For the first time DFS has been asked to provide logistical support for a non-UN peacekeeping mission – the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). How has this relationship worked?

Malcorra: The Security Council established the United Nations Support Office for AMISOM (UNSOA) to deliver a logistics capacity support package to AMISOM. As such, UNSOA is a mission that only has a support component. It is the equivalent to the support component within a UN peacekeeping mission, but this one serves the military and political components of an AU mission, while the mission reports directly to me. The director of support, who normally reports to the Head of Mission, reports to me while he serves the African Union mission.

This is another example of us being a service organization. Yes, we have a different customer – in this case the African Union. Of course, this has been quite a challenge for many reasons. First, because we are serving a non-UN organization; second, because we are serving this non-UN organization in a very harsh environment like Mogadishu. In UNSOA, we are putting together different tools using local contractors as much as possible to help us set up the quality controls for our services and to help us enhance the ability of AMISOM to deliver on its mandate. I think it has been a very interesting exercise. I hear from our colleagues in the African Union that they are satisfied overall. And I think it is proof of the United Nations adapting to different needs at different moments and being ready to be creative while keeping to the principles of our rules and regulations and managing our resources properly.

Looking ahead, what new initiatives are likely going to come to the fore in 2011?

Malcorra: First of all, this is a year to cement initiatives – you can’t always be thinking about new initiatives. The Global Field Support Strategy was approved by the Member States only six months ago. I know everyone assumes it is already done and finished, but it has only just started. It is a five-year project and we are only six months into it. We still have to go back to Member States to finalize the Global Service Centre and the financial framework. And we need to prove that what has already been approved has started to actually deliver results. So, it is a time to pause, to work, to be focused on delivering results: that would be my theme now. We need to be very, very attuned to the changing demands coming from the ground. We have crisis after crisis after crisis. While we foresee new challenges coming, such as the developments in the Sudan as well as the challenges from the upcoming elections in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, these will again pose many big demands on logistics, on personnel, on technology, and on communications. We will also have to discuss a lot with Member States about financial resources. So, it is a time to pause, to work, to deliver on results and to be very mindful of how we manage Member States’ resources to prove to them that they have the right return on their investment.
UN INCREASING USE OF PREVENTIVE DIPLOMACY

INTERVIEW WITH B. LYNN PASCOE, THE UNDER-SECRETARY-GENERAL FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS

Since March 2007, B. Lynn Pascoe has headed the Department of Political Affairs, which currently oversees 11 field-based political missions and peacebuilding offices in Africa, Asia and the Middle East. These operations are delivering on a broad range of activities and mandates, from conflict prevention to mediation and peacebuilding. They are part of a continuum of UN peace operations working in different stages of the conflict cycle. In the interview below, B. Lynn Pascoe reflects on the role of preventive diplomacy in resolving disputes, the operational challenges of overseeing UN political missions, and the ongoing strengthening of his Department.

In the context of the global economic downturn and strains on UN peacekeeping, the international community is showing renewed interest in the use of preventive diplomacy as a cost-effective option for responding to brewing political crises. Do you foresee an increase in demand for mediation efforts and special political missions? How is this being approached within the Security Council and in the field?

Pascoe: When Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon took office, which was before the global financial crisis, he made it clear that UN peacekeeping had been stretched to the limit in terms of financial and personnel resources. He also noted that most conflicts around the world are in essence political and therefore the UN needed to engage more in diplomatic efforts to solve political problems before they escalate into violent conflict. The Secretary-General did not believe in the idea of sharp lines between the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), the Department of Political Affairs, and the peacekeeping operations. He believed that preventive diplomacy was a crucial part of the UN’s mission to prevent conflicts before they escalate into violent conflict.

B. Lynn Pascoe, the Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs, visits African Union mission headquarters in Mogadishu, Somalia. 1 September 2010. (UN Photo)
United Nations Peace Operations

Ben Lyke Pascoe, the Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs, visits returning war refugees in Sri Lanka. 16 June 2010. (UN Photo)

Affairs (DPA) and other parts of the United Nations system. He felt on the contrary that to be more effective on the ground we needed to enhance cooperation. One of the first steps taken was to transform DPA into a more field-oriented department. This has proven to be the correct approach. It is important for the UN to continue to sharpen the tool of conflict prevention in order to avoid having so many conflicts reach the point at which peacekeeping is required. We have advanced considerably in strengthening our peacemaking capacities, including our ability to dispatch special envoys and mediators quickly when political crises erupt.

There is a widely shared view among Member States that preventive diplomacy is critical in stemming conflict in Africa. Can you outline the efforts that have been made to enhance cooperation with regional and sub-regional organizations in this area?

Pascoe: The call for more of an emphasis on preventive diplomacy comes from many regions. In January 2010, the Secretary-General convened a meeting with 14 different regional and sub-regional organizations to identify our respective strengths and weaknesses and look at ways of reinforcing our mutual cooperation. There is no place where this has proven more critical in resolving disputes than in Africa. In Guinea, the United Nations Office for West Africa (UNOWA), which is based in Dakar, has been working very closely with the Economic Commission of West African States (ECOWAS) and the African Union (AU) throughout the crisis that followed the death of longtime President Lansana Conte. We have helped Guinea move from a very critical period to long-delayed democratic elections, run-off elections and the inauguration of the new President at the end of December 2010. This is a great triumph for the combined efforts of the regional organization, the United Nations and countries that support Guinea. At a regional level, UNOWA is also supporting regional initiatives to reduce the threats posed by drug trafficking and organized crime and to build government capacities. We are planning to inaugurate in January 2011 a similar regional political office for Central Africa, based in Libreville, Gabon.

Another area where DPA has been deeply involved is Somalia. In 2010, DPA supported efforts to establish a broader-based Government and to develop a comprehensive strategy to break the cycle of violence. We have had some success in the sense that a much stronger field operation is now in place, the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). Through the UN Support Office to AMISOM (UNSOA), the Department of Field Support has been providing logistics support to the mission, which resulted in significant improvement in the
living and working conditions of its personnel. Furthermore, the African Union’s request to add 4,000 additional troops to AMISOM was authorized by the Security Council in December. Major efforts have also been made to combat piracy off the coast of Somalia and to strengthen regional judicial systems to prosecute suspects. A new United Nations Trust Fund, overseen by a 10-nation board that I chair, was established in April 2010 to support projects to help Somalia counter maritime piracy.

In Burundi, Sierra Leone, Guinea Bissau and the Central African Republic, the UN’s integrated peacebuilding offices have continued to collaborate with the Peacebuilding Commission, as well as with UN agencies, funds and programmes toward building sustainable peace in societies shattered by civil wars.

Where else have DPA’s activities been felt most significantly in 2010?

Pascoe: In Nepal, UNMIN - whose mandate is set to come to an end in January 2011 - has been working with the key political leaders to encourage an action plan for the integration and rehabilitation of former Maoist combatants. The mission was successful in assisting Nepalese authorities in organizing historic elections for a Constituent Assembly and in helping maintain the peace by monitoring the management of arms and armed personnel.

In Lebanon, the UN Special Coordinator has been cooperating closely with UNIFIL and the governments of the region to try to make progress in critical areas in a volatile environment.

In Jerusalem, the Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process (UNSCO) has been working with the parties to the peace process on a wide range of issues related to the humanitarian situation and the development challenges facing the Occupied Palestinian Territories.

DPA also continues to support a major field mission in Iraq, UNAMI, which has been assisting the authorities in the holding of parliamentary elections and in building political cohesion.

In Latin America, the International Commission Against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG), an innovative independent body established with DPA’s support, has continued to investigate illegal security groups and to help Guatemalan authorities in prosecuting criminal organizations and fighting impunity.

Over the past year, the UN Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy in Central Asia, based in Turkmenistan, has been particularly active in responding to the crisis in Kyrgyzstan. In close cooperation with the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), among others, the Secretary-General’s Special Representative has played a valuable role in keeping the transition process on track.

In countries around the world where there are no UN field missions, DPA may be engaged in preventive diplomacy or in offering political backstopping to UN Resident and Humanitarian Coordinators in fulfilling their mandates.

Finally, another important function of DPA is to provide electoral assistance through its Electoral Assistance Division. Elections can contribute to political stability. However, they can sometimes be the spark that sets off significant problems, as has been the case in Côte d’Ivoire. Our role is to help ensure that electoral processes are handled correctly on the technical side, as well as on the political side.

During the Security Council Summit held in September 2010, the Secretary-General called for a more flexible UN architecture of response to conflicts. In particular, he stressed the need to move beyond the idea of a linear sequence of peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding and to use these instruments in a more integrated fashion. Will this require a fundamental reform of current UN structures?

Pascoe: There has already been great progress among the various UN departments and agencies in making their cooperation more effective and averting turf fighting and bureaucratic competition. But it remains a tricky proposition to bring all of the UN’s assets together to address political, development and humanitarian issues in a way that can put a country on the path not only of democratic progress, but also of economic development for its people.

We are constantly working with DPKO, the Peacebuilding Commission, UNDP, as well as other UN agencies on finding the right combination to develop an effective peacebuilding strategy. Studies have shown that political issues such as poor governance are a root cause of most conflicts. Most of the countries that rank at the bottom of the UNDP Human Development Index have experienced violent conflicts that
have contributed to their impoverishment.

We are also trying to ensure that we work closely with international financial institutions as well as donors around the world. Time and again, we’ve seen how efforts to resolve conflicts will fail if the main outside actors – international and regional organizations and Member States – work in different directions.

**What have been the main operational and political challenges of the ongoing strengthening process of DPA and how do you see the way forward?**

Pascoe: The first problem I faced was that the department was having trouble in performing simultaneously its key functions of servicing both the Secretariat and the field. There was some questioning as to whether our main focus should be our work here at Headquarters.

One of my first initiatives was to emphasize the importance of being active in the field. The second problem was serious understaffing. The shortage of personnel was so critical that when one or two people were sent out on mission from a regional desk, there was virtually nobody left at Headquarters to cover the country. We have begun to reverse this chronic problem. In 2008, the General Assembly approved 50 additional posts. This has been invaluable as we recruited a diverse group of junior professionals and top-notch senior political officers to strengthen the department’s regional divisions.

Much emphasis is also being made on staff training to develop their mediation skills and ensure that DPA has the best repository of information and resources on mediation. UN peacemaking capacities have been also greatly enhanced with the establishment of a Mediation Support Unit. Preventive diplomacy is one of the oldest jobs of the United Nations, but one that had fallen somewhat into disrepair. Today, we are working to make sure that the UN is capable of responding quickly to conflicts and making a difference on the ground.
GLOBAL FIELD SUPPORT STRATEGY GOES INTO EFFECT

“The line between disorder and order lies in logistics…” - Sun Tzu

“My logisticians are a humorless lot ... they know if my campaign fails, they are the first ones I will slay.” - Alexander the Great

The responsibility for providing logistical and administrative support to the more than 120,000 United Nations personnel currently serving in peace operations around the world is borne by the men and women of the Department of Field Support, or DFS, created in 2007 in response to a surge in demand for blue helmets.

The scale of the Department’s task is impressive by any measure: the United Nations is now the second largest strategic mover of troops after the U.S. military and does it at a fraction of the cost.

With an annual budget of close to $8 billion, the Department recruits and manages more than 6,000 international civilian staff; deploys and maintains over 4,000 vehicles in field operations; and is responsible for managing a fleet of more than 250 fixed and rotary-wing aircraft used to transport personnel and equipment to and from some of the most inhospitable and dangerous places on earth.

On any one day, the Department will be involved in choreographing the rotation of troops and delivering vital equipment and supplies for military contingents around the world, such as the rations for all uniformed peacekeeping personnel, including those under the command of the African Union in Somalia.

On the civilian side, the tools that the human rights officer relies on daily to conduct her work, the vehicle in which she will reach victims of abuse and the computer she will use to write her report, will have been supplied and kept operational by the Department.

Similarly, in some of the larger peacekeeping missions, the Department equips and maintains extensive radio broadcasting networks that are the most effective way of getting vital public information to isolated communities, for example, Radio Miraya’s voter information programming in advance of the referendum on Southern Sudan, or information campaigns broadcast on Radio Okapi in the Democratic Republic of the Congo on issues such as the disarmament, demobilization and re-integration of former combatants.

The challenges of providing support on this scale and in such varied and challenging environments led the Department in 2010 to develop and launch its Global Field Support Strategy – a five-year project to transform the delivery of support services to United Nations field missions by making them more innovative, flexible and accountable. The main elements of the strategy were approved by the General Assembly in June 2010.

The strategy is designed to improve the effectiveness of support, especially in ensuring a more rapid deployment of operations through access to increased funding for mission start-up and expansion, as well as by using the concept of “modularization” – predefined elements of logistical support that can be rapidly deployed to the field.

The strategy will also maximize efficiencies. For instance, by concentrating certain administrative functions in “service centres”, it will promote economies of scale, in particular in areas with the highest cost, such as air transport. This approach includes the re-profiling of the United Nations logistics base in Brindisi, Italy, as the global service centre, and using the existing support base in Entebbe, Uganda, as a shared regional service centre for missions in the region.

And, in line with the General Assembly resolution approving the strategy, any savings will not adversely affect the operational needs of missions, including crucially, the safety and security of personnel. In fact, the strategy will bring increased benefits to
mission personnel by providing more predictable and secure accommodation and greater strategic workforce planning.

The strategy makes particular sense, bearing in mind that logistical and administrative support to peacekeeping operations – including in the areas of finance, budget, logistics and personnel – is not just a technical matter of supplying goods and services. As UN missions operate in increasingly difficult environments, support has also become what planners call ‘a strategic enabler’ for implementing mandates. For example, since its creation in 2007, the Department of Field Support has:

- helped the African Union support its forces in Somalia by creating a sustainable supply route for essential resources from Mombasa on the Kenyan coast to Mogadishu;
- worked with the Government of Sudan to secure the safe and steady passage of personnel and physical resources to facilitate the full deployment of UNAMID;
- worked with the missions in Iraq (UNAMI) and Afghanistan (UNAMA) to develop long-term solutions to their operational challenges and security threats.

The Global Field Support Strategy is already dramatically transforming the way United Nations peace operations are launched and sustained, making the process more efficient, while ensuring that the endeavour has a lighter overall footprint through the consolidation and streamlining of existing assets and processes. As a result, the United Nations is able to more rapidly and effectively serve communities emerging from conflict, giving the prospects of long-term peace a boost.
WHO ARE THE UN PEACEKEEPERS?

More than 120,000 military, police and civilian personnel serve in UN peace operations providing essential security and support to millions of people on four continents.

All personnel serving on UN peace operations join their respective missions through a variety of means. Military troops, which make up the bulk of peace operations, and Formed Police Units are deployed by governments who have answered the call of the Security Council to keep peace in a country on the Council’s agenda. Military observers and liaison officers, as well as police and corrections officers are seconded on an individual basis by national authorities.

All UN Member States are invited to contribute troops. However in recent years, the majority of UN “blue helmets” come from South Asia and Africa. In 2010, the top five troop contributing countries were Bangladesh, Pakistan, India, Nigeria and Egypt.

The Department of Peacekeeping Operations works to field and maintain more than 100,000 military peacekeepers and their equipment in missions around the world, all of whom serve the cause of peace every day of every year.

Identifying, pledging and deploying military individuals, formed units and hardware (ranging from armoured personnel carriers to helicopters and ships) is a complex business. The peacekeeper must, above all, retain the UN’s impartiality and uphold its core values.

Peacekeepers deploy by sea, land and air – either through commercial arrangements or by the contributing Member State’s military, and both must be coordinated by the UN.

The initial deployment of military capability to a mission area is just the start, because each peacekeeping force must be maintained and often adapted over time to suit prevailing conditions within the mission area. Peacekeepers in formed units usually serve from six to 12 months at a time, but individuals may continue to serve in the mission area for a number of years.

Enabling the continuous rotation of fresh troops can be a demanding business. The UN must also maintain the detailed records of service on peacekeeping missions, which covers the award of medals and other forms of recognition, as well as less welcome occurrences such as death or injury of troops in the line of duty.

UN peace operations also field some 14,700 police officers. These UN police are seconded or loaned by their governments for six -18 month periods as experts on mission. Their salaries are paid by their national police service and they are given a subsistence allowance from the United Nations. (Without a national police force, the US government outsources the internal recruitment and nomination process to private contractors.) Formed Police Units are dedicated contingents of some 140 officers contributed to a UN mission by a national police service, usually six to 12 months, receiving salary and allowance from their government.

Interested police can find the requirements and obligations for service on the UN Police Website (http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/sites/police/index.shtml) and should contact their national authorities to learn how they could be sent to a mission.

The United Nations employs over 6,000 internationally-recruited civilian staff to work in peace operations in a wide variety of occupations such human rights, political or civil affairs, public information, security, engineering, management and logistics support. Civilian staff of peace operations are recruited individually and competitively by the mission. (UN Volunteers, who make a substantial contribution to peace operations, apply and are selected and deployed through the UNV office located in Bonn, Germany.)

In 2010, both the Department of Field Support and the UN Secretariat put into place the sweeping human resources reforms approved by the UN General Assembly in 2009 [http://www.unrol.org/files/A-RES-63-250.pdf], integrating the field and Headquarters into one global workforce. These changes simplified contractual arrangements of UN staff, aligned the pay and allowances of staff in the field with those of the UN Secretariat and standardized the recruitment process for both field and Headquarters.
New procedures for civilian staff mean that recruitment is increasingly decentralized with missions making selections from global rosters maintained by the Department of Field Support at Headquarters. Generic job openings for positions in peacekeeping operations are listed on the UN Careers Portal (www.careers.un.org). The UN is aiming to keep rosters fresh by periodically posting new job openings based on need as identified through workforce planning. Candidates apply electronically and once screened as meeting the academic and work experience requirements for the job, undergo written tests and then interviews by expert panels. Successful candidates are placed on pre-approved rosters, from which peacekeeping operations can select candidates for vacant positions without further additional administrative steps. Male candidates remain on the roster for two years, while female candidates remain three years.

National staff make up the largest portion of civilian staff, with 17,000 currently employed in UN peace operations. National staff are recruited locally within the host country and play an important role in supporting UN peace operations, thereby contributing to reconciliation, recovery and reconstruction efforts.

The United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) staff aid in the delivery of electoral material to the island of La Gonâve off the coast of Port-au-Prince, Haiti. 19 November 2010. (UN Photo/Logan Abassi)
FIVE YEARS OF REFORMS ADDRESSING MISCONDUCT BY UN PEACEKEEPING PERSONNEL

For the United Nations Departments of Peacekeeping Operations and Field Support (DPKO and DFS), 2010 marked the five-year anniversary of the establishment of effective mechanisms to address misconduct involving peacekeeping personnel and to continue to strive towards the goals of “zero tolerance and zero impunity.”

“We have built a foundation capability to the point where the UN can be proud of what it has accomplished,” DFS Assistant Secretary-General Anthony Banbury said. “Creating this foundation and this professionalism is quite an achievement.”

The Conduct and Discipline Unit (CDU) at Headquarters, and its Conduct and Discipline Teams (CDTs), currently deployed in 14 peacekeeping and special political missions, were created in November 2005 in response to serious allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse involving peacekeeping personnel. Up until that time, there was no single institutional means available to the UN to systematically and comprehensively address misconduct committed by all categories of peacekeeping personnel.

Following up on the recommendations of the “Prince Zeid” report—commissioned in 2005 as a “comprehensive strategy to eliminate future sexual exploitation and abuse in UN peacekeeping operations,” and thanks to the commitment of Member States, the UN has put into place significant measures, including the following:

- The General Assembly endorsed the UN comprehensive strategy to address sexual exploitation and abuse through prevention, enforcement and remedial action. This translated at the field level into specific preventative measures, pre-deployment and induction briefings on the UN Code of Conduct, including man-
datory training on sexual exploitation and abuse, and the establishment of complaint reception and tracking mechanisms to handle allegations of misconduct. Investigations are conducted into all reported allegations, thus allowing the disciplinary processes of the UN or Member States to proceed using more substantive information. DFS maintains a dedicated database to ensure that prior offenders are not re-hired.

- A revised model Memorandum of Understanding between troop contributing countries and the UN now includes specific provisions on misconduct and the prevention of sexual exploitation and abuse. It establishes the primary responsibility of national governments to conduct investigations and reaffirms their exclusive jurisdiction for taking subsequent disciplinary or other punitive actions.

- The General Assembly approved the Comprehensive Strategy on Assistance and Support to Victims of Sexual Exploitation and Abuse, which calls for medical treatment, counselling, social support, legal services and material care to complainants, victims and children born as a result of sexual exploitation and abuse.

- The General Assembly also adopted a resolution on the “criminal accountability of UN officials and experts on mission” to address the extension of national jurisdiction by Member States to cover criminal misconduct of UN officials or experts on mission.

- The establishment of the UN and NGO Task Force on Protection from Sexual Exploitation and Abuse contributed to enhanced partnerships between approximately 30 UN and non-UN entities working on the issue.

Serious allegations of misconduct are still being reported and remain a fundamental concern. But the UN and Member States are now equipped with the mechanisms to take action if and when such misconduct occurs.
October 2010 marked the 10th anniversary of the landmark Security Council resolution 1325 (2000) on women and peace and security, the first resolution specifically to address the impact of war on women. The resolution stressed women’s potential contributions to conflict resolution and prevention, with the objective of promoting women’s participation and leadership in peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding.

The commemoration provided an opportunity to reaffirm the commitment of Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon to the implementation of resolution 1325 and was formally marked by a Ministerial Open Debate of the Security Council on 26 October. In the weeks prior to the Open Debate, Member States, UN entities and civil society partners organized a series of events to assess progress and gaps in implementation of the resolution.

The anniversary offered an opportunity to highlight the synergies among the various efforts to advance the concerns of women in the peace and security fields. At the global level, planning for the commemoration inspired the launch of a UN system-wide effort to review progress, identify persistent gaps and work towards a strategy that will guide efforts to achieve implementation of the resolution over the next 10 years, in line with expectations of Member States. The anniversary also provided an opportunity for the UN to set out a set of global indicators to track progress.

The Department of Peacekeeping Operations has made significant investments over the past decade to operationalize Security Council resolution 1325, which has changed the business of peacekeeping. Yet, while there has been progress in some areas, gaps remain, and the overall assessment of the impact of 1325 thus far is modest. Positive steps include the adoption of gender-sensitive policies and

Staff members of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) march alongside Sudanese women for the annual campaign of “16 Days of Activism against Gender-Based Violence” in El Fasher, North Darfur, Sudan. 25 November 2010. (UN Photo/Albert Gonzalez Farran)
guidance, deployment of gender advisers and focal points in all DPKO missions, increased participation of women in electoral and constitutional processes in a number of countries, and contribution to the establishment of institutional mechanisms to support gender mainstreaming.

Sustaining support to local women’s participation in post-conflict processes has attained mixed results. Participation in peace negotiations remains low. Increasing the number of women peacekeepers remains a challenge.

As of late 2010, three of 17 chiefs of mission (Special Representatives of the Secretary-General) were women, while the numbers of female military personnel stood at three per cent and police, nine per cent. Conflict continued to target women: in 2010, reports of terrible mass rapes emanated from the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo where UN peacekeepers continue to try and suppress a brutal but enduring conflict.

To mark the 10th anniversary of 1325, DPKO, the Department of Political Affairs, UNDP and UN Women organized a series of Open Days for Women, Peace and Security in the field, followed by a Global Open Day event at Headquarters, during which women from 27 conflict-affected countries shared their concerns and priorities for peace with senior UN leadership.

In January 2011, DPKO will launch an impact study on implementation of resolution 1325 in peacekeeping, looking at women in peace negotiations, women in the political process, legal and judicial reform, protection of women in disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration and in security sector reform, and sexual and gender-based violence.

This study should inform future activities by DPKO. Otherwise, the Department plans to continue to emphasize the leadership role of governments and women in post-conflict countries to implement
resolution 1325, with the UN lending its support to enhance capacities of local institutions in post-conflict countries to do so. It will also reach out to other UN entities to support impact and sustainability of the resolution and undertake the systematic use of indicators to monitor progress.

The creation in 2010 of UN Women — merging the four parts of the UN system that focused exclusively on gender equality and women’s empowerment — should strengthen coordination among various entities working in post-conflict environments. DPKO and the Department of Field Support will continue to maintain gender components on missions to ensure mainstreaming of gender within peacekeeping. It is hoped that partnership with UN Women will also enhance women’s participation in peace processes from the peacekeeping phase to the peacebuilding and development phases.

Likewise, the new Office of the Special Representative on Sexual Violence in Conflict will coordinate with peacekeeping operations to better protect women and girls who are victimized during conflict and in post-conflict countries. DPKO and DFS continue to support training and guidance to peacekeepers to enhance their ability to deliver protection to civilians, including from sexual violence, especially through the development of scenario-based training modules on sexual violence and protection of civilians. This includes support to national authorities and local communities to help them strengthen the rule of law and to emphasize their leadership role in protecting women and girls from sexual violence and in redressing violations.

Significant steps were taken in 2010 to improve the position of women in peace processes. Working towards full realization of resolution 1325 will be a priority for peacekeeping during the next decade.

UNITED NATIONS POLICE: GROWING PRESENCE AND RULE OF LAW ROLE

THE FIRST DEPLOYMENT

On a bright day in August 1960, in Leopoldville, Congo, (now Kinshasa in the Democratic Republic of the Congo), a unit of Ghanaian police with steel blue helmets hanging on their backs, tasselled fezzes on their heads, pleated khaki shorts and knee-high socks, wooden clubs and wicker shields, disembarked at an airfield to take up their duties as part of the United Nations Mission in the Congo (ONUC).

The UN Secretary-General, Dag Hammarskjöld, had requested police as part of this peacekeeping mission to help the newly independent Congo Government train and develop its national police service. The Ghanaians, along with a Nigerian police detachment, remained in and around Leopoldville until the mission was withdrawn in 1964.

UN POLICE TODAY

Half a century later, the role of UN Police in promoting peace and security in field missions around the world has grown enormously. In December 2010, some 14,000 UN Police were deployed in 12 peacekeeping operations and five special political missions. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) was authorized to deploy more than 17,600 UN Police officers in 2011.

UN Police are called upon to provide expert assistance, conduct operational assessments, train and develop host-state policing capacity, develop and review technical guidance, and assist domestic police services with strategic planning. They often hit the ground at critical moments in post-conflict environments when law and order is in disarray.

In many post-conflict environments, armed groups fill the void when rule of law has disappeared. UN Police are deployed to assist with demilitarization and the professionalization of policing. In other countries, host-state police services are functioning but may need reform, training and gaining or regaining the trust of the population.

To better respond to crises, DPKO has 41 specialized police officers and five judicial affairs and corrections officers ready to deploy within a week to any country in the world. Based at the UN Logistics Base in Brindisi, Italy, these teams can help startup new missions or reinforce existing operations, and are hired according to their expertise to assist any UN entity or Member State with specific challenges.

YEAR IN REVIEW 2010
Another growth area for UN Police is Formed Police Units (FPU), which now make up almost half of the UN Police deployed. National contingents of 120-160 armed police officers undertake crowd control and provide security on rotations of six to 12 months. Their numbers have doubled over 10 years, from two units to 64 FPUs in December 2010 on duty in six UN peacekeeping operations.

UN Police officers have been increasingly mandated to support the reform, restructuring and rebuilding of the national police and other law enforcement agencies to ensure democratic policing. Some Security Council mandates task UN Police with developing a host-state police service: this kind of institution building is a long-term process, difficult to address without sufficient attention, resources, time and sustainability.

**SELECTION AND RECRUITMENT**

The UN Police Division develops guidance, procedures, expertise and partnerships in order to effectively equip, lead and guide mission police services. It is also responsible for overall recruitment of police officers.

The turnover and rotation of police officers is constant, and in order to ensure a continuous stream of high-quality officers with the required experience, the Police Division has enhanced its recruitment capacity, in coordination with police contributing countries and field missions. DPKO has been addressing the specialization gaps that often arise in UN missions, the imbalance in national and linguistic groups deployed, the gender imbalance and the difficulties in recruiting senior personnel.

In 2010, vacancy rates were reduced from 30 to 18.5 per cent; representation of national and linguistic groups increased; progress was made toward the UN Global Effort goal of a 20 per cent female UN Police force by 2014, and some headway was made in recruiting senior personnel.

The UN Police Division is working hard to implement Security Council resolution 1325 (2000), which calls on DPKO to increase the number of women working in peacekeeping. When the Police Division’s “Global Effort” was launched in 2009, only eight per cent of the 11,000 UN Police deployed were female officers. By the end of 2010, with an increase of 3,000 new officers, female officers are now at 10 per cent. This Global Effort is targeting not only UN Police, but also national police services. The Police Division is working with governments to identify obstacles that deter women from joining law enforcement agencies, and in turn is asking governments to send to the UN the same proportion of male and female officers as are represented in their national services.

“By empowering women to become law enforcers and guardians of public security we are not only making police services more effective and representative, but we are also changing the role model: women are also seen as protectors and not only as victims. This has a huge impact in many countries around the world,” said UN Police Adviser Ann-Marie Orler.

**STANDARDIZED IDENTITY**

UN Police, by the nature of their tasks, must be recognized as police officers working under a UN mandate. In some peace operations (Kosovo and Timor-Leste most recently), UN Police have developed an identity to promote trust and legitimacy.
had executive authority for law enforcement and public order.

Over the years, a number of identifying symbols have been used in UN missions on vehicles, uniforms and offices. In 2010, the Police Division with the UN Department of Public Information created a standard identity for UN Police. Following a broad study of shields, colours and symbols, a design was chosen (see the back cover).

WORKING TOGETHER ON RESTORING THE RULE OF LAW

Today’s post-conflict policing challenges require close collaboration between UN Police and other actors on the ground, notably regional organizations, such as the African Union and European Union. The Police Division is also on the UN Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force and is leading a harmonization of international approaches to police roles in peacekeeping. UN Police also work with various partners including INTERPOL and the UN Office for Drugs and Crime (UNODC) to augment national capacities to combat organized crime.

The UN has learned that long-term peace and development following conflict depend upon restoring the three pillars of rule of law, namely the police, judiciary and corrections processes.

Since 2007, the DPKO Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions (OROLSI) has combined an office of Police Advisor with judicial affairs and corrections components, as well as a unit devoted to security sector reform.

In 2011, the division will aim to become more effective through enhanced selection and recruitment, the development of a strategic framework, strengthened partnerships, refined training, guidelines and procedures, and by achieving greater gender parity.

Addressing and building capacity in the entire rule of law sector has become the standard approach of the UN. The need to build professional and accountable national police services, begun 50 years ago in Kinshasa, remains an overarching goal of UN Police deployments, undertaken with the motto “professional service – lasting impact.”
HAITI BEGINS LONG PROCESS OF REBUILDING

As Haiti struggles to recover from the devastating earthquake that claimed the lives of more than 230,000 people and left 1.3 million homeless, the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) has made extraordinary efforts to respond to the post-earthquake humanitarian emergency and address key priorities of recovery and stabilization.

The scale of the destruction caused by the 7.0 magnitude earthquake was unprecedented. It devastated the Government, killing an estimated one-third of Haiti’s public sector employees and destroying schools, hospitals, government buildings, courts and police facilities. The streets of Port-au-Prince, particularly the downtown area, were filled with debris and twisted metal from collapsed buildings. The coastal towns of Léogâne and Jacmel were also severely affected.

The United Nations suffered the biggest single loss of life in its history when 102 of its personnel were killed: 97 were MINUSTAH personnel, including the mission’s senior leadership. Most of them perished in the collapse of their headquarters in Port-au-Prince.

In the wake of the disaster, a massive emergency relief operation was launched by the UN with assistance from several Member States. The United States and Canada deployed about 20,000 troops in the most severely affected areas. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon dispatched Assistant Secretary-General Edmond Mulet to act as his Special Representative alongside a small team from the New York Headquarters to support critical functions and the MINUSTAH staff on the ground.

The Mission’s strength of 9,000 uniformed personnel was swiftly reinforced with an additional 1,500 police officers and 2,000 troops in line with resolution 1908 (2010), unanimously adopted by the Security Council.

In an outpouring of sympathy and solidarity with the people of Haiti, a multitude of aid agencies, NGOs and individuals mobilized worldwide to support the humanitarian effort. At the height of the emergency phase, up to 150 flights were landing each day at the Port-au-Prince airport.

The immediate response focused on life-saving medical assistance, food and safe water delivery and the provision of shelter to earthquake victims. UN agencies, together with bilateral partners, worked tirelessly in a very challenging operating environment to meet the most pressing needs.

The impact of the earthquake was compounded by the profound vulnerability of Haitian society that had existed before 12 January, with 56 per cent of the population living in extreme poverty, widespread chronic malnutrition, and a 70 per cent unemployment rate.

Despite the daunting task, by September approximately 4 million Haitians had received food assistance and more than 200,000 had benefited from cash-for-work programmes. In temporary shelters and spontaneous settlements, around 1.5 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) were provided with basic health care, educational support, water and sanitation facilities, while MINUSTAH and the Haitian National Police provided security, paying particular attention to the most vulnerable.

The international community’s enduring commitment to Haiti was also highlighted at a donors conference convened at the end of March in New York. Pledges went well beyond expectations, totalling $10.5 billion — $6.2 billion for 2010 and 2011, and a further $4.3 billion for 2012 and beyond. To channel support and oversee medium- and long-term reconstruction efforts, former U.S. President Bill Clinton, who has served as the United Nations Special Envoy for Haiti since 2009, was asked by the Haitian Government to co-chair with Haitian Prime Minister Jean-Max Bellerive a new body, the Interim Haiti Recovery Commission.

“Has the reconstruction process been as quick and as far-reaching as many of us had hoped? No, not when so many Haitians remain homeless, hungry and unemployed,” wrote the co-chairs in an op-ed published in June. “Has progress been made? Un-
equivocally, yes. But we must do better.”

Meanwhile, international funds promised for 2010 for reconstruction, including debt relief, continue to come in. The separate UN humanitarian appeal for $1.5 billion in 2010 received more than $1 billion as of mid-December.

Ten months after the earthquake, as preparations for key presidential and parliamentary elections were in full gear, Haiti was battered by yet another deadly disaster. The first case of a virulent cholera outbreak was confirmed in late October. The epidemic quickly spread to all the country’s 10 departments, killing over 2,000 people in less than two months.

A coordinated response strategy to support Haiti’s Public Health Ministry was launched by MINUSTAH and the UN agencies, focusing on operating treatment clinics and providing medicines, clean water and improved sanitation throughout the country. The Secretary-General issued an international appeal for funds to battle the epidemic.

The suggestion that MINUSTAH peacekeepers based in the central town of Mirebalais might have brought the disease to Haiti caused violent protests against the mission in several cities. However, repeated environmental tests on water samples taken in and around the contingent’s camp all proved negative. The Secretary-General, believing that fair questions and legitimate concerns demand the best answer that science can provide, called for the creation of a fully independent international scientific panel to investigate the source of the cholera epidemic.

Under these adverse circumstances, Haitians went to polling stations on 28 November to...
elect a new president and a 99-member parliament, and to renew one-third of their senate. Widespread allegations of vote-rigging emerged shortly after the Provisional Electoral Council announced that one of the presidential front-runners, popular musician Michel Martelly, had failed by a thin margin to secure sufficient votes to run in the second round. Following the announcement of the provisional first-round results, thousands of angry protesters took to the streets, erected barricades of burning tires, set ablaze the headquarters of the ruling party and paralyzed the capital and several other cities for three consecutive days to demand a cancellation of the polls.

Expressing concern about allegations of fraud, the Security Council unanimously called on all political actors to work through the electoral process to ensure that the will of the Haitian people was reflected in the election outcome.

A second round of the presidential election was scheduled to take place in mid-January. Whoever emerges as the winner will face the tremendous task of accelerating the rebuilding of the nation, containing the cholera epidemic, finding long-term housing solutions for the earthquake victims, and creating critically needed job opportunities for the Haitian people.
SUDAN: PULLING OUT THE STOPS FOR THE REFERENDUM

On the first day of registration for southern Sudan’s self-determination referendum, Lometa Robert stood in a queue of about 25 people at the Juba University campus waiting for his chance to sign up for the long-awaited vote. Mr. Robert has spent most of his 56 years in Uganda where his family fled during Sudan’s first civil war, but in 2007 he moved to Juba to teach mechanical engineering at the university. He always believed he would one day have an opportunity to cast a ballot on the future of southern Sudan, and the slow pace of registration that morning did nothing to dampen his high spirits. “I am very happy this day has come,” he said. “This is my soil, and I will be voting for the sake of my family.”

Nearly all of the 2,797 registration centres scattered across Sudan opened on the morning of 15 November 2010, as scheduled. A massive campaign of logistical support and technical advice mounted by the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) and the UN Development Programme (UNDP) played a vital role in meeting the time-tables of the referendum calendar.

On 8 January 2011, the Southern Sudan Referendum Commission (SSRC) announced that more than 3.93 million people had registered both in Sudan and in out-of-country voting centres, and on 9 January, voting began in the historic referendum that would decide the fate of Africa’s largest country.

“Thanks to their efforts, the many skeptics who never thought that southern Sudan would be ready to hold its referendum by next Sunday were proven wrong,” the mission’s Regional Coordinator for Southern Sudan, David Gressly, told a press conference in the peacekeeping mission’s regional headquarters in Juba on 6 January.
Unfortunately, a second referendum to decide the destiny of the Abyei Area was not held as planned amid an ongoing dispute between the National Congress Party (NCP) and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) over voter eligibility requirements and other issues.

Touring polling sites on the first of seven days scheduled for voting in the referendum on southern Sudan, the UN Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) in Sudan, Haile Menkerios, praised the work of the SSRC and its Juba-based bureau for the smooth functioning of the polling, as well as the successful registration of voters on an extremely tight timeline in a politically sensitive environment.

A clock tower erected at a Juba roundabout read “0 days, 0 hours and 0 minutes” just before 8 a.m. when balloting was scheduled to begin. Among the voters who trekked long distances to cast a ballot was 71-year-old former soldier William Anei Yom Akot, who walked three miles to vote in Aweil, Northern Bahr el Ghazal State.

“Today I consider myself one of the luckiest persons on earth,” he told an UNMIS information officer. “I have been waiting to see today’s event for a long time and now is the time.”

Over the past year, the peacekeeping mission had been working at full capacity to assist national authorities in ensuring the referendum would be held on time and peacefully. In the aftermath of last April’s historic general election in Sudan, the peacekeeping mission and UNDP merged their electoral support teams to create the United Nations Integrated Referendum and Electoral Division (UNIRED). The new division was designed to support the Sudanese commission in charge of setting policy and adopting rules and procedures for the referendum.
Unforeseen delays dogged the process from the outset. The nine-member SSRC was appointed by presidential decree in July 2010, but internal disagreements over the naming of the panel’s secretary-general prevented the body from meeting officially until mid-September. The SSRC didn’t finalize a timetable for the referendum in the south until 20 October, giving UNIRED 25 days to distribute referendum books and kits, banners and other related materials to registration centres throughout the country.

But the support operation for the referendum had already begun months before then. UN Police advisers started offering three-day referendum security training courses to Southern Sudan Police Service personnel in July, and by the end of November more than 17,000 policemen and policewomen had completed the training.

In September, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon appointed a three-member panel on Sudan in response to a joint request from the NCP and the SPLM, deciding that the panel would monitor and assess the self-determination referendum processes for southern Sudan and the Abyei Area, including the political and security situation on the ground.

The panel, chaired by former Tanzanian president Benjamin Mkapa, reports directly to the UN Secretary-General and is completely independent of UNMIS, the peacekeeping mission. Since their appointment, Mr. Mkapa and his fellow panelists, Antonio Monteiro of Portugal and Bhojraj Pokharel of Nepal, conducted a number of working visits to Sudan and engaged the parties in close consultation with the Secretary-General.

Hundreds of UN Volunteers designated for deployment at county-level referendum support bases landed in Sudan beginning in October, along with office furniture, computers, motorcycles, generators and other support equipment, delivered by UNIRED to the Referendum Bureau in Juba. By late October, UNIRED had shipped 200,000 kilogrammes of registration materials on 96 UNMIS flights around the south and more than 9,400 kilogrammes to northern Sudan. UNIRED donated 20 new Toyota Land Cruisers to the Juba-based Referendum Bureau in November.

At first blush, the logistical challenge posed by the referendum process figured to be considerably less daunting than that faced in the run-up to the April 2010 general election. Instead of 12 separate ballots with multiple candidates for elected office, eligible southern Sudanese voters would be issued a single ballot offering a simple choice between continued unity with the rest of the country or separation.

But where UNMIS and UNDP had months to prepare for the voter registration exercise of late 2009 and the actual balloting the following April, the countdown to the start of registration for the southern Sudan referendum was measured in weeks.

Nearby 5.3 million registration cards had been distributed to the 2,632 registration centres across southern Sudan and over 300,000 to 165 centres in the north when voter registration commenced on 15 November. But the support operation didn’t end there. An additional 1.4 million registration cards had to be shipped to registration centres when supplies soon ran out, reflecting the high turnout of eligible voters in the southern region’s urban centers.

Turnout for registration was low in the country’s 15 northern states where many people displaced from the south during the civil conflict resided, including hundreds of thousands in internally displaced persons (IDP) camps. The same was true in the eight foreign countries where southern Sudanese expatriates could cast ballots in January.

But the Herculean undertaking yielded rewarding results in southern Sudan, where thousands of IDPs streamed back from the north in the days before the polling began. “People have very high expectations about the referendum,” said Gressly. “They are very excited about finally getting a chance to decide their own destiny.”

Visiting a polling station, SRSG Menkerios said he doubted that the handful of armed clashes in Unity State and the Abyei region just before the voting would have an adverse impact on the overall referendum process.

“The UN will continue to monitor the process and will try to help where necessary, especially in assisting the police in the provision of security,” he said.
As the leading regional broadcaster in southern Sudan, the peacekeeping radio station Miraya FM played a major role in voter education and information dissemination about the 2011 referendum for the region.

Prior to the start of referendum voter registration on 15 November, Miraya produced and aired a series of public service announcements on the 2009 Southern Sudan and Abyei Referendum Acts, the voter registration process and voter rights in Arabic, English and 10 local languages. Miraya created four special referendum programmes.

“Referendum Talk is a live one-hour show where we give the Southern Sudan Referendum Commission (SSRC) the opportunity to tell the listeners what stage of the referendum process we are in and what has been done,” said Celia Koh, Senior Radio Coordinator. Listeners could text and call in their questions on this interactive Thursday show.

The pre-recorded “Village Debates” programme takes the Miraya microphone to the grassroots and airs every Saturday aiming for visits to all 10 of the southern Sudan states.

“Through our correspondents and travelling teams of journalists, Miraya has given Sudanese in all parts of the South the opportunity to join the discussion about the referendum, and the consequences of both separation and unity,” said Chief of Radio Quade Hermann.

“Referendum Diary,” a 30-minute roundup of all weekly referendum news activities, also aired every Saturday. The diary, which is part of the special referendum section at the mirayafm.org website, received an impressive number of hits, Ms. Koh said.
The last of the four programmes, “Referendum Watch,” started airing in December, hosting experts who discuss post-referendum political, historical and economic issues from the differing viewpoints of unity and separation.

CAPACITY BUILDING
To ensure objective and professional coverage by its reporters, Miraya developed a Referenda and Popular Consultations Charter published in English and Arabic.

According to Miraya Editor-in-Chief Jean-Claude Labrecque, the charter governs the station’s coverage of the referendum process from campaigns to post-referendum issues depending on the outcome of the 9 January 2011 poll.

“People trust Miraya, and it is because we work hard at upholding our journalistic principles of maintaining fair and balanced coverage of these sensitive issues,” Ms. Hermann said.

The reporters underwent intensive preparatory training that started in August. In the first phase, Miraya invited experts to discuss referendum and popular consultation law and the history of the peace process. SSRC members were also asked to describe the commission’s role.

“The second aspect of our training was to help our journalists prepare to report,” said the station’s training chief, Christopher Singh. To that end, Miraya invited seasoned, Sudan-based foreign correspondents to share their experiences with its young reporters. The station has also been training state radio journalists in the area.

After the vote, the Miraya editors monitored the referendum reports. “The (reporters) still need fine tuning. We are coaching them and taking corrective measures and we will continue to do this,” Mr. Singh said.

Miraya is a UN radio station run in partnership with the Swiss-based Fondation Hirondelle. It was established to support implementation of the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement and broadcasts throughout southern Sudan.

UNAMID: STRIVING TO PROTECT DARFUR’S MOST VULNERABLE
As dawn breaks, the Formed Police Unit (FPU) has been up for more than an hour. A quick breakfast is followed by a comprehensive briefing and equipment inspection. A radio check by the team leader begins the patrol.

This is just one of approximately 200 patrols that will be conducted today by the African Union – United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID). The aim is to provide protection to the people, especially those most vulnerable.

Although the primary responsibility of protecting civilians lies with the Government of the Sudan, UNAMID has been tasked by the UN Security Council with making “full use of its mandate and capabilities, giving priority in decisions about the use of available capacity and resources to the protection of civilians across Darfur.” While this remains at the heart of UNAMID’s mandate, it proved to be among its greatest challenges in 2010.

Operating in a region the size of Spain and with limited resources, the world’s largest current peacekeeping operation continued to face significant barriers to its work throughout the year. Among these were movement restrictions, the obstruction of humanitarian access, an unstable security situation on the ground and threats to the safety and security of UNAMID personnel. On too many occasions, peacekeepers were hampered in their efforts to respond as effectively as they would have liked to incidents that resulted in civilian casualties or humanitarian aid being prevented from reaching those most in need. Over the course of the year more than 1,300 civilians lost their lives to violence.

Efforts on the political front continued throughout 2010. In October, the Joint Mediation Support Team, with UNAMID’s facilitation, re-convened talks between the Government of Sudan and the Liberation and Justice Movement, a relatively recently formed rebel
group, in Doha, Qatar, aimed at reaching agreement among participants. In a separate series of initiatives throughout 2010, UNAMID’s Joint Special Representative (JSR), Ibrahim Gambari, together with the Joint Chief Mediator, Djibrill Bassolé, maintained constant engagement with the leaders of both the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) and the Sudan Liberation Army - Abdul Wahid (SLA-AW), in order to facilitate an inclusive process.

At the same time, recognizing the importance of civil society’s role in securing a sustainable peace in Darfur, the AU-UN Mediation along with its partners, the State of Qatar and UNAMID, hosted the Second Civil Society Conference in Doha in July, seven months after the first. More than 300 participants representing communities and constituencies from across the region attended the meeting. In addition to being the first opportunity for Darfuri refugees in Chad to meet with civil society, the conference provided a forum to discuss the priority issues to be addressed in any peace accord and agree on positions of consensus that could help lead all parties to reach a final agreement.

Unfortunately, the constructive atmosphere at the conference was followed by violent clashes between supporters and opponents of civil society involvement in the peace talks, in the largest internally displaced people (IDP) camp in Africa – the Kalma IDP camp, located on the outskirts of Nyala, South Darfur. The violence in late July resulted in 35 dead, many injured, and the displacement of roughly 25,000 IDPs, many of which subsequently returned. The humanitarian community and UNAMID encountered initial difficulties in accessing the camp. Fearing reprisals from opposing factions and possible mistreatment by the government, five community leaders sought protection in the mission’s nearby community policing centre. The unrest in Kalma was followed by similar incidents in Hamadiya camp, near Zalingei, resulting in at least a dozen fatalities. The violence in Kalma underscored the highly politicized environment in many camps, particularly around the issue of support to the Doha process.
Elsewhere, the security situation in Darfur remained volatile throughout the year, with levels of violence substantially higher than in 2009. This was largely attributable not only to inter-communal clashes, but also to fighting between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and SLA-AW in Jebel Marra, with JEM in Jebel Moon and with SLA/MM in certain areas in North/South Darfur. From late October, UNAMID observed a build-up of SAF and JEM in South and North Darfur, with confrontations reported in these areas, as well as in Southern Kordofan, further undermining initiatives aimed at the peaceful resolution of the Darfur crisis.

Throughout the year, UNAMID suffered a number of armed attacks and abductions. In April, four South African police advisers, two men and two women, were kidnapped in Nyala, and kept in captivity for 16 days. In July, a Russian pilot was reported missing after his helicopter landed in an undeclared area in South Darfur. He was later found alive and returned within days.

The following month, two Jordanian police officers were abducted, again in Nyala, and freed three days later. In early October, a UNAMID international staff member was kidnapped from his residence in El Fasher, North Darfur but was later released.

Tragically, UNAMID saw the loss of five of its staff as a result of hostile action. Two Egyptian military peacekeepers were killed and three injured in an ambush near Edd al Fursan, South Darfur, in May. The following month, three Rwandan peacekeepers were killed and one seriously injured when gunmen attacked a team site in Nertiti, West Darfur, in June.

JSR Gambari called on the Sudanese authorities to do more to prevent such attacks against UNAMID and humanitarian personnel and to bring those responsible to justice – attacks directed against peacekeepers and humanitarian workers can constitute serious violations of international humanitarian law.
From its inception, the mission has experienced unusually difficult force generation and deployment constraints. As the year closed, UNAMID had deployed over 17,200 military peacekeepers, representing almost 90 per cent of its authorized force and an increase of nearly 2,000 troops over the previous year. The current number of UNAMID police officers stands at more than 2,800, or 75 per cent of the mandated strength, and 14 out of 19 FPUs planned for Darfur are now on the ground.

The protection of civilians and pursuing an inclusive and comprehensive peace agreement between the parties to the conflict will be the main priorities in the year ahead for UNAMID. The mission will continue to support efforts to address the root causes of the conflict in Darfur, namely the political and socio-economic marginalization of the region and power and wealth sharing, while doing all it can to improve security arrangements and facilitate returns.

CÔTE D’IVOIRE: A YEAR OF SIGNIFICANT ADVANCES FOLLOWED BY A LOST OPPORTUNITY

Ivorians had every reason to hope for a successful resolution of the eight-year crisis in their country as successive milestones were passed in 2010, but an electoral process that appeared set to become an example to Africa and the world was suddenly thrown off course by a new, unprecedented crisis. As the year drew to an end, the West African nation found itself with a president who was elected with a clear margin following broadly democratic polls, and a de facto ruler, who refused to accept the will of the people and relinquish power.

The new crisis erupted just after the second round of Côte d’Ivoire’s first presidential polls since 2000. The Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) announced on 2 December 2010 that candidate Alassane Ouattara had won the 28 November election, polling 54.1 per cent of the vote against 45.9 per cent for the incumbent Laurent Gbagbo.

The election result was certified by the head of the UN Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI), Y.J. Choi, the UN Secretary-General’s Special Representative to the West African nation, based on an extensive exercise that included the verification by mission staff of tally sheets from the some 20,000 polling stations.

However, Côte d’Ivoire’s Constitutional Court, headed by a close associate of the incumbent, invalidated the election result in most of the North, which Ouattara had carried by a landslide, proclaimed Gbagbo the victor and swore him in on the following day. The Ouattara camp held an inauguration ceremony of its own at a local hotel transformed into his government’s headquarters, and protected by UNOCI troops.

Just weeks before, the conduct of the first round of the election, originally scheduled in 2005 and postponed six times, had earned widespread admiration. The voter turnout of about 85 per cent was unprecedented in the country’s 50-year history as an independent nation. There had been relatively little violence and the IEC had been credited with running a fairly clean poll. Congratulating the Ivorian people and the candidates for the conduct of the election, Y.J. Choi commented just after the poll that “the Ivorian people have risen to the challenge with great success, demonstrating to the world their political maturity and their determination to end the crisis.”

The October 31 poll had crowned untiring efforts by UNOCI to keep the polls on track. The mission had provided logistical and technical assistance to the IEC throughout the electoral process, chipping in on the financial front as well, either by directly providing such assistance or by helping to mobilize it internationally. Whenever the process appeared to falter, the UN was there to bolster it.
Côte d’Ivoire’s electoral process was widely seen as a key step forward to end the crisis that erupted in September 2002, when an attack against military targets in Abidjan developed into a rebellion that partitioned the country, with the insurgents controlling most of the centre, north and west, and governmental forces in the south, separated by a zone of confidence policed by the impartial forces – UNOCI and the French Licorne Force. An agreement concluded on 4 March 2007 in Ouagadougou, between then President Gbagbo and the Forces Nouvelles and facilitated by President Blaise Compaoré of Burkina Faso, paved the way for the lifting of the buffer zone, national reunification, the redeployment of state officials in the north and the electoral process.

The UN Security Council mandated UNOCI to support the implementation of the Ouagadougou Political Agreement (OPA) and, following a request by the parties to the Ivorian peace process in 2005, it gave Special Representative Choi the task of certifying the various stages of the electoral process, including presidential and legislative elections.

In 2010, the election momentum was accelerated, and a number of achievements were registered. A credible voters’ list was established and duly certified by Special Representative Choi; 11.5 million people received identity and voters’ cards; and elections were held. In each of these operations, the UN played a major role, from transporting personnel and material to remote areas, to air-lifting and shipping equipment from Europe. UNOCI conducted awareness-raising sessions for civil society and communities throughout the country on the need for a peaceful electoral environment, and organized training sessions for media on professional coverage of elections and their role supporting social cohesion. It also used seminars, workshops and other training activities to increase the population’s awareness of human rights. The mission helped transport election-related materials and staff by air, road and boat throughout the country and contributed to providing security throughout the electoral process.

The first round of the poll confounded any doomsayers who may have expected it to

Journalists from the national and international press swarm to cover presidential election in Abidjan, Côte d’Ivoire. 31 October 2010. (UN Photo/Basile Zoma)
be marred by unrest. A violence-free campaign was followed by an orderly, peaceful election on 30 October. UNOCI continued to provide technical, logistical and other support through to the November runoff, the result of which was subsequently certified by Mr. Choi, but rejected by the Constitutional Council.

As the international community refused to accept the election victory granted to Mr. Gbagbo by the Constitutional Council, he, however, continued to refuse to accept the results proclaimed by the IEC and certified by SRSG Choi. His camp went into laager formation, calling for UNOCI and the Force Licorne to leave Côte d’Ivoire, portraying their struggle as a patriotic combat against an international community disdainful of national institutions and bent on undermining its sovereignty, limiting access to state TV and radio to groups and individuals supportive of its position and cutting off foreign news channels. The UN mission’s radio station, ONUCI FM, found itself obliged to shift from frequency to frequency as attempts were made to scramble its broadcasts, while Ivorians were deprived for days on end of the use of mobile phone messaging, in an apparent bid to stymie any attempts by the elected government to mobilize its supporters.

Security forces supported by unidentified masked civilians cracked down heavily on Ouattara’s supporters as they sought to demonstrate in favour of the elected president. UNOCI’s Human Rights Division confirmed that at least 173 persons were killed in the post-election violence, prompting calls from the mission as well as UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon for an end to the violence against the population.

On 20 December, the Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, adopted resolution 1962, condemning in the strongest possible terms the attempts to usurp the will of the people and
undermine the integrity of the electoral process; renewing the UNOCI mandate until 30 June 2011; and urging all the Ivorian parties and stakeholders to respect the will of the people and the election outcome. In a press statement after its meeting, the Council reiterated its deep concern at the continued violence, including armed attacks against UNOCI, and warned all those responsible that they would be brought to justice.

Addressing the General Assembly on 21 December, the Secretary-General accused forces loyal to Mr. Gbagbo of trying to blockade UNOCI and said the situation could become critical within days. He said the tactics included abductions and killings and the propagation of hate speech through the state broadcasting corporation. The Secretary-General added the intention of Mr. Gbagbo was to suffocate the government of President-elect Ouattara. “We cannot allow this,” said the Secretary-General.

As the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the sub-regional grouping to which Côte d’Ivoire belongs, continued efforts to persuade President Gbagbo to step down in late December, the situation on the ground remained a cause of concern for the UN mission, which relocated non-essential staff to The Gambia in early December. Some of the remaining staff were threatened and had to be relocated from areas in the west and centre-west; UNOCI vehicles were systematically blocked by security forces and armed civilians in Abidjan and some parts of the centre, centre-west and South-west of the country. In the Yopougon neighbourhood of Abidjan, a peacekeeper suffered a machete wound on 28 December when his convoy was surrounded by a mob, who burned one of their three vehicles. Over the state broadcaster, RTI, Mr. Gbagbo called for the UN to leave as broadcasts became increasingly hostile.

Francis Deng, the Special Adviser of the Secretary-General on the Prevention of Genocide, and Edward Luck, the Special Adviser focusing on the responsibility to protect, expressed concern over continuing reports of serious human rights violations by supporters of Mr. Gbagbo, and by forces under his control, as well as the use of inflammatory speech to incite hatred and violence, disseminated by state and other media.

“Given the history of internal conflict in Côte d’Ivoire, such actions are highly irresponsible,” Mr. Deng and Mr. Luck said in a joint statement.

The UN mission in Côte d’Ivoire has pledged not to be deterred by these challenges, repeatedly stressing its determination to implement its mandate in the service of the Ivorian people and peace.
The year 2010 saw the 50th anniversary of the Democratic Republic of the Congo’s (DRC) independence on 30 June, the date when, coincidentally, the mandate of the United Nations Organization Mission in the DRC (MONUC) expired. This historic moment was an occasion for the country’s leadership and the international community to assess progress in the DRC and chart a new course for the future.

While there were serious causes for concern, including fighting in eastern DRC and widespread human rights abuses, most of the country was free of armed conflict, at peace with its neighbours and was actively participating in regional institutions.

The Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, Alain Le Roy, visited the DRC in March with a DPKO-led technical assessment mission. The Security Council then sent a delegation to the DRC in May so that its members could engage directly with the DRC Government and civil society.

DRC President Joseph Kabila told both visiting UN parties that the security situation had significantly improved over the past decade; out of 11 provinces only three – North and South Kivu and Orientale Province – could be considered “hotspots”. Given those conditions, President Kabila called for a downsizing of the UN peacekeeping mission, but not a hasty withdrawal.

With this in mind, in May the UN Security Council adopted resolution 1925, extending MONUC’s mandate until the end of June and permitting a reduction of up to 2,000 in the mission’s 19,815 uniformed personnel in areas where security has improved. In view of the new phase that has been reached in the country, the Council also changed the name of the UN peacekeeping mission from MONUC to MONUSCO (with the ‘S’ signifying ‘stabilization’), effective 1 July, with a one-year mandate.

The Council stressed the need to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence. It called for the mission to use “all means to fulfil this mandate,” and
to support the Government in its stabilization and peace consolidation efforts.

Within weeks, the first troops, a group of Senegalese blue helmets, departed the country. The following month, at the invitation of President Kabila, the Secretary-General attended the 50th anniversary celebrations in Kinshasa and a ceremony marking the renaming of the peacekeeping mission. The occasion saw the handover of the mission leadership from Secretary-General’s outgoing Special Representative, Mr. Alan Doss, a veteran UN official with wide peacekeeping experience, to Roger A. Meece, a former US ambassador to the DRC.

The Secretary-General stressed that despite the peacekeeping operation’s new name, “this is not a new mission,” but rather a reflection of the Council’s recognition of the new phase which the DRC has entered. He also emphasized the importance of protecting civilians.

**JOINT OPERATIONS CONDUCTED IN EASTERN DRC**

While most of the DRC has enjoyed peace in recent years, in the eastern part of the country, particularly the Kivus, conflict continues, with the civilian population suffering atrocities and abuse. DRC Government forces conducted military operations against armed groups. In some instances, these operations were supported by UN blue helmets, when joint planning and other conditions set out by the Security Council were met.

Last year marked a change in United Nations support for operations by the Congolese Army. The new approach was adopted in response to concerns that arose in 2009, when MONUC supported Kimia II, an operation launched by the national army (FARDC) against the mainly Rwandan Hutu rebel group, the FDLR, in eastern DRC. At that time, UN peacekeepers supported the operation with helicopter lifts, fuel, rations and in some circumstances, firepower. In all, some 16,000 DRC troops received UN support under Kimia II. But ill-disciplined Congolese soldiers, many of them former combatants of armed groups rapidly integrated into the national force, committed human rights violations and crimes including massacres and rapes against the very civilians they...
were supposed to protect. MONUC elaborated a policy aimed at ensuring its support did not go to commanders and troops responsible for such violations. In light of the Kimia II experience, the Security Council instructed MONUC to strictly condition its support to the DRC armed forces-led military operations against foreign and Congolese armed groups on the army’s compliance with international humanitarian, human rights and refugee law and on effective joint planning of these operations. The Security Council also instructed MONUC to intercede with the command of the DRC armed forces if elements of an army unit receiving MONUC’s support were suspected of committing grave violations of such laws, and to withdraw support if the violations persisted. A joint operational directive for a new campaign – Operation Amani Leo – was concluded between the FARDC and MONUC in December 2009. The new operation’s principal objectives were to protect civilians, clear strategic areas of foreign and armed groups, hold territory liberated from FDLR control, and help restore State authority in these zones. MONUC’s (and later MONUSCO’s) support for Amani Leo was limited to battalions that were pre-screened and designated to carry out specific strike operations. This reduced the number of troops eligible to receive support in the Kivus to around 1,600. A system was put in place to monitor operations and support.

“Joint planning is essential to map out the areas of risk and determine the most effective...
organization and deployment of our forces,” MONUC’s then-force commander, Lieutenant-General Babacar Gaye, said. MONUC would provide rations and other essential support to units carrying out targeted operations only if they were jointly planned with MONUC and conducted in accordance with international human rights, humanitarian and refugee law.

THE ATROCITIES IN WALIKALE

While MONUSCO was stepping up its efforts to protect civilians, a grim reminder of the difficulty of this task and the limits to the mission’s capacity became glaringly apparent when a series of attacks occurred in 13 villages in Walikale territory. The attacks, which took place mostly at night, were carried out between 30 July and 2 August by around 200 members of three armed groups – the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), the Maï Maï Cheka, and elements close to Colonel Emmanuel Nsengiyumva, an army deserter who once had been involved with the rebel National Congress for the Defence of the People (CNDP).

By September, a United Nations human rights team that had been dispatched to the area confirmed that slightly more than 300 civilians were raped over the four-day period, noting that the final number of victims might grow higher.

The report pointed to serious shortcomings in the preparedness and response of the local detachments of the Congolese army and police. It also noted that their failure to prevent or stop the attacks was compounded by subsequent failings on the part of MONUSCO forces, which the report says did not receive any specific training in the protection of civilians.

The report listed a number of recommendations for both the Congolese authorities and MONUSCO to try prevent such situations from arising. It urged humanitarian agencies to provide the Congolese authorities with medical assistance and psychological care for all the victims, and the international community to support efforts to bring to justice those responsible for the crimes.

In the wake of the Walikale atrocities, the Secretary-General dispatched Atul Khare, Assistant Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, and Margot Wallström, his Special Representative on Sexual Violence in Conflict, to the region. As a result of their missions, new measures were taken to correct deficiencies in MONUSCO’s patrolling practices and interaction with communities, and steps were implemented to provide people in the most vulnerable communities with the tools to sound the alarm and contact peacekeepers. MONUSCO later launched Operation “Shop Window” to enhance the protection of civilians in the affected areas and to reassure the population. In a joint operation with the DRC authorities, the mission secured the arrest of two alleged ringleaders of the mass rapes. MONUSCO also supported the DRC authorities in conducting investigations aimed at identifying perpetrators still at large and bringing them to justice, while providing security for witnesses and assistance to survivors.

MONUC LAUNCHES LATE YEAR PREVENTIVE OPERATIONS

In December, MONUSCO deployed troops under operation Rudia Umbrella as a preventive measure in Orientale Province ahead of the end-of-year holiday season, which had in the past seen increased attacks by the infamous Ugandan Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), which had committed atrocities against civilians, including children.

This was another example of the mission’s campaign to bring greater security to the DRC. Although 2010 was yet another challenging year for the country’s people, it also saw progress in a number of areas. Learning from painful experience, MONUSCO strengthened its conditionality policy for supporting FARDC military operations, sharpened its focus on protecting civilians, and undertook more preventive deployments and operations to deny armed groups liberty of movement. The DRC was in dire need of help in establishing the rule of law and legitimate State authority, particularly in areas of armed conflict. Protection of civilians remained at the core of MONUSCO’s mandate, but the mission has also been helping the DRC to achieve more long-term solutions to the crimes committed against the population by supporting State authorities through joint investigative teams, prosecution support cells and strengthening penal institutions. Ultimately, the goal of the United Nations remains to help the DRC consolidate peace, rebuild its institutions and promote sustainable development that benefits all its people.
Throughout 2010, the overall security situation in Chad and the Central African Republic – where UN peacekeepers have been deployed since 2007 – was relatively calm. The number of reported incidents relating to the safety and security of refugees, displaced persons and humanitarian personnel decreased significantly in comparison with previous years.

Some 262,000 Sudanese refugees in 12 camps, 68,000 refugees from the Central African Republic and 168,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs) at 38 sites received assistance from humanitarian organizations. In addition, assistance was provided to 48,000 returnees and an estimated 150,000 members of the host Chadian population.

The yearly wet season brought unusually heavy rains, causing flooding and destroying property. Assessing the full impact of the floods was difficult. An estimated 144,000 people in Chad were seriously affected, and 15 people died as a result of the floods.

The Governments of Chad and the Sudan signed an agreement in N’Djamena on 15 January 2010, to normalize their relations. They agreed to work towards disarming rebel groups and deployed a joint border force of 3,000 troops to stop cross-border movements of armed elements and their criminal activities.

The agreement between Chad and Sudan paved the way for a gradual withdrawal of MINURCAT. In January 2010, Chad informed the UN of its plan to assume all responsibilities regarding the protection of humanitarians and civilians in refugee camps and internally displaced persons sites by using its own security forces and the UN-trained Détachement de Sécurité Intégré (DIS). As part of that plan, the Government reiterated its commitment to assuming full responsibility for the sustainability of DIS both logistically and materially, and to reinforcing the personnel and equipment of DIS. The Security Council concurred with Chad’s plan and requested that MINURCAT draw down its military presence in two phases ending on 15 October 2010.

The initial mandated reduction and reconfiguration of the MINURCAT force was achieved in July 2010, and the force’s strength stabilized at 2,159 personnel. The sector divisions within the area of operations were reconfigured to one force headquarters at Abéché and three sectors: two in eastern Chad and one in the Central African Republic. On 15 October, the MINURCAT force ceased to be fully operational and began withdrawing. Nevertheless, the security situation in the northeastern Central African Republic continued to suffer from inter-ethnic conflict, banditry and cross-border criminality. In anticipation of the Mission’s withdrawal, the Government of the Central African Republic expressed concern about the security situation in the Vakaga and the Haute-Kotto prefectures in the north-east of the country.

Throughout 2010, MINURCAT continued to provide technical support and mentoring to 158 non-professional justices of the peace and their assistants. The Mission also worked towards the voluntary return of IDPs in secure and sustainable conditions through support for local conflict resolution committees to help defuse local tensions and promote reconciliation. UNHCR reported that some 48,000 IDPs had returned to their villages of origin (17,000 in Assoungha and 18,000 in Koko, Ouaddai region; 10,000 in and around Kerfi and 3,000 in Moundeina, Dar Sila region).

In preparation for the assumption of human rights responsibilities by national counterparts, MINURCAT, together with regional delegates of the Ministry of Human Rights and Promotion of Liberties and local human rights organizations, conducted field visits to refugee and IDP camps, towns and villages, and monitored visits to detention facilities in eastern Chad. The mission continued to provide training and mentoring to national prison officials on international standards of prison management and administration. MINURCAT advisers were co-located with national counterparts in the Prisons Directorate in N’Djamena to help enhance its human resources management, planning and budgetary capacities.

The protection of civilians in eastern Chad consisted of more than assuring the physical security of refugees, the displaced and hu-
manitarian workers and the provision of logistical support and hard-wall structures for DIS. Intercommunity dialogue, the enhancement of local governance structures, including justice and prisons, respect for human rights and the creation of socio-economic incentives for the safe and voluntary return of the displaced are mutually interdependent requirements for the protection of civilians, and depend ultimately on the Government of Chad. While MINURCAT worked with partners to ensure the continuation of these tasks, the Government’s commitment to seeing them to fruition will be critical.

**A BUSY YEAR FOR PREVENTIVE DIPLOMACY IN WEST AFRICA**

The December election and inauguration, two years after a military coup, of a civilian president in the West African nation of Guinea, marked a positive culmination to an intense year of UN preventive diplomacy aimed at keeping the country’s democratic transition on track and avoiding violence.

The Secretary-General hailed UN efforts, and the Deputy Secretary-General Asha Rose Migiro travelled to Guinea to attend the 22 December inauguration of President Alpha Condé. The peaceful election and acceptance of results stood out as a positive example in a region still striving to consolidate hard-won peace and democratic progress against a resurgence of coups and other emerging threats.

UN diplomatic efforts on Guinea and other states in the region were led by the Dakar-based United Nations Office for West Africa (UNOWA). Its presence is demonstrating the value of a UN political mission on the ground, working with States and regional bodies to prevent and manage crises while also tackling longer-term challenges. From preventing cross-border crime to mediating political crises, UNOWA headed by Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) Said Djinnit, has had its hands full during the past year responding to tense elections in a number of countries and fragile political transitions.

During the past year, Djinnit shuttled repeatedly to Guinea to persuade all the key players to abide by the Ouagadougou Agreement of 15 January 2010, which sought to end the transition to new leadership following the December 2008 coup. He has also been active in Togo and Niger where coups and elections have sparked tensions that could have been further inflamed had not the mission weighed in.

As part of the UN Department of Political Affairs’ emphasis on preventative diplomacy, Djinnit teamed up with fellow envoys from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the African Union (AU) to address the challenges in those States.

“Conflict prevention requires proximity, knowledge, commitment and presence,” Djinnit told DPA’s Politically Speaking. “The voice of ECOWAS has weight as does that of the AU and UN. But the common voice has even more weight than the three combined. It is the case of one plus one plus one equals 10.”

In another hat, Djinnit is chairman of the Cameroon-Nigeria Mixed Commission set up at the request of those two countries to facilitate the implementation the ruling by the International Court of Justice on a territorial dispute that includes the Bakassi Peninsula.

In December he hosted a meeting of the two countries’ UN Country Teams to launch coordinated development efforts and confidence building initiatives to help communities affected by the settlement.

Also in December, UNOWA along with the UN Office on Drugs and Crime launched a multi-agency programme to help curb drug trafficking and organized crime in West Africa, a hub for cocaine trafficking from Latin America to Europe. ECOWAS is a key partner in that regional effort involving 16 countries.

“The fight against drug trafficking and organized crime is an essential pillar for any conflict prevention and peacebuilding activity strategy in West Africa,” said SRSG Djinnit.
In 2010, “forging ahead” was the key phrase for Liberia, nurturing seven years of unbroken peace since the civil conflict ended in 2003. That spirit resonated in President Johnson Sirleaf’s address during the 26 July Independence Day celebrations, as she exhorted Liberians to “utilize diversity to enhance national unity and harmony.”

During the past year, the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), together with the entire UN family, forged ahead to consolidate peace and security across the nation.

2010 was marked by the launch of the “UN Delivering as One” initiative in Liberia, which will enable the government, the UN family and all international partners to tread a common path, set common goals and deliver joint programmes more effectively and efficiently. Since 2007, eight countries have piloted the “Delivering as One” initiative, and results from these countries have all been positive in leading to a better UN-Government relationship, greater national ownership, improved planning capacity and enhanced oversight, as well as more effective cooperation between UN agencies and development partners.

In view of the eventual withdrawal of UNMIL, the “Delivering as One” initiative also foresees gradual handover of relevant tasks from the mission to the Government of Liberia, as well as to the UN agencies, programmes and funds. As Liberia endeavours to consolidate the gains it has made in the peace process, the initiative could become a central component of the country’s planning and coordination of development activities.

There is wide recognition in Liberia that most of the national security and rule of law institutions, which are now fully operational (with the exception of the Armed Forces of Liberia), are critical to maintaining peace and security, and without which further peace consolida-
tion and economic development cannot be achieved. The UN works with the Government to ensure access to justice for every Liberian. It helps to train judges and prosecutors, to build courts, and to reduce unacceptably high pre-trial detention levels.

As for law enforcement, a professional police presence across the country remained the overriding goal. In recent years, the government, with support from UNMIL and international partners, has made enormous progress in building the Liberia National Police. Yet more needs to be done, as effective policing will be vital to the peaceful conduct of the 2011 elections.

The key remaining challenges facing the security and justice systems will also be addressed through work with the UN Peacebuilding Commission (PBC). In forging a relationship with the PBC, the Government of Liberia clearly set out the need for prioritizing rule of law, security sector reform and national reconciliation, as the key pillars of peace, security and sustainable development.

UNMIL has been widely regarded as a model peacekeeping mission that amply represents the principles and added value of UN peace operations in a post-conflict setting. With this success also comes the challenge of ensuring that Liberia’s security agencies are capable of assuming full responsibility for security in the country by the time UNMIL leaves Liberia. To achieve this, the Government of Liberia and UNMIL established a joint transition planning group tasked to prepare the ground for a gradual transfer of responsibilities from UNMIL to the relevant government authorities.

While UNMIL was expected to retain its current strength until after the 2011 Presidential elections, planning is necessary to allow the controlled drawdown of the military and police components of the mission, in concert with the growing capacity of the Liberian law enforcement agencies. However, even after the peacekeeping mission comes to an end, the UN family will remain on the ground to support the government’s development and governance agenda.

In retrospect, 2010 was a year of enhanced cooperation between the Government of Liberia and the United Nations family as they continued to consolidate peace and security in the country, while at the same time proceeding apace with planning for the transition and the delegation of relevant responsibilities to the Government. This pivotal commitment is particularly essential for ensuring that Liberia’s second democratic elections in 2011 are conducted peacefully and credibly and it sets the stage for sustainable peace and development in the country.

TURNING THE TIDE ON SOMALIA?

The news headlines from Somalia appeared bleak in 2010, but United Nations officials leading a renewed effort to turn the tide in that country say they see the beginnings of a unified strategy taking shape. For Somalis, the increased international effort offers a fighting chance to build a stable government in their country for the first time in decades.

“Is this is a huge challenge? Yes. Is it going to be difficult? Yes. But what strikes me is how the pieces are coming into place and the political will in the international community is strengthening,” observed the Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs, B. Lynn Pascoe, following his September 2010 visit to the war-torn capital of Mogadishu.

The visit by the UN’s top political official to Somalia and other states in the Horn of Africa was indicative of a heightened determination under UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon to help stabilize Somalia. Pascoe was joined by the Secretary-General’s Special Representative for Somalia, Dr. Augustine P. Mahiga, a Tanzanian diplomat named in July 2010 to head the United Nations Political Office for Somalia, known as UNPOS, based in Nairobi.

UNPOS spearheaded negotiations leading to the 2008 Djibouti agreement through which Somalia’s current Transitional Federal Government (TFG) was established under the moderate Islamist leadership of President Sheikh Sharif Ahmed. A wide segment of clans and political groups were included, however the government has strained to consolidate its authority.
With the transitional period approaching its conclusion, the United Nations has been urging the TFG to overcome internal divisions and focus on delivering tangible services to the people. Among the next steps on the transitional calendar are wide-ranging consultations on a draft constitution.

The security situation has remained a major problem. The Al Shabab insurgency increased its reach, launching suicide bombings in the capital while imposing a harsh regime in areas it controls, including amputations and stonings, and banning television and music. Even as efforts continued to develop, professional security forces loyal to the TFG, an 8,000-strong AU peacekeeping force, AMISOM, has provided the critical measure of stability for the embattled government.

In considering its alternatives in Somalia, the UN Security Council opted for a cautious approach to the deployment of blue helmets. Instead, for the first time, assessed funds from the UN budget are being used to help finance the operations of a regional force. The aid to AMISOM, ranging from equipment and logistics to the management of public information, is being provided through the Department of Field Support and its Nairobi-based mission known as UNSOA.

Regional and international resolve to defeat the insurgents hardened after Al Shabab claimed responsibility for two deadly suicide bombings targeting football fans watching the World Cup final in the Ugandan capital, Kampala, in July. Uganda and Burundi have been the major troop-contributing countries to AMISOM.

Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon has considered it a priority to do more for Somalia, saying that no country can be abandoned to lawlessness and chaos. He hosted major international conferences on Somalia in Brussels and Istanbul, and a high-level meeting on the margins of the UN General Assembly in September. The events helped to shine a spotlight on the country, improve international coordination and shore up political and financial commitments to help Somalia in its time of need.

Concerns about the country becoming a haven for terrorism have combined with dramatic incidents of piracy off the Somali coast to increase the depth of international concern.

The UN has hosted regular international meetings on Somali piracy, monitored and reported on trends, and established an anti-piracy trust fund managed by the Department of Political Affairs. The fund has been used to finance projects to build capacities around the region to prosecute piracy suspects. The Secretary-General also appointed a senior French diplomat and jurist, Jack Lang, to advise on how to further strengthen criminal prosecutions.

The Istanbul meeting, co-chaired with the Government of Turkey in May 2010, underscored the importance not only of political and military measures, but also of rebuilding Somalia’s shattered economy. Dozens of business representatives were in attendance, from within the country, from the Somali diaspora and from the international community. UNPOS had identified certain prospective areas, including livestock, fisheries, alternative energy, transport, infrastructure and banking. The companies taking part ranged from a Saudi firm importing Somali livestock to a Somali tunacanning company.

Somalis have never stopped doing business amid the strife. Despite nearly two decades without a stable central government, there were an estimated 1.5 million mobile phone accounts in the country in 2010. The diaspora sends over $1 billion in remittances every year.

While reaching out to the diaspora, SRSG Mahiga also proposed to increase UNPOS’ physical presence on the ground, including in Mogadishu, as security conditions permit.

As of late 2010, more than 60 international UN staff were based inside Somalia, along with nearly 800 national staff working for various UN agencies, delivering humanitarian assistance and implementing recovery and development programmes to some 2 million people in need of humanitarian assistance.

The UN logistical support provided by UNSOA has included a sea-based supply chain from Mombasa to AMISOM peacekeepers in Mogadishu, bringing in everything from rations to construction material on a monthly basis. UNSOA also provides medical evacuation as well as aviation services for the deployment and rotation of troops from Burundi and Uganda, and the transportation of contingent equipment and supplies.

As the end of the year approached, the Security Council called for a 50 per cent increase in the number of
AMISOM troops, raising the number to 12,000. In a unanimous vote on 22 December, the Council adopted resolution 1964 extending AMISOM until 30 September 2011 and calling on Member States and international organizations to contribute funds and equipment “generously and promptly” to enable the force to fulfil a mandate that ranges from restoring peace to helping the TFG develop national security and police forces.

Resolution 1964 also asked the Secretary-General to continue to provide UN logistical support to the enlarged AMISOM, while continuing his good offices for fostering reconciliation in the country. The Council reiterated its intent, mentioned in past resolutions, to set up a UN peacekeeping operation when conditions permit.

THE MIDDLE EAST REMAINS HIGH ON UN PEACE AND SECURITY AGENDA

In the absence of a comprehensive overall settlement and amid the unstable security environment and precarious humanitarian situation in the Middle East, the United Nations continued to be heavily involved in the region on several fronts: political, peacekeeping, developmental and humanitarian.

The United Nations Special Coordinator Office for the Middle East (UNSCO), with offices in Jerusalem, Ramallah and Gaza, leads the UN system in all political and diplomatic efforts related to the Middle East peace process. UNSCO also coordinates the humanitarian and developmental work of UN agencies and programmes in the occupied Palestinian territory (oPt), in support of the Palestinian Authority and the Palestinian people.

In Lebanon, while the massive deployment of blue-helmeted peacekeepers as part of the UN Interim Force (UNIFIL) may be the most visible aspect of the UN presence in the south, the UN Special Coor-
The UN Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) – the first-ever UN peacekeeping operation – remain in operation. It was set up in 1948 to monitor ceasefires, supervise armistice agreements, prevent isolated incidents from escalating and assist other UN peacekeeping operations in the region to fulfill their respective mandates.

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UNSCO: SUPPORTING A TWO-STATE SOLUTION IN THE MIDDLE EAST

As the only international peace mission based on the ground in Jerusalem, Ramallah and Gaza, the Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process (UNSCO), under the leadership of Robert Serry, was at the centre of an interlinking set of developments during 2010.

The mission prioritized the need to close the gap between developments on the ground and the aspirations of the political process. In parallel, it was also actively engaged with the parties, the Quartet and the Security Council in pushing for resumed and comprehensive political negotiations.

Partnering closely with the Palestinian Authority (PA) has been an organizing theme for the UN’s political and development work. Prime Minister Salam Fayyad’s state-building programme made significant gains in 2010. Special Coordinator Serry pledged further support of the UN system for completing institutional preparations for statehood by August 2011.

Under UNSCO’s auspices, the UN agencies, funds and programmes operating in the occupied Palestinian territory have further strengthened internal coordination and their combined support for this agenda. The significance of the state-building agenda was acknowledged in New York in September, when both the Quartet and the Security Council noted the World Bank assessment that the Palestinian Authority was institutionally ready for statehood at any point in the near future.

UNSCO continued to promote further Israeli measures to provide access for the Palestinian Authority to areas of the West Bank that are under Israeli control. There has been a widely acknowledged improvement in security on the ground thanks to the PA’s efforts. Further Israeli-PA security coordination must be a priority so that neither Palestinian militants nor extremist Israeli settlers are able to commit acts of violence that harm civilians and undermine prospects for peace. Equally important will be a further easing of movement restrictions in the West Bank that builds on progress made to date.

The other key UNSCO and UN-wide priority has been to improve conditions in Gaza where the subsistence of over 80 per cent of inhabitants, roughly 1.5 million Palestinians, still depends on humanitarian aid. Special Coordinator Serry has worked intensively with the Israeli government to secure approvals of UN construction projects and an easing of the Israeli closure, cognizant of Israeli security concerns. A first breakthrough was achieved with the visit of the Secretary-General in March, and some of the projects approved at that time were completed before the end of the year.

A revision of Israel’s blockade policy was undertaken in May of this year. As Quartet Envoy Tony Blair worked closely with the Israeli government to spur this process, he drew on the inputs of UNSCO as part of a collective Quartet effort to bring about an improvement to the lives of the inhabitants of Gaza. Since then, there has been some easing of import restrictions and the approval of more projects.

Although fundamental elements of the closure remained in place, the Government of Israel decided towards the end of the year to permit the expansion of exports from the Gaza strip, which was a significant step in the right direction. Approved reconstruction projects involving what Israel characterizes as “dual use” material totalled approximately $100 million in 2010. These include housing, schools, waste-water treatment and health facilities. Such assistance will not only have a direct positive impact on the lives of many Gazans, but should also have an economic multiplier effect, helping the relief efforts in the whole of the Gaza Strip.

Priorities for 2011 must be progress in the movement of persons and the provision of construction materials to the private sector. Pushing for further steps from all parties regarding Gaza to implement Security Council resolution 1860, passed at the end of the Israel-Gaza war of 2008-2009, remains a key objective of UNSCO in the year ahead.

This also places significant responsibilities on the de facto authorities in Gaza to refrain from and prevent attacks into Israel. At-
tacks continued, albeit at reduced levels in 2010, as did Israeli strikes and incursions, underlining the continued fragility of the situation. It is critically important that efforts continue to reunite Gaza with the West Bank within a legitimate Palestinian, regional and international framework. UNSCO has continued to use its contacts to urge all parties in this direction.

Despite these modest improvements on the ground, the lack of political progress was the paramount challenge of 2010. As Special Coordinator Serry underscored in his briefings to the Security Council, it is only if improvements on the ground are tied to a serious political horizon that the gains to date will be sustainable and more fundamental breakthroughs can be achieved. In this regard, 2010 was a frustrating year. PA President Mahmoud Abbas and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu declared their readiness to negotiate a two-State solution, but talks remained bedeviled by disputes over illegal Israeli settlement construction.

After several months of proximity talks, the two sides finally began direct negotiations on 2 September in a summit in Washington, aiming to complete a framework agreement in a year. A Hamas attack on settlers near Hebron shortly before the leaders’ meeting was condemned by the United Nations, but did not deter the leaders from continuing. However, when Israel’s settlement restraint expired in 26 September 2010, talks broke down.

UNSCO has drawn international attention to the continuing damage that settlement activity causes to confidence in the political process and to the very viability of a two-State solution. This also pertains to East Jerusalem, where tensions arise from unilateral actions that undermine trust. When US efforts to secure renewed settlement restraint were not successful, the process suffered a serious setback and direct negotiations could not be restarted.
By December, the US had begun a process of indirect consultations with the parties on the core issues. Special Coordinator Serry stressed to the Security Council the need for the international community to shift strategy given the impasse in the political process. He signaled that more substantive third party mediation is required if the goals set for 2011—a framework peace agreement and the realization of Palestinian readiness for statehood—are to be met. An urgent focus on the elements of a negotiated two-State end-game, together with close Quartet consultation and effective engagement with the parties and the Arab League, will be essential for the credibility of the process.

The urgency of progress on the peace process has been underscored by a tense regional environment during 2010. There was no progress in efforts to promote dialogue between Israel and Syria during this period. Nonetheless, the Special Coordinator continued his engagement with the governments of the region. He has sought their support for Palestinian state-building efforts and Palestinian reconciliation, and discussed ways in which the Quartet and the United Nations could play their full roles in sponsoring a substantive Israeli-Palestinian political negotiation. He also briefed them on UN efforts in Gaza, underlining UN support for a comprehensive approach to Middle East peace as envisaged in Security Council resolutions and the Arab Peace Initiative. His ability to share assessments with a wider range of regional interlocutors remains a key asset for the mission.

After a year of political impasse, it is vital that 2011 be a year of genuine breakthrough in the Middle East peace process. Ensuring that the UN is actively and effectively engaged in bringing this about will be a key challenge for UNSCO.

UNSCOL: THE CHALLENGE OF PEACEMAKING IN LEBANON

As 2010 drew to a close in Lebanon, the usual bustle of New Year’s and religious celebrations created a festive atmosphere and the semblance of normalcy. But this was a year of renewed political polarization and rising tension in the small Mediterranean country, slowing or paralyzing the work of state institutions for months. Two political camps, the 14 March coalition headed by Prime Minister Saad Hariri and the 8 March alliance that includes Hizbullah, took diverging views of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, established by UN Security Council resolution 1757 in 2007 to try those behind the 2005 assassination of former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri. While Saad Hariri, the son of the assassinated former prime minister, and his allies continued to express staunch support for the Tribunal, the parliamentary opposition raised questions over the legitimacy of the international legal body, as well as Lebanon’s financial support for it.

In this context, UNSCOL, the Office of Special Coordinator for Lebanon Michael Williams, was engaged in ongoing contacts with all sides to help calm the tension. “I have been concerned by the political deadlock that has prevailed in the country. I continue to hope and call on all sides to engage in open dialogue and to use the regular institutions of the state to resolve any differences, irrespective of how sensitive. There can be no alternative to this,” said Williams, following a meeting with Prime Minister Hariri in early December. Williams represents the UN Secretary-General in Lebanon, coordinates the work of the UN family, and is also the senior-most UN official following up on Security Council resolution 1701 (2006). Providing the good offices of the Secretary-General to help overcome tension and political stalemate, he has carried similar messages to meetings with a wide array of representatives of the various sides across Lebanon’s political spectrum over the last months of 2010.

Williams recently completed two years in Lebanon as UN Special Coordinator and Special Representative in 2010. During that period, the country moved from prolonged political deadlock to a period of stability and progress following the formation of a national unity government in December 2009—only to fall back into another phase of stalemate and crisis.
In addition to his focus on helping maintain Lebanon’s security and stability, Williams has also been concerned with how the political stalemate in Lebanon may affect the implementation of Security Council resolution 1701, the resolution that put an end to 33 days of violent warfare between Israel and Hizbullah in July and August 2006. That resolution brought about the longest period of calm and stability in south Lebanon and along the Blue Line separating Lebanon and Israel in decades. But a clash between the Lebanese Army and the Israel Defense Forces on the border point of Adaysseh in August 2010, leaving four killed on both sides of the Blue Line, served as a reminder that despite the calm, the situation remained fragile and could deteriorate quickly. As the UN keeps reminding all parties, more efforts need to be exerted to move towards a longer-term ceasefire, as envisaged in the resolution.

In this regard, UNSCOL, the political and peacemaking branch of the UN in Lebanon, works closely with the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), with some 12,000 troops the UN’s third-largest peacekeeping mission. In late 2010, Special Coordinator Williams and UNIFIL Force Commander Gen. Alberto Asarta Cuevas traveled together to Israel after a decision by the Israeli security cabinet to accept, in principle, a new UN proposal to achieve the withdrawal of Israeli military forces from the northern part of Ghajar, a village straddling the Blue Line and whose northern half falls in Lebanese territory. Williams and Asarta then followed up these discussions with meetings with Lebanon’s top leaders to brief them on the anticipated Israeli withdrawal.

To ensure the full implementation of resolution 1701, the UN Special Coordinator, who is based in Beirut, frequently traveled to Israel, but also visited Lebanon’s other neighbour, Syria, as well as other relevant countries in the region, including Turkey and Egypt. In Lebanon, Williams regularly visited areas outside Beirut to better understand the country’s diverse political landscape and the challenges that confront its population.

Lebanon may be a small country in size, but its geographic location at the heart of the volatile Middle East, its open political system and dynamics that frequently serve as an indicator of the broader region’s political climate, have long exposed it to extensive international attention and diplomacy. And the UN’s work here is far from limited to peacekeeping and peacemaking: Lebanon’s relations with the UN run long and deep. The country was among the founding members of the United Nations in 1945 and through its representative in San Francisco and then New York, played a prominent role in the drafting of key foundational documents. Beirut quickly became the seat of several UN offices and today hosts 24 different agencies. These cover the entire spectrum of political, peacekeeping, socio-economic, humanitarian and human rights issues and invest over $250 million annually in their activities in the country. The work of the agencies is complimentary and based on the principle that peace and security can only hold if accompanied by development and respect for human rights.

Over the past year, UNSCOL tried to enhance the coherence and coordination of the overlapping areas of UN engagement in Lebanon. One of these areas is work to improve the conditions of some 400,000 Palestinian refugees living in 12 official refugee camps in the country. “I was very pleased to hear that in the New Year, in 2011, the Palestinian people will be able to return to the camp,” Special Coordinator Williams said after a visit to the Nahr al-Bared refugee camp in northern Lebanon. The camp had been devastated in heavy fighting between the Lebanese army and an armed terrorist group in May 2007. Since then, the UN has spearheaded the effort to ensure the camp’s reconstruction and the return of the refugees to their homes.

Lebanon faces a range of challenges in the spheres of politics, security, and socio-economic development, as well as full respect of universal human rights. In light of such challenges, the UN Special Coordinator has frequently emphasized that open dialogue is the only way to move forward, and safeguarding and utilizing the institutions of the state is the only guarantee for stability and security. “I hope 2011 will offer all Lebanese such stability and security,” he says. In order to do its part, the UN continues to stand ready to assist the government and the people of Lebanon to meet the challenges they face.
After careful GPS measurement of map coordinates, the Lebanese Army soldier delivers two blows with a lump hammer to embed a metal stake in the soil.

Then he sprays the rod in red paint to define it as the marker of the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF). Next to it, another stake is painted United Nations blue and the one of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) is painted yellow. The point agreed to will be where a blue barrel will be erected, defining the Blue Line at that location.

Visibly marking the Blue Line, which separates Lebanon from Israel, is a task undertaken by the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) in coordination with the two countries. The effort is ambitious and the work is painstaking, but the rewards for peace may be well worth it.

The process recently overseen by UNIFIL on the Blue Line near the village of Blida in southern Lebanon will have to be repeated hundreds of times on both the Lebanese and Israeli sides before the job is done.

The Blue Line, sometimes confused as an international border, is in fact the Line of Withdrawal of Israeli forces from southern Lebanon drawn by the UN in 2000. Following the 2006 hostilities, the UN Security Council, by its resolution 1701, tasked UNIFIL, among other things, to verify the withdrawal of Israeli forces from southern Lebanon.

The sole purpose of the Blue Line is to verify the Israeli withdrawal without any prejudice to future border agreements between all concerned.

But the Blue Line is also as complex as many other issues in the Middle East, entangled in history and in today’s political realities. Both Lebanon and Israel in the year 2000 confirmed to the UN Secretary-General that identifying the Blue Line was the sole responsibility of the United Nations and undertook to respect the line in its entirety, despite their reservations on some points.
The Blue Line remains the only reference point for ensuring that there is no violation by any side. This is an important element of the cessation of hostilities and the related obligations that both the parties have taken upon themselves.

In 2007, a year after the last conflict, UNIFIL undertook to visibly mark the Blue Line. The purpose is to establish a clear, common understanding of the line and to mitigate the scope for possible misunderstanding between the Lebanese and Israeli armies as some had upon themselves.

The effort continues today, with many months remaining before the job is done. For UNIFIL, visibly marking the Blue Line is a technical task that must be executed with precision and with the full agreement of both Lebanon and Israel.

The Blue Line was determined on the map by UN cartographers based on 1923 Anglo-French maps when the powers drew borders in the Middle East and the 1949 Armistice between Lebanon and Israel. Over the decades, markers on the ground disappeared due to environmental factors and maps went missing. Then came the modern technology of the Global Positioning System.

On the ground, at many points the Blue Line is invisible, and sometimes complex. For example, at the Sheikh Abbad Hill near the village of Houla, the fence cuts through the tomb of an historic cleric revered by both Muslims and Jews. Elsewhere, it is a crow’s fly between two rocks painted blue by cartographers, defined by markings on an open field or by the median line of a river bed.

The likelihood of inadvertent violations of the Blue Line by civilians, particularly shepherds, is high given the difficulty in identifying it. Hence the need for visible marking on the ground.

The Blue Line runs through rough, inhospitable mountain terrain in places, abuts roads and houses in other locations and, in one case at the village of Ghajar in the east, slices right through it. Israel has built a fence south of the Blue Line, referred to as the Technical Fence. In places the two are adjacent and in other places this Israeli high-security fence runs up to a few hundred metres away from the Blue Line.

![Map of the Blue Line and UNIFIL Deployment](image-url)
Minefields and the sensitivity of some locations tend to slow down the process of visible marking.

In addition, UNIFIL discusses marking with the parties and makes sure the sides are satisfied. Then UNIFIL goes with teams from each country to do measurements on the ground based on GPS coordinates provided by UNIFIL. This can only be done after UNIFIL demining teams clear pathways for the teams to reach the designated location.

UNIFIL does its own measurements. If the measurements of the Lebanese, UNIFIL and Israeli sides match or are within 50 centimetres (about 19.7 inches) of each other, a Blue Barrel point is marked and UNIFIL engineers are called in to build it, with the location later verified by the parties. If the discrepancy is more than 50 centimetres “then we’re back basically to the drawing board,” says John Molloy, the UNIFIL Political Affairs Officer in charge of the task.

The next point to place a blue barrel will have to be within the line of sight of another blue barrel.

It is painstaking work by a group of officers from UNIFIL and the LAF on the Lebanese side and UNIFIL and the IDF on the Israeli side. Hundreds of people are involved in the effort: mapping people from UNIFIL, LAF and IDF, as well as demining teams and construction engineers from UNIFIL, according to Molloy.

By the end of November 2010, 72 blue barrels had been built on agreed locations, 25 of them still requiring final confirmation from the Lebanese and Israeli sides.

The task ahead is monumental. Molloy said there are 198 coordinates along the Blue Line’s 118 kilometres (about 73.3 miles).

“There will be many, many more barrels when we finish … approximately 469 is what we feel we need to create an inter-visible line,” he added.

According to Molloy, the parties are interested in the visible marking, and that is what matters:

“When there’s a will, there’s a way.”
For Iraq, the year 2010 was marked by significant achievements in building a democratic state, however many challenges remain. On 7 March, Iraq held its second parliamentary election relatively successfully. The election was followed by a lengthy series of negotiations between the Iraqi political blocs on the formation of the government that culminated in the re-election of the President and Parliament Speaker by the Council of Representatives on 12 November, followed by the appointment of a broadly representative cabinet and confirmation of the Prime Minister on 21 December. Over much of the year, delays in the formation of the government had affected all aspects of life in Iraq, constituting a true test for the country’s transition.

UNAMI’s electoral assistance team, working closely with other UN agencies and international partners, supported the March 2010 parliamentary elections by providing technical assistance and strengthening the capacity of Iraqi elections officials to organize and conduct the election, continuing a role it has played since the first post-war elections and referendum in 2005.

The election was also a significant step towards the IHEC becoming a sustainable, independent, and professional institution that may serve as a regional role model. To support that goal, nearly $25 million for a UNDP/UNOPS institutional development project was approved on September 30 by the UN Development Group Iraq Trust Fund Steering Committee as the last programming allocation of the Fund’s resources.

Following the 7 March election, Iraqi politicians entered into eight months of negotiations on the formation of the government amidst internal and international concerns over the repercussions of the political crisis on the security situation in the country.
“This is a real test for Iraq’s transition to democracy and the commitment of Iraqi leaders to adhere to the country’s Constitution,” said Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Iraq (SRSG) Ad Melkert, who had consistently called on the country’s leaders to form a new Government through an inclusive process.

Following extensive talks between Iraqi political blocs, the Iraqi Parliament convened on 12 November, re-elected Jalal Talabani as President of the Republic of Iraq and elected the Parliament Speaker (from the Iraqiya List), as well as his two deputies (from the Sadrist Trend and the Kurdistan Alliance). President Talabani then announced that he would task Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki (as leader of the largest bloc) with forming the Government, and on 21 December, the Council of Representatives confirmed the appointment of a broadly representative cabinet under Prime Minister al-Maliki.

These developments were hailed worldwide. UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon welcomed this “major step forward in Iraq’s democratic progress,” urging that prompt attention be given to national reconciliation, reconstruction and long-term stability. He also called on Iraqi leaders “to continue demonstrating the same spirit of partnership in moving swiftly to conclude the formation of a new government.”

SRSG Melkert commended the Iraqi parties for their efforts at reaching agreement on a successful transition between elected governments under full Iraqi sovereignty. He called on all Iraqi parties to work hand in hand, in the spirit of national unity.

At the same time, the security situation remained volatile as targeted and indiscriminate terrorist attacks continued throughout the year, including attacks against newly-elected members of parliament, government officials, media workers, and minority, ethnic and religious groups.

Despite the challenging security environment, UNAMI continued to deliver on its mandate for the seventh year by extending support to the government and people of Iraq in all areas stipulated by relevant Security Council resolutions, including political facilitation, electoral and constitutional support, human rights, humanitarian and development assistance, and the
resolution of outstanding issues between Iraq and its neighbours.

**INTENSIFIED POLITICAL FACILITATION**

UNAMI’s leadership remained focused on facilitating political dialogue and national reconciliation. Prior to the election, the SRSG’s mediation efforts helped Iraqi leaders reach agreements on key issues such as amendments to the electoral law.

As the post-election crisis intensified, SRSG Melkert engaged extensively with all Iraqi political blocs, urging them to work together in the spirit of national dialogue and reconciliation to form an inclusive representational government.

Restarting the stalled dialogue between the Arabs and Kurds in the Nineveh governorate of Iraq’s Kurdistan region was also at the heart of the SRSG’s efforts to end the boycott of the Nineveh Fraternal List, a coalition of seven Kurdish parties, to the provincial council of Nineva. Hosted by the SRSG, these talks between the Hadba (Sunni Arab party) and the Nineveh Fraternal List sought to address the situation of detainees, the rights of minorities and security arrangements in the province. UNAMI facilitated the formation of a committee on missing persons and detainees, and another for the protection of minorities with a view to enabling the return of the Fraternal List to the provincial administration and the council.

With government formation dominating the political agenda, UNAMI continued to assist Iraqis in resolving a number of political and constitutional challenges, including those related to disputed areas, revenue-sharing, adoption of hydrocarbon legislation, relations among federal, regional and provincial governments, the constitutional review process, and strengthening institutions of governance and rule of law.

UNAMI remained engaged with helping Iraq fulfill its obligations under the Security Council’s Chapter VII resolutions in order to assist with the removal of sanctions. On 15 December, those efforts were validated when the Security Council adopted three historic resolutions, returning control of mineral exports to the Government of Iraq, formally ending the residual activities of the Oil-for-Food Programme, and lifting restrictions on programmes for the development of nuclear energy (contained in resolutions 1956, 1957 and 1958, and Presidential Statement S/PRST/27). The Secretary-General hailed the decision as a major step toward restoring Iraq’s standing within the community of nations.

Regarding the situation between Iraq and Kuwait, the Security Council welcomed, in its presidential statement, the progress made by the Governments of Iraq and Kuwait towards the resolution of outstanding issues between them, and encouraged further cooperation. It also called on Iraq to quickly fulfill its remaining obligations under the relevant Chapter VII resolutions pertaining to the situation between Iraq and Kuwait.

**HUMAN RIGHTS**

The promotion of human rights remains a UNAMI priority as the mission continued to monitor and report on developments and provide advice to the Iraqi Government.

The Representative of the Secretary-General on Human Rights of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), Walter Kaelin, undertook a 10-day visit to Iraq to raise the profile of issues faced by IDP communities in the country.

UNAMI and partners also assisted the Iraqi Government with drafting its first national submission to the Human Rights Universal Periodic Review (UPR) and trained civil society representatives on how to produce reports to treaty bodies.

UNAMI and representatives from the Ministries of Defence, Justice and Interior and the US Embassy further agreed to establish a national steering committee to monitor human rights, particularly in Iraqi prisons. UNAMI and UNICEF are also co-chairing a Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism Country Task Force on the protection of children in conflict.

**INTEGRATED PRIORITIES**

The mission and the UN Country Team continued to address the four priorities identified in 2009 by the United Nations in Iraq: disputed internal boundaries; social safety nets; conducting a national census and civil registration; and water resource management. These issues require an integrated and holistic approach by the UN system in Iraq which recognizes that development and political and human stability are interlinked.

UN humanitarian and recovery work continued to focus on addressing the impact of drought; mine action; protection of internally displaced persons, refugees and returnees; and supporting social safety nets. However, the lack of access and security, combined with insufficient humanitarian funding, continued to hinder the ability of humanitarian organizations to ef-
effectively assess and respond to unmet needs. The increased presence of UNAMI staff in the hubs around the country played a critical role in monitoring the humanitarian situation and coordinating with partners. The Office of Development and Humanitarian Support, under Deputy SRSG, Resident Coordinator and Humanitarian Coordinator Christine McNab, continued to advocate on these issues, as well as to ensure information sharing between the UN system and government counterparts.

On 11 May, a significant benchmark in Iraq’s development planning was reached, with the launch of the UN Development Assistance Framework 2011-2014 for Iraq. With Iraq’s National Development Plan, the UNDAF will support Iraq’s efforts to realize the Millennium Development Goals.

UNAMA: ANOTHER TOUGH YEAR FOR AFGHANISTAN

If 2010 started out as a “make it or break it” year for Afghanistan, the situation at the end of the year was less clear cut: “Things have not quite been made, but nor are they broken,” assessed Special Representative of the Secretary-General Staffan de Mistura, who took up his post in March. Violence and fighting spread to many parts of the country that were previously peaceful. But at the same time, there was reason to hope that efforts to initiate dialogue for a peace settlement might take hold in 2011.

It was another very tough year for Afghan communities. The Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon (left) and Staffan de Mistura, his Special Representative for Afghanistan, are greeted by children as they make their way to the Afghan Foreign Ministry where they attended the Kabul International Conference on Afghanistan. 19 July 2010. (UN Photo by Eric Kanalstein)
mid-year human rights report by the United Nations Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) documented a rise in civilian casualties to 3,268, including 1,271 deaths, in six months. The report indicated that women and children are increasingly bearing the brunt of the war. And figures towards the year’s end were likely to show a continuation of this escalation. Local government officials and aid workers were targeted by insurgents in districts across the country, with insecurity rated as the biggest problem by a majority of Afghans in a recent national survey. UN humanitarian agencies, together with Afghan and other international organizations, struggled to deliver much-needed support to people amidst the violence in rural communities, where poverty has been exacerbated by 30 years of conflict.

UNAMA itself faced a daunting challenge at the start of 2010. Practically, the mission faced reassessing how to live and operate in increasingly tight security conditions following the fatal attack on UN workers at the Bakhtar Guest House in Kabul in late 2009. Politically, the mission reassessed how to ensure that the UN could play a constructive and useful role in a very complex conflict situation in assisting Afghans achieve what they most urgently demanded: peace.

Following the departure of the former chief of mission Kai Eide in March 2010, after two years of distinguished service, SRSG de Mistura wasted no time in addressing the pressing need to refocus the mission following a tumultuous 2009. He shaped what became known as the “3+1” priorities for UNAMA: support to national parliamentary elections, working with the UNDP-ELECT team; support to Afghan efforts to initiate political dialogue; encouragement and practical support for regional cooperation with Afghanistan’s neighbours towards sustainable peace; and contributing to more coherent international aid and development support. Human rights protection and promoting equality of Afghan women remain at the core of UNAMA’s work, as well as its integrated approach with UN Country Team members who continue to deliver urgently needed humanitarian as well as development support to communities. A 2010 UNDP report placed Afghanistan at the bottom of the Human Development Index in Asia.

“Afghan leadership” was the theme that ran through all political as well as key development policy work of the year. The president and government led the way in establishing the architecture for inclusive efforts toward dialogue aimed at ending the conflict. Following the London Conference in January, President Karzai convened a 1,600-member Consultative Peace Jirga in June, which set the parameters for dialogue with the Taliban. The 70-member High Peace Council was established in September, in accordance with the Jirga’s recommendations. Afghan civil society also held meetings supported by UNAMA aimed at ensuring its voice is heard in efforts to define a peace settlement.

UNAMA established the Salaam Support Group in October following a request for UN assistance to Afghan efforts to seek avenues to peace.

At the historic Kabul Conference in June, co-chaired by Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, foreign ministers from more than 40 countries endorsed the government’s 23 priority programmes aimed at better governance and development delivery to the Afghan people.

Support by UNAMA and UNDP-ELECT to Afghanistan’s independent electoral institutions was a major focus of 2010. In the country’s second parliamentary elections, held under extreme security conditions, these institutions were widely regarded as having achieved significantly higher standards than in the 2009 elections. While widespread irregularities and fraud were reported on election day, the electoral authorities worked hard to detect and disqualify fraud—ultimately throwing out 1.3 million cast ballots.

As SRSG de Mistura noted in the lead-up to the ballot, “just the fact that these elections are taking place and so many candidates are exposing their own faces, their own names, and their own campaigns, and hopefully many Afghans will go and vote for them, is something that Afghanistan should be proud of.”

The year 2011 will begin with some tough questions: will the political efforts of 2010 prove to be the foundation from which inclusive dialogue can emerge? Can progress be achieved toward a peace settlement between Afghans? How will the NATO-led transition towards Afghan responsibility for security work in the provinces? Will the human rights and humanitarian toll of the conflict be stemmed? UNAMA is positioned to play an active role in supporting Afghan-led initiatives toward peace in 2011, at the same time continuing the UN family’s longstanding role in defending the Afghan people’s human rights and supporting their humanitarian needs.
In 2010, the security and political situation in Timor-Leste was stable, allowing state institutions the space to increasingly focus on the country’s longer-term challenges, while the United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT) turned to capacity-building as its core work for the coming year.

Briefing the UN Security Council on 19 October, Ms. Ameerah Haq, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of UNMIT, observed that the political discourse in the country had generally moved past the dramatic events of 2006, to forward-looking discussions on how to build on recent gains and ensure the future prosperity and stability of Timor-Leste.

Many plans, strategies and institutions have been developed with a longer-term focus, including the Anti-Corruption Commission, the Justice Sector Strategic Plan for Timor-Leste and a package of national security laws. However, implementation in furtherance of these critical initial steps and sustaining momentum in efforts to address systemic, institutional and political fragilities are among the challenges currently faced by Timor-Leste.

Stability is an essential factor for ongoing peacebuilding in Timor-Leste. UNMIT police and the Policia Nacional de Timor-Leste (PNTL) have contributed much toward the current security and stability of the country, and good cooperation with the international security forces of Australia and New Zealand, also deployed in the country, continues. Indeed, since 2006, the mission has been actively supporting the efforts of the Timorese authorities to develop the PNTL into a sustainable, accountable and professional police service.

In many peacekeeping operations, UN police have a monitoring, train-
Since 2006, UNMIT police have also been entrusted with interim executive policing responsibilities in Timor-Leste. The UN Police Commissioner, in exercising his duties and with full respect for the sovereignty of Timor-Leste, works in close coordination and consultation with the PNTL General Commander.

In 2009, the UN began transferring primary policing responsibilities to the PNTL, which continued through 2010. As of December 2010, the PNTL had resumed primary policing responsibilities in 10 of the country’s 13 districts without any significant change in the security situation in those districts. The resumption of primary policing responsibilities was pending in only three districts and six PNTL units, with Dili District, home of the country’s capital, remaining as the most challenging. The resumption process is expected to be completed in all districts and units in 2011, assuming that the mutually agreed criteria for handover are met.

However, the resumption of responsibilities by the PNTL does not mean the full withdrawal of the UNMIT police, which remain in all 13 districts and continue to support the further training, capacity-building, institutional development and strengthening of the PNTL. Throughout 2010, UNMIT provided training to the PNTL in human rights, including on aspects such as the use of force and observation of human rights during arrest, detention, and investigation. UNMIT and international partners also provided training to members of the Timorese armed forces, Falintil-Forças de Defesa de Timor-Leste (F-FDTL), in the areas of human rights, rule of law, and gender awareness.

The government and UNMIT are working in close cooperation on strategies to meet the post-resumption challenges of continued PNTL capacity-building and institutional strengthening, with a new agreement being negotiated to cover these aspects.

While the PNTL’s performance continued to show improvement, challenges remain, including the institutionalization of effective disciplinary mechanisms, command and control structures, weapons control mechanisms and planning processes, as well as the provision of adequate logistical support. In almost every district, the PNTL continued to face serious logistical shortages, resulting in its continued dependence on UNMIT police for the conduct of daily duties.
UNMIT’s human rights team continued to monitor and report alleged ill-treatment by members of the security forces. The number of reported human rights violations by the PNTL and F-FDTL remained stable, while some improvement in accountability was noted with the increased implementation of internal disciplinary measures for members of the security forces, in particular the PNTL.

Gender-based and domestic violence are among the most pressing issues which UNPOL and PNTL have to address, in collaboration with the justice system and the broader population. They are widespread, yet perpetrators are rarely punished through the formal justice system. The Vulnerable Persons Unit of the PNTL continues to investigate gender-based and domestic violence cases. The National Parliament passed a long-awaited law on domestic violence on 3 May 2010. The UN Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM) provided support to the government in drafting the legislation and worked specifically with members of the Women’s Parliamentary Caucus on various aspects of the issue, including the need to raise public awareness.

UN system partners in Timor-Leste, including UNIFEM, have provided support to the Timorese authorities and other stakeholders on a range of measures to address gender-based violence. The national campaign to end violence against women continues, with key national leaders as promoters and advocates.

The humanitarian situation has stabilized considerably since 2006, such that, in 2010, the UN discontinued the position of the Humanitarian Coordinator in Timor-Leste. Ongoing projects of the United Nations Development Programme and International Organization for Migration continue to support the sustainable return of former internally displaced persons (IDPs). The government, with World Food Programme support, has established a multi-agency food security assessment system to help improve disaster preparedness and response.

The expectation of UN Member States and the Government of Timor-Leste is that UNMIT will begin to draw down during the second half of 2012. Preliminary planning, in consultation with the government, has already begun for a smooth transition. This includes identifying tasks that need to continue and by which actors, following the end of UNMIT’s mandate, as this young country continues on its road to sustainable peace and development.
UN MISSION PREPARES TO WITHDRAW FROM NEPAL

Despite positive developments in Nepal’s peace process in 2010, the year was marked by political deadlock and missed deadlines in the implementation of commitments made in the 2006 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). With the United Nations Mission in Nepal (UNMIN) supporting the monitoring of the Maoist army and the Nepal army, the government and the Unified Communist Party of Nepal (UCPN)-Maoist continued to discuss the modalities for the integration of Maoist army personnel into the security forces or their rehabilitation into society. Consensus, however, remained elusive.

As UNMIN prepared to withdraw from Nepal on 15 January 2011 in line with an agreement between the parties and at the request of the government, United Nations officials pledged continued UN support for the process after the mission’s departure.

The year began with a positive step in the peace process when the Maoist army discharged the 4,008 individuals who had been disqualified in a United Nations-led verification process. Three-quarters were disqualified because they joined the Maoist army as minors, while the others had joined after the ceasefire that brought Nepal’s 10-year conflict to a close in 2005. The 30-day discharge process, completed on 8 February 2010, followed an agreement on an action plan for rehabilitation that was signed the previous year by the UCPN (Maoist), the government and the United Nations. In November, the Security Council Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict conducted a week-long visit to Nepal to assess progress in implementation of the action plan.

The peace process suffered a blow on 20 March with the death of the Nepali Congress party president.
G.P. Koirala. The five-time prime minister – a towering figure in Nepali politics – had played a key role in convincing the political parties to accept the Maoists as a negotiating partner in 2005. He continued to be a voice in support of the process until his death.

In May, a week-long general strike called by the Maoists to demand the resignation of the government paralyzed much of the country. The Constituent Assembly then failed to meet its two-year deadline to draft a new constitution in accordance with the CPA. On the deadline, 28 May, the parties agreed to extend the body for an additional year, preventing a collapse of the peace process but without resolving their differences.

Throughout the year, the parties also came to late agreements to request extensions to UNMIN’s mandate. With the Security Council increasingly unwilling to extend the mission without substantial progress in the peace process, uncertainty prevailed in the days ahead of a Council session on Nepal on 15 September when the mandate was due to expire. On 13 September, UCPN-M Chairman Pushpa Kumar Dahal “Prachanda” and Prime Minister Madhav Kumar Nepal signed an agreement to request a final four-month extension for UNMIN, and to “basically complete” the remaining tasks of the peace process by 14 January 2011. In line with the request, Security Council resolution 1939 explicitly stated that UNMIN would leave Nepal after the termination of its mandate on 15 January 2011.

In the run-up to the mid-September Council session and the days that followed, the parties forged consensus on a number of procedural agreements. On 16 September, the special committee for the supervision, integration and rehabilitation of Maoist army personnel adopted guidelines for the supervision and control of the Maoist army. But substantial progress had not been made by early December when UN Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs B. Lynn Pascoe visited Nepal for the third time in 2010 to assess progress in the peace process and the arrangements to conclude UNMIN’s mandate.

On 9 December, the Security Council underlined the need for the Nepalese Government and all political parties to take advantage of the United Nations mission’s last weeks in Nepal to work in a spirit of compromise to ensure progress on outstanding issues in the peace process. Toward the end of the year, the parties had yet to agree on a work plan for integration and rehabilitation of Maoist army personnel or supervisory arrangements to help facilitate UNMIN’s orderly departure from Nepal.

KOSOVO REMAINS STABLE DURING TIME OF POLITICAL CHANGE

In 2010, the 11th year of the United Nations Interim Administration in Kosovo (UNMIK), the situation in Kosovo remained largely stable, although political developments provided new challenges for local and international institutions.

The much-anticipated advisory opinion by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) on the legality of Kosovo’s 2008 unilateral declaration of independence, announced on 22 July, held that the declaration was not a breach of international law.

On 9 September, the General Assembly adopted a resolution sponsored jointly by the 27 Member States of the European Union (EU) and Serbia that highlighted the readiness of the EU to facilitate a process of dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina. The Secretary-General reiterated the importance of dialogue between the parties as a factor promoting peace, security and stability in the context of the European perspective for the region and reaffirmed the readiness of the United Nations to contribute to this effort in close coordination with the European Union.

On 27 September, Kosovo’s President Fatmir Sejdiu stepped down after the Constitutional Court ruled that he had breached the Kosovo...
The Mission continued to focus on promoting security, stability and respect for human rights in Kosovo through engagement with all communities and with the authorities in Pristina and Belgrade, as well as with regional and international actors. In 2010, UNMIK’s work in assisting Kosovo’s under-represented communities continued to serve as a means of defusing tensions and resolving practical problems. In a coordinated action with UNHCR, Mercy Corps International, and the Roma and other residents of the Česmin Lug Camp, located in northern Mitrovica, UNMIK finally closed and sealed off the insalubrious camp, and its former residents were relocated to newly constructed homes funded by USAID in the Roma Mahalla, or to Osterode Camp to await the construction of additional homes funded by the EU.

Another key aspect of UNMIK’s work in 2010 was continuing facilitation of participation by the Kosovo institutions in regional multilateral mechanisms, where differences among members related to Kosovo’s status would otherwise impede this participation. While the Kosovo authorities have been less than enthusiastic about utilising UNMIK’s facilitation role, giving rise to concerns that Kosovo might choose not to participate in some fora, overall, there has been recognition of the value of regional cooperation and a reasonably pragmatic approach. In this respect, UNMIK continued to provide its assistance and to propose practical ways to overcome political obstacles.

A number of relatively low-level inter-ethnic incidents in northern Kosovo highlighted the potential for instability and the urgent need to address issues that continue to contribute to friction between the communities. UNMIK’s key challenge in northern Kosovo remained engaging with and mediating between the communities, as well as serving as a bridge between northern Kosovo and the Pristina authorities. In this regard, 2010 witnessed positive developments arising from UNMIK’s facilitation activities in northern Kosovo. For example, in the northern Mitrovica suburb of Kroï Vitakut/Brdjani, where in 2009 the Kosovo-Serb and Kosovo-Albanian communities repeatedly clashed over returns and reconstruction, there were relatively few incidents in 2010, and numerous houses and buildings were being built by both communities and families intending to return to their homes.

Kosovo reappeared in the international spotlight in December when, responding to a report by its chief investigator, the Council of Europe called for a series of international and national investigations into evidence of disappearances, organ trafficking, corruption and collusion between organised criminal groups and political circles in Kosovo.

And earlier, in July, an appeals panel at the UN’s International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), based in The Hague, ordered the former prime minister of Kosovo, Ramush Haradinaj, to be retried on war crimes charges, due to the alleged intimidation of witnesses at his initial trial held two years earlier.

As of December 2010, 72 of 192 United Nations Member States had recognized Kosovo as an independent state. This includes 22 out of 27 Member States of the European Union and 24 out of 28 Member States of NATO. However, a majority of UN Security Council Member States at present do not recognize Kosovo.

UNMIK continues to implement its mandate in a status-neutral manner and operate under Security Council resolution 1244 (1999), alongside the European Union Rule of Law Mission (EULEX), deployed in December 2008 and operating under the overall authority of the United Nations.
The beginning and end of 2010 in Cyprus were marked by joint encounters between UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon and the leaders of the island’s two main communities, largely seen as an expression of the Secretary-General’s personal support for the Cypriot-led talks to reunify the divided country and an effort to urge the leaders to achieve concrete advances in the ongoing discussions.

The Secretary-General paid a three-day visit to the island between 31 January and 2 February 2010, his first since assuming office. The occasion served as a much-needed boost to the talks, which have been underway for just over two years.

The renewed efforts to reunify the island began in September 2008 when the leaders of the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities launched the negotiation process with the Secretary-General's Special Adviser Alexander Downer serving as the chief negotiator and head of Mr. Ban’s Good Offices Mission. Since then, the two leaders have met over 90 times under the auspices of the United Nations. In a clear demonstration of their commitment to reach a comprehensive solution to the longstanding Cyprus problem, the leaders met over 30 times in the course of 2010. However, a lack of evident progress in the talks summoned the Secretary-General’s personal involvement once again, this time in a meeting with the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot leaders at UN Headquarters in November.

Following the November meeting, Secretary-General Ban announced that the leaders had
agreed to intensify their contacts in the following weeks in order to establish a practical plan for overcoming the major remaining points of disagreement. "The peace talks on Cyprus were losing momentum and needed a boost if the two sides are to reach a settlement while there is still the time and the political opportunity to do so," he stated. The Secretary-General and the leaders decided to meet again at the end of January 2011 in Geneva.

In April 2010, Dervis Eroglu was elected as the new leader of the Turkish Cypriot community, replacing Mehmet Ali Talat, who had served as the Turkish Cypriot side’s chief interlocutor in the direct talks with Greek Cypriot leader Demetris Christofias since the current round of negotiations began.

On the UN front, 2010 also saw a change in leadership when Lisa M. Buttenheim took over as head of mission from Tayé-Brook Zerihoun in June. Serving as the Secretary-General’s Special Representative for Cyprus and the UNFICYP Chief of Mission, as well as Deputy to the Special Advisor of the Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon (centre) attends the inauguration ceremony for the second phase of the Ledra-Lokmaci Street stabilization work in Nicosia, Cyprus. The crossing was opened in April 2008 following an agreement by the Greek and Turkish Cypriot leaders. 1 February 2010. (UN Photo/Eskinder Debebe)
General, Ms. Buttenheim brings to the job a wealth of experience in peacekeeping and political affairs.

Among the milestones achieved during the year was the opening by the two leaders of the Limnitis/Yesilirmak crossing point on 14 October in the north-west of the island, linking its two communities and thus providing a boost to the ongoing negotiations and marking the end of a long wait for residents in the region. The opening of the crossing point, the seventh such access road linking the two sides, was the culmination of more than two years of concerted efforts by the leaders and now drastically cuts travel time across the region and allows for a more direct route for travelers to Nicosia. Secretary-General Ban said the opening would serve to “help strengthen the climate of trust and goodwill necessary for the negotiations to achieve a mutually-acceptable and lasting settlement as soon as possible.”

Another high point in 2010 was reached by UN deminers, who surpassed the 25,000-landmines-cleared-and-destroyed mark in late October, taking a major step towards a mine-free buffer zone and ultimately a mine-free Cyprus. Since late 2004, teams of deminers associated with the UN Mine Action Centre in Cyprus have been working to rid the 180-kilometres-long (about 112 miles) buffer zone of landmines originally laid during the outbreak of violence in 1974. “Reaching this milestone is another important step forward in our activities serving the two communities and will hopefully serve as a prelude to a successful and satisfactory follow-on phase as we move towards our stated goal of a mine-free buffer zone and, eventually, we hope, a mine-free Cyprus,” said Ms. Buttenheim.

Adding to these significant events was the opening in July of the Joint Communication Room (JCR), a bi-communal initiative supported by UNFICYP, which aims at facilitating the exchange of information between the island’s two main communities on crimes and crime-related matters. The JCR, a round-the-clock-operation run by Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot law enforcement experts alongside UNFICYP police officers, enables police forces on either side of the divide to share information on thefts, murders, drug offences and human trafficking, among other things.

The year 2010 added a few more pages to the UN’s 46-year history in Cyprus: UNFICYP, the Good Offices Mission, UNDP and other UN agencies and programmes continued to support reconciliation and promote peace on the island. As the Secretary-General and his team on the ground have repeatedly said, “a solution is within reach” and it lies in the hands of the two communities and their leaders. The United Nations stands ready to assist both sides in their efforts to find a solution and achieve a common future of prosperity and lasting peace.
Peacekeeping operations since 1948.................................................................64
Current peacekeeping operations.................................................................................15
Current peace operations directed and supported by the Dept of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO)..............................16

PERSONNEL
Uniformed personnel (81,792 troops, 14,318 police and 2,201 military observers) ......................................................98,311 *
Countries contributing uniformed personnel .................................................................115
International civilian personnel ..................................................................................5,798 *
Local civilian personnel ..............................................................................................14,192 *
UNV Volunteers ........................................................................................................2,626 *
Total number of personnel serving in 15 peacekeeping operations ........................................120,927
Total number of personnel serving in 16 DPKO-led peace operations .................................................123,001 **
Total number of fatalities in peace operations since 1948 ..............................................2,850 ***

FINANCIAL ASPECTS
Approved resources for the period from 1 July 2010 to 30 June 2011..........................About US$7.26 billion
Estimated total cost of operations from 1948 to 30 June 2010........................................About US$69 billion
Outstanding contributions to peacekeeping........................................................................................................ About US$2.46 billion

* Numbers include 15 peacekeeping operations only. Statistics for UNAMA, a special political mission directed and supported by DPKO, can be found at http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/documents/ppbm.pdf
** This figure includes the total number of uniformed and civilian personnel serving in 15 peacekeeping operations and one DPKO-led special political mission – UNAMA
*** Includes fatalities for all UN peace operations
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<td>United Nations Truce Supervision Organization</td>
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<td>Since March 1978</td>
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<td>MINURCA</td>
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<td>United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad</td>
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<td>military observer 35; police 1,482; international civilian 372; local civilian 894; UN Volunteer 173; total personnel 2,956</td>
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<td>MONUC</td>
<td>November 1999 – 30 June 2010</td>
<td>United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
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<td>troop 3; international civilian 277; local civilian 504; UN Volunteer 123; total personnel 907</td>
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</table>
**NUMBER OF MISSIONS** .................................................................................................................................................. 12

**PERSONNEL**

Uniformed personnel ......................................................................................................................................................... 343  
International civilian personnel ........................................................................................................................................ 1,099  
Local civilian personnel ................................................................................................................................................... 2,716  
UNV Volunteers .............................................................................................................................................................. 128  
Total number of personnel serving in political and peacebuilding missions ............................................................... 4,286

CURRENT POLITICAL AND PEACEBUILDING MISSIONS

UNPOS
United Nations Political Office for Somalia
Since 15 April 1995
Special Representative of the Secretary-General: Augustine Mahiga (Tanzania)
Strength: international civilian 47; local civilian 11

UNOGBIS
United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office in Guinea-Bissau
Since 3 March 1999
Representative of the Secretary-General: Joseph Mutaboba (Rwanda)
Strength: international civilian 55; local civilian 39; military adviser 1

UNSCO
Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for the Middle East
Since 1 October 1999
Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General to the Palestine Liberation Organization and the Palestinian Authority: Robert H. Serry (Netherlands)
Strength: international civilian 29; local civilian 29

BINUCA
United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in the Central African Republic
Since 1 January 2010
Representative of the Secretary-General: Sahle-Work Zewde (Ethiopia)
Strength: international civilian 52; local civilian 54; military adviser 5; police 6; UNV volunteer 4

UNSCOL
Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon
(Formerly known as Office of the Personal Representative of the Secretary-General for Southern Lebanon)
Since 16 February 2007
Special Coordinator for Lebanon: Michael C. Williams (United Kingdom)
Strength: international civilian 18; local civilian 58

UNOWA
Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for West Africa
Since 29 November 2001
Special Representative of the Secretary-General: Said Djinnit (Algeria)
Strength: international civilian 15; local civilian 10; military adviser 4

UNAMA*
United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan
Since 28 March 2002
Special Representative of the Secretary-General: Staffan de Mistura (Sweden)
Strength: international civilian 359; local civilian 1,643; military observer 12; police 4; UNV volunteer 56

UNAMI
United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq
Since 14 August 2003
Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Iraq: Ad Melkert (Netherlands)
Authorized strength: 1,014 (463 international, 551 local)
Current strength (staff based in Iraq, Jordan and Kuwait): international civilian 350; local civilian 463; troop 222; military observer 13

UNIPSIL
United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Sierra Leone
Since 1 October 2008
Executive Representative of the Secretary-General: Michael von der Schulenburg (Germany)
Strength: international civilian 33; local civilian 32; UNV volunteer 6

BINUB
United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi
Since 1 January 2007
Executive Representative of the Secretary-General: Charles Petrie (United Kingdom/France)
Strength: international civilian 95; local civilian 244; military observer 4; UNV volunteer 43

UNMIN
United Nations Mission in Nepal
Since 23 January 2007
Special Representative of the Secretary-General: Karin Landgren (Sweden)
Strength: international civilian 39; local civilian 125; military observer 72; UNV volunteer 19

UNRCCA
United Nations Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia
Since 10 December 2007
Special Representative of the Secretary-General: Miroslav Jenča (Slovakia)
Strength: international civilian 7; local civilian 13

Missions ended in 2010:
BINUB
1 January 2007 – 31 December 2010
United Nations Mission in Burundi
It was succeeded by BNUB (the United Nations Office in Burundi) on 1 January 2011

*Mission or peacebuilding mission directed and supported by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations. All other political and peacebuilding missions are directed by the Department of Political Affairs. For information on political and peacebuilding missions, visit the United Nations website at http://www.un.org/Depts/dpa/
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Grand total in PKO 98,638
Surge in uniformed UN peacekeeping personnel from 1991 to 2010

Top 10 Providers of assessed financial contributions to UN peacekeeping operations (2010–2012)

Top 10 contributors of uniformed personnel to UN peacekeeping operations (2010 Averages)
United Nations Police, by the nature of their tasks, must be recognized as police officers working under a UN mandate. Over the years, a number of identifying symbols have been used in UN missions on vehicles, uniforms and offices. In 2010, DPKO’s Police Division with the UN Department of Public Information created a new standard identity for UN Police. Following a broad study of shields, colours and symbols, this design depicted below was chosen and approved for use by police in all UN field operations.