Security Sector Reform
Integrated Technical Guidance Notes
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PREFACE

Five years after the Secretary-Generals report on security sector reform (SSR) (A/62/659-S/2008/39), where he advocated a more comprehensive approach to this important subject, SSR has become a core element in multidimensional peacekeeping. It is also increasingly recognized as an integral part of conflict prevention, socioeconomic development and peacebuilding more broadly. Among Member States, support for our work in security sector reform has grown steadily, not least due to our demonstrated commitment to provide a transparent forum for Member States to discuss their experiences and develop and agree common approaches to SSR.

The United Nations is pleased to present the first volume of United Nations SSR Integrated Technical Guidance Notes (ITGN). Produced through the system-wide effort undertaken in the framework of the Inter Agency SSR Task Force, the ITGNs provide a body of guidance to United Nations personnel in the field and at Headquarters. The ITGNs also represent a potentially valuable source of information for national actors, and a platform from which we can launch joint initiatives with our partners, including Member States, multilateral and regional organizations and partners in the private and public sector. The ITGNs are an important part of the United Nations efforts to provide a holistic and coherent approach to SSR.

As with all guidance documents, the ITGNs need to be tailored to the specific context; they will also need to be updated regularly to reflect the evolving needs and lessons of our work and that of member states. It is envisaged that all colleagues and partners working in this vital area will find the ITGN a useful tool, and will provide feedback and comments so that our knowledge in this evolving field can be expanded continuously.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The Integrated Technical Guidance Notes (ITGNs) on security sector reform (SSR) were developed through a collaborative effort by a wide range of actors from within the United Nations, SSR experts, academics and policy-makers. The United Nations (UN) Inter-Agency SSR Task Force (IASSRTF)1 would like to thank the numerous staff members from agencies, departments, funds and programmes at headquarters and in field and country operations, who contributed to their development.

We are grateful for the generous support provided to us by the Geneva Centre for Democratic Control of Armed Forces. In particular, we are indebted to Vincenza Scherrer, Albrecht Schnabel, Daniel De Torres, Eden Cole and Heiner Hanggi. Thanks also go to Funmi Olonisakin. The IASSRTF would also like to thank the Governments of Canada, Luxemburg, Norway, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland for their support.

However, the development of the ITGNs was first and foremost an undertaking by UN staff. Over a period of three years colleagues from UN Headquarters’ and the field worked through an ongoing consultative process to review key experiences and lessons learned and develop a body of coherent UN guidance on SSR. Special thanks go to the dedicated focal points and issue experts from among all members of the IASSRTF, whose knowledge and dedication made this product possible. We apologize in advance that the list of those who provided their valuable inputs and contributions will inevitably be incomplete.

Thanks go to Bertrand Njanja-Fassu (DPA), Anna Shotton (DPKO), Annika Hansen (DPKO), Assiata Chikuhwa (DPKO), Beth Asher (DPKO), Clare Hutchinson (DPKO), Ingrid Jeunhomme (DPKO), Jared Rigg (DPKO), Jerome Mellon (DPKO), Kristiana Powell (DPKO), Lea Angela L. Biason (DPKO), Mary Okumu (DPKO), Nikolai Rogosaroff (DPKO), Snezana Vuksa-Coffman (DPKO), Stéphane Jean (DPKO), Thorodd Ommundsen (DPKO), Agnes Marcaillou (ODA), Nicolas Gerard (ODA), Anthony Cardon (OHCHR), Erik Friberg (OHCHR), Francesca Marotta (OHCHR), James Turpin (OHCHR), Johan Olhagen (OHCHR), Marcella Favretto (OHCHR), Mieko Ikegame (OSAA), Ely Dieng (PBSO), Kristina Koch-Avan (PBSO), Tondorai Chikuhwa (OSRSGSVC), Sarah Douglas (UN Women), Simon Tordjman (UN Women), Anne Kahl (UNDP), Djordje Djordjevic (UNDP), Lara Tabac (UNDP), Marije Van Kempen (UNDP), Martin Borgeaud (UNDP), Nicola Palmer (UNDP), Shibani Malhotra (UNDP), Prija Marwah (UNFPA), Gary Risser (UNICEF), Yvonne Lodico (UNITAR), Aisser Al Hafedh (UNODC), Ali Saryazdi (UNODC), Andrea Mancini (UNODC), Candice Welsch (UNODC), Caroline Carnbrin (UNODC), Cecile Grima (UNODC), Claudia Baroni (UNODC),
Dagmar Thomas (UNODC), Estela Maris Deon (UNODC), Ian Munro (UNODC), Karolina Gudmundsson (UNODC), Siri Bjune (UNODC), Mark Shaw (UNODC), Stefano Polacco (UNODC), Tuesday Reitano (UNODC), Nieves Molina-Clemente (UNOPS), Sebastiano Bagnasco (UNOPS) and Tyler Christensen (UNOPS).

Special thanks go to colleagues from United Nations field missions, offices and presences all around the world for their tireless commitment and invaluable inputs on numerous iterations of the draft documents. Inputs were received from BINUCA, BNUB, MINUSTAH, MONUSCO, UNIOGBIS, UNMIL, UNMISS, UNMIT, UNOAU, and UNOWA; UNDP Offices in Afghanistan, Comoros, Guinea-Bissau, Kosovo, Papua New Guinea, Timor Leste and the Regional Centre for Asia-Pacific; OHCHR Office in Colombia, Regional Office in Addis, and OHCHR units in UNIOGBIS and UNMIT; UNICEF Offices in Iraq, and Pakistan and Regional Office for the Middle East and North Africa; UNODA regional centers UNREC, UNRCPD and UNLIREC; UNFPA Offices in the Occupied Palestine Territory and Timor Leste; and the UN Women Office in Liberia.

Finally, this effort would have not been possible without the leadership and vision of the co-chairs of the IASSRTF at the working level, Mr. Adedeji Ebo (DPKO) and Mr. Alejandro Alvarez (UNDP). Ms. Snezana Vuksa-Coffman (DPKO) and Ms. Assiata Chikuhwaa (DPKO) of the IASSRTF Secretariat/SSRU coordinated this endeavor.

Endnotes

1 The IASSRTF was established by the UN Secretary-General in 2007. It brings together 14 UN departments, offices, agencies, funds and programmes (DPA, DPKO, ODA, OHCHR, OSSA, PBSO, SRGS-SVC, UN WOMEN, UNDP, UNFPA, UNICEF, UNITAR, UNODC, UNOPS). The IASSRTF is co-chaired by DPKO and UNDP.
## Glossary

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<tr>
<th>Keyword / component</th>
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| Conflict-Related Sexual Violence (CRSV)* | The United Nations Security Council considers that "sexual violence, when used or commissioned as a tactic of war in order to deliberately target civilians or as a part of a widespread or systematic attack against civilian populations, can significantly exacerbate situations of armed conflict and may impede the restoration of international peace and security". Sexual violence as a "tactic of war" refers to acts of sexual violence that are linked with military/political objectives and that serve (or intend to serve) a strategic aim related to the conflict. Sexual violence, however, does not need to be explicitly orchestrated for military gain to be considered relevant to the Security Council’s remit. The Council also considers sexual violence conflict-related when it is "committed against civilians", committed "in and around UN managed refugee and internally displaced persons camps", or committed during "disarmament, demobilization and reintegration processes".  
(Guidance for Mediators. Addressing Conflict-Related Sexual Violence in Ceasefire and Peace Agreements. DPA, 2012) |
| Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR)* | A process that contributes to security and stability in a post-conflict recovery context by removing weapons from the hands of combatants, taking the combatants out of military structures and helping them to integrate socially and economically into society by finding civilian livelihoods.  
- **Disarmament** is the collection, documentation, control and disposal of weapons from combatants and often from the civilian population.  
- **Demobilization** is the formal and controlled discharge of active combatants from armed forces and groups, including a phase of "reinsertion" which provides short-term assistance to ex-combatants.  
- **Reintegration** is the process by which ex-combatants acquire civilian status and gain sustainable employment and income.  
(Secretary-General, Note to the General Assembly (A/C.5/59/31)) |
| Discrimination against women* | According to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), "any distinction, exclusion or restriction made on the basis of sex which has the effect or purpose of impairing or nullifying the recognition, enjoyment or exercise by women, irrespective of their marital status, on a basis of equality of men and women, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural, civil or any other field"  
(Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, art. 1) |
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<tr>
<td>Gender*</td>
<td>Refers to the social attributes and opportunities associated with being male and female and the relationships between women, girls, men and boys, as well as the relations between women and those between men. These attributes, opportunities and relationships are socially constructed and learned through socialization processes. They are context-/time-specific and changeable. Gender determines what is expected, allowed and valued in women, girls, men and boys in a given context. In most societies there are differences and inequalities between women and men in responsibilities assigned, activities undertaken, access to and control over resources, and decision-making opportunities. Gender is part of the broader socio-cultural context. Other important criteria for socio-cultural analysis include class, race, poverty level, ethnic group and age. (Office of the Special Advisor on Gender Issues and Advancement of Women, Gender Mainstreaming: Strategy for Promoting Gender Equality, rev. August 2001)</td>
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<td>Gender mainstreaming*</td>
<td>The process of assessing the implications for women and men of any planned action, including legislation, policies or programmes, in all areas and at all levels. It is a strategy for making women’s as well as men’s concerns and experiences an integral dimension of the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of policies and programmes in all political, economic and societal spheres, so that women and men benefit equally and inequality is not perpetrated. The ultimate goal of gender mainstreaming is to achieve gender equality. (Agreed Conclusions of ECOSOC Coordination Segment on Gender Mainstreaming, A/52/3, 1997)</td>
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<td>Gender responsiveness, gender sensitive policies</td>
<td>A gender responsive approach addresses the specific gender dynamics and social and cultural reference points that prescribe the roles of men and women in any given society. This requires socio-cultural research and analysis to understand what the norms and expectations are for men and women in any given context and how this might affect the programme, so that interventions can be designed accordingly. (Ending Violence against Women and Girls Programming Essentials, UNWOMEN January 2012, <a href="http://www.endvawnow.org/uploads/modules/pdf/1328563919.pdf">http://www.endvawnow.org/uploads/modules/pdf/1328563919.pdf</a>) Gender sensitive policies and programmes equitably consider the needs and capacities of women, men, girls and boys. (ABC of Women Worker’s Rights and Gender Equality, ILO, Geneva, 2000)</td>
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<td>Gender-Based Violence (GBV)</td>
<td>The term gender-based violence is used to distinguish common violence from violence that is directed against individuals or groups of individuals on the basis of their gender or sex. It includes acts that inflict physical, mental or sexual harm or suffering, threats of such acts, coercion and other deprivations of liberty. While women, men and boys and girls can be victims of gender-based violence, women and girls are the main victims. (Guidelines for Gender-based Violence Interventions in Humanitarian Settings, Inter-Agency Standing Committee Task Force on Gender and Humanitarian Assistance, 2009)</td>
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<td><strong>Good offices</strong></td>
<td>‘Good offices’ refers to official or unofficial mediation between two or more parties or the provision of advice to national counterparts by senior UN representatives. (Integrated Technical Guidance Note, Peace Processes and Security Sector Reform (SSR), December 2012)</td>
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<td><strong>Governance</strong></td>
<td>Governance refers to the structures and processes whereby a social organisation – from a family to corporate business to international institution – steers itself, ranging from centralised control to self-regulation. (Bryden, Alan, Heiner Hänggi, Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces. Security governance in post-conflict peacebuilding. Munster; Piscataway, NJ, 2005)</td>
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<td><strong>Justice system</strong></td>
<td>The Justice system includes justice ministries; prisons; criminal investigation and prosecution services; the judiciary (courts and tribunals); implementation justice services (bailiffs and ushers), other customary and traditional justice systems; human rights commission and ombudsperson; etc. (Maintenance of international peace and security: role of the Security Council in supporting security sector reform; Concept paper prepared for the Security Council open debate (S/2007/72), 9 February 2007)</td>
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<td><strong>Mediation</strong></td>
<td>Mediation is a process whereby a third party assists two or more parties, with their consent, to prevent, manage or resolve a conflict by helping them to develop mutually acceptable agreements. (SG Report on Strengthening the role of mediation in the peaceful settlement of disputes, conflict prevention and resolution (A/66/811), United Nations Guidance for Effective Mediation, September 2012, (Annex UN Guidance for Effective Mediation 12 September 2012))</td>
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<td><strong>National ownership</strong></td>
<td>National ownership (of SSR processes) refers to an inclusive and consultative process, methodology and outcome, predicated on the perspectives, priorities and vision of stakeholders within the society undergoing reform. National ownership of SSR is manifest in relations among national stakeholders, and between national stakeholders and external actors such as bilateral partners, regional organizations, the United Nations and other international organizations. (Integrated Technical Guidance Note, National Ownership of SSR, December 2012)</td>
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<td><strong>National security policy</strong></td>
<td>National security policy is defined as a formal description of a country’s understanding of its national values, interests, goals, strategic environment and threats in view of protecting or promoting national security for the State and its people, which is anchored in a vision of security determined through a comprehensive process of dialogue with all national stakeholders (and regional and international ones if deemed appropriate by the State concerned). In this sense, it shall incorporate the views and perceptions of the Government and other institutions of State, as well as the needs and perceptions of the country’s people. (Integrated Technical Guidance Note, United Nations Support to National Security Policy- and Strategy-Making Processes, December 2012)</td>
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<td>National security strategy</td>
<td>A national security strategy is defined as a formal description of the methods to be used by the State and its people to realize the vision and goals outlined in a national security policy. This includes setting specific objectives, identifying priorities and considering activities and resource allocation. The document is based on the values, interests, threats to and needs of the country, as outlined in a national security policy. (Integrated Technical Guidance Note, United Nations Support to National Security Policy and Strategy-Making Processes, December 2012)</td>
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<td>National security vision</td>
<td>The vision is a statement describing the desired future end state of national security over a specific timeframe, based on national values and national aspirations, interests, and needs. An effective vision should be clear, realistic and in harmony with the needs and values of society at large. The vision guides the development of both the national security policy and national security strategy and sets the direction for all other strategic planning. (Integrated Technical Guidance Note, United Nations Support to National Security Policy and Strategy-Making Processes, December 2012)</td>
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<td>Non-statutory security forces</td>
<td>Non-statutory security forces are armed groups and entities that fall outside the direct purview and control of the state in terms of their financing, command and control, oversight and functioning. The role of non-statutory security forces, which may include private security companies, guerrilla armies and private militia are not covered by national legislation. (Ebo, Adedeji. “Non-State Actors, Peacebuilding and Security Governance in West Africa: Beyond Commercialisation.” Journal of Peacebuilding &amp; Development 3, no. 2 (2007): 53–69)</td>
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<td>Parliamentary oversight (of the security sector)</td>
<td>Parliamentary oversight refers to the responsibility, control and accountability of parliament over the security sector. Parliamentary oversight sets limits on executive power by setting legal parameters and adopting a budget. Parliamentary involvement in security policy and security sector reform also ensures that citizens’ concerns are being heard and that the new directions and actions of security services are consistent with the constitution, international humanitarian law and human rights law. (Parliamentary oversight of the security sector ECOWAS Parliament-DCAF Guide for West African Parliamentarians. Geneva: Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, 2011)</td>
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<td>Peace processes</td>
<td>Peace agreements are formal agreements aimed at ending violent conflict and creating the conditions for durable peace. They include ceasefire agreements, interim or preliminary agreements, comprehensive and framework agreements, and implementation agreements. The way in which the conflict ends, whether by compromise, or a one-sided victory, for example, typically has implications for the nature of the peace. (Topic Guide on Conflict, 2012, Governance and Social Development Resource Centre, <a href="http://www.gsdrc.org/docs/open/CON69.pdf">http://www.gsdrc.org/docs/open/CON69.pdf</a>)</td>
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| Reproductive health | This falls within the framework of the World Health Organization’s (WHO) definition of health as a state of complete physical, mental and social wellbeing, and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity. Reproductive health addresses the reproductive processes, functions and system at all stages of life. The term thus implies that people are able to have a responsible, satisfying and safe sex life, and that they have the capability to reproduce and the freedom to decide if, when and how often to do so.  
(Reproductive health, WHO, http://www.who.int/topics/reproductive_health/en/) |
| Rule of Law* | The rule of law refers to a principle of governance in which all persons, institutions and entities, public and private, including the State itself, are accountable to laws that are publicly promulgated, equally enforced and independently adjudicated, and which are consistent with international human rights norms and standards. It requires, as well, measures to ensure adherence to the principles of supremacy of law, equality before the law, accountability to the law, fairness in the application of the law, separation of powers, participation in decision-making, legal certainty, avoidance of arbitrariness and procedural and legal transparency.  
| Security governance | Security governance refers to the process of steering the state and society, ideally but not always under effective democratic control, towards the realisation of individual and collective freedom from fear.  
| Security sector* | Security sector is a broad term often used to describe the structures, institutions and personnel responsible for the management, provision and oversight of security in a country. It is generally accepted that the security sector includes defence, law enforcement, corrections, intelligence services and institutions responsible for border management, customs and civil emergencies. Elements of the judicial sector responsible for the adjudication of cases of alleged criminal conduct and misuse of force are, in many instances, also included. Furthermore, the security sector includes actors that play a role in managing and overseeing the design and implementation of security, such as ministries, legislative bodies and civil society groups. Other non-State actors that could be considered part of the security sector include customary or informal authorities and private security services.  
### GLOSSARY

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<td><strong>Security Sector Reform</strong></td>
<td>Security sector reform (SSR) describes a process of assessment, review and implementation as well as monitoring and evaluation led by national authorities that has as its goal the enhancement of effective and accountable security for the State and its peoples without discrimination and with full respect for human rights and the rule of law. (Report of the Secretary-General, Securing peace and development: the role of the United Nations in supporting security sector reform, 23 January 2008, (A/62/659–S/2008/39))</td>
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<td><strong>Sexual violence</strong></td>
<td>Any sexual act, attempt to obtain a sexual act, unwanted sexual comments or advances, or acts to traffic, or otherwise directed, against a person’s sexuality using coercion, by any person regardless of their relationship to the victim, in any setting, including but not limited to home and work. (World report on violence and health. WHO, 2002 <a href="http://www.who.int/violence_injury_prevention/violence/world_report/en/index.html">http://www.who.int/violence_injury_prevention/violence/world_report/en/index.html</a>)</td>
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| **Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW)** | Small Arms and Light Weapons mean any man-portable lethal weapon that expels or launches, is designed to expel or launch, or may be readily converted to expel or launch a shot, bullet or projectile by the action of an explosive, excluding antique small arms and light weapons or their replicas.  
  a. ‘Small arms’ are, broadly speaking, weapons designed for individual use. They include, inter alia, revolvers and self-loading pistols, rifles and carbines, sub-machine guns, assault rifles and light machine guns;  
  b. ‘Light weapons’ are, broadly speaking, weapons designed for use by two or three persons serving as a crew, although some may be carried and used by a single person. They include, inter alia, heavy machine guns, hand-held under-barrel and mounted grenade launchers, portable anti-aircraft guns, portable anti-tank guns, recoilless rifles, portable launchers of anti-tank missile and rocket systems, portable launchers of anti-aircraft missile systems, and mortars of a calibre of less than 100 millimetres. (Report of the Open-ended Working Group to Negotiate an International Instrument to Enable States to Identify and Trace, in a Timely and Reliable Manner, Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons (A/60/88)) |
| **Transitional justice**             | The notion of transitional justice comprises the full range of processes and mechanisms associated with a society’s attempts to come to terms with a legacy of large-scale past abuses, in order to ensure accountability, serve justice and achieve reconciliation. These may include both judicial and non-judicial mechanisms, with differing levels of international involvement (or none at all) and individual prosecutions, reparations, truth-seeking, institutional reform, vetting and dismissals, or a combination thereof. (Report of the Secretary-General, The rule of law and transitional justice in conflict and post-conflict societies (S/2004/616)) |

* UN documents
# ABBREVIATIONS

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<tr>
<td>APLA</td>
<td>Azanian People’s Liberation Army (South Africa)</td>
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<td>CDD</td>
<td>Centre for Democracy and Development (Lagos, Nigeria)</td>
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<td>CEDAW</td>
<td>Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women</td>
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<td>CPA</td>
<td>Comprehensive Peace Agreement (Liberia)</td>
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<td>CPPNM</td>
<td>Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material</td>
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<td>CRSV</td>
<td>Conflict–related sexual violence</td>
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<td>CSDG</td>
<td>Conflict Security and Development Group (King’s College, University of London)</td>
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<td>DCAF</td>
<td>Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (Geneva, Switzerland)</td>
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<td>DDR</td>
<td>Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration</td>
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<td>DFS</td>
<td>Department of Field Support</td>
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<td>DSR</td>
<td>Defense sector reform</td>
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<td>DPA</td>
<td>UN Department of Political Affairs</td>
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<td>DPKO</td>
<td>Department of Peacekeeping Operations</td>
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<td>ECOSOC</td>
<td>United Nations Economic and Social Council</td>
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<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>Economic Community Of West African States</td>
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<td>FMLN</td>
<td>Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (El Salvador)</td>
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<tr>
<td>GBV</td>
<td>Gender-based violence</td>
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<td>GC</td>
<td>Governance Commission (Liberia)</td>
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<td>GRB</td>
<td>Gender-responsive budgeting</td>
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<td>HRC</td>
<td>Human Rights Council</td>
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<td>HRDDP</td>
<td>Human Rights Due Diligence Policy</td>
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<td>IASC</td>
<td>UN Inter-Agency Standing Committee</td>
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<td>IASSRTF</td>
<td>UN Inter-Agency Security Sector Reform Task Force</td>
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<td>IAWG</td>
<td>Inter-Agency Working Group (DDR)</td>
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<td>ICCPR</td>
<td>International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights</td>
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<td>ICESCR</td>
<td>International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights</td>
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<td>IDDRS</td>
<td>Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards</td>
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<tr>
<td>IFI</td>
<td>International financial institution</td>
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ABBREVIATIONS

IFP  Inkatha Freedom Party (South Africa)
ISF  Integrated Strategic Framework
ISO  International Organization for Standardization
ISSR  Kosovo Internal Security Sector Review
ITGN  Integrated Technical Guidance Note
IWPR  Institute for War and Peace Reporting
M&E  Monitoring and evaluation
MARA  Monitoring analysis and reporting arrangements
MoD  Ministry of Defence
MRM  United Nations Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism (on Grave Child Rights Violations in Situations of Armed Conflict)
n.d.  no date
NDI  National Democratic Institute for International Affairs
NGO  Non-governmental organization
NHRI  National human rights institution
ODIHR  Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights
OECD DAC  Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Development Assistance Committee
OHCHR  Office of the High Commissioner on Human Rights
OPCAT  Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment
OROLSI  Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions
OSCE  Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
PCNA  Post-Conflict Needs Assessment
PDNA  Post-Disaster Needs Assessment
PER  Public expenditure review
PESTLE  Political, Economic, Social, Technical, Legislative and Environmental (assessment methodology)
PIFS  Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat
PRSP  Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
RSLAF  Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces
SALW  Small arms and light weapons
SCR  Security Council resolution
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<tr>
<td>SG</td>
<td>UN Secretary-General</td>
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<tr>
<td>SGBV</td>
<td>Sexual and gender-based violence</td>
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<td>SOP</td>
<td>Standard operating procedure</td>
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<td>SPT</td>
<td>Subcommittee on Prevention of Torture</td>
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<td>SSR</td>
<td>Security Sector Reform</td>
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<tr>
<td>STI/HIV/AIDS</td>
<td>Sexually transmitted infection/human immunodeficiency virus/acquired immune deficiency syndrome</td>
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<td>SWOT</td>
<td>Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, Threats (assessment methodology)</td>
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<td>TOC</td>
<td>Transnational organized crime</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNCAC</td>
<td>United Nations Convention against Corruption</td>
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<td>UNCT</td>
<td>UN Country Team</td>
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<td>UNDAF</td>
<td>United Nations Development Assistance Framework</td>
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<td>UNDG</td>
<td>United Nations Development Group</td>
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<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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<td>UNFPA</td>
<td>United Nations Population Fund</td>
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<td>UNHQ</td>
<td>United Nations Headquarters</td>
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<td>UDHR</td>
<td>Universal Declaration of Human Rights</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNIFEM</td>
<td>United Nations Development Fund for Women, now UN Women – UN Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN-INSTRAW</td>
<td>United Nations International Research and Training Institute for the Advancement of Women</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNMIL</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in Liberia</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNMIT</td>
<td>United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNODC</td>
<td>United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNPO</td>
<td>Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNREC</td>
<td>United Nations Regional Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNSAC</td>
<td>United Nations Standing Advisory Committee (on Security Questions in Central Africa)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VCT</td>
<td>Voluntary counselling and testing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VSC</td>
<td>Victim Support Centres (Bangladesh)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WACI</td>
<td>West African Coast Initiative</td>
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<tr>
<td>WHO</td>
<td>World Health Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>WPA</td>
<td>Women protection advisers</td>
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1. PURPOSE

The United Nations (UN) Secretary-General, in his report of January 2008, has developed a conceptual framework for security sector reform (SSR) by outlining a number of key definitions and guiding principles for the Organization’s approach to SSR, with the ultimate objective of increasing coherence and coordination within the United Nations system. The purpose of the Integrated Technical Guidance Notes (ITGNs) is therefore to foster a “One United Nations” approach to SSR by providing a common framework to guide United Nations support to nationally led SSR efforts. The United Nations approach is also based on the understanding that ineffective and unaccountable security institutions can be a major obstacle to addressing poverty, respect for human rights, good governance, sustainable peace building and long-term development. The objective of United Nations support to SSR efforts is essentially to help ensure that people feel safer through the enhanced effectiveness and accountability of security institutions operating under civilian control and within a framework of the rule of law and respect for human rights. However, as recognized by Member States and reiterated in the Secretary-General’s report, there is a need to develop system-wide guidance that is grounded in international human rights norms and standards, and that assists in the pragmatic implementation of this holistic approach.

Developed through a coordinated inter-agency process, the ITGNs provide a system-wide technical framework for United Nations SSR support that addresses different thematic areas. Specifically, these Notes provide guidance to United Nations personnel in the field and at Headquarters by outlining the challenges and opportunities that SSR processes entail. They suggest operational and strategic interventions, and highlight how those interventions can impact reform processes on the ground. The Notes facilitate coherence by providing a common platform as the basis for coordination within relevant institutional processes, in the field and at Headquarters. As such they may also be of use to Member States of the United Nations, as well as multilateral and regional organizations engaged and/or interested in this important area.

2. SCOPE

The ITGNs focus on crosscutting areas beyond specific categories or components of the security sector (such as defence, police, corrections, etc.). The crosscutting thematic issues and processes cover a broad range and impact on the entire security sector. At this first stage, the Notes focus on national security policy- and strategy-making, gender, democratic governance, peace processes, and national ownership. However, the ITGNs are intended to be a growing body of work, which
will continue to expand and improve through field-level practice and the inclusion of additional (thematic) issue areas.

These ITGNs apply to all United Nations staff engaged in SSR support, whether in the field and regional offices, or at Headquarters.

3. THE UNITED NATIONS’ CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR SSR

The Secretary-General’s report of January 2008 provides a broad definition of security and the security sector, and identifies ten core principles that should guide United Nations engagement in this area. These definitions are suggestions rather than prescriptive: it is the responsibility of every country to articulate, define and configure its security sector. It should be noted that the term “security sector reform” could also apply to national and regional contexts where the objective is the transformation, development, support and governance of the security sector. Therefore, the role and relevance of the United Nations in supporting SSR should be understood within the particular context of, and the conceptual framework that guides, the United Nations approach to SSR.

The Guidance Notes reflect themes that have been central to the United Nations approach to supporting SSR, in order to encourage yet greater coherence across

Box 1. Definitions

- **Security sector** is a broad term often used to describe the structures, institutions and personnel responsible for the management, provision and oversight of security in a country. It is generally accepted that the security sector includes defence, law enforcement, corrections, intelligence services, and institutions responsible for border management, customs and civil emergencies. Elements of the judicial sector responsible for the adjudication of cases of alleged criminal conduct and misuse of force are, in many instances, also included. Furthermore, the security sector includes actors that play a role in managing and overseeing the design and implementation of security, such as ministries, legislative bodies and civil society groups. Other non-State actors that could be considered part of the sector include customary or informal authorities and private security services.

- **Security sector reform** describes a process of assessment, review and implementation as well as monitoring and evaluation led by national authorities. The goal of this process is the enhancement of effective and accountable security for the State and its peoples, without discrimination and with full respect for human rights and the rule of law.

- **Rule of law** The rule of law is a principle of governance according to which all persons, institutions and entities, including the State, are accountable to laws that are publicly promulgated, equally enforced and independently adjudicated, and that are consistent with international human rights norms and standards (S/2004/616).
the United Nations system. Attention to the subjects of peace processes, democratic governance, gender, national security policy- and strategy-making, and national ownership encourages greater coherence of United Nations support across the entire security sector. Beyond coherence of that support, the Guidance Notes foster sustainability of reforms by identifying support strategies that address peace building, State building and development as a continuum, and focus on building sector-wide SSR capacities as a basis for component-level activities. This approach is predicated on a context-specific combination of the individual components (pillars) of the security sector on the one hand, and the sector-wide interventions that define the strategic framework for reform, particularly its governance and oversight aspects, on the other.

Components of the security sector are country-specific, and could include defence, law enforcement, corrections, border and immigration services, and other institutions whose operational competence defines the effectiveness of security service delivery. Sector-wide interventions – such as the development of policies, strategies and plans, the facilitation of national dialogues on SSR, the development of national management and oversight capacities, the design of national security sector strategies, the development of security sector legislation, and the conduct of security sector reviews – determine the quality of governance of the security sector. In this regard, the ITGNs outline a United Nations approach to SSR that seeks to support development of security architectures, moving beyond isolated support to security pillars.

The United Nations recognises that the development of effective and accountable security institutions on the basis of non-discrimination, full respect for human rights and the rule of law is essential to its approach. To this end, United Nations engagement is guided by a commitment to ensuring that SSR initiatives are grounded in international law, including international human rights law. The United Nations approach to SSR, and the rationale behind the ITGNs, can further be found in the desire not only to assist in developing effective and accountable security institutions, but also to address the fragility of these institutions and ensure their sustainability and viability. In this regard, the United Nations approach to SSR recognizes the need to support the transformation or rebuilding of the social contract upon which security institutions are predicated. It is therefore essential to facilitate a common national vision and strategy that aims to develop organic and accountable national security institutions, built on the principle of the rule of law and capable of withstanding political and socio-economic shocks. This is in essence a transformational paradigm.

The United Nations SSR approach recognizes and advocates that security is multi-layered and those layers are interdependent, both a function and a reflection
of a series of interactions between and among actors – ranging from the individual to the family, community, State, regional and, ultimately, global levels. In this regard, the viability of the United Nations approach to SSR is determined by the extent to which it reflects and is responsive to national and regional dimensions of SSR. Similarly, the United Nations approach to SSR takes as its point of departure the notion that individuals, families and communities are the critical building blocks for the security of its Member States.

4. THE UNITED NATIONS’ ROLE IN SSR

The goal of United Nations engagement in SSR is to support national efforts to enhance the effectiveness, inclusiveness and accountability of security sector institutions in order to contribute to sustainable peace, security, good governance and development for the State and its peoples, without discrimination and with full respect for human rights and the rule of law, and in accordance with national and international laws and nation-specific agreements.

The United Nations recognizes that its role in supporting national and regional authorities in their reform of the security sector is conditioned by the fact that the United Nations will rarely be the exclusive actor that supports such a reform process. However, the role of the United Nations in supporting SSR processes is also defined by the Organization’s legitimacy and global character, and has both a normative and operational component.

In its normative role, the United Nations can contribute by:

- Supporting the incorporation of international legal standards, including human rights standards, into domestic law and policy, as well as supporting the implementation of recommendations by international human rights bodies regarding the security sector;

- Elaborating policies and guidelines for the implementation of SSR plans and programmes. These can provide the basis for a transparent and accountable partnership between the United Nations system, national authorities, and bilateral and multilateral actors;

- Ensuring that all parts of the United Nations engaged in reform, including peacekeepers, Special Political Missions and United Nations Country Teams, receive practical guidance and assistance in establishing benchmarks and other evaluation processes;

- Contributing to the generation of collective knowledge on SSR, by providing a forum for international dialogue and by assisting in the further development of best practices.
Box 2. Basic principles for a United Nations approach to security sector reform

1. The goal of the United Nations in security sector reform is to support States and societies in developing effective, inclusive and accountable security institutions so as to contribute to international peace and security, sustainable development, and the enjoyment of human rights by all.

2. Security sector reform should be undertaken on the basis of a national decision; a Security Council mandate and/or a General Assembly resolution; the Charter of the United Nations; and human rights laws and standards.

3. In order to be successful and sustainable, support in the area of security sector reform must be anchored in national ownership and the commitment of the States and societies involved.

4. A United Nations approach to security sector reform must be flexible, and tailored to the country, region and/or specific environment in which reform is taking place as well as to the different needs of all stakeholders.

5. A United Nations approach to security sector reform must be gender-sensitive throughout its planning, design, implementation, and monitoring and evaluation phases. It must also include the reform of recruitment processes and improvement in the delivery of security services, to address and prevent sexual and gender-based violence.

6. A security sector reform framework is essential in the planning and implementation of post-conflict activities. Ideally, security sector reform should begin at the outset of a peace process and should be incorporated into early recovery and development strategies.

7. A clearly defined strategy, including the identification of priorities, indicative timelines and partnerships, is required for the implementation of a security sector reform process.

8. The effectiveness of international support for security sector reform will be shaped by the integrity of motive, the level of accountability and the amount of resources provided.

9. Coordination of national and international partners’ efforts is essential. Lead national entities and a designated international counterpart should be identified wherever possible.

10. Monitoring and regular evaluation against established principles and specific benchmarks are essential to track and maintain progress in security sector reform.

In its operational role, the United Nations enjoys a comparative advantage (through e.g. political neutrality and universal coverage), which enables it to address the political dimensions of SSR; it can do so by facilitating national dialogues and reconciliation as platforms for broader reforms, and by accompanying national and regional actors in the inclusive conceptualization, articulation, implementation and evaluation of relevant security governance policies.

The ITGNs provide support strategies that underpin the operational role that the United Nations has in security sector reform. The Integrated Technical Guidance Notes thus might be read alongside the United Nations defence sector reform policy, which together provide a comprehensive framework for United Nations support to SSR. Another United Nations system-wide instrument, and one relevant to its operational role, is the Human Rights Due Diligence Policy.
This requires United Nations entities, in the context of support, to engage with national or regional actors so as to modify their behaviour with regard to addressing human rights violations and, as a last resort, to cease support if violations continue unaddressed.

The United Nations is particularly well positioned to assist by:

- Helping establish an enabling environment through monitoring of human rights and supporting national authorities in their promotion of good governance, human rights and reconciliation processes.

- Supporting needs assessment and strategic planning through early needs evaluation, and helping develop national security strategies and implementation plans.

- Facilitating national dialogues on SSR – and through them, transparent and inclusive reform – by supporting dialogue among national and local authorities, security sector actors, civil society and other non-State actors.

- Providing technical advice and support to components of the security sector, including defence, law enforcement institutions, relevant elements of the judicial sector and corrections, border management, customs, civil emergencies and crime prevention. This support can include for instance capacity development; identification of training, equipment and major resources needs; vetting; and personnel training, including on applicable human rights and specific aspects such as the prevention of sexual and gender-based violence and organized crime.

- Supporting capacity development for oversight mechanisms, including legislatures, judiciaries and national human rights institutions.

- Supporting the development of national capacities in coordination and resource mobilization.

- Supporting the development of national capacities to conduct monitoring and evaluation.

5. OVERVIEW OF THE ITGNs

As stated, the purpose of the ITGNs is to foster a “One United Nations” approach to SSR by providing a common framework for guiding United Nations support to nationally led SSR efforts. In this way the ITGNs seek to enable the United Nations to implement its role in SSR more effectively, and to provide more effective support to Member States in those SSR areas where the Organization has a comparative advantage. The Notes are configured as a single body of guidance.
for supporting specific areas of SSR. These ITGNs, together with additional Notes that will be elaborated in the future, will eventually be developed into programming tools and training modules that together form a package similar to the Integrated Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) Standards.4

This first set of ITGNs cover five main areas: democratic governance of security institutions; national security policy- and strategy-making; peace processes and SSR; gender-responsive SSR; and national ownership of SSR.

5.1 Democratic Governance of the Security Sector

While acknowledging that accountability and effectiveness are mutually reinforcing and intertwined, this Guidance Note identifies five key areas for United Nations support to establish and strengthen democratic governance of the security sector, based on the rule of law6 and respect for human rights, and in line with the United Nations comprehensive approach to SSR.6

The Note addresses key thematic areas of SSR support that the United Nations has been providing for decades. During that time, the United Nations has gained significant experience in:

- strengthening constitutional and legal frameworks;
- strengthening the role and capacity of civil society;
- supporting oversight institutions and mechanisms;
- strengthening the institutional system of governance; and
- strengthening the system of management in support of security sector governance.

Building on the collective experience of United Nations departments, offices, agencies, funds and programmes in this area, this Note provides detailed guidance to enhance United Nations delivery of SSR support.

Specific United Nations support will be based on the demands in each individual context. Indeed, the rationale for United Nations support to democratic governance of the security sector may differ according to the different contexts in which support is provided; in some situations these contexts may overlap. The contexts identified by the Guidance Note are the following:

- Peace processes
- Peacekeeping and peace building in the immediate aftermath of conflict
- Longer-term peace building
- Development
The Guidance Note provides specific examples of programmes promoting democratic governance within security sectors and the five different forms that such support can take, with each form divided into strategic and operational interventions. A further section specifies approaches and entry points that UN personnel can adopt in order to advance democratic governance of the security sector.

5.2 National Security Policy- and Strategy-Making

The United Nations is increasingly seen as a trusted and suitable partner to support national security policy- and strategy-making processes, even though (and perhaps even because) these are traditionally the most sensitive of all the State’s responsibilities. In 2010 and 2011, the General Assembly recognised the important role that the United Nations “can play in the provision of technical assistance to State authorities, where requested and based on the specific needs, in their efforts to develop” such national frameworks. National security policy- and strategy-making, and the way in which the United Nations can support national and regional efforts in this area, are addressed in this Guidance Note. The Note provides an analysis of national security policies and strategies and situates these concepts within a larger framework of SSR and the sensitivities associated with the sovereign right of States to determine security policy, as well as their responsibility to meet international obligations.

United Nations staff, whether based in field operations (either at the country or regional level) or at United Nations Headquarters, are thus introduced to various concepts that are subsequently put into operation through concrete recommendations and support strategies, as well as the roles the United Nations staff play to facilitate this form of support. For example, a human rights perspective should be incorporated into the assessments, development, implementation, monitoring, evaluation and review of national security policies and strategies.

The Guidance Note concludes with a review of challenges and opportunities that United Nations staff are likely to encounter when supporting such processes. Examples include fragile transitions and how to make use of actual case studies. In sum, the Note provides a clear and actionable reference for United Nations personnel encountering this crucial dimension of SSR.

5.3 Peace Processes and Security Sector Reform

The political nature of SSR and the fact that it can arise as part of a transition away from conflict situations make it imperative that peace processes include SSR on their agenda. This ITGN provides conceptual, technical and strategic guidance on how to integrate SSR into peace processes.
The first section of the Note addresses the connections between SSR and peace processes at a conceptual level, arguing that the integration of these two issues makes each more likely to succeed in the long term. Essentially, SSR can make peace more sustainable and a peace process serves as an entry point that makes SSR more effective. In recognition of this mutually beneficial relationship, the Guidance Note recognizes that advisors, mediators and SSR practitioners must cooperate and liaise so as to optimize those opportunities.

Having established the rationale for SSR to be included in peace processes, the Guidance Note provides suggestions and steps to be taken to successfully integrate SSR into peace processes, noting that an awareness of local context, the nature of the conflict and the actors involved are crucial elements. The sensitive nature of SSR can create difficulties in negotiations, and mediators must be prepared to address key concerns by the negotiating parties. Part of the SSR process also includes an in-depth mapping of security needs, conflict analysis, human rights assessment and analysis of the various stakeholders that allows mediators to understand the best way to include specific concerns about SSR in the peace process. Strategic, operational and technical recommendations are then explained with the objective of providing a resource for practitioners facing complicated negotiations. The Guidance Note addresses obligations under international human rights law, including those relating to accountability, right to truth, reparations, and guarantees of non-recurrence; the Note highlights that by including these obligations, peace agreements can facilitate the later establishment of transitional justice mechanisms. Mention is made of DDR considerations, and several case studies illustrating the use of some of these recommendations can be found throughout the Note.

An Annex provides a concise list of recommendations that provide useful guidance. As such, the Guidance Note is an invaluable resource for mediators and SSR practitioners seeking to address the complex yet fundamental issue of SSR within peace processes.

5.4 Gender-Responsive Security Sector Reform

Recognizing that armed conflict and insecurity have built-in gender components, this Guidance Note indicates the ways that SSR must take these gender components into consideration. The Note emphasizes that conflict and post-conflict transition processes, including SSR, affect women, girls, men and boys in profoundly different ways. Thus, international and national interventions must be tailored to meet the varying needs that arise from different experiences. Also, there is important recognition that sexual and gender-based violence constitutes a legitimate threat to peace and security, and requires an operational security response, including in the realm of SSR.⁸
The Guidance Note delves further into this concept, providing a rationale for examining how insecurity and conflict are gendered and suggesting ways in which gender-responsive SSR can address those differences. For example, the Note cites the potential benefits derived from integrating higher numbers of women professionally into security sectors, such as a more comprehensive understanding of security threats and dynamics, as well as greater sensitivity to insecurity affecting women and girls primarily (from e.g. the threat of sexual violence).

The ultimate objective of gender-responsive SSR is to improve the ability of security sector institutions to address different security threats faced by women, girls, men and boys, through facilitating the participation of women and girls in SSR decision-making, assessment, planning, implementation and oversight. To help achieve these goals, the Guidance Note identifies five thematic areas that should be addressed, dividing each of these possible United Nations contributions into concrete strategic and operational interventions. The five are:

- Effective service delivery
- Participation and equal opportunities
- Prevention and protection
- Accountability
- Monitoring and evaluation

Finally, the diverse opportunities and challenges that a gender-responsive SSR process is likely to meet are discussed, and a number of suggestions on how to overcome the challenges are also included. These range from addressing the perception that the progression of women in security sectors is a zero-sum game for men in those sectors, to the opportunities for an approach to DDR and SSR that include the specific needs of former female combatants.

5.5 National Ownership of SSR

This ITGN is predicated on the recognition that national ownership is essential for the legitimacy and sustainability of national SSR efforts. It provides useful clarity on what national ownership entails in practice and provides specific guidance on making it operational, especially in contexts where national capacities have been weakened by conflict and/or persistent fragility.

The ITGN identifies the components of national ownership as:

- Facilitation of a common national security vision
- Implementation based on national participation and capacity
- Nationally led and nationally focused monitoring and evaluation
- Commitment of some national resources to the SSR process
The ITGN provides specific guidance on how to support national actors in each of these components of national ownership, based on practical experiences and examples. In addition, it provides a set of guiding principles for supporting national ownership, and stresses that national ownership extends beyond “State ownership”. The ITGN also provides a “checklist of tips” section, a practical menu of advice in this important area.

6. CONCLUSION

These ITGNs are intended to guide and facilitate implementation of the United Nations’ approach to SSR support. They are crosscutting and apply to the entire United Nations system. Their aim is to improve delivery on the ground with the ultimate goal of helping national authorities make their populations feel safer, and building institutions capable of providing sustainable, accountable and effective security.

The ITGNs represent a living body of work that will continue to be enhanced and expanded with additional crosscutting areas. They will also provide the basis for future training and programming tools.

Box 3. Language

In the Integrated Technical Guidance Notes, the words “shall”, “should” and “may” are used to indicate the intended degree of compliance with the guidance. This usage is consistent with the language used in the International Organization for Standardization standards and guidelines.

- **Shall** is used to indicate requirements, methods or specifications that are to be applied in order to conform to the standard.
- **Should** is used to indicate the preferred requirements, methods or specifications.
- **May** is used to indicate a possible method or course of action.
ENDNOTES


2. In this regard the recently adopted Human Rights Due Diligence Policy (HRDDP) for United Nations support to non-UN security forces is a key element of the normative framework defining the role and profile of the United Nations on SSR issues, and has been referred to in all SSR Integrated Technical Guidance Notes.

3. This section is based on the aforementioned 2008 report of the Secretary-General on security sector reform, paragraphs 46-50.

4. See the aforementioned 2008 report of the Secretary-General on security sector reform, paragraph 53: “The Organization’s approach to SSR could also build on the United Nations-wide DDR standards.”


6. As elaborated in the aforementioned 2008 report of the Secretary-General on security sector reform.


8. In its resolutions 1820, 1888 and 1960 on sexual violence in conflict, the Security Council emphasizes the link between prevention of such violations and UN SSR efforts.
NATIONAL OWNERSHIP OF SECURITY SECTOR REFORM

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1. PURPOSE

This Guidance Note is intended to facilitate the institutionalization of national ownership in United Nations (UN) support to national security sector reform (SSR) processes, and ensure sustainability of United Nations assistance to SSR processes that are predicated on the rule of law and consistent with international humanitarian law and human rights law.

2. SCOPE

This guidance applies to staff of all United Nations peacekeeping operations and special political missions, including heads of missions, deputies, representatives and their delegates, force commanders, chiefs of SSR support components, and all others charged with responsibility for supporting national SSR efforts, whether in the field or at United Nations Headquarters.

The guidance also applies to all departments, funds, offices, and programmes of the United Nations Inter-Agency SSR Task Force (IASSRTF), including their operations/offices in the field and in Member States. Regional authorities and other multilateral actors engaged in SSR may also find this Guidance Note useful in informing their interventions.

3. RATIONALE

The ultimate aim is to have United Nations practitioners in the field and at Headquarters benefit from a common conceptual framework, against which they will ensure that national ownership is accounted for during the planning, designing, implementation, monitoring and revision of United Nations SSR programmes in the field.

4. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND GUIDING PRINCIPLES FOR SUPPORTING NATIONAL OWNERSHIP

4.1 Conceptual Framework

National ownership (synonymous in this Integrated Guidance Note with the formulation of local ownership) refers to an inclusive and consultative process, methodology and outcome that are predicated on the perspectives, priorities and vision of
stakeholders within the society undergoing reform. National ownership promotes effective, accountable and sustainable security institutions that operate under civilian oversight, within a framework of the rule of law and respect for human rights.

National ownership of SSR is demonstrated in relations among national stakeholders, and between national stakeholders and external actors such as bilateral partners, regional organizations, the United Nations and other international organizations. This Note provides a guiding framework through which national ownership can be made integral to the planning, design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of SSR programmes. An SSR process based on national ownership would include the following basic elements:

a. An inclusive national consultation and dialogue involving the State and all segments of society, including women and minority groups – this a process, not a single event or conference – from which a national consensus on security needs and priorities evolves, and from which a common national security vision is formulated and derived. That common vision would include the objectives of and approaches for national security architecture and arrangements, including strategies and policies.

b. A process of implementation that should involve national stakeholders – including, to the fullest extent possible, actors beyond government. This element of national ownership necessitates a coordination process/mechanism through which national authorities work together with international partners/donors in mapping and directing their intervention, in order to achieve coherence and complementarity with the national vision and agenda.

c. Monitoring and evaluation in which national actors actively monitor and evaluate the reform process as well as being monitored and evaluated themselves. This would include their active involvement in determining what needs to be monitored and evaluated.

d. A process in which national actors commit, to the extent possible and on a systematic basis, financial resources to the oversight of the reform process. These allocations by the relevant legislative authorities, including to non-state actors, should reflect the security needs and aspirations of all segments of society.

The approach to national ownership by external actors seeking to support SSR in a variety of contexts will have a direct impact on the extent to which the planning, design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of SSR programmes reflect and are responsive to the security needs and aspirations of the people in those contexts. The United Nations is one such external actor, and a critical one in this regard.

The role of national stakeholders is crucial, and indeed at the core of national ownership. National ownership and (consequently) sustainability are futile if
national actors continue to lack the requisite capacity to direct, implement, finance and coordinate the implementation process. In other words, ownership grows in direct proportion to the capacity of national stakeholders. An accurate assessment of national capacity in these areas is therefore essential for ensuring the feasibility of national ownership. The qualitative and quantitative enhancement of national capacity should be one of the overriding strategic objectives and benchmarks of United Nations support to the SSR processes predicated on the notion of national ownership.

4.2 Guiding Principles for Supporting National Ownership

The following approaches will guide United Nations practitioners in the field and at Headquarters in the promotion and operationalization of national ownership in support of SSR processes.

4.2.1 The people comprise the basis for reform

The basis for the legitimacy, viability and sustainability of the reform and governance of the security sector in a specific national context lies in the expressed needs and visions of the people; this should be the core driver of any security reform process. There is often no single cohesive vision that serves as a platform for a consistent reform of the security sector. A common national vision may only be possible after a consultative process – facilitated by international assistance providers (if need be), compatible with international standards of human rights and the rule of law, and ideally leading to a national security policy. The ideas that underpin national SSR processes should not be generated wholesale from and by external partners. The security reform process must directly benefit the population in their day-to-day lives.

Box 1. Establishing a critical mass for national ownership

A critical element of a successful SSR process is the recognition, by a critical mass of the national population, of the need for reform and partnerships. Recognition by a significant body of national stakeholders that security institutions are in need of reform establishes a crucial and organic constituency for advocacy and sustainability of the reform agenda within the local population. As with other reform efforts, this recognition is not required to be initially unanimous. However, there needs to be a sizeable constituency that is convinced of the need for reform and that can act as a “force multiplier” to mobilize grassroots support for the reform among the national population more broadly.

Ideally, such a reform constituency should also recognize that the reform and/or transformation of security institutions will have a better chance of success if undertaken in partnership with, and with technical support from, the international community. In other words, an ability to embark on the reform process should be premised on a national acknowledgement of the need for change and for external partnerships to facilitate this change.
4.2.2 Buy into national agenda and processes; do not seek “buy-in” from national actors

The fundamental and abiding principle of national ownership is that external support and engagement must be informed, directed and led by national stakeholders. It is therefore crucial, to the extent possible, for external actors to seek to buy into national reform processes, rather than to bring national actors on board for ideas and processes that are externally generated and inspired. National stakeholders should be encouraged and supported in seeking the commitment or “buy-in” of externals into locally generated, negotiated and inspired ideas, and their vision of security. Where that “buy-in” is lacking, the strategic opportunity for sustainability of the reform process will be lost.

4.2.3 National ownership extends beyond “state ownership”

A careful process of relationship building with a broad constituency of actors at the local and national levels is essential for external stakeholders to successfully facilitate nationally owned SSR. “National stakeholders” must be seen as extending beyond the State to include civil society, the legislature, the media, and informal and traditional justice and security institutions. At stake here are both the objective reality of the security of the population and their perception of security. A viable SSR process therefore needs to strengthen – and in some cases, transform – the trust between security institutions and the public. In this regard it is worth stressing that NGOs do not speak for the full spectrum of civic representation. The broader public and independent experts and individuals who are not part of civic associations should also be encouraged and enabled to participate in the process. Adequate representation of women in security sector decision-making is also crucial to ensuring that national security policies reflect the security priorities of women and girls. A broader constituency of national actors leads to greater legitimacy and sustainability of the reform agenda.

Box 2. Addressing national ownership in the absence of political will

The normative imperative of predating international support and engagement on national agendas and processes is often confronted with and frustrated by the absence of clear political will for reform. SSR in post-conflict environments often touches the very heart of state sovereignty and necessitates changes in power relations, which may be perceived as marginalizing the interests of the very actors expected to lead and implement reform. The result can be inadequate government or (in some cases) national political will for reforms within the security sector.

In such cases the United Nations could promote and facilitate national political will through sensitization of key national actors on the benefits of SSR, based on the notion of human security and in line with the ten principles espoused in the Report of the Secretary-General on Security Sector Reform (UN, 2008). When/where political will is polarized, facilitating national dialogue on SSR could be of immense benefit in closing the underlying socio-political cleavages.
4.2.4 Dispute among national stakeholders is not an absence of ownership

Very often, there is a preponderance of local and national debates around competing and conflicting visions of security, particularly in societies emerging from protracted conflict. This is often interpreted to indicate the absence of ownership by national actors. Such a conclusion would be inaccurate. Rather, these situations should be seen as opportunities for the international community, ideally the United Nations, to facilitate nationally led processes of dialogue through which such conflicting visions can merge into a common vision of national security in which all major national stakeholders can see themselves. Such facilitation should particularly recognize and address the interests of marginalized groups in society, such as minorities, women, children, refugees, rural communities, and vulnerable groups as may be defined by respective national and regional contexts.

4.2.5 Capacity is an essential element of ownership

The tasks of facilitating and coordinating the SSR process are a national responsibility; if those tasks are not performed, ownership cannot be either genuine or sustainable. However, states emerging from conflict often lack the capacity for such coordination. In such cases the United Nations may, with the consent and/or engagement of national authorities, temporarily coordinate international support to SSR process, with a constant eye on developing national capacity to take over coordination functions. As mentioned earlier, the higher the national capacity to coordinate international support to SSR processes, the higher will be the degree of national ownership. National ownership is directly related to the human, institutional and financial capacity of national actors to implement SSR activities. From this perspective, national ownership is somewhat synonymous with national capacity.

National capacity development should be outcome-oriented. This means that the focus must be on how the benefits of national capacity development will trickle down to the population in terms of tangible improvements in their day-to-day lives – for example accessing and using security services. National capacity development initiatives should also have a clearly phased exit strategy that shows how increased knowledge transfer (including mentoring) is coupled with, and translates into, increased national takeover and, eventually, complete transfer of responsibilities.

4.2.6 Capacity development cuts both ways

The requisite capacity for a credible and sustainable SSR process relates to both technical capacity and in-depth knowledge of the context. While national actors often lack the former, they are unrivalled in the latter. On the other hand, while
external actors (including United Nations personnel) often have technical skills, they frequently lack the necessary depth of knowledge of the local environment. Therefore, the dual composition and definition of capacity should be integral to the entire reform process, and national actors should also be recognized as agents for enhancing the capacity of external actors. In this regard, increasing emphasis should be placed by the United Nations and other international actors on facilitating the exchange of experiences and best practices among countries that have undergone reform (UN, 2011).

4.2.7 Effective partnerships are essential for success

The key to facilitating and enhancing national ownership and sustainability of SSR processes is not just technical proficiency and regular exchange of information, but also the ability to build effective partnerships based on mutual trust and confidence. Good working relations with a broad range of actors – official and non-official, local and international – are essential to ensure national ownership of an SSR process. Partnerships with national actors should be built not only at the national level but also at the sub-national and regional levels.

5. GUIDANCE ON THE MAIN COMPONENTS OF NATIONAL OWNERSHIP

Guidance provided in this section is structured on the basis of the four essential components of national ownership:

i) a common national security vision;
ii) implementation and capacity;
iii) financing; and
iv) monitoring and evaluation.
5.1 A Common National Security Vision

Discrepancies and contradictions in security perceptions and needs among national stakeholders, particularly after conflict, is often the norm. Such differing and conflicting positions among national actors should be taken as the point of departure for support planning and design; activities should be aimed at facilitating continued national dialogue on a national vision of security. National ownership of reform(s) has to be underpinned by national consultation in order to be successful and effective. Nationally owned SSR is based on the need to ensure that the national security vision, including the objectives and approach for national security arrangements, is developed in consultation with, and in response to the needs and security perceptions of, both the State and its citizens according to their political affiliations, sex, age, sexual orientation, ethnicity, region, religion, class and beliefs – including and particularly the marginalized.

The strategic objective in this regard is to take the ideas of various national stakeholders about their security situation as a starting point in the conceptualization, design and implementation of SSR programmes. This is an essential element for the viability and sustainability of the entire reform process, and forms the basis of the legitimacy and direction of support to be provided by the United Nations and other external actors. A crucial part of the visioning process is a national assessment of needs to identify a set of concrete areas for development of the security sector. This entails ensuring that there is a core and representative group of stakeholders that drives the identification and prioritization of what needs to be done in reforming and transforming the sector. In the absence of a clear national vision, the facilitation of such a consensus must be regarded as an ongoing, integral element of international support to the reform process.

It is important to emphasize that the operational aspects of needs assessment are no less important in the visioning exercise than political considerations. Such (post-conflict) assessments are ideally led by national authorities, supported by the international community, and based fundamentally on local and national needs and with the closest possible collaboration of national stakeholders, including civil society. The needs assessment aims to overcome the consequences of conflict or war; prevent the renewed outbreak of violence; and shape the short-term and potentially medium-term recovery priorities, as well as articulate their financial implications on the basis of an overall and long-term vision or goal (UNDG, UNDP and the World Bank, forthcoming).

The identification of a common national security vision should take into account post-conflict reconstruction initiatives in other countries. Peace agreements and other transitional arrangements often provide local or national avenues of discussions where information or data can be collected. For example, truth-seeking
Box 4. Liberia national dialogue on security sector reform, Monrovia, Liberia, 3–4 August 2005

In addition to historical contradictions and inadequacies, implementation of the 2003 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) has further exposed the need to address critical issues in Liberia’s security sector, in order to consolidate the gains of post-conflict reconstruction and to pave the way towards good governance. In view of the role played by ill-governed security institutions in the Liberian civil war, the success and sustainability of rebuilding Liberia will to a large extent depend on the extent to which the security sector is reformed to operate more efficiently and within a framework of effective democratic control. Within this context, a dialogue on SSR would help broaden the constituency of actors working to develop a collective vision of security in Liberia. Moreover, such a dialogue would facilitate the inclusion of debates around the security sector prior to elections, so as to sustain interest on the issue in a post-election reform agenda. Significantly, a dialogue on SSR would serve as a crucial step in bringing voice and accountability into the process of creating an inclusive, locally driven SSR process in Liberia.

Against this background, the Ministry of Justice of Liberia and the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) convened a National Dialogue on Security Sector Reform, which was held in Monrovia 3–4 August 2005. The event was jointly facilitated and funded by the Conflict Security and Development Group (CSDG) of King’s College, University of London; the Centre for Democracy and Development (CDD), Lagos, Nigeria; and the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), Switzerland. The dialogue served as an avenue toward a structured but informal conversation on SSR among relevant stakeholders, including the United Nations, the transitional legislature, the judiciary, civil society, relevant ministries, civil society, and organizations responsible for implementing reform.

The dialogue was guided by, and sought to provide answers to, the following interrelated questions:

1. What kind of security (and security sector) does Liberia have?
2. What kind of security (and security sector) do Liberians want?
3. What are the necessary key steps for achieving the desired security?
4. Who are the critical actors for attaining such security?
5. How can a locally driven, inclusive and accountable security sector reform process be achieved?

achieve the latter’s vision of security and blueprint for SSR. In this regard, the support envisaged might include *inter alia* the following:

a. Encouraging adoption of SSR-related provisions in peace agreements or transitional legal arrangements.

b. Convening key stakeholders and galvanizing them into reaching consensus and taking action around the objectives of SSR.

c. Assisting national actors in conducting assessments of the security sector, including gap analysis and assessments of infrastructure, security perception surveys, and other initiatives that expose the challenges of security provision and governance facing the country in question, and the role of respective stakeholders in the governance of the security sector.

d. Facilitating a series of national dialogues on SSR by all stakeholder constituencies, including women’s groups and civil society.

e. Promoting the development and consolidation of knowledge systems and local and regional expertise to assist the SSR process.

f. Capitalizing on the potential of other post-conflict reconstruction and rule-of-law re-establishment programmes to mainstream the SSR process.

g. Assisting with institution building and capacity development to enhance national capacity for institutional reform and development in various component and related areas, such as policing, the judiciary, corrections, immigration, customs and excise, and defence.

h. Helping develop national stakeholders’ capacity to coordinate external support to the SSR process; and

i. Building the capacity and facilitating the expansion of space for various stakeholders (women, children’s organizations, minorities, etc.) to effectively participate in the oversight of budget formulation and expenditure as it pertains to the security sector.

**Box 5. In the process of supporting national capacities, three particular areas are of critical importance**

- **Distinct benchmarks** should be established and met in a relatively short period (six months to two years), and other benchmarks set for long-term processing. One must begin by asking, “Capacity development for what exactly and by when?”

- Capacity gap analysis should be conducted – *i.e. a capacity assessment* for these specific benchmarks, in which the gap between existing and desired capacities are identified in order to build on existing systems wherever possible and avoid parallel structures.

- A capacity development plan should be developed; this would address technical capacities on the individual level and organizational capacities on the institutional level, and include a clearly phased exit strategy to ensure that the capacities are effectively sustained and maintained.
5.3 Financing

While societies emerging from conflict typically face resource constraints and are therefore unable to finance SSR processes entirely by themselves, it is unrealistic to expect national ownership to prevail if the reform process is entirely dependent on external funding; such dependence undermines national ownership. Financial responsibility is a significant element and component of (national) ownership. Governments should be supported in integrating security issues into expenditure and budgeting processes and anti-corruption efforts.

It is important to stress that while national decisions on financial mobilization, allocation and public expenditure are sovereign decisions, United Nations support to national ownership shall promote and be guided by fundamental principles of good governance: participation, responsibility, accountability and transparency. United Nations support shall be based on the following strategic concerns:

- Issues of financial responsibility and participation shall be encouraged for inclusion in the agenda of national dialogues on security sector reform. It is important that all stakeholders have a sense of the actual financial costs of reforming the security sector, particularly as such knowledge would guide and inform the affordability, feasibility and sustainability of security options proffered by various national stakeholders.

- Financial responsibility and decisions of national actors should be guided by and in sync with the common national security vision and needs – ideally, as encapsulated in national security policy and other nationally owned strategies and action plans. In this context, particular attention should be paid to strategies for sustainable and long-term development and poverty reduction, and for the protection of human rights.

- Control over the funds should be recognized by all national stakeholders as a means of control over the security sector.

- Development and enforcement of relevant national legislative frameworks to ensure transparency and oversight of the financial process should be supported.

- To the extent possible, funds should not focus on purchase of equipment alone. Host governments sometimes push for primacy in decision-making when it comes to how, when and where donor funding is dispensed. This is an integral element of national ownership and should be supported. At the same time experience has shown that frequently focus is disproportionally placed on buying vehicles, uniforms and other physical equipment, as opposed to reforming procedures, processes, management and accountability practices as well as inclusiveness, for example through enhancing the engagement with civil society.
A strategic objective of United Nations support to SSR processes shall be to strengthen national capacity to mobilize, allocate, and spend public resources. National capacity for responsible and responsive public expenditure is a basic prerequisite for service delivery, without which the legitimacy of the State can neither be established nor be maintained. Reform and governance of the security sector are problematic in the short term and certainly not possible in the medium or long term if the country lacks the requisite capacity and information to mobilize, allocate and spend public resources diligently and in a manner that meets commonly agreed national security priorities and vision. In other words, the integrity of the SSR process is, to a large extent, a function of the transparency, accountability and participatory ethos of the financial mobilization, allocation and expenditure processes. It is extremely important to support the development of national capacity in financial management – including a reliable corps of accountants, auditors and bookkeepers who can ensure that the financial integrity and probity of the reform process is guaranteed from a national perspective.

5.3.1 Mobilization

Post-conflict environments provide a unique opportunity to address the legitimacy and participation deficits that often characterize the dynamics leading to conflicts. The disconnect between security decision-making and the general population (including the mobilization of resources for security) means that only a limited circle is aware of the financial challenges faced by governments. Ultimately, only this limited circle is held responsible for any outcomes related to security matters, thus enabling accountability deficits.

Promoting broader participation and transparency in the mobilization of security-related resources contributes positively to national ownership by enhancing popular understanding of the dynamics, challenges, and intricacies involved in the national search for the financial resources allocated to security. When and where such mobilization is unsuccessful, a participatory and transparent process facilitates public sympathy and understanding, thus ensuring a much-reduced level of public protestation against lack of resources. Possible means of achieving this include the following:

- Build fiscal dimensions of security into peace agreements, post-disaster and post-conflict needs assessments (PDNAs and PCNAs), development strategies (the United Nations Development Assistance Framework, UNDAF; poverty reduction strategy papers, PRSPs) and expenditure planning (Middlebrook and Peake, 2008). To the extent possible, integrate security planning into efforts to tackle the broader development challenges facing the country, including integration of security needs into the aforementioned frameworks.
Involve as broad a range of national stakeholders as possible in the mobilization of financial resources for security needs, in order to establish legitimacy and a broad-based awareness of the financial challenges facing the State.

Encourage and support a long-term approach to the mobilization of financial resources, as quick-impact projects are unlikely to be sufficient in addressing the fundamental gaps in security sector governance.

5.3.2 Allocation

The legitimacy of the process through which resources are appropriated for security purposes is also an essential element of national ownership. As much effort as possible must be put towards ensuring that allocation of financial resources responds to the political directives and preferences of society at large within national legal frameworks, as follows:

- Expenditure should be based on legislative appropriation. The role of relevant parliamentary committees should be both clear and capacitated.

- Even in many contexts where there has been no conflict, the budget remains under-appreciated and underutilized as a primary tool of policy. The challenge is even more acute in post-conflict contexts, and particularly in the case of the security sector. The primacy of the national budget as a policy tool for outlining policy decisions and priorities, for addressing fiscal sensitivities, and for indicating security policy direction should be encouraged.

- The conceptualization and implementation of security sector reform processes should include deliberate strategies for progressively and sustainably increasing national financial contributions to the reform process. The allocation of financial resources for national security needs shall respect the principle of separation of powers. There should be a functional ministry of finance along with primary security governance institutions, such as a ministry of defence, with clear roles in the management of allocated resources.

- Financial allocation should be cognisant of the need for a flexible timeline for the progressive and eventual assumption of financial responsibility by the State undergoing reform.

5.3.3 Public expenditure

Public expenditure is another aspect of finance in which the circle of participation has typically been limited and where transparency has been often lacking, particularly in countries emerging from conflict and/or where government capacity is weak. Public expenditure mechanisms often reside outside civilian oversight frameworks, especially when the latter form part of bilateral security cooperation.
Knowledge and control of public expenditure is an essential component of national ownership, because decisions regarding how, why and where security expenditure is undertaken are central to implementation of the nationally agreed vision of security. It is important to keep in mind the following:

- Broadly speaking, the security sector should be subject to the same governance norms as other parts of the public sector.
- In rare cases where donor support permits payment of salaries, such support should include clear “exit strategies” for an orderly transition to a normal budgetary process (Middlebrook and Peake, 2008).
- Where possible, the role of civil society organizations, considered key to the integrity of the process, should also be supported.
- Gender-responsive budgeting (GRB) is a useful tool to be employed during the public expenditure review to ensure adequate allocation of resources to women’s and girls’ security and gender-responsive programming.

5.4 Monitoring and Evaluation

A fourth major component of national ownership resides in the monitoring and evaluation of security sector reform processes. The level, role and quality of local (national) active, free and meaningful participation in the monitoring and evaluation of SSR processes are significant measures and elements of national ownership. The direct participation (both qualitative and quantitative) of national counterparts in the M&E process enhances the prospects of their readiness to implement the findings of the M&E exercise.

Ensuring national participation in M&E

- It is important to discuss and agree on indicators, benchmarks, targets, objectives, and the scope of M&E with national counterparts. This contributes to

Box 6. National ownership-friendly assessment methodologies

1. PESTLE (Political, Economic, Social, Technical, Legislative and Environmental) – for assessing the macro environment within which SSR occurs.
2. SWOT (Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, Threats) – combines an internal analysis of strengths and weaknesses with an external analysis of opportunities and threats.
3. Stakeholder Analysis – for assessing who holds power and what their interests are.
4. Reverse Stakeholder Mapping – identifies strategic objectives based on what actor-mapping shows to be feasible, within a broad understanding of the general objective.
5. Roadmaps and Benchmarking – measure progress toward objectives and outcomes.

the sustainability of intervention and also builds national capacity for decision-making and strategic planning in these technical areas.

- Active, free and meaningful participation should be as broad-based as possible and extend beyond the government. Also to the extent possible, the legislature, civil society, relevant government ministries and departments, and political parties should be included.

- The process and content of M&E should be guided by issues that are important and of priority concern to national counterparts.

- While specific methodologies would depend on context, it is important to focus on outcomes and not merely on outputs. M&E should therefore be approached as a process involving a set of relationships and not merely a series of reports.

Building national capacity for monitoring and evaluation

- M&E provides an opportunity to enhance the skills of national counterparts; they should therefore be engaged in all stages of the M&E process.

- National counterparts should be involved not only politically but also technically. It is important to prioritize the technical skills of national officials; national counterparts are key participants and not merely the objects of M&E.

- Use national experts as much as possible.

- Support mentoring and assist national staff in the M&E process.

5.4.1 Monitoring and evaluation principles for enhancing and supporting national ownership

- M&E should begin as early as possible in the programme.

- Roles should be clear, having been discussed and agreed with national counterparts.

- Facilitate and support, do not direct.

- M&E should be based on sound political and economic analysis, and should include the perspectives of national stakeholders at various levels and as broad an array of political opinions as possible.

- It is not always necessary or practical to completely deconstruct existing security arrangements in order to reform the sector. To the extent possible, build on what is already present.

- Monitoring and evaluation processes and content should conform to United Nations principles and normative standards, e.g. as regards human rights, gender, rights of children and accountability, and transparency.
6. ADDRESSING OPERATIONAL CHALLENGES

A number of challenges can undermine efforts to guarantee national ownership of SSR processes. Some of those challenges are highlighted here.

a. Support the primacy of national coordination functions

Inability of the reforming society to coordinate SSR support often appears to shift basic coordination responsibility to external actors. States recovering from long periods of extended armed conflict may not have the institutional capacity to oversee their own SSR process. In such instances, there is a tendency to rely on external partners and stakeholders to facilitate and coordinate SSR processes. Thus, there is an omnipresent risk of a dependency syndrome, perpetuated as much by the national as by the external partners.

Moreover, on the side of international partners including the United Nations, the necessity for coordination is often contradicted and undermined by the reluctance to be coordinated. Given wide-ranging interests and engagement, the difficulty of coordinating activities with other international actors creates challenges related to both intra-United Nations coordination on the one hand, and coordination between the United Nations and other bilateral and multilateral actors on the other.

The lack of capacity of national actors to manage the process should not remove their responsibility to provide leadership in shaping an SSR process that responds to the security needs of the people in the target environment; nor should it substitute or erode national lines and mechanisms of accountability. National leadership should guide external actors and ensure that their support responds to national needs and context, and not to external interests. Transfer of skills to nationals must therefore be an important criterion for the reform process.

b. As much as possible, support actors beyond the State

There is an inherent tendency and pressure to focus SSR support on incumbent governments and statutory security structures. Yet, in reality, governance of the security sector extends beyond the State and the government and includes the legislature (including the opposition political parties), civil society, and informal but traditional security institutions that often have an ambivalent relationship with the State and citizens. Also, other State institutions, such as national human rights institutions, can, if they function independently, play an important role in SSR processes. Experiences from several SSR processes have shown that the broader the national constituency engaged in SSR, the higher the prospects for sustainability. United Nations support to SSR processes needs to take deliberate steps to encourage a broader constituency beyond the State.
c. Relate outputs to outcomes and focus on impact

There is a tendency to define important aspects of SSR implementation (such as security sector assessments and gap analyses) as technical outputs arising out of a technical process. More accurately, however, the production of seemingly technical output is inherently a political process, and provides opportunities to change mindsets, build alliances, transfer skills, and create a common understanding in the society undergoing reform or transformation.

For example, security sector assessments that pertain to institutional tasks and responsibilities should be conducted with a view to building the capacity of all segments of society to perform their roles (according to the constitution and other legal frameworks) in the provision, management and governance of security institutions. Such assessments invariably have other benefits and serve other purposes – including, for example, providing the legitimacy for United Nations actors to provide a platform for convening all critical stakeholders while developing or refining the emerging vision of security.

Box 7. Comprehensive review of the security sector in Timor-Leste

The United Nation’s task mandated by Security Council resolution 1704 of 2006 to assist the Government of Timor-Leste in conducting a comprehensive review of the security sector appeared to have been met by national ambivalence. This is in spite of the fact that the mandate was endorsed by the Prime Minister, who signed the “Security Sector Review in Timor-Leste” project with UNDP in June 2008. Many national interlocutors held the view that the review was a belated and unnecessary exercise, especially given that national review processes such as the Force 2020 defence sector review process were already under way. The word “review” was also seen by some as pejorative. Given the lack of interest and even subtle resistance, it would have been easy at that point to conduct a purely technical review in isolation and move on to the other things in which the government was demonstrably more interested. However, as the review took shape and gained momentum, the United Nations’ integrity of motive became evident. Relevant ministers, secretaries of state and the Council of Ministers did debate and coordinate the review, agreeing and amending as necessary. A further interesting development was the aspect of gender and the strong backing by the Secretary of State for the Promotion of Equality. Thus, the review began to create its own champions within the government, and that reinforced the point that SSR is essentially a political and transformative process.

The entire process took almost two years, with the requisite detailed planning and timelines. Subsequently, the United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT) began drafting the review independently. However, it did manage to engage national partners in the drafting process at a later stage. Following review by relevant government and security sector agencies, the review was ultimately approved by the Council of Ministers in May 2012.

The comprehensive review of the security sector featured as a foundation document because it had demonstratively gone through the political process of review and endorsement.

Source: Murray McCullough and John Symons, Security Sector Support Unit, UNMIT.
d. **Distinguish between consultancy and consultation**

The use of technical experts (including consultants) can be valuable for objectively identifying and analyzing national challenges and opportunities for SSR in any particular country. In addition to bringing valuable comparative examples and experiences, technical experts may be able to package information in a format with which the United Nations and other international actors are familiar. However, experience has shown that there is often also a risk that technical experts, having worked in several countries, could develop a “one size fits all” mental template. Even unconsciously, they may advocate certain “models” of security sector governance and may not sufficiently appreciate the historical, socio-political and sociological nuances and factors that are singularly and collectively responsible for the uniqueness of each operational context. Moreover, while the United Nations and other international actors are familiar with processes of qualitative and/or quantitative social analysis and evaluation, as well as the interventions and policy-making processes underpinning international assistance, there is always a risk of not effectively communicating the rationale and internal logic (historical, social, economic) of their approach to national actors, thus excluding national actors from the most critical part of decision-making.

Therefore, even where consultants are engaged to lead assessments, national actors and the population should be substantively consulted, and those consultations should form the bedrock of such assessments. The use of focal groups, roundtables and town hall meetings is encouraged as means of directly involving national actors and interlocutors in security sector assessments. Where feasible and available, national experts should be paired with international experts. It is also recommended that methodologies be developed for each stage of international assessments. Interventions should ensure that account is taken of the prevailing rationale on the side of national stakeholders.

e. **Appreciate the regional dimension**

Regional organizations also have an important role to play in facilitating nationally owned SSR. Some regional organisations are already developing their own approaches to SSR and have identified appropriate normative frameworks. These regional perspectives and specificities are particularly useful in identifying cross-border and transnational dimensions and contexts of SSR. Such regional approaches can be reflected in national approaches. In this regard, the United Nations could rely upon and/or support the development of regional SSR capacity to provide confidence-building mechanisms. Regional actors should therefore be involved as early as possible in the reform process.
f. **Cooperate in undertaking and developing assessments**

Common understanding promotes common solutions and a reality check. Joint assessments with international and multinational stakeholders help take into account the differing orientation and philosophy among these actors, and identify differences in objectives, approaches and methods that may be inconsistent with the national priorities identified. The United Nations’ potential to provide normative leadership, as well as a convening base for national and local actors, can moderate the actions of multinational and international actors in ways that align them with national priorities. However, this depends on the multinational and international actors present in the target environment. It is important that United Nations personnel are sensitive to and conversant with the institutional dynamics and operational cultures of all international actors engaged in supporting the SSR processes.

Assessments undertaken with both national and international stakeholders may offer an opportunity to develop an inclusive and process-oriented approach, which enables United Nations actors to build mutually reinforcing relationships with national stakeholders. Such assessments should to the extent possible be developed in ways that can yield multiple outcomes and processes. For example, beginning with broad consultations with national and international partners provides a framework for bringing together a wide range of national stakeholders; it creates room for an audit of the available knowledge and resources, and fosters understanding of the local context and language to which externals must demonstrate sensitivity. It is worth stressing that any assessment should be made with a constant eye on local dynamics.

In addition, such interactive assessments pave the way for future national dialogues, as well as planning and design activities. Moreover, a number of unintended but positive consequences can potentially result – including for example a gradual rebuilding of relationships among critical stakeholders, such as between civil society and security institutions, who may have had a troubled or nonexistent relationship in the past. By adopting such an inclusive and process-oriented approach, United Nations programmes focusing on SSR on the ground have the potential to become catalysts for overall governance reform and peacebuilding. The level of trust potentially generated between the United Nations and national stakeholders, as well as among the latter, can serve as a driver for the implementation of a locally owned SSR process.

g. **Avoid overly technical language**

Overly technical language can intimidate rather than promote national ownership. United Nations staff who design and implement SSR programmes
in support of national security dialogues should to the extent possible harmonize delivery of SSR assistance — and that includes using language that facilitates dialogue with national stakeholders on security needs as expressed by national stakeholders and with reference to applicable national, regional and international norms. For example, organizational or managerial solutions such as “community policing” or “integrated border control” shall always be used in conjunction with the national and/or regional context from which they are derived with reference to the generic security challenges they are designed to address. Effective use of language during programme planning, design and implementation should create room for dialogue and the evolution of a national understanding and response to national security needs.

h. Know the value of national knowledge and expertise

National knowledge and expertise are the foundations for a nationally owned SSR process. United Nations programmes should at all stages of the SSR process develop and implement activities aimed at obtaining, generating, verifying and developing national knowledge of security, and addressing national needs. Robust gender analysis is required to obtain information on specific security threats faced by women and girls, as well as on appropriate actions to improve their security. In addition, women and women’s organizations often possess particular perspectives on security dynamics at local and national levels. Providing support to the development and maintenance of a repository of local knowledge sources and expertise will contribute to the development of local capacity and provide the data needed for sound analysis; transparency in revealing sources of data; monitoring and evaluation; and benchmarking.
ANNEX I (CHECKLIST). TIPS FOR SUPPORTING AND FACILITATING NATIONAL OWNERSHIP

- Engage as early as possible, think long term, and be prepared to stay the course.
- Take articulated national priorities and objectives as the basis for engagement.
- Actively encourage compliance with international norms and standards – including through the Human Rights Due Diligence Policy (HRDDP) framework – when supporting the design and implementation of nationally owned SSR processes. Promote the sensitization/awareness of those norms.
- Invest as much in national capacity building and processes (e.g. supporting national counterparts in distilling reform priorities, in planning for reform, and in ensuring wide consultation on draft outputs) as in “deliverables”.
- National ownership is neither quick nor easy, and requires both patience and a long-term perspective. Be patient – stop, look and listen to national counterparts. Appreciate that your own capacity is also being enhanced, as your interaction with national counterparts improves your knowledge of the local context and dynamics.
- Facilitate an approach to SSR that is based on the needs of the population of the reforming country – in particular the vulnerable, the marginalized and women – as well as on the objectives of the government.
- Create a reform-friendly environment: publicizing small successes in reform efforts is a key tool to impact the operational environment. “Quick wins” and tangible dividends can serve as entry points that bring actors on board and kick-start discussion and dialogue on SSR, even if the context is not yet ripe for more substantive implementation.
ENDNOTES

1 The scope and focus of M&E discussed here relate specifically to the role of monitoring and evaluation as a crucial component and means of building and enhancing national ownership.

2 Two examples are the draft African Union SSR Policy Framework (forthcoming 2013), and the Economic Community of West African States Conflict Prevention Framework.

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GENDER-RESPONSIVE SECURITY SECTOR REFORM

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1. SUMMARY

This Guidance Note is intended to facilitate the inclusion of women and women’s perspectives in Security Sector Reform (SSR), and to ensure that United Nations (UN)-supported SSR initiatives respond to the different needs and capacities of women, girls, men and boys.

The Note provides guidance for interventions at the strategic and operational levels around the following five themes: 1) effective service delivery, 2) participation and equal opportunities, 3) prevention and protection, 4) accountability and oversight, and 5) monitoring and evaluation. The Note is intended to assist practitioners in developing regionally and nationally appropriate strategies based on context-specific challenges and opportunities.

Security sector institutions that reflect societies at large in terms of, inter alia, sex, ethnicity, tribal affiliation, religion and sexual orientation are more likely to be trusted and considered legitimate. From the UN perspective, SSR is inherently a process about transforming a security apparatus into professional, transparent and accountable institutions. This transformation process offers opportunities to engage with men and women in security sector institutions so as to increase their knowledge of and responsiveness to the rights, perspectives and needs of women, girls, men and boys, and to promote security institutions that operate within a framework comprising rule of law and respect for human rights.

Similarly, gender-responsive SSR can enhance the security sector’s ability to grapple with key post-conflict security issues, such as how post-traumatic stress and shifting gender roles can perpetuate violence; the link between violence in the community and within families and the spread of HIV; the continuum of violence that women and girls experience prior to, during and after conflict; and the often underutilized role of women and girls in promoting peace and reconciliation at the local level.

2. OBJECTIVES

This Interim Technical Guidance Note (ITGN) is a resource for UN-supported Security Sector Reform (SSR) initiatives. It aims to: a) facilitate the participation of women and girls in SSR decision-making, planning, implementation and oversight; b) ensure that the resulting security sector institutions and policies respond to the different rights, perspectives and needs of women, girls, men and boys – and in particular provide effective human rights protection, including protection from and response to sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV); and c) ensure
that governmental and UN interventions comply with the standards set forth in various international human rights instruments. Relevant instruments include the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW); the mandates set forth in UNSC resolutions, inter alia, UNSCRs 1325 (2000), 1820 (2008), 1888 (2009), 1889 (2009) and 1960 (2010); and the basic principles for a UN approach to SSR as outlined in the Secretary-General’s Report on the role of the UN in supporting SSR of January 2008 (S/2008/39).

3. SCOPE

This Guidance Note examines the integration of gender into two broad levels of SSR processes, outlining specific actions the UN should take to promote gender-responsive SSR. One is the strategic level, comprising legislation, policies and rules governing the security sector and its reform. The other is the operational/institutional level, comprising institutions; structures and their practices; and operating procedures.

The Note aims to help practitioners and policy makers develop strategies tailored to regional, national and local needs.

4. INTRODUCTION

In order to be effective and inclusive, SSR must respond to the different needs, priorities and capacities of women, girls, men and boys. Gender roles, relations and dynamics are context-specific, and their political and social implications vary among societies. Any UN-supported SSR process must therefore begin with a thorough analysis that looks at cultural norms relating to gender; how roles and relations have shifted during conflict and transition; and how conflict may have exacerbated pre-existing gender discrimination, or created gender discrimination where it did not exist. In many contexts where the UN is operating, citizens may face particular security threats due to their sexual orientation, which should be addressed through SSR initiatives.

SSR offers opportunities to engage with men and women in existing security sector institutions so as to increase their knowledge of and responsiveness to the rights, perspectives and needs of women, girls, men and boys, and to promote security institutions that operate within a framework comprising the rule of law and respect for human rights. Similarly, gender-responsive SSR can enhance the security sector’s ability to grapple with key post-conflict security issues, such as
how post-traumatic stress can perpetuate violence; the political nature of some acts of conflict-related sexual violence; the link between violence in the community and within families and the spread of HIV; and the often underutilized role of women and girls in promoting peace and reconciliation at the local level.

5. GENDER-RESPONSIVE SSR

The international standards and mandates relevant to gender-responsive SSR are listed in the Annex. Underpinning these mandates is the recognition that conflict and post-conflict transition processes, including SSR, affect women, girls, men and boys in profoundly different ways. Thus, international and national interventions must be analyzed through a gender perspective and tailored to meet the varying needs that arise from different experiences. Women, girls, men and boys face different security threats at different times and locations. These differences can also be influenced by other identity factors, such as age, religion, ethnic affiliation and sexual orientation. For example, in many contexts men and boys are more likely to be killed by small arms, whereas women and girls are the most likely to be (although not exclusively) victims of sexual violence or a physical assault. In a given context, women and girls may be more likely to be attacked near water points or agricultural areas, whereas men and boys may be more likely to be attacked near grazing areas. Girls are often attacked on their way to school, which can lead their parents to keep them at home, thereby hampering their educational and career prospects later in life. Sexual violence can often be used as a tactic of warfare, and should be met with tailored political and judicial response. Conflict has a profound impact on the provision of and access to services, especially for survivors of sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV), which can carry over far into the post-conflict phase. The breakdown of the justice system and security sector, and the environment of impunity that often follows such a breakdown, can contribute to an increase in violence against women, attacks and exploitation of widows, forced marriages, sexual exploitation, sex work, or human trafficking.

SSR initiatives can affect women, girls, men and boys differently. If security actors only gather information about security threats from men, they may miss key details about dangers that affect mainly women and girls. Such dangers include attacks at water points, mine fields near agricultural areas, and threats against women community leaders in urban areas. Women and girls may be particularly vulnerable to insecurity during elections, natural disasters, or other times of upheaval. Women have the capacity to make strategic contributions to SSR initiatives, such as gathering and dissemination of information about threats to their
security, as well as on arms caches, troop movements and other security issues in their communities. Moreover, women’s expertise in grassroots peacebuilding and reconciliation in many contexts can be an asset to promoting social cohesion and greater community trust in the security sector. Small arms and light weapons also impact men and women disproportionately. Men and boys are the primary users of small arms and present the largest share of victims of small arms. However, in relation to the number of women and girls that use small arms, they make up a greater share of small arms victims. Addressing these threats in a gender-responsive manner is essential to ensuring an effective and sustainable impact on community security. Recognition of and response to these differences in security needs will enhance the effectiveness of security institutions.

Gender-responsive SSR can address specific biases and systemic discriminatory practices manifested in the security sector, including women’s confinement to traditional roles and tasks, conditions of work and employment that inhibit their full and equal participation (e.g. maternity policies), and women’s lack of access to higher ranks within the sector. In many post-conflict contexts, national and international actors support a good number of other processes, such as rule of law reform and disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR), and this may have a bearing on gender-responsive SSR delivery. As with all aspects of SSR, close coordination between the UN, partners, and national and regional counterparts will be a linchpin for successful programming.

Gender mainstreaming into SSR is not an end in itself. Rather, gender mainstreaming is a strategy to ensure that SSR initiatives equitably consider and respond to the different security and welfare needs and capacities of women, girls, men and boys; thus it aims to promote gender equality in society at large and ensure that all activities integrate the human rights of all persons. Gender mainstreaming enables everyone’s rights, perspectives and needs to be codified within policy and practice.

### 5.1 Effective Service Delivery

Women, girls, men and boys have different security experiences and priorities. Taking these differences into account when reforming the security sector strengthens the ability of the relevant institutions to respond to the security needs of the public. In addition, the increased participation of women in these institutions has been shown in part to improve their functioning in many areas, such as SGBV reporting rates, intelligence gathering, and the treatment of female witnesses, victims and suspects. The presence of women in the sector – coupled with capacity development for gender analysis and gender-responsive institutional
policies and procedures – can reduce sexual harassment and promote respect for human rights within security organs. Gender-responsive SSR can serve as a model for the inclusion of marginalized and excluded groups in the security sector. Its potential as a more acceptable SSR objective can make it a valuable catalyst and entry point for wider SSR reform.

The efficacy of gender-responsiveness in SSR strategy is demonstrated by the graph above. Comprising data from forty countries, the graph shows a positive correlation between the proportion of female police and rates of reporting of sexual assault.

Strategic Interventions

- **Draft gender-sensitive national security policies, strategies and plans.** The first step is a thorough analysis of the security needs and capacities of women, girls, men and boys. Gender issues that can be included in national security policies include, *inter alia*, the equal right of men and women to participate in security sector institutions as staff and decision-makers; recognition that sexual violence and domestic violence are human rights violations and internal security threats; the involvement of women at the decision-making level in peace and security arrangements and structures; and mechanisms that promote women’s role in decision-making and ensure the participation of civil society, including women’s organizations, in overseeing the implementation of security policies. A security policy can also establish rules against discrimination within security sector institutions – and promote an end to impunity – through effective rule of law initiatives.

Source: UN Women, 2011.
Support the allocation of sufficient financial resources to gender-related activities and programmes within the security sector. Governments can signal their support for gender-sensitive initiatives by allocating funds to promoting such initiatives, including through national budgets and development plans or documents. Gender-responsive budgeting is a useful tool for establishing adequate expenditure towards gender mainstreaming in any sector.

Operational Interventions

- The UN should provide national partners with technical expertise on developing gender-responsive policies, regulations for security institutions, and standard operating procedures (SOPs) for regional and national security sector institutions that recognize the rights, perspectives and needs of women and girls, as well as the capacity of women and girls in the community to be opinion leaders, educators, peacebuilders, etc. SOPs should also detail the gender-sensitive procedures and infrastructure needed to ensure equal participation of women and men. Gender policies should complement a code of conduct, the development of which the UN should support. Gender policies should address cultural norms that may prevent women from joining, staying with, or being promoted within security sector institutions. Policies should also encourage the use of gender-sensitive language (for example, “police officers” rather than “policemen”).

- The UN should see that a proper mechanism is in place to coordinate and ensure coherence on gender and SSR issues; ideally, the coordination mechanism should be chaired or co-chaired by the relevant national authorities. In some cases, existing forums could be utilized, whereas in others a new working group or task force should be created. Coordination and coherence among actors is required if interventions are to be successful.

Box 1. “Do No Harm” – SSR, gender and national legislations

The “Do No Harm” approach ensures that national legislative and normative frameworks facilitate – rather than hinder – the inclusion of gender perspectives in SSR. Ways of ensuring “Do No Harm” can include:

- Ensuring that legislation or regulations on armed, gender-based and domestic violence include the development of national strategies, facilitate data collection on violence, and promote adherence to operational standards of intervention by the security sector.

- Creating opportunities for women’s ministries and development institutes to share experiences and best practices with policy-makers.

- Incorporating a “Do No Harm” approach in small arms legislation by strengthening restrictions on small arms acquisitions by those with a history of armed, domestic or gender-based violence and by ensuring adequate registration of small arms licences. Laws can also require spouses to be notified prior to the issuance of a small arms licence.
The UN can support capacity development for national security institutions in pre-service and in-service training, including curriculum development on gender mainstreaming and women’s rights as well as UN treaties and related Security Council resolutions. For example, organizing multidisciplinary training workshops for security institutions that include gender equality sensitization and ways to eliminate stereotypes is useful alongside the provision of other support capacities. This latter support could include transport and communications equipment; record management systems; skills development for collecting and managing evidence in cases of sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) in general and conflict-related sexual violence in particular; ethical guiding principles for dealing with survivors; and education/sensitization regarding HIV. Such training can also enhance ownership of reforms and commitment to gender equality within the security sector. Moreover, the UN can encourage national institutions to identify “champions” of gender equality within the sector, such as inspector-generals or commissioners. Advocacy with senior male leadership should be considered a key strategy.

The UN should assist the national security institutions in the collection and analysis of disaggregated age and sex data as a key tool towards understanding and responding to the different needs of women, girls, men and boys. National data can also point to trends based on religious or ethnic affiliation or other factors where appropriate.

The UN should promote the mainstreaming of STIs/HIV/AIDS prevention across all capacity development support provided to national uniformed personnel, and ensure international uniformed and civilian personnel receive STI/HIV/AIDS awareness and prevention training as part of their in-country induction. The personnel deployed should have adequate referral information for post-sexual violence emergency services (post-exposure prophylaxis, emergency contraception, psychosocial support where available, etc.) in-country. Providing HIV awareness and prevention training to the security sector can contribute significantly to awareness in the wider community, especially in contexts where community policing approaches are used.

The UN should facilitate the participation of women’s organizations in SSR efforts. For example, regular consultations should be held with women’s organizations and women’s leaders, both to identify their SSR priorities and to solicit their feedback on UN-supported initiatives. In doing this, the UN should ensure the participation of women belonging to traditionally marginalized or excluded groups. Women’s groups must also be included in the drafting, implementation and monitoring of community-level security plans.
5.2 Participation and Equal Opportunities

Women and girls account for more than half of the population for which the security sector works, and therefore must be perceived as central constituents and stakeholders of SSR rather than a special interest segment of the population. Basic principles of democratic governance and human rights require that women be equal participants in the design, implementation, and oversight of security policies.

Women and men have an equal right to participate in security delivery and oversight. Equality and non-discrimination principles, to which most countries in the world have adhered, apply as much to employment in the security sector as in any other sector. Accordingly, the UN and regional bodies that work on SSR must promote gender balance at all levels in SSR units and teams.

Security sector institutions that mirror society at large in terms of, inter alia, ethnicity, tribal affiliation, religion, sex, sexual orientation and language are more likely to be trusted and considered legitimate. However, men continue to be vastly overrepresented in security sector institutions, and thus have disproportionate influence over how, for example, “national ownership” is defined. This is particularly true of the police, the military and intelligence services and the ministries to which they report. The concept of “national ownership”, a commonly acknowledged requisite for successful SSR, should be interpreted to comprise a representative cross-section of society rather than dominant segments of the population. SSR should be a process that recognizes women in their diversity as agents a) in defining security and security risks, b) in providing security services to society, c) in accessing the services of security providers, and d) in overseeing (as participants and constituents) the performance of security actors at all levels.

Women’s civil society groups and organizations have a particularly important role to perform: that of “watchdog” over security institutions. As local security actors, they not only provide services to victims, liaise with security sector institutions and work to prevent insecurity; they also often serve as key sources of detailed information regarding local security and justice needs and trends. They can serve as a bridge between communities and security policy-makers; their involvement is thus an essential part of effective local ownership. Equal participation of men and women in oversight bodies, such as parliament, ombudsperson institutions, civil society organisations, uniformed services and the judiciary, builds trust and strengthens responsiveness to the concerns of the entire population.

Research has indicated that recruitment of women to positions in which women were previously underrepresented must be increased if issues of marginalization and workplace harassment are to be addressed effectively. Such issues are more likely to occur if the level of women’s participation is below 20 per cent;
while 30 per cent participation is generally considered the minimum to promote a change in behaviours and practices in the workplace.

**Strategic Interventions**

- **Increase the number of women serving in the security sector.** Increasing women’s participation in any type of institution, in terms of both numbers and quality, is often considered to result in those institutions better serving women in particular as well as the population in general. This is especially the case with security institutions. Temporary special measures, in conjunction with policy change, must be set in place to increase female recruitment as well as retention and promotion, and to recruit women from underrepresented regions, ethnic groups, etc. This may require legislative changes, new or updated human resource policies, and public campaigns addressing long-held stereotypes, for example stereotypes that women serving in the armed forces and police wouldn’t be as effective as males in the same positions. A strict and enforceable Code of Conduct that penalizes sexual harassment against men and women will make security institutions less hostile work environments for all staff, especially women. Quotas should be extended to the police and other security sector and civil society institutions. The establishment of professional associations for female security sector employees could help provide a support network for female recruits. Infrastructure reform may also be required to adapt barracks and police stations to the presence of women.

- **Eliminate legal obstacles to, and establish targets for, women’s recruitment in the security sector.** Relevant ministries may enact internal rules to facilitate the recruitment, retention and promotion of women among their ranks. Well-publicized and family-friendly policies, flexible working arrangements and schedules, equitable pay, and strong anti-harassment policies can help attract women to the security services. Public awareness campaigns should be targeted at potential female recruits to encourage them to apply, since women may not be as likely as men to envision themselves as security providers. Discriminatory criteria and practices that hinder women of reproductive age from recruitment into and promotion within certain security sector institutions must be stopped.

- **Involve women and their organizations in the planning of reforms.** While conducting consultations and hearings on the planning and implementation of reforms, efforts should be made to ensure the free, active and meaningful participation of women in all processes. Outreach should be undertaken that targets a broad range of women’s organizations, to ensure that women’s opinions and priorities are included in the planning of security reform initiatives.
Increase the numbers of women serving as police and military in peacekeeping missions. With a greater number of uniformed women peacekeepers, the UN can better respond to women’s security needs in the peacekeeping context. International women in uniform can be powerful role models for encouraging local women and girls to take part in the work of national security sector institutions, and for demonstrating how a gender-responsive security institution should function. The UN Police Global Effort initiative accordingly aims to increase the share of women serving as UN Police to 20 per cent by 2014.

Operational Interventions

The UN should provide technical support to police, the army, border control agencies, etc., to assist in defining and implementing strategies for the recruitment, retention and promotion of female members. This could include legislative reform to eliminate legal obstacles to women’s recruitment, retention and promotion within security institutions, as well as assistance in the development of policies to increase female recruitment, retention and promotion. Support could furthermore include special training opportunities for women to bridge the education gap in some cases, in order to acquire the required skills or certifications to join the security institutions, police and armed forces.

The UN must insist on the participation of women in all technical meetings, decision-making forums, etc. when planning for SSR takes place with national counterparts. This participation should include women belonging to groups that are traditionally excluded or marginalized.

The UN should require a minimum presence of women (i.e. 30%, although specific national contexts may necessitate flexibility) in any training activities undertaken with security institutions.

The UN can promote spaces for genuine participation by women’s entities (i.e. Ministries of Women or Gender, etc.), civil society, and women’s groups in discussions on security sector policies, strategies and plans.

UN-supported SSR efforts should be closely aligned with the DDR processes to facilitate the entry of

Box 2. Reforming human resource policies

During a workshop on gender in Freetown, Sierra Leone in July 2009, several female officers noted that although they were not aware of any written policy, they were certain that internal Sierra Leone MoD rules prohibit female personnel from getting pregnant in the first three years of employment, under penalty of dismissal.

As a follow-up to the workshop, the MoD issued a gender policy document promising to adopt a new approach “to guarantee career progression and effective leadership of women at every level of the MoD/RSLAF”.

Source: Ministry of Defense and The Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces’ “Gender (Equal Opportunities) Policy.”
female DDR participants into the security sector. This is because women who may have participated in conflict as combatants or groups linked with combatants may face additional stigma that inhibits their ability to join security sector institutions even though they may possess relevant skills and experience.

The UN should lead by example. UN-SSR units should strive towards gender balance at all levels of staffing, and should include embedded experts who can provide technical support, coordination and coherence on gender mainstreaming.

5.3 Prevention and Protection
In the post-conflict period, women, girls, men and boys may all face security threats in different locations and at different times. Although the war tactic of sexual violence is certainly used against both genders and all ages in many conflict settings, women may be more vulnerable to sexual assault while men and boys may be at greater risk of arbitrary detention. In many contexts women are increasingly targeted for intimidation and violence due to their political activity, and are sometimes (along with girls) attacked by the security service personnel. National and regional security institutions should take a proactive approach to preventing gender-based crimes and human rights violations. States’ duty to exercise due diligence to protect women and girls entails using all appropriate means of a legal, political, administrative and social nature. States must prevent violations; provide access to justice, health care and support services that respond to the immediate needs of survivors; and address the ongoing consequences of violence against women and girls, taking into account its impact on their families and their communities.

Strategic Interventions
- Create dedicated capacity within national security structures for preventing and responding to violations against women and girls. Addressing and preventing SGBV requires a specific set of skills and structures that many security actors lack. Even in cases where the relevant skills and structures do exist, the attitude of the officers informed by a certain cultural upbringing and socialization may impede their capacity or willingness to tackle cases of gender-based violence (GBV). In response, many police services have created protection units staffed with professionals specially trained to work with the victims, witnesses and perpetrators of SGBV and domestic violence. Importantly, women police officers should not be relegated to dealing exclusively with “women’s issues”, for several reasons. First, retention rates
would suffer as promotion is more difficult in smaller units. Second, women officers have the right to pursue a career matching their professional interest and skills, whatever those may be. Third, having mixed teams of male and female officers sends the signal that SGBV is not a women’s problem but a law and order problem that affects all society. Fourth, the presence of women should be a priority in all units across the police service. Where they exist, special protection units must work in close cooperation with referral network actors, such as shelters and health and psychosocial and legal aid service providers.

- Develop the capacity of the entire security sector to prevent and respond to violations against women and girls. While special protection units have been successful in some areas, all security institutions should be able to respond to any threat faced by civilians, be they female or male. The UN can help national partners elaborate capacity development plans and policies to be disseminated to all security actors to enhance their ability to prevent and respond to threats faced by women and girls. Furthermore, defence and police reform initiatives should ensure that structures are in place to prevent, identify and respond to conflict-related sexual violence, and to provide adequate witness protection.

- Support preventive approaches in national legislative reform. Opportunities may arise during the process of national legislative reform to enshrine women’s rights and protection. For example, national small arms control or anti-trafficking legislation could specifically respond to the implications of reform for the security of women and girls.

**Operational Interventions**

- The UN should provide specialized training to police cadres working in and outside specialized units, both male and female, to build their capacity for investigating SGBV cases and furnishing witness protection. Training will only be successful if police have adequate human and financial resources and equipment to carry out their responsibilities, as well as an adequate understanding of the ethical and safety implications of interviewing survivors and the need to provide referral information. If training is to produce the desired impact on behaviour and professional performance, it should be supported by and linked to corresponding policies and rules, and be part of a comprehensive capacity development strategy that includes proper resource allocation and accountability mechanisms.

- UN civilian and uniformed staff must routinely meet with women’s organizations and representatives in order to collect information on possible violations of human rights and international humanitarian law, including conflict-related sexual violence, human trafficking and sexual exploitation and abuse.
Where one does not exist, the UN could assist the national security actors in creating an SGBV task force. This body could comprise police, justice sector representatives, community organizations, women’s NGOs, UN country team representatives, women protection advisers (WPA) where applicable and other UN staff, and donors’ representatives. Information on conflict-related sexual violence collected through the Monitoring Analysis and Reporting Arrangements (MARA), as well as information gathered by UN field missions and UN country teams, can be brought to the international level for advocacy and prevention through the Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights. In some cases, the Team of Experts on Rule of Law and Sexual Violence in Conflict, created under Security Council resolution 1888, can be used as a resource at the national level to provide technical advice.

The UN should include materials dealing with gender issues in DDR programme packages. Materials should explicitly address human rights and the prevention of violence against women and other forms of sexual and gender-based violence, as well as reproductive health rights, including information on contraceptives and STIs/HIV/AIDS.

The UN can support cooperative work efforts that engage men and boys in endeavours to halt violence against women and children and security sector institutions. Such efforts would be aimed at preventing violence both within the security sector and in the community at large.

The UN and host countries should put into operation programmes to prevent human trafficking and raise STIs/HIV/AIDS awareness, including in border areas.

The UN must ensure that its military personnel (male and female), including those in border areas, have the skills to assist in investigating incidents of human trafficking, sexual and gender-based violence and conflict-related sexual violence, and refer victims to existing services when appropriate. The UN must also ensure that systems are established for collecting information on these incidents.

The UN should provide host border management institutions with the necessary equipment and training to detect and prevent human trafficking, in compliance with the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and its additional Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons especially Women and Children. The UN should see that cooperative strategies are put in place with links to other actors in the development, education and social services sectors, to ensure that programmes relating to health, social work, child care, etc. are compatible and complement one another. “One-stop-shops” where women receive both advice
(medical, social, legal) and appropriate referrals within support agency networks have proved very successful in some contexts.

Private military and security companies are also security sector actors, usually providing security for persons or property, investigative services, surveillance and other services. In fact these companies often make up a significant proportion of security providers in post-conflict contexts. A State has the ultimate obligation to protect the security of its citizens and ensure that private security actors comply with international human rights standards and respect international norms. The UN should work with its relevant government counterparts to develop a gender-responsive legislative framework to regulate private security actors and ensure adequate oversight of their work.

- The UN must establish a mechanism for the local community to report incidents of SGBV, discriminatory behaviour, misconduct, etc. relating to private security firms. Such a mechanism must ensure the protection of witnesses.

5.4 Accountability and Oversight

Policies and strategies are only as meaningful as their implementation. Hence, accountability is essential to ensuring that reforms are benefiting the entire population equally. In many countries, women’s civil society organizations play a crucial “watchdog” role: they ensure that security actors are responding to women’s rights, perspectives and needs, and often monitor the extent to which security actors are complicit or implicated in violations of human rights and international humanitarian law, including SGBV and conflict-related sexual violence. Many parliaments have women’s commissions or caucuses. Some caucuses include all female parliamentarians by design, as is the case in Colombia’s bicameral Bancada de Mujeres, Rwanda’s Forum des Femmes Rwandaises Parlementaires, Liberia’s Women’s Legislative Caucus, or South Africa’s Multiparty Women’s Caucus. These organizations can be useful forums for promoting gender-sensitive oversight of the security sector.

Many countries have national human rights institutions (NHRIs), such as human rights commissions and ombudspersons’ offices. The precise mandate, independence and scope of these institutions vary greatly, but in general the institutions promote and monitor the effective implementation of international human rights standards at the national level. Protection issues can include the prevention of torture and degrading treatment, summary executions, arbitrary detention and disappearances, among others. NRHIs have a crucial role to play as independent overseers, thereby promoting the rule of law.
Strategic Interventions

- **Increase institutional accountability with respect to gender through internal and external oversight.** Existing oversight structures (inspectors-general, ombudspersons, parliamentary committees, etc.) will often need to change their mission statements and operating procedures to reflect an expanded mandate to include gender-sensitive initiatives and policies. Parliamentary committees need to include women among their members, call witnesses to hearings, and push for the criminalization of sexual and gender-based violence. Partnerships with women’s organizations are also greatly effective in the provision of gender-sensitive oversight. The UN should also help strengthen the judicial system in its prosecution of national uniformed personnel who have violated women’s rights, in line with international human rights obligations and in accordance with Security Council resolutions 1820 (2008), 1888 (2009) and 1960 (2010) on conflict-related sexual violence. The UN should also support the strengthening of mechanisms for the prosecution of international uniformed and civilian personnel suspected of having violated women’s rights.

- **Promote the creation of parliamentary women’s caucuses and their active involvement in security policy making and oversight.** Women’s caucuses help heighten women’s influence on policy-making and oversight.

- **Include compliance with women’s rights in the scope of oversight bodies.** Oversight bodies usually examine whether and how security institutions fulfil their missions and comply with applicable regulations and policies. By explicitly including women’s rights in the oversight mandates, security institutions have a strong incentive to comply with these rights. At the very least, their record of respect for women’s rights will be publicly examined.

- **Support the establishment or strengthening of an independent national human rights institution in line with the Paris Principles.** Or, integrate into the mandate of an existing institution oversight of compliance with women’s rights and the integration of a gender perspective within defence and other security sector institutions.

- **Include security issues in the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) and other international human rights reporting.** National reports submitted to UN bodies and regional mechanisms should devote sufficient space to the role of women as both providers and users of security. For example, submissions could pertain to articles 2 and 3 of CEDAW (principles of discrimination and equality), article 4 on special measures and article 7 (b) on participation in the formulation of government policy and performance of all public functions.
Operational Interventions

- The UN should provide technical gender expertise to parliamentary oversight committees, including expertise in gender-responsive budgeting that can be applied to legislative spending on the security sector.
- The UN can build female parliamentarians’ awareness and understanding of security issues through briefings, trainings and study tours.
- The UN can facilitate regular briefings for members and senior staff of oversight bodies on women’s rights and gender-related analyses of local security dynamics; those should be delivered by local women’s organizations.
- The UN should help build the capacity of women’s organizations to fulfil their “watchdog” role.
- The UN can support national counterparts in developing a gender-responsive audit system for security policies, as well as a system to communicate results to the community.
- The UN should support the national human rights institutions to work on protection issues affecting the rights, perspectives and needs of women.

5.5 Monitoring and Evaluation

A solid monitoring and evaluation (M&E) framework is key to assessing the impact of any UN-supported SSR initiatives. Gender-responsive M&E will ensure that the differing impacts of SSR on women, girls, men and boys are adequately addressed. Whether directly or through national institutions, the UN should ensure that the M&E framework of any SSR initiative observes the following:

- All information and statistics collected must be sex-disaggregated, as well as disaggregated by age, ethnic affiliation, etc. where possible.
- Assessment questionnaires must include questions designed to gather information about security issues for women, girls, men and boys, as well as women and men’s assessment of the success of various interventions. The questionnaires should take into account cultural sensitivities and issues that may affect the responses provided.
- All-female focus groups should be organized as part of any community-based information collection and should be facilitated by women. Further stratification by ethnicity, language group or tribal affiliation may be required.
- Gender-responsive budget analysis should be applied to all SSR initiatives.
- The terms of reference in any external evaluation should include gender components/expertise, in order to capture the programmatic impact on women and men.
Include a monitoring framework as required under the Human Rights Due Diligence Policy on UN support to non-UN security forces.

6. CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES

Challenges

Women’s rights as a women’s issue. Emphasis placed on the gains for women from increased participation in the security sector may often appear to signal a “zero-sum game”, in which women’s progress corresponds to a loss in men’s employment, promotion opportunities, political power or influence. This perception is common among men in the security sector, and often results in open resistance to reform, which males see as threatening. It is therefore always important to emphasize that women’s inclusion and empowerment in security will bring important gains for all, both men and women. The involvement of male stakeholders is crucial; “men’s organizations” may be valuable partners in mainstreaming the inclusion of women through reform.

Educational and cultural gaps. In many post-conflict countries, low education levels among women have often resulted in their not meeting the minimum criteria to join security institutions. Traditional gender stereotypes, such as notions of women requiring protection and men providing protection, can also hamper recruitment. Often, creative solutions will be necessary – as is the case in Liberia, where special fast-track education courses are allowing women to acquire the required education to join the police and armed forces. In other cases, illiteracy among women in civil society will require special strategies to disseminate information through non-written viral media campaigns, using community radio, public consultation and word of mouth. In some cases, special training opportunities for women can be used to bridge the education gap.

Lack of capacity of women’s organizations. Women’s civil society organizations are generally lack the capacity to participate in large-scale programmes. In addition to the lack of basic equipment, they are often challenged by their members’ family or professional demands. They are especially hampered by their weak internal governance systems: fledgling groups rarely survive, as they are overwhelmed by the demands of project implementation, including donors’ reporting requirements. It is crucial that donors devote considerable time and funding to strengthening the capacities of those organizations with which they work – most importantly, those relating to basic organizational development and internal governance and management. Too often, donor support focuses on project management, reporting, and the provision of office facilities, equipment and
salary support – while neglecting other fundamental aspects of organizational development, such as internal accountability and governance. The situation is exacerbated in cases of ongoing conflict – in Somalia for instance, where the capacity of the NGOs is overstretched by the inaccessibility of most of the regions due to insecurity.

Weak institutional capacity. Local governmental institutions often lack the most basic capacity to implement projects or even run their day-to-day activities in an effective manner. Activities related to gender mainstreaming in SSR may get de-prioritized or be completely abandoned. Similarly, NGOs, referral networks and other service providers focused on women’s rights may lack the capacity to keep up with the demand for their services in many post-conflict contexts. Some governments may compound the challenge through lack of political will to address gender issues and women’s security. Lack of capacity can also translate into a lack of long-term SSR planning, which will negatively affect the ability of the security sector to incorporate women’s needs and capacities into reform efforts.

Lack of information and data. While collecting basic information in post-conflict environments is always difficult, the lack of attention to gender issues and the “invisibility” of women and their health and welfare needs pose specific challenges. It is often impossible to obtain reliable data to establish baselines for projects, activities or resources, which in turn makes it challenging to assess females’ progress or impact.

Lack of coordination of actors involved with gender and SSR issues. In many contexts, numerous UN, governmental and non-governmental actors are involved in various aspects of gender and SSR. Coordination among these actors is often a serious challenge that can lead to conflicting information, duplication of efforts, wasting of human or financial resources, or insufficient attention paid to some key issues. Despite the many obstacles to effective coordination, UN and governmental partners must continually prioritize coherence in order to ensure effectiveness and responsiveness.

Opportunities

Openings provided by SSR. Security sector reform usually implies an in-depth revision of all security structures, including strategies, threat mapping, institutional arrangements, staffing, etc. Among other measures typically part of SSR, expansion of the stakeholder pool – to include civil society, ethnic or religious minorities, opposition parties, etc. – offers an invaluable opportunity to ensure that women’s voices are heard in the decision-making.

Moreover, in post-conflict environments, traditional gender roles have often been altered by the dynamics of conflict, with women assuming new roles in both
public and private life. Assumption of those roles often results in a new class of politically empowered women for whom participation in security decision-making is a natural continuation of their roles during the armed conflict (see Box 3). However, women can also face erosion in their status during the recovery phase: their priorities and participation can be sidelined due to the notion that men’s livelihoods and political participation should come first, or due to the stigma they carry as a result of their involvement in the conflict.

Gender, SSR and Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR). The DDR of former armed combatants that often follows a peace agreement is a process closely linked to SSR. One reason is that DDR returns the control of the legitimate use of force to the state institutions; another is that former combatants are often encouraged to transition into security institutions, particularly the police and military. A gender-responsive DDR process will ensure that the needs, skills, and priorities of female ex-combatants are taken into account; that the vetting of ex-combatants applying for security jobs includes appropriate checks to disqualify known perpetrators of SGBV and conflict-related sexual violence; and that men will have a greater awareness of SGBV prevention and women’s rights. Sexual violence in conflict is a grave violation of international law. Human rights benchmarks and individual screening of past human rights records shall be established for all security sector personnel through vetting: those responsible for violations, including conflict-related sexual violence, are to be excluded from reconstructed security forces – including armed forces, police, intelligence services and national guard, as well as civilian oversight and control mechanisms. The 2006 UN Integrated DDR Standards (IDDRS) include modules on Women, Gender and DDR, and HIV and DDR. Former female combatants should also be vetted before they are transitioned to security services.

Working with men and boys. In most countries, the majority of the security sector personnel is male. Most of the perpetrators of violence against males and females are also male. The transformative nature of SSR offers a unique opportunity to grapple with some of the gender issues that men and boys face as well. A strong understanding of what may lead men and boys to become perpetrators, as well as strategies to address these underlying motivators, can strengthen SSR initiatives.

Box 3. Women maintaining the new roles assumed during conflict
In South Africa the post-apartheid armed forces integrated the former military plus the African National Congress’s Umkhonto we Sizwe, the Pan Africanist Congress’ APLA and the Self-Protection Units of the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP). Female members of opposition armed groups transitioned into the new armed forces, most often keeping the rank obtained during the armed struggle. In consequence, the South African Armed Forces boast a large proportion of women among its higher ranks.
Integrating HIV awareness and prevention and reproductive health. Post-conflict settings can be high-risk environments for the spread of HIV. The end of armed violence brings new population movements of displaced people and ex-combatants back to communities that have had no access to education or basic health care, and no means to promote HIV prevention or support care. In this environment, shattered economies are slow to recover, leaving many communities in deep poverty. Hopes for peace and recovery often exist in parallel with unemployment, destitution and an increase in alcohol or drug use and other risky behaviours. Where women have assumed new decision-making roles while men were off fighting, the return of men to civilian life is sometimes associated with increased domestic violence. The convergence of these factors can drive up HIV transmission rates, adding to the challenge of peacebuilding and reconstruction.

HIV infection rates may be high in some uniformed service personnel and general populations, requiring access to services and availability of prophylaxis and other materials. New recruits as well as longstanding members should receive routine STI/HIV/AIDS awareness training as part of their standard training packages. Security sector institutions can also provide their employees with access to pre- and post-exposure prophylaxis, free voluntary counselling and testing, and access to other HIV services. Women in the security sector will also need access to reproductive health and family planning services, which can have a positive influence on retention rates of female security personnel. HIV prevalence rates among prison inmates are also of particular concern; inmates’ need for treatment and prevention services should be assessed and addressed through the appropriate oversight channels.

In many countries, HIV prevention activities within DDR programmes have led to discussions of more sensitive issues such as SGBV. Experience has shown that demobilization processes can provide time and space for critical health screening and education efforts, including raising HIV awareness and provision of basic prevention packages. Community reintegration policies work best if they incorporate HIV prevention as a priority not only for ex-combatants, but also for host communities and returning refugees. Training and livelihood programmes, critical for national recovery, are also key entry points to HIV prevention since they offer alternatives to sex work and lessen the prevalence of other high-risk behaviours.

Given close inter-linkages between DDR and SSR initiatives, demobilized personnel who have been engaged in HIV prevention efforts can act as agents of change and peer educators when entering other security sectors, helping to protect themselves and the communities they serve.
The UN can:

- Coordinate and implement gender and DDR HIV initiatives with key stakeholders, including national DDR commissions, to ensure a unified and strengthened response.

- Build the capacity of relevant agencies to incorporate and strengthen gender-sensitive and HIV interventions within DDR programmes through appropriate staffing, training, resource mobilization and implementation.

- Provide resources to pay for gender-related HIV prevention activities during the DDR process.

- Establish linkages with ongoing SSR processes to integrate gender and HIV-related issues/interventions from the early phases.

- Establish linkages with national counterparts to promote long-term sustainability.

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**Box 4. Raising the HIV awareness of uniformed personnel in Sudan**

In partnership with the UN DDR Unit, UNFPA, UNDP and the UN Mission in Sudan (UN 2010) supported DDR interventions to address HIV, promote human development, and provide psychosocial support and reproductive health services. The Mission’s work involved close collaboration with the North and Southern Sudan DDR Commissions, the Sudan Armed Forces, the Sudan People’s Liberation Army and the Sudan National AIDS Programme. Activities included:

- Vulnerability and capacity assessments of women associated with the armed forces.
- Training demobilized ex-combatants, women associated with the armed forces and community members on HIV/sexual and reproductive health/gender-based violence through a trainer-training programme.
- Implementing public information campaigns to raise awareness and sensitize receiving communities about HIV.
- Developing referral networks with existing providers to ensure service coverage in receiving communities.
- Supporting access to reproductive health services and STI testing and treatments.
- Supporting access to voluntary counselling and testing (VCT) for ex-combatants and women associated with the armed forces.
- Training reintegration counsellors on HIV, sexual and reproductive health and gender-based violence.
ANNEX. INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS AND MANDATES FOR MAINSTREAMING GENDER INTO SSR

United Nations Charter (1945)

The UN Charter, establishing the United Nations, enshrines equal rights of men and women in recognition of the dignity and worth of the human person. As outlined by the Charter, the UN is mandated to maintain international peace and security and – to that end – to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to peace and to bring about, by peaceful means, the settlement of international disputes and conflict prevention.

Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1949)

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights calls on Member States to achieve the promotion of universal respect for and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms. In particular, article 25(1) guarantees the right to an adequate standard of living and the right to security in the event of unemployment, sickness, widowhood, old age or other lack of livelihood. Similarly, article 3 guarantees the equal right to life, liberty and security of the person.

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966)

At the core of human security for women, girls, men and boys is the elimination of unequal and oppressive gender relations. Article 26 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights supports this central aim of SSR by guaranteeing that all persons are equal before the law and have equal protection of the law. Laws must prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to all persons equal and effective protection against discrimination on any ground, including gender.

International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966)

SSR aims to guarantee the day-to-day human security of individuals and communities, which includes the creation of safe spaces for development initiatives to sustainably take root and flourish. Article 12 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights imposes a positive obligation on States parties to ensure the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health for everyone. The Covenant calls on States parties to take all steps for the reduction of the stillbirth and infant mortality rate; improvement of all aspects of environmental and industrial hygiene; and the prevention, treatment and control of epidemics and other diseases, as well as the creation of conditions to ensure that medical service and attention is provided to all.
**Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (1979)**

The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) aims to eliminate gender discrimination, and is premised on guaranteeing fundamental human rights to men and women. The Convention calls for the protection of women against all forms of violence, gender mainstreaming, and for the equal and full participation of women in all fields. That participation of women is recognized as a necessary component of the complete development of a country, the welfare of the world, and the cause of peace. A highly participatory process is crucial if there is to be an accountable, equitable, effective and transparent security sector that responds to the particular security needs of women, girls, men and boys.


The United Nations Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women imposes an obligation on States parties to take all steps to condemn violence against women, including the implementation of dedicated policies. The Declaration recognizes that violence against women is an obstacle to the achievement of equality, development and peace; it entitles women to equal enjoyment and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms in all fields. These rights include the right to liberty and security of the person, equal protection under the law, freedom from all forms of discrimination, and the right to the highest standard attainable of physical and mental health.

**Beijing Platform for Action (1995)**

The Beijing Platform for Action is an agenda for women’s empowerment. It reiterates that equality between women and men is a matter of human rights and is a condition for social justice, development and peace. The Platform recognizes that the full participation of women in decision-making, conflict prevention and all other peace initiatives is essential to the realization of lasting peace.

In SCR 1308 (2000) on HIV/AIDS and international peacekeeping operations, the Security Council recognizes that the HIV/AIDS pandemic presents a threat to international peace and security. The Council further requested Member States to ensure that peacekeeping personnel had adequate access to HIV awareness, prevention and voluntary counselling and testing (VCT).

In SCR 1325 (2000) on Women and Peace and Security, the Security Council stresses the role of women in all efforts to maintain peace and security; recognizes the need to mainstream gender into all areas of peacekeeping; urges the Secretary-
General to increase the participation of women at all levels of peace processes; urges the Secretary-General to increase women in all UN field missions (OP4); and calls on all parties to take measures to protect women and girls (OP10).

In SCR 1820 (2008) on Women and Peace and Security, the Security Council demands that all parties take steps to protect civilians, including women and girls, from all forms of sexual violence, including enforcement of appropriate military discipline. The instrument also calls for the training of troops; the debunking of myths that fuel sexual violence; vetting armed and security forces to take into account past actions of rape and other forms of sexual violence (OP3); and for encouraging the troops and police of contributing countries to take preventive measures, including through the deployment of more female uniformed personnel (OP8).

In SCR 1888 (2009) on Women and Peace and Security, the Security Council emphasizes the need to address sexual violence in SSR initiatives, and urges that SSR be included in all UN peace negotiation agendas, including in relation to SSR arrangements (OP17).


In SCR 1960 (2010) on Women and Peace and Security, the Security Council requests that parties to armed conflict issue directives at the highest levels to avoid the use of sexual violence as a tactic of war.
ENDNOTES

1 See: www.unddr.org/.

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PEACE PROCESSES AND SECURITY SECTOR REFORM

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1. SUMMARY

The 2008 United Nations (UN) Secretary-General’s Report on security sector reform (SSR) acknowledges the importance of addressing SSR in peace processes. The Report underlines that SSR “should begin at the outset of a peace process” [UN, 2008, para. 46(f)] and that “[f]ailure to address the requirements of effective and accountable security can sow the seeds for future conflict” (UN, 2008, para. 21). Policy documents increasingly mention SSR’s importance in relation to peace processes; yet in practice the subject is not fully understood, as research and policy guidance are lacking. This Guidance Note attempts to bridge that gap – not by providing a blueprint but rather by emphasizing important issues and potential dilemmas connected with SSR in peace processes. The Note has been developed by the United Nations Inter-Agency SSR Task Force (IASSRTF) and written under the leadership of the UN Department of Political Affairs.

2. OBJECTIVE

The Note underlines the importance of addressing security sector reform priorities – and thus “the enhancement of effective and accountable security for the State and its peoples without discrimination and with full respect for human rights and the rule of law” (UN, 2008, para. 17) – in peace processes; of incorporating commitments to appropriate SSR activities in formal expressions of negotiation results; and of ensuring that engagement with SSR issues enhance, and not hinder, the effective and efficient conduct of a peace process. While the Note addresses a range of strategies and techniques to consider when attempting to integrate SSR into peace processes, it also recognizes that the extent to which these are appropriate or implementable depends greatly on context. Users of this Note are encouraged to utilize the various assessments suggested in Section 8 to help them identify the most constructive means for facilitating the integration of SSR into peace processes.

3. SCOPE

Building on the UN Secretary-General’s Report on SSR, the Note examines the entry points, opportunities, constraints and strategies for addressing SSR in formal and informal peace processes. It also discusses the risks and benefits of addressing security sector reform during peace talks and broader peace processes. The Note recognizes the inherent challenge of linking peace mediation efforts with practical implementation of SSR, and aims to raise a shared awareness and understanding of the concerns of various actors as well as the opportunities
present at different stages of the peace process. The Note recognizes that while the UN has often supported peace processes, regional organizations are playing a crucial and growing role in leading mediation support. This guidance is thus addressed to UN experts [including the UN Department of Political Affairs (DPA) mediation support unit, the mediation standby team with its SSR capacity, and specialized mediation support networks)]; to experts and advisers of regional organizations; and to other actors involved in mediation or the provision of good offices. The Note also applies to practitioners engaged in supporting SSR and other related areas [e.g. rule of law, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR), human rights, women’s empowerment and gender equality] who are called upon to provide expertise to mediation teams.

4. INTRODUCTION

This Note provides detailed guidance to actors seeking to integrate SSR into formal and informal peace processes. It encourages firm local, national and regional ownership of both the peace process and implementation of its outcomes, recognizing that these are essential for credibility and long-term sustainability. It in fact recommends a strong operational role for regional organizations in supporting national peace processes and the implementation of subsequent reform efforts. The Note also highlights why advisers, mediators and SSR practitioners should be concerned with this topic, by addressing how the issues are interrelated (Section 5); discusses how the different actors involved should interact (Section 6); and proposes possible assessments, strategies and approaches (Sections 7-10).

5. UNDERSTANDING THE NECESSITY OF ADDRESSING SSR IN PEACE PROCESSES

The rationale for supporting integration of SSR into a peace process is twofold: doing so can bolster both the outcome and sustainability of the peace process; and it can help lead to more successful SSR implementation. Discussion of these two aspects follows.

5.1 Support for Peace Processes

Addressing SSR can support the sustainability of the peace process

Peace processes generally take place against the backdrop of weak State institutions, fragile political situations, gross human rights violations that were committed
during the conflict including by security sector actors, fluid and unpredictable political processes, and difficult economic conditions. During peace processes access to justice and political, economic and social power is redistributed, which makes mediating such processes a highly sensitive undertaking. SSR affects the redistribution of control over, between and within security institutions, and therefore has a considerable impact on overall realignments of post-conflict power relations. Furthermore, in many conflict contexts, tensions within the security sector or over the control of security institutions are considered to be among the root causes of escalating or re-escalating conflict. Engaging in dialogue to address these challenges is necessary to create stability and build a sustainable and viable peace. Progress in achieving agreement on these invariably contentious issues during negotiations can be an asset to the development, outcome and sustainability of a peace process.

Addressing SSR can build public trust in the peace process

This may be the case when conflicts are rooted in and/or characterized by large-scale or systematic violations of international humanitarian law and human rights that are committed by armed groups or security institutions themselves. In such cases, engaging in establishing or reforming the security sector to protect the population can create momentum for the promotion and protection of human rights, as well as raise overall confidence levels. Immediately addressing some of the urgent SSR needs can buy time and generate confidence in ongoing talks on SSR.

Addressing SSR can support broader objectives of the peace process

This is possible when other closely related initiatives (e.g. DDR and transitional justice) are on the agenda. In such cases, discussions on SSR are necessary to achieve coherence of the objectives and implementation of all security-related issues. For example, engaging in dialogue on SSR will be essential in cases where armed non-State actors expect their combatants to be integrated into the newly formed national armed forces, police, or other parts of the security sector as a condition for peace.

5.2 Support for SSR

Peace processes offer an entry point for achieving commitments to SSR

Peace processes provide unique opportunities for addressing challenging SSR issues. They can offer early entry points for crafting and realizing a broad national vision of the future security sector, which can enhance commitment to SSR. Building this early commitment may help prevent piecemeal and poorly conceived reforms
by supporting a holistic approach to SSR that considers linkages with the broader peace process. While engagement on SSR may be difficult if there are clear winners and losers in an SSR process – hence the importance of assessments and “do no harm” approaches – in some cases engagement may provide an entry point for securing the buy-in of negotiating parties, other key stakeholders, and broader society, and thus prevent the rise of potential future spoilers of the peace process.

**Peace processes can facilitate accountability for SSR implementation**

Formal inclusion of well-formulated SSR provisions in peace agreements can help create a useful framework for holding national and international institutions accountable for the sustainable implementation of their commitments, pending the development of oversight institutions.

**Mediation through informal dialogue processes may support SSR implementation**

The signing of a peace agreement does not signal the end of discussions on SSR. In fact, in many contexts provisions will have been left specifically vague in order to enable and encourage a national dialogue and corresponding policy-making process to take place. In other cases, an informal peace process may be based on a national dialogue that, among other objectives, seeks to discuss approaches to broader rule-of-law reforms. In all these cases, turning to mediation support for SSR discussions can facilitate such dialogue and garner broad support for SSR implementation that helps achieve successful results.

**6. UNDERSTANDING THE NEED FOR ALL ACTORS TO SYNCHRONIZE MEDIATION REQUIREMENTS WITH SSR IMPLEMENTATION**

Both mediation activities and SSR activities involve large numbers of highly diverse actors who are specialized in accordance with the situation’s political, economic or technical requirements. Increasingly, regional organizations play leading roles in mediation efforts, and the UN assists mediation through the DPA’s mediation support unit, as well as its standby team with SSR expertise. A number of independent NGOs, bilateral development partners and institutions may also provide specialized mediation services (teams of experts or observers). SSR activities are supported by a broad range of similar actors, including the UN through its Peacekeeping and Special Political Missions and its Country Teams.
Managing and coordinating the constructive interplay among these numerous actors can be truly challenging, particularly in cases where one set of actors may be involved in mediation and another in SSR implementation. There are considerable risks in having some actors talk about and facilitate important decisions on SSR requirements and strategies when they are not involved in supporting implementation of SSR activities in line with the results of the peace process. The same applies the other way round – those implementing SSR components of a peace agreement should be aware of the political and cultural dynamics (among others) that defined the nature of agreed SSR provisions. Enhanced dialogue and coordination can help prevent misunderstandings, misinterpretations, and discrepancies between SSR intentions expressed during the mediation phase and the SSR provisions actually implemented.

Mediators and their teams should therefore be able to draw on the expertise of SSR advisers in developing realistic SSR provisions, perhaps including them as members of mediation/negotiation teams. The risk of overburdening the negotiation process with too many advisers should be avoided by drawing on targeted advice only when and for as long as a specific issue is discussed. On the other hand, those international and domestic actors that will be involved in SSR implementation should understand the constraints faced by mediators, as well as the dynamics and intentions of the negotiations that have led to the SSR provisions they are expected to implement. This should be based on dialogue and the sharing of expertise between the actor(s) leading the mediation and the actor(s) involved in implementing SSR provisions. Using trusted interlocutors with relevant expertise and the appropriate language skills can facilitate this.

7. ADDRESSING SSR IN THE PEACE PROCESS

This section identifies the main characteristics of a peace process that are relevant to SSR, and then considers entry points for integrating SSR across the different phases of the process by drawing on specific recommendations outlined in later sections of this Note.

7.1 Consideration of the Nature and Possible Phases of a Peace Process

Peace processes may be formal or informal in nature. Formal processes tend to result in formal peace agreements that mark the end of a violent conflict. Informal peace processes may not result in written agreements, but may instead find expression in national dialogues with or without external involvement. Informal
processes can evolve into “national reconciliation” or “democratization” contexts that follow periods of deep instability and internal political and social turmoil, often accompanied by widespread violence with higher risk for marginalized groups, women and children.

Whether formal or informal, a peace process rarely follows a linear path. It is often characterized by informal dialogues, with alternating moments of negotiation and stalemate. The dynamics of the peace process and their impact on opportunities for engaging in discussions on SSR vary greatly depending on the context. The evolving interests and attitudes of the negotiating parties require constant and careful monitoring and assessment – for they will in turn affect the options for clarifying, sequencing, postponing or addressing SSR intentions, requirements and provisions.

If negotiations result in peace agreements, the latter usually reflect compromises between the diverse interests of the negotiating parties. The interests of women should be included, and the agreement phase also represents a good opportunity for including SSR provisions that benefit the interests of children. To facilitate inclusive, representative and realistic negotiations of SSR requirements and provisions and the subsequent requisite local engagement and commitment for implementation, it is crucial to hold consultations with national stakeholders over the content of such provisions and the sequencing of SSR activities during peace processes.

Integration of SSR discussions and provisions must be approached in a carefully considered manner to ensure that they advance, and not undermine, the peace process. A few crucial steps should therefore be taken:

- Realistic assessments should be conducted on the feasibility of integrating SSR provisions into an eventual formal or informal peace agreement (see Section 8 for a list of assessments);
- Once the negotiating parties reach a common understanding of SSR and what it entails, mediators should support that understanding;
- A common terminology of SSR among negotiating parties should be agreed upon to avoid misunderstandings, conflicting expectations and, ultimately, contested reform efforts; and,
- Understanding should be achieved on the depth and extent of provisions that may be required to implement SSR in a sustainable manner and as envisioned by the negotiating parties and all affected stakeholders.

Although peace processes are rarely linear, it is still helpful to consider them in terms of phases, which are typically the following: 1) pre-negotiation activities, 2) negotiation activities, 3) the drafting and conclusion of formal and informal
peace agreements and, finally, 4) implementation of the agreements. In order to maximize mediation outcomes, the possibility of addressing SSR objectives should be considered at each phase, as outlined in the next subsection.

Regardless of the phase(s) chosen to serve as entry point(s), broad agreement on the objectives of the SSR process and mobilization of appropriate resources at the earliest possible opportunity are fundamental to future success.

### 7.2 Integrating SSR across Different Phases of the Peace Process

#### 7.2.1 Pre-negotiation activities

Understand the factors driving the need for SSR, the expectations of key stakeholders on this issue, and the role SSR can and should play in the peace process

This understanding should be informed by a series of mapping exercises, such as human rights and rule-of-law assessments, institutional capacity assessments, conflict analyses, stakeholder mapping, and specialized mapping exercises on SSR requirements. Such exercises should help develop mediation strategies for mitigating challenges and identifying and acting on opportunities for moving the peace talks forward.

Seek to address and reduce the sensitivity of SSR

The perception that SSR is too sensitive to be included on the agenda of a peace process needs to be addressed by highlighting the benefits of addressing the issue. While recognizing the risk of having “losers” and eventual spoilers of the SSR process, an analysis of the negotiating parties’ interests should be supported. Briefings can also be held with former negotiating parties from other peace processes in the region and beyond, who can share their own experiences addressing SSR issues. Such dialogues ease concerns over sensitivity.

Seek to level the terrain between the negotiating parties (as well as their entourages)

Attempts should be made to raise the negotiating parties’ awareness and understanding of SSR and related issues prior to the beginning of the negotiation process. This should help level the terrain between individual negotiating parties’ varied educational and administrative experiences and familiarity with the functioning and governance of the security sector, and so minimize the risk of misunderstandings.
7.2.2 Negotiation activities

Consider means and ways of generating general goodwill and political support for addressing SSR issues among the negotiating parties and the broader population.

This would include supporting political dialogue among conflicting parties; arranging consultations with civil society groups, including women’s organizations, that can share information about the impact security institutions have on marginalized groups on the ground; supporting think tanks and academia in their efforts to raise awareness; and considering regional and international advocacy and conditionality measures. Creating liaison mechanisms with security institutions to keep them informed of objectives and progress is also an option for enhancing support. The broader benefits of well-intended and effectively planned SSR for peace, security, justice and human rights should be continuously emphasized through these activities. Quick wins (see below), ahead of formal agreements or reviews, are particularly useful in generating goodwill.

Ensure an inclusive approach through consultations and national dialogue.

Supporting consultations is an important element of an inclusive peace process that considers the concerns of the wider population. This can help ensure that discussions on SSR are not dominated by the narrow interests of the negotiating parties. Sensitization and capacity development activities for civil society actors can facilitate their effective involvement in parallel with dialogue processes, which in turn can put pressure on negotiating parties to keep SSR on the agenda of the peace talks.

Seek to achieve commitment to a future vision of the security sector.

Negotiations would ideally result in commitment to SSR in line with international standards. A formal and broad-based host-nation commitment is the foundation for future SSR. Advisers to mediation teams may highlight areas that are likely to be points of intense international pressure or subject to conditionality requirements for meeting international aid criteria, and suggest provisions that would ensure broad support for the reform process.

7.2.3 Drafting a conclusion following negotiations

Provide clarity on the key issues and benefits related to SSR that may be reflected in an agreement.

The SSR provisions drafted should be firmly rooted in a broad framework of good governance and rule of law, and should uphold principles of human rights and accountability. Considerations of lead actors, available national resources and international donor support may also be addressed in the peace agreement.
As an integral part of the agreement, implementation frameworks should be elaborated that stipulate commitment to, *inter alia*, reform programme priorities, timelines, lead national implementers and monitoring mechanisms. Highlighting the benefits of effective SSR, good governance and rule of law for the parties involved can help convince sceptical stakeholders.

Consider SSR provisions that are financially sustainable
Special consideration should be given to the depth of detail into which SSR provisions in a peace process should go to ensure effective and sustainable implementation. However, adequate space should be left for addressing further details in subsequent political processes. Sustainability also refers to the financial resources necessary to support implementation. Discussions with potential donors may already be necessary, as may considerations for funding beyond the current mission through the host nation or bilateral or other organizations. As post-conflict societies are being rebuilt, resources for future SSR need to be considered in national fiscal policy.

Consider the need to balance quick wins with requirements for long-term sustainability
Quick wins may preserve peace and stability (such as the integration of ex-combatants into existing security institutions), but they need to be in line with the security sector’s legitimacy, size, role and financial cost to society. Long-term sustainability must be considered even as quick wins are being planned, to ensure that short-term responses do not harm initiatives planned for the longer term.

### 7.2.4 Implementation

Create opportunities to consult those who were directly involved in any earlier negotiation process, in order to understand the spirit of the peace agreement and the original intentions of the negotiating parties

Basic SSR provisions are likely to be implemented by transitional governing arrangements that emerge after the signing of a peace agreement. The individuals now holding positions of power (and trusted advisers) may not resemble those who were involved in peace negotiations, and may not remain in their current positions for long. Having some kind of records from the negotiations themselves, such as minutes signed off by both sides, should be encouraged even if it proves difficult to get both sides to agree to minutes or official records.

Consider how to bring in mediation/facilitation expertise to support the implementation of SSR provisions
The longer-term political process of putting the peace agreement into practice should be part of the regular policy-making process of national institutions; this may
call for continuing dialogue on unresolved issues or on new points of contention. Supporting confidence building is a foundation stone for successful UN SSR efforts.

These issues will be covered in more detail in the following sections, which offer suggestions on how to prepare the case for SSR (Section 8), strategies for addressing SSR in peace processes (Section 9), and approaches for integrating SSR into peace agreements (Section 10).

8. PREPARING THE CASE FOR SSR – MAPPING THE CONTEXT

Mapping exercises should be undertaken to better understand the relevance of SSR for the peace process, as well as the opportunities and risks of addressing SSR during that process. It is important to ascertain entry points and needs for SSR overall. Hence, context mapping should be conducted at the outset of the process and be revisited throughout. Mediators and their advisers should ensure that a large number of stakeholders are consulted in the assessments – including security sector actors, civil society organizations, women’s groups and marginalized groups. Data should ideally be disaggregated *inter alia* by ethnic groups, religions, gender and age to ensure a clear understanding of the needs and perceptions of diverse segments of the population, including women, girls and boys. The assessments could be carried out by the mediation team, the negotiating parties and/or reliable civil society organizations and experts – including SSR advisers – and with the support of relevant UN partners. Efforts should be made to include these in existing assessment initiatives.

As part of broader context analysis, or – depending on the context – on the basis of targeted analysis, assessments should generally include:

a. A *conflict analysis*, to determine the root causes of the conflict. The assessment should offer answers to the following key questions:

   - What are the roles played by the security sector in the conflict?
   - Has the security sector contributed to, or been among the root causes of, the conflict?
   - What is the extent to which the inclusion of SSR in negotiations affects the prospects for peace?

b. A *comprehensive security and threat analysis, potentially including a perceptions survey*, to determine the key concerns of the population, which would need to be addressed through, *inter alia*, SSR. The assessment should seek input from civil society, including women, children, youth, and ethnic and
Box 1. The importance of threat assessments

A comprehensive security and threat analysis is essential for identifying emerging challenges that need to be considered in discussions on the future security sector. In El Salvador the changing patterns and increasing levels of criminal violence, linked to changing regional dynamics, were not identified in time through appropriate threat analysis. As a direct result, the national police that was newly established in accordance with the peace agreement was not provided with the resources necessary to deal with the rising violence following establishment. The impact of this is still visible today.

c. A human rights assessment, to facilitate a better understanding of whether and how the existing security sector has contributed to international humanitarian law and human rights violations, including incidences of grave child rights violations and sexual and gender-based violence. Such an assessment will help determine how to conduct negotiations on issues such as vetting of the security sector. It also corresponds to the risk assessment that UN entities providing support to non-UN security forces are required to furnish under the Human Rights Due Diligence Policy (HRDDP). It should offer answers to, inter alia, the following key questions:

- What are the main human rights and international humanitarian law violations people have faced/are facing?
- Who are the main perpetrators of the human rights violations committed during the conflict?
- What were the scope and dynamics of sexual and gender-based violence during the conflict?
- Does a mechanism exist to monitor, report and respond to violations perpetrated by members of the security sector?
- Are effective steps being taken to hold perpetrators in the security sector accountable?
- What measures have been taken with a view to preventing the recurrence of such violations?
- What capacity does the security sector have to prevent and respond to reports of violations by its own actors or by other actors?
How can reforms of the security sector further contribute to the protection and promotion of human rights inside and outside security institutions?

d. An assessment of the regional dimensions of conflict and cooperation dynamics, to understand the capacities of regional networks to influence the peace process and subsequent SSR efforts. It is crucially important to consider the motivations, interests and capacities of regional State and non-State actors/stakeholders, and to provide analyses of their affiliations and relationships with domestic stakeholders. The assessment would provide an analytical basis for the development of a regional response/approach, involving the principal regional/national stakeholders. The assessment should offer answers to the following key questions:

- Which are the most prevalent conflict dynamics (e.g. cross-border organized crime, drug trafficking, refugees and asylum-seekers, regional conflict) and cooperation dynamics (e.g. regional organizations, networks, associations or platforms on political and economic cooperation, regional human rights instruments and mechanisms, women’s organizations) among regional stakeholders?

- How do these dynamics affect potential SSR plans and efforts?

- What are the motivations, interests and capacities behind these dynamics, and what effect could they have on the peace process and SSR activities?

- A mapping of the (formal and informal) security sector including the administration of justice (particularly criminal justice) and the current state of security sector reform efforts, to understand the nature of SSR requirements. This may include the systematic collection of comprehensive information on individual security institutions’ personnel (numbers, background, levels of training), equipment, infrastructure, and the roles and responsibilities of security sector actors, as well as existing mechanisms to assure internal and democratic oversight and control. Such assessments should cover the entire range of security institutions and not (as is often the case) focus primarily on the armed forces. The latter may sometimes be less suitable as effective entry points for SSR discussions during peace processes than, for instance, the police or border guards. The assessment should offer answers to the following key questions:

- What are the strengths of and gaps in the security sector, or current/previous SSR efforts, that need to be addressed in the discussions?

- What elements of the security sector may provide useful entry points for initiating a broader discussion on SSR (UNODC & OSCE, 2012)?
f. A stakeholder mapping of groups at which SSR is aimed, to determine the principal subjects of security sector reform programmes. Representatives of security institutions that are accused of gross international humanitarian law and human rights violations, for instance, are likely to resist provisions for reform efforts that threaten their political, professional, economic and social status. Nevertheless, mediators need to work with security institutions if they represent one of the conflict and/or negotiating parties. Political and economic interests within the security sector should be assessed to understand the impact of potential SSR provisions on the interests of various negotiating parties, as well as those of powerful political and economic actors in society. That knowledge will assist in predicting and preventing the sources of potential spoilers during the implementation of SSR provisions. Stakeholder mapping should also identify potential “champions of change”, who could help support the peace process. The assessment should offer answers to the following key questions:

- Who are the stakeholders most likely to be affected by the implementation of SSR provisions, and how will they react to the peace process and SSR provisions under discussion?
- What are the economic agendas and interests of the negotiating parties and the powerful political and economic actors in society?
- In what ways could these agendas undermine future SSR efforts?
- Which stakeholders can be “champions of change” who might, for instance, help break an impasse in peace talks?
- How would SSR affect the situation of the general public, particularly previously marginalized groups?

g. A stakeholder mapping of the negotiating parties, to understand the background of those parties and their incentives for supporting or undermining the inclusion of SSR in a peace process. This can help identify entry points for SSR discussions during the peace process, anticipate potential responses by negotiating parties and, most importantly, indicate their commitment towards the implementation of eventual SSR provisions. The assessment should offer answers to the following key questions:

- How do the backgrounds, motivations and incentives of the negotiating parties influence their approach to SSR issues?
- What does this imply for the extent to which – and the point at which – the peace process can address SSR issues without compromising the objectives and direction of the overall process?
9. STRATEGIES FOR ADDRESSING SSR IN PEACE PROCESSES

Advisers, including SSR experts providing support to a peace process, should be aware of the constraints faced by mediators and negotiating teams in relation to the complexity of addressing SSR and related issues. Support should therefore be based on carefully calibrated assessments, which examine the risks as well as the feasibility of addressing SSR concerns in a peace process. The following sections outline some strategic and operational coping strategies for minimizing the risks.

9.1 Strategic Level

Uphold basic principles

Mediators and their advisers should uphold basic principles that align with international standards when supporting dialogue on SSR. Upholding international standards requires, *inter alia*, promoting accountability and ending impunity for violations of international human rights law, international humanitarian law and local laws, as well as for sexual and gender-based violence, grave violations of children’s rights and all human rights violations in situations of armed conflict. Compliance of transitional justice processes and mechanisms with international human rights norms and standards should also be promoted consistently. For example, the UN shall not endorse provisions in peace agreements that include amnesties for genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes or gross violations of human rights.

Upholding principles may hamper the ability to negotiate SSR and related issues (such as vetting and transitional justice). However, normative obligations can be cited as an important reason for dealing with issues related to the accountability of security sector officials, particularly where there is resistance to addressing them. Further impetus and support can also be drawn from the operational concept on the protection of civilians, with its emphasis on the need for sound political processes that take due account of human rights considerations and the benefits that the nation accrues from the rule of law and upholding normative obligations.

Understand the competing SSR interests of negotiating parties

The various stakeholders in the peace process – parties to the conflict, negotiators, ex-combatants, victims, broader civil society and international actors – will have diverse and potentially competing demands on the process. Mediators and their teams should invest time well in advance to understand the various SSR
agendas and interests of the negotiating parties and their supporting groups, including women leaders’ representatives; that way, a minimum level of shared interests can be maintained during the negotiations. Even if there is no common ground on the nature of comprehensive SSR provisions, space should be provided within peace agreements to ensure at least commitment to basic principles of democratic governance, respect for human rights, and gender equality in the security sector.

Negotiating parties may take advantage of SSR (and related activities) to further their own interests. For example, armed groups may want to engage in SSR discussions if this is perceived as a means of seizing power and influence from the army. On the other hand, the army may try to prioritize and monopolize talks on DDR and SSR if those activities are perceived as tools for weakening the armed groups. The background of the negotiating parties, as well as their incentives for engaging in and potentially manipulating discussions on SSR, should be clear to mediating parties. This requires conducting mapping and assessment exercises from the outset (Section 8).

**Adopt inclusive approaches**

Engagement with the population should be encouraged to avoid the risk that a peace process and its formal outcomes lack the broad support required for their implementation. The range of stakeholders required to implement and live with the consequences of peace agreements is much larger than those officially involved in formal negotiations – a fact that should drive any approach adopted.

Although gaining consensus may be difficult, broad-based consultation efforts that engage with wider society, including civil society and previously marginalized groups, women’s organizations and youth organizations, should be promoted. Ways should be sought to incorporate the views of children as well. Gender mainstreaming should occur as early as during the peace process by incorporating women in national
dialogue that feeds into negotiations and by sensitizing men to the existence and prevention of sexual violence. However, these approaches should be implemented in a considered and systematic manner. For example, merely including one or more women on the negotiation team is not a substitute for conducting and utilizing systematic assessments of the security needs and concerns of women. Including women in peace processes at decision-making level can broaden national ownership of post-conflict reforms, in effect reinforcing the credibility of the process. This should also set the tone for a post-peace process society that is sensitive to gender issues.

Bottom-up participation does however require civil society organizations to be knowledgeable regarding SSR issues. If judged to be necessary as indicated by initial assessments, “good office” activities may therefore include provision of training and opportunities for civil society organizations, including women’s organizations, to gain knowledge of SSR issues and so the competence to engage on a par with the parties negotiating SSR issues. Only then will they be able to take full advantage of opportunities to voice their concerns and to put their security and justice needs on the agenda.

Inclusive approaches should also be encouraged beyond civil society, through public consultation processes that inform and guide the negotiations. Parallel national dialogue addressing SSR provisions and requirements should be held with representatives of all security institutions (including militias and armed groups) as well as relevant regional or other actors that are playing or are likely to play a role in the peace process. This inclusion effort should be ongoing: for example, whenever national laws on security and prevention of violence are passed, these should be communicated to the public through outreach initiatives.

**Encourage commitment to a common vision of national security and the role of the security sector**

National dialogue processes in the margins of the peace process should be encouraged to support the development of a national vision of security by and for the State and the population. Basing SSR negotiations on a commonly shared national security vision can mitigate the risk that dissenting parties support only those SSR activities with which they are comfortable. If parties cannot agree on the technical aspects of SSR in a peace agreement, there should at least be broad commitment to that common vision. In some cases, parties may want to build into the agreement a stipulation for national dialogue as part of a subsequent political process. That dialogue can generate specific requirements for implementation of the broad provisions included in the peace agreement.
Consider SSR provisions in light of available resources

SSR provisions should be realistic in relation to the human and financial resources that are likely to be available for the implementation and maintenance of reform efforts, as well as timelines. This is an important challenge for mediators who may be faced with negotiating parties’ readiness to agree to SSR demands that seem impossible to implement. Assessing the availability of national funds (and international financial and other pledges of assistance) represents a continuing challenge when judging and balancing SSR objectives, stakeholder expectations, and potential for implementation. If anticipated reforms depend heavily on the contributions of external donors, coordination between donors and national authorities and joint implementation mechanisms need to be agreed and reflected in reform, budget and implementation plans. Engaging with SSR experts and those partners likely to be involved in eventual implementation of SSR provisions is essential for determining the feasibility and sustainability of SSR provisions under discussion. Engaging a “Group of Friends”\(^2\) in the mediation process can also help in keeping interested parties committed – not only to the peace process, but also to the subsequent and crucial implementation phase.

9.2 Operational Level
Build trust and confidence

The negotiating parties’ mutual trust and confidence in an overall, beneficial peace process is a prerequisite for addressing SSR. Mediators and their advisers should assess the confidence level among negotiating parties. When those levels
are too low to engage in negotiations on SSR, it may be useful to begin with less controversial issues that do not directly target the power base or vital interest of the parties, or other issues that already enjoy broad support. Advances on such issues might generate enough goodwill among the parties to move ahead on more difficult items. For example, there might be agreement on the need to increase women’s representation in security forces – both an important item on the SSR agenda and a critical means to move the peace process forward and build confidence among parties by signalling a commitment to change.

Provide capacity development through briefings for negotiating parties

Capacity development through training, study tours and exchange of experiences is necessary to ensure that all parties use the same language and share the same understanding of a holistic approach to SSR. Parties should therefore be sensitized, through outreach and information campaigns, to the need for all sides – whether or not familiar with the SSR concept already – to attend briefings and develop a shared understanding of the language and issues that are central to negotiations. This includes familiarizing actors with the critical yet often neglected fact that a comprehensive concept of SSR includes the need for democratic oversight and governance of the security sector. This will help ensure a level playing field when it comes to negotiating SSR issues, and enable discussions to focus on broad commitment to basic principles of democratic governance and respect for human rights in the security sector.

Support communication strategies

Effective strategies for communicating the objectives of SSR in the peace process and prospects for implementation should be developed to manage expectations and build credibility among all stakeholders involved directly and indirectly in the peace process. Assuring that expectations remain realistic and match the progress made during negotiations will help in avoiding frustrations over unfulfilled and unrealistic expectations of the ongoing peace process. SSR videos, such as those made in Timor-Leste, can play an important role in demystifying security sector reform, encouraging commitment, and publicizing the sometimes otherwise invisible achievements in the sector.

Encourage and support scenario-planning exercises

Scenario-planning exercises can help to foresee challenges that may arise during the implementation of SSR provisions agreed during a peace process. This may include identifying the potential negative impact of provisions. It can also help in understanding competing views on the future of the security sector. Scenarios
may be used to highlight variations in the projected impact of SSR issues on long-term peace and stability. This can help all parties understand and adequately respond to each other's perspective.

**Draw on assistance and expertise in SSR**

Specialized expertise in SSR and related activities may need to be drawn from experts and specialized entities such as DPA Mediation Support Unit and broader mediation and SSR networks. Areas where expert advisers may be particularly helpful include support to strategic planning, human rights, conflict and threat assessments, security sector assessments, scenario planning, child protection, gender mainstreaming, defence and police capacity development or reform, and discussions on the sequencing and costing of SSR activities. For crosscutting issues closely related to SSR, such as human rights, gender and child protection or transnational organized crime, relevant UN entities, regional organizations and specialized non-governmental organizations should be engaged so as to share their considerable knowledge and expertise.

While bringing SSR advisers on board will probably be essential at some point in the negotiations, there is a risk of overburdening the negotiation process with too many advisers. Expertise on SSR should be brought in only if there is a clear need for external advice and upon careful consideration of the timing. To ensure that SSR advisers are able to contribute effectively to the process, they should have received training in the art of mediation support and should be ready to solicit support from experts specialized in crosscutting thematic issues.

**Engage in partial implementation while negotiations are ongoing**

Implementing individual components of larger SSR initiatives while the peace process is ongoing can highlight progress, raise confidence, and maintain momentum. Mitigating strategies to prevent frustration over the direction and speed of implementation.
of peace and SSR processes and expected dividends may include the implement-
ation of quick-impact projects on SSR that raise confidence in the overall
process, while simultaneously contributing to longer-term peace-building objec-
tives. Some of these initiatives and related activities could demonstrate the nego-
tiating parties’ good faith and commitment to the peace process, and promise
a direct impact on the security of the population and individuals. Setting up a
DDR commission, supporting community-based policing and organizing human
rights training for security institutions are examples. On the other hand, care
should be taken to ensure that these projects do not deflect attention from the
main mandate of engaging in a holistic SSR process that embraces democratic
governance.

Use ceasefire agreements to introduce SSR issues

Due to their often extensive military implications, it can be helpful to consider
and discuss certain SSR provisions as early as during negotiations of a ceasefire,
instead of waiting for the eventual negotiation of a peace agreement. Once intro-
duced during ceasefire negotiations, discussions on SSR can then be continued
during peace talks. Ceasefires may also serve as indicators: if their negotiation
and implementation have already generated positive outcomes and contributed
to building trust and confidence in the peace process, this may suggest that
including SSR provisions in a subsequent peace agreement might also hold
promise for successful implementation.

10. TECHNICAL APPROACHES TO INTEGRATING SSR
INTO PEACE AGREEMENTS

This section covers key aspects to consider when integrating SSR into peace
agreements.

Retain flexibility with the help of neutral wording

Drafting agenda points in broad language with neutral wording can help main-
tain flexibility and create room for interpreting individual items on the negotia-
tion agenda. This allows mediators and negotiating parties to keep an issue on
the agenda despite uncertainty about the place, time and opportunity at which
it can be most constructively addressed. Depending on existing confidence
levels or political sensitivities, parties may opt for alternative negotiation strat-
gegies; for the postponement of a particular issue; or – if the prevailing dynamics
permit – for tackling a highly sensitive or controversial issue. Such an approach
may be of considerable assistance in selecting the right moment for introducing
discussions on SSR issues. Moreover, choosing neutral terms to describe aspects of potentially charged issues can also avert discontent before negotiations have even started. This approach must be balanced against the fact that use of “neutral” language can also lead to confusion over the subsequent steps towards the implementation of a peace agreement. It could also limit the United Nations in its capacity to assist, as provisions in peace agreements are often used to determine the mandate of a UN mission.

**Uphold basic principles in the peace agreement**

Security issues on the agenda of a peace process must be addressed in a manner that acknowledges legal obligations under international human rights law and humanitarian law, including with regard to accountability, truth, reparations and guarantees of non-recurrence. In particular, the UN shall not endorse provisions in peace agreements that include amnesties for genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes or gross violations of human rights. By including these obligations, peace agreements facilitate the later establishment of transitional justice mechanisms. Moreover, reference to legal obligations signals to victims and their advocates that violations suffered by affected populations will not be disregarded.

**Find a working balance between main principles covered in the agreement and details left for subsequent political processes**

Reaching agreement first on main principles before discussing details may help in securing firm commitments to SSR as an inherent component of post-conflict rebuilding. While discussing technical aspects of implementation, careful consideration should be given to finding a balance between the need for detailed and binding provisions – such as vetting of the security sector – and the need for more flexibly formulated provisions on issues that first need to be shaped

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**Box 5. The benefits of a flexible and neutral agenda in El Salvador**

In El Salvador, the choice of wording of agenda items was at the outset perceived as crucial to the success of the peace negotiation process. On the one hand, the text was written in very neutral language so that it could encompass whatever meaning either side wanted it to have. This also minimized the risk that, upon seeing the agenda, the constituents of either side could accuse the negotiators of betraying their interests. For example, no mention was made of disarmament in order to avert fears among the armed groups; the word “ceasefire” was used instead. The neutral term “armed forces” (rather than “reform of the armed forces”) was used to avoid heightening tensions about where the discussions would lead. Additionally, the agenda was worded so as to allow other entry points to be used for returning to the delicate subject of armed forces at a later point. Thus the contentious topic of army reform was raised again towards the end of the discussions (under the item “constitutional reform”) when sufficient trust and confidence had been generated to engage on the issue.
through national dialogue after a peace agreement has been signed. The goal should therefore be to define an agreed framework on SSR provisions that is sufficiently detailed to provide direction and assure commitment to basic principles, while simultaneously retaining enough flexibility to accommodate unexpected events as well as emerging realities of post-conflict political dynamics. It is advisable to make very clear who will be responsible for deciding the technical details later on, to avoid acrimony and fighting later down the line when relationships between the signatories may well have deteriorated.

**Support consideration of realistic timelines on SSR in the peace agreement**

Timelines are useful in that they can set expectations and targets and prevent overly controversial SSR issues from being pushed to one side when it comes to implementation. On the other hand, national signatories to the peace process may be unfamiliar with good practices in SSR and establish timelines that are wholly unrealistic; if these are missed, confidence in SSR – and in the peace agreement itself – can be undermined. It is essential that the mediation team have SSR advisers in place to support dialogue on realistic timelines, and effective mediators to ensure that national counterparts take this into consideration.

**Appreciate and tackle the link between SSR and closely related issues**

It is important to consider linkages between SSR and closely related issues during peace processes. Failure to do so may result in counterproductive, incoherent and unsustainable outcomes of the peace process and SSR implementation. Specialists should be called upon to provide advice on how to address these related issues – examples of which follow – in a mutually supportive manner.

**SSR and Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR)**

DDR or related activities may be addressed at an early stage of the negotiation phase of a peace process, although DDR advisers should avoid walking into negotiations with fixed formulae that do not take the country-specific context into account. Negotiating provisions on DDR may be a key entry point for engaging in discussions on SSR. DDR and SSR should be addressed in a coherent way to ensure that the planning and implementation of respective programmatic activities are coordinated and mutually supportive.

Additional provisions should be made for ensuring that agreements on DDR programmes are in line with a national vision for the security sector. Such a vision should further inform any decisions on force size and structure. Similarly, SSR considerations should help determine criteria for the integration of ex-combatants.
into the formal security sector – such as vetting, selection and training – coordinated with parallel efforts to reintegrate former combatants into civilian life. In this connection, it would be important to assure that there is no major difference between these integration and reintegration options in terms of benefits provided to ex-combatants. Consideration should therefore be given to funding requirements and financial and economic policies that address the long-term sustainability of DDR and SSR programmes. The timing, sequencing and implementation of DDR and SSR processes (in a peace process context) should be realistic and supported by a public awareness campaign in order to build the confidence of all relevant stakeholders. Consideration should also be given to the special needs of boys and girls who have been involved with armed forces or armed groups as they go through the process of release and reintegration.

* See the modules on DDR and SSR, and on DDR and peace processes, in the Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards.

Transitional justice and SSR

Transitional justice is vital for supporting the reform or creation of professional security services that deliver genuine security, are trusted by the population, and further a viable peace in a sustainable manner. Transitional justice mechanisms include national consultative processes; judicial and non-judicial accountability; and truth-seeking mechanisms such as prosecutions, truth and reconciliation mechanisms, and fact-finding missions and commissions of inquiry, reparations and institutional reform (including vetting). It is essential that reference be made in the peace agreement to the transitional justice mechanisms, including explicit mention of the vetting of security services. Failure to do so could jeopardize reforms and undermine trust in security institutions. Human rights benchmarks and individual screening of documents and other forms of information concerning past international humanitarian law and human rights violations should be established for all individuals undergoing a vetting process; all those responsible for serious violations should be excluded from reformed security institutions. The removal of these persons should comply with due process of law and the principle of non-discrimination.

Rule of law and SSR

SSR can only be achieved within a broader framework of the rule of law and respect for human rights. This framework may include the establishment of new legitimate institutions built on public integrity, transparency and accountability principles. It may also comprise a new or revised legal basis that establishes anti-corruption mechanisms. Capacity development of all institutions affected by such reforms would follow. Rule of law and/or SSR provisions in peace agreements need to lay the foundation for those steps, within an appropriate national context (UN, 2009).
The governance dimension of SSR

The close interrelationship between SSR and democratic governance is rarely as prominent as in post-conflict societies and societies moving through political transition processes. During the peace process, close attention should be paid to provisions to strengthen good governance of the security sector, including provisions that assure civilian and independent oversight of security actors and develop the capacity of individuals and organizations that provide it. (See UN Inter-Agency SSR Task Force, forthcoming-a for a list of key UN principles.)

Sexual and gender-based violence and gender mainstreaming

The peace agreement should include provisions that pave the way for ensuring that women are not discriminated against and are given the opportunity for a prominent role in the security sector. It should also provide that gender-specific challenges women and men face – such as gender-based violence – are taken into account and addressed by a gender-sensitive security sector. When negotiating the restructuring of the police and armed forces, references to recruitment on the basis of non-discrimination and provisions to support women’s increased participation in the security sector should be included in peace agreements. UN Security Council Resolutions 1325 (2000), 1612 (2005), 1820 (2008), 1882 (2009), 1888 (2009) and 1889 (2009) provide a powerful legal and normative basis for requiring that SSR incorporate all measures necessary to guarantee women their rightful place in determining the security of the society in which they live. They also provide a firm foundation for strongly condemning grave violations against children affected by armed violence as well as widespread rape and other sexual abuse.

Children and youth

Children and youth are often exposed to a wide range of violations during situations of armed conflict, including recruitment and use by armed forces and armed groups, sexual violence, abduction, killing and maiming, forced relocation, and destruction of their homes. Moreover, unemployment among young people in post-conflict societies is often high and persistent, causing grave destabilizing effects on society. Negotiations on SSR in peace processes offer an important opportunity to build and strengthen a protective environment for children. Thus, child protection actors should be consulted early in the process to help identify priorities. Those tasked with supporting peace processes should ensure that, as part of a human rights perspective, children’s and youths’ perspectives are incorporated into assessments, reviews, implementation, monitoring and evaluation. Accountability mechanisms should be integrated into the peace agreement and be recognized as entry points for streamlining children and youth concerns into SSR. Where it is operational, the United Nations Monitoring and
PEACE PROCESSES AND SSR

Reporting Mechanism on Grave Child Rights Violations in Situations of Armed Conflict (MRM), established by Security Council Resolution 1612 and further strengthened by Resolutions 1882 and 1998, also seeks to engage those within the parties to the conflict that have committed grave violations against children. In several instances, this mechanism has led to the development by security sector actors of action plans or agreement on other actions intended to bring abuses to an end. Information from this mechanism could be used to inform peace processes.

Weapons and disarmament

During negotiation of peace agreements, small arms, light weapons and disarmament seem to be subjects that – either by accident or by design – rarely receive sufficient attention round the table. However, of all the issues encountered during peace operations, small arms and light weapons issues are among the most visible and sensitive. Experience shows that the degree to which these issues are successfully handled on the ground can influence the outcome of the entire peace process. Small arms and light weapons should not be allowed to be “peace spoilers”: the groundwork for control of small arms and light weapons in peacetime must be laid early on.

Transnational organized crime and SSR

Transnational organized crime (TOC) is a recognized threat to peace and security, especially in post-conflict and peace-building scenarios. TOC can be a contributing factor, as well as a means of conflict and as such should be addressed during peace processes, although it should also be recognized that stakeholders taking part in the negotiation might have been involved in TOC during the conflict. TOC should be addressed through SSR and State institution building, and cross-border collaboration should be considered given that TOC goes beyond boundaries and can have a regional impact that spoils national-level efforts.

Integrate monitoring and evaluation into implementation frameworks

Provisions for effective monitoring and evaluation (M&E) of the implementation of peace agreements should be an inherent component of peace talks.

Box 6. The implementation phase in Guinea Bissau

In the case of Guinea Bissau, the signings of the ceasefire and Abuja peace agreements were not followed by establishment of an integrated monitoring and evaluation (M&E) system. Thus, the exact number of military and police officers that went through the subsequent Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group-assisted DDR process cannot be easily ascertained. The inadequate preparation of ex-combatants for demobilization and subsequent discharge into the communities, as well as the failure of the security forces and the justice system, subsequently posed very serious challenges to sustainable peace building.
Specific and measurable benchmarks for M&E should be included in peace agreement plans in order to facilitate their successful implementation. This is of key importance in the area of SSR – where, due to political sensitivities, actors may avoid following up on commitments made during negotiations or even expressed through subsequent peace agreements.
ANNEX. PRACTICAL HINTS FOR MEDIATORS AND SSR ADVISERS

- Consider your role in a given context. Are the parties to the conflict aware of and in agreement with this role? Does this role offer opportunities for negotiating politically sensitive issues such as SSR?

- Consider previous mediation/negotiation attempts. Have these previous attempts addressed SSR, and to what effect? Have options been limited, or has there been a level of mutual trust that allowed negotiating parties to give significant consideration to SSR provisions?

- Know where to access knowledge and expertise on SSR and related issues, both within and outside your team. Have you considered tapping into the expertise of DPA’s standby mediation team, the UN SSR task force, or experts located within UN Country Teams?

- Make sure that there is a common general understanding of the concept of SSR, among both the negotiating parties and the mediation and advisory teams. Have appropriate capacity development and sensitization been conducted?

- Recognize that SSR should be shaped by a national dialogue process that identifies a common national vision for it. The peace process should establish the framework for supporting such national dialogue. It should also balance the need for commitments to a future vision of SSR against the need for details to be agreed in subsequent political dialogue processes (UN Inter-Agency SSR Task Force, forthcoming).

- Ensure that key issues such as SSR are raised for consideration, and if initially this is not possible because of hesitations and sensitivities, revisit those issues at a later point during the negotiations. Is it recognized that SSR and related issues are likely to serve as key building blocks for post-conflict peace building and post-transition stabilization?

- Understand that a peace process is at the same time a confidence-building process. Have you considered highlighting common ground, and focusing first on “easy”, less delicate issues within and outside SSR considerations? Doing so would build trust and confidence and thus prepare the ground for introducing more politically delicate facets of reforming the security sector.

- Support and actively encourage compliance with international norms and standards when designing and implementing peace processes. Does the peace process take into account the root causes of conflict and address issues of impunity and violations of human rights and international humanitarian law?

- Do not give in on core principles, such as the need to end impunity or to strengthen civilian control of security institutions. Have you considered where,
when and how the peace process offers windows of opportunity to open negotiation and implementation agendas for key SSR provisions, including the creation or improvement of institutions and procedures for security sector oversight and accountability?

- Ensure that the discussion on SSR is locally owned, while upholding basic principles. Do the negotiating teams understand what they are committing to and that local and national authorities will ultimately be responsible for implementation?

- Do not overstate the importance of the technical aspects of SSR, and separate them from political and social issues. Has the need for – and impact of – (new) legal and political frameworks been considered? Is there a risk that long-term requirements might be derailed by short-term considerations?

- Consider how to build trust and confidence among those who will be called upon to support the financing and implementation of SSR provisions agreed during negotiations. Has consideration been given to existing donor coordination mechanisms at the country level, or the establishment of a Group of Friends and/or a donor conference dedicated to the implementation of SSR provisions?

- Consider how expectations, interests, incentives and impacts differ for men, women, boys and girls. Are assessments being disaggregated according to gender and age to ensure that discussions and provisions on SSR (and all other peace-building tasks, for that matter) are properly attuned to their respective needs?

- Consider that the formal peace agreement should set minimum standards for the future SSR process (in accordance with civilian oversight, rule of law and respect for human rights), and outline areas where there is a need for further (mediated) negotiations in the post-agreement phase. Has consideration been given to the fact that some SSR issues are best reserved for political processes following the conclusion of an initial peace process?
ENDNOTES

1 “Good offices” here refers to official or unofficial mediation between two or more parties or the provision of advice to national counterparts by senior UN representatives.

2 In this context, a “Group of Friends” is an informal community of countries and/or international organizations that support or are simply interested in the peace process in question.

3 The Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards (IDDRS) consolidate policy guidance on DDR, providing an integrated approach to the planning, management and implementation of DDR processes. They are the most complete repository of best practices drawn from the experience of all United Nations departments, agencies, funds and programmes involved in DDR. The IDDRS were jointly developed by DDR practitioners, at headquarters and country level (available at www.unddr.org/iddrs/framework.php).

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# DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE OF THE SECURITY SECTOR

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1. SUMMARY

This Integrated Technical Guidance Note (ITGN) outlines the desirable characteristics of democratic governance of the security sector, and sets out the key areas of United Nations (UN) support to national efforts to establish and strengthen that governance. The Note also addresses the rationale for United Nations engagement in this area, from peacekeeping to long-term development. The guidance for UN support addresses both the strategic and operational aspects of security governance. Advice at the strategic level has to do with securing commitment and progress in areas essential to establishing the legal and institutional fundamentals. At the operational level, advice is provided on key areas of technical support and capacity development.

2. OBJECTIVE

The objective of this Guidance Note is to identify the key areas for United Nations support to the establishment and strengthening of democratic governance of the security sector, based on the rule of law (UN, 2004a) and in line with the United Nations’ comprehensive approach to security sector reform (SSR) (UN, 2008). Supporting democratic governance of the security sector within the framework of the rule of law promotes the understanding that governance relates to all persons, institutions and entities, both public and private, including the State itself, and ensures that these are accountable to laws that are publicly promulgated, equally enforced and independently adjudicated, and that are consistent with international human rights norms and standards (UN, 2008).

By outlining these key areas for strategic and operational United Nations support, the Note aims to facilitate coherence of United Nations delivery of that support through enhanced coordination with national counterparts to the United Nations, Member States, regional organizations and other multilateral actors engaged in supporting national SSR efforts.

3. SCOPE

Apart from the requisite legal and constitutional framework, the Note addresses the role and capacity of civil society; independent oversight institutions and mechanisms; the institutional system of governance; and the system of institutional management and internal oversight. Given the broad spectrum of UN actions to support democratic governance of the security sector, the Note is not able to cover every area in detail, but rather provides an overview within the framework of the rule of law.
The Note does not elaborate on post-conflict or development issues, such as corruption, transnational organized crime or poverty reduction. However, examples are provided to illustrate their links to democratic governance, in an effort to support coherence. The Bibliography offers a list of available resources and toolkits with more detailed information, studies and best practices; toolkits are further listed by Issue in the Annex.

4. INTRODUCTION

The United Nations has been providing support in the area of security sector reform for decades. During that time the Organization gained significant experience in helping strengthen constitutional and legal frameworks, as well as helping strengthen the role and capacity of civil society; oversight institutions and mechanisms; the institutional system of governance; and management of democratic governance of the security sector. Building on the collective experience of related UN departments, offices, agencies, funds and programmes, this Note provides detailed guidance aimed at enhancing United Nations support to democratic governance of the security sector.

5. Differing Rationales in Different Contexts

Ensuring democratic governance of the security sector, on the basis of the rule of law and respect for human rights, is crucial to securing the peaceful and sustainable development of States in a variety of contexts. A democratically governed security sector enhances the safety and security of individuals, and prevents abuses and violations by the sector’s personnel. This can be achieved through effective checks and balances, transparency, accountability, and effective disciplinary mechanisms built within and around the security sector. Democratic governance of the sector should ensure that security agencies and their staff meet expected standards of behaviour and performance, as defined through applicable laws and policies. A governance-driven approach will also enhance coordination and thus lead to integrated initiatives by security sector actors at all levels of government. That will contribute to increased responsiveness to the needs of the entire population, and therefore have an impact on the safety and security of individuals.

The specific form(s) of United Nations support will be based on the demands of each individual situation. And indeed, the rationale for UN support to democratic governance of the security sector may differ according to the context(s) in which support is provided. In some situations these contexts may not exist, or may overlap:
In the context of peace processes, early focus on the key areas of democratic governance of the security sector should facilitate national commitment to that governance, and to understanding how the security sector should be governed in the future, to prevent further human rights violations. Such commitment can provide the necessary basis for quick delivery on peace-building priorities in the immediate aftermath of conflict and beyond.

In the context of peacekeeping and peace building in the immediate aftermath of conflict, support should go to initiatives that will improve delivery of basic safety and security to the population and build national capacity in key areas of democratic governance of the security sector. Interventions should be closely coordinated and should promote coherent, sustainable and inclusive approaches for peace building and development. It is important to ensure that early interventions in the security sector do not prejudice longer-term development goals, but rather contribute to strengthening the rule of law and the protection of human rights.

In the context of longer-term peace building, UN support should enhance the institutional and human capacity of national counterparts to govern the security sector in line with international norms, standards and best practices. These and other efforts should also contribute to ensuring that tensions in post-conflict situations are not exacerbated by maintaining unprosecuted perpetrators of human rights violations in the security sector (UN, 2008, p. 9, para 28). This approach should be developed around a comprehensive set of mechanisms, including transitional justice initiatives. Furthermore, ensuring equal opportunities for the effective participation of women and ethnic, religious and other underrepresented groups will help build sustainable peace.

In a development context, adherence to norms and practices of democratic governance will ensure that the security sector is linked to broader development priorities and needs. Effective and transparent management of the sector should minimize the risk of unnecessary financial costs to society. A functioning security system, properly overseen by a civilian institution in a developmental context, will positively impact on human security, build a strong legal business environment, and (subsequently) increase investments.

6. PRINCIPLE AND FOUNDATIONS OF SECURITY SECTOR GOVERNANCE

Rule of law and respect for human rights should form the fundamental basis for provision of security by the State. The Secretary-General has affirmed that “[t]he rule of law is a concept at the very heart of the Organization’s mission. It refers to a principle of governance in which all persons, institutions and entities, public and
private, including the State itself, are accountable to laws that are publicly promulgated, equally enforced and independently adjudicated, and which are consistent with international human rights norms and standards. It requires, as well, measures to ensure adherence to supremacy of law, equality before the law, accountability to the law, fairness in the application of the law, separation of powers, participation in decision-making, legal certainty, avoidance of arbitrariness and procedural and legal transparency” (UN, 2004a).

Provision of security to individuals is a duty of States under human rights law, and part of their human rights obligations. In this connection, the Commission on Human Rights’ resolution 2000/64 on “The Role of Good Governance in the Promotion of Human Rights” sets forth those elements necessary for a democratically governed security sector. The resolution “recognizes that transparent, responsible, accountable and participatory government, responsive to the needs and aspirations of the people, is the foundation on which good governance rests, and that such a foundation is a sine qua non for the promotion of human rights” (Commission of Human Rights, 2000).

* UN staff should ensure that the principle and foundations of security sector governance outlined above are mainstreamed across all areas of UN support.

In particular, UN entities should apply the principles of the recently adopted Human Rights Due Diligence Policy [hereafter HRDDP (United Nations, 2011)]. The HRDDP sets out principles and measures to mainstream human rights in support provided by United Nations entities to non-UN security forces globally, in order to ensure that such support is consistent with the UN’s purposes and principles as provided for in the Charter and in international law to respect, promote, and encourage respect for international humanitarian, human rights and refugee law.

7. SUPPORT TO THE DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE OF THE SECURITY SECTOR

UN support to national authorities for strengthening democratic governance of the security sector should be both political and technical in nature. Political support requires consultation with national stakeholders in order to achieve agreement on the scope of necessary reforms – and ultimately, the commitment needed for their implementation. That entails focused, sustained effort on the part of the United Nations. Technical support requires ongoing technical advice and national capacity development. The United Nations should work closely with national counterparts to prioritize and sequence interventions based on national actors’ own priorities and concerns, as established through appropriate analysis.
Key aims of United Nations support to democratic governance of the security sector include:

a. Strengthening of the constitutional and legal framework
b. Strengthening of the role and capacity of civil society, including women’s groups
c. Strengthening of independent oversight institutions and mechanisms
d. Strengthening of the institutional system of governance
e. Strengthening the management system and internal oversight

7.1 Strengthen the Constitutional and Legal Framework

In many transitional, post-conflict and developing contexts, the legal and constitutional framework is not sufficiently clear regarding the different roles and responsibilities of the security actors. This may pose challenges: duplication of mandates, the creation of capacity gaps, lack of public clarity on these roles and responsibilities, and no or limited attention paid to democratic and civilian governance of the security sector. All – indeed, any – of those circumstances may jeopardize public confidence in security personnel. Support to strengthen the legal and constitutional framework is therefore of key importance in enhancing democratic control of the security sector.

The UN-supported framework should be in accordance with the national vision of society, and in line with international legal obligations and standards. Issues that should be addressed include provisions on civilian oversight of the security sector, and clear roles, responsibilities and competencies of security sector actors and independent oversight bodies. The constitutional and legal framework should outline the institutional structure of the security sector architecture, including decision-making and coordination competencies of the executive.

Legal provisions should be in place to regulate *inter alia* the authorization procedures for administrative and operational activities; transparent appointment and vetting procedures; vetting measures in compliance with due process guarantees; and the legal obligations and responsibilities of individual servicemen/women. Also relevant are laws and provisions on asset management, financial accountability, procurement in the security sector, access to classified information, data protection and privacy, and anti-corruption mechanisms.

Strategic Interventions

- Secure political commitment to the strengthening of a constitutional and legal framework in line with international legal obligations and principles.
Support the ratification of relevant international conventions, ensure that their standards are reflected in domestic law, and support the implementation of activities that have been agreed by the signatories. Examples include international conventions on human rights, gender equality, and small arms and explosive munitions, as well as anti-corruption initiatives.

Monitor and support government responses and follow up on reports of international human rights bodies and mechanisms that provide concrete recommendations to governments regarding the security sector.

Support an inclusive approach to developing the legal and constitutional framework. Support commitment to political compromise among different stakeholders to ensure that constitutional/legal amendments are not short-lived but represent a true reflection of the country’s common vision of security.

Support and strengthen the role of parliament in debating and passing constitutional and legislative acts, *inter alia* by supporting dialogue between parliament and society (UNDP, 2006; OHCHR, 2006a). Be aware that tight deadlines by the international community will often be at the expense of due parliamentary and public debate, and can thus undermine national ownership of reforms and lead to erosion of public confidence in the political system.
Operational Interventions

- Provide technical support to assessments of the constitutional and legal framework. Assessments should preferably be nationally led.
- Provide technical expertise and capacity development for legal drafting for national actors. Ensure that technical support for the development of the legal framework is tailored to the national context and fully respects any normative frameworks already in place.
- Where legislative changes lead to transformation within – or to the establishment of – new institutions, ensure that support for their capacity development is provided early on, and support public outreach.

7.2 Strengthen the Role and Capacity of Civil Society

The engagement of civil society on security issues enables the perspective of the general population to be factored into security policy-making and governance processes. Specialized civil society organizations (e.g. security-focused non-governmental organizations, women’s organizations) are well placed to represent the security needs and perceptions of their specific constituent base. They can contribute to an informed and fact-based discourse on security-related issues, and so enhance the public’s competence in monitoring the performance and conduct of security sector actors and the level of public security provision. The insights of civil society organizations that operate at the local level will be of particular value. However, in many contexts, civil society organizations do not have the capacity to interact effectively with State institutions and effectively represent their constituents’ interests in policy-making and implementation processes. UN support should be geared towards developing their capacity as well as enhancing their role in the democratic governance of the security sector.

Strategic Interventions

- Support the inclusion of civil society in dialogue on SSR. Consultations should include diverse stakeholders, such as civil society, women’s organizations and the public at national and sub-national levels.
- Support the engagement of marginalized groups. Advocate priority-setting to address, for example, women’s and children’s rights and the rights of ethnic and religious groups. The UN should assist the host country in implementing policies and strategies to advance access to justice for all individuals, including marginalized people.
- Support confidence building between the security sector and civil society. Exchanges should be encouraged through the creation of communication departments within the security providers that would engage proactively
with the media, civil society and the public at large. Additionally, liaison groups may be established to promote formal and structured interaction between communities, municipal officials and law enforcement representatives.

Operational Interventions

- Support an initial mapping of existing civil society organizations and their capacity to enhance democratic governance of the security sector.

- Support the capacity of civil society organizations to actively monitor security policies and practices affecting their constituents and to advocate appropriate solutions.

- Develop the capacity of civil society organizations to be more responsive by familiarizing them with existing national security policies, laws and regulations of the security sector, including through the development and distribution of materials to facilitate access and enhance their understanding (Cole, Eppert and Kinzelbach, 2008; OHCHR, 2008).

- Support the capacity of civil society organizations to undertake outreach and awareness-raising programmes, and to draw on such programmes in order to better represent their constituents’ needs and advocate change.

- Support civic education through civil society institutions.

- Support the identification or creation of institutional points of contact/liaison offices to allow civil society organizations direct access to the security sector.

7.3 Strengthen Independent Oversight Institutions and Mechanisms

Independent oversight of the security sector is essential to ensuring accountability and strengthening confidence in its governance. A system of independent oversight should be created to provide clear and transparent channels for substantive dialogue and cooperation between oversight institutions and statutory
security sector actors. Other mechanisms should allow civil society and individual citizens to take part in the monitoring and oversight of the sector. Parliament, the judiciary, independent audit bodies and networks can also perform oversight. Efforts should be made to enhance the participation of women at all levels of oversight and accountability.

The legislature (parliament) holds a key position in the system of independent oversight. Its oversight function is largely performed by specialized committees (e.g. on defence, security, police, intelligence, human rights or finance) and by dedicated committees that monitor the implementation of government policies. Specialized committees should be equipped with an adequate legal mandate – supported by institutional rules and regulations – that will allow them to request and receive regular reports from relevant security actors. They should also be able to hold public hearings and conduct investigations, and have access to classified information where necessary. Parliament should approve appointments for senior positions within independent, politically balanced oversight bodies.

Another major actor in the system of independent oversight is the judiciary, which ensures that security sector personnel are held accountable for any human rights violations, abuses or other offences they commit. Access to justice for victims of such violations is paramount, as it is a precondition for an effective and enforceable remedy. The judiciary also provides oversight by interpreting and applying the law, and by implementing mechanisms for the resolution of disputes. The judiciary should support the workings of the security sector by scrutinizing the use of special measures by law enforcement/intelligence agencies or through retrospective reviews of security operations.

Independent bodies with specialized mandates perform vital roles in the governance of the security sector. These bodies may include national human rights

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**Box 3. Enhancing Parliamentary Oversight in Kyrgyzstan**

UNDP Kyrgyzstan supported a long-term project in 2001 to assist the Kyrgyz Parliament (Jogorku Kenesh) in enhancing its oversight, legislative and representative roles. The first steps focused on raising awareness among Members of Parliament and parliamentary staff of their specific responsibilities concerning oversight, and the practical mechanisms to enhance it. Support was also provided for the creation of a legal basis for parliamentary oversight. The resulting legal framework proved an incentive for establishing parliamentary oversight procedures, including budget hearings, parliamentary investigations, debates and government reporting. Assistance was provided to the budget committee in order to conduct standardized hearing procedures; activities included public announcements, identification of participants, distribution of a copy of the budget in advance, and requests for public feedback. An important outcome was the increased involvement of civil society organizations and non-partisan experts in the budget hearings, which enhanced public debate on security issues (Mamatkerimova, 2006, pp. 75-76).
institutions, national ethics committees, anti-corruption agencies, auditors-general and other specialized expert oversight bodies. Depending on their mandate, such bodies may independently undertake investigations, including abuses and human rights violations; receive complaints against security agencies; report on incidents; and issue binding and/or non-binding recommendations on accountability issues, policies and practices.

Civil society plays an important role in the system of independent civilian oversight of the security sector, as also set out in Section 7.2. Civil society organizations should directly support the work of oversight bodies by taking part in parliamentary hearings as well as by providing specialized knowledge to parliamentarians and independent oversight bodies. They may also carry out campaigns targeted at disclosing weaknesses of the oversight bodies themselves. Civil society will often be involved in providing capacity development support to newly established oversight institutions (UNODC, 2001).

### Strategic Interventions

- Support adoption of and commitment to a legal framework that provides independent oversight institutions and bodies with the requisite mandate to perform their roles and responsibilities.

- Ensure that the provision of resources to these bodies, often newly established, remains a high priority for national counterparts and international partners alike.
Support commitment by independent oversight institutions and bodies to ensuring respect for the rights of all segments of society, including groups that are marginalized or not able to uphold their rights.

In line with international best practice, advocate the establishment of one (or more) specialized committees of parliament/legislature that deal with security issues (e.g. internal security issues, defence issues, intelligence matters [Born, Fluri and Johnsson, 2003]).

Support the inclusion of independent oversight institutions and bodies in regional and international professional networks.

Operational Interventions

Provide capacity development to members of oversight institutions and bodies on their mandate, roles and responsibilities.

Help to raise public awareness of the mandates and functioning of these institutions.

Support the functioning of the oversight system by ensuring that independent oversight bodies have access to expertise, including through input from specialized professional civil society organizations and individuals.

Support oversight institutions that are open to the public, including through support to website development and management to encourage online publication of these institutions’ reports and sharing of updates on important events and developments.

Support the judicial oversight role through technical advice and measures that help the judiciary review/authorize the use of special powers by security actors, and that strengthen judicial integrity and independence in line with e.g. the Convention against Corruption.4

Support the separation of powers between the executive and the judiciary, including by ensuring adequate provision in the legal framework to help prevent security sector interference in justice processes, including court rulings.

Provide logistical assistance and necessary equipment (IT equipment, software, transport, etc.) to oversight bodies to help them play their respective roles to the full.

7.4 Strengthen the Institutional System of Governance

UN programmes should support an institutional architecture of the security sector that is based on clearly legislated roles and responsibilities for all security actors. A governance approach to that architecture will require support to institutional
mechanisms and practices that facilitate and strengthen inter-institutional cooperation. Cooperation should go beyond the national level, taking in linkages and open exchanges with institutions, mechanisms and networks at the local, regional, sub-regional and international level.

The functioning of such an integrative system of institutional governance requires fostering a culture of openness, transparency and cooperation that would be supported through internal oversight and accountability mechanisms. Support should be provided to the elaboration of institutional rules and procedures and professional codes of conduct relating to internal oversight. Codes of conduct are not a substitute for the enforcement of rules, procedures, or civil or criminal law. However, they can engender greater transparency and accountability, and improve understanding of and sensitivity towards the obligations and duties of professionals working in the security field.

Strategic Interventions

- Support whole-of-government approaches by linking the security sector coherently to, *inter alia*, the economic, environment, social, health, education and youth sectors, including through policy planning and implementation.
- Promote the role of local government in security sector governance and obtain commitment to strengthening its role, including through the development of appropriate legal provisions.
- Promote the role of regional mechanisms in security sector governance and support national mechanisms that provide for substantive cooperation with regional institutions.
- Promote use of the leverage provided by regional organizations and respected regional leaders.
- Support the development of sub-regional/regional codes of conduct.

**Box 5. Example of sub-regional initiatives in Africa: The Central African Code of Conduct**

In 2007, the 25th Ministerial Meeting of the United Nations Standing Advisory Committee on Security Questions in Central Africa (UNSAC) adopted the São Tomé Initiative, which calls for the elaboration of a code of conduct for armed and security forces in Central Africa. In May 2009, such a code was adopted at the 28th Ministerial Meeting held in Libreville, Gabon. The Code outlines numerous principles of security sector governance, such as civilian supremacy over the security forces; respect for the rule of law; and the right to judicial review in cases of abuse committed by security sector actors. The Code is now being promoted in the region, and the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Security in Africa (UNREC), in partnership with the Economic Community of Central African States, is supporting implementation of the Code through dissemination and training. The Code offers an entry point for supporting initiatives on security governance, and is being used as a basis for the development of other national codes of conduct for security personnel. This is expected to result in the integration of such principles into national policy and legislative frameworks across the region.

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Support the development of national codes of conduct/ethics, and ensure support for their enforcement.

Promote the security sector’s adherence to codes of conduct formulated at national, regional and international levels.

Consider the risk that multiple layers of internal oversight could present an obstacle to effective access to justice, and seek to promote agreement on clear but limited levels of internal review.

Support mechanisms within the security sector that ensure substantive cooperation with international institutions and mechanisms.

Support initiatives to tackle corruption through encouraging political commitment and an applied approach across several levels, including support to legal frameworks, vetting, public awareness campaigns, internal investigations/audit, and independent oversight. The United Nations Convention against Corruption provides countries with an important starting point for addressing the problem (see Box 6).

Operational Interventions

Support local government reform processes and provide technical expertise to ensure that security sector-related issues are adequately integrated in the governance framework. Provide capacity development for local security actors.

Box 6. The United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC)

The new monitoring mechanism of the UNCAC represents a major breakthrough in the global campaign against corruption. Under the terms of the Convention, all States parties will be reviewed every five years on their fulfilment of its obligations. Through self-assessments and peer review, the mechanism will identify gaps in national anti-corruption laws and practices. A useful tool is the Comprehensive Self-Assessment Checklist on the Implementation of the United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC). In addition, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime has developed a state-of-the-art software programme for self-assessment that identifies States’ strengths and weaknesses in countering corruption, and pinpoints where technical assistance is needed. Identical software has been developed to assess States’ implementation of the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and its three Protocols. UNCAC represents a milestone in the fight against corruption and the setting of international legal standards. The mechanism effectively raises issues relating to the governance and efficiency of the security providers, and instils peer pressure among Member States. United Nations support could assist in establishing an assessment mechanism for measuring accountability and transparency in accordance with the UNCAC. For example, the United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT) assists the Timor-Leste Anti-Corruption Commission in preparing for the self-assessment mandated by the UNCAC review mechanism, which will lead to a peer review by Namibia and Fiji in the last quarter of 2011.
Support an ongoing two-way exchange between national/local and regional security institutions, and develop national capacity to participate in and contribute to relevant mechanisms.

Encourage cross-fertilization/cross-border initiatives for experience sharing – supporting, for example, regional civil society networks that focus on cross-border cooperation.

Support national participation at conferences and meetings of sub-regional and regional organizations (such as sub-regional chiefs of staff meetings) to impart regional norms including the support related to democratic governance of the security sector.

Support ongoing exchange among international organizations and bodies, and provide capacity development to enhance national participation and input into relevant mechanisms.

Recognize that a variety of codes of conduct impact on the work of the security sector.

Box 7. Codes of conduct/ethics

- It clearly establishes what is expected of a specific employee or group of employees, thus helping to instil fundamental values that curb corruption.
- It forms the basis for employee training, discussion of standards and, where necessary, modification of standards.
- It forms the basis for disciplinary action, including suspension and dismissal, in cases where an employee breaches or fails to meet a prescribed standard, and may outline procedural penalties.

Assembling all of the applicable standards into a comprehensive code makes it difficult to abuse the disciplinary process for corrupt or other improper purposes.

Means of setting standards or establishing codes of conduct include the following:

- **Legislation,** usually criminal and/or administrative law, is used to set general standards that apply to everyone or to large categories of people. Bribery, for instance, is considered a criminal offence no matter who commits it; usually such offences involve the public interest or a public official. In some countries, more specific legislation is used to set additional standards applicable to all public officials or, in some cases, even private sector workers.

- **Delegated legislation or regulations,** where the legislature delegates the power to create specific technical rules, may also be used for setting standards for specific categories of officials, such as prosecutors, members of the legislature or officials responsible for financial accounting or contracting matters.

- **Contract law** governing employment or the delivery of goods or services may set standards for an individual employee or contractor. Alternatively, an agency or department may set general standards to which all employees or contractors are required to adhere as a condition of employment.
aligned with current national legislation where that legislation is itself in compliance with international standards; and accompanied by mechanisms that are truly transparent – that is, open to internal oversight and accessible to civil society.

Support capacity development for civil society at the local level to engage in security-related issues, and support civil society networks to increase their leverage.

### 7.5 Strengthen the Management System and Internal Oversight

Management systems and practices are essential for implementing reforms and ensuring that the performance of security sector actors is effective, efficient, human rights-compliant, and based on principles of equality and equal opportunity. Adequate management practices should be in place to ensure internal accountability mechanisms, clear reporting lines, transparency and professional conduct. In promoting well-managed security sectors, United Nations support should encompass human resource management; financial resource management; management capacity for effective policy implementation; and information management.

#### 7.5.1 Support Human Resource Management

- Support the revision and/or development of institutional rules, procedures and practices for managing human resources that are in accordance with international norms and standards.

- Support commitment to fair, objective, transparent, non-discriminatory and merit-based policies and practices on recruitment, salaries, performance evaluation, promotion and professional development.

- Support commitment to policies that ensure the participation and employment of women and frequently underrepresented social groups in the security sector (including positive discrimination measures), alongside measures to facilitate their retention and promotion.

- Ensure that internal oversight mechanisms are in place to support compliance with policies, rules and regulations; ensure that accountability measures are in place for the enforcement of these practices; and provide effective redress mechanisms.

- Support selection and recruitment policy that is based on proper recruitment mechanisms, integrity assessments, and vetting or other forms of review/screening of existing personnel. Support public announcements for vacancies/openings and transparency throughout the process. Provide staff
with the capacity to implement non-discriminatory recruitment, management and promotion policies.

- Support the creation of human resource databases, for more efficient management of personnel.

- In contexts where there have been gross human rights violations, support the development and application of objective vetting/integrity assessment criteria and processes, to be applied to both existing and new personnel (OHCHR, 2006b).

- Support vetting based on human rights standards and review of human rights records for all individuals, to ensure that those personally responsible for gross human rights violations are excluded from the reformed security sector; ensure that the removal of persons as a consequence of vetting complies with due process of law and the principle of non-discrimination.

7.5.2 Support financial resource management

- Ensure that financial resource management is based on the premise that the security sector is subject to common, cross-sectoral principles of public sector management. Budgets need to be open to ensure they are affordable, and budget policies need to be open to ensure that they accord with other government priorities and strategies.

- Secure political commitment to enhancing financial resource management in line with international good practice. Support the enhancement of financial planning and management within ministries while also enhancing the management units of security sector actors themselves (Aker et al., forthcoming a).

- Support the development of transparent and accountable procurement systems.

- Support the development of efficient auditing systems.

7.5.3 Develop management capacity for effective policy implementation

- Ensure that administrative and programme management promotes transparency and accountability, and encourages adherence to professional rules and regulations.

- Support independent analysis of institutional processes that undermine transparency, cooperation and effectiveness, and provide capacity to implement change management.

- Support the development of financial resource management, in particular at the level of management units, directorates and ministries.
Support capacity development on strategic planning, priority-setting and decision-making, as well as the development of a common work plan.

Support the establishment of operational approaches and mechanisms to enhance cooperation and information sharing among government agencies, oversight bodies, and the general public.

7.5.4 Support information management

- Ensure that the collection and management of information enhances the delivery of security by relevant actors: this is of particular importance for law enforcement institutions that rely on recordkeeping and the management and analysis of data. Collection and retention of such data should be in compliance with international human rights obligations, in particular the right to privacy (OHCHR, 2004; Aker et al., forthcoming b).

- Support political commitment to the sharing of information on policy, practice and management with other stakeholders. Consider confidentiality at all times and ensure care in the handling of sensitive information.

- Support the development of standardized procedures and systems for the recording of information, e.g. during investigations, and of strict supervisory procedures for the management of confidential information (OHCHR, 2004; Aker et al., forthcoming b).

- Support the creation of platforms at community levels that will secure any feedback to local law enforcement institutions (UNODC, 2011; Osse, 2006).

- Facilitate awareness raising on privacy law and procedures; promote the declassification and support mechanisms for external oversight.

- Provide technical support to modernize/improve existing equipment and infrastructure (IT, software, etc.).

8. Approaches for United Nations Support

A significant challenge for UN programmes is to find appropriate entry points for building national commitment to supporting democratic governance of the security sector in the face of limited political space. The following are some approaches the UN can take to enhance support in this area.

8.1 Build on International Legal Obligations of Member States

The ratification of, or accession to, international treaties represent opportunities to promote that domestic legislation, policies and other measures comply with the country’s international obligations. Examples include international treaties on human rights, small arms and explosive munitions, as well as anti-corruption initiatives. For example, the subsequent review and reporting by human rights entities, including OHCHR field presences and UN human rights mechanisms as applicable, on the implementation of States international obligations provide valuable opportunities for advocacy and engagement through the issuing of detailed and concrete recommendations to Governments. Such entry points can be pursued for proposing technical advice on the
implementation of obligations in the area of national legislation, policies, and practice, and can support the initiation of dialogue on issues related to the democratic governance of the security sector.

8.2 Support Programmes at the Provincial Level to Overcome Political Obstacles

Due to the highly political nature of support in this area, finding appropriate entry points at the national level can be challenging. In such cases, working at the local level can be a good alternative; coordination around safety and security among various actors, as well as willingness to problem-solve to produce results, can be greater than in more politicized national forums. Examples include supporting the decentralization of local security governance structures (e.g. security committees in Liberia) or promoting targeted dialogues on the provision of security in a specific location; this may facilitate greater understanding and trust between security providers and the society they serve. Results at the provincial level, and evidence of what works and what does not, can then be used to contribute to a national dialogue on improving security governance. That can then pave the way for more sensitive projects at the national level.

8.3 Link with Broader Governance Programming in Development Contexts

Broader governance programmes (i.e. not solely related to the security sector) can provide a key entry point for enhancing security governance. Many governance programmes focus on finance and national development planning, and take a so-called “whole-of-government approach”. However, these governance programmes often do not include security or justice sector planning and budgeting, but instead focus on developing budgeted plans to ensure service delivery in areas like health and education. Security and justice should

Box 8. The public perception survey process in Kosovo

Public outreach and dialogue on a grassroots level have been high priorities throughout the development of the Kosovo Internal Security Sector Review (ISSR). The campaign included widely publicized press conferences and debates, and the dissemination of publications to raise awareness of security issues as well as of the actual ISSR process and the role the population could play. Public input was then collected through public opinion surveys, comment boxes and questionnaires. A key component here was the innovative approach of a “Have Your Say” bus, which travelled throughout Kosovo in urban and rural zones gathering information on threats. This carefully planned and targeted approach resulted in confidence building among the general population and facilitated the sharing of fears and expectations with the project team. Contrary to what was expected, the main threats identified by the population related to employment and the economy, rather than ethnic tensions or external dangers. This finding was integrated into the Review, which today is still considered one of the key reference documents for security issues in Kosovo.
also be recognized as basic public services that the State should deliver, and be mainstreamed into public financial planning and development strategies.

8.4 Support Participatory Processes

One of the cornerstones of governance of the security sector is support to confidence building and dialogue across all sectors of the population. This may be encouraged by supporting public outreach schemes, public perception surveys, and the development of inclusive and participatory national security policies and strategies as part of broader development strategizing.

8.5 Build on Opportunities Provided by Electoral Processes

Electoral processes can provide an opportunity to support numerous initiatives in the area of governance of the security sector. These may include training in security sector oversight through parliamentary capacity development; enhancing management systems within law enforcement institutions through support to election security; bringing together media and civil society on coverage of security issues to be addressed during the election campaign; internal management arrangements through the introduction of new technologies; promoting equal access to information; and the creation of (legal) space for inclusive political participation.

8.6 Consider Gender Equality and Women’s Empowerment Programmes

Programmes aimed at promoting gender equality and addressing gender-based violence are important entry points for improving security governance. Key areas of activity include supporting: the development of legislation tackling discriminatory practices; legislation addressing violence against women; female recruitment campaigns; awareness-raising programmes and training in gender-based violence targeted at security personnel; strengthening relevant and legitimate lobby groups; ensuring that security budgets are gender-sensitive; factoring the views of all genders into the elaboration of national strategies for the development/

Box 9. Security forces training in election security in West Africa

Since 2007, the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa (UNREC) has supported capacity-development training for security and defence forces in West Africa. Training has covered human rights, international humanitarian law, responsibility and roles in law enforcement, maintenance of law and order (including use and choice of weapons by the security sector), and civilian–military relations during election periods. UNREC also produced a “Guide for Security Forces on the Maintenance of Law and Order During Elections” and a video of the simulation exercise that was part of the training. Over 200 armed and security personnel have been trained in Togo, Guinea-Conakry and Niger; some have in turn trained thousands more personnel with UNREC’s support.
reform of the security sector; and gender- and age-disaggregated data collection (Bastick, 2008; Bastick and Valasek, 2008).

8.7 Consider Child Protection Programmes
Child protection offers another important entry point for improving democratic governance of the security sector. Among the areas of work are strengthening the juvenile justice system; protecting children during times of armed conflict; establishing procedures to prevent children from being recruited into or otherwise associated with armed forces; release and reintegration of children; designating child protection focal points in security sector structures; strengthening child protection laws; supporting parliamentary child protection committees; and civil-military cooperation in the interests of children during times of emergency.

8.8 Consider the Threat of Serious Organized Crime as an Entry Point
The threat of transnational organized crime – and its link to corruption, societal fragmentation and gang culture, and terrorism – can be an important entry point for highlighting to national authorities the importance of taking action to strengthen democratic governance of the security sector. Measures can include anti-corruption initiatives; assessments and engagement with the public for enhanced responsiveness; and the establishment of effective planning and management mechanisms to strengthen the capacity of the criminal justice system – including the judiciary, the prosecution and law enforcement (UN, 2004b).

8.9 Recognize and Act on Ambivalence to Change
UN programmes should seek to understand the underlying reasons for indifference or resistance to change in the security sector. Sometimes a cultural shift is

Box 10. The West African Coast Initiative (WACI)
WACI is a joint ECOWAS-United Nations programme established to deal with trans-border crime. This international initiative was established in October 2008 in response to the need for a comprehensive and multi-stakeholder approach to support implementation of the “ECOWAS Regional Action Plan to Address the Growing Problem of Illicit Drug Trafficking, Organized Crime, and Drug Abuse in West Africa”. WACI provides an entry point for engaging with countries on the importance of combating criminal activity and strengthening the democratic governance of the security sector. For example, sensitization activities have been introduced in the region – including at the leadership level – on the possible impact of widespread criminal activity on security, in order to enhance national and international coordination as well as enable intelligence-based investigations. The initiative has also generated close cooperation on the political and technical level among four West African countries: Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia and Sierra Leone. WACI is expected to achieve sustainable reform within the crime prevention and criminal justice sector, in accordance with the priority interventions outlined in the ECOWAS Regional Action Plan 2008–2011.
required to emphasize that security forces should work for the people rather than for political or other elites. This necessitates working with diverse political, economic and social groups to: illustrate the benefits of improved security provision (particularly in terms of economic development and public security), and identify the groups already convinced of such benefits; identify potential reform entry points; develop an efficient communications campaign to highlight the benefits of enhanced management of the security sector for the public security sector personnel themselves; and support the creation of mechanisms to protect oversight bodies and personnel. UN staff may also need to underline that programming is to support security actors as institutions of the State itself. This will minimize the danger of being accused of supporting one or more political groupings (which are often in open conflict with rivals) and can therefore support a wholesale de-politicization of the sector.

8.10 Support Capacity Development Programmes for Civilian Actors across Rule of Law, Justice and Security Institutions

A common, fundamental challenge to the governance and management of the security sector by civilians is their traditional exclusion from security matters and/or lack of knowledge about security functions, cultures, or expenditure. Specialized training for civilian personnel in the security sector, ministries and oversight bodies is needed to ensure a clear understanding of the roles, tasks and operating environment of security sector actors; to provide the management and monitoring tools needed to ensure alignment of policy and practice; and to promote leadership and management skills. In some contexts there may be a need to provide basic organizational and clerical training to help create a functioning secretariat before other technical reform issues are tackled. Capacity development should also be provided to police, military, judicial and civilian actors, to develop an understanding, respect, and acceptance of each other’s role as well as to promote professional behaviour in line with international standards, including international human rights law.
## ANNEX. SAMPLE TOOLS FOR SUPPORTING THE DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE OF THE SECURITY SECTOR

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ENDNOTES

1 The Secretary-General’s Report on Peace Building in the Immediate Aftermath of Conflict outlines the following interventions in the area of basic safety and security: mine action, protection of civilians, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, strengthening of the rule of law, and initiation of security sector reform.

2 Authorization refers here to the review and approval of proposed operations by security agencies, for example law enforcement officers seeking warrants to intercept communications.

3 For more information about the United Nations Subcommittee on Prevention of Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, see www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cat/opcat/index.htm.


5 Such codes of conduct may cover issues such as integrity building, anti-corruption, equal treatment and non-discrimination, impartiality, independence, loyalty towards the organization, diligence, propriety of personal conduct, transparency, accountability, responsible use of organizational resources and, where appropriate, standards of conduct towards the public.


7 This should be balanced with a State’s need for – and right to – confidentiality of sensitive material.

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UNIVERSAL NATIONS SUPPORT TO NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY- AND STRATEGY-MAKING PROCESSES

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1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The United Nations (UN) is increasingly seen as a suitable partner for supporting national security policy- and strategy-making processes. In 2010 and 2011 the General Assembly (UN, 2010, 2011) recognized the important role that the UN “can play in the provision of technical assistance to State authorities, where requested and based on the specific needs, in their efforts to develop” such national frameworks. In this regard, the General Assembly encouraged the Secretariat to elaborate guidance and the Secretary-General’s 2008 report on security sector reform (SSR) (UN, 2008) also emphasized the need for guidance in this area.

This Guidance Note responds to those developments, with the aim of enhancing effective, efficient, predictable and consistent UN assistance in the area of national security policy- and strategy-making for the benefit of States and their peoples. The Note has been developed by the UN Inter-Agency SSR Task Force (IASSR TF) under the leadership of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations.

2. OBJECTIVES

Within the context of the UN support to nationally led SSR processes, the objective of this Note is to provide guidance to UN staff, whether based in field operations (at country or regional level) or at UN Headquarters (UNHQ), for their support to national security policy- and strategy-making processes. The guidance elaborated herein aims to ensure effective, efficient, predictable and consistent UN assistance in the area of national security policy- and strategy-making for the benefit of States and their peoples.

“Support” and “assistance” are emphasized because this Guidance Note is based on the understanding that national security policy- and/or strategy-making is a country’s sovereign prerogative. However, the Note also emphasizes that these policies and strategies should be consistent with the country’s international obligations.

3. SCOPE

The Guidance Note highlights potential roles and steps for UN support to national security policies and strategies. It discusses the important challenges and opportunities likely to be faced by UN personnel, as well as other national and international actors. It also discusses the purpose, scope and core elements of national security policies and strategies.
4. INTRODUCTION

Given the overarching role and central position of national security policies and strategies within a country’s security architecture, the processes behind their formulation provide an invaluable opportunity for a country to effect long-term change of the security sector for the benefit of the State and its peoples. Such processes have the potential to produce systemic or “sector-wide” changes within the security sector, through the transformation of strategic foundations common to all security sector components. These foundations can include strengthening non-discriminatory and accountable enforcement of the rule of law, ensuring the primacy of individual and community security, and defining the roles and powers of security sector actors on this basis. Related to this, national security policy- and strategy-making processes can also offer a window of opportunity for a State to redevelop and refine its social contract with its peoples. National security policies and strategies are therefore central to ensuring successful SSR.

Developing a national security policy and/or strategy is a highly political process which relies on the will and capacity of the State to convene dialogue involving all national stakeholders and segments of society, and to reach agreement on issues of national security by encouraging national consultation and public debate. In this respect, it is important to ensure that the interests and needs of women, girls, men and boys are represented in such processes. The development of a national security policy and/or strategy is also a complex technical endeavour, for which many post-conflict and developing countries lack the necessary expertise, capacity and/or financial resources. Even when countries have experience in this area, national security policies and strategies are often developed alongside other reform initiatives, and must compete for limited national resources.

Historically, while States have often been willing to accept technical assistance (and equipment) at operational and tactical levels, they have been reluctant to request foreign support for domestic processes of national security policy- and strategy-making. This has largely been due to their concerns about interference in domestic matters, especially one as sensitive as national security policy- and strategy-making. Furthermore, until recently neither the UN General Assembly nor the Security Council viewed the preparation of national security policies and strategies as a priority for the attainment of sustainable peace and development, the rule of law and protection of human rights, or as an important step toward stabilization, further peacebuilding or the prevention of conflict. Consequently, requests or mandates for the UN to support national security policy- or strategy-making processes were rare. However, over the past decade this situation has begun to change. The Organization is increasingly seen as a suitable partner for governments in this area, in particular given the UN’s impartiality and convening capacity. In 2010 and 2011, the General Assembly (UN, 2010, 2011) recognized
the important role that the UN “can play in the provision of technical assistance to State authorities, where requested and based on the specific needs, in their efforts to develop” such instruments. The General Assembly therefore encouraged the Secretariat to elaborate guidance.

5. OVERVIEW: NATIONAL SECURITY POLICIES AND STRATEGIES

National security policies and strategies provide frameworks for a country to address the security needs of its peoples and the State. Typically, both are based on a country’s constitution (where relevant), founding documents and legislation, and inform positions (whether in law or in policy) concerning the relationship between security providers and the public. They also clarify behaviours and responsibilities of State institutions in providing security and upholding the rule of law, at the time of promulgation and in the future. National security policies and strategies that address both the effectiveness and accountability of the security sector are crucial for the legitimacy of State security institutions; trust between the State and the public; the protection of a person’s right to security; and, in conflict-affected situations in particular, the protection of civilians. Indeed, national security policies and strategies themselves gain both credibility and legitimacy when they are formulated to ensure that security institutions are effective, human rights-compliant and accountable.

National security policies and strategies may be developed to encourage a break with the past (e.g. as a result of constitutional reform or in the context of a peace process); with a view to enhancing State- and people-centric security (e.g. as a response to a change in a country’s security threats or a political transition based on greater reforms); and/or to provide political and strategic guidance for the envisaged reform of the security sector. Developing a “vision and strategy” aimed at strengthening national capacity to address basic security in the immediate aftermath of conflict is recognized as a fundamental peacebuilding priority, and therefore essential for increasing the chances for sustainable peace and development (UN, 2009, p. 1). In other situations, strengthened strategic capacity in the security sector can help address many of the factors undermining sustainable development and possibly contributing to violence, impunity, corruption, violent crime and overly high public expenditure on security.

There are several rationales for developing national security policies and strategies:

- To enhance service delivery in the area of national security – including people’s right to security – through informed dialogue and mapping and analysis of challenges, needs and means;
To increase confidence of the local population in the State and its institutions through dialogue and through development of a common national understanding of needs and priorities via the active, free and meaningful participation of all stakeholders;

To provide strategic national guidance to ongoing or planned SSR programmes in order to ensure their success, i.e. the establishment of effective, human rights-compliant and accountable security institutions that deliver appropriate services to both the people and the State;

To ensure that spending in the area of national security and SSR is driven by inclusive national priorities and is both cost-effective and sustainable, while encouraging the need for security considerations to be part of transparent national budgeting processes;

To increase aid effectiveness through ensuring that international donors have a national strategy to which aid can be aligned and harmonized;

To enhance foreign confidence and investment in other sectors by linking security policy to national development priorities (e.g. poverty reduction strategies);

To enhance regional confidence building by reaching out to neighbouring countries on the basis of national strategy; and

To ensure sustainable growth through environmentally friendly utilization of natural resources for job creation and sustainable economical development.

Box 1. National security policy and the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper in Sierra Leone

In Sierra Leone, a decision was made to link efforts to develop national security policy to the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP). The national security sector review, which was designed to serve as the basis for national security policy, was therefore merged with a central strategic pillar of the PRSP on “promotion of good governance, security and peacebuilding”. The rationale for formally linking the two processes was based on national recognition that security is essential for economic development, and on the need to support connections between broader social and economic policies. It was also intended to align government priorities in a way that would streamline resources. This innovative approach faced several challenges; for example, concerns were voiced by some members of government about a “securitization” of the development agenda, particularly with regard to the high costs envisioned for the security package within the PRSP. Despite the challenges, Sierra Leone’s PRSP became the first national document to explicitly acknowledge linkages between security and economic development. In practice, it is also said to have enhanced the coherence and coordination of SSR support on the part of international donors, by providing a clear framework with which they were able to align themselves (Garrasi, Kuttner and Wam, 2009).
National security policies and strategies are intimately linked to SSR, as they articulate the priorities for national security and the capacities required to meet them. These policies and strategies should therefore be viewed as invaluable strategic entry points at the sector-wide level for engaging in and guiding SSR. The Secretary-General’s Report on SSR recognizes that “security sector reform cannot be isolated from other national strategies and priorities”; the Report encourages Member States to address SSR in a coherent and comprehensive manner, central to their broader national reform efforts and on the basis of “a thorough and broadly inclusive assessment of national security needs” (UN, 2008, par. 38). In this respect, the General Assembly has noted that:

“the United Nations and the international community should avoid imposing external models of security sector reform and concentrate on strengthening the capacity of the host country to develop, manage and implement security sector reform through inclusive consultation processes at all stages” (UN, 2010).

Given that national security policies and strategies must be both proactive and reactive, they should be reviewed regularly – every three to five years, for example, or upon a significant shift in the security environment, to ensure that they respond to both current and future needs and concerns. Reviews need to be, and be seen to be, credible and accessible by the public. They must critically assess whether there have in fact been improvements in accountability and how shortcomings and excesses over the review period have been addressed. National security reviews play a key role in supporting the development, monitoring and evaluation of national security policies and strategies; they therefore contribute to the full cycle of national security policy and strategy development.

6. GUIDANCE FRAMEWORK

In supporting national security policy- and strategy-making processes, all UN personnel – whether military, police or civilian – have the responsibility to promote human rights norms and standards, grounded in international law, which govern the actions of all security sector personnel (military, police and civilian). These include, inter alia, equality and non-discrimination, the right to liberty, security of person and freedom of expression, the freedom of association and peaceful assembly, the rights for persons deprived of liberty to be treated humanely, the right of equal opportunities for women and men (i.e. to be employed and promoted within the security sector), the right to a fair trial, the prohibition against torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment
or punishment, the prohibition of extrajudicial, summary and arbitrary executions as well as the prohibition of sexual and gender-based violence, the right to participate in public and political life and the right to an adequate standard of living. The UN shall promote the compliance of transitional justice processes and mechanisms with international norms and standards.

Furthermore, in providing assistance, UN staff shall adhere to the basic principles of the UN approach to SSR outlined in the Secretary-General’s report on SSR (UN, 2008):

- The goal of the UN in SSR is to support States and societies in developing effective, inclusive and accountable security institutions so as to contribute to international peace and security, sustainable development and the enjoyment of human rights by all.
- SSR shall be undertaken on the basis of a national decision, a Security Council mandate and/or a General Assembly resolution; the Charter of the United Nations and human rights laws and standards.
- In order to be successful and sustainable, support in the area of security sector reform must be anchored in national ownership and the commitment of involved States and societies.

Currently, there is no one definition or model for a national security policy or strategy. Moreover, in practice the distinction between each instrument can sometimes appear vague. Given the ambiguity of purpose and the nature of these important tools, and considering the increased demand for UN support in these areas, functional definitions to guide UN staff in their support to national security policy- and strategy-making processes are important.

6.1 National Security Policies

For the purpose of this Note, a national security policy is defined as a formal description of a country’s understanding of its guiding principles, values, interests, goals, strategic environment, threats, risks and challenges in view of protecting or promoting national security for the State and its peoples. This understanding is anchored in a vision of security determined through a comprehensive process of dialogue with all national stakeholders (and possibly regional and international partners if deemed appropriate by the State concerned). In this sense, a national security policy incorporates the views of the Government and other institutions of State, as well as the needs and perceptions of the country’s people.

In practice, some countries do not have one national security policy document but rather numerous policy documents, such as sector-specific white papers or
speeches of the country’s political leaders. Such documents could serve as the basis for developing a national security policy, which the UN may be requested and/or mandated to support.

UN staff shall promote certain elements of effective national security policy in the course of their support, while respecting the country’s sovereign prerogative to determine its own particular solution consistent with its international obligations. These elements (described in Annex I, which provides a “checklist” for practitioners) are vision, guiding principles, values, interests, goals, strategic environment, and threats, risks and challenges.

The UN shall also advise national authorities on the importance of developing a national security policy, in line with the definition provided above. Furthermore, the UN shall highlight the importance of translating a national security policy into a national security strategy and, subsequently, a plan of action for later implementation. All such documents should be based on relevant legislation and be financially sustainable in light of national budget realities and broader development priorities.

6.2 National Security Strategies

For the purpose of this Note, a national security strategy is defined as a formal description of the methods to be used by the State and its peoples to realize the vision and goals outlined in national security policy. Should no such policy document exist, a national security strategy should be based, where possible, on national security policy positions located, for example, in white papers or political statements. The UN shall advocate for the need to conduct a broad and inclusive dialogue and consultation process – as part of the national security strategy-making process – to ensure that the needs and concerns of all stakeholders, including women, girls, men and boys are taken into account.

Annex II outlines the essential elements of an effective national security strategy, which UN staff shall promote in their support to national security strategy-making while respecting the country’s sovereign prerogative to determine its own particular solution consistent with its international obligations. Annex II also provides a “checklist” for practitioners. Essential elements of a national security strategy are: vision (as outlined in national security policy, if existing); guiding principles (as outlined in national security policy, if existing); objectives; priorities; responses/activities; human and financial resource allocation; communication; implementation; co-ordination; and monitoring and evaluation.

Ideally, a national security strategy should be based on an assessment of the capacity and capability of the security sector; interrelationships with other systems...
and sectors such as national human rights protection systems, child protection, justice and education; and on a functional review of what services the security sector should provide. A security strategy should not be a standalone instrument, but should instead be coherently linked with a national development strategy. If it is so linked, it is more likely that the strategy will be financially realistic and sustainable, in particular in light of broader national development priorities.

6.3 National Security Plans and National Security Sector Development Plans

National security policies and strategies should result in national plans (e.g. security sector development plans, justice sector plans, emergency preparedness plans, etc.). These should address crosscutting issues such as human rights, gender equality and child protection, while being financially realistic and sustainable. Security development plans should outline the specific changes (development/reform/transformation) required within the national security architecture in response to the needs of, threats to and vision and objectives for national security articulated in the national security policy and/or strategy. Ideally, plans should also contain clear goals and indicators, to encourage measurement of impact and to contribute to public communication campaigns outlining the progress of specific reforms.

6.4 Linkages with National Security Legislation

While it is common for countries to ensure linkages between domestic legislation and their national security policy and/or strategy (including, where relevant, the country’s constitution and any international instruments the country may have ratified or acceded to), no one model for achieving this exists. Typically, the security policy and/or strategy will be based on (where applicable) a country’s constitution or founding documents. Subsequently, the development of a national security policy and/or strategy is likely to result in modifications to the existing national legal framework – both as it applies to the security sector and sometimes more broadly, including in the areas of justice, the economy and education. The policy and strategy may highlight the need to review the legal framework or may outline the specific amendments required. For example, the Plan de Seguridad Publica of Chile includes a seven-page annex on legislative priorities for the government to take forward (Chile, 2012-2014). Spain’s Estrategia Española de Seguridad: Una responsabilidad de todos calls for legislative instruments to be updated in four key areas in alignment with the strategy (Spain, 2011). The Jamaican National Security Policy notes the importance of reviewing the legal framework supporting national security goals identified in the policy and calls for the establishment of a commission to ensure that laws are relevant and current (Jamaica, 2006).
When supporting the development of national security policy or strategy, the UN shall encourage national stakeholders to reflect on the existing constitution and/or founding documents, national legislation and international legal agreements, and to consider potential amendments that may be required in domestic legislation following passage of the national security policy or strategy. Furthermore, national stakeholders should give special consideration to the sequencing of national security policy, strategy and legislation, to ensure that the approach supports national priorities and is realistic in terms of the national capacity required to support such processes.

6.5 Linkages with International Obligations and Standards

Ratification of or accession to international conventions can represent an opportunity to review national security policies and strategies, and ensure that they comply with the country’s international obligations. Furthermore, the reports of human rights entities (including OHCHR field presences) and UN human rights mechanisms (including the Universal Periodic Review, treaty bodies and special procedures) represent an opportunity to issue detailed and concrete recommendations to governments; as such, they provide valuable entry points for advocacy and engagement. A human rights perspective should be incorporated into all aspects of national security policies and strategies: assessments, development, implementation, monitoring, evaluation and review.

Box 2. The challenges of sequencing national security policy and national security legislation in Timor-Leste

In Timor-Leste, the government’s intention was first to develop a national security policy, which would subsequently guide the development of national security legislation. However, following the 2006 security crisis,6 swift development of the legislation became a priority, so that the roles and responsibilities of the police and defence forces could be more clearly delineated. Legislation and policy thus advanced in parallel: the national security law would be led by the Office of the Prime Minister and Secretary of State for Defence, while national security policy would continue to be developed under the auspices of the Office of the President and the Secretary of State for Security. In order to ensure links between the two processes, each of the institutions would comment in parallel on the draft law and draft policy. In practice this approach proved challenging; there were limited national resources to lead both processes, and equally limited international resources to support the national effort. Finally, further delays in the policy-making process resulted in the national security law being adopted prior to the national security policy. As a result there was difficulty aligning policy with law, despite the fact that the law did not undergo the same broad consultative process as national security policy. After considerable national effort, law and policy were finally aligned, with a focus on supporting an integrated security sector.
7. SUPPORT STRATEGIES AND ROLES

This section will outline a number of support strategies and activities that UN staff shall consider when requested and/or mandated to assist national security policy- and strategy-making. UN staff should recall that the success of their assistance to national SSR efforts, in these or any other areas, depends on the level of trust and confidence they are able to develop with national interlocutors. It should also be remembered that a request or mandate to support does not always imply that the Organization has the trust and confidence of national stakeholders. As such, partnership-building activities must be factored into the programme/project life cycle and “enhanced trust and confidence” viewed as a mandatory performance indicator for any programme, project, or attempt to support national actors in national security policy- and strategy-making processes.

7.1 Facilitation and Coordination

Given the political nature of national security policy- and strategy-making processes, an impartial party such as the UN can be helpful in facilitating dialogue and supporting effective coordination. Specific roles may include organizing and providing coordination and logistical support to national dialogue and decision-making processes; facilitating the involvement of opposition, civil society and marginalized/vulnerable groups in such dialogues and consultations; and mediating conflicts of interest throughout the national security policy- and/or strategy-making process.

7.2 Communication, Awareness Raising and Outreach

National security policy and strategy development processes benefit from well-designed communications campaigns, which capture and share information while promoting two-way communication and dialogue among all stakeholders. Accordingly, the UN shall consider encouraging and offering support to the development of a national communications campaign. Awareness-raising activities are an essential part of this campaign, as they: a) promote the free, active and meaningful participation of all stakeholders; (b) help ensure that all actors are on board and will not undermine the process; and c) garner the interest, support and involvement of the wider population in the process. The UN shall also consider using its media outlets and the country’s own communication methods – such as storytelling, drama and song – to raise awareness.

7.3 Provision of Technical Assistance

In line with its mandate and contingent upon national demand, the UN shall provide specialized technical advice on the content of and process for the development
of national security policies and strategies, either from its SSR capacities in field Missions and Offices, or from appropriate experts at UNHQ – in particular those within member entities of the Inter-agency SSR Task Force and/or the UN Roster of SSR Experts. Technical advice shall emphasize the importance of human rights, gender equality, women’s empowerment and child protection, as well as issues concerning governance and financial sustainability.

- Content-related assistance may include advice on core elements of national security policies and strategies, as outlined in Annexes I and II; on how to undertake a needs assessment, stakeholder mapping, threat analysis and/or public perception survey; and on how to facilitate national consultations and establish a steering committee. It may also involve provision of comparative examples from other countries to present options, inform the national decision-making process and enhance capacities. This may be achieved through workshops with national actors from other countries who are invited to speak about promising practices and lessons learned from their experiences, including for example on subjects such as leadership and political will. The UN shall propose key questions and important issues for consideration throughout the process, including, *inter alia*, in the areas of human rights, gender equality and child protection.

- The UN shall offer its support as a “process assistant” by providing the advice, information and tools necessary to help national stakeholders carry out their national security policy- and strategy-making processes effectively. Process-related assistance may include for example provision of advice on potential steps for developing policies and strategies, including national dialogue and communication (for an overview of such steps, please refer to Annex III). During this process, the UN shall remain impartial and respect the country’s sovereign prerogative to determine its own particular solution consistent with its international obligations.

### 7.4 Capacity Development

Capacity development may be required in specialized areas such as leadership, policy- and strategy-making, strategic planning, dialogue, mediation, facilitation, budgeting and fiscal management, and monitoring and evaluation. Capacity development is also likely to be required in areas such as human rights, gender equality and child protection. Development of national capacity may be achieved through training as well as support to the establishment and strengthening of think tanks or forums that include representatives from State institutions and civil society; these entities could play a role in the policy/strategy process itself. As noted in Section 7.3 above, capacity may also be enhanced through facilitating the exchange of promising practices and lessons learned from other countries. Capacity
development shall also be achieved through day-to-day mentoring and example setting, based on applicable international norms. Capacity-development activities for civil society actors should be envisaged, in order to effectively involve them in the processes.

### 7.5 Steps to Guide UN Support

Timelines, steps and activities between and within national security policy- and strategy-making processes vary greatly from context to context. Nevertheless, Annex III outlines a number of steps to guide support that UN staff shall promote with national stakeholders.

In this regard, UN entities should pay particular attention to the Human Rights Due Diligence Policy on UN support to non-UN security forces (hereafter HRDDP, referred to in Annex IV). The HRDDP sets out principles and measures to mainstream human rights into support provided by United Nations entities to non-UN security forces globally, in order to ensure that such support is consistent with the UN's purposes and principles as provided for in the UN Charter and in international law to respect, promote, and encourage respect for international humanitarian, human rights and refugee law.

#### Box 3. Provision of technical advice: Establishing a Steering Committee in the Central African Republic

In the Central African Republic, the committee in charge of organizing the “National SSR Seminar” – the Comité Préparatoire – was supported by UNDP. The Comité was in charge of research and document preparation, including gathering lessons from the threat assessment and supporting the information and awareness-raising campaign via consultation meetings in Bangui and five provinces. The Comité was also responsible for practical and logistical arrangements for the seminar. As the Comité undertook this intensive work, two main challenges emerged. First, staff members were only partially detached from their ministries or civil society organizations. This resulted in a prioritization of their other duties rather than the short-term mission they had been asked to complete within the Comité. Second, a number of the members were very senior – often former ministers – and were therefore reluctant to undertake the large number of (even basic) tasks required by the Comité’s mandate. UNDP and other international experts assisted the Government in overcoming these challenges: in highlighting the importance of the work of the Comité to high-level political actors, they garnered support for secondments of staff to the Comité. UNDP also provided training and seconded secretarial staff to the Comité to increase the body’s administrative capacity. The provision of advice and sensitization on the need to carefully consider the membership of such committees paid off when the Secrétariat Technique Permanent (that replaced the Comité Préparatoire following the National SSR Seminar) was assigned full-time staff for its mandate, thus enabling it to fully support implementation of the security sector reform activities agreed at the Seminar.
8. CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES

8.1 General Challenges and Opportunities

This section will address general challenges – and opportunities – that the UN and other actors typically face when supporting national security policy- and strategy-making processes.

8.1.1 Managing fragile transitions

In conflict, post-conflict and otherwise fragile situations, UN staff may encounter a fragile peace characterized by continued political and physical insecurity throughout the country. Often in such environments there is a lack of trust in and between the country’s institutions and communities, including those of the security sector, political parties and civil society. Most conflicts are characterized by large-scale or systematic international humanitarian law and human rights violations. Helping societies emerging from conflict to come to terms with a legacy of large-scale past abuses and assisting in the promotion of justice and reconciliation are fundamental objectives of the UN. Populations may be displaced and transport infrastructure severely weakened. Moreover, political situations are often in flux, with elections on the near-term horizon. Such conditions may hamper the Organization’s ability to effectively support national security policy- and strategy-making processes – in particular, programmes of national dialogue and consultation.

It may therefore be necessary to consider alternative methods for supporting national consultations. These may include supporting the government in undertaking a mapping exercise to determine who the key stakeholders are that will a) be most affected by reforms; b) not be heard unless specifically targeted for consultation; and c) have suffered the greatest levels of insecurity prior to and during the most recent period of conflict. The UN shall always advocate the need to ensure that these stakeholders – including women, girls, men and boys – enjoy active, free and meaningful participation in the national security policy- and strategy-making processes. Subsequently, the UN shall identify ways to assist the State in holding direct consultations with these people, for example through financing travel to communities or by financing stakeholder participation in consultations in the capital. The use of national media to reach a wider selection of stakeholders and communities is also essential. Finally, those supporting the process should remain aware that certain stakeholders may seek to exploit the fragile peace for their own ends, or to limit dialogue with specific stakeholders. This shall be addressed through carefully calibrated political dialogue at the highest levels.
8.1.2 Fostering political will and leadership

Another challenge that could arise is the lack of political will to engage in a national security policy and/or strategy process. This could be due to, *inter alia*: a) a culture of “closed” and “secretive” decision-making in the area of national security; b) concerns about UN impartiality in a particular context, given UN history (or that of its States Members) in the particular country/region concerned; c) a lack of understanding of the advantages (political and financial) that such a process could bring; d) limited capacity to undertake the process; and/or e) fear of power shifts that could result and negatively affect some stakeholders more than others. The UN shall emphasize both the importance and the benefits of national security policy- and strategy-making processes by providing examples from other States and underlining their international obligations.

Various degrees of political will within a government are to be expected in this domain. While it may be challenging to maintain political will and momentum throughout the process, national actors – with international support if needed – should make every effort to ensure that there is clear commitment and understanding among relevant stakeholders as to why they are engaging in the process. The link to SSR is a common motivation for engaging in these national processes, in particular in post-conflict contexts.

**Box 4. Fostering political will in Liberia and Timor-Leste**

Development of national security strategy in Liberia stemmed from recognition that the security sector needed reform: challenges in that sector’s governance had to be met, and there were specific issues such as the duplication of mandates between existing security institutions. The actual trigger was the organization by Liberia’s Governance Commission of a policy seminar in 2006 to address the need for more coordinated action in the area of SSR. The participants recognized that a clear strategy would have to rationalize the security sector and clarify the various needs and functions in an overarching framework. The government’s 150-day action plan in 2006 signalled commitment to devising a national security strategy, which was approved in 2008.

In the case of Timor-Leste, there had been references to the need for a national security policy in the national security framework adopted in 2003. However, impetus to move the policy forward developed only after the 2006 national security crisis, which brought to light major weaknesses within the sector. The Secretariat of State for Security was then tasked by the Minister of Defence and Security to develop the policy. However, changes in the government and shifting national priorities affected the political will required to develop the document, which resulted in the process stalling on several occasions. It was only the determination of the Secretariat of State for Security and the Office of the President that allowed the policy development to be revitalized with the creation of an informal national security policy core group. With UN support, this group spearheaded finalization of the draft, which was sent to the Council of Ministers for approval in early 2011.
The United Nations shall facilitate common understanding and political will among national stakeholder to engage in SSR in an inclusive and consultative manner. As different degrees of political will are to be expected, this will involve careful prior analysis of the situation. The UN shall manage expectations by clearly stating the kind of support it can provide to the government throughout the process. Similarly, the level of commitment expected from the government throughout the process should be captured in a written agreement. Such an agreement should include an indicative work plan consisting of phases, milestones, projects, resources, timelines, performance indicators and risk mitigation strategies, to help prevent a loss of momentum at latter stages. As noted in preceding sections, any such work plan must always include an inception phase for trust- and confidence-building activities.

While sufficient political will may exist, limited experience within the State – including the government and the security sector – in exercising leadership at the national level may prove an additional challenge. This is especially so in post-conflict and transition contexts, where changes within the political and social strata may have been considerable. That holds not only for the development of such instruments, but also for their implementation by all relevant stakeholders, in particular those within the security sector. Therefore, the UN shall promote the need for national stakeholders to consider leadership capacities, while offering technical assistance as described in Sections 7.3 and 7.4 above.

8.1.3 Building trust and confidence

The level of trust and confidence local stakeholders show – towards those leading or supporting the process as well as in the process itself – will depend on the past performance of the State’s security institutions in terms of relations among them, the populace and political parties, as well as on any previous contact with the UN. Significant challenges can arise in States that have not historically engaged with the public on security issues. In many contexts the security sector may have been implicated in abuses against the population, making trust building all the more challenging. For example, open, participatory approaches may be viewed with suspicion and mistrust, as stakeholders fear reprisals or repression. Others may not consider themselves stakeholders, seeing national security decision-making as the remit solely of “those in power”, and hence may not acknowledge the importance of contributing their views and needs. Lastly, members of the general public who are interested in contributing may lack awareness about how they can make their voices heard.

Supporting communication and awareness-raising programmes (discussed above) is therefore essential to enhancing the population’s trust and confidence in the
national security policy and/or strategy development process. Of course, such programmes must explain changes, with a focus on outcomes and benefits for end-users. Such communication programmes shall rely on national media to access as many communities as possible, and should strive to encourage every stakeholder group to ask themselves, “What's in it for us?” It is also crucial to address any safety concerns stakeholders have about sharing their views, needs and perceptions. Given the impartiality of the UN and its presumed legitimacy in the country, the Organization has an important supporting role to play in facilitating political dialogue or simply attending State-run focus group meetings to enhance trust and confidence among stakeholders. The UN enhances its credibility when adopting a principled, norm-based and constructive approach in its support. However, the history of the UN in the country concerned should be understood and taken into account, and a separate communications campaign to raise the population's awareness of the Organization's current mandate and/or enhance their trust in the UN body may be required.

8.1.4 Supporting a consultative or governance-driven process

One particularly common challenge may be the State’s unwillingness to undertake broad consultations with all stakeholders – a position that could be based on fear, a history of discrimination, and/or misunderstandings of the process itself. In such cases, the UN shall highlight the benefits of an inclusive and consultative process, while underlining the risks of not having one. Key messages shall include the following:

- A consultative process may improve the legitimacy and the credibility of the State, as well as the government and the security sector more specifically, in the eyes of the population, regional actors, international investors and the broader international community. Such enhanced levels of popular, regional and international confidence could increase the amount of support received from both domestic and international sources, thereby enhancing the prospects of successful development and peacebuilding efforts more generally.

- Not consulting with the population may represent a missed opportunity to identify real problems and potential solutions that could be addressed through the national security policy and/or strategy – in turn enhancing the possibility of sustainable peace and development.

- If the population is consulted, they will take more ownership of the national security policy and strategy, and therefore will be more inclined to support (and participate in) subsequent implementation of the policy, strategy or plan.
8.1.5 Dealing with a culture of secrecy

The culture of secrecy is frequently cited as a key challenge to developing inclusive policies in the area of security and is often the source of significant tension between security actors and civilians. It should be noted that the “need” for secrecy can be used as an excuse to avoid inclusive consultations. While it is generally considered legal and legitimate to adopt some level of secrecy in specific, limited categories, this needs to be justified in each case and cannot be undertaken to avoid accountability or for other purposes.

While elements of a national security strategy and/or operational plans may genuinely need to remain secret, the UN shall emphasize from the outset the need to balance necessary secrecy with transparency, as well as relevant international obligations and norms. If the State considers it too risky to disseminate a national security strategy because it includes too much operational detail, the UN shall advocate publicizing the main points of the policy or strategy (including vision, key priorities and objectives) through a communications campaign, to avoid losing public confidence to perceptions of non-transparent.

8.1.6 Addressing capacity shortages – financial resources

The development of a national security policy and/or strategy can require significant financial resources, especially when it entails organizing a process of dialogue with national stakeholders. As such, the UN should support the government in planning, fundraising, budget management, and identification of adequate and predictable resources. Expectations need to be managed in

Box 5. Facilitating national consultations in Liberia

In Liberia, it was decided that the Governance Commission (GC) would lead in the development of national security strategy. The GC, which had been created by the Accra Comprehensive Peace Agreement to promote good governance in the Liberian public sector, resolved to ensure a consultative approach to the development of the strategy. However, this approach was resisted by numerous representatives of government ministries, who feared that including civilians in discussions on national security would amount to compromising that security. The leadership provided by the GC was vital in overcoming this challenge. In particular, an effective approach was the South-South dialogue the GC supported, which brought together experts from other countries in the region to share their experiences with similar processes. This approach proved extremely useful in alleviating fears of undertaking broad national public consultations. The consultation process then took place across the country and involved traditional chiefs, women, civil society, local authorities, youth and local officials from the United Nations Mission in Liberia. The consultation identified local perceptions of national security threats, which included poverty, unemployment, crime, ethnic tensions and regional insecurity. These concerns were in turn reflected in the national security strategy and resulted in recognition of the need for a wider range of government ministries to support national security provision.
terms of what financial support the UN can provide and what it can offer in the area of fundraising.

8.1.7 Addressing capacity shortages – human resources

Limited national human resources capacity could be a significant challenge, in particular given the expertise required – including in the areas of leadership, process and events facilitation, dialogue, drafting, communication, planning, budgeting, national security, human rights, gender equality and child protection. Nevertheless, it is important to prioritize the identification of qualified national experts to form the core of the project team and/or drafting committee, and to support their capacity development from the outset. In this regard, Section 7.4 outlines specific suggestions for capacity development. Other ideas to bridge capacity gaps in the immediate term could include South-South cooperation and/or sourcing qualified expertise from within civil society and/or the country’s diaspora.

The UN shall also advocate for the appointment of a full-time national expert to lead the process, as well as a good mix of international and national technical experts in both national teams and committees in order to support their effective operation; these experts could also contribute to the transfer of skills from international to national staff and vice versa. Human resource policies must also encourage the recruitment, retention and promotion of female staff, as well as those from varied ethnic, religious and regional backgrounds.

8.1.8 Review and monitoring mechanisms

Monitoring implementation of a national security policy or strategy can also be a challenging political and technical undertaking. The UN could suggest establishing standing groups to monitor the way in which such instruments are implemented. These groups could perform evaluation in light of current capabilities and threat assessments. Some countries assign this task to an institutionalized body such as their national security council; others foresee regular meetings of an ad hoc interdepartmental review group. The monitoring bodies’ composition and proceedings should follow the same principles of inclusiveness, transparency, debate and consensus as national security policy/strategy review committees.

8.2 UN-specific Challenges

This section will address some challenges particular to the UN that field operations and/or offices may face, and opportunities to address them.

8.2.1 Short-term mandates

In the case of UN peacekeeping and special political Missions, short-term mandates do not typically accord with the longer time frames required to support a
national security policy and/or strategy development process, or to develop trust and confidence in national stakeholders. Consequently, UN peace operations can become caught in a difficult situation with the need to demonstrate tangible progress toward mandate implementation by a specific short-term deadline on the one hand and the need to support a nationally owned process that cannot fit into a short time frame on the other.

Short-term mandates are difficult to avoid. However, in contexts where peacekeeping and special political Missions are deployed, the tension such mandates create should be recognized from the outset by the Security Council or General Assembly, the Mission concerned, and the UN personnel involved. It should also be accepted that support to national security policy- and strategy-making processes might not deliver final results in a short time frame. This is because such processes require significant consultation and confidence-building efforts – both within the population and between the Mission and the State – and the adoption of these instruments depends on political processes and decisions of national authorities that often take a long time. Mandates should be more realistic, focusing not only on longer-term outcomes but also on detailed short-term outputs. Missions should consider including these outputs in their planning, budgeting and performance management mechanisms and then assess them through frank reporting on the basis of clear performance indicators. For example, they could include the following output in the Mission’s results-based budget for the first six to twelve months of its operation: “completion of xx meetings with senior national decision makers and stakeholders to engender trust and confidence in the Mission’s ability to support the national SSR process”. At the same time and as part of its overall support to the process, the Mission should seek to develop sufficient national capacity in the area of national security policy- and strategy-making with its eventual exit and the principle of national ownership in mind.

The development of partnerships with other UN entities and International Financial Institutions (IFIs) – in particular the World Bank – from the outset of a Mission’s deployment is vital. For that reason joint programming should be explored, in order to make best use of all available experience, relationships, expertise and resources in the short term, and with longer-term sustainability in mind. At a minimum, Mission staff shall coordinate with UN Country Team (UNCT) and relevant IFI colleagues throughout the process of supporting national actors in this area. It is also important to establish effective partnerships with other international and regional actors to secure their support to the national process, including after the Mission’s departure.

8.2.2 Risk of undermining national ownership

Given the aforementioned tensions with short-term mandates, coupled with capacity gaps within local institutions, UN personnel may feel pressured into...
Taking the lead in the national security policy- and/or strategy-making process. It is important to guard against this tendency; otherwise UN Missions and/or offices risk acting contrary to UN principles for SSR – for example, they might:

- Undermine national ownership of the process – and thereby develop unsupported and unsustainable solutions based on external models that do not take into account local politics, culture and history; and,
- Deprive national actors of the opportunity to develop capacities in the areas of national security policy-making and SSR, which are critical after UN withdrawal.

From the outset, the UN should regularly ensure that all national stakeholders (i.e. not just the government and other State actors, but also those within civil society and at the community level) are aware of the UN’s supporting role in the national security policy- and strategy-making process. At the same time, UN personnel should discuss with the lead national actor the need to develop an appropriate methodology and plan for the policy- and/or strategy-making process, including clear written agreements on the specific way in which the State envisages UN support. Such agreements should include a division of labour, as well as information on outputs and deliverables, outcomes and results, timelines, resources (human, financial and materiel), reporting, and other working modalities including governance and regular meetings.

Generally, relevant UN actors shall conduct and/or facilitate training and awareness-raising initiatives among local and international stakeholders, highlighting inter alia the UN’s supporting role in order to mitigate the risk of undermining national ownership. Similarly, it is important that national actors are encouraged to take the lead in all aspects of the national security policy and strategy development process. This includes chairing committees, coordination meetings and workshops, in order to ensure that the process is nationally owned and is seen as such at the domestic, regional and international level. However, with ownership comes responsibility and with support comes the need to ensure that the responsibility of ownership is effectively carried out. This important monitoring and evaluation role of the UN is often misunderstood – and resented – by national actors, and therefore requires significant advocacy and explanation. One dimension of this difficult and controversial role is the need for frank progress reports to national leaders, donors and/or the Security Council by the lead UN actor involved.

8.2.3 Resources

There is an essential need for early identification of adequate and predictable resources for implementation of the national security policy and strategy development process.
opment processes. These resources could come from both domestic and international sources in the form of expertise, equipment and funding. Domestic resources should be involved to the fullest extent possible with international resources used to cover shortfalls in the three aforementioned areas. However, in post-conflict contexts, it is likely that the bulk of the resources will come from the international community, including the UN, regional actors and the donor community. In terms of the UN, it is essential to take a “one UN approach” to the provision of support to national security policy- and strategy-making processes which best utilizes scarce Mission and UNCT resources through partnership, joint programming and/or coordination.

Given the long budgeting processes of all actors involved, planning (and fundraising) early is critical for overall success. While early planning may be difficult given shifting priorities and conditions in the country concerned, it is important not to wait for a detailed budget before beginning fundraising initiatives, but rather to initiate contact with domestic and international sources on the basis of potential scenarios. Generally, as part of the overall planning process and with a view to managing expectations and fostering effective partnerships, the UN should communicate its own constraints in terms of human, financial and materiel resources to the lead national actor as early in the process as possible, preferably as part of the agreements mentioned in the preceding paragraphs. For example, gender-responsive budgeting is a practical tool to help security institutions allocate adequate resources to ensure gender mainstreaming and the UN should seek to provide expertise on gender-responsive budgeting.

In terms of human resources, the UN should advocate for development of one project team consisting of seconded personnel from State institutions and UN staff, co-located in the same physical space. The project team could also consist of international and locally hired project staff, as well as seconded personnel from donor nations. Advisory expertise is also available within UNHQ, if required, in particular within the SSR Unit and the Interagency Security Sector Reform Task Force (IASSRTF) members. These entities can offer support in terms of outreach to States Members; strategic planning; fundraising; technical advice and guidance in the area of national security policy- and strategy-making (on the basis of this guidance material); advice in the areas of, *inter alia*, human rights, gender analysis and child protection, as well as the conduct of national dialogue processes; lessons learned in this area from past experience; experts for swift short-term deployments from the UN Roster of SSR Experts; and training.
ANNEX I (CHECKLIST). POTENTIAL ELEMENTS OF A NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY TO GUIDE UN TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE TO NATIONAL AUTHORITIES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Component</th>
<th>Description</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Vision</strong></td>
<td>The vision is a statement describing the desired future state of national security over a specific time frame (e.g. three to five years), based on national values, interests and needs. An effective vision should be clear, realistic, and in harmony with the needs and values of society at large (including women, marginalized men, youth and children). The vision shall guide the development of both national security policy and the national security strategy, and will set the direction for all other strategic planning.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Guiding principles</strong></td>
<td>The national security policy shall enshrine full respect for human rights and the rule of law, including under HRDDP principles. The policy shall also be based on principles including, but not limited to, ethics, transparency, inclusiveness, confidence building, partnership building and the respect for gender equality.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Values</strong></td>
<td>Values refer to the common and uniting beliefs of a society based on e.g. equality and non-discrimination, democracy, rule of law, gender equality and civilian control of the military. Values may be derived from obligations under international law, the founding documents of the State, and/or national dialogue processes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Interests</strong></td>
<td>National interests are the issues that the State and its peoples consider to be of vital importance, based on their vision and values. At the international level, this may include issues of sovereignty and territorial integrity as well as the fostering of peaceful relations with other States. Domestically, this may include maintaining social harmony and inclusion by promoting and protecting civil, cultural, economic, social and political rights.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Goals</strong></td>
<td>Goals describe the intended outcomes of the national security policy, and are based on national interests. Goals are broader than the objectives set out in the national security strategy, as they seek to define the intentions rather than the specific targets.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Strategic environment</strong></td>
<td>The strategic environment is the context in which a State and its society currently exist and how that context relates to national interests and goals. This would include the State’s interactions with other States and transnational groupings in terms of both cooperation and competition. However, there will also be non-state considerations such as cross-border relations between peoples, environmental factors, transnational crime, health matters and the international consequences of domestic issues in other States, e.g. refugees.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Threats, risks and challenges</strong></td>
<td>Threats, risks and challenges consist of factors stemming from the strategic environment that may prevent the achievement of national goals, for example natural disasters, unemployment, organized crime, illicit trafficking, corruption, etc. These may be identified on the basis of an assessment of the strategic environment within the State, the region and beyond. A full range of internal, external, regional and global threats should be considered in relation to e.g. State security, the overall human rights situation, human security, environmental security and economic security. Threats addressed ought to be both current and forward looking. A threat can be considered as any factor (actions, circumstances or events) that has the potential or possibility to cause harm, loss or damage. A risk can be considered as the combination of the projected impact and likelihood for harm, loss or damage from the exposure to threats.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## ANNEX II (CHECKLIST). POTENTIAL ELEMENTS OF A NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY TO GUIDE UN TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE TO NATIONAL AUTHORITIES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Component</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vision</td>
<td>The vision shall be identical to that in the national security policy – Annex I.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guiding principles</td>
<td>The national security strategy shall enshrine full respect for human rights and the rule of law. The strategy shall also be based on principles including, but not limited to, transparency, inclusiveness, confidence building, partnership building and respect for gender equality.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Objectives</td>
<td>Objectives set specific targets within the broader goals identified in national security policy. They should be clear, realistic, measurable (with associated indicators) and time-bound so as to serve as the basis for monitoring and evaluating the implementation of the national security strategy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Priorities</td>
<td>Priorities list the objectives in order of urgency in terms of both time and spending. They may indicate where one objective is a prerequisite for another. Priorities may also refer to geographic zones, target groups and/or key threats to be addressed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Responses/activities</td>
<td>Responses provide a breakdown of the initiatives needed to achieve the objectives outlined in order of priority. The overview of responses should be broad, leaving the detailed operational planning of activities to those involved in the next planning stage.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human and financial resource allocation</td>
<td>Human and financial resource allocation outlines the means available to implement the strategy. This should be based on an analysis of the roles and responsibilities of traditional and non-traditional security sector actors (e.g. security sector review) and on gap analysis. It should reflect how current mandates, capacities and division of responsibilities need to be adjusted to meet the objectives and carry out the responses, as well as clarify whether there is a need for further fundraising or specialized expertise.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communication</td>
<td>Communication outlines the strategies that need developing to raise awareness of the national security strategy, in order to get all stakeholders moving in a common direction. It should include strategies for winning widespread support for the national security strategy by reassuring target groups that their concerns will be addressed. This involves listing the target groups (e.g. government, ministries, civil society), the key messages to be delivered, and the medium of communication.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implementation</td>
<td>Implementation outlines how the strategy will be put into practice. It may take the form of an annexed implementation plan outlining the institutions and mechanisms needed for implementation, and identifying indicators and timelines. It may also call for preparation of security sector development plans.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coordination</td>
<td>Coordination outlines the mechanisms needed to integrate and harmonize the work of the various actors involved in the implementation process. This may include the appointment of a lead actor to oversee the process and/or an inter-agency national security coordination body.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monitoring and evaluation</td>
<td>Monitoring and evaluation outlines the mechanisms for reviewing progress in implementing the strategy, in order to make necessary adjustments to improve performance. It should clarify who will be in charge of monitoring and evaluation (e.g. establishment of a security policy review committee) and whether it will take place on a regular or an ad hoc basis.</td>
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ANNEX III (CHECKLIST). POTENTIAL STEPS FOR NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY- AND STRATEGY-MAKING PROCESSES TO GUIDE UN TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE TO NATIONAL AUTHORITIES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phase</th>
<th>Step</th>
<th>Definition</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Initiation</td>
<td>1. Conduct a feasibility (and mapping) study</td>
<td>A feasibility study is necessary to evaluate (a) the need for the process, which may include a mapping of the security sector (in particular existing policies, strategies and plans); (b) the affordability of the process; and (c) whether sufficient national will and capacity exist to support it. The need for international support may be considered.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Initiation</td>
<td>2. Build trust and confidence between national stakeholders</td>
<td>Political will and confidence must be secured to ensure that the support of all stakeholders to the process is sustainable. This requires sufficient time for trust and confidence-building activities, including sensitization, dialogue and meetings.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Initiation</td>
<td>3. Reach an agreement on the way forward</td>
<td>Agreement is needed within the State on the scope, roles, responsibilities and methodology of the process, as well as on the resources for implementation. Formal agreement with the UN and other international actors should also be encouraged to achieve clear commitments on the division of labour.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Initiation</td>
<td>4. Resource utilization</td>
<td>Resources need to be utilized as agreed. This may include creating a Steering Committee and hiring technical staff. Full-time, dedicated ministry staff secondments should be considered to ensure the process remains a priority and does not have to compete with other ministerial considerations and projects.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Initiation</td>
<td>5. Raise awareness</td>
<td>A public launch of the process should be undertaken to raise awareness and support among the population. Communication strategies should be developed that target society at large, including marginalized groups, women and children.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planning/inception</td>
<td>6. Facilitate national dialogue through consultations and outreach</td>
<td>Widespread public dialogue should be facilitated using gender-responsive focus groups, rural and urban consultations, and public perception surveys. Key stakeholders should be identified in both rural and urban areas to ensure that all security interests are taken into account.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planning/inception</td>
<td>7. Conduct assessments (in parallel with Step 6)</td>
<td>A diverse range of stakeholders should be engaged (including civil society and non-traditional security providers) to identify threats (as highlighted in Step 6 above); define leading and supporting roles in implementing the strategy; agree on priorities; and identify how decisions will be financed. Assessments may include: (a) a strategic environment review; (b) threat/risk analysis; (c) a security sector review; (d) security sector gap analysis; (e) human rights assessment; and (f) costing assessment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planning/inception</td>
<td>8. Define values, interests and goals</td>
<td>Values, interests, and goals should be defined based on human rights and the rule of law, as well as on the assessment and national dialogue processes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planning/inception</td>
<td>9. Establish a drafting committee</td>
<td>A drafting committee may be established if this role was not assigned to the steering committee. When recruiting and/or training, consideration should be made of the languages and formats the document needs so that all stakeholders, including minority groups and internationals, can understand it.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Step</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>10. Draft background papers</td>
<td>Background papers should prepare the ground for the drafting of the final document. The background papers may summarize relevant national policy, the national and international legal framework, and the results of the assessments.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>11. Provide feedback on the final draft</td>
<td>The final document will respect the guidelines introduced in Annex I, if it is a national security policy, or Annex II, if it is a national security strategy. Thought should be given to the consultation process for review of the draft by national institutions as well as experts.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>12. Seek parliamentary approval</td>
<td>The final document shall be submitted to parliament for approval before being translated into law and/or mainstreamed into policies on other subjects. Providing sufficient time for this step is important in order to engage parliamentarians. The latter should be sensitized to their crucial role in oversight and implementation.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Seek executive approval</td>
<td>The final document shall be submitted to the executive branch for approval. In some countries, Steps 12 and 13 may be reversed.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>14. Mainstream the document</td>
<td>The content of the security policy or strategy should be mainstreamed across all government departments and considered in current and future planned policy actions.</td>
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<tr>
<td>15. Communicate the policy/strategy</td>
<td>A strategy for communicating the content of the security policy/strategy to stakeholders should be devised to generate nationwide interest and support for implementation, in line with national legislation concerning the 1) right of individuals to access public information and 2) classification of sensitive information. The content should reach a wide range of stakeholders.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. Coordinate implementation</td>
<td>Timelines, priorities and responsibilities for implementation set out in the document and/or its implementation plan should be coordinated among the relevant stakeholders. This may involve creating an implementation or coordination committee or assigning a coordinating or implementing role to an existing national security council.</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. Revise/develop policy instruments</td>
<td>Existing policy instruments may need to be revised and new ones created to implement the security strategy. This may include developing a security sector development plan that outlines changes required in the security sector, including in terms of governance, force strength, posture, procurement, equipment and infrastructure.</td>
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<tr>
<td>18. Consider the need for dispute management</td>
<td>Competing interests may lead to disputes regarding implementation. This needs to be handled proactively through expert facilitation and dispute management.</td>
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<tr>
<td>19. Set up a review committee</td>
<td>A review committee should be set up to periodically review implementation and the level of effectiveness of the national security strategy.</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>20. Support expert participation</td>
<td>A network of government, academic and civil society representatives could be formed to monitor the implementation and provide input to future revisions.</td>
<td></td>
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</table>
### ANNEX IV. SPECIFIC LEGAL INSTRUMENTS, PRINCIPLES, NORMS AND STANDARDS TO BE RESPECTED AND PROMOTED BY UN STAFF IN SUPPORT OF NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY- AND STRATEGY-MAKING PROCESSES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Instrument</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>CEDAW</strong></td>
<td>Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women and its Optional Protocol. Adopted and opened for signature, ratification and accession by General Assembly resolution 34/180 of 18 December 1979; entry into force 3 September 1981, in accordance with article 27(1).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CRC</strong></td>
<td>Convention on the Rights of the Child and its two Optional Protocols.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CICRMW</strong></td>
<td>International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CCED</strong></td>
<td>International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CCPRD</strong></td>
<td>Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and its Optional Protocol.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Geneva Conventions</strong></td>
<td>Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field; Convention (II) for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea; Convention (III) relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War. Geneva, 12 August 1949; Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, and Protocols I and II.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Genocide Convention</strong></td>
<td>Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. Approved and proposed for signature and ratification or accession by General Assembly resolution 260 A (III) of 9 December 1948; entry into force 12 January 1951, in accordance with article XIII.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ottawa Convention</strong></td>
<td>Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction. Adopted in Oslo 18 September 1997; entry into force 1 March 1999 following the 40th ratification.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treaty/Convention</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>Terrorism-related treaties</td>
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<tr>
<td>Resolution</td>
<td>Notes</td>
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</table>

**Declarations**


**Principles**

- Principles on the Effective Investigation and Documentation of Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (recommended by the General Assembly resolution of 4 December 2000).


**Policies**

- Human Rights Due Diligence Policy on UN support to non-UN security forces (2011).

**Guidance**

- UN Inter-Agency SSR Task Force (forthcoming), Integrated Technical Guidance Note on Gender-Responsive SSR.
- UN Inter-Agency SSR Task Force (forthcoming), Integrated Technical Guidance Note on National Ownership of SSR.
ENDNOTES

1 Security sector reform is described as “a process of assessment, review and implementation as well as monitoring and evaluation led by national authorities that has as its goal the enhancement of effective and accountable security for the State and its peoples without discrimination and with full respect for human rights and the rule of law” (UN, 2008).

2 “Security sector” is a broad term often used to describe the structures, institutions and personnel responsible for the management, provision and oversight of security in a country. It is generally accepted that the security sector includes defence, law enforcement, corrections, intelligence services and institutions responsible for border management, customs and civil emergencies. Elements of the judicial sector responsible for the adjudication of cases of alleged criminal conduct and misuse of force are, in many instances, also included. Furthermore, the security sector includes actors that play a role in managing and overseeing the design and implementation of security, such as ministries, legislative bodies and civil society groups. Other non-State actors that could be considered part of the security sector include customary or informal authorities and private security services” (UN, 2008).


4 These areas are crisis management, civilian protection, official secrets and planning for an effective response to emergencies and disasters (Spain, 2011).

5 In late April 2006, tensions between and within Timor-Leste’s fledging police (Policía Nacional de Timor-Leste, PNTL) and defence forces (Forças Defesa de Timor-Leste, F-FDTL) caused a breakdown in public order. By the time order was restored, 38 people had died, an estimated 150,000 were displaced, approximately 40% of the army had deserted or been dismissed, and key elements of the police had collapsed.

BIBLIOGRAPHY


DPA
Department of Political Affairs

DPKO
Department of Peacekeeping Operations

OHCHR
Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights

OSAA
Office of the Special Adviser on Africa

OSRSG-SVC
Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict

PBSO
Peacebuilding Support Office

UNDP
United Nations Development Programme

UNFPA
United Nations Population Fund

UNICEF
United Nations Children’s Fund

UNITAR
United Nations Institute for Training and Research

UNODA
United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs

UNODC
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime

UNOPS
United Nations Office for Project Services

UN Women
United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women