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## Policy

## Defence Sector Reform

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## POLICY ON DEFENCE SECTOR REFORM

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## A. PURPOSE

1. The purpose of this policy is to guide the United Nations support to national defence sector reform (DSR) efforts. It outlines the parameters and components of this support, including principles, elements for any mission concept, core tasks and constraints. The policy also highlights linkages with security sector reform (SSR), rule of law and other broader reform processes, such as public administration reform initiatives and regional security development plans, as well as with United Nations actors, including those involved in peacemaking, peacekeeping, early peacebuilding and peacebuilding, development, humanitarian relief and the promotion of human rights and the rule of law.
2. This policy has been prepared by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) within the framework of the Inter-agency SSR Task Force (IASSRTF) and in significant consultation with its members.

## B. SCOPE

3. This policy applies to staff of all United Nations Peacekeeping Operations and Special Political Missions with specific mandates on SSR and/or DSR, including Heads of Missions,
deputies, representatives and their delegates, Force Commanders, Chiefs of SSR support components, as well as all others with responsibilities for supporting national DSR efforts, whether in the field or at United Nations Headquarters. United Nations personnel in related roles should also be made aware of and comply with this policy.
4. This policy could serve as a reference for all Offices, Departments, Funds and Programmes of the IASSRTF (including their operations/Offices in the field) and Member States, as well as regional authorities and other multi-lateral actors engaged in DSR.
5. This policy will be followed by a set of guidelines and standard operating procedures, which will elaborate concepts and methodologies in the area of DSR.

## C. RATIONALE

6. The United Nations has, for many years, been involved in assisting national actors to enhance or re-establish security within the broad framework of the rule of law and with respect to human rights. This support is provided at the request of national governments and/or in response to Security Council resolutions or General Assembly mandates, as well as during development and implementation of a peace agreement, in particular in the aftermath of a conflict and calls for guided engagement.
7. An effective, efficient, accountable and affordable defence sector - an important component of the broader security sector - is essential for sustainable peace and development and should be considered an important dimension of United Nations assistance to Member States. In the specific context of United Nations peacekeeping and other peace operations mandated by the Security Council, DSR as a key component of United Nations efforts to support SSR is increasingly understood to be at the heart of good governance, and the rule of law. Assisting national actors to strengthen the rule of law, including the institutions of justice and security, on the basis of national ownership and transparency, is recognized by Member States in both Security Council resolutions and General Assembly mandates as a vital goal and activity of the United Nations.
8. In this context, over the last decades, the United Nations has increasingly provided support to national DSR efforts. Since 2003, Security Council resolutions have included DSR elements in the mandates of at least five peacekeeping operations ${ }^{1}$ and three political missions, while other United Nations actors have provided support on the basis of requests from Member States. This policy draws upon lessons learned and best practices from these endeavours and is underpinned by applicable international norms and standards.
9. Despite the Organization's support to DSR processes, assistance in this area has remained largely an ad hoc undertaking. The Organization has neither elaborated the principles nor the standards to guide its support to national DSR efforts, nor has it articulated the importance of ensuring that DSR efforts contribute to SSR more broadly. Moreover, the Organisation has not defined the relationships between DSR and justice sector reform or other important processes such as disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR). This policy is to serve as the foundation for all future United Nations support to national DSR efforts.
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## D. POLICY

## D1. Mandate and goal

## Mandate

10. All United Nations activities in support of national DSR efforts must be based on the request of the national government and/or in response to a Security Council resolution or General Assembly mandate. Without a mandate or request, the United Nations shall not provide DSR support.

## Goal

11. Where mandated or requested, the goal of the United Nations engagement in DSR is to support national efforts to enhance the effectiveness, efficiency, accountability and affordability of the defence sector and its components, in order to contribute to sustainable peace, security, good governance and development for the State and its peoples without discrimination and with full respect for human rights and the rule of law, and in accordance with national and international norms, laws and nation-specific agreements.

## D2. Legal principles

12. Human rights norms and standards governing the actions of all defence personnel (civil and military) are grounded in international law and shall be fully respected and promoted by United Nations staff in all their activities in support of national DSR efforts. These include, inter alia, the right to life, the right to liberty and security of the person, the right to freedom of opinion and expression, the rights to freedom of association and peaceful assembly, the rights of peoples deprived of liberty to be treated humanely, the prohibition against torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, the prohibition of extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions as well as the prohibition of sexual and gender-based violence.
13. Additionally, a number of specific legal instruments, norms and standards, shall be fully respected and promoted by United Nations staff in their support of national DSR efforts. A nonexhaustive list is included in Annex One.

## D3. SSR general and DSR specific principles

## SSR general principles

14. In line with the report of the Secretary-General entitled "Securing peace and development: the role of the United Nations in supporting security sector reform" (A/62/659$\mathrm{S} / 2008 / 39$ ), as well as national approaches and international best practices, the defence sector is considered to be one important subset of the security sector. As such, principles that apply to SSR also apply to DSR. These principles are outlined in the Secretary-General's Report on SSR (see Annex Two) and, in particular, stress that:
14.1. Security sector reform shall be undertaken on the basis of a national decision, a Security Council resolution and/or a General Assembly mandate, the Charter of the United Nations and human rights laws and standards; and
14.2. In order to be successful and sustainable, support in the area of security sector reform must be anchored on national ownership and the commitment of involved States and societies.

## DSR-specific principles

15. There are, however, a number of additional principles on which the United Nations support to national DSR efforts must be based. These are:
15.1. DSR support provided by the United Nations shall consider and be sensitive to existing security and defence institutions, concepts, approaches and cultures.
15.2. DSR support provided by the United Nations shall respect and ensure the commitment of the defence sector and its oversight bodies to national and international norms, laws, and nation-specific agreements.
15.3. DSR support provided by the United Nations, at all stages of the process, shall adhere to the basic principles of transparency, accountability, efficiency, effectiveness, and affordability, while respecting the host-nation's right to confidentiality in certain issues pertaining to national security and defence.
15.4. DSR support provided by the United Nations shall aim to strengthen trust and confidence between the State and people within its jurisdiction, defence sector components and other security sector actors, with a view to enhancing the legitimacy of the defence sector.
15.5. DSR support by United Nations shall be approached comprehensibly, and consider other related reform processes such as those within the security, justice and/or public sectors, including DDR, with the aim of developing a single politicalstrategic vision and programme for reform, on the basis of a thorough understanding and assessment of threats, dominant pressures, and national interests, objectives, values and needs.
15.6. DSR support provided by the United Nations shall include all national stakeholders within the defence sector, including representatives from the government, legislative bodies, defence institutions, other actors from the security and justice sectors, civil society and the media.
15.7. DSR support provided by the United Nations shall focus on the development of sufficient national governance, management, institutional, resource (human, material and financial) and technical capacities and capabilities, in the strategic, operational and tactical dimensions of a national defence sector and its contribution to the overall peacebuilding strategies.
15.8. DSR support provided by the United Nations shall be tailored and defined while appraising many factors, such as: national requests and the will of host-nation authorities; the level, breadth and depth of the reform required; available capacities and resources of both national and other different stakeholders; partnerships and roles at the international, regional and national levels; potential scenarios typical for implementation of DSR; and identification of the appropriate initiation/ start-up point for United Nations DSR support (see also section 20).
15.9. While the United Nations shall not be involved in supporting all types, dimensions and levels of national DSR processes, the United Nations shall facilitate the initiation of DSR at the outset of a peace process and its incorporation into early recovery and development strategies. The United Nations shall also promote the planning of DSR as a long-term endeavour, underscoring the implications for subsequent generations and factors of national power.
15.10. In post conflict settings, DSR is often both a complex political process and a long-term technical endeavour. As such, both dimensions have different momentums within the life of the reforming exercise that shall be carefully considered by the United Nations leadership and/or experts in order to successfully carry out the different support tasks and activities stipulated in the Mission Concept.

## Peace agreements and related arrangements

16. To support more effective implementation of DSR programmes and/or projects where a United Nations role in support of national DSR efforts is envisaged, United Nations personnel, including DSR specialists, should seek to advise the host government and/or be involved in processes leading up to a peace agreement.
17. United Nations personnel involved in peace negotiations or mediation processes should, to the extent possible, promote the inclusion of a number of important elements as part of peace agreements and related arrangements. These are outlined in Annex Three.

## D4. National DSR Implementation and/or Development Plan

18. All activities undertaken by United Nations personnel in support of national DSR efforts shall be guided by a Mission Concept ${ }^{2}$, which shall be derived from a National DSR Implementation Plan or synonymous guiding document. The National DSR Implementation Plan should, ideally, be derived from a recent national security policy/strategy, if it exists, and/or a national strategic defence review and appraisal that will, inter alia, diagnose the condition of the defence sector, as well as any ongoing reform process, and recommend specific programmes for change. If the breadth of the reform requires and if neither a national security strategy nor a strategic defence review and appraisal exist, or have not been revised following a recent period of conflict, the United Nations shall, if requested, support national authorities in preparing both.
19. In general terms, United Nations planners ${ }^{3}$ and implementers should take into consideration that DSR process is an integral part of SSR and would derive from the National Policy Process which would be built by the following steps:
19.1. Appraisal and review of the national situation in political, economic, social and military terms and in close relation to the regional and international contexts;
19.2. Identification of national objectives based on national interests and aspirations.
19.3. National development or reform project;
19.4. Government's Directive that will encompass all the ministries and will allow their planning for the national security policy and/or strategy;
19.5. Development sector (necessary for the security);
19.6. Defence sector (necessary for development);
19.7. Planning Directives of the different sectors (in this case the Defense Sector where the DSR Plan will be implemented);
19.8. Plans, programs and projects (formation, education, training, infrastructure, assets, structural, national disaster response, etc.).
20. Ideally, the national strategic defence review and appraisal should confirm whether the goal is to reconcile, reform, transform, restructure, reengineer, enhance or develop the defence sector, including to what extent the strategic, operational and tactical capabilities and capacities of the host nations' defence institutions are to be modified. In order to ensure consistency in the
[^1]Mission Concept, the United Nations shall consider the following broad types of reforms for its support: structural reforms; functional reforms; physical or infrastructure reforms; asset reforms; defence legislation, policy and doctrinal reforms; and combined reforms (these are detailed in Annex Four).
21. These types of reforms can be supported under the following parameters:
21.1. Partnership and potential cyclical ${ }^{4}$ probabilities in the process of the reform:

- International stakeholders primarily supporting the process while the United Nations performs some specific and discrete tasks - probability: most likely;
- International stakeholders supporting the DSR process alone - probability: likely;
- United Nations primarily supporting the process while international stakeholders perform some specific tasks - probability: unlikely;
- United Nations and international stakeholders supporting the process equally - probability: unlikely; and,
- United Nations supporting the DSR process alone - probability: very unlikely.
21.1.1. Comprehensive DSR processes are generally lengthy with a variety of resources involved. Therefore, the aforementioned partnerships and probabilities shall be taken as a reference for mapping, planning, formulation of the Mission Concept and allocation of adequate resources. Throughout the processes it is likely that the nature of existing partnerships will change, in line with the probabilities discussed above. In line with the probabilities discussed above, it is likely that the nature of existing partnerships will change throughout the processes. For example, during the first cycle of a national reform implementation plan, the United Nations assumes responsibility for facilitating political dialogue among national authorities and civil society (last option of the probabilities listed above refer). Subsequently and during the second cycle, a group of technical experts from the region assist national authorities in appraising and reviewing the defence sector. Finally and as part of the third/final cycle, national authorities, with the assistance of bilateral partners, take up the full responsibility for executing the tasks reflected in the implementation plan.
21.2. Dimensions of support. The United Nations support to national DSR effort can be exercised at the political and/or technical dimensions. Bearing in mind that DSR is very often inherently political, the United Nations responsibility within each dimension may vary from case to case. Additionally, there are a number of factors that will help the leadership of each Mission to define different political and/or technical aspects, such as the relative importance of each dimension at any given point in time, as well as the roles and timing for each or both dimensions in performing the different mandated tasks and activities.
21.3. Supporting by levels. Strategic, operational and/or tactical level support can be provided. These levels of support are horizontally, vertically and transversally interrelated with the types and dimensions of reform discussed above. A multilevel and multidirectional approach is vital for the development of a comprehensive and well synchronized DSR support plan.

[^2]21.4. Duration. The length of the United Nations support will be governed by, among others things, the extent or intention/end state of the reform envisioned by the host nation. The duration, extent and degree of United Nations support may span months to years. These parameters shall be clearly articulated in the Mission Concept and the agreement with the host nation.
21.5. Organizing the human resources. The number and configuration of teams of experts for the support and implementation of DSR plans will be influenced by different factors, especially the extent and duration of the request presented by the host nation. In general, post-conflict scenarios are likely to require human resource-intensive support. Also, the curve of DSR demand may be inversely proportional to the host nation's existing defence capacity. As the reform process moves forward, local capacity and confidence building will likely be reinforced and potentially lead to a diminishing need for external support in terms of human resources. United Nations shall consider that the Organization is neither fully staffed nor configured to provide the entire range of DSR core tasks. Resources managers need to plan the demand for resources in a flexible manner to meet the demand based on the request for the DSR assistance as expressed by the host nation and include them in the Mission Concept. For example, the first months of United Nations support may require only two experts to facilitate national dialogue, while subsequent months may require experts with experience in assessment and reformulation of the roles of national defence institutions.
21.6. Potential scenarios. There are five potential scenarios: defence sector fully in place and organized; defence sector partially dismantled (affected by circumstances such as the withdrawal of some actors from defence institutions, dysfunctional or parallel chains of command, etc); defence sector totally dismantled and only functioning on a sporadic basis; defence sector existing only on paper; and non-existent defence sector.
21.7. Initiation/start-up. Taking into account the potential scenarios, there are four common opportunities for initiating United Nations support activities and tasks: 1) before the initiation of the process; 2) from the starting point of the process; 3) during an ongoing process; or 4 ) at the conclusion of a recent process.
21.8. Interrelations and interdependencies. It is important that the various types of reforms (outlined in paragraph 21) are planned and executed cognisant of their interrelations and interdependencies. Ideally, if there is sufficient time and resources (human and financial), the national strategic defence review and appraisal should be undertaken within a wider national security sector review and appraisal. At a minimum, this should enable an understanding of national interests, objectives, values, threats, dominant pressures and needs, if not already articulated in a national security policy/strategy. If, due to insufficient time and/or resources, a wider security sector review and appraisal is not possible, the strategic defence review and appraisal should at least be conducted in coordination and/or consultation with other security sectorspecific assessments that might be ongoing or in existence.
21.9. Roles. The National DSR Implementation Plan or synonymous guiding document, should articulate the goals, roles, responsibilities and tasks of the national authorities, the United Nations, as well as relevant national and international partners (including donors and implementing actors).
22. The United Nations Mission Concept shall:
22.1. Promote the development of institutional capacity through formation, education, instruction and training programmes.
22.2. Articulate the programmes, projects, timelines and responsibilities of United Nations actors.
22.3. Establish a clear division of roles between national authorities, the United Nations and other international partners at an early stage in the DSR process. Articulating a division of labour at the outset of the DSR planning process shall help ensure coherence, synchronization and avoid duplication of efforts.
22.4. Be thoroughly consulted and communicated to all stakeholders.
22.5. Identify realistic approaches for the:

- Mapping, assessing, joint programmes development processes and monitoring and evaluation phases;
- Mobilisation of financial, human, and/or material resources;
- Identification and engagement of appropriate partners, including the establishment of relationships with a range of external entities such as bilateral and multilateral donors; and
- Development of agreements, coordination mechanisms and related working practices between the national authorities, the United Nations and other international partners.

23. In developing the United Nations Mission Concept, in addition to the aforementioned guiding principles for SSR and DSR, the following shall be considered:
23.1. The national authorities, including officials of the defence sector, must be committed to the process, as well as to agreements with the United Nations; together, they should be accountable, demonstrating results that are independently verifiable and measurable.
23.2. During the national strategic defence review and appraisal and throughout the implementation phase there should be consultation with all stakeholders, including the government, the opposition, civil society, international donors and relevant United Nations personnel.
23.3. It is important to identify potential drivers and spoilers of the reform process, as well as to maintain the momentum of the DSR process. This will require continuous assessment both at Headquarters and in the field. For example, the loss of "political momentum", national and/or regional, may affect the success of the process.
23.4. The United Nations Mission Concept shall encourage national authorities to reach an appropriate balance between effectiveness and efficiency of the defence sector on the one hand and appropriate civilian oversight and management on the other.
23.5. The United Nations Mission Concept shall, as much as possible, promote affordability, including the use of sustainable infrastructure and equipment. Where applicable, the United Nations Mission Concept shall assist national authorities to ensure the effective reintegration of retrenched personnel as well as the disposal of surplus military equipment.
24. The support of the United Nations Mission or field presence to the DSR process shall be aligned with the mandate provided by the Security Council or General Assembly and/or requests received from the host nation. Outputs and outcomes of support for DSR will be set out in the United Nations Mission or Office Concept and/or budget.

## D5. Core Tasks

25. While United Nations principles and regulations could allow a wide range of support activities to be performed by United Nations staff, due to the political and/or technical nature of DSR processes, as well as their complexity, United Nations decision makers outlined in the scope of this policy shall bear in mind the human and financial limitations of the organization when planning DSR support. A very precise national and sector specific resource assessment will be essential in each case to set up the framework for the United Nations support strategy and its linkages with those formulated by other partners. The United Nations Mission Concept shall then be inspired by the general SSR and specific DSR principles (outlined above), the general parameters described in paragraph 20 of this policy and the types of reform explained in Annex Four.
26. Taking into consideration firstly the broad types of reforms described in Annex Four, secondly the limitations of the organization, and thirdly the legal, political, social, economical, cultural, security, and geostrategic and operational factors of the particular context in which reform is taking place, the United Nations support to national DSR processes could mainly include the following core tasks:
26.1. Governance and oversight tasks, including among others: support for the reform/development of the required mechanisms for civilian oversight of the defence sector and rules for measuring the level of accountability of such systems; support for the reform/development of the required mechanisms for civilian management of the defence sector; and, support for the reform/development of the required legislative framework for the defence sector, including issues concerned with the delineation of roles and responsibilities within the security sector and between defence, police and other security and justice actors.
26.2. Defence legislation, norms, doctrine and/or overall reform plan development tasks, including among others: development of a defence policy and/or strategy on the basis of a national security policy and/or strategy; planning for reconciling, reforming, transforming, restructuring, reengineering, enhancing or developing the defence sector (on the basis of the aforementioned defence policy/strategy).
26.3. Administration, budget development and management tasks, including among others: all activities aimed at ensuring the affordability, financial sustainability and transparent administration of the defence sector in line with national defence policies, strategies, priorities, reform plans and initiatives.
26.4. Formation and education tasks, including among others: education and/or awareness-building initiatives within the defence sector, such as the role of the defence institutions within the State; human rights; gender; and international humanitarian law and other bodies of international law.
26.5. Consensus building among national stakeholders and reconciliation tasks, including among others: facilitation of national dialogue/s on DSR. As mandated by the Security Council, a key task of the United Nations is to build consensus among national authorities and civil society with support from external partners. Without this supportive environment, there will be insufficient unity of effort and purpose, and reforms are
unlikely to be widely supported by the population. This shall, in turn, impact on the legitimacy of defence sector actors themselves in the eyes of those they exist to serve and protect.
26.6. Defence sector review, appraisal and coordination tasks, including among others: defence sector evaluation and determinations of potential defence arrangements, synchronization and harmonization of international support and resource mobilisation, for implementation of the aforementioned defence reform plan; provision of programming tools and monitoring and evaluation of the reform programmes, processes and initiatives.
27. Within these core tasks, planners and implementers may play a range of roles, which could include: technical assistance; strategic advice; facilitation; liaison; monitoring and evaluation; oversight; supervision; mobilization of resources; capacity and relationship-building; formation, education, instruction and training; temporary administration ${ }^{5}$; managing; ${ }^{6}$ and directing ${ }^{7}$.
28. United Nations planners and implementers shall use the following generic phases to guide the provision of specific DSR support:

| Phase one: | Early negotiation, peace agreements and arrangement processes |
| :--- | :--- |
| Phase two: | Request of the national government and/or in response to a <br> Security Council resolution or General Assembly mandate <br> Strategic assessment/ defence sector analysis <br> (which can vary according to the type of DSR envisaged) |
| Phase three: | Resource mobilization |
| Phase four: | Foundation and operational planning <br> (pre-mandate and pre deployment) |
| Phase six: | Implementation planning (deployment). <br> This could involve among others, the development of DSR <br> functional strategies and plans (programmes and projects <br> including establishment of benchmarks for exit strategy) |
| Phase seven: | Implementation |
| Phase eight: | Follow-up, including through monitoring and evaluation |
| Phase nine: | Transition (hand over), withdrawal and liquidation of the UN DSR <br> support |

29. Through the aforementioned phases, political will shall be fostered and maintained to ensure the success of the tasks undertaken by the United Nations and partners.

[^3]30. Depending on the availability of national and international DSR expertise and resources, as well as the political and or technical timeframe for reform, the core tasks might be conducted sequentially by phases or concurrently when the situation warrants. Maintaining political momentum should be balanced with the need to be thorough in the completion of each core task.
31. The United Nations neither has the capacity to support all types of DSR nor all national requirements. However, the United Nations has extensive and diverse expertise, capacity and experience that can be used to support the development and implementation of specific elements of a consolidated DSR programme. In addition, the impartiality and legitimacy of the United Nations may help to establish the necessary trust and confidence with national authorities required for successful DSR processes.
32. Where a Mission has been granted an executive role to assume functions that are usually the prerogative of the State and is leading a transitional administration, and while the Mission in such a capacity may be required to lead the DSR process from the outset, the Mission shall aim to develop the DSR capacities of national stakeholders in order for them to assume responsibility for core tasks as soon as possible.

## D6. Provisions for United Nations support to national DSR efforts

33. The United Nations shall avoid supporting initiatives aimed at improving the effectiveness and efficiency of the defence sector in the absence of, or in isolation of, initiatives aimed at developing civilian oversight, accountability and management of the defence sector.
34. United Nations support to national DSR process shall not include activities compromising the sovereignty and territorial integrity of other states, or the human rights of the people, or activities contributing - openly or covertly - to internal conflicts in the host nation.
35. The United Nations shall focus on basic training. The Organization shall neither provide advanced field training to enhance a country's capacity and/or capability to wage war nor any type of support in terms of inter alia, resources and/or knowledge, towards this end. Operational training aimed at developing, directly, capacities for the enhancement of military capabilties shall be reserved for bilateral partners.
36. In exceptional cases when there is an arrangement between the host country and the United Nations, the Organization working within its own capacity and/or through Members States and associated Peacekeeping Training Institutions (PKTI), could support other types of formation, education and/or basic operational and tactical instruction or training programmes ${ }^{8}$. In such circumstances, such support will be guided by relevant human rights diligence policies.
37. In line with the DPKO/DFS Policy on support to Military and Police Predeployment Training for UN Peacekeeping Operations, the Security Sector Reform Unit (SSRU) with Integrated Training Service within the Policy, Evaluation and Training Division in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (ITS/DPET/DPKO) and Office of Military Affairs (OMA) shall consider assisting Member States and associated peacekeeping training institutions (PKTI) and/or Integrated Mission Training Centre (IMTC) in the design of mission-specific Pre Deployment Training (PDT), 'induction training' and 'ongoing training'.
38. Upon request from the host country, Members States and associated PKTI with official UN Training Recognition could also support the DSR process with adequate peacekeeping training team $/ \mathrm{s}$ or detachment/s with the objective of forming, educating, instructing, and/or

[^4]training on specific programmes. The details for official UN Training Recognition are outlined In the DPKO/DFS Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) on training recognition.
39. Moreover, the United Nations shall provide neither military armaments nor specific military equipment to national defence institutions. All UN engagement in supporting "assets reforms" (see Annex Four) should also be accompanied by a risk management folder.
40. Funding is generally not provided by United Nations budgets for the operation of national defence institutions including, for example, national staff salaries, vehicles, communication and security equipment for use by national staff.

## D7. Resources

## Personnel

41. United Nations support to national DSR efforts must include the deployment of highly qualified personnel, at United Nations Headquarters and in the field, who have sound technical knowledge and skills in the area of DSR and, specifically, in the aforementioned areas of United Nations support to national DSR efforts. These personnel must have the ability to apply these skills, knowledge and the principles for DSR and SSR in a culturally sensitive manner, while demonstrating a commitment to and capacity for facilitating and supporting appropriate nationally owned solutions. It is vital that these personnel have a thorough understanding of the local context in which they are working.
42. DSR personnel shall be provided through direct appointment under United Nations Staff Rules and Regulations, on secondment from government service, as independent consultants from SSR/DSR rosters or engaged through the United Nations Volunteer (UNV) programme.
43. For peacekeeping operations and special political missions, personnel costs are provided from the assessed budget, in line with staffing tables approved by Member States, as well as from extra-budgetary resources.

## Funding

44. While the ownership and responsibility for DSR lies solely with the State, many "fragile" or post-conflict States may be unable to generate adequate funds for reforms. In order to ensure long-term sustainability, national leaders, United Nations and other stakeholders must ensure that reforms are properly funded on the basis of Security Council resolutions and General Assembly mandates and the needs of the national authorities of Member States.
45. Funding sources for DSR may normally include: national governments, national donors and agencies, regional agreements and organizations, United Nations actors and other international stakeholders.
46. For United Nations peacekeeping operations and Special Political Missions, funding for support of national DSR efforts shall come from Member State assessed contributions and extrabudgetary resources ${ }^{9}$. These funds include Mission-managed resources (for example from bilateral donors and multilateral donors); joint programmes with funds managed by United Nations and other partners (for example United Nations peacebuilding funds, World Bank state and peacebuilding funds); programmes coordinated and managed by key partners; and other sources.

[^5]47. United Nations missions mandated to support national DSR efforts can take steps to establish a voluntary trust fund so that voluntary funds can be received from donors to support national DSR priorities, in so far as these priorities are consistent with this policy. In such a scenario, it is necessary to develop specific terms of reference and seek the Controller's prior approval before circulating funding appeals to donors. For other United Nations actors, donor funds can be received through programme/project funding mechanisms, in line with the established rules and procedures of the respective United Nations entity. In some cases, existing United Nations mechanisms, such as the Peacebuilding Fund, may be an appropriate source for extra-budgetary support of national DSR efforts.
48. A major role of United Nations DSR personnel is to encourage, and in some cases coordinate or synchronize, the engagement and financial support of donors in line with nationallydefined priorities for DSR, in support of and in close coordination with the national government or transitional authority.
49. As early as possible, the lead United Nations actor in the field should offer its support to the government in coordinating requests for assistance, on the basis, where possible, of a nationally-owned and prioritised strategic plan, within the United Nations and with donors who are active in and/or interested in supporting DSR. This support can contribute to building the capacity of the host nation in effective coordination and resource mobilization for DSR, which should be the goal.
50. As the United Nations Headquarters enhances its DSR support capacity, efforts shall be made to encourage Member State support of national DSR efforts, in line with this policy. Moreover, Headquarters-based funding mechanisms shall be considered to enable the United Nations to carry out its tasks in this area.

## D8. Relationships and linkages

51. The recognition of the inter-related and interdependent nature of security sector components is critical to successful DSR. As such, United Nations DSR personnel shall establish effective relationships with national stakeholders, including all security sector actors (in particular those within the defence, police or law enforcement and justice sectors), relevant United Nations actors, as well as international, regional and national human rights bodies in order to ensure:
51.1. Compliance with applicable human rights standards;
51.2. Support to the development of independent national monitoring capacity, accountability mechanisms and education of defence sector civil and military personnel in the interpretation and application of international standards in cooperation with the wider United Nations system, and other international and regional partners.
52. DSR planner and implementers shall also take into account other broader post conflict processes such as community based public safety approaches (police), DDR, transitional justice, reconciliation, political processes, for instance constitutional reforms, national elections, etc.

## D9. Lead within the United Nations system

53. In line with the Secretary-General's Policy Committee Decision 2007/11 of 21 February 2007, DPKO shall be the lead entity within the United Nations system for supporting national DSR activities, and for coordinating the support of other United Nations actors ${ }^{10}$. In close coordination with the OMA and other actors such as ITS/DPET, and in regular consultation with relevant
[^6]Integrated Operational Teams (IOTs), the SSRU within the Office of the Rule of Law and Security Institutions (OROLSI) shall lead in developing the necessary normative framework for United Nations support in this area. With the support of and in coordination with the SSRU, OMA shall develop and provide a dedicated backstopping capacity for existing Missions engaged in supporting national DSR efforts. The SSRU, together with OMA, shall be responsible for evaluating the effectiveness of this capacity after an initial period of one year and every two years thereafter.
54. Working with the national authorities, the Head of the respective field Mission, with assistance from his/her deputy, the Head of the SSR component (or, in their absence, the lead DSR expert) and, if applicable, the Force Commander, shall be responsible for overseeing and leading support to national DSR efforts, through an appropriate implementation strategy, in consultation with all relevant United Nations headquarters (first and foremost, both OMA and the SSRU), field Mission components, and relevant national and international partners including bilateral donors and implementers.
55. Heads of SSR components or, in their absence, the lead DSR expert, shall be responsible for ensuring regular, timely and accurate reporting on DSR plans, programmes/projects, issues, challenges, lessons learned and best practices, through their respective chains of command, to both DPKO and DPA Headquarters. DPKO shall be responsible for keeping the IASSRTF informed of developments in Missions, as well as for sharing lessons learned and best practices.
56. Heads of human rights components in the field shall lead the relevant field Mission's efforts aimed at strengthening independent human rights monitoring capacity, accountability of defence sector institutions as well as transitional justice including vetting processes in the context of conflict and post-conflict situations.

## D10. Resource implications arising from this policy

57. Where the United Nations is mandated and/or requested to undertake DSR support, the establishment of appropriate SSR field capacities, in which DSR capacities shall be located, is required.
58. As noted above, a dedicated backstopping capacity for existing Missions engaged in supporting national DSR efforts is required at United Nations Headquarters. This capacity shall be located within OMA, and shall be supported by and work in close coordination with the SSRU, members of the IASSRTF and other relevant United Nations actors. Current SSRU capacity to lead in the development of the necessary normative framework for United Nations DSR support, as well as its broad coordination responsibilities, shall be maintained.

## E. TERMS and DEFINITIONS

59. The following definitions shall apply to this policy and subsidiary guidance:
59.1. Security sector - is a broad term often used to describe the structures, institutions and personnel responsible for the management, provision and oversight of security in a nation. It is generally accepted that the security sector includes defence, law enforcement, corrections, intelligence services and institutions responsible for border control and management, immigration services, customs and civil emergencies. Elements of the judicial sector and prosecution services responsible for the adjudication of cases of alleged criminal conduct and misuse of force are, in many instances, also included. Furthermore, the security sector includes actors that play a
role in managing and overseeing the design and implementation of security, such as ministries, legislative bodies and civil society groups. Other non-State actors that could be considered part of the security sector include customary or informal authorities and private security services ${ }^{11}$.
59.2. Security sector reform - describes a process of assessment, review and implementation as well as monitoring and evaluation led by national authorities that has as its goal the enhancement of effective and accountable security for the State and its peoples without discrimination and with full respect for human rights and the rule of law ${ }^{12}$.
59.3. Defence sector - refers to the civil-military structures, and personnel responsible for the protection of the sovereignty of a State and its peoples while meeting the State's obligations to contribute to international peace and security. The defence sector also includes those actors responsible for governance, oversight, management, and the command and control of defence, including legislative bodies, ministries, education and research centres and civil society groups.

Note: The following are generally recognized as constituting a State's defence institutions or components: Defence and Security councils with representation of the defence sector, committees and/or commissions (at parliamentary and/or executive levels), Ministry of Defence or similar body (including subordinated, subsidiary and/or supporting services), military branches, defence education, instruction and training centres, centres of research, technology and development (even with shared responsibilities with national education system), national intelligence services with defence representation, border management bodies with defence or military status, private military industries, etc. However, there are variations as to the heading, titles, and composition of the defence architecture depending on the nation.
59.4. Defence sector reform - describes a nationally-owned process intended to reconcile, reform, transform, restructure, reengineers, enhance or develop an effective, efficient, accountable and affordable defence sector which operates without discrimination, with full respect of human rights and, under extraordinary and constitutionally defined circumstances, in support of the establishment, maintenance and upholding of law and order. In some specific cases, the reform process may include the assessment of the role of the private defence-related organizations and regularization of non-statutory forces ${ }^{13}$.
59.5. Rule of law - a principle of governance in which all persons, institutions and entities, public and private, including the State itself, are accountable to laws that are publicly promulgated, equally enforced and independently adjudicated, and which are consistent with international human rights norms and standards. It requires, as well, measures to ensure adherence to the principles of supremacy of law, equality before the law, accountability to the law, fairness in the application of the law, separation of powers, participation in decision-making, legal certainty, avoidance of arbitrariness and procedural and legal transparency ${ }^{14}$.

[^7]
## F. REFERENCES

- Universal Declaration of Human Rights. United Nations 1948;
- International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. United Nations 1976;
- Statement by the President of the Security Council. S/PRST/2008/14. 12 May 2008;
- Statement by the President of the Security Council. S/PRST/2007/3. 21 February 2007;
- General Assembly Resolution: Comprehensive report on strengthening the capacity of the UN to manage and sustain operations. A/RES/61/279. 1 August 2007;
- Report of the Secretary-General: Securing Peace and development: the role of the United Nations in supporting security sector reform. A/62/659 - S/2008/39. 23 January 2008;
- United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines. 18 January 2008;
- United Nations Policy on Support to Military and Police Predeployment Training for UN Peacekeeping Operations. 1 October 2009.
- Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards (IDDRS), Module 6.10: DDR and Security Sector Reform. 14 December 2009.


## G. MONITORING AND COMPLIANCE

60. All United Nations actors providing support to national DSR efforts must comply with this policy. The Chief of the SSR Unit, in OROLSI, DPKO, in coordination with DPKO's Military Adviser, Head of Missions, Field Offices, or their delegates, and the Heads of SSR components in the field shall monitor and evaluate compliance with this policy.

## H. CONTACT

61. SSR Programme Officer (Defence Sector Reform), SSRU, OROLSI, DPKO, New York.

## H. HISTORY

62. This is the first issue of this policy and it has not been amended.


DATE OFAPPROVAL: 2 Augnst 20 M

## ANNEXES

## Annex One

## Specific legal instruments, principles, norms and standards to be respected and promoted by United Nations staff in support of national Defence Sector Reform efforts

| UN Charter | The Charter of the United Nations (in particular Chapter VI Articles 33 to 38 and VII Articles 39 to 51). Signed 26 June 1945 and amendments. Adopted on 24 October 1945. |
| :---: | :---: |
| UDHR | Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Adopted and proclaimed by General Assembly resolution 217 A (III) of 10 December 1948. |
| ICCPR | International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 16 December 1966; treaty in force since 23 March 1976. |
| ICESCR | International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. Adopted and opened for signature, ratification and accession by General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 1966 entry into force 3 January 1976, in accordance with article 27. |
| ICERD | International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. Adopted and opened for signature and ratification by General Assembly Resolution 2106 (XX) of 21 December 1965 entry into force 4 January 1969, in accordance with Article 19. |
| CAT | Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. Adopted by the General Assembly on 10 December 1984. Treaty in force since 26 June 1987. |
| CEDAW | Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women. Adopted and opened for signature, ratification and accession by General Assembly resolution 34/180 of 18 December 1979 entry into force 3 September 1981, in accordance with article 27(1). |
| OP-CRC-AC | Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the involvement of children in armed conflict. Adopted and opened for signature, ratification and accession by General Assembly resolution A/RES/54/263 of 25 May 2000. Entered into force on 12 February 2002. |
| Disappearance Convention | International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance. Adopted by the General Assembly on 20 December 2006. |


| Geneva Conventions | Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field; <br> Convention (II) for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea; <br> Convention (III) relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War. Geneva, 12 August 1949; <br> Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, and Protocols I and II]. |
| :---: | :---: |
| Genocide Convention | Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. Approved and proposed for signature and ratification or accession by General Assembly resolution 260 A (III) of 9 December 1948 entry into force 12 January 1951, in accordance with article XIII. |
| Ottawa Convention | Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction. Adopted in Oslo on 18 September 1997. Entered into force on 1 March 1999 following the 40th ratification. |
| Chemical Weapons Convention | Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction. Adopted and opened for signature for signature on 13 January 1993. Entered into Force on 29 April 1997. |
| Certain <br> Conventional <br> Weapons Convention | Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons which may be deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to have Indiscriminate Effects. Geneva, 10 October 1980 and amendment to article 1, 21 December 2001. |
| CPPNM | Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. Adopted on 26 October 1979 in Vienna, Austria. Entered into force on 8 February 1987. |
| Terrorism related treaties | United Nations Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed On Board Aircraft, 1963. |
|  | United Nations Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, 1970. |
|  | United Nations Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation, 1971. |
|  | United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents, 1973. |
|  | United Nations International Convention against the Taking of Hostages, 1979. |
|  | United Nations Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, 1980. |
|  | United Nations Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, 2005. |

United Nations International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, 2005.

United Nations Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, 1988.

United Nations Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detection, 1991.

United Nations International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, 1997.

United Nations International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, 1999.

United Nations Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International Civil Aviation, 1988.

United Nations Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf, 1988.

United Nations Protocol of 2005 to the Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf, 2005.

United Nations Protocol of 2005 to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, 2005.

S/RES/1888 (2009)

S/RES/1820 (2008)

S/RES/1325 (2000)

S/RES/1612 (2005)

S/RES/1624
(2005)

S/RES/1373 (2001)

United Nations Security Council Resolution 1888 of 30 September 2009. "Sexual violence in situations of armed conflict in particular against women and children".

United Nations Security Council Resolution 1820 of 19 June 2008. "Women and peace, and security".

United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 of 31 October 2000. "On women, peace, and security".

United Nations Security Council Resolution 1612 of 26 July 2005. "Protection of children affected by armed conflict".

United Nations Security Council Resolution 1624 of 14 September 2005. "Threats to international peace and security".

United Nations Security Council Resolution 1373 of 28 September 2001. "Threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts".

Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners. Adopted by the First United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, held at Geneva in 1955, and approved by the Economic and Social Council by its resolutions 663 C (XXIV) of 31 July 1957 and 2076 (LXII) of 13 May 1977.

| Declarations | Declaration on the Protection of Women and Children in Emergency and Armed Conflict. Proclaimed by General Assembly Resolution 3318 (XXIX) of 14 December 1974. |
| :---: | :---: |
|  | Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance. Adopted by the General Assembly on 18 December 1992. |
|  | Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women. Adopted by General Assembly Resolution 48/104 of 20 December 1993. |
| Principles | Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement (contained in the annex of document E/CN.4/1998/53/Add.2). Adopted on 11 February 1998. |
|  | Principles and Guidelines on Children Associated with Armed Forces or Armed Groups. "Paris Principles". February 2007. |
|  | Principles on the Effective Investigation and Documentation of Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (recommended by the General Assembly Resolution of 4 December 2000). |
|  | Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials. Adopted by the Eighth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, Havana, Cuba, 27 August to 7 September 1990. |
|  | Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons Under any form of detention or imprisonment. Adopted by the General Assembly on 9 December 1988. |
|  | Basic Principles for the Treatment of Prisoners. Adopted by the General Assembly, 14 December 1990. |
| A/RES/60/288 | Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy. <br> Adopted by General Assembly Resolution of 20 September 2006. |
| A/RES/55/33 | General and Complete Disarmament. Q. "Illicit Traffic in Small Arms and Light Weapons" <br> Adopted on 20 November 2000. |
| A/RES/51/59 | Annex: "International Code of Conduct for Public Officials" Adopted by General Assembly Resolution of 12 December 1996. |
| A/RES/44/25 | Convention on the Rights of the Child and Optional Protocol. Adopted by General Assembly Resolution of 20 November 1989. |

## Annex Two <br> Basic United Nations principles for Security Sector Reform ${ }^{15}$

1. The goal of the United Nations in security sector reform is to support States and societies in developing effective, inclusive and accountable security institutions so as to contribute to international peace and security, sustainable development and the enjoyment of human rights by all;
2. Security sector reform should be undertaken on the basis of a national decision, a Security Council resolution and/or a General Assembly mandate, the Charter of the United Nations and human rights laws and standards;
3. In order to be successful and sustainable, support in the area of security sector reform must be anchored on national ownership and the commitment of involved States and societies;
4. A United Nations approach to security sector reform must be flexible and tailored to the country, region and/or specific environment in which reform is taking place, as well as to the different needs of all stakeholders;
5. A United Nations approach to security sector reform must be gender sensitive throughout its planning, design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation phases. It must also include the reform of recruitment processes and improvement in the delivery of security services to address and prevent sexual and gender-based violence;
6. A security sector reform framework is essential in the planning and implementation of postconflict activities. Ideally, security sector reform should begin at the outset of a peace process and should be incorporated into early recovery and development strategies;
7. A clearly defined strategy, including the identification of priorities, indicative timelines and partnerships, is required for the implementation of a security sector reform process;
8. The effectiveness of international support for security sector reform shall be shaped by the integrity of motive, the level of accountability and the amount of resources provided;
9. Coordination of national and international partners' efforts is essential. Lead national entities and a designated international counterpart should be identified wherever possible;
10. Monitoring and regular evaluation against established principles and specific benchmarks.
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## Annex Three <br> Important Defence Sector Reform considerations to be promoted as part of peace agreements and related arrangements

1. A commitment from the parties to undertake DSR in a strategic and transparent manner in accordance with national legislation and international norms and standards;
2. A commitment for the census and identification of all defence sector personnel and the vetting of such personnel (civilian and military) for past human rights violations with the support of the international community and by engaging civil society;
3. A commitment to the establishment in the Constitution or national legal framework of civilian oversight of the defence sector and its institutions;
4. A commitment to respect international norms and standards and protect human dignity, maintain and uphold the human rights of all persons, and respect the independence of the judiciary;
5. A commitment for meaningful gender and minority representation in the defence sector and its institutions;
6. A commitment to the establishment of national human rights monitoring and education mechanisms for the defence sector, its institutions and personnel;
7. A commitment to undertake an assessment of national needs and subsequent reforms without imposing details in relation to the size and the structure of defence sector institutions that may have to be renegotiated later;
8. An acknowledgement and mention that the reform of the defence sector must take place as part of a broader security sector reform process and, therefore, in an integrated manner with the reform of justice and other security providers, in particular the national internal security sector. There should also be linkages with demobilization, disarmament and reintegration programmes;
9. A commitment to help depoliticize reform efforts, there should be a recommendation for the establishment of a specific commission for DSR made up of professionals, technocrats in the domain, as well as representatives of civil society; and
10. A commitment from all parties to support national DSR efforts in a way that it contribute to an early draw down of UN peacekeeping assets.

# Annex Four <br> Broad types of reforms that could be supported by the United Nations in accordance with Security Council resolutions or General Assembly mandates 

1. Structural reforms. This type of reform aims to modify the existing structure of any defence sector institutions or components, including reshaping, resizing and/or hybridizing. For example: downsizing/upsizing of the armed forces; transforming an existing defence sector actor into another; creating or restructuring a parliamentary committee on defence; changing the jurisdiction of military justice systems vis-à-vis civilian justice systems to reflect international human rights norms and standards;
2. Functional and/or human capacity reforms. This type of reform aims to modify (including creating and removing) the functionality of existing structures within the defence sector. This type of reform is sometimes associated with activities related to institution or capacity building. For example: developing the functionalities of a newly established the military chain of command (structural) to ensure appropriate internal oversight and management; developing appropriate civilian oversight capacities for the defence sector at ministerial and/or parliamentary level; ensuring that military detention functions operate in accordance with international human rights norms and standards;
3. Physical or infrastructure reforms. This type of reform aims to change the physical nature and/or geographical deployment of defence sector infrastructure. Many physical reforms are a consequence of structural reforms. For example: creating a new naval base to control drug trafficking; renovating existing military premises, including barracks.
4. Asset reforms. This type of reform aims to acquire, distribute, and/or dispose of assets within the defence sector, such as equipment, weaponry and vehicles, including the development or enhancement of new research and technology. For example: procuring the necessary equipment and office material for a newly established Ministry of Defence; disposing of weaponry as a result of a DDR programme.
5. Legislation, policy and doctrinal reforms. This type of reform aims to create, reformulate and/or update defence legislation, codes, norms, policies, strategies, regulations, doctrine and/or standards. For example: updating existing legislation on the basis of new international human rights norms and standards; developing a new Statute or Law for the Administration and Regulation for the Ministry of Defence; developing a policy intended to increase the representation of women in the defence sector.
6. Combined reforms. This type of reform aims to develop a more efficient, effective, affordable and accountable defence sector by combining two or more of the aforementioned types of reforms. For example: the creation of a new quick reaction brigade may require the definition of an envisioned structure, redistribution/acquisition of assets (structural plus functional plus asset reform) and very likely a modification of the Defence Organic or Statutory Law for the Army (i.e. legislative reform).

[^0]:    ${ }^{1}$ S/RES/1509 (2003) (UNMIL), S/RES/1704 (2006) (UNMIT), S/RES/1719 (2006) (BINUB), S/RES/1756 (2007) (MONUC), S/RES/1739 (2007) (UNOCI).

[^1]:    ${ }^{2}$ IMPP Guidelines. Role of the Field. Integrated Planning for UN Field Presences. United Nations. January 2010.
    ${ }^{3}$ Key planners are part of the Integrated Mission Task Force/Integrated Task Force (e.g. representatives from SSRU, OMA, OITs, other OROLSI components, ITS, Mission and UNCT staff with direct responsibilities over DSR programmes, etc). ${ }^{3}$ IMPP Guidelines. Role of the Field. Integrated Planning for UN Field Presences. United Nations. January 2010.

[^2]:    ${ }^{4}$ It is probably that for example within a period of defence sector reform planned for five years, various types of partnerships coexist or perhaps that one of them occurs immediately after the other. Based on that scenario, it could be found that during the first year a defence legislative reform is mostly supported by the United Nations and thereafter bilateral donors undertake the responsibility for supporting largely the development of specific functions within the sector.

[^3]:    ${ }^{5}$ UN DPKO, 18 January 2008. "United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and guidelines". Page 22, Para 2.3. "In exceptional circumstances, the Security Council has also authorized multi-dimensional UN peacekeeping operations to temporarily assume the legislative and administrate functions of the State, in order to support the transfer of authority from one sovereign entity to another, or until sovereignty questions are fully resolved (as in the case of transitional administrations), or to help the State to establish administrative structures that may not have existed previously".
    ${ }_{7}^{6}$ Ibid.
    ${ }^{7}$ Ibid.

[^4]:    ${ }^{8}$ E.g. UN pre-deployment training course, Specialized Training Modules,

[^5]:    ${ }^{9}$ UN DPKO, October 2008. Peacekeeping practice notes. Supporting Programmes with Extra-budgetary Resources: Options for UN Peace Operations.

[^6]:    ${ }^{10}$ The designation of a lead support entity for a specific sector/activity does not imply exclusive responsibility; but identifies, in accordance with entities' mandates, the roles and capacities for which the lead entity will be expected to perform and make available to the UN system, as required.

[^7]:    ${ }^{11}$ Report of the Secretary-General on SSR, entitled "Securing Peace and Development: The Role of the United Nations in Supporting Security Sector Reform", dated 23 January 2008 (A/62/659-S/2008/39), Para. 14.
    ${ }^{12}$ lbid. Para 17.
    ${ }^{13}$ Non-statutory forces usually include irregular and often illegally established security and defence bodies, sometimes internally legitimized, exercising defence activities in a particular region or area. Non-statutory forces are normally associated to non-state forces and comprise: defence forces or structures, militias, local security or defence forces of political parties, liberation armies (national and transnational), self-defence bodies or groups, and bodyguards. In special circumstances, these forces are state-supported and -funded. They may enjoy certain benefits derived from other states.
    ${ }^{14}$ Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council on "The rule of law and transitional justice in conflict and postconflict societies", dated 23 August 2004 (S/2004/616).

[^8]:    ${ }^{15}$ As outlined in the Report of the Secretary-General on SSR, entitled "Securing peace and development: the role of the United Nations in supporting security sector reform", 23 January 2008, A/62/659-S/2008/39.

