Study Report

Military Capacity-Building Support to Troop-Contributing Countries - Ascertaining its Effectiveness & Seizing New Opportunities

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The views expressed in this study do not necessarily reflect those of the United Nations.

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Adrian Foster retired from the British Army in 2018 as a Major General with just under forty years of military service. During that time, he served on many overseas assignments as well as filling a number of senior positions at home in both the Ministry of Defence (MOD) and the Field Army. In the MOD he was the military assistant to the Minister of the Armed Forces.

On operations he commanded his regiment (26 Regiment Royal Artillery) in Bosnia and Herzegovina (SFOR), being awarded a Queen's Commendation for Valuable Service (QCVS). When becoming a brigadier, he was assigned to the UN Peacekeeping Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) as military chief of staff, and subsequently was an adviser to the UN mission's leadership in Liberia. His next assignment in Africa was in the rank of Major General, as Deputy Force Commander of the UN's then largest peacekeeping mission, operating in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. He spent four years there, eventually becoming the Acting Force Commander of the 18,000 multinational military peacekeepers. He was conferred the award of CMG by HM Queen Elizabeth II at the completion of his time in the DRC, and subsequently moved across to the UN Headquarters in New York for four years as the Deputy Military Adviser for all UN peacekeeping missions around the globe.

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Introduction

1.   In late 2022 an independent study was commissioned by the Light Coordination Mechanism (LCM) in the United Nations (UN) Department of Peace Operations (DPO) to review the subject of how Member States monitor and evaluate military capacity-building support[1] provided to troop-contributing countries (TCCs) within the framework of UN peace operations. The primary objective of this study was to identify best practices in monitoring and evaluating the efficacy of military peacekeeping capacity-building activities. The impetus of this study originated from queries made by Member States seeking guidance on how to evaluate the performance and identify best practices for military capacity-building assistance programs in the context of UN peace operations and in alignment with the Action for Peacekeeping initiative. The study was primarily to be Member State facing, incorporating the perspectives of both the providers and recipients of capacity-building assistance. The scope of the study was subsequently broadened to encompass some of the future key strategic challenges and opportunities for enhancing the effectiveness of capacity-building efforts within the framework of UN peace operations.

2.   This report is a summary of the outcomes derived from the study. Part One provides illustrations of Member States' activities across the whole spectrum of capacity-building support to TCCs. Within the section entitled 'Evidence-Based Capacity-Building', the report then delves into the methodologies employed to assess and appraise such interventions. For the purposes of the study, the following definitions were used:

- Monitoring[2]: "…*a continuing function that aims primarily to provide the management and main stakeholders of an ongoing intervention with early indications of progress, or lack thereof, in the achievement of results*".
- Evaluation: "…*a selective exercise that attempts to systematically and objectively assess progress towards, and the achievement of an outcome*".

3.   The report then proceeds to address the inherent challenges associated with the collection of timely and accurate performance data and with the evaluation of the impact of managed interventions. It then transitions to the dissemination of knowledge and lessons learned gained from these experiences. The report redirects its focus towards a more strategic perspective in Part Three, wherein it examines some of the principal challenges and opportunities for the future of capacity-building by Member States. Finally, the report lists a series of recommendations emanating from the study.

4.   As part of the fact-finding aspect of the study, extensive consultations were undertaken with subject matter experts from Member States, the UN, training providers

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[1] There is no universal, official definition of capacity-building within the UN. However, for the purposes of this study the UNDP's definition has been used: "The process of developing and strengthening the skills, instincts, abilities, processes and resources that organizations and communities need to survive, adapt and thrive in a fast-changing world." (In this particular case 'organizations and communities' has been taken to mean the TCCs and the context is the UN peacekeeping environment) – See: https://www.un.org/en/academic-impact/capacity-building.
[2] See: http://web.undp.org/evaluation/documents/handbook/me-handbook.pdf.

and academia. This multifaceted approach included around 40 key informant interviews (KIIs) along with two workshops. Moreover, two surveys were conducted: one targeting Member States (both the providers and recipients of military capacity-building support),[3] and the other focusing on peacekeeping training centers. A comprehensive literature search was also carried out, examining a wide range of publications by Member States, the UN[4] and academia.[5]

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[3] See also annex.
[4] e.g. UN SOPs, UN Peacekeeping Resource Hub, UN Deployment Review Digital Toolkit, the Comprehensive Planning and Performance Assessment System (CPAS), the UN's 'Action for Peacekeeping+'; DPO's Peacekeeping Capability Readiness System (PCRS), UN Specialized Training Materials (STMs), DPO's 'A Practical Guide to Peacekeeping Training Evaluation'.
[5] e.g. The Kirkpatrick Model (2014); The Value of Learning: How Organizations Capture Value and ROI

and Translate them into Support, Improvement and Funds (Phillips, 2007); Design, Monitoring and Evaluation Programming in Fragile Environments (USIP); Impact-Driven Peacekeeping Partnerships for Capacity-Building and Training (Boutellis, IPI, 2020); NGO Capacity-Building: The Challenge of Impact Assessment (Hailey & James, INTRAC, 2003); Monitoring and Evaluating Capacity-Building: Is it Really that Difficult? (Simister & Smith, INTRAC, 2010).

Part One

A Wide Spectrum of Military Capacity-Building Activities within the Framework of UN Peace Operations

5. The capacity-building process comprises a series of stages, depicted in the diagram at Fig 1. They tend to be sequential although there is a degree of overlap between neighboring elements. Optimally, a further stage is added to the end of the process after evaluation with the inclusion of a lessons learned analysis. This then feeds into subsequent iterations as part of a closed-loop process.

6. Member States have at their disposal a diverse array of options for building operational capacity – both theirs and partners. These approaches range from training, mentoring and advisory services to the provision of equipment, infrastructure, logistics and financial resources. However, the prevalence of these methods varies considerably. Amongst these, training and technical support[6] are the most common

activities according to Member States' responses to the survey conducted as part of this study (95% of providers and all recipients engage in training activities, 80% of providers and 69% of recipients engage in technical support). At the other end of the scale, the loan or sale of equipment is undertaken by the least number of responders (reported by only 11% of providers for each of loan and sale) – though donation/gift of equipment is more common (39% of providers).[7]

7. The primary factors motivating Member States to focus on training support likely include the relatively lower costs and the easier access to the necessary resources (e.g. trainers). Conceivably though, another reason might be a lack of awareness of other options and opportunities. The table at Fig 2, compiled from various sources, illustrates the wide-ranging possibilities within this domain. Most are equally applicable to 'green' and 'blue' training,[8] recognizing that preparation of military peacekeepers requires attention to both. Should the contents prompt an interest, capacity-building providers and recipients could discuss their ideas with UN staff in the Strategic Force Generation and Capability Planning Cell (SFGC), Integrated Training Service (ITS), the LCM and the Triangular Partnership Program (TPP).

Fig 1: Stages of the capacity-building process.

| Consideration | Preparation | Capacity-Building Activity | Operational Implementation | Evaluation |

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[6] In the survey conducted as part of this study, "technical support" includes knowledge management, mentoring, advise and assist, and other. See also annex for more detail.

[7] See annex for more detail.

[8] 'Green training' is a term commonly used to refer to the military's basic and core skills training, whilst 'Blue training' refers to the peacekeeping component.

Type of capacity-building support (provided to/by one or more Member States)	Illustrations
Training and technical support	- In-person classroom and/or field tuition (ranging from unit pre-deployment training modules (PDT) to senior leadership courses). - 'Blended learning' through a combination of in-person and online lessons. - 'Distance learning' via access to online training material and/or instructors. - In-mission training, advice, mentoring (e.g. Mobile Training Teams (MTT)). - Online/in-person seminars, workshops, webinars, podcasts. - Exchange programs for trainers and students. - Secondment posts for trainers and students. - Collective training of HQ staffs and commanders. - Participation in and/or support to command post/field training exercises. - Knowledge management, including lessons learned.
Other types of support	**Equipment:** - Donating items to partners. - Lending items to partners. - Procuring items for partners. - Hiring items for partners. - Providing technical advice (e.g. vehicle maintenance). - Secondment/attachment/co-location of equipment support staff and technicians. **Logistics:** - Provision of service support supplies for training (e.g. fuel, ammunition, rations, medical supplies). **Infrastructure:** - Providing access to suitable facilities (e.g. camps, classrooms, firing ranges, training areas, simulators). **Finance:** - Funding in full or part of various peacekeeping-related courses, workshops, seminars and field training. - Financing partners' peacekeeping equipment and infrastructure acquisitions. - Funding the publication of training material. - Funding partners' access to training aids/enablers (including sound systems, projectors, interpreters, etc.) - Providing extra-budgetary (XB) funding for enhancements to, for example, performance evaluation and M&E.

Fig 2: Illustrations of Member States' military capacity-building support to TCCs within the framework of UN peace operations.

Part Two
'Evidence-Based' Capacity-Building

Monitoring and Evaluation

8. The effectiveness of capacity-building efforts depends on the collection and evaluation of suitable information to verify the attainment of established objectives. Adjustments can be made provided timely and appropriate evidence is obtained.

9. It has been clear from interactions with a range of Member States that most are fully aware of the importance of monitoring and evaluation (M&E) for ensuring the effectiveness of capacity-building initiatives. Some Member States' processes might be perceived as rudimentary and incomplete in certain areas, with some openly acknowledging their limited expertise (and resources).[9] Nevertheless, the basic principles and procedures associated with M&E seem to be known. Indeed, there would appear to be a keen interest in the topic, and an appetite to hear more about the theoretical foundations and good practices in this field. Member States seem willing, at least to some degree, to share information about their own practices and demonstrate a readiness to adapt and refine their approaches to anything that is demonstrably better.

10. The M&E tools and indicators utilized by Member States for activities such as training tend to be:

- Participants' feedback (the most common method used by both providers and recipients)
- Testing of personnel before, during and upon course completion
- Participants' attendance rates
- Deliverers' feedback
- Accomplishment (by time and substance) of planned milestones
- Feedback from third party observers/adjudicators
- Chain of command feedback and satisfaction surveys
- Assessment visits to deployed contingents
- Post-tour debriefing
- In-mission performance reporting

Learning from experience, and using increasingly available technology, Member States are also employing new M&E methods and tools such as:

- Online pre-course testing and assessment
- Bespoke training assessment systems
- Daily electronic questionnaires
- Satisfaction surveys via platforms such as SurveyMonkey
- Syndicate discussions as part of end-of-course assessments
- WhatsApp groups for post-deployment feedback
- Independent assessors

11. Based on findings from the surveys conducted as part of this study, it is evident that the vast majority of military capacity-building providers and recipients also conduct gender sensitive monitoring and evaluation of their activities.[10] This includes

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[9] Responses to the survey conducted as part of this study revealed that 48% of capacity-building providers and 40% of capacity-building recipients found insufficient resources (e.g. time, money and staff) to be an obstacle to measuring success of capacity-building.

[10] 19 out of 20 responses from capacity-building providers stated that they conduct gender sensitive monitoring and assessment; 13 out of 16 responses

the measuring and monitoring of gender ratios for their courses.

12. One area of M&E that is as problematic as it is contentious is the determining of the 'impact' of capacity-building activities. It is relatively easy to establish the inputs (i.e. the constituent elements) and the outputs (i.e. the resulting products) of managed interventions. These are routinely captured by the majority of Member States. What is more challenging is the accurate identification of their impact (i.e. the effects). This is a matter that goes well beyond peacekeeping and serves as a hotly debated subject among M&E scholars and practitioners. Some argue that there are too many variables to determine a causational link, whilst others believe it is possible to isolate an intervention from its surroundings and thereby measure the effect.

13. It would seem, according to the feedback from many Member States that even those with the greatest knowledge and experience of M&E processes tend to focus more on the inputs (e.g. training programmes) and outputs (e.g. the number of trained personnel) rather than delving into the impacts (e.g. a safer environment). The benefit of investing a lot of time and effort on identifying the operational impacts is for many actors questionable because of the complexities, the likely contentious nature of the conclusions and the paucity of meaningful data. Where attempts are made, they typically tend to be a combination of expert intuition, 'then and now' comparisons, baseline data, and a recourse to broader

indicators (e.g. rates of violence, statistics on sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA), etc.). Together these are used to make a determination, albeit heavily caveated, on the operational effect - as well as, in some cases, the quality, value and efficiency[11] - of the capacity-building activity. This represents the extent to which any Member State seems willing to go, regardless of the nature of the provided support (e.g. training, equipment, logistics, finance). Arguably this pragmatic approach is better than nothing, and more Member States would do well to at least consider doing something similar.[12]

Performance Reporting

14. Gaining a more comprehensive understanding of the impact of capacity-building can also be achieved by knowing more about the operational performance of contingents when in their UN missions. In recent years, notable progress has been achieved within UN peacekeeping to monitor, measure and evaluate the operational performance of deployed entities. Illustrative examples include UNSCR 2436 (2018), the establishment in DPO of the Military Performance Evaluation Team (MPET) and the roll-out of the Integrated Peacekeeping Performance and Accountability Framework (IPPAF). Greater emphasis has been attached to the reporting of performance results to those that need to know. For instance, the results of in-mission evaluations by Force Commanders (FC) of deployed units are conveyed to contingent

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from capacity-building recipients gave a similar response. (To be noted: a few Member States did not respond to this question – either they preferred not to say or they currently do not have female peacekeepers).
[11] It should be borne in mind that the objectives assigned to an M&E process can vary depending on the target audience. A process "*designed for the accountability to donors and supporters is not the same as M&E designed to learn and improve*" (Simister and Smith, Monitoring and Evaluating Capacity-Building: Is it Really that Difficult?, 2010, INTRAC, Oxford). In the

context of this study, the main focus of M&E was taken to be the operational impact. However, some capacity-building providers said that it was also used (to a lesser degree) to inform judgements on cost-effectiveness, quality and efficiency.
[12] For instance, TCCs could improve their awareness and use of DPO's Comprehensive Planning and Performance Assessment System (CPAS) given that increasingly it should be able to provide useful insights into the impact of interventions.

commanders so that appropriate follow-up action may be taken. However, insights from some TCCs suggest that not all contingent commanders are relaying that information back to their capitals (perhaps because of a lack of guidance on such matters). There is therefore an information gap, and this must surely be a hindrance to TCCs in their efforts to force-generate the personnel, equipment and units that are suitable and fit for purpose. Addressing this situation appears to be a manageable task for TCCs, and remedying the issue could significantly benefit their operational performance and the efficiency of their contribution.

First-Hand Information

15.   The interviews conducted within the scope of this study drew comment from many capacity-builders including from Member States, international organizations and independent training providers on the absence of feedback once they had completed their activities (e.g. after pre-deployment training). Capacity-builders said they noted a lack of back-briefing on the effectiveness of their efforts (either from TCCs or the UN). Capacity-builders attributed this phenomenon mainly to the reluctance of recipient TCCs to disclose sensitive and potentially disconcerting details about operational performance. Such reluctance however can prove counter-productive as it prevents partners from then optimizing their support through access to detailed, objective performance data.

16.   Obviously, one solution is for supported TCCs to proactively share such information with their partners, incorporating necessary safeguards as

appropriate. Another approach is for the capacity-building partners to travel to UN missions in order to witness first-hand the effectiveness of their support and potentially to provide on-site supplementary advice and training. This approach is exemplified by a couple of UN Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) titled 'Mobile Training Teams' (MTT), dated 1 October 2018, and 'Member State-provided Military Mobile Training Teams', dated 1 September 2022. These SOPs facilitate what one prominent capacity-building provider refers to as 'accompaniment.'

17.   The SOP on Member State-provided Military Mobile Training Teams refers to a deployment to a UN mission of a military technical assistance team originating from one or more Member States for a limited period of time.[13] As outlined in the SOP, the primary role of this team is to provide training rather than participate in the mandated tasks. The thinking is that the force protection mandate falls under the purview of the troops deployed in the peace operation, and there is therefore no requirement for MTT members to be armed. Whilst some capacity-building partners are reasonably relaxed about this – with some even favoring the deployment of unarmed civilian contractors in lieu of military personnel – this perspective is not endorsed by all capacity-building providers. Some Member States, including a substantial proportion of the major providers of support, adamantly reject the idea of deploying their personnel, irrespective of role (i.e. trainer, mentor, assessor), if they are not in possession of their own personal weapon for self-defense.

18.   Probably the easiest way around the issue of personal small arms is for the

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[13] "Personnel provided by a Member State to perform services as members of an MTT shall be engaged as type II gratis personnel […]. While performing functions for the Organization as MTT members, the gratis personnel shall have the status of experts on mission

[.]" Para 4. United Nations Department of Peace Operations, *Member State-provided Mobile Training Team*, Standard Operating Procedure, Ref. 2022. 09 (effective date 1 September 2022).

provider Member State to agree with the host nation to the deployment of national, armed military trainers. This would be an arrangement between the two countries, with no explicit involvement of the UN. However, a separate agreement would be needed with the deployed UN mission to cover any logistical requirements.

19. Conceivably, another approach would be to have a joint UN deployment, where a small number of capacity builders from a partner Member State would be embedded within the supported TCC's deployed contingent. They would then be entitled to carry personal small arms, as part of the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) between the UN and the host nation.

20. A less straightforward but theoretically viable alternative would be for the provider Member State to request DPO for exceptional authorization to equip their MTT personnel with small arms due to the assessed threat level in the mission area. Parallels could be drawn with historical precedents such as the exceptional decision in the past to arm military observers (MILOBs) - similarly classified as 'experts on mission' - in the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA). The legal and practical feasibilities of such an option however would need further examination.

21. The proposition of categorizing such personnel as being part of a National Support Element (NSE) has also been raised during the interviews. Paragraph 21 of the UN's extant NSE policy (DPKO/DFS 2015.17) states:

"NSE personnel are authorized to carry a firearm for personal protection and self-defense."

However, this policy would seem to suggest, even though it is not explicitly stated, that NSE personnel are of the same nationality as the supported TCC. In which case, this would seem to rule-out the idea of treating trainers of a different nationality as being part of a contingent's authorized NSE.[14] Once again though, there might be merit in having this verified by the appropriate experts.

Knowledge Management and Lessons Learned

22. Learning from experience is a critical component of 'evidence-based' capacity-building. This process of learning from past events is now almost universally referred to as 'lessons learned'. In DPO's Deployment Review Digital Toolkit[15] the concept of 'lessons learned' is defined as:

"Knowledge or understanding gained from applied or considered good practices or lessons identified from past actions, projects and/or operations."[16]

It comprises a series of functions, usually running sequentially, and listed in the same UN Deployment Review Digital Toolkit as:

- **Collect** [information about the past event]
- **Analyze** [root causes]

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[14] Unless it was a joint deployment in which case the NSE could comprise trainers from each constituent nation.

[15] The UN Deployment Review Digital Toolkit, which includes a mobile app, was developed by the LCM to offer a methodology and templates for troop- and police-contributing countries to collect and share operational experiences gathered in UN peace

operations, and support the development of lessons learned and best practices to improve preparations for future deployments. See also: https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/deployment-review-mobile-app.

[16] https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/deployment_1.0.final_.pdf.

- **Record** [observations]
- **Share** [lessons and remedial actions]
- **Implement** [remedial actions]
- **Verify** [the remedial actions have resulted in improvement]
- **Archive** [all relevant material]

23. It was evident from the interviews with Member States that most are aware of the concept of lessons learned and the overall process. However, challenges arise in the practical implementation, where many Member States acknowledge that it is still 'work in progress'. It can be a resource intensive activity to identify valuable insights from past experiences, requiring engagement from top to bottom, and underpinned by the efficient flow of information and its systematic documentation.

24. For busy peacekeepers, the thought of carving out space to analyze past actions when there is barely enough time to deal with the present demands might not hold much appeal. However, notwithstanding the understandable pressures, ways need to be found so that the errors of the past are not repeated. Instead, successes can be replicated and the safety and security of peacekeepers can be guaranteed.[17]

25. A functional and productive Lessons Learned process represents the indispensable framework to successfully deliver efficient capacity-building efforts. Be they providers or recipients of capacity-building support, Member States' achievements can be even more impactful through the implementation of a rigorous lessons learned process. This is monitoring and evaluation in its most methodical, systematic form, and many Member States, particularly those in receipt of capacity-building support would do well to afford it a higher priority. As a matter of fact, 43% of military capacity-building recipients that responded to the LCM 2023 capacity-building survey expressed interest in receiving additional knowledge management support.[18] There are an increasing number of tools specifically designed to assist TCCs, such as the LCM's 'Deployment Review Digital Toolkit'. Member States are encouraged to seek these out and make best use of them so as to create their own national knowledge management framework or to enhance existing systems.

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[17] See also para. 181 of the 2023 report of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (A/77/19): "[…] The Special Committee encourages missions and training centers to integrate lessons learned cycles into tactics, techniques and procedures and adjust associated training requirements in the shortest amount of time, including through in-mission training, to improve the safety and security of United Nations peacekeepers [.]"

[18] According to the UN DPO LCM's Deployment Review Digital Toolkit 'Knowledge Management' is defined as: "A set of processes by which an organisation gathers, organises, disseminates and analyses its experiential knowledge, drawing upon and mining unstructured information throughout the organisation in order to form a body of institutional knowledge."

Part Three

Capacity-Building for Future Success

26. The evolving nature and sources of conflict, and the rapidly accelerating pace of technological change inevitably have implications for the future conduct of peacekeeping operations. In 'Our Common Agenda Policy Brief 9 - A New Agenda for Peace,'[19] issued by the UN Secretary-General in July 2023, the prospect is of a fragmented, multi-polar landscape, where the threats are interlocking and exacerbated by misinformation, disinformation and hate speech. Nimble, adaptable models are what is envisaged, affording UN peacekeeping an ability to engage appropriately across an operational spectrum from cease-fire monitoring to supporting regional peace enforcement operations. At the operational level, peacekeepers' capabilities will also need to adapt to the emerging risks and challenges. The operating space is changing, with technology upping the tempo (e.g. automation and machine learning), adding new dimensions (e.g. cyber and cognitive) and expanding the nature of threats (e.g. drones, 3-D printing, IEDs). Peacekeepers' equipment needs to keep abreast of these changes so as to avoid an untenable gap emerging between theirs' and adversaries' capabilities.

27. Equipment however is only as effective as the people that operate - and maintain - it. Their operating skills are a fundamental aspect of operational capability. There is little to be gained in having modern sensors, communication systems and armaments if users are unable to exploit their full potential. Hence, the importance of equipment training, and capacity-building in the round, to the delivery of overall operational effect.

28. Sitting alongside the enduring need for equipment training, there are a number of other important aspects of capacity-building that ought to feature prominently in the future. Discussed below are three that up until now have not received the attention that they probably merit.

Future Concepts and Operational Doctrine

29. Although substantial advances have been made over the past decade to bolster both the quality and quantity of UN peacekeeping military doctrine there is yet no specific framework/doctrine/policy in place to address the nature and response to these new, emerging military challenges. Given the rapid advances in military technology and the way these are shaping new and traditional methods of conflict, it is important for military peacekeeping to keep up with these developments. The start-point is having up-to-date military peacekeeping doctrine that identifies the emerging challenges and sign-posts the ways in which they can be addressed.

30. The primary responsibility for producing such doctrine rests with DPO and specifically in the Office of Military Affairs (OMA). Given though the time and effort required to develop such guidance, they might appreciate some collaborative support. One approach would be for the groundwork to be outsourced to willing Member States, as previously done with the compendium of specialist military manuals for peacekeeping.[20] In this vein, a working-group of Member States could be created for

[19] See: our-common-agenda-policy-brief-new-agenda-for-peace-en.pdf (un.org).

[20] Originally issued in 2015 and subsequently updated.

the initial brainstorming and development of the operational concepts and doctrine. OMA could then tailor the output, as needed, to align with its specific requirements, once a draft has been submitted. Not only would this help quicken the overall process, there is also the added benefit of tapping into Member States' experience and state-of-the-art thinking. There is also the attraction that Member States are likely to feel more comfortable with what is finally produced because of their close involvement in its development.

31. With the benefit of a well-informed and thought-through document on future military peacekeeping doctrine, there is then a basis for the subsequent identification and addressing of the capability and capacity-building needs. This overall collaborative approach could serve as a catalyst to the future establishment by one or more TCCs, guided by OMA, of a standing capacity for the development of military peacekeeping concepts: a creative "sandbox" for joint thinking and experimentation.

Command and Staff Training

32. One aspect of capacity-building that has consistently been a major challenge for UN military peacekeeping is the pre-deployment training of formation-level (i.e. sector and above) headquarters – specifically the preparation of commanders and their staff for peacekeeping operations. Advances have been made in terms of peacekeeping courses and training material. However, the opportunities for practicing and refining acquired skills as an integrated, multi-national team prior to deployment

remain limited because of the difficulties of bringing everyone together.[21][22] This is a constraint not unique to the UN, but the consequences can be all the more telling given the large mix of languages, doctrines and customs that confront UN commanders and their staff. Furthermore, the frequent rotation of staff officers and commanders after deployment is yet an additional obstacle to building cohesive and high performing teams.

33. One way of trying to compensate for the lack of command and staff training beforehand, is to conduct it after deployment. Inroads have been made in this respect over the last few years with initiatives like the command-post exercise (CPX) training packages for Force Headquarters (FHQs). However, getting the most out of such training can be a struggle when, simultaneously, commanders and staff are having to focus on the real and present challenges. It is better therefore to consider this as a complement to, rather than a substitute for pre-deployment training.

34. The question therefore is what else can be done prior to deployment, particularly by Member States, to build the collective as well as individual capacity of commanders and staff. One area that looks particularly promising is computer-based exercises and simulation. UN peacekeeping is a comparative novice in this area, but within some militaries and institutions this is already an established practice. An example with particular resonance for UN peacekeeping is the long-running series of VIKING[23] computer-assisted exercises (CAX) arranged by the Swedish Armed Forces and the Folke Bernadotte Academy.

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[21] SHIRBRIG (Stand-by High-Readiness Brigade) in the early 2000s was probably the closest that UN peacekeeping has come to the training of multinational headquarters prior to deployment.
[22] This challenge relates mainly, although not exclusively to multinational HQs. Some HQs,

particularly at the sector level comprise staff and commanders drawn mainly from one TCC. Even those HQs however tend to have a few personnel from other TCCs.
[23] A Swedish/US initiative which began in 1999.

Various multidimensional scenarios have been exercised over the years including regional alliance deployments and UN Chapter VII peace operations, and they have involved military and civilian leaders and staff from over 60 countries. Facilitated by bespoke exercise-management software (EXONAUT), some players and controllers have operated from Exercise Control (EXCON) whilst others have participated from their own home stations around the world.

35. These and comparable initiatives may at present exceed the capacities of many TCCs[24] (and also DPO). However, that is not to say that this should always be the case. Conceivably, one day this type of technology could be used to practice UN commanders and staff in the integration, for instance, of specialist operational support for the AU's African Standby Force (ASF). For the moment though the focus needs to be on how and where to begin this journey, and probably the best place to look is the battalion level of TCCs. Through TCCs embracing this way of training, initially with company/battalion-level computer-assisted exercises, there is every chance that the practice will take root and grow – bottom-up. The prospects are even better if some of the traditional capacity-building funders were to get behind this. Help with the purchase costs of computers and software, maybe initially for a pilot by a small group of TCCs in one particular region, might be all that is needed to generate momentum.

36. Through TCCs embracing the benefits and opportunities offered by this form of technology, it is now possible for them to build the collective and individual capacity of commanders and staff to a level that up until now has been unthinkable.

Cognitive Skills

37. The function of peacekeeping is as much about *how* to think as about *what* to think. Training peacekeepers on what to do in certain situations is standard practice. However, no matter how extensive the training it can never cover all eventualities given the complex, dynamic and volatile environment in which they operate. Educating them on how to think and act (e.g. flexibility, imagination, consultation, empathy, openness, analysis, clarity) can help augment skills and knowledge already acquired through drills and experience. This, of course, must be built on a strong understanding of UN doctrine and guidance.

38. This approach though to capacity-building of peacekeepers is not widespread amongst TCCs. Where it does happen, it tends to be limited to the officer corps and even then, often only at the senior level. Part of the reason is historic, with the practice of 'top-down/detailed command' being a key tenet of how most militaries have traditionally operated. Many still do, with a focus more on compliance to orders than subordinates' use of initiative and imagination. Arguably that practice can still be made to work for the military's traditional tasks, but it comes under considerable strain when up against the less well-defined, multi-functional context of peacekeeping.

39. The paucity of publications on this way of preparing and developing military peacekeepers is probably another reason why this approach has yet to gain greater traction. There are plenty that tell people what to do; precious few on how to think and confront issues in the absence of prescribed drills and procedures. And even where SOPs and guidance documents on Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs) do exist, they are mainly written in the abstract and

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[24] Bangladesh has now developed a 'United Nations Computer Assisted Exercise – UN CAX'.

with little guidance on the specific, contextual factors. Likewise, much of what exists on the ethics of peacekeeping and peacekeepers tends more towards a set of *do's and don'ts* than an exposure of prevailing norms and responses.

40. Doctrinal guidance in this area can be decisive. One course of action could be to have interested TCCs develop, in conjunction with OMA and other elements of DPO, the contents of such a document - '*The Mindset of the Military Peacekeeper.*' If and when produced and endorsed this would serve as a major contribution to the building of individual and collective capacity of military peacekeepers. There is every potential for it to be a force-multiplier.

Recommendations

Serial	Member States/TCCs (as applicable) are recommended to:	Remarks
1.	Take note, and where appropriate, discuss with UN staff the capacity-building opportunities illustrated in the table at Figure 2.	
2.	Ensure contingent commanders are sending UN performance evaluation reports back to capitals.	Also ensure that respective Permanent Missions to the UN in New York have sight of such reports.
3.	Share in-mission performance data with capacity-building partners and involve them in the debriefing processes.	
4.	Attempt to gain greater insight into the 'impact' of capacity-building measures through, for instance, the greater awareness and use of the Comprehensive Planning and Performance Assessment System (CPAS). Share new and best practices in this regard and the methods of assessing the quality, influence, cost effectiveness and efficiency of capacity-building interventions.	
5.	Where applicable: • Consider drawing-up a bilateral agreement with the host nation to facilitate the deployment of *armed* trainers/mentors/assessors. or • Consider embedding armed trainers/mentors/assessors within the supported TCC's contingent in order to form a joint deployment.	The UN could also examine the potential of expanding the current SOP on Military MTTs to include the carrying of personal small arms in exceptional circumstances and/or authorize their deployment based on past precedent. Likewise, it could examine whether extant UN policy allows NSE personnel to be drawn from other Member States rather than just the supported TCC.

6.	Afford the concept of lessons learned and its processes a higher priority in order that it becomes universally implemented.	
7.	Share best practice on lessons learned processes both to internal and external audiences (e.g. DPO/LCM).	
8.	Search-out new tools to assist with the collection of operational experiences, the pooling of knowledge and the development of lessons learned processes (such as the UN Deployment Review Digital Toolkit).	
9.	Under OMA's (DPO) guidance, form working groups to: • Draft military peacekeeping doctrine to address the changing operational context. • Draft a publication entitled '*The Mindset of the Military Peacekeeper*' elaborating on *How* (as distinct from *What*) to think when engaged in UN peacekeeping.	
10.	Use computer-assisted exercises and simulation (initially at the company/battalion level) during pre-deployment training to bolster command and staff effectiveness.	
11.	Assist TCCs in the procurement of hardware and software for computer-assisted exercises (CAX).	Alternatively, consider equipment sharing/lending/mentoring arrangements with TCCs.

Summary and Conclusions

41.   This report summarizes the findings of a study into Member States' peacekeeping capacity-building activities, with a particular focus on monitoring and evaluation. Capacity-building can take many forms although it was clear from what was reported by Member States that military training and technical support (i.e. the sharing of knowledge and provision of advice and mentoring) are the main activities.

42.   M&E constitutes part of the capacity-building process and TCCs are aware of its importance as a means of determining overall success. Measuring inputs and outputs is well understood and the practice is widely observed. Ascertaining the operational impact (plus efficiency, cost-effectiveness and quality) of capacity-building activities is however more challenging, and in some quarters, the benefits from even trying are strongly contested. That said, the study concluded that there was merit in TCCs sharing their experiences in this area, and also fully embracing the concept and practices of lessons learned given the clear association with M&E. The study also found that by sharing data on in-mission operational performance, capacity-building partners stood a better chance of optimizing their contributions. Various options are mentioned in this report for how this could be achieved.

43.   The final element of the study looked at three aspects of capacity-building where there is both opportunity and need for greater engagement by Member States in order to establish the foundations for the continued success of UN peacekeeping: concepts and doctrine; command and staff training; cognitive skills. It is hoped that by mentioning them here, this will prompt interest and engagement, particularly by TCCs.

44.   Finally, thanks must go to the many individuals from Member States, UN entities and independent training providers who kindly agreed to give up their time to be interviewed for this study. Their expert knowledge and views made a significant contribution to the project, and this support is deeply appreciated.

ANNEX: EXTRACTS FROM THE SURVEY ON HOW MEMBER STATES MONITOR AND ASSESS CAPACITY-BUILDING SUPPORT TO TCCs.

(SURVEY CONDUCTED AS PART OF THIS STUDY)

Has your country <u>provided</u> the following types of military <u>training</u> support to TCCs in the context of UN peacekeeping operations in the last 5 years? (Select all that apply)

Any military training support[1]	**95%**
Staff officer training (e.g. planners; peacekeeping intelligence specialists; CIMIC officers; gender experts; legal advisers)	86%
Foundational military UN peacekeeper skills (e.g. protection of civilians)	86%
Education & awareness programs (e.g. seminars; workshops; publications; briefings)	81%
'Military Experts on Mission' (UNMEM) training (e.g. military observers)	76%
Soft skills training (e.g. leadership; communication; mediation)	71%
Technical skills training (e.g. engineering; signals; EOD; vehicle maintenance; data handling; medical; investigations)	67%
Team training (e.g. section; sector HQ; FHQ)	62%
Academic training (e.g. language course)	43%
Foundational field-soldiering skills (e.g. map reading, firing, etc.)	43%
Other	14%
None of the above	5%

1. Calculated as 100% less percentage responding 'None of the above'.   Note: Excludes non-providers and 'Prefer not to say' responses.
Source: Survey on How Member States Monitor and Assess Capacity-Building Support to TCCs (answered by **21 Member States**).

Has your country <u>provided</u> the following types of military <u>technical</u> support to TCCs in the context of UN peacekeeping operations in the last 5 years? (Select all that apply)

Category	Percentage
Any military technical support[1]	80%
Knowledge management (e.g. lessons learned)	65%
Mentoring	65%
Advise and assist	60%
Other	5%
None of the above	20%

1. Calculated as 100% less percentage responding 'None of the above'.   Note: Excludes non-providers and 'Prefer not to say' responses.
Source: Survey on How Member States Monitor and Assess Capacity-Building Support to TCCs (answered by **20 Member States**).

Has your country <u>provided</u> the following <u>other</u> types of military capacity-building support to TCCs in the context of UN peacekeeping operations in the last 5 years? (Select all that apply)

Category	Percentage
Donation of equipment	39%
Infrastructure (e.g. shooting range)	39%
Logistics (e.g. airlift capacity)	33%
Financial support	33%
Loan of equipment	11%
Sale of equipment	11%
Other	11%
None of the above	39%

Note: Excludes non-providers and 'Prefer not to say' responses.
Source: Survey on How Member States Monitor and Assess Capacity-Building Support to TCCs (answered by **18 Member States**).

Were any of the following an obstacle to <u>measuring the success</u> of the capacity-building support to TCCs? (Select all that apply)

| Category	Percentage
Insufficient resources (i.e. time, money, staff) to conduct such an exercise	48%
Language barriers	24%
Technical issues (e.g. lack of internet access)	19%
Stakeholder sensitivities on "success/failure" assessments and declarations	14%
Insufficient expert knowledge on what methods to use	10%
Inadequate data to support such an exercise	10%
Difficulties in fusing disparate information to form an overall judgement	0%
Other	5%
None of the above	43%

Note: Excludes non-providers and 'Prefer not to say' responses.
Source: Survey on How Member States Monitor and Assess Capacity-Building Support to TCCs (answered by **17 Member States**).

Has your country <u>received</u> the following types of military <u>training</u> support from another country? (Select all that apply)

Category	Percentage
Any military training support[1]	100%
'Military Experts on Mission' (UNMEM) training (e.g. military observers)	81%
Staff officer training (e.g. planners; peacekeeping; intelligence specialists; CIMIC officers; gender experts; legal advisers)	75%
Foundational military UN peacekeeper skills (e.g. protection of civilians)	63%
Education & awareness programs (e.g. seminars; workshops; publications; briefings)	56%
Academic training (e.g. language courses)	44%
Soft skills training (e.g. leadership; communication; mediation)	38%
Technical skills training (e.g. engineering; signals; EOD; vehicle maintenance; data handling; medical; investigations)	31%
Team training (e.g. section; sector HQ; FHQ)	25%
Foundational field-soldiering skills (e.g. map reading, firing, etc.)	6%
Other	13%
None of the above	0%

Has your country <u>received</u> the following types of military <u>technical</u> support from another country? (Select all that apply)

1. Calculated as 100% less percentage responding 'None of the above'.   Note: Excludes non-recipients and 'Prefer not to say' responses.
Source: Survey on How Member States Monitor and Assess Capacity-Building Support to TCCs (answered by **16 Member States**).

Has your country <u>received</u> the following <u>other</u> types of military capacity-building support from another country? (Select all that apply)

Gift of equipment	25%
Logistics	19%
Infrastructure (e.g. shooting range)	19%
Financial support	19%
Sale of equipment	6%
Loan of equipment	0%
Other	6%
None of the above	25%

Note: Excludes non-recipients and 'Prefer not to say' responses.
Source: Survey on How Member States Monitor and Assess Capacity-Building Support to TCCs (answered by **16 Member States**).

Were any of the following an obstacle to <u>measuring the success</u> of the capacity-building support? (Select all that apply)

Category	Percentage
Insufficient resources (i.e. time, money, staff) to conduct such an exercise	40%
Inadequate data to support such an exercise	27%
Insufficient expert knowledge on what methods to use	20%
Technical issues (e.g. internet access)	20%
Difficulties in fusing disparate information to form an overall judgement	13%
Language barriers	13%
Stakeholder sensitivities on 'success/failure' assessments and declarations	0%
Other	7%
None of the above	47%

Note: Excludes non-recipients and 'Prefer not to say' responses.
Source: Survey on How Member States Monitor and Assess Capacity-Building Support to TCCs (answered by **15 Member States**).