

United Nations Infantry Battalion Manual

Volume II



DEPARTMENT OF PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS DEPARTMENT OF FIELD SUPPORT

AUGUST 2012

United Nations Infantry Battalion Manual

Volume II



DEPARTMENT OF PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS DEPARTMENT OF FIELD SUPPORT

AUGUST 2012





Introduction

- 1. Volume II (Vol. II) is the stand-alone, comprehensive and capability-based portion of the UN Infantry Battalion Manual (UNIBAM). This volume provides Battalion Commanders, staff, and Company Commanders with best practice baseline information that is normally required to plan, lead and manage battalion peacekeeping operations.
- 2. Vol. II supports the "Purpose and Scope" outlined in Chapter 1, Vol. I of the UNIBAM. The contents in the volume are designed to assist key leaders in their planning and preparations, training and equipping, organizing and evaluating and in execution of command and control responsibilities related to UN Infantry Battalions. As such, this volume provides the functional details of the battalion key leaders and staff sections, mission essential task descriptions, checklists for commanders and staff and various annexes to amplify specific issues.
- 3. The descriptions, considerations and standards outlined in the Vol. II are peacekeeping-specific and provide guidance on the methodology of conduct of peacekeeping operations by a UN Infantry Battalion. The contents provided in the Manual are broad guidelines and are baseline tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP), adaptable to specific mission environments. Particularly, the capability standards and criteria outlined in the Vol. II of the Manual are the minimum expectations to be achieved for effective performance in the field. The Troop-Contributing Countries (TCCs) and infantry battalions may develop their own TTPs and exhaustive standards and checklists, based on specific mission requirements.
- 4. The abbreviations used in the UNIBAM and a detailed list of references are attached at Annex N and O, Vol. II, p. 324 and p. 329 of the UNIBAM respectively for ready reference.



Contents

		Page
	Introduction	3
Chapt	er	
1.	UN Infantry Battalion Key Leader Functions	7
2.	Tasks	25
	Primary Tasks	
	2.1: Patrolling	27
	2.2 : Observation Post	37
	2.3 : Checkpoint	43
	2.4: Outreach and Engagement	49
	2.5 : Situational Awareness	61
	2.6: Cordon and Search	73
	2.7 : Convoy and Escort	83
	2.8 : Operation Base	93
	Support Tasks	
	2.9: Disarmament and Demobilization	103
	2.10: Critical Infrastructure and Assets Protection	117
	2.11: Crowd Management	123
	2.12: Detention	137
	Other Tasks	
	2.13: Buffer Zone	147
	2.14: Joint Operations	155
	2.15 : Reinforce/Relief	169
	2.16 : Extract/Evacuate	175
3	Capability Standards	185
	3.1: Introduction	185
	3.2 : Purpose	185
	3.3 : Definitions	185
	3.4 : Layout.	187
	3.5 : UN Infantry Battalion Capability Standards and Criteria	188
4	3.6: UN Infantry Battalion Capability Standards for Tasks	215
4.	Annexes	242
	A : We Are United Nations Peacekeeping Personnel B : Conduct and Discipline	243 246



	Page
C : Model Rules of Engagement	251
D: Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Office of Military Affairs	260
E : Operations Centre	264
F : Negotiations	268
G: Interpreters	274
H:ICTD/DFS Information Guide	278
I: UN Handling of Improvised Explosive Devices (IED)	282
J : Field Sanitation, Hygiene, Environmental and Occupational Safety	288
K : After Action Reviews and Handover Notes	306
L : High Technology Equipments	316
M : UN Military Symbols	320
N : Abbreviations	324
O · References	328



Note: New policies/guidelines/amendments issued from time to time prior to the first review will be uploaded in the web as an addendum to the UN Infantry Battalion Manual on as required basis.



CHAPTER 1



UN Infantry Battalion Key Leader Functions

1.1: Introduction.

The UN Infantry Battalion is comprised of a dynamic command structure, multifaceted staff support, an integrated Support Company and three or four Infantry Company Groups. The detailed organizational structure, the table of personnel and equipment and brief description of responsibilities are depicted in Vol. I, Chapter 8, p. 76 of the UNIBAM.

1.2: Purpose.

The purpose of this chapter is to detail the primary functions of battalion key leaders and other organizational elements.

1.3: Command and Control Structure.

UN peacekeeping operations are conducted under unified UN command and control. While the Force Commander has operational control and responsibility, the Battalion Commanders and subordinate unit commanders should exercise effective command and control at their respective levels. An Infantry Battalion may operate under a UN Brigade or Sector HQ or directly under the Force HQ. The battalion will have a well-defined AOR to conduct peacekeeping operations and may be employed or redeployed anywhere in the mission AOR as per operational requirements.

1.4: Organization and Functions.

1.4.1: Battalion HO.

The Battalion HQ includes the Battalion Command Group and the Battalion Staff.



1.4.1.1: Battalion Command Group.

The Battalion Command Group consists of the Commanding Officer, the Executive Officer (XO) or Second in Command (2IC), the Senior Warrant Officer, the Senior Sergeant Major, Personal Assistants, Radio Operators and Drivers. The Battalion Command Group will be assisted by a Legal Officer (for managing legal affairs of the unit) and a Gender/Child Protection Officer as advisers.

Battalion Commander. The Battalion Commander has the command responsibility for the overall conduct of peacekeeping operations in the battalion AOR and for the accomplishment of the assigned missions as per Operations Order. In this regard, the Battalion Commander should:

- Exercise authority that a commander in military service lawfully exercises over subordinates by virtue of rank and assignment with resolve, care and skill.
- Employ skills developed by professional study, constant practice, and considered judgement to fulfil command responsibilities through decision-making and leadership.
- Visualize and plan operations by specifying the intent, directions and guidance to achieve battalion tasks.
- Continually assesses all activities within command and AOR, in order to maintain situational awareness in support of sound decision-making.
- The UN Peacekeeping Infantry Battalion Commander's knowledge, experience and personality determine how he/she interacts with the unit. The Battalion Commander drives processes through mission command, establishes a command climate for the unit, prepares and commands the unit for operations and assesses subordinates. The commander refines the battalion's command and control system as necessary. He/she establishes a system to meet the unique demands that he places on the unit, balancing the abilities and personalities of subordinates and the capabilities of the equipment in the UN Peacekeeping Infantry Battalion.
- Ensure training of battalion staff to execute operational plans in his/her absence and institute cross-training among the staff.
- State his/her intent to subordinates in a clear and concise manner, laying out the mission, terms of reference, and resources, subject to applicable mission-specific rules of engagement.



- Be responsible for conduct and discipline of the unit.
- Perform outreach and engagement tasks as required in the process of interacting with other actors deployed in the battalion AOR, the higher HQ, and visiting delegations.
- Ensure that gender is mainstreamed and operationalised throughout the tasks of the battalion.
- Provide timely, relevant and substantive information to higher HQ Staff and Operations Centres.
- Ensure continuity of operations with her/his replacement through written Handover Notes and an End of Assignment Report and organizational learning and improvement through the identification of lessons and good practices (refer to Annex K, Vol. II, p. 306 of the UNIBAM).

Battalion Executive Officer(XO)/Second in Command(2IC). The battalion XO/2IC exercises the duties of chief of staff and coordinates the staff work, operations and logistics. Battalion XO/2IC's primary duties include:

- Exercise command in the absence of the Battalion Commander.
- The XO/2IC transmits the commander's decision and coordinates the execution with the staff and subordinate units.
- Integrate and synchronize staff activities to optimize command and control of battalion operations.
- Directly supervise the battalion's main command post operations centre.
- Oversee the synchronization of information management within the battalion.
- Act as the "Human Rights Focal Point", between the human rights component and the battalion. XO/2IC will be responsible for developing and overseeing implementation of SOPs aimed at:
 - * Ensuring prompt information sharing with the human rights component regarding any relevant human rights information recorded while performing various tasks (e.g., patrolling, observation and checkpoint etc.).
 - * Guiding peacekeepers' action, should they be confronted with ongoing human rights violations (in line with the DPKO/OHCHR/DPA/DFS Policy on Human Rights).
- Monitor and coordinate public information and media management in the battalion AOR.



- Closely monitor administrative and logistics issues within the battalion.
- Manage commander's critical information requirements.
- Plan and ensure that individual and collective training of the battalion is conducted.
- Be responsible for unit security including safety and security of personnel, material and information.
- Be responsible for coordinating the monitoring, restoration and maintenance of safety and security in the battalion AOR.
- Act as the battalion custodian of best practices and lessons learnt, share/ disseminate relevant details to all concerned and incorporate them in battalion procedures and activities. In addition, provide inputs to the mission's best practices/knowledge management focal point.
- Execute any other duties as directed by the commander.

Legal Officer.

- Sensitize all ranks on the legal framework of the peacekeeping operation with particular reference to MOU, SOFA, ROE, human rights, sexual exploitation and abuse, gender sensitization, and host country legal aspects and customs.
- Provide legal advice to the Battalion Commander in accordance with OLA policies and mission SOPs.

Gender Adviser. The Military Gender Adviser is responsible for coordinating and guiding implementation of SC Mandates on Women Peace and Security in the work of the infantry battalion. Under the leadership of the Battalion Commander, the Gender Adviser/Focal Point will work to support the operational integration of gender and coordinate with the Military Focal Point at Mission HQ and the civilian Gender Adviser to the mission. Responsibilities include:

- Provide advice on gender-sensitive strategies and appropriate responses to support women's protection, including from sexual violence.
- Liaise with women in the local community in order to identify women's and girl's vulnerabilities and needs in relation to their physical protection.
- Provide training on gender awareness.
- Provide input to reporting on threats and violations, including sexual violence and analysis of women and girls protection mechanisms.



- Handle SEA related issues co-jointly with the legal and internal oversights officer.
- Coordinate with Military Gender Focal Point at Force/Mission HQ.

Child Protection Officer. The Child Protection Officer in the Battalion Command Group is responsible for implementing the following tasks:

- Advise the Battalion Commander on all issues related to the protection of children.
- Act as a liaison between child protection actors and the battalion.
- Handle all issues related to child protection violations, including establishment of an alert system to transmit through command channel and also to the child protection unit/section, pertaining to information received on any of the six grave violations especially the recruitment or use of children by armed forces or armed groups, the killing or maiming of children, sexual violence, attacks on schools and hospitals, abductions of children, and the denial of humanitarian access.
- Coordinate with Military Child Protection Focal Point at Force/Mission HQ.

The Child Protection Officer should furthermore:

- Develop and oversee the implementation of specific SOPs on the handover of child soldiers captured in operations or those who have surrendered to the peacekeeping force.
- Develop guidelines for the battalion on children's issues including detention, conduct during the interaction with children and prevention of all forms of exploitation against children including child labour and sexual exploitation.

Note: At the UN Infantry Battalion level, the responsibility of "Gender and Child Protection" will be performed by a single officer, under the supervision of the XO/2IC.

1.4.1.2: Battalion Staff.

The Battalion Staff consists of the Personnel Staff Section, the Situational Awareness (SA) Staff Section, the Operations Staff Section, the Logistics Staff Section, the Outreach Staff Section and the Communications Staff Section. All staff elements assist the commander with planning, organizing, employing and sustaining the battalion.

Personnel Staff Section. The Personnel Staff Section consists of the Personnel Officer and staff, a Spiritual Adviser, a unit Welfare Adviser and staff,



and an Internal Oversight Staff (military police personnel with a working dog). The Personnel Staff Section's responsibilities are to:

- Maintain unit strength and conducting personnel actions.
- Identify and report critical human resources issues to the commander and higher HQ.
- Supervise medical, legal, safety and civilian labour assets.
- Ensure smooth rotation of personnel into and out of the battalion AOR.
- Handle routine day-to-day tasks such as preparing battalion status and strength reports, monitoring and preparing and orders, scheduling and other administrative support as required.
- Act as staff point of contact for mail, UN inspections, public affairs, and legal or disciplinary actions.
- Coordinate and report the Medical Section's actions, supervise casualty evacuation, and handling of injured and sick personnel.
- Coordinate religious support and spiritual counselling to the battalion.
- Maintain gender disaggregated manpower chart.
- Keep the commander informed of section matters, which may affect operations and force protection.

The specific responsibilities of the Spiritual Adviser, Welfare Adviser, Psychologist and Internal Oversights Cell are as follows:

Spiritual Adviser. The Spiritual Adviser has the following responsibilities:

- * Facilitate and coordinate religious and spiritual support to battalion personnel.
- * Act as confidential adviser to the Battalion Commander on the spiritual fitness, and ethical and moral health of the command.
- Advise the Battalion Commander on the impact of command policies on indigenous religions.
- * Provide privileged and sensitive personal counselling and religious teachings to the unit's command, soldiers and authorized civilians.

Welfare Adviser.

- * Advise the Battalion Commander, Battalion Staff and the Company Commanders in unit welfare (collective and individual) measures.
- * Monitor compliance of UN standards on unit welfare.
- ⋆ Plan, coordinate and implement welfare measures in the battalion.



Psychologist.

- * Act as confidential adviser to the Battalion Commander on all matters related to mental health, morale and motivation of the unit.
- * Provide confidential counselling/support to the needy/identified personnel of the battalion.

Internal Oversight Cell. The Internal Oversight Cell consists of five military police personnel. Its responsibilities are to:

- * Enforce strict conduct and discipline as per UN standards.
- * Investigate and process disciplinary violations.
- * Maintain liaison and coordination with host police and UN police.

Situational Awareness Staff Section. Tactical information and situational awareness based on all source tactical information collection and analysis is one of the commander's most important decision-making tools and augments safety and security in the mission area. Information and operations have a dynamic relationship in that information drives peacekeeping operations and successful operations generate additional information. Peacekeeping operations conducted without accurate information may lessen the credibility and legitimacy of the mission in the eyes of the populace and other principal actors in the AOR. The SA Staff Section consists of seven (07) personnel who are experts in information management and maintaining SA. The section's responsibilities are to:

- Provide timely and accurate information analysis and products in support of the commander, staff and subordinate units.
- Supervise and coordinate collection, processing, production and dissemination of tactical information from all sources and integrate it into operational planning and tasking.
- Sources include patrols, outreach and engagement with the local population, observation posts, checkpoints, gender and child protection focal points and company SA and outreach cells. In addition, information summaries from higher HQ, ground and aerial reconnaissance assets, ground surveillance radar (GSR) and local media assets.
- Make analytical assessments on when and where threat, non-combatant, terrain and weather effects will occur.
- Maintain Battalion AOR situation map in the OC with details of Priority Information Requirements (PIR), a time event chart, a coordinate's regis-



ter, a pattern analysis and plot sheet, an association matrix, an activities matrix, a threat capabilities and courses of action chart, and other such tools to assist the commander and staff in conducting predictive analysis

- Provide analysis on the threats to the population and their vulnerabilities (including those specific to women and children), especially when the mission is mandated to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence.
- Coordinate staff inputs for integration into SA analysis for staff planning, decision-making, targeting and threat assessments.
- Plan and manage information, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) operations (including GS Radar and UAV tasking and employment) in coordination with the Operations Section.
- Participate in key leader engagement meetings.
- Coordinate with Outreach Section for better integration of tactical information collection and reporting.
- Prepare gender-disaggregated data and situation reports from reconnaissance missions and company reports as appropriate.
- Act as the focal point for receiving and reporting indicators of counter information and reconnaissance directed against the battalion, information and operational security training, map procurement/distribution, and storage and control of any sensitive or classified information.

Operations Staff Section. The Operations Staff Section is the commander's primary staff for planning, coordinating, prioritizing, and integrating all battalion operations. It consists of the Operations Officer and staff, the Operations Centre Staff, the Liaison Officers and Aviation Staff. The section's responsibilities are to:

- Ensure effective functioning of Battalion Operations Centre.
- Plan, prepare and produce the battalion operations orders, control current operations, and coordinate critical support operations as required, with the other staff sections.
- Collect and disseminate information to the Company Operations Centres and other relevant operational elements.
- Maintain details of locations and activities of other UN contingents/ peacekeeping elements and humanitarian actors.
- Coordinate with the SA Section to develop and synchronizes the ISR collection plan.



- Update the reconnaissance plan, threat condition levels and all other operations based on the latest predictive analysis.
- Provide the daily operational update to the commander and staff (including information related to specific threats against women, girls and children).
- Ensure overall safety and security of personnel, materials and information.
- Identify, capture, compile and share lessons identified and good practices following main events/operations at battalion level.

Command Post/Operations Centre (CP/OC). The CP/OC maintains the 24/7 flow of information. Operations Centre responsibilities include:

- * Receive and send messages and transmissions and maintain a message log.
- ⋆ Collate, synthesize, analyse and disseminate information.
- * Maintain SA map and the progress of operations and monitor friendly force movement and locations.
- * Remain in radio contact with all operational elements, neighbouring units and higher HQ.

Liaison Cell. The Liaison Cell is comprised of two officers. They should have good communication skills in mission and local languages. Responsibilities of the liaison cell include:

- * Normally augmented with interpreter support (including female interpreters, if needed).
- * Facilitate and coordinate the operations of the battalion with other units or agencies as directed by the Battalion Commander.
- * Keep other contingents or higher HQ informed of status, disposition, and location of battalion components and assists coordinating operations with other units.
- * Assist Outreach Section in coordinating operations with governmental and non-governmental organizations, women's groups and other civil society actors as required.
- $\star\,$ Liaise with host military, police and militias when tasked.
- * Coordinate operations with host police and UN Formed Police Units.
- $\star~$ Liaise with the other Focal Points (Gender, Child Protection, etc.) and UNCT.



Air Operations Cell. It consists of one officer and one non-commissioned officer (NCO). Responsibilities of Air Operations Cell include:

- * Plan and coordinate airlift, heli-borne and MEDEVAC operations.
- * Supervise the palletizing of equipment and supplies, loading and securing.
- * Prepare and maintain personnel and equipment manifests.

Logistics Staff Section. The Logistics Staff Section comprises logistics, finance and COE staff. Its responsibilities are to:

- Provide logistic planning and support to the battalion.
- Provide timely and accurate logistical information to commanders, staff,
 Battalion Operational Centre and the higher HQ.
- Coordinate the provision and replenishment of all types of supplies to the various company and temporary operating bases (COBs/TOBs).
- Coordinate the preventive maintenance and repair of all weapons, equipments and vehicles.
- Ensure adequate and proper storage facilities for food items and other unit stores.
- Coordinate transportation of personnel with Operations Section.
- Assist Operations Section with logistics input for preparation of battalion operation order.
- Manage unit finances and accounting of United Nations and contingent owned equipment (UNOE/COE).
- Provide the daily logistics update to the commander and staff.
- Ensure gender-sensitive planning to provide appropriate and separate facilities for the deployment of uniformed and civilian female personnel.

Outreach Staff Section. Outreach Staff Section plays a vital role in supporting battalion peacekeeping operations and objectives through its interface and outreach to key leaders and populations within the battalion's AOR including women community leaders. Outreach is essential to gain the support and trust of the local population (especially women) to improve the understanding of local dynamics as well as to identify the most relevant interlocutors in the area. It also helps in developing important information database about the AOR that are relevant for peacekeeping operations. The section coordinates the conduct of outreach operations with local communities, belligerent factions and key leaders, who often communicate in



different languages. It is important to integrate women's perspectives and liaise with women in the local community to build and maintain trust. To that effect it is crucial that the outreach section is able to draw on female personnel and interpreters. The Outreach Section responsibilities are to:

- Maintain cooperation and coordination with the mission Civil Affairs components, which is crucial to ensure consistency, effectiveness, and coordination of action.
- Establish and maintain communications and build rapport with key leaders (including female leaders) and populations.
- Establish a Civil Military Operations Centre (CMOC) if required.
- Provide information to SA Section on CMOC meetings and activities.
- Set information collection as a priority during all outreach activities.
- Sensitise the commanders, staff and subordinate units on the concerns of the civilian including women's and children's protection needs.
- Maintain regular contact with and bridge communication gaps with civilian actors (including women's groups), and the leaders of belligerent factions/groups.
- Facilitate negotiations with civilian actors and belligerent factions.
- Coordinate and process compensation claims to civilians, if any.
- Formulate outreach and engagement plans, collection of information, tasking and monitoring of outreach activities of sub-units.
- Plan and coordinate public relations and media management functions.
- Liaise with host military and police when tasked.
- Liaise and coordinate information with the Military Gender Adviser/ Focal Point.

Communications Staff Section. The Communications Staff Section has the following responsibilities:

- Advise the commander and staff on all communication matters.
- Monitor and direct communications and IT activities.
- Formulate operational communication plans and IT plans and projects.
- Plan and supervise the integration of the unit communications system into the systems of higher, lower and adjacent HQs.
- Supervise the maintenance of communications equipment.



- Maintain communications network flowchart in the OC and prepare a maintenance and support plan.
- Advise the commander and staff on the electronic countermeasures (ECM) and develop procedures for countering it.
- Ensure all communications channels are operational at all times.
- Establish communications security throughout the battalion.
- Maintain and update data transmission hardware and software.
- Provide the daily communications update to the commander and staff.
- Oversee compatibility of communication assets between the battalion elements and others (police, civilian agencies, etc.)

1.4.3: Battalion Support Company.

The Battalion Support Company consists of a Company HQ, Mortar Platoon, Engineer Platoon, Reconnaissance and Surveillance Platoon, Logistic Platoon (Logistics Section, Signals Section, Transport Section and Field Workshop), and a Medical Section (Level I Field Hospital). This company provides information, fire support, protection and sustainment to the battalion.

Support Company HQ. The Support Company HQ consists of five (05) personnel including two officers. It provides operational and logistics support to the Battalion HQ and coordinates the logistics sustenance of all the COBs and TOBs. The Mortar, Engineer, Reconnaissance and Surveillance Platoons provide operation support to the battalion, employed either centrally or as per tactical situation.

Mortar Platoon. The Mortar Platoon consists of one (01) officer, two (02) warrant officers ten (10) NCOs and twelve (12) enlisted soldiers. The platoon is equipped with six (06) infantry mortars for providing indirect fire support and illumination cover to the battalion. Based on the operational requirements and commanders' appreciation, the mortar platoon may be either centrally kept or deployed in section level at COBs. At least 25 percent of Officers and WOs should be trained in directing Mortar Fire. When not employed in on their primary role, the platoon personnel will complement other operational activities of the support company and serve as an additional ORT.

Engineer Platoon. The Engineer Platoon consists of one (01) officer, two (02) warrant officers, seven (07) NCOs and ten (10) enlisted personnel. The



platoon has EOD, field engineering, minor construction and water supply management capabilities. Important responsibilities are as follows:

- Engineer officer will also act as engineer staff officer to support Battalion HQ Staff.
- Provide technical advice in EOD, field engineering, construction, etc.
- If under self-sustainment, provide basic trade capabilities of plumbing, electrical and carpentry to repair and maintain the battalion facilities.
- Advise the commander on employing engineer assets in mobility, counter mobility and survivability roles to include destruction of IEDs, UXOs and mines.
- Operate earth moving machinery/multipurpose tractors.
- Plan and direct base construction and improvement projects, such as, defences, observation posts and entry control points (ECP).
- EOD technicians operate in conjunction with the battalion dog team.
- Advise on force protection measures against improvised explosive devices (IED) and vehicle born IEDs (VBIED).
- Assist targeted CIMIC/Quick Impact Projects (QIP) where required.
- Plan and monitor operation base master planning and construction.
- Advise on the allocation of engineer resources in the AOR.
- Provide environmental oversight and implementation, and liaise with the environmental focal point of the mission military component and the Mission Environmental Officer

Reconnaissance and Surveillance Platoon. The Battalion Reconnaissance and Surveillance Platoon consists of two (02) officers, two (02) warrant officers, eight (08) NCOs and ten (10) enlisted soldiers. It has a specially trained Reconnaissance Section, which can also act as a special QRT and a Surveillance Section with a UAV and an electronic monitor. The Surveillance Section will coordinate the employment of GS Radars of the ICGs. Its responsibilities include:

- Conduct initial reconnaissance of new areas to which battalion assets will deploy.
- Conduct reconnaissance to gain information in support of Priority Information Requirements.
- Act as a QRT to deal with immediate contingencies as directed by the Battalion Commander.



- Occupy temporary positions from which it can relay information to the battalion Operations Centre.
- Conduct ISR operations as directed by the SA Staff Section in consultation with the Operations Staff Section.
- Adopt a gender-sensitive approach to the security of women and girls.

Logistics Platoon. The Logistics Platoon consists of the Logistics Section, the Signals Section, the Transport Section and the Field Workshop. It provides the sustainment and maintenance cover to the battalion and its subordinate units. It has three (03) officers, five (05) warrant officers, eighteen (18) NCOs and twenty (20) enlisted personnel.

- Logistics Section. The Logistics Section provides support for running the field kitchen and unit canteen, provision and distribution of supplies and expendables, and maintenance of weapons, management of ordnance and general stores for the battalion.
- Signals Section. The Signals Section is responsible to maintain uninterrupted line and radio communications with all the static bases and mobile operational elements in the battalion AOR. It will operate the battalion exchange and ensure communications with HQ, the subordinate units and other lateral military entities. The section will remain in radio contact with all operational elements, neighbouring units and higher HQ, and maintain hotlines and Video Tele-Conferencing (VTC) facility with the higher HQ situation centre/operations centre and Company Operations Centres at all times.
- Transport Section. The Transport Section is responsible for operating all
 essential vehicles of the battalion and coordinating the transport fleet
 management of various ICGs. It will coordinate the preventive maintenance and repairs with the Field Workshop.
- Field Workshop. The Field Workshop is responsible for providing repair and recovery cover to the battalion (weapons, instruments, signals and engineer equipment, vehicles, etc.). It will have specially trained technicians (mechanical, electrical, electronics, armourers, etc.).
 - **Note:** All personnel of the Transport Section and Field Workshop should be qualified drivers (Dual Trade).
- Medical Section. The Medical Section consists of two (02) medical officers, six (06) paramedics, nurses or nursing assistants, three (03) attendants (normally a laboratory technician, dispenser and medical clerk) and one (01) ambulance with a driver with the capabilities described in the



Medical Support Manual. This may be considered as the minimum composition of the Level 1 Medical Section. The numbers may vary depending on the operational requirements, and as agreed in the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU). The Medical Section provides Level I medical care to the battalion. It provides immediate life-saving and resuscitation capabilities, along with routine clinical care. In the case of serious injury, the Medical Section must be able to stabilize patients and prepare them for transport to higher level facilities. The Medical Section is mobile, and shall be able to deploy into remote field locations, in whole or half strength. Each ICG will have a paramedic, nurse or medic trained in the equivalent of advanced trauma life support to ensure patients can be stabilized and prepared for evacuation. The Medical Section Commander will act as health adviser to the Battalion Commander and staff; and provides HIV/AIDS counselling to all ranks. The Medical Section Commander's responsibilities are as follows:

- Responsible for the day-to-day operations of his/her Medical Unit and for the services it provides to the supported UN population dependency.
- Oversees medical services provided by the battalion and ensures that this meets the standards described in the UN Contingent Owned Equipment (COE) Manual and the Medical Support Manual.
- Coordinates medical logistics support to the battalion with the SMO and/or the respective national support and logistics elements.
- Oversees implementation of preventive medicine, hygiene and environmental health measures within the battalion AOR.
- Oversees medical training and health education of all personnel in the unit, including HIV/AIDS prevention.
- Compiles statistics and prepares reports as required by the CMO/FMO for submission to UN HQ.
- Provides professional supervision to and responsible for the welfare and conduct of medical staff in the Unit.
- In particular, the Medical Section shall:
 - * Develop battalion SOPs that ensure uncontaminated drinking water is supplied to and consumed by PK soldiers; ensures proper control of unit waste (both human waste and trash); prevents weather-related problems such as cold weather injuries, frostbite, trench foot, and immersion foot; heat related injuries, such as, heat exhaustion, heat stroke, and sunburn; ensures protection against vector-borne diseases,



infestations, and poisonous flora and fauna such as snakes, scorpions, and vegetation that causes skin irritation and ensures strict implementation of the battalion rest plan.

- * Assist in casualty collection and medical evacuation from the ICGs to the next level of medical cover.
- * Supply and inspect medical aid bags and provide in-mission first aid (combat lifesaver) training to battalion personnel.

Note: Depending on operational requirements, geographic separation and points of deployments, a UN Infantry Battalion may be grouped with an additional Level 1 medical facility to provide for at least one medical officer, and a combination of at least three nurses, paramedics or nursing assistants, with an ambulance support as required to ensure evacuation of casualties to a medical facility within one hour following injury.

1.4.4: Infantry Company (Mechanized/Motorized).

The detailed organization and structure of an Infantry Company Group (ICG) is covered in Chapter 8 of Vol. I of UNIBAM. Each ICG is configured with a Mechanized Platoon, three Rifle Platoons (Motorized) and a Support Platoon, to make it self-sustaining both operationally and logistically. Being a versatile and tactically integrated group, the ICG has multifaceted capabilities suitable to peacekeeping operations in accordance with the mandate. Organic firepower, enhanced day and night observation and surveillance capabilities, dedicated interpreters and situational awareness staff for outreach and engagement, protected mobility for quick response, engineer and signal specialists and effective inter-communication systems, enable and enhance the potential of the ICG to obtain optimal operational reach and increased visibility. Based on the mission requirements and envisaged role, the ICG is easily adaptable, flexible and self-reliant up to the section level in all respects.





CHAPTER 2



Tasks

1.1: Introduction.

A UN Peacekeeping Infantry Battalion should execute common core tasks in order to accomplish assigned missions. This chapter provides details for the resourcing, planning and execution of these tasks.

1.2: Purpose.

The purpose of this chapter is to provide information to the UN Infantry Battalion Commander and staff concerning the core battalion peacekeeping tasks with the purpose, planning considerations, modalities of conduct in a peacekeeping environment and the related generic capability standards. The description of these tasks provides the Battalion Commander with a reference guide for use in evaluating and training the battalion during predeployment and in-mission deployment.





2.1: Patrolling



2.1.1: General Description.

Patrolling is a core peacekeeping task and can create or support a number of tactical effects required by the commander. It is a means and method to promote a visible presence of the UN in a mission area for the purposes of outreach, restoring and maintaining a safe and secure environment, establishing credibility and legitimacy of the mission and acting as a deterrence. Patrolling should display a friendly but robust posture to establish rapport, generate faith, build confidence and trust in the UN effort. When planned and executed robustly and intelligently, patrols can impart important tactical advantages for the force. Patrols provide wide area mission security and protection across the area of responsibility and contribute positively to force protection and mandate implementation.

Active patrolling is required to achieve and maintain complete freedom of movement. All military and civilian police components undertake patrolling in one form or another. Any movement between UN bases, regardless of the intended task or purpose, may be considered to be a patrol in order to ensure that sufficient planning and coordination takes place. A patrol should always retain its tactical balance and be capable of executing operational tasks to address any threat that may endanger the execution of the mandate (particularly where the physical safety of civilians is concerned including protection of women and girls from sexual violence).

Regular, visible patrols, particularly those that interact with the local community, reassure the local civilian population of the mission's intent to protect them. Through routine interaction with the local community, patrols are one of the military component's most important means of gaining an understanding of the threats that civilians face. This information is critical for missions with protection of civilians' mandates, as they are required to prevent attacks on civilians from occurring.

2.1.2: Basic Tasks.

Specific patrol tasks will be described in greater detail in Mission Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs). Subject to the relevant mandate, typically these tasks include the following activities:



- Reassure and protect isolated/threatened communities and displaced persons especially women and children at risk and deter potential spoilers and human rights violators.
- Observe, monitor, supervise and verify ceasefire lines/compliance of agreements/troop deployments and interpose between warring factions.
- Observe and report on movements of other armed groups.
- Inspect existing or abandoned positions.
- Conduct inspections or verifications.
- Investigate incidents (within context, capability and level).
- Carry out reconnaissance to gather or confirm information.
- Record observed allegations of human rights violations for sharing with the human rights component for verification and follow-up.
- Establish a physical link and maintain lines of communication between adjoining but relatively isolated UN positions.
- Establish mobile OPs/CPs to observe areas that fixed OPs and CPs cannot observe and/or observe from isolated/unoccupied OPs.
- Establish TOBs/FOBs or long range patrols in specific areas to ensure extended UN presence and to deter potential spoilers.
- Conduct Joint Monitoring Team Patrols (including a mix of women and men) for specific purposes.
- Establish and maintain freedom of movement for UN forces as per mandate.
- Establish liaison and contact with local leaders (including female leaders), societal factions and local population.
- Interact with local communities to gain an understanding of the threats to their physical safety. Recognise early-warning indicators for sexual and gender-based violence.
- Provide protection to local population travelling without UN escort especially for women travelling to and from regular destinations (e.g., markets, fields, water sources).
- Monitor curfews.
- Demonstrate the presence and visibility of the UN and act as deterrence to all parties in the AOR.
- Conduct Route Reconnaissance.



- Conduct CIMIC tasks when necessary and support CIMIC teams and operators from other units tasked in the AOR.
- Escort or conduct joint patrolling with UN civilian components (Gender, CP, CA, PI, HR, etc.) and UN police/local police or military elements.
- Create a safe and secure environment for the provision of humanitarian assistance.
- Conduct patrols in areas that have been identified as at risk routes for women.
- Carry out patrolling by aerial insertion to address inaccessible areas and patrolling with riverine/naval assets.

2.1.3: Planning Considerations.

Patrol planning and execution at battalion level should reflect the higher commanders' intent and is a tool to gain mission essential and critical information. It should conform to the mission CONOPS and OPORD. Patrol planning, execution and reporting should follow a set procedure to ensure that all mission requirements are attended to and achieved. Important issues to be kept in mind are:

- Situational Awareness. Patrols are the primary means of gathering and disseminating information and contribute to maintenance of real time situational awareness. Patrols should be planned to achieve operational tasks in support of and driven by the objectives of the mandate, CONOPS, Operational Orders and Battalion Operational Plans. Patrols should be employed based on information-led targeting with due considerations to the prevailing operational environment and the challenges in the mission area. Patrols should be cognisant of the threats, terrain restrictions and operational constraints in which they have to operate.
- Command, Control and Communications. Whatever the composition
 or level of patrolling activity, it should be centrally controlled by the battalion and well integrated/coordinated with other operational activities
 at the sector and force level. An adequate redundancy of communications should be catered for, to deal with emergencies. Command and
 control responsibility has to be clearly stipulated, especially when operating as part of joint monitoring teams and while escorting UNMOs.
- Visibility. In addition to facilitating achievement of mandated objectives, patrols are the most common means to display visibility of the UN



and help to establish faith and credibility through effective interaction with civilians. Interaction with women's groups is essential to understand and mitigate risks to women and girls and to access information related to threats against "at-risk" populations. Patrolling should be increased in areas where reports of violent incidences against women occur and where there is a high level of female-headed households.

- **Security.** Patrols should be capable of self-protection and use force in tactically adverse situations and in hostile environments to deter potential threats within the parameters of Rules of Engagement and directives on use of force. However, they should exercise restraint and maturity in dealing with even extremely provocative situations.
- Awareness of other mission components' working modalities: When
 escorting UNMOs and CIMIC teams, they should remain discretely visible. Similarly, when escorting and working with human rights officers,
 they should be aware of key issues pertaining to their working modalities (e.g., confidentiality).
- Preparations and Rehearsal. Patrol leaders should ensure thorough operational and administrative preparations, detailed briefing and realistic rehearsals to respond appropriately to various contingencies.
- Civil Military Interface. Being the eyes and ears of the mission, patrols should be able to facilitate effective civil military interface and meaningful outreach and engagement. The patrols should also be targeted for outreach and engagement with women in the community.
- Grouping. Women interpreters and women military personnel will invariably be grouped with the patrols when interaction with local women is expected.
- Joint Patrolling. Joint patrolling with human rights and other civilian components has become an increasing practice in several peace operations. It offers the advantage of building on complementary expertise and develops a shared understanding of threats and vulnerabilities.
- Important Planning Parameters.
 - * Define the mission and objectives of the patrol and develop a coherent and integrated patrol plan.
 - * In the case of joint patrols, consult with other mission components and agree on working modalities (including issues of communication), priorities and objectives.



- * Avoid predictability. Routes, timings, frequency and composition should be varied on a daily basis.
- * Study the general situation in the area of responsibility and the behaviour and potential courses of action of armed groups, locals and government officials towards UN forces and against each other in areas through which the patrol may pass. Capitalize on available human rights information in the mission, which provide useful inputs on belligerents' modus operandi and potential threats and vulnerabilities against the population.
- * Study previous patrol reports for information of use to the patrol (e.g., going conditions, obstacles, problems encountered, etc.).
- * Study areas where heightened threats to the safety of civilians may exist to factor into the patrol plan.
- * Consider local language and plan to include an interpreter in patrols when necessary.
- * Confirm local procedures in use by the opposing armed forces in the area and by the local civilian police.
- * Identify restrictions imposed on patrol movement under the Status of Forces Agreement and identify the locations of control and checkpoints, boundaries, etc. Mark these clearly on patrol maps along with the positions of the respective lines of forward defences.
- * Identify permanent or temporary road restrictions in the area of patrolling.
- * Identify areas that need special permission to enter or to pass through.
- Identify areas that will make it difficult to communicate or terrain that would make communication impossible and take necessary remedial actions.
- * Identify and coordinate with other UN activities, OPs/CPs or patrols in the area and confirm their tasks.
- * Notify flanking units, OPs, other patrols and any intermediate control posts en-route particularly if the patrol is crossing ceasefire lines or buffer zones.
- * Identify routes prone to mine threat and preferably avoid movement on unused roads/tracks. Use roads that are commonly used by locals.



- * Plan and coordinate the routes to be followed, including alternate routes out of the area in the event roadblocks or restrictions are encountered.
- * Plan for places (UN-positions) to use for safety if the situation so requires.
- * Plan localities to be visited (including where specific threats to women exist) and the action to be followed at each locality.
- Make out an approximate time schedule for the patrol. If night operations are required, carry out the required preparation and coordination.
- * Identify critical information needed for situational awareness.
- * Cater for contingency of quick reaction teams, casualty evacuation by helicopters/vehicles, etc.
- * Consult the Early-warning Indicators on sexual violence to identify factors associated with risk.
- * Consider that communication channels are likely to be monitored and adjust security of communications accordingly.
- * Conduct a careful and thorough briefing on the task (including restrictions or limitations that are currently in force).
- * Select and check equipment, vehicles and other administrative necessities.
- * Brief the HQ duty officers who will monitor the patrol to provide information on task, composition, route, timings, communication, coordination and control aspects and actions during emergency.
- * Draw on satellite imagery, where available, during planning.

2.1.4 : Conduct.

General. Patrol should strictly comply with the operational plan for its security.

- Patrols should adhere to principle of impartiality and to the international character of the mission.
- Patrols must fully understand and adhere to the UN Zero-Tolerance Policy on Sexual Exploitation and Abuse.
- Progress of the patrol is to be centrally monitored and coordinated by higher HQ.



- Maintain effective inter-communication and remain in continuous contact with the base, control HQ and other elements in the AOR.
- Look for tell tale signs, such as, the absence of children or normal activities around a village that arouse suspicion.
- Be alert of any threat and operate cautiously as per best practices of peacekeeping operations. If threatened, do not capitulate; stand your ground tactically and negotiate. In an emergency, contact the control HQ using the mission emergency code words.
- Quick reaction teams are to be on standby.
- Ensure the security of all maps, documents and equipment.
- Ensure personal safety and security by proper field craft and protective clothing.
- Strengthen all security vehicles against small arms fire and IED threat.
- Do not attempt to overtake mobile military vehicles or convoys.
- Follow mission SOPs for crossing friendly lines, link up and establishing identity with CPs, OPs and other UN Patrols en route.
- Refrain from diverging from the original patrol plan in order to investigate unscheduled incidents or situations without obtaining approval of HO.
- Be vigilant when people speak and interact freely with the patrol.
- An interpreter may be grouped with a patrol if, the situation so demands and take the necessary precautions not to expose them to retaliation.
- If access to an area is denied by the military or police element of host country, or any other groups, ascertain more details on the reasons and authority for such a denial and inform the HQ for further confirmation with the unit Liaison Officer.

Record Observations. Maintain a written and photographic record of time and grid reference of all observations (including threats to the civilian population) made during the patrol. Draw sketches where these are helpful. Record any changes in terrain, dispositions and civilian activity. Maps should be updated with all the terrain and infrastructural changes

Patrol Debriefing. After return, conduct a collective and detailed debriefing to derive vital information for the commanders without delay. Prepare an after action review to capture best practices and areas of improvement



for the future. Information related to the safety and well-being of the local population should be communicated to the relevant civilian components.

Reporting. Report relevant information as per task in a timely, accurate, clear and concise manner, substantiated with evaluations and assessments, to support higher commanders' decision-making. Supplement such information with a detailed written report with sketches, photographs and/or diagrams as necessary. Information on violations committed against the civilian population such as the presence of children in armed groups, reports of killings or sexual violence, attacks on schools and hospitals, and other violations on which the peacekeeping mission is mandated by the Security Council to report, should be signalled to all relevant civilian components.

2.1.5: Organization.

A battalion with its integral companies deployed in independent and self-sustaining operating bases will primarily use patrols to carry out its operational tasks. Centralised assets and capabilities of the battalion (reconnaissance, mobility support, outreach and engagement teams, fire support capabilities, etc.) are attached or provided to the sub-units as per operational necessities.

- **Personnel.** Patrol size varies from a company group to a buddy team to an adequately resourced platoon or company. Patrolling may be carried out on foot, vehicle/APC mounted or by air. As in multidimensional integrated missions, additional grouping of UNMOs and other specialists/staff from civilian components, including gender experts and female interpreters may also accompany a patrol as Joint Monitoring Teams.
- **Equipment.** In normal circumstances, an infantry component shall carry their personal arms and ammunition and associated operational equipment as per the level of grouping. Additional specialist equipment and capabilities may be grouped temporarily with the companies based on task by the battalion.

2.1.6 : Support.

Patrols should be capable of administratively sustaining themselves for the task and duration of the patrol under all weather conditions and should:



- Ensure wearing of distinctive identification signs for both day and night patrolling.
- Have communication equipment including satellite phone with adequate spare batteries.
- Have adequate food and water.
- Obtain and coordinate medical support and attachments.
- Obtain transportation support and ensure preventive maintenance and checks.

(Suggested task capability standards are at p. 215)





2.2: Observation Post



2.2.1: General Description.

The Observation Post (OP) is a manned peacekeeping position established to monitor and observe a certain area, object or event. An OP can be permanent, temporary, static, or mobile. Reports from OPs provide timely, accurate, and relevant information to higher HQ, adjacent units and other mission components in the sector. Observing and reporting from OPs is a cornerstone peacekeeping operations task. A thorough analysis of accurate and timely OP observations and reports provide the Battalion Commander and staff with critical information required for recording and understanding developing situations that effect UN peacekeeping missions.

2.2.2: Basic Tasks.

The basic tasks of an OP are to:

- Observe and report all activities in the observation area to higher HQ through established SOPs and to adjacent OPs or units as required or appropriate.
- Increase security in the Area of Operations (AOR) by demonstrating vigilant and visible peacekeeper presence to all parties and populations especially women in the area.
- Monitor movement in and around airspace, coastal areas, airfields, buffer zones (BZ), ceasefire lines (CFL) boundaries, borders and protected zones.
- Count special traffic, such as, military vehicles, tanks, armored personnel carriers (APC), artillery, etc.
- Monitor activities of parties involved in the conflict and all other abnormal or suspicious activities, including threats to civilians. Be aware of the use of women as "porters" in transporting illegal weapons.
- Monitor violations of international agreements or conventions.
- Observe and record human rights and international humanitarian law violations and promptly share information with the human rights component.
- Observe BZ restrictions.
- Support other battalion operations as required.



2.2.3: Planning Considerations.

OPs are established and manned as early as possible in a new AOR as they serve as the eyes and ears of the missions, the Battalion Commander and staff. The battalion and its deployed companies should immediately establish Temporary Observation Posts (TOP) as an initial priority of work.

- Location. Terrain that maximizes observation, threat analysis and probable courses of actions (COA), defensive requirements, and logistical sustainment should be taken into account when deciding on OP location and force structure.
- **Coordination**. Coordinate OP establishment with other peacekeeping units, civilian actors, belligerent and friendly forces, as well as with national and non-governmental organizations and agencies in the AOR. Conduct liaison and establish rapport with belligerent forces and the local population (including women) under observation.
- Observation. Preferably, an OP should allow 360 degrees/maximum observation and monitoring, 24 hours a day, under all weather and light conditions.
- Observation Equipment. An OP location should have appropriate observation and communication equipment with adequate back up and power source.
- **Protection**. OP position should be defensible under all weather and light conditions. The entry/exit, protection and evacuation procedures should be well established as per unit SOP.
- **Logistics**. The OP should have adequate supplies, potable water, ammunition and transportation to sustain itself for the duration.
- Reporting. An OP should be able to provide timely, accurate and relevant reports to higher HQ. Information reported should be verified and corroborated by multiple sources and documented though imagery and other forms of electronic media.
- **Early-warning Indicators**. OP personnel should be trained in recognising early-warning indicators for sexual and gender-based violence.
- **Environment**. OP occupation and maintenance must not degrade the environment (e.g., appropriate waste management and disposal, precautions against deforestation, etc.) or living conditions of the local population (facilitating women's access to natural resources).



- Additional Capacity. OP infrastructure, logistics and administration should be capable of supporting additional UN Personnel if required and provide security to endangered civilian populations within its capacity.
- **Training**. Train and equip designated OP personnel to effectively observe, monitor and report. Ensure OP personnel are trained to operate and maintain OP equipment at the operator level.
- Temporary Observation Posts. TOPs are invariably used to cover areas
 and events of a temporary nature that cannot be covered from fixed OPs.
 Their operation may range from for a few hours to several days. TOPs
 may be manned by foot patrols, vehicle patrols, APCs or other deployed
 troops.

2.2.4 : Conduct.

- Reconnaissance. Initial reconnaissance and site survey to determine optimal OP locations should be carried out. In addition, survey and reconnoitre the area to be observed and monitored.
- OP Location Design. Determine OP design to include troop shelters (gender specific), defences, structures for field sanitation and hygiene, supply storage, entry control points (ECP), medical facilities, helipad/ parking areas as appropriate, sheltered cooking and dining areas, human waste and garbage disposal facilities, sheltered generator sites, motor pool, religious facilities, etc.
- **Deployment.** Based on the operational parameters, threat perception, task, reconnaissance, timelines and logistics requirements, requisition troops, supplies, equipment, and transportation and deploy the OP as per mission SOP.
- **Display of UN Insignia**. Conspicuous UN markings on installations, vehicles and personnel are a source of protection.
- Protection. Establish a perimeter surrounding the OP that incorporates early-warning systems, devices and sensors to cover blind spots outside of the perimeter. Establish ECPs for visitors to the OP and exit points for OP personnel only known to peacekeepers.
- **Observation**. Establish observation, monitoring, and reporting criteria and site observation means/equipments (OP Tower, vantage point, OP view point, etc.).
- Vigilance. OP vigilance should remain constant and without distraction.



- Alert procedures. Redundancy of communications and alert signals within the OP and with the higher HQ should be established for emergency situations.
- Reinforcement and Support. Coordinate fires, air support, QRF, and MEDAVAC support with battalion or force assets as necessary in the event of an emergency situation.
- **Serviceability**. All communication, lighting and monitoring equipment should be maintained at a fully mission capable level.
- **Rest and Relief**. Plan proper relief for 24/7 observation and monitoring with adequate reserves.
- ROE. OP personnel must strictly follow ROE and limitations on the use of force.
- Reporting. Accurate, timely and relevant reporting (including sex disaggregated reporting) is a primary function of an OP. An observation not reported may have a significant negative impact on the security of the unit and mission accomplishment.

2.2.5: Organization.

- **Strength**. The number of personnel assigned to an OP is determined by mission, threat conditions, time constraints, logistics requirements and availability of troops.
- Command and Control. The OP should have an established chain of command.
- **Documentation.** All OPs should maintain OP logs and if required carry out digital recording of events.

2.2.6 : Support.

- Infrastructure. An OP location should have infrastructure for accommodation, ablutions, lighting, sustenance and protection. Continually improve and maintain OP infrastructure to include shelters, sanitation and hygiene facilities, water points, cooking and eating areas protected from inclement weather, and OP drainage and garbage disposal works that do not degrade the environment or living conditions of the local population.
- Weapons/Equipment/Stores. The OP will have both UNOE and COE observation and communication equipment as per mission SOP and



ground requirements. All equipment should be serviceable, well maintained and accounted for during handing and taking over. The OP will also have vehicles to perform its task and for logistics sustenance. In case the security situation demands, an OP location may have additional weapon systems.

- Stocking. An OP location should be stocked with adequate food, water, fuel and other logistics stores including spares for self-sustainment.
- Medical. Being an independent entity, an OP should have an emergency medical kit for first aid and may be prepared to hold casualties for a short duration until evacuated.
- Maintenance. An OP should be capable of maintaining and attending to minor repairs to equipment and vehicles and should be stocked and equipped accordingly.
- **Health and Hygiene**. The commander of the OP will ensure proper health and hygiene of OP personnel as per SOP.

(Suggested task capability standards are at p. 216)





2.3 : Checkpoint



2.3.1: General Description.

A Checkpoint (CP) is a manned and self-contained position deployed on a road or track to observe/check, inspect/search personnel or vehicles and control movement into and out of a designated area (e.g. buffer zone or DMZ, or a specific area in a Company AOR). A CP can be either permanent or temporary. Permanent checkpoints are established on the main access routes and cannot be moved or closed without the authorization of the Force Commander. Temporary checkpoints (vehicle based or foot based mobile CPs) may be set up on minor routes, for a specific duration, usually with authorization of the Battalion Commander.

2.3.2: Basic Tasks.

CPs are set up to display UN will and capacity to exercise control and facilitate the following activities:

- Project UN presence and operational reach to all parties and the population in the area to reassure and build confidence.
- Control movement in and out of a designated area in support of the
 overall safety and security in the AOR and to protect civilian population
 (movement of ethnic groups, refugees, IDPs, including women, vulnerable population, etc.). To that end, information collected through checkpoints should be referred to relevant stakeholders through pre-determined information-management structures and processes.
- Control movements into/out of a DMZ, particularly during a crisis.
- Facilitate routine activities for livelihood and maintaining freedom of movement in the AOR based on consultation with the local population and in line with the POC strategy.
- Prevent smuggling of weapons, ammunition, explosives and other illegal/contraband material, drugs or items.
- Confiscate illegal items and apprehend the persons carrying them.
- Prevent illegal armed personnel or groups from passing through a particular area.
- Carry out specific survey, monitoring and information-gathering activity and share observations with relevant stakeholders through pre-determined information-management structures and processes.



- Carry out specific vehicle/personnel search.
- Detain criminals or wanted personnel.
- Act as an OP as part of the peacekeeping force's observation plan.
- Control movement of crowds, enforce a curfew and/or detain criminals, wanted personnel and known offenders as part of public order management.
- Dominate the area of responsibility around the control point.

2.3.3: Planning Considerations.

- Purpose. Being a control measure, the deployment of a CP or temporary CP should be done only if operationally necessary and should aid freedom of movement, protection of civilians and establish a safe and secure environment. Special care should be taken to prevent any harassment of the local population and to remain respectful of local customs.
- **Location**. Siting of a CP should take into consideration the space required to conduct various activities, domination of the area by observation, terrain configuration to prevent bypassing and defensibility.
- Grouping. Depending on the purpose, security situation and operational requirement, the CP may be composed of interpreters, EOD personnel, female military/police personnel, medical attendants, UN Police, sniffer dogs, host military/police/representatives of local civil authorities and the APCs (with protected mobility and firepower) for deterrence.
- Legality. Commanders and troops should clearly understand the legal aspects pertaining to ROE for meeting certain legal requirements in conduct of tasks.
- **Coordination with Civil Authorities.** Support for a CP by civil authorities reinforces legitimacy and credibility. The special powers of local police to search, arrest and seize; and its ability to identify criminals, etc., will help better coordination and functioning of the CP.
- Reinforcements. Reinforcements to deal with emergency/crisis situations should be planned, coordinated and troops earmarked to respond rapidly.
- Knowledge. CP personnel should have good civic knowledge with regard to personal identity cards, vehicle documents, government authorities' seal and signatures, data of local population etc. Only a trained, alert and



intelligent CP soldier can quickly identify a problem or anomaly and take appropriate action.

- Contingency Planning and Rehearsals. Likely scenarios and operational challenges that could be encountered in the CP should be analysed, SOPs and drills established and well rehearsed to respond effectively.
- POC. Coordination should be ensured with relevant actors on POC considerations, such as, location of routes for livelihood activities and information-management processes. Female uniformed personnel, community liaison staff and language staff should be included as part of CP.

2.3.4: Conduct.

- Composition. A CP will invariably be composed of the following elements:
 - * Command element (for control and coordination of activities).
 - * Control element (barrier sentries and guides to control the flow of personnel and traffic).
 - * Monitoring element (observes and alerts the CP from a vantage point).
 - * Search element (men and women to search/frisk personnel and vehicles).
 - * Protection element (provide close protection to all other elements).
 - * Reserve element (to respond to any crisis situation).
- **Actions**. A CP should ensure the following actions for efficient conduct:
 - * Carry out detailed preparations and briefing of all personnel including any attached elements.
 - * CP should be clearly identifiable from a distance with UN markings and insignia.
 - CP should be clearly marked with warning/cautionary notes or sign postings in vernacular language/s, to guide the personnel and traffic to waiting area, search area, detention area, etc.
 - * Ensure protection arrangements of CP personnel and UN assets including vehicles.
 - CP area should be well demarcated with obstacles (hard and barbed wire), barricades and sign boards at the entry, waiting, search, detention, exit areas.



- * Measures to reduce speed of vehicles (road bumps, etc.) and to canalize the traffic and personnel should be taken.
- * CP should be in continuous communication with the control HQ and should cater for effective inter-communication with all the elements of the CP.
- * All personnel to observe local customs to avoid offending the local population.
- * CP should have a local alarm scheme to alert all elements of the CP.
- * All vehicles and pedestrians should be channelled through the barriers systematically, and checked in accordance with mission SOPs.
- * Only the nominated search personnel (including women) will carry out frisking or searching of the vehicles and their actions will be covered by the protection element.
- ⋆ Checking will be carried out within the barriers in the search area by the civil police (including female police) if available, otherwise by barrier sentries or NCOs.
- * Suspicious vehicles may be searched with the EOD personnel and the sniffer dog.
- * Detainees should be segregated and carefully guarded.
- * If required, the CP should be able to quickly and effectively block the road to prevent any passage including forced passage.
- * The commander should maintain a log of all important events and incidents.
- * The commander must carefully assess the effect of his/her controls and take timely actions to ensure smooth and frictionless conduct.

2.3.5: Organization.

A CP can be established by a self-sufficient and independent tactical group ranging from a section to a platoon, depending on the task, situation and operational requirement. All CP activities will be centrally coordinated at the battalion level and control will be exercised at company level. Due to concurrent execution of other tasks, a COB may only be able to take out a platoon level CP or 2 or 3 Section level CPs. CPs should be appropriately configured and grouped with additional personnel to augment its efficacy as mentioned in paragraph 2.3.3.



2.3.6 : Support.

A CP should be supported with the following:

- Vehicles for mobility.
- Means of communication.
- Stores for self-protection (barricades, sand bags, wire obstacles, lighting arrangements flood lights, flash lights, etc.).
- Stores for guidance and control (warning boards, loud hailers, guiding tapes/ropes, road markers, etc.).
- Logistics sustenance (food, water, first aid kit, waste/recycling bins, etc.) for the duration.
- Engineer stores (EOD stores, detectors, under carriage inspection mirrors, etc.).

(Suggested task capability standards are at p. 218)





2.4: Outreach and Engagement



2.4.1: General Description.

The creation and maintenance of a safe and secure environment in the AOR that promotes peace, recovery and development is a key responsibility of the battalion. Therefore, commanders and staff in the battalion should maintain an excellent, cooperative relationship with other actors in the field and have good liaison with the local government authorities and parties to the conflict.

The aim of Outreach and Engagement is to reach out to all sections of the population, remote geographical locations of the AOR and the various power centres with a view to generate trust and faith in the peace process. To achieve that, the battalion should undertake genuine and purpose-oriented confidence-building measures to establish normalcy, alleviate suffering of the deprived, mitigate the threats and vulnerabilities the local population faces, and to find a sustainable solution in close coordination with other relevant stakeholders.

Outreach and engagement comprises all actions taken by the battalion elements to carry out constructive and active engagement of the local population and other actors in the field. This includes host civilian authorities, military and police organizations; the parties to the conflict and spoilers, the Civil Military Coordination (with UN system entities and other partners – IOs, ROs, NGOs, etc.), welfare activities and the planned Quick Impact Projects undertaken by the battalion in the AOR as part of a integrated and comprehensive mission level effort. Contingents are also required to work closely with civilian elements of the mission including Human Rights, Child Protection, UNHCR, etc. and interaction may have to take place at the tactical level between patrol commanders and representatives of protection activities.

2.4.2: Basic Tasks.

As custodians of peace and stability, the infantry battalion has a major role to perform to ensure correct and timely implementation and achievement of the mandated objectives. The battalion will perform Outreach and Engagement through the following primary functions.



2.4.2.1: Operational.

- Enhance Visibility. Conduct robust mobile operations, extensive patrolling (including standing and long-range patrols) and establishment of TOBs to increase operational reach to inaccessible or remote areas to dominate, deter and enhance security to the populace.
- Create and Maintain Safe and Secure Environment. Battalion operational activities are directed to restore, create and maintain a safe and secure environment in which all sections of the population can live without fear and with full freedom and also to ensure the peace process remains on track.
- Protection of Civilians. POC, based on a comprehensive mission-wide strategy to include joint planning, coordination with other protection actors, information sharing, risk analysis and conduct of MET, assumes importance at battalion level. As battalions go about their daily work, it is essential that they interact with the local communities they come in contact with. This will help to establish trust, manage expectations of the local community by indicating the extent of the mission's capabilities regarding the protection of civilians, and gain a more comprehensive understanding of the threats and vulnerabilities facing civilians in the mission area. Regular outreach and engagement with local communities will also help to determine how early-warning mechanisms can be established to inform the military component of imminent threat of violence to civilians.
- **Stabilisation**. Address sanctuaries of possible aggressors or spoilers and engage with their leadership to conform to the peace process.
- Liaison. Carry out liaison with the various factions.
- Protection from Mines. Carry out emergency Mine/UXO/IED clearance in AOR in conjunction with Mission MACC, mark minefields and conduct mine-awareness training.
- Support DDR. Facilitate and support Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration efforts of the Mission DDR component including provision of security cover, logistics support and conduct proactive disarmament operations as mandated/authorized.



2.4.2.2 : Societal.

- Humanitarian. Provide a safe and secure environment to create the necessary security conditions for the provision of humanitarian assistance. If appropriate, and at the request of humanitarian actors, the use of military and mission assets to support humanitarian assistance should be based on identified humanitarian needs, timely, unique in capability and availability.
- Protect Vulnerable Sections of the Society as a Whole. Identify societal vulnerabilities with particular focus to ethnic/religious/sectarian groups, women, children and the elderly; and take measures to prevent threat manifestation and protect from danger.
- Protection of Women. The battalion should pay particular attention to prevent, mitigate or reduce sexual and gender based violence, and sexual violence used as a tactic of war as well as prevent any sexual exploitation and abuse in the AOR; the battalion should be informed and trained on local referral arrangements (with local contact details for response services) regarding incidents of sexual violence.
- **Protection of Children.** Battalion should ensure protection of children.
- **Ensure Freedom of Movement.** Ensure freedom of movement for livelihood and other routine activities including specific protection of women's daily activities (collecting wood, water, travelling to market, etc. without fear of life or danger.
- Key Leader Engagement. Engage key leaders (including women) in the AOR to include social elites, community bodies, religious heads, tribal/ ethnic chieftains, political heads, factional leaders and local governmental officials/police and military authorities to find amicable solutions and to prevent any triggers that may endanger the peace and tranquillity in the AOR.
- **Protection of the Environment.** The battalion should pay attention to prevent and mitigate environmental impacts of its operations.

2.4.2.3: Organizational.

 Support Local Administration. Assistance to the local administration (though limited in scope for the military, but yet very important) to comply with the principles of good governance and maintenance of public law and order may be carried out as required. The battalion should estab-



lish links with the local and provincial level authorities for coordination and integrated efforts. Ensure that the support to and collaboration with the national/local security sector promotes a gender-sensitive approach and adheres to United Nations Human Rights Due Diligence Policy. Support to local administration should be systematically coordinated with relevant civilian components and UN agencies.

- Support Early Peacebuilding Activities. Facilitate and support the early peacebuilding activities undertaken by the mission and the larger humanitarian and international community for faster recovery and sustained development.
- **Civil Military Coordination.** It provides for effective interface between the battalion and the political, humanitarian, developmental, human rights, gender, child protection and rule of law components of the mission in the AOR and others in the larger peacebuilding system. It is always coordinated at the highest level and the battalion will be responsible for its own AOR. It helps to build trust and close working partnership with all actors.
- Quick Impact Projects (QIPs). QIPs are small scale, low cost projects that
 are planned and implemented within a short time frame. The primary
 objective of QIPs is to build confidence in the mission, mandate or the
 peace process. In order not to jeopardize humanitarian access, implementation of a QIP project requires close coordination and consultation
 with the Humanitarian Country Team.
- Public Information Campaigns. The battalion can play a vital role in support of the mission public information campaign through its static deployments and mobile operational elements to disseminate information and gather feedbacks from the targeted population.
- Media Management. The local media has to be carefully and proactively
 managed to create a positive atmosphere and prevent negative publicity in consonance with the mission policy. Commanders and troops of
 the battalion should be cognizant of the flash points and other sociocultural sensitivities that could be exploited by the media and institute
 appropriate measures.
- **2.4.2.4:** Battalion Level. All outreach and engagement activities at the battalion level should be in coordination and coherence with mission priorities.



- Winning Hearts and Minds. Targeted use of undertaking confidencebuilding measures and people oriented non-military initiatives aimed at perception management and to establish close contact and build trust, confidence and credibility in the battalion's role.
- **Welfare Activities**. Carry out socially productive, gender-sensitive and creative welfare activities to address immediate needs of the women, girls, boys and men to foster normalcy in day to day life.
- Community Engagement. With good conduct, genuine efforts to help the populace, undertaking initiatives for societal reconciliation and upholding the UN principles, the battalion should play a key role in changing attitudes over time.

2.4.3: Planning Considerations.

- Characteristics of Civilian Entities. Take into consideration that these
 independent entities have their own specific agendas, outlook, attitudes
 and approach to functioning and problem solving, which may not be in
 consonance with military ways of functioning.
- Problem Areas. When working with civilian entities, main problem areas
 to be resolved are the information sharing, joint planning and task sharing aspects.
- **Support to Humanitarian Agencies**. Considerations for providing military support to humanitarian agencies upon request from the HCT through the HC/RC, are that the capability required should be unique to the military, that it cannot be provided in a timely manner by the civilian set up and the use of military should be a last resort and time-limited. The start and duration of any support to UN humanitarian activities should be determined by the HC upon the request or consent by the affected Sovereign State.¹
- Military Role. The battalion may support the humanitarian effort or play a complementary role with the Humanitarian Agencies. Involvement in direct assistance should be weighed on a case-by-case basis and only if it satisfies the criteria of last resort. Activities should focus on indirect assistance and infrastructure support missions.²

¹ Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets to Support United Nations Humanitarian Activities in Complex Emergencies, March 2003, Revision 1, para. 34.

² Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets to Support United Nations Humanitarian Activities in Complex Emergencies, March 2003, Revision 1, para. 38.



- Responsibility. Civilian authorities will coordinate all non-security/ humanitarian effort. Control of humanitarian activity will remain with humanitarian community, and the battalion assets will remain under normal chain of command and control.
- **Integration and Synergy**. The battalion should take the lead in integrating efforts of all actors in the field and promote synergy to optimise effects on the beneficiaries.
- **Cultural Awareness.** Understand cultural and attitudinal sensitivities and respect local customs, traditions and practices.
- **Language Skills.** Knowledge of local language is an asset to establish rapport and bridge the communication gap.

2.4.4 : Conduct.

Outreach and engagement with all sections of society enhances the credibility of the battalion with local actors, promotes the legitimacy of the UN presence, and encourages parties in a conflict to work towards a peaceful settlement. Engaging women specifically is a useful operational tool to build trust and enhance the credibility with the local population.

- **2.4.4.1 : Operational Support.** The battalion should expand its security influence and strive for persistent presence beyond static deployments. It should destabilise factions that seek sanctuary in areas beyond reach and perpetrate violence. Battalion operations should aim to dominate, deter and prevail upon aggressors/spoilers to the peace process and build a safe and secure environment in the AOR for the humanitarian agencies to provide assistance, encourage IDPs to voluntarily return and reassure the population of their protection, especially women.
- **2.4.4.2 : Battalion Assistance.** Battalion may provide assistance to civilian entities by providing static security, escort for convoys, provision of transport, communication services and logistics support for specific purpose and duration, field engineering support, medical aid, casualty evacuation, etc.
- **2.4.4.3 : Civil Military Coordination.** It is the system of interaction involving exchange of information, negotiation, de-confliction, mutual support and planning at all levels between the military elements and humanitarian/developmental organizations and the local civilian communities including women's organizations to achieve UN mandated objectives. The infantry



battalion, while taking a lead role in providing security, also have to take on support roles to civilian-led mandated tasks, including those assigned to UN Police.

Therefore, all commanders should have a solid understanding of the aims and objectives of civilian components and the broader strategic, political and social context within which it takes place, and of ways in which the battalion can make a constructive contribution. In this context, at the battalion level, two main reasons to undertake UN-CIMIC activities are for – first, to support management of the operational and tactical interaction between military and civilian actors in all phases of peacekeeping operations; and second, to support creating an enabling environment for the implementation of the mission mandate by maximizing the comparative advantage of all actors operating in the mission area.

UN-CIMIC shall liaise with the UN-CMCoord focal point to ensure that coordination takes place between humanitarian and military actors. In all cases, regardless of the mission or status of the military force, there will be a requirement for the sharing of information. Critical areas for coordination include security, logistics, medical, transportation and communications.³

2.4.4.4: Quick Impact Projects. QIPs are small-scale, rapidly implementable projects of benefit to the population. These projects are used by UN peacekeeping operations to establish and build confidence in the mission, its mandate, and the peace process, thereby improving the environment for effective mandate implementation. Projects shall be devised and/or selected according to one or more of the following criteria:

- Contribution to promoting acceptance of the mandated tasks of the mission amongst the population and/or supporting the credibility of the mission by demonstrating progress in the implementation of these tasks where confidence is lacking.
- Contribution to building confidence in the peace process, and/or building support for the peace process, including through demonstrating early dividends of stability to the population.
- Contribution to improving the environment for mandate implementation by generating support for the mission including through addressing immediate needs of the population.

³ Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets to Support United Nations Humanitarian Activities in Complex Emergencies, March 2003, Revision 1, para. 50-54



It is important to have stakeholder consultation (including the RC/HC and HCT), close monitoring and/or implementation to cover entire cycle, and consider the principles of local ownership, gender, culture, environment and context sensitivity. QIPs help to build confidence through opening communication channels and interface between the battalion and host communities. Some of the projects that are undertaken as QIPs are:

- Construction of roads and tracks, bearing in mind possible environmental impacts.
- Construction of infrastructural and support facilities (camps, schools, furniture, clinic, etc.).
- Provision of basic amenities (water, pond/well, toilet, electricity, radios, etc.).
- Provision of recreational facilities (sports ground and equipment).
- Construction of employment-generating infrastructure (mills, small-scale factories etc.).
- Ensure that QIPs targeting communities are gender sensitive, take into consideration female participation/access, and contribute towards women's empowerment and protection.

2.4.4.5: Welfare Activities. To help restore normalcy and to win the hearts and minds of the local people, welfare activities are undertaken by the battalion by targeting the basic social needs of the people. Consult the Military and Civilian Gender Advisers in order to ensure a gender-sensitive approach.

- Medical camps.
- Promote cultural activities.
- Provide vocational training for economic self-sustenance (in particular target women).
- Provide basic essential support for daily sustenance of the destitute.
- Rehabilitation training and support.
- · Organising sports and games at local level.

2.4.4.6: Important Guidelines.

Promote cooperation and coordination.



- Avoid competition, duplication (resources and effort), conflict of interest and minimize inconsistency and pursue common goals when appropriate.
- Avoid direct humanitarian assistance operations.
- Overcome challenges in interoperability and differences in perception (humanitarian principles are different).
- Avoid compromising humanitarian activities.
- Promote inclusive outlook, consultation with all stakeholders, shared partnership, local ownership and collaborative leadership to achieve common objectives.
- Do not transgress into domain of others and respect their individuality.
- For QIPs and welfare initiatives make intelligent decision-making.
- Harmonize differences and synergise capabilities.
- Mitigate possible negative environmental impacts to avoid negative public perception.

2.4.4.7: Measures to Achieve Effective Outreach and Engagement.

- Carry out continuous and constructive interactions and interface with all sections of the local population and all other actors in the field.
- Liaison and communication with key leaders is important to influence a positive and sustainable outcome.
- Ensure timely information acquisition and sharing with concerned authorities and actors
- Carry out informal meetings to develop personal rapport. Employ female military personnel to engage women in the community to build rapport and trust.
- Develop and cultivate consensus and mutual understanding for all parties concerned including women and men from the community.
- Remember that security, development and diplomacy are interdependent issues and important at even battalion level.
- Be resilient and accommodative to accept other actors' views and standpoint.
- Work for convergence of vision and shared goals.
- Never make promises that cannot be achieved. The battalion should take utmost care in managing local expectations.



The support provided by the battalion should be sustainable and purposeful.

2.4.5: Organization.

Each mission will have a Deputy SRSG (often also taking on the functions of the Resident and/or Humanitarian Coordinator) who is responsible for coordination at mission level. He/she might be assisted by an integrated civil-military staff, Civil-Military Coordination Officers and Liaison Officers, the OCHA, the UN/Humanitarian Country Team, and the CAOR. At the mission level, a Joint Civil-Military Operations Centre also would be established. The battalion will function in an integrated and cohesive mission set up and is expected to carry out lateral functional coordination with other stakeholders up to the COB level.

2.4.6 : Support.

The battalion organic resources have the capability to undertake meaningful Outreach and Engagement in all functional areas. However, for Quick Impact Projects and certain welfare initiatives, additional financial and material support will be provided as per mission policy.









2.5: Situational Awareness



2.5.1: General Description.

To create and maintain a peaceful and secure environment in the mission, military commanders at all levels require timely information to plan, prevent or respond appropriately to various challenges. The efficient gathering and processing of information and its dissemination, therefore is critical to the success of peacekeeping operations. To be effective, an infantry battalion should proactively acquire and deliberately analyse the information about the operational conditions in the mission area of responsibility. It is critical that this information should be reported to higher HQ, disseminated within the battalion and shared with relevant stakeholders, through the command and functional channels.

UN Infantry Battalions often operate in hazardous and unpredictable conflict environments where establishing situational awareness is a critical task. Situational Awareness (SA) involves maintaining information databanks and further continues to set priority information requirements, acquire relevant inputs, collate and corroborate to process the inputs, analyse and share/disseminate accurate information to all concerned in real time.

At the battalion level the focus of information management is to corroborate the existing information, acquire and analyse changes in attitudes and perceptions, identify likely triggers, threats to civilians, and provide early-warning to the mission leadership to assess the situation and institute preventive measures, (taking into consideration the necessary protection of women and girls). Information on operational challenges and the ability to engage local population and other key players constructively contributes to force protection and prevents hindrance in execution of mandated tasks of the battalion. Ability to act faster than spoilers in a peace process is of paramount importance. Within its AOR, the battalion should strive to dominate the information landscape and foresee the likely developments and to react accordingly.

2.5.2: Basic Tasks.

The ultimate aim of maintaining an effective situational awareness is to establish a safe and secure environment, protect the civilians, protect UN personnel and property and protect the mandate for a sustainable peace.



Effective SA helps to generate a comprehensive picture of the operating environment and enhances the quality of decision-making for accomplishment of a variety of mandated tasks. It provides ability to take proactive measures to prevent rather than react to situations. At battalion level, the following issues need to be tackled to achieve effective SA:

- Constant surveillance and monitoring of the operational situation utilizing authorized resources available in the battalion (technical and human).
- Generate real time and accurate information for planning and execution of mandate.
- Carry out realistic "Risk/Threat Analysis" to identify and assess vulnerabilities to the peace process, the population and various mission elements from the spoilers and other actors.
- Recording and sharing with the human rights component of allegations
 of human rights violations and early signs of possible violence against
 civilians to assist in protection of civilians.
- Provide early-warning (e.g. on conflict, threat to civilians, sexual violence etc.) to higher HQ/leadership to help decision-making and to initiate preventive or mitigation actions.
- Undertake preventive/stabilization actions within AOR based on predictive analysis.
- Carry out engagement with key leaders (including women) to assess intentions and changes in attitudes to help take preventive actions.
- Carry out grass-roots engagement with the local population at battalion and company level to establish rapport, create accessible human information channels, develop faith and credibility in battalion's intent and conduct, thereby, generate trust and hope in the peace process.
- Monitor migration, internal displacement, refugee movements, etc.
- Maintain contact with spoilers and splinter groups to analyze their capabilities and intentions. Create environment of trust to motivate them to join the peace process.
- Monitor activities, capabilities and intentions of the opposing parties and of neutral sympathizers. Female military personnel can work with the community to access this information from local women.
- Every member of the battalion should understand their role as "eyes and ears" of the mission to contribute as information gatherers for the unit.



2.5.3: Planning Considerations.

2.5.3.1: General. The process of information gathering and SA is complex and yet crucial in a peacekeeping environment. Tactical failures can have disastrous strategic or political ramifications on the peace process and stability and impact on the safety and security of the mission itself. More often than not, the action or reactions of various parties to the conflict to situations is ambiguous, unpredictable and volatile, demanding a proactive and reliable SA to respond appropriately and in a timely manner. The battalion also should be cognizant of politico-socio-economic, factional and humanitarian implications of their efforts in maintaining an information edge. The battalion should not be fixated with operational information requirements alone, but should endeavour to develop a comprehensive and all-encompassing information effort in support of the peacekeeping mission needs.

Synchronization of military information process at the battalion level, based on formalization of threat/risk assessment and information-collection plan, tasking collection, analysis (interpretation and prediction), and dissemination/sharing and reporting process is an important part of the information-planning process. As part of the Peacekeeping Information Preparation of AOR, following considerations assume importance:

- Adherence to Information Gathering Principles. The SA staff at battalion level should ensure accuracy, timeliness, utilization of authorized multiple sources, set priorities; and carry out liaison and coordination with all other entities in the field to gain relevant information.
- **Information Acquisition**. The methodology of information management for effective SA should conform to the principles and spirit of the United Nations and within the confines of the peacekeeping mission mandate and operational requirements. Special care needs to be emphasised to prevent violation of host national interests, laws and privacy in the employment of means and methods of information gathering.
- Information Security. Information acquired should be guarded from all
 belligerent parties to a conflict, to ensure that impartiality is not compromised, that civilians are not put at risk, and the consent of the parties
 maintained and fostered. It is critical that information about the identity
 of victims of rape and abuse are kept confidential. At the battalion level,
 information security (protect from unauthorized access, use, disclosure,
 disruption, modification, perusal, inspection, recording or destruction)



and confidentiality has to be maintained and disseminated/shared only on a "need to know" basis.

- Mission Information Management. The Joint Operations Centre (JOC) is the 'information hub' at the mission level. The JOC is responsible for monitoring and reporting on the situation throughout the mission's AOR on a 24/7 basis. Military operational information and situational information acquired by the military component should be reported to the JOC through the Force HQ. Drawing on all sources of information, including mission components, the Joint Mission Analysis Centre (JMAC) is responsible for producing integrated analysis, as a basis for enhanced mission planning and decision-making; and for assessing threats to the implementation of the mission's mandate. The JOC and JMAC coordinate the information processing cycle at the mission level. The Force HQ Information Branch Staff (J2) will guide the battalion in its SA activities, and facilitate interaction with the JOC and JMAC.
- Priority Information Requirements (PIR). The JMAC will lead on determining the mission leadership's PIRs and on that basis develop a Collection Plan with application across the mission. The Battalion Commanders should ascertain higher commander's PIRs to support military decision-making and generate additional Battalion Information Requirements (BIR) as a basis for planning, tasking and processing information. It should also take into consideration the availability of analysis tools which may include, for example, early-warning indicators regarding sexual violence.
- **SA Plan**. Based on the mission PIRs and BIRs, the battalion SA staff in coordination with the Operations staff will prepare detailed SA Plan indicating information requirements, information acquisition, timelines and guidelines. The SA plan should also take into consideration the availability of analysis tools, which may include for example early warning indicators regarding sexual violence.
- Peacekeeping Information Preparation of AOR. Peacekeeping Information Preparation (PIP) of AOR is a systematic, continuous process of analyzing the risks, challenges and operational environment in a specific peacekeeping conflict zone or geographical area to describe the operational environment and its effects on the battalion. It is designed to support staff estimates and military decision-making process. This process helps the commander to selectively apply responses and optimize the effect of the battalion capabilities at critical points in time and



space in the AOR by determining the likely capabilities, vulnerabilities and options available to potential aggressors, spoilers or parties to the conflict and the courses of action open to the battalion.

- It is a continuous process which consists of four steps:
 - ⋆ Define the peacekeeping environment.
 - * Describe the peacekeeping conflict zone's effects.
 - * Analyze and evaluate the challenges and risks (including risks to civilians) in the battalion AOR.
 - * Determine various courses of action.
- Battalion Information staff will carry out a proactive "PIP" of AOR by using
 multiple resources to collect and corroborate, managing inflow of information, evaluation of predictive information reports, profile the personalities involved, monitor the operational situation, updating the history
 of the conflict, monitor the media and political scene and analyze the
 motives of various parties and leadership.
- **Databank**. Battalion should prepare databanks containing the background knowledge of the mission area and causes of the conflict, terrain analysis and implications (lay of the ground, vegetation, going conditions, weather effect on terrain), security issues (tactical positions and strength of belligerents, DMZ, minefields, ERW, etc.), local culture customs and practices and how it relates to the operational environment, and the operational peculiarities of the Battalion AOR. One set of the databank should be available at the immediate HQ also.
- **Technology**. Apply authorized information-gathering technology in a judicious manner. Remember, peacekeeping generally involves a low technology environment and more reliance on human inputs.
- **2.5.3.2 : SA Requirements.** The SA requirement for a battalion in a peace-keeping environment will be guided by the mission mandate, PIRs and Collection Plan, and may include the following:
- Historical background and regional, religious, ethnic/sectarian, cultural, socio-economic and political dynamics that have an impact in the mission.
- Location (including deployments), strength, organizational structure, equipment profile, support facilities (including foreign support), inter group nexus and rivalry, attitude towards the population and UN, and the capabilities of parties to the conflict.



- Tactics used by belligerents for political/military gain e.g., abduction, forced labour, sexual violence, recruitment, forced displacement, etc.
- Personalities, motives and intentions of opposing faction commanders.
- Spoiler/splinter groups, their support structure, factional tensions and competing claims.
- Likely humanitarian and gender effect of the conflict and areas where these could manifest.
- Report humanitarian situation/needs of the local people to humanitarian actors.
- Understand political dynamics and likely triggers that can escalate into breakdown of peace.
- Appreciate "Law and Order" indicators (organized crime, human trafficking, SGBV/CRSV, domestic violence, smuggling, ethnic/religious sensibilities, local groups, criminal gangs, warlords, trouble makers, etc.).
- Appreciate tribal/ethnic dynamics and identify escalatory interplays with potential to spiral out of control.
- Assess and identify specific vulnerabilities to civilians, including children, women, elderly and ethnic/sectarian groups as part of POC.
- Information on violations committed against the civilian population such as the presence of children in armed groups, reports of killings, sexual violence, attacks on schools and hospitals and violations for which the peacekeeping mission is tasked by the Security Council to report on should be signaled to relevant civilian components such as child protection, human rights, etc.
- Efficacy of Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration process.
- Local attitudes, emotions, opinions, identities, sensibilities, key players
 and their role in the situation. Include the attitudes of women who can
 play a key role in encouraging both negative and positive sentiments in
 the community.
- Analyze perspectives, perceptions, expectations, and concerns of the population about the conflict situation, their security and the UN roles.
- Facilitate effective dissemination and analyze the impact of ideas and themes of the mission "Public Information" campaign and activities of Civil Affairs



 Responding to Requests for Information generated from the mission JOC and JMAC, and verification of information, as requested by the mission IOC and IMAC

2.5.3.3: Counter-Information Management.

Battalion should analyse and address vulnerabilities to its information documents, procedures, personnel and IT systems, through counter information best practices, threat assessments, security awareness training, internal monitoring and investigations of lapses. SA staff should protect the confidentiality of the information and its source.

2.5.4: Conduct.

A UN Infantry Battalion with its organic capability carries out multiple operational activities to accomplish its mandated tasks, roles and responsibilities in the AOR by projecting its operational reach and visibility to the people and opposing parties to the conflict. In doing so, the battalion elements are in continuous and intimate contact with the population and have become an invaluable source to generate human information for the mission as such. Important aspects of maintaining SA at battalion level are:

- Observation and Overt Information. The attached MILOBs, Battalion OPs (including mobile OPs and Air OPs) and CPs, the COBs and TOBs, routine, special and long-range patrols, etc. provide overt information about the AOR.
- Reconnaissance and Liaison. Specific reconnaissance and planned liaison is carried out to evaluate the situation on the ground.
- Human Information. The primary source of gathering information at a battalion level is its human resources. At battalion and company level, the importance of engaging with local interlocutors should be emphasized for gaining relevant information regarding risk, vulnerabilities and possible hindrances to the peace process. Every tactical detachment/ group, while performing its mission will also be specifically tasked for gaining priority human information for the commander as well as for updating the existing information. Women are the "heart" of the community and as such have access to vital information that can be utilized



by the military for operational necessity. Creating linkages and building relationships with women in the community can assist in this.

- Briefing and Debriefing. At battalion and company level daily briefing and debriefing of all personnel and elements that were out on operational/logistics/outreach activities are crucial to ensure that information is correctly processed. Maintain a record of all relevant inputs for future reference.
- **Community Support**. The battalion and COBs should establish a respectful, trusting and cordial relationship with the local communities and have "Community Liaison Agents" (CLA) and "Community Alert Networks" (CAN) in place for early-warning and to gain information on their concerns and vulnerabilities. It is important to ensure that where feasible, female CLAs are recruited to promote interaction with women and girls, and ensure that CAN is supported.
- Formal Interactions and Key Leader Engagements. The Battalion Commander, staff and company commanders should carry out formal interactions/interface with social elites, political leaders, religious heads, women leaders, ethnic chieftains, leaders of spoilers/splinter groups and other local governmental authorities including Departmental/Provincial Health, Gender and Social Affairs offices. Interactions with various victims and power centres are also useful to assess the attitudes and motives. Ensure that the information analysis of all such interactions are recorded and reported through proper channels.
- **Informal Interactions**. Most of the ground information is generated during informal interactions in the process of patrolling or in performance of other battalion tasks. Therefore, up to the Platoon Commander's level, the methods and importance of gaining information should be stressed upon. Specially trained SA personnel at company level should be grouped with patrols as required. Female military personnel should be involved to converse with local women.
- Interpreters. The military interpreters on listening watch and the local interpreters providing the interface is also a good source of obtaining information. However, local interpreters should be carefully employed to avoid information leakage/security lapses/ selective or misrepresentation of information.
- **Mission Components**. Mission components (Political Affairs, Civil Affairs, Public Information, Human Rights, DDR, SSR, Mine Action, UN Police,



DSS, etc.) who are in contact with the people and various leaders are also a major source of early-warning information and may provide a true picture about the undercurrents in a mission area.

- Host Nation. Host national security and information apparatus would be a good source to obtain relevant inputs, though they will be very selective in sharing any data.
- Open Sources. Information obtained through internet data mining, Google Satellite Maps, BBC Monitoring, local print and electronic media, academics, intelligentsia, interaction with host civilian and military authorities, etc. complement hard information obtained from the human sources.
- Other Agencies. The UN Country Team (particularly OCHA and UNDP), International Organizations (e.g. ICRC, HR Monitors) and NGOs are a major source of factual information in specific fields due to the fact that these organizations are present in the conflict zone for a long time.
- Technical Means. At the battalion level, the tactical UAV, signal communication monitoring system and ground surveillance radars provide the electronic data inputs for information management (as per Statement of Unit Requirement, MOU and SOFA/SOMA). Additional information from higher HQ and other sources would help consolidation of Battalion PIP.
- Information Collection Plans. Drawing on the mission Collection Plan, the mission PIRs and the BIRs, the battalion and companies will prepare a detailed information collection plan to fill the gaps in information and to carry out predictive analysis. This includes the PIR with specific questions, probable indicators, sources, discipline, tasking, timelines and methodology of collecting the information.
- Additional Support. Geographical Information System (GIS) with digital maps, and overlays, air and satellite imagery, etc. are useful for the information management.
- **Reliability.** All efforts should be taken to ensure corroboration of the information for its reliability and trustworthiness.
- Conduct and Outreach. Respect for the local population and their culture, genuine welfare-oriented assistance by the battalion, impeccable conduct of all personnel, and meaningful and sincere outreach, etc. will create a social commitment and a conducive environment in which information flow would be automatic with trust and faith.



2.5.5: Organization.

The battalion chain of command, up to Platoon Commander, should be cognizant and responsive to the information management requirements and constraints in the UN peacekeeping environment. The information staff should be specially trained, qualified and experienced in information management, air/satellite photo interpretation and in handling GIS and should have a peacekeeping orientation. Dedicated and trained SA personnel with vernacular linguistic expertise are authorized at both battalion and company level to assist the staff and commanders.

2.5.6: Support.

The following assets will complement battalion information management:

- Tactical UAV and signal communication monitor at battalion Level.
- Each ICG with integral miniature UAVs.
- Ground Surveillance Radar with each COB.
- Secured voice and data communications channel for transmission of sensitive information to the mission leadership.
- IT with GIS support.
- High power digital cameras.
- Mission specific SOPs, standard collection plan template, assessment and reporting forms and other documentation.











2.5: Situational Awareness



2.6.1 : General Description.

A Cordon and Search Operation is generally launched on specific information, designed to secure a location suspected of hiding unauthorized personnel and equipment. The concept of search covers a systematic, focused and well-defined investigation of houses, vehicles, objects, areas or persons in order to determine character and magnitude of illegal objects and/or activities. During searches force is not used except in self-defence and protection of own troops/property and civilians, and therefore, ROE and mandate are to be complied with. The purpose of search is to send a clear and consequent signal that any attempt to ignore applying regulations and laws will not be accepted and to increase the stability in the area by removing weapons or other warlike stores that can be used against civilians, the parties to the conflict or against the mission personnel. Military peacekeepers engaging in Cordon and Search Operations must adhere to human rights standards and need to have a clear understanding of the applicable law, acceptable courses of action and effective tactics.

2.6.2: Basic Tasks.

Subject to the relevant mandate, the primary tasks involved in conducting Cordon and Search Operations in a peacekeeping mission environment are:

- To locate and confiscate illegal weapons or warlike stores (explosives, equipments, materials and supplies).
- To find and confiscate contraband materials.
- To arrest and detain suspects, unauthorized personnel and wanted criminals or persons countering the reconstruction of peace and stability in compliance with the ROEs.
- To protect potential targets, particularly civilians under threat of physical violence.
- To obtain evidence to ongoing illegal activities.
- To build confidence of the people and deny access to belligerents to the area or population.



- To display UN resolve to enforce the mandate for the furtherance of peace and security.
- To help faster demobilization and check ethnic violence.
- To conduct joint operations with host nation security forces and police if mandated.

2.6.3 : Planning Considerations. Important planning considerations for conduct of Cordon and Search Operations in the peacekeeping environment are:

- Preconditions. Prima facie information of confirmed illegal presence or activities or a verified suspicion is a precondition for conduct of a search (since it may result in local resentment and loss of credibility if the outcome is not positive). Furthermore, the legal provisions and implication, and special procedures for involving the local police or UNPOL will have to be determined.
- Situational Awareness. Establish intimate contact with important dignitaries, influential people and other members of local populace to generate timely, valuable and actionable information to stabilise the situation.
- Information Led Operations. Preferably, such operations should be launched only on specific information. Therefore, all efforts to collect collate and corroborate relevant information and evidence beforehand to facilitate correct decision-making. Where required, inputs from additional surveillance means (Satellite Imagery, UAV, Ground Surveillance Radars and Communication Monitors, etc.) may be resorted to.
- Secrecy. Maintain secrecy of all operational plans and ensure discrete preparations for the conduct. Take measures to prevent any leakage of confidential or otherwise sensitive information through civilians employed in the COBs, local interpreters, rumors among the soldiers, reconnaissance around the target, etc. While maintaining general operational readiness, preparations, training, rehearsals, the conduct should appear to be spontaneous rapid and effective.
- Surprise. Maintain surprise in conduct of search operations in its target
 area, force involved and composition, timing and direction of concentration to prevent premature smuggling out of illegal objects, escape of
 wanted persons, etc. Disseminate information only to those who need to
 know at appropriate time and involve other agencies and resources only
 as late as possible.



- **Flexibility**. Retain operational flexibility to meet any contingencies or reaction of the local population and the specific conditions in the area.
- **Proactive Threat Management.** Assess the normal reaction pattern in the area, possibility of risk of escalation as a consequence of changed attitude and likely reactions to flash points or sudden provocative tense situations due to misunderstandings to arrive at likely threat manifestations. Therefore, take necessary steps to arrest, neutralize or contain individuals, groups or organizations who may try to encourage a negative reaction among the local population.
- Reserves. Maintain reserves at the battalion level for quick reinforcement or deployment in addition to having reserves at the target area to deal with crowd control or to meet any other eventuality.
- Support and Availability of Local Officials. Since the local population
 is involved, the support of civil administration authorities and the local
 police is an imperative for efficient conduct and positive outcome. Necessary liaison, coordination and rapport will have to be built over time to
 establish good working relations and to foster faith, credibility and trust
 in the battalion's legitimate operational conduct in support of the overall
 peace process. Utilise the Military Gender Adviser in outreach to women
 officials.
- Respect Religious and Local Customs. Conduct of personnel carrying out search should be exemplary. Inhabitants, village elders and local personnel must be present during the search. This helps in avoiding misunderstanding at a later stage.
- **Professional behaviour.** Subject to international human rights standards, respect the local customs, practices, conditions and habits and conduct in a professional, mature and people (gender) friendly manner. Do not do anything that may be perceived as an offensive act and exercise extreme restraint and caution in all reactions. Consult with local women on effective engagement with women in the community. Ensure that the methodology of conduct, behaviour reflects that of UN standards and reactions do not hurt sentiments or self-respect of the people or incur damage to their property. Take necessary steps to reimburse or mitigate the damages, if any, as per Mission SOP's.
- People Friendly Operations. Conduct of Cordon and Search Operations should be carried out in a friendly manner, without harassment to the



local people and they should be well informed about the reason and cause of the purpose of the effort.

- Outreach. The operation should possibly terminate in some welfare-oriented civic action programme, provision of medical aid, etc. supporting the overall CIMIC Plan.
- Human Rights Compliance. Searches should only be conducted when
 necessary to achieve a legitimate objective, should not be arbitrary and
 should be based on a reasonable suspicion that an offence has been
 or is about to be committed, and should not be used in a discriminatory manner against specific sections of the population. Women should
 be searched by female peacekeepers and due care should be taken to
 ensure that searches do not unduly infringe on fundamental rights such
 as freedom of movement, right to privacy, respect for human dignity.
- Prepare to Deal with Negative Reactions. On a moderate scale, a force can expect pronounced cooperation and friendliness from a crowd, or on a negative scale, it may face armed resistance against the search. In certain conditions a force may encounter lack of will to cooperate and resistance from the local population, militia, regular armed forces, etc. This may escalate the mob mentality and display of discontent, leading to problems ranging from stone pelting, civilian disobedience, riot, physical assault and/or initiation of IED attacks and even regular combat. Prior information helps to configure the force and adopt techniques to deal with such threats.
- **Concentration of force.** Ensure timely, rapid concentration of right quantum of force based on the threat level.
- **Thoroughness.** The search should be thorough, and failing to disclose illegal activities will decrease the credibility of the force.
- Concurrent Activities. Checkpoints and patrols also may be tasked to carry out specific searches of personnel and vehicles in conjunction with the Cordon and Search. Women military/police personnel must be included for searches of women.
- **Search of women.** Women police or military personnel should be employed for search operations where women are involved.
- Medical Support. Adequate resources for provision of medical aid to the troops, casualty evacuation means and support CIMIC actions should be catered for.



- **Training**. Commanders and troops should be well trained and rehearsed to execute the task in a careful and deliberate manner without human rights violations, negative fallouts and collateral damage.
- Record. Always record actions by the search party with still and digital cameras, and take clearances or no-damage certificates once the search is terminated.

2.6.4: Conduct.

2.6.4.1 : General. Cordon and Search Operations involve movement and securing a designated target area, carrying out the actual search and follow up actions. Movement may be carried out directly from the COBs or the troops from various locations concentrated at an assembly area, preferably during darkness, based on the operational requirement and then move to a release point to launch various components to cordon and secure the target area. The deployment is done sequentially from outer to inner while moving in and vice versa while moving out of the target area. The force should fully isolate the area, secure tactically, establish control, close in and conduct systematic search, maintain reserve, report on progress of operation and termination to the HQ and carry out welfare activities where possible.

2.6.4.2: Methodology.

- **Target area.** A specific area is designated to secure a targeted search where illegal objects, activities or wanted persons are expected to be.
- Outer Cordon. Outer cordon primarily prevent unwanted persons from entering or leaving the target area without permission or smuggling illegal items out of the area. The outer cordon is established by means of MCPs, OPTs and/or stationary OPs as close to the target area as possible in order to reduce the amount of units.
- Inner Cordon. Inner cordon is established to secure the search and to control movement in connection with the target area. The inner cordon is therefore placed in connection to the limit of the target area. Penetration and search is started only when the inner cordon is established. Outer and inner cordon may, in certain situations, be merged if the level of threat from outside is low or where the warning time to the unit is long.



- **Person Search.** Always search a suspect in public view, (unless the suspect is a woman in this case, the suspect should be searched in an enclosed environment by only uniformed women personnel) inform reason for search and give opportunity to surrender any prohibited items voluntarily. Let the suspect stand naturally with his/her feet slightly apart and arms down. Searcher should be of the same sex and protected by a guard of the same sex. Use hand held metal detectors if need be, frisk the body, cloths, any baggage and observe reactions of the suspect. Question the suspect if need be and in case of doubt, handover to the local police to further interrogate in full compliance with the Interim SOP on Detention in UN Peace Operations. If the suspect is a female then hand over to only women police officers.
- Vehicle Search. Vehicle searches are undertaken to arrest/detain a
 wanted criminal or a suspect, confiscate illegal weapons or material
 transportation or to protect potential targets by intercepting. Stop all
 vehicles, interact quickly, carry out a cursory check, randomly select
 vehicles for detailed checks and conduct search in the presence of their
 owner. When suspicion is aroused, segregate the vehicle, and carry out
 a thorough search with the help of working dogs and other detection
 assets. Where required use EOD and take assistance of the local police in
 confiscation or arrest.
- House Search. Establish an outer and inner cordon. Ensure all entry exit points are closely guarded. Request all inmates to step out of the house. Question and confirm if any illegal material hidden or suspected person hiding inside the house. If voluntarily disclosed presence, have the item confiscated or person arrested. If not, let the head of the family lead the search team in to the house (if the head of family is a woman then take a man from the family or the village head). This will also serve as guarantee for peacekeepers against accusations that they may have illegally seized any property. Never touch switches or other suspicious objects. Move in tactically but ensure no damage to property. If need be use working dogs, EOD team and police. Continue close observation of activities within the house from a vantage point to identify any suspicious or threatening move. Question the head of the family once again inside the house. Ensure video/digital camera coverage of the activities, assess damage if any, and take a no-damage certificate from the head of family. If any item is confiscated/person arrested, hand it/him over to the police for further interrogation. In case of firing or IED threat, take tactical



actions as per ROE. Confiscated weapons may be dismantled, deposited or destroyed as per mission SOPs.

2.6.5: Organization.

2.6.5.1 : Structure. Due to wide ramifications of the impact, planned Cordon and Search Operations in peacekeeping environment should invariably be conducted at battalion level and in certain cases may be delegated to COB level with additional support. Where platoon strength or a patrol party get involved in a spontaneous search situation, necessary reinforcements should be moved immediately. Cordon and Search force, may be organized into four groups:

- Command Group comprising a commander, signals personnel, interpreters (including women), EOD team, local police, medical support personnel and recorder.
- Security Group comprising of outer and inner cordon.
- Search Group comprising search and clear group (commander, scouts and searchers), covering group (secure exterior entry/exit points) and segregation group (detention and material collecting point).
- Reserve Group centrally located for dealing with contingencies.

2.6.5.2: Additional Elements.

- Medical Support. Provide medical assistance and medicines to the locals and particularly attend to the old and infirm in addition to providing medical cover to the force.
- EOD Team. Keep EOD team centrally and employ, where there is a suspicion or actual existence of threat, to carry out reconnaissance, locate, disarm/neutralize and destroy any unexploded devices, booby traps or IEDs.
- Police Units. UN Formed Police Units, UN Military Police and local police
 personnel (including women) are invariably co-opted for the search to
 carry out interrogation of suspects, arresting wanted criminals, preparation of confiscation documents, assist house searches, assist in maintenance of law and order, crowd control, public announcements and
 assembling the personnel if required, search of women and children, etc.



- Military or Police Working Dogs. Specially trained working dogs can be used as search dogs to trace objects including weapons, ammunition, drugs, etc. or as a show of force.
- CIMIC/Welfare Personnel. As per Mission SOP.

2.6.5.3: Command and Control.

The Battalion Commander or the designated company commander will retain overall command and control based on the level of operations. Police personnel employed for search operations will remain under operational control of the commander of the search force. Local and military interpreters, CIMIC and situation awareness officers, etc. may also be grouped to draw a positive outcome.

2.6.6 : Support.

The force should be self-contained for the duration of the operation in terms of food, water and ammunition and in case of extension of the search; necessary replenishments should have been coordinated before hand. Additional field engineering stores, lighting arrangements, generators, etc. may be required to facilitate effective cordon. Stores and equipment for the targeted welfare activities could build up once the cordon is in place and the search has commenced.









2.7: Convoy and Escort



2.7.1: Description.

Operational flexibility of a peacekeeping force depends on its organic capability to logistically sustain itself. In addition, the mandate itself may authorize the mission to protect civilians and have objectives of providing safety, security and freedom of movement to various UN agencies, funds, and programmes, humanitarian aid agencies and others including NGOs operating in the peacekeeping arena. To support it logistically and to provide security to these entities, an infantry battalion may be tasked to organise movement of convoys and provide escorts. Not all convoy operations and provision of escort need the level of planning and preparation highlighted in the chapter. It will primarily depend upon the operational environment in the AOR.

2.7.2: Purpose.

The purpose of conducting convoy operations is to organise and escort, to facilitate a secure and frictionless movement of a group of vehicles from a designated start point to an intended destination for the following purposes:

- Movement of UN Personnel (civilians or military or both).
- Force logistics supply.
- Administrative convoys of deployed troops.
- · Movement of humanitarian aid and personnel.
- Movement of election staff and equipment.
- Escort duties for very important dignitaries.
- Movement of refugees/displaced persons or prisoners of war.
- Escort support to local government authorities in specific cases (e.g., money disbursement).

2.7.3: Planning Considerations.

An Infantry Battalion in a peacekeeping mission should be adequately equipped and trained to provide comprehensive convoy security and respond appropriately as per "Rules of Engagement" in challenging and often provocative circumstances to ensure safe and timely transit. They



should be conscious of the material value and safety of the convoy and be cognizant of the vulnerabilities and the effect (positive or negative) of an operational engagement on the overall peace process. Detailed SOPs are evolved in each mission for grouping, timing and security of convoys. Day to day convoy management, whether routine or of special nature, necessitates due deliberations and careful considerations to be effective and successful. Consider the following:

- Situational Awareness. As a routine, obtain relevant security related information on activities of belligerents and environmental hazards which may impede the move. Verify and corroborate through cultivated sources and informers on the current situation and likely manifestation of threat. Collect and collate all inputs from the HQ and various other sources.
- **Threat Perception**. Convoys are an attractive target to belligerents and criminals with an aim of restricting freedom of movement, preventing aid material from reaching the intended population or to seize supplies and military equipment. Therefore, it is important to develop a clear understanding of the threat perception through situational awareness and information management.
- Tactics of Belligerents. Based on past events and present practices, carry out a realistic assessment of the organizational structure, leadership, strength, weapon and equipment profile, level of deception measures.
- **Constructive engagement**. Proactively engage and forewarn belligerents to abstain from interfering with execution of mandated tasks. Display the capability and will to execute effective security measures.
- In-mission cooperation. Liaison and planning with human rights and other civilian mission components is essential in order to agree on priorities, itinerary and escort modalities.
- Civil Military Cooperation. Liaison and coordination with the civilian components of the mission, the UN agencies, humanitarian actors and INGOs as well as local authorities, the NGOs, and deployed troops is an important facet. Various military sub-units and elements operating out of the bases should have real time input about the movement of the convoy. The HQ concerned needs to synchronise passage and sharing of information. Liaison with the UN Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination focal point shall be ensured all along the process. Coordination is



required for planning and information-sharing between the RC/HC/HCT and the mission.

- Pre-position. To provide additional security, pre-position patrols or occupy TOBs in vulnerable areas to dominate and deter or to respond quickly.
- Route. Route the convoy through secured areas. Identify and carry out reconnaissance of alternate routes for last-minute switching over prior to movement or even during the convoy. Each vehicle should have a route sketch/card.
- Road Opening. In certain missions, security situation may demand physical clearance of a road by a combined infantry and engineer component to locate and clear mines/improvised explosive devices or minor blocks/obstacles.
- **Picketing**. A composite group on APC's or helicopters may establish pickets to secure specific areas for a limited period to allow safe passage of a convoy when there is a grave threat of ambush.
- Movement. All movements should be centrally controlled and integrated with other operational activities and the existing security grid. A separate movement control organization may be established to coordinate all convoy movements.
- Traffic Control. If required, the route may be marked, manned by UN Military Police/guides and establish check posts for effective traffic control. However, their personal security should be taken care of when deployed.
- **Communications.** Cater for redundancy for alternate communications with all concerned (HF/VHF radio sets, satellite and cell phones).
- Surveillance and Monitoring. Aerial and ground surveillance of the route and adjacent areas to identify any unusual or suspected activities should be undertaken. Aerial photographs and satellite imagery also may be used where necessary. Movement should be centrally monitored in real time by the HQ concerned by electronic means.
- Contingency Planning. Selection of alternate routes, methods and troops for reinforcement, provision of additional combat support, undertaking combat operations and extrication should be carefully deliberated and catered for.
- Reserves and QRF. For emergency response, adequate reserves in terms
 of mobile Infantry Company Group (motorized and APC based) and a



helicopter-borne infantry group (ranging from a platoon to a company) be kept on standby to instantaneously and rapidly respond to any adverse operational situation that is beyond the capability of the escorting infantry component.

- **Use of Force**. Comply with the Mission-specific "Rules of Engagement" and any other guidelines on the "Use of Force" and be capable of delivering a measured and calibrated response to any kind of threat that may emerge in a mission area.
- Vehicle Security. Necessary modification for strengthening of vehicles against small arms fire and mine/improvised explosives threat may be taken care of.
- Knowledge of local language. The security elements should have elementary conversation skills to negotiate and converse in the vernacular language.
- **Interpreter**. An interpreter should preferably be a part of the leading elements to facilitate negotiations and mediations when required. (When necessary include a female interpreter)
- First Aid and Medical Evacuation. Adequate measures and means must be catered for providing immediate first aid and the quick evacuation of casualties.

2.7.4: Conduct.

- **Likely Threats.** Threats may manifest in the following forms:
 - * Obstacles (unattended).
 - * Roadblock (held by belligerents).
 - * Mines and Improvised Explosives and/or Vehicle-Borne IED.
 - * Penetration by other unauthorized vehicles.
 - \star Demonstrations by crowd.
 - ⋆ Pelting of stones.
 - Hostage taking.
 - * Pilfering.
 - * Stand off fire including sniper fire.
 - * Ambush.
 - Attack and plunder.



* Traffic accidents and mechanical breakdowns.

(Note that any demonstration or physical threats posed by women alone should not be under estimated as a genuine likely threat and treated with the same amount of precaution as any other threat.)

- Briefing. A thorough briefing of all the personnel (escort party, reserves, vehicle drivers and other civilian members) should be conducted by the convoy commander on the route, timing, threat, action on contingencies and method of emergency response. On the other hand, the escort personnel should be made aware by the parties to be escorted of their priorities and working modalities.
- Marching Order. Prepare a marching order in correct sequence to ensure security. Position security elements at the lead, middle and end. Consider more security elements if the terrain, threat and length of column make it necessary.
- **Tactical Movement**. All movement and activities should be tactical in nature and without any complacency. Be vigilant, cautious and poised for quick action.
- Day/Night Move. Due to security reasons, preferably UN/humanitarian convoys should only move during the day. Night moves may be undertaken in exceptional circumstances by providing additional security cover and good coordination.
- Time and Distance. Consider distance to be traversed, number of vehicles and length of the convoy, required gap between vehicles, cruising speed, time past a point and expected time to complete the movement, etc. having impact on the convoy movement and security plan.
- Avoid Pattern and Predictability. As a matter of discipline, maintain an irregular pattern in convoy procedures (routes, timings, speed, composition, etc.).
- **Visibility**. Display UN Flags and symbols at the lead, middle and end. Security personnel should be in operational readiness at all times.
- Convoy Commander. Senior most military officer will be the Convoy Commander and his/her decisions are binding on all. The commander should position immediately behind the leading elements and move up and down as required for effective command and control and is responsible for communication with HQ, setting the pace, timings, safety and security and for emergency response.



- Trail Officer. The convoy second in command located at the rear of the convoy will be responsible for repair, recovery, accident investigation, med aid/casualty evacuation and to keeping the convoy commander informed.
- **Halts**. Based on the distance to be traversed, administrative halts may be scheduled. However, at no point security should be compromised.
- Unauthorized Vehicles. Do not allow unauthorized vehicles to enter the convoy. All such vehicles are to be regarded as an attempt to breach the security.
- **Safe Driving**. Take measures to prevent accidents and take special note of local population and their livestock.
- Rehearsals. Actions in the event of operational contingencies should be rehearsed based on the envisaged scenarios. Also plan and rehearse actions at embarkation/disembarkation and at halts.
- Negotiate. Exercise extreme caution, restraint and maturity to prevent
 the situation from going out of hand. Avoid a confrontation by negotiating and deft handling without compromising security. However, certain
 tactical situations may call for a spontaneous and rapid response in selfdefence or defence of the mandate.
- Calling for Fire. The escort party should be trained to call for indirect fire
 or attack helicopters fire and be capable of directing them correctly to
 avoid and/or minimize collateral damage. Necessary signal communication procedures and means should be tied up in advance.
- Reporting. Report on the progress of movement based on predetermined phase lines/bounds and manned checkpoints and also on occurrence of any incident.
- Communication. Continuous, instantaneous and timely communication and reporting is a vital aspect of convoy management, protection, security and response.

2.7.5: Organization.

The structure and command and control of the escort party would primarily depend on the threat, terrain and the type of convoy.

Strength and Composition. The strength may vary from an infantry section to a company group with integral protected mobility and engineer resources.



- Organization. The convoy will comprise of an advance guard, main body and rear guard. The advance guard will comprise of the leading elements like Mine Protected Vehicle, protection vehicle, interpreter and APCs, followed by convoy commanders group with communication vehicle and security elements. The reserve security elements will be centrally located with the main body and the rear guard with the convoy second in command, recovery vehicle, ambulance and rear security elements will bring up the rear.
- Formation. A convoy should be divided into smaller packets of five to seven vehicles according to the threat level, each with its own security element and nominated commander. Formation and distances are adjustable based on the threat and availability of resources.
- Weapons and Equipment. Security personnel shall carry their personal
 weapons and a Light Machine Gun per protection vehicle along with
 adequate ammunition. In addition, basic infantry equipments like binoculars, compass, maps and other section/platoon level weapons and
 equipments as required may be carried. In complex missions, the convoy
 escort may carry Medium Machine Guns, Rocket Launchers, Automatic
 Grenade Launchers and Mortars considering the threat envisaged.
- Force Multipliers. In some multidimensional peacekeeping operations, tactical situation and belligerent's capability may require use of Armoured Personnel Carriers and or even Tanks as part of the robust mandate execution for both escort duty or as QRF. Aviation resources like UAVs, Reconnaissance and Surveillance Helicopters and Attack Helicopters may also be employed where required. Employment of mine protected vehicle, mine/explosive detectors, tracking/explosive detection dogs and jammers will prove useful to enhance operational security.

2.7.6: Support.

- Medical. Include an ambulance with medical personnel certified in accordance with the Medical Support Manual standards to provide advanced first aid, including knowledge in Cardiopulmonary Resuscitation or Basic Life-support and use of Automated External Defibrillator (AED) to stabilise patients and facilitate their evacuation to the nearest medical facility by road or air.
- **Self-Sustenance**. Be self-contained for the movement with regard to ammunition, food and water. Carry some emergency rations.



- Preventive Maintenance Checks and Readiness of Vehicles. Prior to movement, necessary serviceability inspections and preventive maintenance should be carried out. Carry all essential fuel and stores with adequate reserves.
- **Repair and Recovery**. A recovery vehicle along with technicians for immediate in situ repairs or for recovery should be carried.
- Additional Measures. Carrying a public announcement system to communicate with belligerents where required and a video camera to record activities will help.
- Loading Plan. Ensure careful loading of vehicles for safety and security.

(Suggested task capability standards are at p. 221)







Task 2.8: Operation Base



2.8.1: General Description.

The establishment and maintenance of a secure and functional operation base for the battalion and its sub-units is a priority mission of the Battalion Commander. UN infantry battalions, in contrast to conventional infantry battalions, do not manoeuvre in offensive and defensive operations. UN infantry battalions and their sub-units operate from and return to static bases. Therefore, it is a prerequisite that battalion operational bases are secure and functional before the battalion and its sub-units can achieve overall mission success in the conduct of other battalion tasks. These bases also serve as the planning, administrative, and logistic hubs of UN mission support in the battalion AOR.

Operational bases are established and maintained as secure locations for conducting operations and logistics support activities. The battalion and sub-unit operational bases should be dispersed and self-supporting projection platforms that enable operational coverage throughout the battalion AOR. In most instances, peacekeeping infantry battalions establish or deploy to static operation bases for the duration of their deployment. The commander should therefore carefully consider site suitability for an extended time as well as operational requirements as factors for site selection. These same considerations as detailed below should also be considered when selecting sites for Temporary Operational Bases (TOB). Camp security requires the camp commander and troops to be prepared to respond to all feasible man-made and environmental contingencies that may affect base security and maintenance.

2.8.2: Basic Tasks.

General. Operation bases are established to support battalion operations throughout its AOR. It involves the following:

- Provide a secure and static firm base for the mobile elements of the battalion to conduct dynamic, relentless and proactive peacekeeping operations in execution of MET.
- Provide protection to the UN personnel of the battalion and other personnel of mission components.



- Facilitate rest and recuperation of personnel, resupply of logistics sustenance, repair and maintenance of equipments and establish facilities to plan and organize operations.
- Deploy in an integrated grid to execute the MET optimally and cover the battalion AOR effectively and facilitate mutual support and synergy.
- Provide a security framework in order to protect civilians.
- Monitor and report on all developments in the AOR that have an implication on the peace process.
- Initiate rapid response to deal with any emergency to contain and restore adverse situations.
- Facilitate effective outreach and engagement; promoting confidencebuilding measures; generate situational awareness and help establish rapport with the local population.
- Facilitate observation and domination of key terrain, buffer zones, or population centres.
- Safeguard key installations and infrastructure by being closely located.
- Facilitate stockpiling of supplies in support of other UN components.
- Provide a secure environment for other agencies and host nation forces.

2.8.3: Considerations.

- Deployment. A balance should be kept between an excessive dispersal of peacekeeping forces and operation bases and a concentration of troops on large bases in order to ensure the security of all battalion assets. Logistic and communication capability requirements should also be met when determining the disposition of battalion forces.
- Conditions. Operation base security may have to be designed in accordance with numerous political constraints and stipulations. For example, status of forces agreements (SOFA) between the UN and the host country may prescribe what battalion activities are authorized, what Rules of Engagement (ROE) must be adhered to, and the territorial limits of operation base authority. Commanders should consider whether their unit capabilities and operation base configurations support their mission and that ever-changing environmental circumstances do not constrain security and maintenance.
- **Threat**. Regardless of what type of base the unit establishes, or where, it should be prepared to defend itself and its equipment from attacks,



criminal activity and civil unrest. Attacks may be conventional assaults supported by indirect fire or by unconventional means, such as, covert infiltration or an attack by a suicide bomber(s). Attacks may consist solely of indirect fires or standoff attacks using small arms. Criminal activity may be organized or random attempts to infiltrate the camp in order to pilfer unit equipment and supplies, conduct illicit activity with camp inhabitants, or gather information about camp conditions or security measures in support of future criminal or belligerent activities.

- Site Selection and Construction. The site selection for a base is critical.
 The site should meet two fundamental capability standards, which are to be capable of defending battalion assets and to be capable of serving as a peacekeeping operation projection platform.
- Reconnaissance. Commanders and staff should carry out physical reconnaissance and survey of the proposed operational base site as part of predeployment area study assessment. Predeployment site surveys will assist the commander and staff in formulating operation base priorities of work for battalion assets constrained by time, equipment, personnel and security considerations.
- Mission Analysis. The requirement to establish a operation base will be
 the result of a mission analysis of the battalion's primary mission. Mission analysis will indicate what tasks the operation base will support and
 is capable of supporting. Mission analysis should consider what effects
 belligerent, social and environmental forces may have on operation base
 selection and maintenance.
- Belligerent Forces. Such forces may be conventional, irregular, or criminal. These forces are always evolving in character and strength yet always have some capacity to threaten the operational base. The base defence should be such that an adequate amount of combat power is required and available to defeat any attack and secure base equipment and supplies. This frees the rest of the force for operations.
- **Social Forces.** These forces comprise local inhabitants, Internally Displaced People (IDP), or other refugees. These forces always place demands on the base and at the same time will take action to prevent the base from negatively effecting their livelihoods, lifestyles and environment. Base site location should consider what proximity to the civilian population is most advantageous in supporting base missions, security, and civil military relations and cooperation. Unless the mission dictates,



bases should not be too close to the civilian population whereby an attack on the base could result in collateral damage or civilian casualties. In any case, security and the fostering of positive civic relations between the local communities dictate that there is no access to the base by civilians that could encourage/elicit activities between soldiers and the local population.

- Environmental Forces. Environmental baseline studies on any selected sites are also requested as per UN environmental policy to avoid any possible liabilities once the UN leaves. Environmental forces include weather and terrain. Terrain selected for the base should be defensible and safeguarded from the effects of weather. Primary terrain considerations are:
 - * Does the operation base control key terrain or can key terrain outside the operation base control it?
 - * Does the camp interfere with local activities and sanitation or safeguard local activities and improve the environmental conditions of the civilian population?
 - * Does the camp provide access to good road networks and airfields or can these lines of supply and communication be disrupted through hostile action, civil unrest or weather conditions?
 - ⋆ Does the camp location provide secure access to resupply and relief?
 - Does the operation base location provide for defensible and adequate water, power and sanitation sources as well as proper waste management?
 - * Does the operation base provide enough area for anticipated expansion and improvements to base defence or an area for safeguarding civilians?
 - * Does the camp allow for observation and fields of fire and can it be shielded from observation and fields of fire from hostile forces?
 - * Does the operation base require engineer unit assets to shape the terrain in order to support the establishment of a fully functional base?
 - * Will adverse weather degrade operational capabilities?
 - ⋆ Will flooding affect operations if the base is in a flood zone?
 - * Will drought conditions degrade camp water sources?
 - ⋆ Will flooding effect base resupply?



- * Will adverse weather create unsanitary conditions within the camp or in the local community?
- * Does the operation base have adequate shelters to protect soldiers, supplies and equipment from adverse weather including extreme temperatures, torrential rain and sand or dust storms?
- * Does the base have dedicated space for waste collection and segregation?
- Conduct. A secure camp is also a camp that abides by UN environmental
 and soldier conduct policy and guidelines. Active and passive security
 measures provide for an alert and disciplined force and this facilitates
 positive and lawful relationships between the battalion and the local
 community.
- Protection. Civil unrest can escalate over time or spontaneously and result in the devastation of a camp, injury to battalion personnel, and the cutting off or degradation of water supplies required for survival. Therefore, vigilance and improvements to base security should be continuous and units should be trained, organized and equipped to defend the base at all times and under all environmental conditions against conventional and asymmetric attacks, criminal activity, and civil unrest.

2.8.4 : Conduct.

- Work Schedule. Construction of operation base should be undertaken under adequate security cover as per priority laid down by the Battalion Commander/Company Commander. Invariably, an engineer company will form part of the battalion for construction of the bases. However, the UN Infantry Battalion has adequate capability to establish temporary operational bases with its organic engineer elements.
- Security. The battalion operational bases should have adequate defensibility against all types of threats expected in a mission environment. As per operational situations, the base may have early-warning devices deployed outside and in the periphery of the base, have a tiered perimeter fence/wall (including barbed wire and concertina coils), perimeter lighting (flood lights), sentry posts, local alarm systems, bunkers, observation towers, weapon emplacements and pits, establishment of surveillance and communication equipments, multiple entry and exit gates, etc. Bunkers/defences will be made in a tiered manner to provide all round



protection in depth. Where required, the living accommodation should be hardened against direct and indirect fires.

- Operations Centre. The Base Commander is responsible for the defence
 of the base. Each base will have an Operations Centre for monitoring
 and controlling all operational activities. The Operations Centre will be
 functional 24/7 and will be connected to the battalion HQ Operations
 Centre through hotline and VTC facilities. It will be responsible to report
 on incidents instantaneously to the higher HQ. A suggested UN Military
 Symbols that are currently in use is attached for reference at Annex M,
 Vol. II, p. 320 of the UNIBAM.
- **Defence**. Base commanders establish a base defence with available forces to provide all-around security. This base defence includes detailed planning and centralized control. Security measures shall also include provisions to evacuate the camp due to man-made or environmental effects as well as protect adjacent civilian communities and IDP camps. Constant and energetic action by peacekeeping forces constitutes a major element of base defence. Vigilance and sound security measures reduce outside interference with operation base as well as C2 of peacekeeping operations. Visible active and passive defence measures dissuade potential threats from attacking or infiltrating the operation base.
- **Security**. Entry and exit to and from operation base should be monitored and controlled.
 - * Ensure that there is no scope of thoroughfare or trespassing into the base.
 - * Early-warning of hostile actions, criminal activity, or civil unrest provides the base commander time to react to any threat.
 - * These measures may include outposts, patrols, ground surveillance radar, alarms, working dogs, remote video monitoring, and air reconnaissance and surveillance platforms.
 - * Local friendly civilian contacts and the actions of indigenous personnel near the base also may indicate threats to the base.
 - * Security measures employed inside the base may include guard towers, internal roving patrols and guards stationed at key sites.
- Patrols. Preferably at least one patrol should be operating in the near
 vicinity of the base at all times which can respond to any threat to the
 base from outside. Night patrols are particularly effective as they will
 keep threats, including threats to civilians, off balance and ensure peace-



keepers can exercise freedom of movement under all visibility conditions and act as confidence-building measures.

- **Coordination**. Base operational and logistics matters, alert procedures, immediate action drills and reactions, etc. will be internally coordinated with all additional elements (UN Civilian Experts, UN Police personnel, etc. if in location) that are deployed within the base. In addition, coordination with other UN entities, the local authorities in the vicinity and the local population should also be carried out.
- Alarms. A Standing Operating Procedure should be established specifying alarms for specific contingencies and reactions rehearsed.
- Mutual Support. Peacekeepers in operation bases should ensure mutual employment of defensive resources which include fires, observation and manoeuvre elements. Defensive plans provide for the use of all available direct and indirect fire support depending on the force and the mandate.
- **Reserve Force**. Each base should maintain at least platoon strength as reserve/QRT to respond to any threat, including threat to civilians.
- Asset Protection. The vehicles, ammunition magazine, fuel dump, armoury and other unit equipment stores should be adequately protected from all types of threat.
- **Helipad**. Depending on the space availability, each base will have a Helipad either within the base or in close proximity to the base for both operational and logistics (including evacuation of casualty) purposes.
- **Rest and Relief**. Establishing a work, rest and guard schedule.
- Hygiene and Sanitation. Within 24 hours, providing for human waste disposal in accordance with UN environmental guidelines. Installing containment basins under any fuel storage and/or fuelling distribution point to contain oil spills. Setting up sanitary wastewater and solid waste (including hazardous) disposal procedures and functional base drainage patterns that do not degrade or pollute the base, local environment and the civil population. Base commander should ensure the base is in compliance with the United Nations Environmental Policy for UN Field Missions, dated 1 June 2009 and pertinent COE Manual 2011 Edition guidelines. Building healthy, clean and secure living facilities not prone to flooding or infestations. A detailed guide on "Field Sanitation, Hygiene and occupational Safety" is given at Annex J, Vol. II, p. 288 of the UNIBAM.



 Rehearsal. All elements of the operation base should be conversant with security aspects and reaction to threat. Necessary preparation, training and rehearsals should be conducted for a cohesive response.

2.8.5: Organization.

Battalion will be deployed in dispersed manner in various COBs/TOBs which are operationally and logistically self-sustained and operate under the integrated C3 of the Battalion HQ.

- All COBs, TOBs and operational elements will be under an integrated C3 network and operate in a cohesive manner.
- Each operation base will maintain guard posts, entry control points, OPs,
 QRTs and some operational element outside the base at all times.
- Reinforcement and additional support to deal with critical situations will be planned and rehearsed.

2.8.6 : Support.

Invariably, the operation base infrastructure will be provided under UN arrangements. Notwithstanding that, an Infantry Battalion should have capability to establish temporary bases within its organic resources. Support requirements shall be determined through MOU negotiations between the TCC and UN HQ.

- Base Defence Stores. The details of field defence stores will be provided under UN arrangements as per the Contingent-Owned Equipment (COE) Manual.
- Close Security. An operation base should be configured with surveillance, early warning and quick response assets (GSR, sensors, NVDs, CCTV and cameras, biometric devises at entry control, security fencing and perimeter lighting, tiered defensive positions, OP locations, etc.).
- **Stocking**. The base will be stocked with specified reserve scales of dry ration, tinned ration/MRE, water, medicines, ammunition, fuel, oil and lubricants, spares and expendable stores, etc.
- **Water**. Preferably, the water point/source should be in the near vicinity and it should be protected from any sabotage. Care should be taken to ensure the water requirements of the local population are not hampered by the base.



- Electricity. In addition to direct electricity connection, the base should have alternate means of generating power as specified in the COE Manual.
- Routine Administration. The camp infrastructure and facilities will be in accordance with the TCC guidelines and mission SOPs on the subject. Camp administration shall be in accordance with TCC and UN regulations and guidelines.
- Replenishment. Based on the mission logistics support policy, the replenishment may either be done directly under the mission arrangements or be executed through the battalion HQ.
- Communication. In accordance with COE guidelines (COE Manual 2011 Edition), camp communications should primarily rely on a landline telephone system. This system may be augmented by loudspeakers, personal mobile phones, battalion radios and other signals as required. In accordance with COE guidelines (COE Manual 2011 Edition), VHF/UHF-FM communications will be used as the primary means of radio communication with sub-units and sub-elements of the battalion that are in a tactical or mobile environment, and thus unable to communicate via telephonic means.
- Medical Support. Each operation base will maintain a medical inspection and holding facility with one medic, an attendant and an ambulance to ensure casualties can be evacuated to a medical facility within one hour following injury. The medical section shall be responsible for establishing and enforcing measures for malaria prophylaxis and vector control in accordance with the Medical Support Manual.
- Fire Hazard. The base should have adequate fire fighting equipments and institute all fire safety measures to deal with any type of fire hazard (including ammunition and fuel related).

(Suggested task capability standards are at p. 223)



2.9: Disarmament and Demobilization



2.9.1: General Description.

The Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) of ex-combatants is a complex process with political, military, security, human rights, humanitarian and socio-economic dimensions that will need to be supported by multiple components of the Mission. The overarching goal of the UN approach to DDR is to enhance and consolidate security in support of the ongoing political process so that post-conflict reconstruction and wider recovery can begin. Therefore, DDR programmes are often at the nexus of peacekeeping, post-conflict peace-building and development efforts, and involve a variety of national and international, military, police and civilian actors and institutions. Given the complexity of the undertaking, there is a need to involve a broad range of UN agencies, other external actors, local government and civil society with the peacekeeping mission elements for its synchronized application.

If mandated, the primary contribution of the military component of a mission to the DDR programme is to create and maintain a secure environment, observe, monitor and report on security related issues, provide security and assist in the registration of combatants. Military contingents possess a wide range of skills and capabilities that could be vital to support a DDR programme. In UN peacekeeping operations DDR planning, policy and execution is usually led by a civilian DDR component which works closely with the appropriate national counterparts and UN agencies, funds and programmes (e.g., UNDP).

2.9.2: Basic Tasks.

The basic tasks of the military component to the DDR programme could be divided into the following categories:

2.9.2.1 : Security:

- Create and maintain a stable and secure environment.
- Camp/cantonment security, including security of weapons and ammunition that have been handed in or stored as part of a DDR programme.
- Security of disarmament and/or demobilization sites, routes; provision of escorts to movements of those participating in the programme.



 Provision of security to DDR operations (e.g., sensitization) of civilian DDR staff.

2.9.2.2 : Information gathering, reporting, dissemination and sensitization:

- Information gathering on the locations, strengths and intentions of former combatants.
- Support to public information and sensitization efforts.
- Joint patrols/information gathering with civilian DDR staff.
- Monitoring and reporting on armed groups.
- Capturing, compiling and sharing lessons learned and good practices on DDR related activities.

2.9.2.3: Specialised weapon and ammunition expertise:

 Provision of special expertise and support during the disarmament phase.

2.9.2.4 : Logistic support:

 Provide logistic/administrative support to the DDR staff and for the DDR process if specially tasked.

Note: In addition to the above, it should be noted that military observers are often tasked to play a key role in registering either surrendered weapons or combatants joining the DDR programme.

2.9.3: Planning Considerations.

2.9.3.1 : Phases. A typical DDR process consists of the following phases:

- Disarmament. Disarmament is the collection, documentation, control and disposal of small arms, ammunition, explosives and light and heavy weapons of combatants and often also of the civilian population. Disarmament also includes the development of responsible arms management programmes.
- Demobilization. Demobilization is the formal and controlled discharge
 of active combatants from armed forces or other armed groups. The first
 stage of demobilization may extend from the processing of individual
 combatants in temporary centres to the massing of troops in camps
 designated for this purpose (cantonment sites, encampments, assembly
 areas or barracks). The second stage of demobilization encompasses the



support package provided to the demobilized, which is called reinsertion.

- Reinsertion. Reinsertion is the assistance offered to ex-combatants during demobilization but prior to the longer-term process of reintegration. Reinsertion is a form of transitional assistance to help cover the basic needs of ex-combatants and their families and can include transitional safety allowances, food, clothes, shelter, medical services, short-term education, training, employment and tools. While reintegration is a long-term, continuous social and economic process of development, reinsertion is short-term material and/or financial assistance to meet immediate needs, and can last up to one year.
- Reintegration. Reintegration is the process by which ex-combatants
 acquire civilian status and gain sustainable employment and income.
 Reintegration is essentially a social and economic process with an open
 time frame, primarily taking place in communities at the local level. It is
 part of the general development of a country and a national responsibility, and often necessitates long-term external assistance.
- **2.9.3.2 : Planning Considerations**. As military resources and assets for peacekeeping are limited and often provided for multiple purposes, it is important to identify DDR tasks for the infantry battalion at an early stage in the mission planning process so that appropriately trained and equipped units are available for the task. For the military, DDR planning is not very different from planning related to other military tasks in a UN peacekeeping operation. Clear guidelines and terms of references on the scope of the involvement of an infantry battalion will be laid down by HQ and adequate coordination mechanisms and integration with other elements should be established. Important considerations at battalion level are:
- National Ownership and Responsibility. The primary responsibility
 for DDR programmes rests with the national actors (DDR processes are
 often led by a special commission created by the government for that
 purpose). The UN's role is to support the process as an impartial actor.
 So, the success of the DDR process depends on the political will of the
 parties to enter into the process in a genuine manner.
- Holistic Approach. Throughout all stages of DDR strategy development, programme planning and implementation, it is important to encourage integration and unity of effort within the UN system and with national actors. Military involvement in DDR should be determined by a



DDR plan, developed under the leadership of the Mission's civilian DDR component, which in turn works closely with the national counterparts directing the process.

- Mandate. If the mandate and CONOPS lay down the specific tasks for military support to DDR, then the military components need to be resourced and equipped appropriately so that the wider security-related function of the military component is not badly affected.
- Prior Planning. Military logistic capacity cannot be guaranteed unless specific planning for military DDR tasks has taken place, and forces generated accordingly. Therefore, it is imperative to include employment of any military capability in a DDR programme in the planning stage and make it part of the endorsed mission operational requirement.
- **Temporary Dependence**. Use of military capability may be needed where it is uniquely able to fulfil the task (e.g., site security) or where civilian capacity is limited (e.g., engineering). DDR is primarily planned and implemented by the Mission's DDR section, staffed by civilian experts.
- **Use of Contingents**. Planners should use formed units or contingents that have already been deployed, rather than deploying other formed units or contingents for short-term tasks.
- Joint Assessment Mission. Military staff officers or DDR staff will participate in joint assessment missions to assist in determining the military operational requirement of technical nature.
- Mission Concept of Operations. Once sufficient information is available, a detailed operational requirement of military capability in support of DDR is developed and included in the mission concept of operations as part of an integrated strategy. Tasks will be assigned accordingly.
- Flexibility. Since DDR programmes are owned by national governments or transitional governments, the mission plans and CONOPS should be flexible and reviewed, and allow for adjustments during implementation.
- Situational Awareness. Gain information relevant for DDR on the armed groups in the AOR with organic resources and also from the other UN components/civilian agencies in location who are familiar with the environment and personalities.
- Assess and Estimate. Assess and analyze the expected security tasks to develop own courses of action, work out contingencies and prepare an effective response mechanism. Understand the plan clearly with regard to number of combatants expected to join the programme, the location



of proposed DDR sites, hurdles, security situation, etc. to supplement own responses.

- **Deployment.** By their nature, DDR operations are likely to demand that an infantry battalion will be deployed in dispersed platoon or company-size groups and be working in operational areas where other units have their own tasks and report through a separate chain of command.
- Coordination and Integration. DDR programmes call for high levels of cooperation and coordination between the military component and the DDR unit/team and civilian actors. Obstacles to cooperation and coordination originate from the different institutional cultures and mandates of the military component and the civilian DDR unit/team. Understanding each other's roles and limits to become familiar with the different working styles of one another to limit misconceptions, early joint analysis and planning, establishment of joint coordinating mechanisms for information sharing and to monitor progress, close consultation during implementation and mid course corrections to adapt to changes in the mission environment, etc. will enable effective coordination. Joint operating procedures should be developed to guide civilian-military cooperation in DDR tasks.
- Synergy. A DDR programme can involve many actors, including UN system agencies, funds and programmes, regional actors, international and national NGOs and corporations, Member States and bilateral partners, development banks, local communities, research and policy centres.
- Intended Beneficiaries. The primary beneficiaries of DDR are combatants from security forces and armed groups, as well as associated personnel (for example, women and children associated with armed groups) and sometimes receptor communities at large. The exact target groups are typically defined in a ceasefire agreement, peace treaty or a DDR planning document. Depending on the Mission context and DDR planning parameters, the target groups can include a wide range of individuals and groups, including regular government forces, irregular and opposition forces, police forces, civil defence forces, militias, communities, Children Associated with Armed Forces and Groups (CAAFG), Women Associated with Armed Forces and Groups (WAAFG), youth, armed group abductees, dependents of ex-combatants, wounded and disabled personnel, etc. In addition, foreign forces and their weapons will need to be repatriated with escort as part of a civilian-led activity. Foreign irregulars that are to be escorted out of the country by international



monitors should be subject to the same disarmament requirements as nationals under arms.

• **Safety.** As the destruction of small arms is a time- and resource-consuming process it is important to know how to control and store the small arms collected in a safe and proper way. Appropriate control, storage and destruction methods are necessary to minimise the risk of accidents and disasters. In order to avoid accidents, international regulations should be adhered to and skilled EOD personnel and specialists should be part of the disarmament. Ammunition and explosive materials should be stored at a long distance from populated areas and assembly areas and only special trained personnel should be involved in inspection, collection and destroying of ammunition and explosives. Where possible, consultation with civilian experts from the Mission (DDR, DSR and Mine Action) for incorporation of appropriate safety measures should be taken.

2.9.4 : Conduct.

To be successful, the DDR programme should be well planned integrated, nationally owned, people-centred, gender sensitive, flexible, accountable and transparent.

- **2.9.4.1 : Security**. To promote former combatants' confidence in a DDR programme and to ensure the security of other elements of a mission and the civilian population, the UN Infantry Battalion will be responsible to:
- Create and maintain a stable secure environment for the DDR process to take off.
- Provide area security.
- Monitor and report on security related issues.
- Provide security to the DDR personnel, their transport and routes.
- Provide security, including security of weapons and ammunition that have been handed in or stored as part of a DDR programme, and security of disarmament and/or demobilization sites or cantonment areas (whether semi-permanent or mobile).
- Provide security to routes that former combatants will use to enter the programme, and provide escorts to movement of those participating in the programme.
- Create incentives and disincentive for former combatants to join or remain outside a programme by constructive engagement and provide



support to civilian-led focused public information/sensitization campaigns.

The use of mobile demobilization camps, where the demobilization process moves from location to location so that other military security tasks are not interfered with.

The use of UNMOs in remote situations should be carefully balanced with their security requirements and where necessary supported by an Infantry Battalion.

2.9.4.2 : Support Disarmament. Disarmament is an essential first step of demobilization. It involves the collection, documentation (registration), control and disposal (destruction) of small arms, ammunition, explosives, and light and heavy weapons from combatants. Collection of weapons from an armed civilian population may be conducted separately, but not as a part of the DDR process (which is aimed at combatants and goes beyond simple collection activities). Disarmament by a neutral party can only be conducted if all parties to the conflict agree on disarmament of their combatants. The steps in disarmament are weapons survey, weapons collection, weapons storage and weapons destruction. In some cases, based on an agreed policy between the UN and national authorities, serviceable weapons may also be returned for the use of a legitimate national security force. However, it should be noted that weapons destruction remains the preferable option as it negates the possibility of weapons being diverted to unintended uses.

Disarmament entails planning and management of collection sites, weapons management and destruction. Collection of unused landmines may also constitute a component of disarmament and requires close cooperation with the Mine Action component. Disarmament provisions for heavy weapons like artillery, tanks and planes are usually specified in the peace agreement. The main reason for disarmament of combatants is to restore and build the confidence and faith of the people in the political and peaceful settlement of the issues for a sustainable future. Weapons distributed by warring factions and militias have often created a situation in which no group is able to control the use of arms. Lessons from previous instances indicate that initially poor quality or small numbers of weapons will be returned, until confidence in the peace process increases.

2.9.4.3 : Control. The control includes the registration of the weapon and the soldier. The collected weapons and ammunition have to be stored prop-



erly in barracks, containers or bunkers and carefully guarded. All weapons have to be marked and registered even if they are destroyed afterwards for the verification of the parties and the UN. Weapons should be stored in a dismantled state (store functional parts and the main body of the weapon separately) to make the weapons unusable even if stolen.

2.9.4.4 : Weapons Destruction. Every effort should be made to plan for destruction (of small arms) in the assembly areas. This approach avoids the problems that may arise regarding the safe and secure transportation and storage of large quantities of small arms and light weapons. A profusion of destruction techniques exist, ranging from cheap and simple, to perhaps less reliable and environmentally unfriendly, to advanced, very reliable and relatively costly methods. Expert assistance from Mission EOD, Mine Action Service and DDR component, etc. may be sought by the battalion to carry out safe and reliable destruction.

Burning, shredding and cutting are the simpler methods, whereas industrial disposal and dumping at high seas are more resource consuming methods. Burning is a cheap destruction method for non-explosive items such as small arms, though it is not a recommended option since undamaged metal parts may remain useable. The procedure is labour intensive, but can serve a symbolic or ceremonial purpose in visibly demonstrating the destruction of weapons for the civilian population. Other options include cutting (time consuming) and shredding (quick but expensive), but for these appropriate equipment and training will have to be secured and included at the planning stage.

2.9.4.5 : Support Demobilization. Demobilization means the formal and controlled discharge of active combatants from security forces or from an armed group. It determines the terms and conditions of the transitional phase. The process is comprised of detailed planning, massing troops together in camps designated for this purpose (encampment) or barracks, through temporary and permanent centres, subsequent registration of the combatants with an aim to initially downsize to disband completely. The purpose is to count and monitor the soldiers and to prepare them for their discharge and involves some form of compensation or other short-term assistance package to encourage their transition to civilian life/reinsertion into society. It covers sustaining the combatants and generally also transportation, when they return to their home regions. Demobilization takes place on a contractual or statutory basis at stipulated places and is



implemented within a limited time frame. The objective of demobilization is to reduce or completely disband an army or armed group. Experience has shown that if sufficient resources are not allocated by the international society, demobilization and integration is difficult. It is demanding tasks to get sufficient donor money for reintegration programmes and provide the necessary jobs. Typical destabilizing factors during demobilization include idle and poorly controlled armed groups and uncontrolled arms circulation. The short-term aim is to keep the ex-combatants active and involved, to prevent reversion to armed violence or criminality.

2.9.4.6: Activities in Assembly Area. Different names are used for housing in the temporary assembly area: assembly area, cantonment site, encampment site, quartering area, etc. Ex-combatants come from a range of political and economic backgrounds. Adequate security and freedom of movement should be provided for the assembly areas and demobilization camps so that former combatants feel secure enough to start living without their weapons. Value of the effort will depend on period of encampment, goals of programmes, expectations of combatants and appropriate design of programmes. Even a plan for short encampment should have a contingency plan and a budget for activities due to inevitable unplanned delays. Activities prevent boredom, limit frustration, lessen risk of mutinies and riots, and help make time more productive. There are, however, situations in which, for political reasons, combatants have to remain in assembly areas for several months or a year. This time can be used for skills training or other activities that prepare the ex-combatants for civilian life. Such programmes should be linked to reintegration measures. Reinsertion programmes with briefings, counselling and training should take these different personal situations into account and offer targeted assistance for the return to civilian life. Assembly area activities, training, and reinsertion or reintegration measures are conducted by civilian DDR staff and the Mission military component is not expected to play a role.

2.9.4.7 : Facilitate Reintegration. Reintegration programmes are assistance measures provided to former combatants that would increase the potential for themselves and their families, economic and social reintegration into civil society. ("You need to replace the soldier's gun with something else"). Reinsertion, repatriation and reinsertion are civilian responsibilities led by the Mission's DDR component and partner organizations. Repatriation of foreign combatants to their countries of origin is a civilian-



led process that has to comply with the relevant international humanitarian and human rights norms.

2.9.4.8 : Information Gathering and Dissemination. The Joint Operations Centre (JOC) and Joint Mission Analysis Centre (JMAC) should coordinate and manage the information gathering and reporting task to:

- Seek information on the location, strength and intentions of ex-combatants who may or will become part of a DDR programme.
- Detect whether commanders within armed forces and groups are withholding information about their rank and file.
- Parties to the conflict are often reluctant to fully disclose troop strengths
 and locations, and it would also be naïve to assume that all combatants fully accept or trust a peace process. As a result, accurate figures
 on weapons and ammunition expected to be collected during the programme may never be available, so the technical part of the programme
 should include some flexibility.
- Identify or confirm the presence of women, children or wounded/disabled people within an armed force or group, particularly if these groups are being underreported.
- Due to dispersed deployment across the post-conflict country/region, military can assist by distributing information to potential participants and the local population.
- Unarmed UNMOs as well as civilian mission components can assist in contributing to early-warning and wider information-gathering and information distribution.
- The information-gathering can also be a by-product of its normal operations, e.g., information gathered by patrols and the activities of UNMOs.
- Information from UN system organizations, NGOs, etc. is also valuable.

2.9.4.9 : Public Information and Sensitization. Due to its dispersed grid deployment across the conflict area, it can assist distributing information to potential participants and the local population effectively. Planned and monitored by the DDR unit/team and wider mission public information staff, an infantry battalion can assist in the roll-out of public information and sensitization campaigns particularly when command, control and communications in armed forces and groups are poor. It can even encourage all people to inform armed groups on DDR processes.



- **2.9.4.10:** Monitoring and Reporting. Obtain ground inputs through routine operational activities, established surveillance grid, cultivated local sources and informers or specially tasked patrols to ascertain the progress of the programme by effective monitoring and reporting to the DDR staff and the JOC.
- **2.9.4.11 : Special Expertise and Support.** Provide specialist military ammunition and weapon expertise to the technical aspects of disarmament and special assets like Engineer (Generic Support and Explosive Ordnance Disarmament) and Aviation resources. Depending on the methods agreed on in peace agreements and plans for future national security forces, weapons and ammunition will either be destroyed or safely and securely stored.
- **2.9.4.12 : Logistic Support.** By experience logistics assistance from the military is highly appreciated in any UN mission in the early stages provided nobody else can do the job. However, this task can only be performed, if it has been foreseen in the mandate, considered in the logistics mission analysis and interpreted down into the configuration of the deploying logistics troops. The logistics and related tasks may encompass: providing/supporting demobilization camp construction, aerial /surface transportation means for movement of ex-combatants (including material handling), administration (assistance with registration and disarmament forms), supply support (food, equipment/spare parts, petrol), engineer support if no civilian contractor is available (Including Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD), medical care, etc. if spare capacity is available for specific purpose and duration and essential communication support.
- **2.9.4.13 : Assist UNMOs**. Assist in performing tasks involving monitoring separation of forces, monitoring withdrawal and disbandment of irregular forces, manning reception centres, registering and collecting weapons, ammunition and explosives, registering ex-combatants and performing investigations. Ideally national authorities (national police) should be responsible for security, but often it is the UN, who performs this task due to the absence of local authorities.
- **2.9.4.14 : Assist UN Police**. Help UN Police when needed in administration and security inside the cantonment area and weapon collection programmes.
- **2.9.4.15: Proactive Engagement of Armed Groups**. In coordination with the Mission DDR component, seek out armed groups (which are not con-



forming to agreed modalities or those which are not yet part of the process) proactively to engage and bring them to negotiation and conform to the DDR process. If mandated, the military component may also be involved in supporting operations against armed groups while the DDR component is simultaneously conducting outreach for individual combatants to defect and enter a DDR process. Communication and coordination with the DDR component are vital under such circumstances.

- **2.9.4.16 : Focal Points**. Where accessibility to or for the DDR units/staff is limited or when there is a trust deficit, Infantry Battalion elements can be an effective interface and act as a focal point to promote and encourage participation from fence sitters and welcome/direct them for the DDR processes.
- **2.9.4.17 : Support Infrastructure Creation**. Help in creating reception centre, transit camps, demobilization centre, rehabilitation camps, vocational training centre, childcare centre, roads, wells, etc. This task is particularly relevant for military engineer units, which may be called upon to perform construction tasks in remote areas or situations where civilian engineering capacity is limited.

2.9.5: Organization.

- **2.9.5.1 : DDR Component Structure**. Missions with a DDR mandate contain a DDR component which has a mix of civilian experts (DDR specialists, planning officers, public information officers, operations officers, logisticians, etc.). The DDR component can be supported from a wide range of Mission assets, including construction engineers, aviation resources, demining units, explosive disposal and weapon destruction units, interpreters, unarmed UNMO's and armed contingent troops (with EOD capability) of the peacekeeping force designed to provide security specific to DDR sites, each with its own core competency to support the DDR programme where required. In addition, UN agencies, funds and programmes, such as, UNDP and UNICEF, are typically involved in the reintegration part of the DDR process. Therefore, an Infantry Battalion will be undertaking the DDR support task as part of an integrated and comprehensive programme. Deployments typically take place in platoon or company-size task groups duly assisted by the experts and specialised support personnel.
- **2.9.5.2 : Command and Control**. Usually, an infantry battalion remains under normal military command and control arrangements and accord-



ingly, the HQ concerned will direct activities. It is important to distinguish between operational military tasks in support of DDR, which are directed by the military chain of command, and engagement in the often politically sensitive DDR planning and policymaking process, which is led by the civilian Chief of the DDR component and senior Mission leadership. However, while remaining under military command and control, an infantry battalion will be functioning under the overall guidance of civilian DDR staff, JOC and the Chief DDR Officer if specifically tasked for DDR tasks. For support and logistics tasks, the battalion will operate under the guidance of the Mission's Chief/Director of Mission support (CMS/DMS) in case any assistance for DDR task is being provided.

In practice, joint activities between military and DDR components are often pursued at a relatively low level. For example, the DDR component or field team may approach a company commander for support within the company's AOR. The infantry battalion and its Companies have a major role and obligation to support the civilian DDR staff in their AOR and facilitate meaningful and result-oriented implementation of the Mission DDR programmes. UNMOs, Military Staff Officers and Military Liaison Officers are also incorporated into the force command structure and individual military officers although technically part of contingents, serve in staff posts, both within the force HQ and in various specialised positions where they are integrated with civilian staff, e.g., in sections such as Integrated Support Services and DDR Section.

2.9.6 : Logistic Support.

The military logistic capabilities can be useful in a DDR programme and their support should be coordinated with units that provide integrated services support to a mission. A less ideal solution would be to reprioritize or reschedule the activities of military elements carrying out other mandated tasks.

(Suggested task capability standards are at p. 226)



2.10: Critical Infrastructure and Assets Protection



2.10.1: General Description.

As part of the major responsibility of restoring, creating and preserving safety and security in the AOR, an Infantry Battalion may be involved in protection of various international organizations, public and civilian infrastructure and assets that are vital to the peace process. These are identified, analysed and decided upon at the mission HQ level in consultation with the host national authorities and based on the risk assessment and operational conditions prevailing. Danger or damage to such assets may have serious functional and political implications in peaceful coexistence and economic well-being and therefore need to be protected temporarily by the UN forces until the Host National Security Forces or Agencies are capable of taking on the responsibility. Such responsibilities have high public visibility and impact on the attitude of local people towards the UN and mission entities and therefore, the battalion should take utmost care to prevent any untoward incident.

2.10.2 : Basic Tasks.

In addition to the mission force protection, an Infantry Battalion may be tasked to provide protection to various international and civilian institutions and infrastructural facilities which are vital to the host nation and need to be preserved for sustained peace. Such infrastructure and assets to be protected include but are not limited to the following:

- Protect Support Institutions. UN System entities outside the mission, other International Organizations (ICRC, etc.), Regional Organizations, NGOs working for the protection and benefit of the people, etc. who are under physical threat of violence.
- Protect Critical Government Infrastructure/Assets. Local Government HQ, civil authorities, power generation facilities, water works, communication centres, logistics dump, river/seaports, air fields and bases and other sensitive offices/installations which have a direct bearing in essential services and good governance.
- Protect law enforcing entities. Judicial institutions, police institutions, correction institutions etc which have a predominant role in restoring and maintaining rule of law.



- Protect Vital Civilian Assets/Infrastructure. Important religious sites, structures of cultural/historic value, important city centres, hospitals and schools or areas that provide daily subsistence and livelihood to the local people and protect vulnerable key leaders.
- **Lines of Communication.** Protect critical roads, bridges and defiles to maintain freedom of movement in a chosen area.

2.10.3: Planning Considerations.

Such tasks being beyond the normal military tasks which involve governmental authorities and civilians, detailed planning, coordination and deliberate preparations should be carried out. Important planning considerations are:

- **Situational Awareness.** Carry out a thorough risk/threat analysis based on the tactical information available. Gaps in information should be filled by gaining relevant inputs from other sources.
- Reconnaissance. Reconnaissance of the site/facility by key personnel of the protection force prior to deployment should be carried out to analyse the requirements.
- Protection Responsibility. In consultation with the local authorities/ leadership, the actual protection responsibility needs to be ascertained and defined clearly.
- Planning and Coordination. Joint planning and coordination with civilian authorities and the people involved in the asset or infrastructure is essential to integrate the effort and formulate day to day functional procedures and responses during emergencies.
- Resource Allocation. Based on the threat analysis and task requirements, necessary resources should be allocated within battalion capability and grouped appropriately. Additional requirements, if any, may be requested from the mission resources and grouped with the battalion assets.
- Deployment. Deployment of military personnel should not violate cultural/religious sentiments; infringe freedom of people and lead to perceived political misunderstandings or impact negatively the local environment.
- **Contingency Planning.** The means and methodology of responses to address various contingencies by the protection force and the battalion reserves should be carefully worked out.



• **Logistics Support.** The protection force should be self-sustained in terms of food, water, transport, protection stores, temporary shelters, ablutions, medical support, etc.

2.10.4 : Conduct.

Important aspects that need attention during the conduct stage are as follows:

- **Occupation of Site.** Quietly occupy the site without alerting the local people, preferably at night.
- Protection arrangements. Deploy in tiers to cover the extent, create obstacles and barriers as required, both visible and concealed from observation and prepare sentry posts/protection positions as required. Coordinate perimeter fencing, lighting arrangements and entry/exit points.
- Safety Distance. Ensure clear safety distance between the sentry post/ obstacle lines to the surrounding area as far as possible.
- **Surveillance.** Deploy 24/7 OP and have some elements outside for earlywarning. Surveillance should be carried out unobtrusively.
- Technological Edge. If necessary, close circuit TV with control station and sensors be established.
- Access Control. Access to personnel and vehicles should be controlled.
 Metal/explosive detectors, undercarriage inspection mirrors, door frame
 detectors, biometric instruments (finger printing, retina reader, etc.),
 smart card reader, and working dogs would be useful.
- **Coordination.** Coordination with the inhabitants, if any, functionaries of the infrastructure, and the local authorities should be carried out.
- Local Alarm Scheme. Install a local alarm scheme for alerting all the personnel in emergency.
- Response. Responses to various contingencies should be pre-planned, rehearsed and coordinated with all military and civilian personnel involved.
- **Reinforcement.** Timely reinforcement by the nearest military installation should be planned and rehearsed.
- Casualty Evacuation. The protection force should be able to tend to casualty and be able to evacuate with its own transport or with battalion support.



• **Command and Control.** Battalion HQ should maintain good command and control and monitor all critical situations for timely stabilization.

2.10.5: Organization.

The responsibility to protect assets or infrastructure will be at battalion level, delegated to respective companies as per AOR. It is generally undertaken by a Platoon strength duly complemented with additional operational assets and logistics support to sustain itself independently to execute the task. Where required, direct command, control and communication arrangements will be defined and established.

2.10.6 : Support.

Some of the support measures required for performing the task are:

- Engineer Stores. For lighting, obstacles, sentry posts etc.
- Communication Arrangements.
- Medical. Nursing assistant with ambulance.
- **Subsistence.** Food, water, emergency rations etc.
- Field Kitchen. For provision of food.
- **Shelter.** Temporary accommodation arrangements if not provided at the site.
- Hygiene and Sanitation. Ablutions/toilets and solid waste management
- Transport. Utility trucks and protected mobility.

(Suggested task capability standards are at p. 227)





2.11: Crowd Management



2.11.1: General Description.

A peacekeeping mission is deployed in the aftermath or against the back-drop of a heightened conflict situation, reflecting possible lawlessness, dysfunctional legal institutions and an ineffective police organization. Local populations may undertake demonstrations in towns and villages to air their concerns, project problems or protest issues that directly or indirectly affect them. Such gatherings, though mostly political and peaceful in nature, may turn violent, leading to disturbances/riots. The target of such demonstrations may be the host government, socio-politico or ethnic groups, or the peacekeeping mission itself.

In principle, the responsibility for restoration and maintenance of law and order lies with the host State, with operational support or advice provided by a UN Formed Police Unit (FPU) or with the UN police, in accordance with the mandate. UN police are usually in the lead for coordinating actions with local UN HQ, civil and police authorities. In the case that civil authorities are unable to cope, military assistance may be needed as long as the mandate permits action and the ROE specify the use of crowd management means by the military. It should be stressed that military commanders are to request the presence of police personnel through the quickest means possible if not at the scene in an outbreak.

Crowd management is a sensitive operation requiring, amongst other elements, human rights compliance, training, appropriate equipment and clear command and control arrangements, to manage a calibrated and appropriate response to a volatile situation. It is important to allow the legitimate expression of views by the assembled crowd, while preventing escalation, casualties and collateral damage.

An infantry battalion may be faced with crowd management in four particular scenarios:

- When charged with securing the perimeter of the tactical area of operation within which the host State police and/or UN police are managing public order.
- When the situation is beyond the control of the host State police and/or UN police and has evolved into a public disorder.
- When the host State police or UN police are not available and cannot reach the area in time.



 When called upon to protect UN staff, facilities, equipment, installations or institutions.

Crowd management is followed by civil police legal action, which may be reflected in procedures like registration of criminal cases, arrests, search and seizure and subsequent prosecution action in the courts. The civil (usually) and UN police are trained and equipped to handle these activities and battalion commanders should readily use this expertise in field situations wherever necessary.

Whether carried out by UN or host State police or by military peacekeepers, the graduated use of force in crowd management will be guided by the mandate and expressed within relevant operational documents (ROE and Directives on Use of Force-DUF). Some of the important facets to be kept in mind while carrying out crowd management are; advance planning and readiness to deal with various contingencies, allocating and maintaining adequate resources (dedicated and trained troops, transport and specialized equipments), preparation for establishing a joint HQ to coordinate and integrate planning and conduct of operations, coordination and communication arrangements with all other actors, key leader engagement, incorporating female interpreters of military/police forces, etc. .

2.11.2 : Basic Tasks.

Scenario A. The most typical scenario is for the police (host State or UN) to have primacy in crowd management. In this scenario, the role of the UN Infantry Battalion may be to assist host State and/or UN police by deploying and controlling a military security support zone surrounding the police area of operation. The senior most UN Police Officer in location exercises tactical control in these situations. The battalion's support role should follow the mission-specific SOP on military-police cooperation in defining the division of responsibility, the respective tactical AOR and the transfer of authority. A joint command post/incident control point is to be established to monitor and coordinate operations.

Scenario B. When the public order situation evolves to become public disorder of a military nature, i.e. where there is sustained use of firearms or military weaponry, there is a transfer of authority to the senior most military commander at location to exercise tactical control, since the police primacy as described in Scenario A is no longer sustainable. The military commander may request FPU personnel and/or other security personnel



of the mission to perform specific tasks in support of crowd management. The assignment of FPU personnel should be coordinated with the HOPC or his/her delegate (Chief Operations, Deputy Chief Operations (FPU) or Regional Commander).

Scenario C. When local police or UN police is not present, the battalion should monitor and report to the HQ on crowd gathering, and share information with the nearest and relevant host State police and UN police representatives. Part of the situational awareness might be to identify and limit the area of operations. The task might involve protecting host government institutions, civilians and officials. If resources are available, establish perimeter security at an appropriate distance to restrict access and prevent crowd from further swelling. In collaboration with local authorities, it may be possible to identify routes which the crowd can use to easily disperse. Otherwise, the battalion should keep a distance from the crowd, if possible and wait for the crowd to disperse. Authority should be transferred to host State police or UN police at the earliest possible moment in order to restore law and order.

Scenario D. When called upon to protect UN staff, facilities, installations or institutions or in protection of battalion COBs, mobile troops and vehicles, the battalion may be required to reinforce, provide security, disperse the crowd and extricate the UN personnel to safety, if required.

2.11.3: Planning Considerations.

General. General. Careful planning, deliberate preparations, timely interface and controlled execution will pay rich dividends. Important planning considerations are as follows:

- **Training.** An important part of the pre-planning and preparation is regular joint military-police exercises. Scenario-based training with rehearsals and exercises within the contingent and jointly with the police on various actions for crowd management and dispersal are critical. It should also emphasize command and control arrangements and procedures. There is also a need to test communication equipments and coordinate necessary communication means to overcome interoperability challenges. Furthermore it is to ensure full knowledge and understanding of principles included in the ROE and DUF, and their application.
- Prognosis. Carry out an assessment of the likely disturbances, their probable locations and strengths, action needed to prevent them and



any likely tasks or roles envisaged for the battalion. Prior planning to deal with likely situations and contingencies should be carried out.

- **Situational Awareness.** Develop an effective situational awareness network and institute monitoring mechanisms in place for early-warning. Prepare an information-collection plan and estimate the overall situation and mood of the people. Key aspects are the reasons of gathering and messages, the nature and composition, leadership profile of the crowd and the means available to it.
- Security of Critical Terrain and Infrastructure. Assess requirement of securing/holding key terrain and infrastructures in accomplishment of the task.
- Joint HQ/Command Post. Create joint police and military operational HQ/command post, where appropriate, to establish a joint working mechanism between the civil, police and the military elements in the area for a coordinated response and measures for securing the exercise of command and control.
- Outreach. Carry out constructive engagement and liaison with local leaders in advance to discourage initiation or development of any unlawful activity.
- **Gender Issues.** Engage women's groups to understand their particular concerns.
- Coordination. Plans (resources and responses) should be well coordinated amongst all responders and implemented in an integrated manner.
- Processing of Requests. The channels through which requests for military help is required to be processed should be well defined.
- Civil Authority. The arrangements for representatives of the civil authorities, who may be police officers, to join the troops in execution of the responsibility.
- **Troops to Task.** Assess requirement and earmark troops for each task and locality.
- **Reserves.** Assessment and configuration of a reserve force.
- Joint Reconnaissance. Carry out joint reconnaissance down to platoon or squad level, if possible.



- Preparations. Prepare special stores like public address equipment, barbed wire, knife rests, sandbags, fire fighting equipment and emergency lighting.
- **Resources.** Provision of crowd management equipment, riot control agents and maps for reinforcing units.
- **Coordination.** Coordinate movement, deployment and support to be provided with the local administration and police authorities.
- **Reception.** The reception, briefings, guidance, deployment and administrative support to the reinforcements.
- Record. Plan to record/collect evidence with cameras, videos and by written or tape recorded eye witness accounts.
- **Traffic Control.** Plans to divert civil traffic, which should include provision for maintaining cleared routes for use by military reinforcements
- Interpreters. Interpreters will be of great help in interacting with the locals to establish contact, engage key leaders and in diffusing situations. Note that interpreters will also need to be trained, fully trusted and protected.

2.11.4: Conduct.

General. The method of execution and the resultant outcome of a Crowd Management Operation are likely to have severe positive or negative ramifications on the entire peace process. An inappropriate response to the crowd can trigger aggravation and greater disturbances. The basis for any posture is a firm, fair and friendly conduct of operations. Regardless of which combination of actors may be present (the UN military alone or in support of the host State and UN police or alone), the UN presence should at all times consider the possible reactions to any proposed or planned actions.

Measures. Crowd management operations broadly encompass the following measures:

- Information gathering and sharing.
- Liaise and coordinate with UN police and/or host State police before, during and after the event, for purposes of information gathering, interoperability and protection of human rights. The host State police deals with organizers and leaders often on a daily basis and their understand-



ing and rapport can be a powerful way of managing demonstrations without the use of force.

- Protective measures (alert static and mobile forces, pre-position troops, etc.).
- Preventive measures (show readiness, engage key leaders, negotiations, persuasions, etc.).
- Sustainability measures (logistics support, equipment readiness and ammunition, etc.).
- Contingency measures (evacuation, escalation, use of deadly force).

Judgement. A military commander should select the best method of managing a crowd most appropriate to the circumstances. On the one hand, a relatively amiable crowd may be inflamed by an ill judged show of force; while on the other hand, an underestimation of the hostile intent of a crowd and the deployment of an inadequate number of troops could be equally disastrous. The tactics outlined in this section should be used as a guide; the military commander on the spot has to use his/her own judgement as to how to deal with any particular situation.

Restraint. The military commanders at all levels should ensure that their tactical actions are consistent with political goals and it is an obligation to respect the rights of unarmed peaceful protesters. Maintain restraint to avoid causing casualties to innocent civilians. Legal, political and humanitarian constraints will also shape the conduct of operations and actions of the battalion should correspond to the ROE. Negative effects of inappropriate tactical actions will be exploited by the media.

Preliminary Military Action. Plan in consultation with the UN Police and/ or host police and civilian authorities, to concentrate, move and position the troops close to the scene of an anticipated disturbance. It will ensure close monitoring of the situation and the readiness of troops for getting employed. Keep the troops in tactical groups and maintain adequate reserves. A joint HQ should be set up to coordinate and control operations.

Required Information. The Infantry Battalion should seek to gain information from all possible sources and establish awareness of the AOR including with regard to the nature of the crowd's grievance, its location, its attitude and the overall situation. At least the information should include:

- Overall situation and the tasks that the military are to perform.
- Command, control and coordination responsibilities, and arrangements.



- Police force locations.
- Route (best direction without interference) to the scene of the incident and rendezvous.
- Nature of disturbance, estimated size of the crowd, its intentions and temper.
- Any relevant topographical details including lighting requirements at night.
- Direction in which the crowd should be dispersed.

Movement. Establish liaison with the civil authorities and police force in location prior to movement. Consider the following:

- The route (least interference) and direction by which troops should arrive.
- Whether the move should be ostentatious to show force or unobtrusive.
- The tactics and weapons needed on arrival.
- A rendez-vous where the military and UN police and/or host police commanders can meet: it should be sufficiently clear of the crowd but with a view of the scene of the disturbances.
- Preliminary orders for troops involved.

Arrival of Military Forces. Troops should be prepared to intervene the moment they arrive at the scene of the disturbance so that the situation does not deteriorate through unnecessary delay. They should therefore have a well-rehearsed deployment drill. This does not mean that troops should always be used at once. Preferably, the armoured vehicles should not make a premature appearance, which may rob a commander of the advantage he would gain later from the shock effect of their sudden intervention. Troops should never be brought to the scene of a disturbance until their intervention is required.

Transport. The following points should be noted:

- **Debussing Point.** If the troops move on transport, debus quickly to a practised drill, away from the area, unless armoured or special vehicles are used and if it is advantageous to debus close to the crowd.
- Soft-Skinned Transport. Transport should be left under guard at an appropriate distance. One or two vehicles may carry a small party including policemen along with blocking stores to deal quickly with any specific diversions. These vehicles should be fitted with protection kits and fire proof canopies, and may carry a public address system.



Armoured Vehicles. The use of APCs has a deterrent function since their
presence rather than their firepower delivers the impact. Its use should
always be considered under the aspect of proportionality and minimum
use of force. It is not advised to use tracked vehicles for crowd management purposes, as they may be reported as "tanks" in the media and have
a counterproductive effect on the local population.

Action on Arrival. There can be no definite sequence of events and most actions take place concurrently and overlap. Troops should take the following actions on arrival:

- Obtain information about the situation from UN police and/or host police/civil authorities, roof-top standing patrols and helicopters
- Assess the best direction to disperse the crowd; some factors affecting
 would be the mood and intentions of the crowd, the existence of attractive targets and of other crowds, and alternative dispersal routes.
- The method of handling the various elements in the crowd should be decided.
- Preferably do not bottle up the crowd, but give time and room in which those non-violent elements can be separated from trouble makers and dispersed as appropriate.
- The process for coordination with the local authorities should be established.
- Deployment should ensure all around protection to prevent rioters from encircling security forces. It should be decided whether there will be a deterrent value in arresting ring-leaders.
- Bear in mind to warn and persuade without the use of force, particularly when directed at community leaders and use of minimum necessary force.

Directing/Stopping a Moving Crowd. It will be usual to deploy troops to halt the progress of a crowd, and such deployment focuses the attention of the crowd, thus distracting attention from other moves by the security forces. It establishes a baseline from which:

- · OPs are established and ground reconnaissance carried out.
- Barricades, blocks and cordons may have to be established.
- Every effort is made to identify individuals in the crowd, especially ringleaders.



Use of Aircraft and Helicopters. Depending on the threat posed, aircraft, particularly helicopters, may be employed on the following tasks:

- Reconnaissance to give early-warning of crowd assembly and movement.
- Dominating a crowd by flying or hovering overhead and drowning any speakers who may be addressing the crowd.
- Dropping riot control agent if necessary and reasonable to do so.
- Acting as an airborne command post or radio relay station.
- Positioning OPs on high buildings or lifting troops to the roof-tops of those occupied by crowds or snipers.
- Deployment of quick reaction forces, including search and rescue.
- Public address by means of loudspeakers, photography and night illumination.

Dispersing Crowds and Riots by Persuasion. Most demonstrations are lawful and the primary aim of a security force—whether an infantry battalion or a police service—should be to facilitate and allow the demonstration to proceed. In the majority of cases, there will be no need to disperse the crowd. However, a crowd may also shelter agitators who will seek to provoke the security forces into ill-considered, hasty action. Ensure that only minimum necessary force is used to disperse a crowd and that the methods employed are appropriate to its mood and the local situation. The measures, short of using force, include the following:

- Voluntary Dispersal. As a first and most effective and least provocative step, unobtrusive discussion with the leaders involved may lead to the orderly dispersal of a crowd. It is important to address responsible members of the crowd and rely on them to influence the remainder. Moreover, it will appear to be voluntary rather than enforced by the security forces.
- Verbal or Visual Persuasion. Use hand held/vehicle or helicopter mounted public address system to persuade and warn the crowd in the local language.
- **Important Points.** When adopting any of these methods, the following should be kept in mind:
- Pleas. Pleading from a position of moral or physical strength may be
 a logical and productive stage in the process of dispersal; however, it
 is more likely that pleas from a position of weakness will produce an
 adverse effect.



- Promises. While promises may produce an immediate and positive result, the longer term results of rash promises made without due authority will be inevitably negative and damaging to the security forces.
- Observation. Just maintaining an observation of a crowd should be enough to achieve objectives. The lack of a suitable target, in the shape of the security forces, may cause the crowd to disperse from fear or boredom. The ringleaders may have particular difficulty in inciting the crowd if there is no suitable target for them to attack.
- Threats. Any attempt to force a crowd to disperse has to be preceded by clear and repeated warnings of a possible use of force and has to allow sufficient time for the crowd to understand and respond to the warnings. Any abuse or inappropriate action may provoke the crowd and discredit the security forces.
- **Show of force.** A show of force might have a deterrent or an aggravating effect, depending on the specific scenario and on the mood of the crowd. Less provocation can be achieved by posting OPs, particularly on roof-tops and high buildings where they can be seen, so that the crowd becomes aware of a military presence, and individuals may begin to fear being surrounded and decide to leave. Their departure can be infectious and the crowd should be allowed to melt away. While an open show of force may require that all troops available be seen, a more unobtrusive approach should always be backed up by a reserve. This may be needed should an isolated detachment be attacked or surrounded.

Use of Force. The use of force in these situations should always be based on the principles of necessity, proportionality/ minimum level of force, legality and accountability and all actions of UN military and police should be aimed at the protection and preservation of human life, property, liberty and dignity. Dialogue and mediation should be applied whenever possible. The use of force is the last resort, when all other means of peaceful de-escalation have failed. Any use of force is to be conducted in accordance with ROE.

Dealing with Women and Children. The presence of women and children either in or on the frontline of a crowd may affect operational decisions at the tactical level. Tactics and procedures may be adapted with regard to how women and children are handled physically, which agents and other support are used and how the use of force is restrained. Another factor to keep in mind is the media, as women and children may be involved in



disturbances for publicity purposes, as well as being used as a cover for agitators.

Records. Military action in support of the civil authorities may be the subject of subsequent enquiry. It is therefore essential to be able to establish what happened, and a complete record should be kept of all events as they occur. Important aids to keep evidence include photography/videography from ground and air (helicopter) with digital still cameras, video recorders, pocket tape recorder and cell phone recorder. All military commanders should record important events in chronological order in the pocket diary.

Handling injured persons, casualties and detainees. The battalion, in conjunction with the police and civil authorities should facilitate/provide first aid and carry out evacuation to the nearest medical facility. Detainees, if any, should be handed over to the UN police and/or host police as early as possible as per Interim SOP on Detention.

2.11.5: Organization.

Structure. Crowd management situations may be encountered by a squad/section to a platoon/company level group either in static or mobile mode. One company at battalion level and a platoon each at company level should be equipped with public order management equipments and stores. However, all ranks of the battalion should be trained and undergo joint exercises with the police.

Equipment.

- Organic equipments and UN field uniform, and should not include weaponry like rifles, etc. until and unless the level of threat is elevated to one of a military nature.
- Crowd management batons and shield, body protection, gas mask, disposable handcuffs, crowd management helmet with facial protection.
- "Non-Lethal Weapons" such as OC-spray (Oleoresin Capsicum), CS-gas (tear gas), tear gas launchers, tear gas hand grenades, smoke grenades, water cannons, and flash and bang/stun grenades. It should be noted that the use of rubber bullets by UN police units has been banned by DPKO.
- Vehicles/APCs reinforce the display of a massive and determined strength.
- Handheld loud speakers and video or digital cameras.



- Stores for barricading.
- Working dogs (crowd management dogs).
- Handheld metal detector according to the nature of the operation/task.
- Availability of language assistant has to be considered to facilitate the understanding of the crowd and for tactical negotiation with the crowd.

2.11.6 : Support.

All troops should be administratively self-contained for food, water and ammunition. An ambulance with medical attendants and casualty evacuation measures should be coordinated. Necessary replenishment should be catered for sustaining the force for the expected duration of the operations.

Note:

- The modalities of conducting joint operations are covered under Chapter 14, Joint Operations.
- The authorization of Crowd Management Equipment for platoon and company strength is in the COE Manual 2011.









2.12: Detention



2.12.1: General Description.

UN Personnel in missions are sometimes required under the terms of their mandates to detain persons in application of mission-specific military rules of engagement or police directives on the use of force and related matters issued by the DPKO. It is required that detained persons be handled humanely and in compliance with military specific rules of engagement and Status of Mission Agreements, police directives on the use of force and applicable international human rights, humanitarian and refugee law, norms and standards. The operational framework for detentions within UN peacekeeping operations is provided by "Detention in United Nations Peace Operations Interim Standard Operating Procedures", dated 25 January 2010. The ISOP remains applicable until such a time that final SOPs are approved. However, the ISOP does not address issues of criminal procedures which are governed by the relevant laws of the host State, and are not applicable to missions with executive mandate or interim law enforcement function, where handling of detainees will be governed by the law applicable in the Mission area.

2.12.2: Circumstances for Detention.

An Infantry Battalion may be constrained/called upon to detain suspected persons or criminals in the following circumstances:

- While conducting Cordon and Search Operations.
- · At the Checkpoint.
- When a person commits an offence in the presence of a patrol against any vulnerable section of the society (women, children, elderly, etc.).
- When grave danger or reasonable threat to life is imminent or exists.
- As part of support to law and public order management.
- Whilst carrying out proactive disarmament.
- In protection of UN personnel and property where danger is imminent.
- When an intrusion/trespass or attempt to commit an infraction or violation in UN premises takes place.



2.12.3: General Principles.

Any person detained by UN personnel shall be released or handed over to national law enforcement officials of host state or other national authorities as soon as possible.

Detained persons are entitled to rights provided in international human rights, humanitarian and refugee law, norms and standards.

The fundamental principles and rules of international humanitarian law are applicable to UN forces when actively engaged as combatants in situations of armed conflict to the extent and for the duration of that engagement⁴.

2.12.4: Planning Considerations.

Procedures for handling detained personnel shall be in compliance with mission-specific military rules of engagement, Status of Forces Agreements (SOFA) and Status of Mission Agreements (SOMA), police directives on the use of force, and applicable international human rights, humanitarian and refugee law, norms and standards.

- Rights of Detainee. The detainee has the right to know the reason for detention, designate a family member and or other representative person to be notified of the detention, to make complaint on condition or treatment during the detention, to make claim/compensation for bodily injury/damage to property arising from detention and to receive an inventory of items taken and have them returned under certain conditions.
- No Discrimination. Detainees shall not be subjected to any discrimination on any grounds including sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national, ethnic or social origin, sexual orientation or identity, association with a national community, property, birth, disability or other status.
- **Prohibition**. Detained persons shall not be subjected to torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.
- Provision of Food and Water. Adequate food shall be provided at the usual hours and as reasonably practicable in accordance with accepted

⁴ Secretary-General' Bulletin, Observance by the UN Forces of International Humanitarian Law, ST/SGB/1999/13, 6 August 1999.



religious practices, customs and tradition. Clean drinking water will be made available at all times.

- Detention Focal Point (DFP). DFP is authorized to inquire into and provide advice on matters of detention, and has unimpeded access to records.
- Safety. Safety and well-being of a detainee shall be the responsibility
 of the UN personnel and will be ensured until release or handover to
 national authority.
- **Health and Hygiene**. Provision of clean clothing, good sanitary facilities and access to fresh air and regular exercise to be ensured.
- Use of Force. Force will be used strictly in accordance with international standards on the use of force, mission specific military ROE, and police directives on the use of force and related matters..
- Physical restraints. Shall only be used as a precaution during transfer/ handover, on medical grounds, and by order of the CO, and only purpose-designed hand/flexi cuffs shall be used and hands kept to the front. Circumstances for physical restraints as per the SPO para. 27 must be taken note of.
- Privacy and Accommodation. Protection from public curiosity and privacy of accommodation based on age, sexual orientation, ethnicity, religion or any other criteria shall be ensured.

2.12.5 : Conduct.

Taking and Handling Detained Persons.

- Commencement of Detention.
 - * At the time detention commences, the detainee shall be notified orally of the reason of detention and a written statement explaining the reason for detention and notifying of rights will be read to and given to the detainee at the earliest practical time.
 - * A Commanding Officer will ensure delivery of UN detention, release, transfer and/or handover form delivered to the Detention Focal Point, Chief of HR Component and HOM within 36 hours. He/she will also within 36 hours provide a written notification to ICRC with basic information on the detainee, reason, date, time and place of detention.
 - * A "Detained Persons Register" shall be maintained on initial details of detention and updated to reflect any material change of circumstances.



- * The detainee shall be photographed for identification and to record any injury or matter relating to his/her well being.
- * A person designated by the detainee shall be notified of the detention as soon as possible.
- Medical Examination. Conduct medical screening of a detainee immediately on commencement of detention or prior to release, and when force has been used against the detainee, or after allegations of abuse or ill-treatment, or when detainee is injured or unwell and when necessary to ascertain physical or mental illness. Consent of the detainee (except when mentally unstable or underage) and legitimate medical reasons are required to carry out medical examination. (Refer to para. 32 to 40). If a child, medical examination shall only be conducted with additional consent of parent or appropriate adult relative or guardian except if deemed necessary by the medical personnel. Children, elderly persons, persons with physical and mental disabilities, pregnant or nursing mothers, shall be monitored and given priority of care. A report with details of the medical examination including treatment provided and recommended shall be provided to the detainee on release.
- Questioning. Questioning is governed by mission-specific ROE. In any
 case, on request for identity and address, detainee's responses shall be
 recorded including decline/refusal to answer and the identity of UN personnel present at that time.
- Searches. UN personnel are authorized to search detained persons for arms, ammunition, explosives, drugs and any other item that may cause harm or damage persons or property. Search will be conducted with respect and consideration of gender, age, and sensitivity to race, religion, culture and disability. UN male personnel may search female detainees in exceptional circumstances at the commencement of detention, for imperative security reasons (e.g., reasonable belief that the female is carrying a weapon) or when no female UN personnel are available to conduct the search.
- Confiscation/Deposition of Items. All items in the possession of the
 detained person shall be taken and registered in the Detained Persons
 Property Register. Items of security/investigative interest shall be confiscated and dangerous items may be destroyed upon the approval of the
 commanding officer. A detailed description of such items will be maintained including photography and filming prior to destruction. All per-



sonal items not confiscated or ordered destroyed will be returned to the detainee upon release or transfer to the national authority at the time of handover.

- **Children**. A child may only be detained as a last resort and for the shortest possible time and separate from other detainees unless with members of family except where this is against the child's best interest. The nearest kin shall be notified as soon as possible and arrangement made for regular visitation by adult relatives/guardian. A child will only be handed over to the national authorities on their written commitment that the child will not be recruited for participation in hostilities, or the lack of which the child will be set free and the HOM advised of the refusal accordingly.
- Foreign National. A detained foreign person shall be informed of their right to communicate to and be accessed by the respective embassy, consulate or diplomatic representatives for purpose of such communication.
- Refugees/Stateless persons or persons under the protection of an international organization. These persons have a right to communicate orally or in writing with representatives of the competent international organization, and will be provided with the necessary contact information and means to accomplish contact.
- Media and Public Information. All media inquiries to be directed to missions designated Public Information Focal Point. No information shall be disclosed to the media without the authorization of the HOM or their representative
- Disclosure of Information. Information to host State/State of nationality should only be given with the approval of HOM in accordance with applicable procedures including SOFA/SOMA. Unauthorized disclosure of information under any circumstances including photographs, film relating to detained persons is strictly forbidden.
- Serious Illness or Death. Commanding officer shall immediately notify and consult qualified UN medical personnel and transmit oral and written information to HOM or delegate with copy to DFP, Chief of HR Component of the mission and the ICRC. In the case of death, the family of the detainee or other appropriate person must be notified as soon as possible with cause of death and arrangements for handing over the body. A written notification shall immediately be sent by the HOM to the USG/



DPKO. A timely investigation of the death shall be undertaken in accordance with existing procedures.

- Transfer. Based on operational requirements a detainee may be transferred from one Commanding Officer to another Commanding Officer with due considerations to place of residence, access to family, etc. with appropriate documentation copied to the DFP and Chief of the Human Rights component. Items of the detained person (other than those confiscated) shall be transferred along and records updated to reflect the transfer.
- Complaints. The detainee has the right to complain orally or in writing
 regarding treatment or the conditions of detention and such complaints
 will be recorded in the Detained Persons Complaint Register and will be
 reported to DFP with a copy to Chief of HR Component of the mission.
 The HOM will ensure investigation of all complaints and the CO will be
 responsible for prompt investigation of all cases that do not constitute
 allegations of misconduct.

Release and Handover.

- **Length of Detention**. Within 48 hours, the detained person should be either released or handed over to the national authorities. Detainees may be held for an additional 24 hours if on transit and in the process of handover to the national authorities. Custody beyond 72 hours may only be undertaken on a written request from and for temporary detention on behalf of the national authorities, in discharge of a mandate to assist national law enforcement agencies to this effect, or when the HOM considers detention reasonable and appropriate to discharge the mandate in relation to the specific case.
- Release. Release should be effected as soon as the detention is no longer warranted by completing information contained in the UN detention, release, transfer or handover form. A completed form shall be submitted to the HOM copied to the DFP and Chief of Human Rights component, and a copy of the statement of release shall be provided to the released detainee.
- Handover. Handover to national authorities will be affected within the stipulated timelines on the length of detention. In case of substantial grounds indicating real risk to detained persons from national authorities of torture, ill-treatment, persecution, subjection to death penalty or



arbitrary deprivation of life; the UN shall not handover but rather release the detainee. If national authorities decline to accept handover, the detainee may be released. A detained person is entitled to a copy of the Statement of Handover. Until handover or release, the detainee remains the responsibility of the UN personnel engaged in the handover/release.

- Reporting of Handover. CO will provide communication to the national authorities the identity; date, time, place of detention; reasons for detention; place of handover and identity of national authority who received the handover. A copy of the UN Detention, Release, Transfer and/or Handover Form will be submitted to the HOM, DFP and Chief of HR Component, and the Detained Persons Register and the Detained Persons Property Register updated accordingly. A copy of the statement of handover with contents explained in a language understood by the detainee shall be provided to him or her at the time of handover.
- Return of Items. Items except for those deemed dangerous and intended to be destroyed should be either handed over to the detained person or signed for by the national authority and records updated accordingly.
- **Documents**. The Battalion will maintain the following registers:
 - * Detained Persons Register.
 - * Detained Persons Property Register.
 - * Detained Persons Complaints Register.
- Reporting. Detentions will be reported immediately on occurrence, through daily and weekly situation reports, and half-yearly reports will be submitted on number and reason for detentions, any mission specific operational and administrative issuances, and other information related to detentions and evaluation of the implementation of the ISOP.

2.12.6: Organisation.

The rules and methodology of detention must be clearly known up to the Platoon Commander Level. The Commanding Officer and Company Commanders will ensure that all those under their authority and command who handle detained persons receive sufficient training to understand and apply the detention procedures and prevent any potential embarrassments social, political and legal implications from detention-related incidents. It is prudent to coordinate as much as possible with the UN and local police to avoid unnecessary legal repercussions. Detention guards should be well trained and adequately briefed to prevent embarrassing situations



e.g., escape, suicide attempt, assault on guard, etc. Human rights components and ICRC shall be granted unconditional access to detainees and be notified of and have access to documents relating to detentions, releases, transfers and handover of detainees.

2.12.7 : Support.

Battalion will ensure the following:

- Detention Cell. Each COB and the Battalion HQ will have detention cells as per mission SOPs. These cells will be provided with sleeping arrangements, good ventilation and adequate lighting.
- **Basic Amenities**. Food, water, recreation facilities and toilet facilities will be provided. Religious scriptures should be accessible to the detainees.

(Suggested task capability standards are at p. 230)







Task 2.13: Buffer Zone



2.13.1: General Description

A Buffer Zone (BZ) is primarily established to separate the warring factions by interposing UN peacekeeping forces to reposition or withdraw the opposing forces back to a predetermined and agreed upon line of deployment and creation of a demilitarized buffer zone under UN control with a view to restore international peace and security. The main purpose of establishing a BZ would be to maintain a visible presence and dominate the BZ with robust force projection to preserve the sanctity of the buffer zone by preventing any violation of ceasefire/peace agreement clauses, effective aerial, mobile and static monitoring and surveillance of the area, carrying out investigations of any violations and finding a negotiated/mediated settlement or resolution of disputes and protection of the civilians in the BZ.

2.13.2: Basic Tasks.

The following important activities encompass the BZ operations:

- **Tactical Deployment**. Deploy tactical sub-units and detachments (both permanent and temporary) to effectively cover the entire frontage.
- Monitoring. Observe, monitor, supervise and verify the cessation of hostilities/ceasefire/Truce/armistice agreements, compliance of agreements, troop deployments, etc.
- **Interposition**. Interpose between opposing forces to stabilize the situation, where formal peace agreements are not in force.
- **Supervision**. Supervise the implementation of the disengagement agreement.
- Repositioning of Belligerent Forces. Accompany and support opposing forces to redeploy/withdraw to agreed dispositions and subsequent adherence to military status quo.
- Control of BZ. Ensure no presence of military personnel, weapons, installations and activities, assist in securing the respective areas/line to prevent/intervene entry/intrusion without consent of military personnel, arms or related material in the Buffer Zone.



- Civilian Activities. Monitor Crossing/Control Points across buffer zone
 for safe and orderly passage through by civilians in conjunction with
 opposing forces. Facilitate daily subsistence and routine activities of civilians in the buffer zone.
- Contain. Prevent/contain violations/cross border attacks/isolated incidents taking place and if taken place, prevent it from escalating in to major conflicts.
- Investigation. Follow up on complaints by investigations.
- Proactive Deployment. Proactive troop deployment to prevent an incident or its recurrence.
- Area of Limitations. Visit, monitor and ascertain compliance of activities
 periodically in stipulated "Areas of Limitations" (where military restrictions on deployment of body of troops and weapons systems and massing of troops not permitted).
- **Interface and Coordination**. Act as go-betweens for the hostile parties with good liaison, close contact and effective coordination.
- Assist Establishment of Local Authority. Assist/coordinate with local Government/belligerent parties in restoring its effective authority in respective areas.
- Assist in Good Governance. Facilitate good governance in the area of separation/buffer zone, contribute to maintenance and restoration of law and order and policing, establish interface with the inhabitants and help resumption of routine civilian activity (farming, electricity, water, medical support) for establishing normalcy.
- Assist Other Entities. Assist/support formed military police elements, formed UN police elements/UNPOL, UN agencies in the area and other international organizations when tasked.
- **Mine Awareness**. Support mine awareness, identify and mark minefields, and help in clearance of mines and unexploded ordnance.
- Facilitate Humanitarian Access. Extend assistance to help ensure humanitarian access to civilian populations, provision of medical aid and facilitate voluntary and safe return of displaced personnel.
- Reconciliation and Rapprochement. Play an active and constructive role which is critical in preventing a recurrence of hostilities/to prevent flash point, detrimental to the peace process and work towards a comprehensive political solution.



- Assist Negotiation and Mediation. Assist UN mediator and undertake mediation and negotiation when tasked or required.
- Other Activities. Facilitate exchange of prisoners, refugees, IDPs, dead bodies and to retrieve livestock.

2.13.3: Planning Considerations.

- Situational Awareness. Tactical information gathering for realistic situational awareness about the dispositions, operational activities, tactics and potential problem areas pertaining to the opposing forces.
- **Threat Level**. Regardless of the situation on the ground, the battalion should perform generic, synchronized and supporting tasks in both high and low-threat environments, whether they are operating under a Chapter VI or Chapter VII mandate.
- **Planning and Preparations**. Meticulous planning, preparation and execution by battalion staff and companies.
- Liaison and Coordination. Extensive coordination of moving in and deployment with the opposing forces to overcome identification issues (distinctive day and night signs), deployment areas, movement schedules and on communication matters.
- **Deployment**. A battalion should maintain visible presence throughout the zone and have complete freedom of movement for its forces.
- C3. Command, Control and Communications, capable of working in a hostile, unpredictable and fluid environment and exercise effective control on the activities of the belligerents and to establish efficient communication with all relevant stakeholders.
- **Observation**. The static and mobile operational elements of the battalion should have unobstructed ground, sea and air observation of the zone to be fully effective in maintaining a BZ.
- Operations. The battalion may have to establish a BZ in an environment/ AOR in which there is no stable peace. This may require peacekeeping battalions to conduct active operations around the buffer zone in order to provide space in which to operate.

2.13.4 : Conduct.

Maintenance of the sanctity and integrity of the buffer zone from illegal and unauthorized entry/activities, active and intimate monitoring of the



activities of the belligerents, carrying out investigations of any violations and finding a negotiated/mediated settlement of disputes are important facets that need to be taken care of by the UN troops deployed on ground. Important aspects that need attention during conduct stage are:

- Reconnaissance. Based on the operational requirement carry out a
 ground reconnaissance by the key elements of the battalion. During the
 visit, liaise and coordinate with various actors in the area and finalise the
 movement, deployment and sustenance.
- Preparations. The battalion should task organize its subordinate units as
 per operational environment and the threat analysis and establish tactics, techniques and procedures to accomplish assigned peacekeeping
 tasks.
- Training. Training and rehearsal to ensure operational readiness to perform the Mission Essential Tasks should go on concurrently and should continue once deployed.
- Movement. Movement into the buffer zone should be well coordinated with all parties concerned to avoid mistaken identity and operational challenges. All movements will be tactical, systematic (simultaneous or sequential based on operational situation) and centrally controlled.
- Deployment. Deployment of static and robust mobile forces (to include COBs, TOBs, OPs, CPs, control points, patrols, etc.) to monitor and carry out surveillance of the AOR of operations, based on the tasking of the battalion will be executed rapidly to retain operational balance and prevent further deterioration of the situation. Due attention should be paid to force protection aspects.
- Conduct of Operations. Battalion may be required to operate in a volatile and highly charged and restrictive environment with caution and constraints. Therefore, proactive operations will have to be conducted as per assigned "Mission Essential Tasks" based on ROE and Directives on Use of Force. Through the static and mobile bases, project and sustain concurrent domination of the area. Care should be taken to prevent occurrence of an untoward incident and/or contain the event from further escalation. Use of force is always as a last resort, and therefore the battalion should constructively engage the belligerents through liaison, negotiation, mediation, reconciliation and robust posturing to effectively conduct peacekeeping operations.



- QRF. Maintain company/platoon level QRF/QRTs for rapid response to prevent a violation or restore an adverse situation.
- C3. Effective C3 capability to meet peculiar buffer zone environment, duly complemented by IT infrastructure and situational awareness support staff is essential.
- **Flexibility**. Maintain adequate mobile reserves capable of expeditious redeploying (including helicopter mounted/landed operations) in the AOR to stabilize critical situations by interposing. Where possible keep the operational elements mobile.
- Logistics Sustenance. The battalion should be self-sustained both operationally and logistically up to the sub-unit level and all operational elements should be self contained/supporting.
- Situational Awareness. Battalion should acquire, collate, process the
 tactical information to institute proactive measures to influence the
 environment and outcome of activities and have efficient situational
 awareness capability up to the lowest level. Battalion should carry out
 day and night monitoring and surveillance of the area, undertake foot
 and vehicle mounted patrols, utilise conventional electronic means and
 aerial platforms to maintain situational awareness.
- Liaison and Coordination. Establish liaison and interaction with all parties concerned to bridge the communication gap and protect the mandate. Where required, the battalion should co-opt and coordinate with all non-organic assets such as Police, military working dogs, MAS specialists, UNMOs, specialists from other mission components etc.
- **Civil Interaction**. In addition to protecting the civilian population in the buffer zone, the battalion may undertake CIMIC, Quick Impact Projects and other welfare oriented programmes in support of and in consonance with the mandate. It should also undertake EOD tasks/mobility tasks and emergency mine or UXO clearance in the AOR.

2.13.5 : Organization.

The UN Infantry Battalion with four Infantry Company Groups is task organized to perform Buffer Zone Operations. The organizational imperatives of Buffer Zone operations necessitate an augmented observation and monitoring capability, effective C3 apparatus with high mobility robust elements conducting proactive operations to deal with fluid and often



unpredictable nature of operational conditions, particularly in the initial stages.

2.13.6 : Support.

All operational elements and static bases in the buffer zone will be self-sustained in all respects. Some issues that need attention in the peacekeeping context are;

- Preventive maintenance of observation and surveillance equipments to ensure optimum serviceability.
- Stocking of static bases and mobile elements to retain flexibility.
- Maintain an effective medical support infrastructure and speedy evacuation means.

(Suggested task capability standards are at p. 230)







2.14: Joint Operations



2.14.1 General Description.

A UN Infantry Battalion may be required to carry out joint operations with UN police and/or host police and/or host military forces, in support of peacekeeping operations. This section primarily deals with joint operations with UN police, with relevant amplifications on modalities of conducting joint operations with host police and military forces.

Conflict and post-conflict countries are often characterized by a collapse of public law and order and major security and human rights deficits leading to the erosion of public confidence in the security sector. The presence of a UN Peacekeeping Force, which includes the military contingents and UN Police, contributes to restoring popular confidence in the host-state police⁵ and rule of law structures as a whole.

By promoting a service-oriented culture, community interaction and citizen participation, UN Police personnel support the host State police in regaining the trust of the communities they serve, which is a key factor for the effective functioning of the national police. Ultimately, the greatest community confidence builder is visible professional efforts by the host State police leading to tangible improvements in security. Since the police are the most visible arm of the state, this promotes trust in the government more broadly. UN police can play a vital role in providing advice, training, equipping and in certain cases temporarily take on the responsibility to maintain law and order.

In most peacekeeping missions the UN police component operates in an integrated manner with other mission entities. A UN police component can consist of individual police officers (IPOs) and – where they are authorised and deployed – Formed Police Units (FPUs). Both together form what is referred to as UNPOL. There are specific roles and responsibilities laid down for all entities in a mission area and in addressing some critical issues, the military and police have to operate jointly to accomplish common objectives or provide complementary support to their respective functions.

The battalion chain of command and staff should consider the capability of the UN police and the strong interdependence of each other in peacekeep-

⁵ Given that a number of United Nations Member States do not have a single national police service the term host State will be used throughout the report to encompass metropolitan, provincial/state and federal/national police and other law enforcement agencies.



ing environment to develop collaborative strategies to bridge the functional gap and ensure convergence of effort. Visibility of UN Police and/or local police enhances effective establishment of rule of law and the legitimacy and credibility of the mission as a whole, the peacekeeping force and of the good governance of host authorities. Particularly, during the stabilization phase of a peacekeeping operation, the complementarities of both military and police would facilitate better outreach and engagement and faster restoration of safety and security. Needless to say, the battalion should take the initiative to liaise, coordinate with the corresponding police entities to develop a coherent and comprehensive joint plan.

2.14.2 : Circumstances for Joint Operations.

Joint operations entail the battalion personnel operating with UN police to accomplish a common objective or in support of each other. Joint operations may take place in the following circumstances:

- When the UN police require military assistance to execute their functions.
- When the battalion require support of police in conduct of its operational activities.
- When the operational situation escalates beyond the capacity of UN police.
- When mandated to provide support to host Security Forces.

2.14.3: UN Police: Role and Responsibilities.

2.14.3.1 : General. Police-related aspects of Security Council mandates fall broadly into the following three categories:

- Support for the reform, restructuring and rebuilding of national police and other law enforcement agencies.
- Operational support to host-state police and other law enforcement agencies, including through the deployment of formed police units.
- · Interim policing and other law enforcement.

In addition, many recent mandates include specific reference to promoting and protecting human rights and protection of civilians, which highlight the integral part UN police play in implementing mission-wide tasks. For example, they might perform the following tasks if mandated:

• Assist host State police in developing a community-oriented approach.



- Mentor and train host State police officers.
- · Provide specialised training in different types of investigations.
- Help host State police and other law enforcement agencies to address transnational crime.
- Support the reform, restructuring and rebuilding of host State police and other law enforcement agencies.
- Facilitate financial and material assistance for the refurbishment of facilities and the procurement of vehicles, communication equipment and other law enforcement equipment.
- In the rare case of an "interim policing" mandate, UN police is responsible for all policing and other law enforcement functions and has a clear authority and responsibility for the maintenance of law and order (including powers to arrest, detain and search).
- UN IPOs and FPUs support host State police and law enforcement agencies in the execution of their functions.
- Play a key role in the protection of United Nations personnel and facilities.

2.14.3.2: Formed Police Units. FPUs are defined as cohesive mobile police units, providing support to UN operations and ensuring the safety and security of UN personnel and missions, primarily in public order management. FPUs work in support of the establishment and maintenance of safe, democratic and human rights abiding communities by delivering professional, responsive and more effective policing in accordance with the mandate. FPUs consist of approximately 140 police officers, deployed as a group to undertake public order management, protect UN staff and facilities and provide operational support to host-state police where a formed response is required. FPUs are rapidly deployable, well equipped and trained, self-sufficient and able to operate in "high-risk" environments to act as a cohesive body capable of responding to a wide range of contingencies including enforcing the law and dealing with threats to public order. However, the FPU personnel usually do not have law enforcement authority, i.e. they may stop, detain and search individuals, but do not have powers of arrest.

FPUs are a tool that can and should be fine-tuned to support police operations in the context of peacekeeping operations. The exact composition, including number of units and addition of specialised capacities, equip-



ment requirements, command and control arrangements and tasks of the FPUs will be determined in the strategic assessment phase of the Integrated Mission Planning Process (IMPP). Specific tasking is detailed when component concepts of operation (CONOPS) are drawn up, in accordance with the mandate of the mission and specific directives issued by the DPKO.

2.14.4: Basic Tasks.

- **2.14.4.1 : General.** The joint operations have to be carried out within an integrated framework with well-defined roles and responsibilities. The division of labour will vary in each case but will broadly follow the below description. The contribution of the military and the police respectively is based on their comparative advantages. The infantry battalion should utilize the legal authority—where relevant—and functional expertise of the UN Police in handling public safety issues. Similarly, UN police should combine its effort with the military component to exploit the latter's wider operational reach, enormous resources and force potential. Following are the basic tasks that may be undertaken as part of joint operations between the military and UN police:
- Protection of Civilians. In each mission with a protection mandate, POC is a system-wide responsibility in which each component undertakes respective functions in the integrated mission structure. In the battalion AOR, the Battalion Commander and the responsible UN police representative should take part in all relevant coordination mechanisms and implement their respective POC responsibilities in accordance with agreed priorities. This includes joint measures such as establishing joint foot patrols with POC focus at night in high risk areas/sites (often at the request of local women and organizations), establishment of early-warning and early response mechanisms and strengthening the local protection mechanism.
- Joint Risk Assessments and Analysis. On a routine basis, the battalion leadership and the police counterpart should share information and/ or conduct joint risk assessments and analysis, with the participation of host-state police as appropriate.
- Stabilization Operations. In the battalion AOR, the Battalion Commander should take the lead in stabilization operations against possible aggressors or spoilers aimed at restoring safety and security and free-



dom of movement. UN police and or local police can play a supporting role as necessitated by operational requirements.

- Patrolling. Military and police can conduct joint patrols (monitoring, assessments, etc.) particularly when interaction with local population and outreach and engagement is involved. Patrolling should be sensitive to the needs of vulnerable groups and can, for example, specifically include female police or military officers.
- Reinforcement. In grave situations and danger to life and property is expected, the military should reinforce the location or extricate police personnel to safety.
- Provide Security during Outreach. To outreach remote areas or inaccessible areas where police deployment is non-existent, the military should provide additional security cover to the isolated police patrols and posts.
- EOD Cover. Battalion EOD capability should also cover requirements of police.
- Checkpoint. As part of CP to facilitate checking, questioning, detaining, etc. police would be highly useful.
- Cordon and Search. For conduct of cordon and search, the UN police and local police personnel (including women) should be incorporated since it is a highly sensitive operation in which civilians are involved. Arrest, detention, confiscation, management of public order, etc. require police support.
- Public Law and Order Management, including Crowd Control Operations. At times, the UN Police may require additional support from the military to complement their effort in maintaining law and order. In the event of military entities, personnel or assets including the static and mobile elements faced with handling of crowd, the battalion would need support of the police to diffuse and control the situation. When the situation is beyond the control of the police, the battalion is expected to undertake crowd control operations on its own.
- **Check HR Violations.** Battalion operational assets will work together with the police in monitoring, promoting and preserving basic human rights and undertake joint operations against perpetrators of human rights violations in close coordination with human rights officers.



- **Investigations.** Host-state and/or UN police have primacy when it comes to carrying out specific investigations in the mission area and can assist military with their expertise, where appropriate.
- Countering Organized Crime. An infantry battalion due to operational reach and dynamic mobile operations can complement the police effort in countering transnational organized crime, which may also include illegal extraction and commerce of natural resources, again as directed by the host State and/or UN police.
- **Natural Disasters.** With enormous man and material resources and logistics capabilities, an infantry battalion can provide emergency support in conjunction with the host-state and/or UN police to effectively manage disasters (earthquakes, floods, etc.).
- Monitoring a Disputed Border or a Buffer Zone. Police can assist the
 military in maintaining vigil, law and order, control of movements, investigations, transnational crime, etc. in a buffer zone/Demilitarized Zone.
- **Community Support**. The military with its traditional role (CIMIC, Winning Hearts and Mind, confidence-building efforts, community security measures, etc.), in conjunction with the UNPOL and/or local police would be vital for maintaining a high level of safety and security in the AOR.
- Assist Local Police. In the absence of UN police or until UN police is fully
 effective, the battalion entities may undertake limited scale training and
 mentoring to improve their efficacy. Including host State police (men
 and women) in conducting various mission essential tasks of the battalion would be highly useful to display legitimacy, extension of government authority and establishment of rapport with the population.
- **2.14.4.2: Host Nation Police Forces**. Given that the host State police has the primary responsibility for law and order in the vast majority of cases, elements of the host-state police personnel should be incorporated with battalion elements where the situation so demands and where it is operationally feasible. Host nation police is a major asset to help the battalion in executing civil functions including interrogation, arrest, detention, where legal implications are involved and their knowledge of local circumstances and their role as an interface with local communities. However, the battalion must comply with the Secretary-Generals Human Rights Due Diligence Policy on UN Support to non-UN Security Forces, while operating with host nation security forces or police. The participation of women as members of



the national police is essential and should be encouraged. Most missions have provided assistance to host nations to train and develop public order managing police entities with the support of UN Police and may be working in conjunction with the FPU, when the military is also requisitioned. Therefore, additional coordination and integration with local police forces will have to be carried out by the military.

2.14.4.3: Joint Operations with/Support to Host Nation Military Forces. In certain multidimensional peacekeeping missions, an Infantry Battalion may be required to conduct joint operations and/or provide support to the military forces of the Host Nation. Such support/joint operations will be strictly in accordance with the mission mandate and the conditions specified in the Secretary-General's Human Rights Due Diligence Policy on non-UN security forces (July 2011). In such missions, a UN Infantry Battalion may be required to carry out the following activities:

- Conduct joint operations if mandated to do so as per overall mission strategy.
- Support in joint planning and execution, fire support, medical support, logistics, etc. as defined in mission-specific policy.
- Organize formal non-combat training courses (e.g., training of paramedics).
- Supervise training and mentoring of host military and auxiliary security services personnel in basic military and security aspects and in respect for and promotion of human rights in accordance with international professional standards, norms, security needs of the society and the state).
- Guide national security services to operate lawfully (respect for rule of law of the country and IHL).
- Assist in improvement in delivery of security services to address and prevent sexual and gender based violence.
- Coordinate, assist and ensure proper border management by parties concerned.
- Assist/train elements involved in dealing with civil emergencies/disasters.
- Facilitate identification and disarmament of illegal armed groups, prevention of illegal infiltration, controlling violent spoilers and criminal elements in the battalion AOR.



- Identify potential drivers and spoilers to the reform process, analyze their role and assess likely future course and report to the HQ on the political momentum that may affect the success of the process.
- Assist local authorities in reintegration of retrenched personnel and disposal of surplus military equipment.
- Build awareness on role of defence institutions with in the state, human rights, gender, international humanitarian law, etc.

2.14.5: Planning Considerations.

Important planning considerations are as follows:

- Unity of Effort. Peacekeeping challenges demand collaborative partnership between all components of the mission, particularly between the military and the UN police. Therefore, unity of effort, shared outlook and common goals are imperative facets for success. Commanders at all levels should envisage and analyze scenarios where joint operations would become necessary and work out modalities for its execution.
- Command and Control. Military and police elements will function under respective commanders on ground and overall coordination will be carried out by the HQ which has the primacy in the operations. However, during crisis, a uniformed unit or sub-unit of one component may be placed temporarily under command of another component.
- Liaison and Coordination. Effective liaison and coordination at all levels (commanders, staff and functional groups) is the hallmark of success in joint operations. Commanders of tactical entities should overcome differences in perception, difficulties in coordination and challenges in implementation by developing consensus and working for a common purpose.
- Information Sharing. Military and police should have an effective and reliable system of early-warning and sharing of tactical information, laterally at respective levels. Joint mechanisms such as the Joint Operations Centre (JOC) and Joint Mission Analysis Centre (JMAC) should be effectively made use of.
- FPU Capabilities. Unless they have an executive mandate, FPUs are not
 considered as law enforcement officers under the legislation of the host
 country and their prerogatives are consequently limited: they may, how-



ever, stop, detain and search individuals in accordance with the mandate of the mission and specific directives issued by the DPKO.

- Joint HQ. For integrated planning and implementations, a joint HQ/ command post should be created which can monitor progress of operations and carry out timely adjustments in the conduct.
- Joint Training and Rehearsals. To function in an integrated manner, joint operational SOPs should be adopted by the mission and regular training, rehearsals and exercises, including simulations, should be undertaken. Lessons learned in addressing such situations of public disorder as well as through exercises should be shared and necessary steps for better coordination and integration should be instituted.
- **Mutual Respect.** Battalion should foster mutual respect and better understanding of each others role and the imperative of mutual interdependence and ensure non-interference in each others domain.
- **Communication.** Communication between the military and police components are always an interoperability challenge. Adequate measures to ensure intercommunication with redundancy must be ensured at mission level. Exchange of radio sets, liaison officers, using compatible communication equipments and utilisation of local communication networks (including cell phones) would be beneficial. Use of common language and terminology is of utmost importance since both elements have their respective terminologies. Where necessary, interpreters may be used to overcome communication hurdles.
- Protective Clothing and Masks. When military elements are employed in support of police, where the police has used or likely to use non-lethal weapons like OC-spray (Oleoresin Capsicum), CS-gas (tear gas), etc. the military personnel should have requisite protective clothing and masks.
- Resources. One company at battalion level and a platoon each at company level should be equipped with public order management equipments and stores. However, all ranks of the battalion should be trained in carrying out joint operations, particularly the crowd control operations.
- Incident Control Point. A joint control will be set up at the site of the incident to effectively integrate and coordinate employment of resources and execution of the task.
- Link Up. Link up plan between both the components should be carefully
 worked out to include link up point, methodology of link up, identification, reception, guidance, briefing and movement for deployment.



• **Female Police Officers.** Peacekeeping operations demand active involvement of uniformed women (military and particularly police) in support of joint operations and in order to outreach to local women and girls who are victims of trafficking/sexual and gender-based violence.

2.14.6 : Conduct.

Major challenges in conducting joint operations are in the sphere of interoperability to include operational role, standards, procedures and techniques; command, control and communication; and the mindset. Therefore, both the military and police personnel need to carefully integrate and coordinate effectively to operate successfully in a peacekeeping environment. Important issues that merit coordination and understanding are:

Command and Control.

- * Military Lead. In situations of public disorder of a military nature, where there is sustained use of firearms or military weaponry, the battalion should have primacy in addressing such situations in support of or in cooperation with relevant host State agencies, as applicable. The HOMC or sector/unit commander may request FPU personnel and/or other security personnel of the mission to perform specific missions or tasks. In these situations, the most senior Military Commander in location (at the site of the incident) will exercise tactical control and have overall command. The assignment of FPU personnel must be coordinated with the HOPC or his/her delegate (Chief Operations, Deputy Chief Ops (FPU) or Regional Commander).
- * UN Police Lead. In situations of public disorder of a non-military nature, where there is no sustained use of firearms or military weaponry, the FPUs should have primacy in addressing such situations in support of or in cooperation with host State law enforcement agencies, as applicable. The HOPC or his/her delegates (Chief Operations, Deputy Chief Operations (FPU) or Regional Commander) may request personnel of the military component and/or other security personnel of the mission to perform specific missions or tasks. In these situations, the United Nations Police Officer designated by the HOPC or his/her delegates at the location of the incident will exercise tactical control and have overall command. The assignment of military personnel must be coordinated with the Head of the Military Component (HOMC) or Sector or Battalion Commander, as applicable.



- * The above-mentioned arrangements should not result in any operational delays to address situations of public disorder. In this regard, standard operating procedures should be adopted by the mission and regular training and exercises, including simulations, should take place on a regular basis.
- Tactical AOR. Both components will have a designated tactical area of responsibility which is well defined in the planning stage itself to avoid confusion. In mutually supportive operations with the military component, a police tactical area of operation and surrounding military security support zone will be established to define the respective tactical area of responsibility. Police operations are conducted under the tactical control of the designated police commander on the spot in the inner tactical area of operation. The police will not transfer primary responsibility for resolving "rule of law" incidents to the military component unless the local threat reaches a level that is determined by the HOPC's delegate in location (at the site of the incident) to be beyond police capacity. In the surrounding security zone, the military component can be deployed to support the police operation. Both areas shall be defined in terms of time and space, as outlined in the operational planning documents, and the transfer of authority will be planned in advance. In such scenarios, a joint command post should be established where representatives of the police and military follow and tactically coordinate the operation.⁶
- Functional Responsibility. Within the overall framework of joint operations, the division of responsibility should be worked out and defined. Responsibility in terms of specific task, resources, locations, timelines, C3 arrangements, coordination aspects and logistics support should be clearly laid down.
- **Briefing and Coordination**. Detailed joint briefing and final rehearsals will be useful to overcome interoperability challenges.
- **Identification**. Both components should have clearly laid down physical and electronic communication identification procedures to prevent untoward incidents.
- Transfer of Responsibility. Modalities of cooperation and clear benchmarks that indicate when the transition is to take place shall be stipulated in mission-specific documents, developed in advance and approved jointly by the HOMC and the HOPC. Handovers in deteriorating and improving situations should also be prepared in advance with

⁶ The approach described is also known as the "Blue Box-Green Box" concept in which the "blue" and the "green" represent the police and the military respectively.



joint military-police exercises and training. The police will only transfer primary responsibility for resolving "rule of law" incidents to the military component, when the local threat reaches a level that is determined by the HOPC's delegate in location (at the site of the incident) to be beyond police capacity.

Command Responsibility. The Battalion Commander and the commander conducting the operations should ensure people-friendly operations and conduct as per ROE and Directives on Use of Force. Critical activities should be personally monitored and firmly controlled to prevent or minimise collateral damages.

2.14.7: Organization.

Depending on the mission of the joint operations, the battalion assets will be employed either to conduct operations as a lead force or provide necessary support to the UN Police as per requirement. The COBs will maintain liaison and coordination of all activities in their respective AOR with the police counterparts. Battalion HQ will carry out overall planning, coordination and integration of all resources in the battalion AOR. From the mission resources, attack helicopters, utility and air observation helicopters, aerial photographs/satellite imageries and real time tactical information etc. may be obtained as per requirement. Adequate standby reserves will be maintained for quick reaction.


2.14.8: Support.

Battalion entities have self-sufficient operational and logistics capabilities to undertake joint operations. As far as possible, both components should be self-contained for the duration of operations. However, for prolonged employment, the component which has primacy in the task will be responsible for logistics support of the support element. Special emphasis need to be taken for coordinating casualty treatment and evacuation. Battalion should provide additional logistics cover in terms of transport, food, water, etc. to the police in case required.

Note:

- The modalities of conducting Crowd Control Operations are covered under Chapter 11, Crowd Control Operations.

(Suggested task capability standards are at p. 234)





2.15: Reinforce/Relief



2.15.1: Introduction.

An Infantry Battalion may get involved in conducting "Relief in Place and or Extrication" of peacekeepers and other civilians in a mission area depending on the operational environment and security conditions. Both operations though similar in many ways, are uniquely disparate in both planning and execution aspects. The Task is explained in two parts: Part I deals with Relief in Place and Part II deals with Reinforcement in the succeeding paragraphs.

Part I: Reinforce

2.15.2: General Description.

A Peacekeeping Infantry Battalion or its sub-unit may be tasked to carry out reinforcement or receive reinforcement in support of emergent vulnerable/deteriorating scenarios in peacekeeping operations/situations requiring pre-empting imminent violence against civilians. Reinforcement may be done for the purposes of interposing between warring factions, reinforcement of a COB within the battalion AOR, support and extricate own troops under threat in performance of their duty, reinforce another contingent COB or military components in the process of execution of tasks, execute any mission related contingency tasks, assist host security forces when requisitioned or mandated or may be tasked to reinforce a potential threat area as an independent entity within the mission or even outside the mission AOR as part of Inter-Mission Cooperation. Timely employment (pre-emptively, when imminent or on occurrence) reflects UN resolve and solidarity in resolving or preventing a threat from manifesting or deteriorating.

2.15.3: Planning Considerations.

- **Mission**. The mission should be specific, clearly laid out and within the capability of the battalioin.
- Information Gathering. Ensure routine physical and electronic monitoring of activities and gain early-warning of impending/actual ground situation inputs through Community Liaison Assistants and Community Alert Network.



- **Discrete Planning**. Analyse and evaluate implications of alarming the parties to the dispute and risk escalation.
- Coordination. Liaise and coordinate with all elements that are likely to get involved in the conduct (local government officials, social elites, local police, etc.) in advance and tie up passage of information and support.
- Preparations and Rehearsals. The force employed should be adequately resourced, prepared and trained based on likely scenarios and contingencies and rehearsed realistic conditions.
- Self Sufficiency. The force employed for operations should be self-sufficient in terms of fire-power and logistics including transportation (for specific duration after which local dependency will be effective).
- Dedicated Force. Ensure earmarking dedicated personnel, trained and equipped to conduct operations maintain them in high state of readiness.
- **Response**. Battalion and the HQ concerned should facilitate rapid response (terrain accessibility, air/surface mobility and operational readiness).
- **Reserves**. Recreate reserves once available troops are committed to meet various contingencies once operation commences.
- **Caveats**. National caveats (if applicable) on willingness to operate only under certain conditions.

2.15.4 : Conduct.

- **Situational Awareness**. Well informed on developments, threat and establish monitoring mechanisms.
- **Composition**. Force composition should be based on task and threat.
- **Grouping of Enablers and Force Multipliers**. Augment with enablers and force multipliers where necessary (engineers, air assets, surveillance assets, interpreters, etc.).
- Availability. Keep preferably uncommitted with no fixed ground deployment.
- Readiness. Force on standby readiness and keep concentrated. Issue timely warning order and preposition resources (helicopters/Vehicles/ APCs) for quick mobility.
- **Movement**. Coordinated, integrated and centrally controlled movement and employment.
- **Response**. Clear tasking, detailed briefing and rapid action.



- Reception. Exchange of liaison officers, communication arrangements, link up, reception, provision of guides, movement and deployment in earmarked area.
- C3. Clearly demarcated AOR and well-defined channels of command, control and communication.
- **Logistics**. Coordinate and resume local logistics dependency and medical support at the earliest.
- Exit. Plan for safe and secure move back once the task is completed.

Part II: Relief

2.15.5: General Description.

The purpose of relief in place is to relieve all or part of the force in a designated AOR by an incoming force. The underlying principle in relief operations is to sustain a level of operational capability while transferring the operational responsibility from one force to another and ensure continuity of operations. Relief can be carried out as a routine time bound relief, to replace an existing force in an emergency, to take up part of the operational responsibility when the situation demands and during change of role between two forces.

2.15.6: Planning Considerations.

In a peacekeeping environment, the important issues to be considered are:

- **Mission.** Understand the mission and responsibilities clearly in terms of operational tasks, the designated AOR and the static deployment areas.
- Information Gathering. Based on the mission assigned, gather information pertaining to the AOR with specific focus on operational environment, tactical information on various belligerents and spoilers, terrain and weather conditions, socio-cultural inputs, deployment areas, etc.
- **Timeframe**. Adequate timeframe for transition has to cater for reconnaissance, movement, deployment and familiarisation for assuming the operational responsibility and settle the incoming unit.
- Liaison and coordination. Early liaison and coordination with relevant HQ, staff and the unit to be relieved will pay rich dividends. Carry out liaison and coordination with local UN HQ and the unit being relieved



with regard to reconnaissance, sending of advance parties, movement of main body, reception and link up, guidance and deployment administrative sustenance and security responsibilities during move and deployment.

- Movement. Timely provisioning/arrangement for various means of transportation are critical to ensure smooth process of relief. Arrange transportation for the move of advance party and main body.
- Handing Taking Over. Formalise the load tables based on the assets/ items that are being taken over at the new location and accordingly finalise the individual and unit stores to be carried for relief.
- Transfer of Responsibilities. The UN HQ concerned will give clear guidelines on the actual timing and conditions for the transfer of responsibilities.
- Command and Control. The command and control arrangements during moving in, familiarisation, deployment and moving out should be clearly laid down.
- **Security**. Security arrangements and responsibilities for the incoming and outgoing units during the moving in/out and relief process have to be coordinated and tied up well in advance.
- Logistics Sustenance. Unit needs to arrange for the logistic support for the move and carry sufficient reserves as per mission SOPs to sustain until routine replenishment resumes.

2.15.7 : Conduct.

Important aspects to be coordinated and ensured during conduct stage are:

- Initial Inspection. Coordinate with Department of Field Support for movement and initial/arrival inspection (assessed value and numbers of COE being deployed).
- Reconnaissance. Time permitting, the command elements and other essential personnel of the battalion should undertake an initial reconnaissance. It should be coordinated by the HQ concerned.
- Advance Party. Subsequent to the reconnaissance, an advance party comprising of the nucleus element of all companies and key personnel should be sent well in time to coordinate handing taking over and to coordinate reception of the unit.



- Move of Main Body. Move of main body will be centrally coordinated by the HQ concerned with additional support for transportation, logistics support, security, etc.
- Reception. The Unit being relieved will ensure link up, reception and guidance of the incoming unit to respective locations as per deployment plan.
- **Familiarization**. Incoming unit will undergo a familiarization with the AOR and operational role jointly with the outgoing unit personnel.
- Transfer of Responsibility. Once familiarization and handing/taking over of assets are completed, the operational responsibility will be transferred to the incoming unit which must be clearly recorded and supervised by the superior UN HQ.
- **Redeployment**. Followed by a repatriation inspection, the security arrangements and transportation for move and outgoing unit will be centrally coordinated for its redeployment.

2.15.8: Organization.

A battalion as a whole or in part may get involved in the conduct of either relief in place or reinforcement or both, depending on the operational environment and ground situation. Both the operations will be centrally controlled and coordinated at the local UN HQ level and accordingly the Battalion will be responsible to execute the assigned mission.

2.15.9 : Support.

While UN Infantry Battalions are designed to be self-sufficient in all respects, where required the mission resources like additional surface transport, helicopter/fixed wing lift and logistics supply will be provided as need be. The battalion should be self contained for the move and for a specified duration to sustain itself in the new deployment area, after which routine replenishment will resume.

(Suggested task capability standards are at p. 235)



2.16: Extract/Evacuate



2.16.1: Introduction.

An Infantry Battalion may get involved in extraction and/or evacuation of peacekeepers and other civilians in a mission area depending on the operational environment and security conditions. Both operations though similar in many ways, are equally disparate in both planning and execution aspects. The task is explained in two parts: Part I deals with Extractions and Part II deals with Evacuation in the succeeding paragraphs.

Part I: Extract

2.16.2: General Description.

A UN Peacekeeping Infantry Battalion may be confronted with or tasked for extraction of military peacekeepers, UN personnel or civilians (personnel from international organizations, NGOs, host nationalities, etc.) who are either detained, taken hostage or under imminent threat of physical violence. In such situations, the battalion is required, subject to the rules of engagement, to ensure rapid and spontaneous action from the the nearest COB or the military element operating in the vicinity to safeguard and extricate the UN personnel or associated personnel.

2.16.3 : Basic Tasks.

- Mobilise appropriate force level to the place of incident/action.
- Negotiate release.
- Isolate, contain and dominate the location.
- Physical extraction by military means as per Rules of Engagement and guidelines on the use of force.
- Conduct organized move out from the location.

2.16.4 : Planning Considerations.

Important planning parameters include the following:



- Situational Awareness. Effective situational awareness to identify vulnerabilities and danger areas to either avoid unnecessary move or move always with adequate protection.
- **Security**. An Infantry Battalion should institute proactive measures to ensure safety and security of UN personnel (routine operational activities, activating community liaison teams, key leader engagement, obtaining tactical information on the belligerents, pre-positioning of troops, robust posturing to deter any misadventure by belligerents, etc.).
- Centralised Control. In a mission area ensure that all movements are coordinated and centrally controlled.
- Monitoring. Own movements and activities of the belligerents or locals have to be effectively monitored in real time (human and electronic means) and an effective system of feedback should be established.
- Contingency Planning. Analyse the threat and vulnerabilities and work out detailed contingency plans to respond to various situations.
- **Communication**. All vehicles and personnel detachments should have communication system to contact the HQ in any emergency.
- Operational Readiness. Earmark dedicated task-oriented tactical groups at each COB and retains a central QRF at the Battalion HQ as reserve for quick response. The reserves and other various mobile tactical elements operating in the vicinity should maintain operational readiness for instantaneous action. They should be grouped with adequate mobility and operational capability, including enablers.
- **Brief**. Ensure a detailed briefing prior to the mission along with all the elements that are taking part in the operation.
- **Rehearsal**. Carry out training and rehearsals for precision effect and to avoid collateral damage.
- **C3**. Lay down Command, Control and Communication arrangements in advance.
- Mobility. Cater for rapid mobility (surface or by air) to address the location/area immediately.
- Coordinate. Coordinate with local police/UN Formed Police Units in location and the UN political affairs officers to facilitate negotiations and defusing the situation.



- Constructive Engagement. Continuous and effective liaison and political engagement of the belligerent leadership to prevent an incident is vital.
- **Employment of Military Means**. Ensure adherence to guidelines on "Use of Force and ROE" and take measures to prevent collateral damage or civilian casualty as far as possible.

2.16.5 : Conduct.

- **Task Force**. Keep a task organized force centrally with specialised personnel and adequate enabling resources.
- Mobility. Retain capability for rapid mobility (helicopter, APCs or by vehicles).
- **Integrated Operations**. Plan for employing multiple tactical groups to complement each other.
- **C3**. Establish clear command, control and communication arrangements to manage the crisis.
- Real Time Information. Have tactical information and ground inputs (including from mission components) to obtain advance warning of the treat manifestation.
- **Tasking**. All COBs to be tasked for extrication and the nearest one to be employed quickly duly supported by the battalion QRT/reserve.
- Employment of Enablers and Force Multipliers. Augment with enablers and force multipliers where necessary (engineers, air assets, surveillance assets, interpreters, etc.).
- **Key Leader Engagement**. Key leader engagement at appropriate level and negotiations with belligerents to continue simultaneously.
- Local Support. Involve local dignitaries and influential elder people (women and men) in the society to de-escalate and prevent situation from deteriorating.
- **Coordination with Police**. Request local police/UN Formed Police Unit as the case may be to assist where required.
- Coordinate Response. Be in continuous communication with the personnel in problem and advice on response, if required. The soldier or commander on ground is always the best judge with regard to self-defence.



- **Negotiate**. Once in location, talk and negotiate your way through to release or extract the personnel.
- Warn and Constructively Engage. If not possible, warn the belligerents
 that you are authorized to use force, including deadly force. Concurrently
 build up additional force if required to display force projection and force
 belligerent to yield to UN stand. Call the leaders for a meeting at your
 camp at a later time.
- **Use of Force**. If situation not diffusible and turns hostile use force as per ROF.
- **Follow-Up**. Extricate, de-escalate situation, tend to casualty if any and move out of the area at the earliest.
- **Damage Assessment**. Ensure respect for human rights and international humanitarian law; avoid and in any event minimize collateral damages (civilian personnel and property).
- **Record**. Maintain record (photographs, videography, witnesses, etc.) and continuous reporting to the HQ.

Part II: Evacuation

2.16.6: General Description.

In the mission cycle, sometimes there could emerge a sudden security situation that may prompt an immediate evacuation of UN personnel deployed independently in smaller groups to safe areas or may even lead to evacuation of HQ, logistics installations, military contigents or other UN system entities. Therefore, the Battalion should be trained and ready to assist and support the overall evacuation plans to be put into effect. Deterioration of security situation in a country and the resultant relocation or evacuation in a mission area also encompassess all the UN elements in the country and entails fine judgement by mission leadership, high degree of sitational awareness, operational capability to respond adequately in emergencies and flexibility in implementation. Notwithstanding own preparations and readiness to deal with security issues, the host government has the ultimate responsibility for the safety and security of UN peacekeeping operation and its personnel in a mission area.



2.16.7: Basic Tasks.

- Liaise and coordinate with mission components and other UN elements in AOR for developing an integrated evacuation response.
- Protect vulnerable UN elements in the AOR.
- Ensure timely shifting of vulnerable elements to a safe staging area.
- Establish safe areas/safe corridors for sequential extrication of evacuees.
- Provide security and logistics support of a staging area.
- Coordinate and execute systematic evacuation of personnel and essential material.
- Maintain safety and security of UN personnel as per ROE until completion of evacuation even to the extent of using force.
- Battalion elements to be evacuated only after all other UN elements have been evacuated.

2.16.8: Planning Considerations.

- Overall Responsibility. Overall responsibility for the safety and security
 of UN personnel lies with UNSG assisted by USG DSS. In a UN peacekeeping mission, the SRSG/FC acts as designated official (DO) for planning
 and ensuring safety and security of all the staff members, contingents
 and volunteers.
 - * A Security Management Team chaired by DO, comprising Heads of Mission Components and the Heads of the UN Agency, Funds and Programmes is responsible for instituting various security measures and arrangements to be followed in the event of serious criminality or emergency situations such as hostilities, internal disorder or natural disasters.
 - * SRSG/FC function in consultation with a security (crisis) management team to discuss significant security related incidents.
- Mission Security Plan. All UN Peacekkeping Missions have an overall mission security plan for managing security of its personnel and is planned, coordinated and implemented centrally. The mission security plan lays down responsibilities of specific individuals, the actions to be carried out and the sequence to be followed when evacuation has to be undertaken. Three important steps for planning and implementation of evacuation involves:
 - ⋆ Review of security situation and ensure safety of UN personnel.



- * Preparation of contingency plans for move and concentration of personnel and eventual evacuation to safe areas/safe heavens.
- * Coordination of all communication and transport resources for optimum utilization in case of an emergency.
- Important Planning Parameters.
 - * **Monitoring**. Situational awareness and monitoring for timely review and accurate assessment.
 - * **Crisis Management**. Comprehensive and coordinated Mission Security Plan for effetive crisis management.
 - * **Logistics**. Apportioning responsibilities and resources (communication, transport, logistic support).
 - ⋆ Coordination. Dissemination of plans to all components.
 - Evacuation Means. Identification of staging areas (safe heavens), safe routes for surface movement or helipads/air strips by air lift or a port of embarkation for river/sea evacuation.
 - * **Security**. Establishing military dominance to ensure protection in vulnerable areas.

2.16.9: Conduct.

General. As part of a broader security risk management strategy, the Designated Official may temporarily remove UN peacekeepers, personnel and/ or eligible family members from an area or situation of unacceptable risk as a means of managing that risk (i.e., avoiding the risk). In an emergency situation or a security situation where the safety and security of the UN is threatened there are three basic options for avoiding risk used by the United Nations Security Management System:

- Alternate Work Modalities (temporary closure of UN premises). Alternate Work Modalities are defined as measures that limit or totally remove the number of personnel or family members at a specific location(s), short of official relocation or evacuation, with the view to limit or remove their exposure to a sudden situation that creates unacceptable residual risk.
- Relocation. Relocation is defined as the official movement of any personnel or eligible dependant from their normal place of assignment or place of work to another location within their country of assignment for the purpose of avoiding unacceptable risk. Relocation is a risk avoidance



measure that can be applied to all personnel and eligible family members.

• **Evacuation**. Evacuation is defined as the official movement of any personnel or eligible dependant from their place of assignment to a location outside of their country of assignment (safe haven country, home country or third country) for the purpose of avoiding unacceptable risk. Evacuation is applied only to internationally recruited personnel and their eligible family members.

Implementation. The Designated Official, in consultation with the Security Management Team, may recommend the relocation or evacuation of personnel and/or eligible family members when residual risks are deemed unacceptable, regardless of the security level. After assessing the situation, the Under-Secretary-General for Safety and Security makes a recommendation to the Secretary-General for approval of evacuation or relocation. Actions, chains of command, channels of communication and responsibilities will be laid down in the guidelines for the preparation of the mission wide security plan. The role of military component is very crucial in the implementation of the plan. More often, military contingent camps will act as temporary staging areas, where all UN personnel will concentrate. They will then be escorted to designated safe areas under escort by military contingents.

2.16.10: Organization.

A UN Infantry Battalion with its integral resources including enablers is capable of executing the task of extraction effectively. Where required (when the task is beyond the capability of a battalion), additional resources in terms of helicopters, reserves and specialised troops will be employed by the Sector HQ. However, evacuation being a force responsibility, it would be centrally controlled, coordinated and executed at the force and sector level. A UN Peacekeeping Infantry Battalion may be tasked and held accountable to implement the evacuation plan as per clearly defined roles. The Battalion HQ and COBs act as focal points to coordinate and execute evacuation plans in respective AOR.

2.16.11 : Support.

Extraction operations are undertaken within the organic logistic capabilities of the battalion. In support of executing the mission Evacuation Plan,



an Infantry Battalion is required to provide the following logistics support to the people being supported from within its organic structure:

- Living accommodation (temporary arrangements, separate for men and women).
- Provision of basic necessities (food, water, medical support, hygiene and sanitation etc.).
- Provision of transport (utility trucks, helipad facilities, etc.).
- Provide security (in the process of assembling and concentrating at a COB, while in the staging area, and during movement).

(Suggested task capability standards are at p. 236)









Capability Standards

3.1: Introduction

It is incumbent upon Battalion Commanders and subordinate leaders to constantly conduct formal and informal "Operational Readiness Self-evaluations" of their unit in order to maintain a fully mission capable battalion. UN Peacekeeping Infantry Battalions are military organizations governed by UN and national rules, regulations, policies, and capability standards. UN peacekeeping relies upon battalions that are capable of conducting peacekeeping operations in accordance with measureable and quantifiable capability standards in order to accomplish mandated peacekeeping mission tasks.

Prior to deployment in the mission area, infantry battalions should achieve required standards that are expected of them to meet the challenges of peacekeeping effectively. The self-evaluation model of the UNIBAM will facilitate the TCC and the Battalion Commander to ensure deployment of a fully mission capable unit in the mission area. Battalions meeting these capability standards provide assurance to themselves, the UN, and to adjacent battalions that they can be relied upon to execute the MET effectively.

3.2: Purpose

This chapter defines capability and standards for an infantry battalion in peacekeeping operations and provides generic guidelines in the form of checklists to the TCCs and the battalion chain of command to carry out self-evaluation. In this regard, refer to p. 183 of Vol. I of UNIBAM.

3.3: Definitions

Capability. In the context of capability standards for a UN Peacekeeping Infantry Battalion, "capability" is operationally defined as the ability and



readiness to deliver against a reasonable standard. It encompasses the combination of capacities (human and material), readiness (organization, process and training), and sustainment (support, logistics) required to accomplish assigned tasks.

Standard. A "standard" is a level of quality or excellence attained by an individual or a group of people against an accepted norm by which actual measureable attainments are judged. Common baseline operational standards for uniformed battalion peacekeepers are specific, measurable, achievable and attributable, relevant and realistic, time-bound, timely, traceable and targeted.

UN Infantry Battalion Operational Readiness Evaluation Checklist.

A Battalion Readiness Evaluation Checklist is a compilation of common baseline operational standards for uniformed battalion peacekeepers deployed to UN peacekeeping operations. These capability standards can in turn be combined with TCC capability standards for use as a basis for improved training guidance and assistance, identification of equipment requirements and common evaluation approaches, as well as more targeted and effective capacity-building support for troop contributing countries by third party donors.

The UN Peacekeeping Infantry Battalion Readiness Evaluation Checklists in this Manual may be used by the Battalion Commander to evaluate the readiness of the battalion, TCC peacekeeping operations trainers and national authorities, and UN Force Commanders in the field in order to establish a common standard for a fully mission capable UN Peacekeeping Infantry Battalion.

The capability standards may be modified or augmented as appropriate depending on the battalion's mission. TCCs and Force Commanders may find this checklist valuable for the development of their own self-evaluation priorities. Guidelines on how a TCC conducts a readiness inspection of its units are governed by national rules and regulations.



3.4: Layout.

The self-evaluation of operational readiness checklists based on capability standards described in this chapter is divided into the following categories:

- Conventional, generic peacekeeping and mission specific standards (p. 188).
- Capability standards for a peacekeeper and various commanders and battalion staff personnel (p. 192).
- Operational, logistics and miscellaneous capability standards (p. 200).
- Capability standards for battalion tasks (p. 215).

In the longer term, these generic capability standards may be used by the UN to bolster the effectiveness and interoperability of various peacekeeping components and thus enable more targeted capacity-building support to TCCs by third country training and equipping partners to meet identified capability requirements.





3.5 : UN Infantry Battalion Capability Standards and Criteria **Checklist for Commanders**

SERIAL	STANDARD/CRITERIA	REFERENCE	EVALUATION	REMARKS
3.5.1 : Cor	3.5.1 : Conventional Military Skill Capability			
-	Does the soldier maintain physical fitness required for active military service?	As per National Military Standards		
2	Is the soldier medically fit and does not have any category restriction on employment in operational duties?			
3	Has the soldier been trained and tested to perform basic infantry skills (including live firing, observation techniques, guarding, escorting, holding a static post, fire and move technique, conducting night operations, etc.)?			
4	Has the soldier been trained and tested at individual and collective level to undertake minor tactical operations at section and platoon level (day and night patrolling etc.).			
2	Has the soldier, subordinate units and the battalion as a whole been trained and tested for conducting conventional offensive and defensive operations?			
9	Has the unit undergone specialised infantry skills training to augment multi-role capability (heliborne/heli-lifted operations, Cordon and Search Operations etc.)?			
7				
8				



3.5.2.: G	3.5.2. : GENERIC UN CAPABILITY		
3.5.2.1 : F UN Docui	3.5.2.1 : Policies and Practices UN Documents. Do the commanders down the channel and battalion HQ Staff understand the responsibility and accountability based on the following UN Directives, Policies and Plans?	ased on the following UN	Directives, Policies and Plans?
6	Mission Directives, CONOPS, OP Directives, Operational Plans and SOPs	Latest policies, guidelines,	
10	Mission Specific Legal framework for peacekeeping Operations (MOU, OPORD and ROE)	SOPs and mission specific	
11	Statement of Unit Requirement issued by OMA/DPKO	Sile	
12	Tables of Organization and Equipment - 2009		
13	Contingent Owned Equipment Manual 2011 and FGS Generic Guidelines for TCCs – 2008		
14	UN Infantry Battalion Manual		
15	Relevant SGB's		
16	Secretary-General's Human Rights Due Diligence Policy on UN Support to non-UN Security Forces.		
17			
18			



		СРТМ												
				ST/SGB 2003/13					DPKO/OHCHR/ DPA/DFS Policy on Human Rights					Environmental Policy for UN field missions (2009.6)
3.5.2.2 : UN Generic Peacekeeping Orientation	Are all commanders and troops trained and sensitized on the following aspects relevant for conduct of peacekeeping operations?	Understand and adhere to UN standards of conduct, as applicable to members of military contingents.	Have instituted channels and systems for internal oversights and reporting of acts of possible misconduct or serious misconduct as per battalion SOP and peacekeeping best practices (conduct and discipline)?	Is trained, understands and recognises the Zero-tolerance policy of Sexual Exploitation and Abuse by UN personnel, the role of gender aspects and its integration into the work of the military and steps to prevent/protect women and girls from SGBV/CRSV?	Is cognizant of the responsibility to protect vulnerable sections (including women and children) of the population.	Have taken measures to ensure child protection.	Have ensured that the battalion employs no child labour (civilians below 18 years of age).	Have taken measures to prevent human trafficking.	Understand and promote respect for Human Rights and Humanitarian Law and is able to recognize a human rights violation and is prepared to intervene in line with mandate and competency.	Undergone cultural awareness and sensitization to handle diversity effectively.	Understand and respect host country law, customs and practices	Has functional knowledge of mission language and host country vernacular language.	Is adept with mission public information policy including media management.	Understand responsibility and duties with regard to Environmental Management in the mission area.
3.5.2.2	Are all	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31



32	Methods and means of outreach and engagement including CIMIC, welfare and Quick Impact Project activities.		
33	Guidelines on military role and responsibility in supporting early peacebuilding tasks.		
34	Adept with awareness of Safety and Security in the Field.	UN Hand Book	
35	Awareness and Prevention of HIV/AIDS.	TCC Guidelines P. 35, COE Manual 2011	
36			
37			
3.5.2.3: M	3.5.2.3 : Mission Specific Capability		
38	Does the unit perform all the mission essential tasks effectively as per peacekeeping best practices and Mission SOPs?		Mission-specific modules
39	Has the unit taken remedial/corrective actions on shortcomings/gaps in performance/resources observed by the unit, COE team or the mission leadership?		
40	Does the Battalion carry out periodic in mission refresher task oriented and mission specific training as per IMTC guidelines?		
41	Does the unit carry out preventive maintenance and repairs in time and replace unserviceable items?		
42	Does the unit continue to maintain high standards of conduct and discipline in rank and file?		
43	Has the unit been able to establish good rapport and effective interface with the local population through CIMIC, QIP and welfare activities?		
44	Does the unit have adequate participation of uniformed women (military/police/interpreters, etc.) personnel to assist in patrolling, cordon and search, demobilization of female combatants, interaction with local population, etc?	SC Resolution 1325 (2000)	
45			
46			



		UNIBAM TCC Guidelines 2008		UNIBAM COE Manual 2011 TCC Guidelines 2008		UN Charter, Staff Rules and Regulations and Code of Conduct Guidelines		Environmental Policy for UN field missions (2009.6)
5.3.3 : CAPABILITY OF PEACEKEEPER AND COMMANDERS	3.5.3 : 1 Checklist for Peacekeeper.	Does the soldier maintain highest standards of integrity and conduct as a UN peacekeeper?	Does the soldier understand the concept of Zero-tolerance for sexual exploitation and abuse?	Does the soldier have a UN Specified uniform, protective clothing (helmet and protective vest), personal weapon with accessories and ammunition and individual kit?	Have any inadequacies as a potential for a peacekeeper been identified and if so mid-course corrective action instituted?	Has the soldier been adequately sensitized on the code of conduct including Do's and Don'ts of the UN peacekeeping in the mission area?	Are the soldier's common peacekeeping understanding, tactical ability and weapon proficiency adequate to understand and interpret the mission rules of engagement and prevent excessive use of force or lead to collateral damage?	Is the soldier conscious of the cultural sensibilities and environmental impact of all his/her actions?
5.3.3 : CA	3.5.3:10	47	48	49	50	51	52	53



54	Does the soldier understand legal aspects pertaining to the mission, host country and relevant international laws (human and humanitarian laws and other statutes), and has he/she been trained on his/her human rights roles and responsibilities as per UN policy?	DPKO/OHCHR/ DPA/DFS Policy on Human Rights	
55	Has the peacekeeper been put through all specified peacekeeping orientation training and tested in a graduated manner at individual, crew, collective (company and battalion level) and tested for competency at successive stages.		
56	Has the soldier been put through periodic mission task-orientated training including firing to maintain required standards (to prevent degradation of standards or develop complacency)?		
57	Is the soldier trained and capable of handling other section/platoon support weapons (e.g., LMG/RL) and instruments/equipments (e.g., NVD) in an emergency?		
58	Does the soldier have basic functional linguistic skills in mission and vernacular language?		
59	If earmarked as a driver, is the soldier trained and capable of safe all weather, day and night driving and know how to carry out preventive maintenance/minor repairs of the vehicle? Does he understand the mission area traffic rules and regulations?		
60	Is the soldier proficient in his/her trade work (armourer, cook, clerk, etc.)?		
61	Does the soldier have the capability to administer basic first aid for himself and his colleagues and carry the necessary kit?	TCC Guidelines 2008 p. 29	
62	Is the soldier able to self-sustain for 72 hours whenever employed for peacekeeping tasks outside the COB?		
63	Is his/her personal health and hygiene of high standards?		
64	Has the soldier undergone required medical checks and inoculation as per procedures?		
65	Is the soldier screened and confirmed by the battalion that he/she has not been responsible for any human rights and international humanitarian law violations?	DPKO/OHCHR/ DPA/DFS Policy on Human Rights	



99	Is the soldier in possession of the personal documentation (Passport and Visa, UN and military Identity Card, health card and stores issued card and other pocket cards/handouts on code of conduct, Do's and Don'ts, hostage incident card, ROE card, vernacular language card etc in national language) for the mission?	
29	Has he/she been made responsible, accountable and responsive as per the assigned role and appointment in the company?	
89	Does the soldier maintains high morale and is well motivated?	
69	Is the soldier trained in general field hygiene including water purification, prevention of climatic injury, STDHIV awareness and prevention, gender awareness and IHL?	TCC Guidelines 2008 p. 29
70		
71		
3.5.3.5 : Cr	3.5.3.5 : Crew/Specialist Skills Capabilities	
72	Have all support weapons and surveillance crew members' undergone integrated operational training as a crew and with other tactical sub-units?	UNIBAM
73	Are all crew members trained and capable of replacing one another in emergencies to perform the tasks equally well?	
74	Are all specialist trade personnel qualified in the designated job, trained, tested and proficient in their respective field as required in a peacekeeping mission (engineer personnel, signal personnel (including radio operators), clerks, drivers, technicians (electrical, electronic, mechanical and armourers) logistics store holders and technicians, nursing assistants etc.)?	
75	Do the battalion maintain 100 percent reserve trained and tested personnel for crew and specialist skilled category at all levels?	
76		
77		
3.5.3.6: 5	3.5.3.6 : Section Commander : Is the Section Commander capable of and responsible for?	
78	Executing mission essential tasks as per role and responsibility within the platoon.	UNIBAM



79	Undertake independent operations to include gender-sensitive patrolling, establishment of OP and CP, joint monitoring, interaction with the local population, etc.	
80	Ensuring adherence to UN Principles, legal framework, methodology of conducting peacekeeping operations, respect for local culture, code of conduct and "Do's and Don'ts" in a mission area.	
81	Ensuring adequate levels of understanding by section personnel of their roles and responsibilities to promote and protect human rights and ensure they are able to recognize human rights violations and understand how implementation of military tasks intersects with human rights?	DPKO/OHCHR/ DPA/DFS Policy on Human Rights
82	Exercise caution, restraint and maturity in performing operational tasks based on ROE.	
83	Ensuring safety and security of UN personnel and property within capability even to the use of force (including lethal force).	
84	Ensuring adequate personnel trained for use of radio, provision of first aid, driving vehicle and in basic vernacular linguistic skills.	
82	Carrying out daily inspections of personnel and equipment for mission effectiveness, briefing and debriefing and training and rehearsal for the assigned tasks.	
98	Carrying out regular preventive maintenance and ensure logistics sustenance including emergency rations for execution of various tasks.	
87	Maintaining operational readiness of the section at all times.	
88	Ensuring high standards of morale and motivation of the section personnel and coordinate welfare measures.	
89	Undertaking negotiations and handle a deteriorating situation until reinforced.	
06		
91		
3.5.3.4: P	3.5.3.4 : Platoon Commander : Is the Platoon Commander capable and responsible for?	
92	Executing mission essential tasks as per role and responsibility within the Company as per mission SOP's and Operations Order.	UNIBAM



93	Undertaking independent operations to include establishment of TOB, LRP, reinforcement, extrication, joint patrolling and monitoring, escort duties, coordinated outreach and engagement activities at Company level, etc.		
94	Ensuring that all ranks in the platoon are cognizant and conversant with the generic and mission specific guidelines and parameters in conduct in a mission area.		
95	Maintaining operational readiness of the personnel, equipment and vehicles for rapid mobilization as a QRT.		
96	Have adequate trained personnel including reserves as special weapon handlers, radio operators, drives, field nursing assistants, and key personnel with vernacular and mission language skills.		
97	Ensuring responsive chain of command, apportion responsibilities make them accountable and monitor and control activities to effectively perform in the mission area.		
98	Ensuring morale, motivation and welfare of the personnel.		
66	Carrying out briefing and debriefing, and training and rehearsal for the assigned tasks.		
100	Protecting UN personnel and property and protect civilians who are at risk within the capability.		
101	Handle an adverse situation including crowd control within the means and until reinforcement arrives.		
102	Communicate and negotiate well at local level with spoilers, possible aggressors and local civilians.		
103	Conduct joint operations with various mission entities, host civil and security agencies and other actors for specific tasks.		
104	Handle local interpreters, women contingent/police personnel and village/society elites effectively.		
105	Recognize human rights violations and understand how military peacekeepers are expected to intervene should they be confronted with such violations; understand how human rights intersect with other military tasks.	DPKO/OHCHR/ DPA/DFS Policy on Human Rights	
106			
107			



3.5.3.5:C	3.5.3.5: Company Commander: Is the Company Commander capable and responsible for?	
108	Carry out company level independent operations to include Cordon and Search Operations, protection of civilians, assist host authorities in public order management including crowd control, reinforcement, extrication, evacuation, establishment of TOB, redeployment to potential threat areas, assist disarmament and demobilization, emergency mine/UXO dearance, etc.	UNIBAM
109	Undertake QRF/reserve actions as part of battalion level operations either independently or in support of other entities by all means of transportation.	
110	Undertake enforcement operations in protection of the mandate if tasked.	
111	Carry out "Key Leader Engagement" to prevent emergence of critical situations or to contain a deteriorating situation in AOR.	
112	Carry out "Outreach and Engagement" by constructive confidence-building measures/initiatives, vibrant people oriented CIMIC/QIP/Welfare activities.	
113	Ensure force protection, protection of civilians, freedom of movement by creating a secure and safe environment in the company AOR by proactive posturing and prophylactic relentless operations.	
114	Protect and promote respect for and adherence of human rights, international law (humanitarian law, statutes and covenants) and the host national law (customs, traditions, practices and environment). Able to recognize human rights violations and understand how military peacekeepers are expected to intervene should they be confronted with such violations; understand how human rights intersects with other military tasks.	DPKO/OHCHR/ DPA/DFS Policy on Human Rights
115	Prevent gender and child abuse and atrocities and violence, human and weapon trafficking, violations against women, girls, men and boys (includes sexual violence), sex trafficking, socioeconomic exploitation by any host or foreign national perpetrators.	
116	Carry out joint operations with UNPOL/UN FPU and/or host police or security forces.	
117		
118		
3.5.3.6:B	3.5.3.6 : Battalion Commander : Is the Battalion Commander Capable of and Responsible for?	
119	Restore and maintain safe and secure environment and freedom of movement in AOR?	UNIBAM



120	Institute measures and means to maintain effective situational awareness to preclude deterioration of situation, carry out prognosis of evolving situations and to undertake proactive prophylactic and comprehensive measures?		
121	Undertake responsible actions with tolerance for ambiguity in dealing with fluid situations in the best interest and spirit of UN ethos and highest military traditions?		
122	Play a vital role in coordination and integration of all actors in the field for synergistic effort for furtherance of the mandate?		
123	Prepare battalion operational plan and undertake independent operations with battalion elements as per CONOPS and Operations Order?		
124	Ensure operational readiness to undertake independent operations within the mission area or as part of Inter-Mission Cooperation with specified troops and timeline?		
125	Undertake enforcement actions to protect the mandate?		
126	Establish integrated HQ with civil and police authorities to coordinate and conduct joint operations?		
127	Ensure force protection and protection of civilians.		
128	Carry out "Outreach and Engagement" including "Key Leader Engagement"?		
129	Promote respect for and adherence to human rights and international humanitarian law. Ensure that military peacekeepers understand how human rights intersect with their tasks and are able to recognize human rights violations and intervene within their mandate, competency and ROEs.	DPKO/OHCHR/ DPA/DFS Policy on Human Rights	
130	Have an understanding of the host national law (customs, traditions and practices) and its implications in the conduct of operations by the sub-units and personnel of the battalion?		
131	Prevent gender and child abuse and atrocities and violence, human and weapon trafficking, human trafficking, socio-economic exploitation by any host or foreign national perpetrators?		
132	Ensure the battalion chain of command up to section level made accountable and responsive to peacekeeping operational requirements?		
133	Ensure all personnel are clear and cognizant of their responsibilities and obligations as peacekeepers in the mission area?		



134	Ensure institution of measures to prevent conduct and discipline violations (including criminal or illegal activities, Sexual Exploitation and Abuse, exploitation of children etc.)?
135	Monitor and investigate all aberrations thoroughly and that appropriate disciplinary action is taken, in accordance with the provisions of the Standard Operating Procedure on Implementation of Amendments on Conduct and Discipline in the Model Memorandum of Understanding [DPKO/DFS Ref. 2011.01].
136	Carry out peacekeeping oriented predeployment and in mission refresher training?
137	Ensure all personnel in the battalion comply with provisions of mission mandate, SOFA, ROE, CONOPS and Operations Order, etc.?
138	Promote respect for host country law, culture, customs, traditions, practices and environment?
139	Ensure logistic self-sustainability of the battalion with integral resources and with UN assistance.
140	Ensure the COE and UNOE are well maintained and operationally serviceable?
141	Ensure health, hygiene, welfare, morale, motivation and personal administration of all ranks in the battalion?
142	Ensure continuity of operations through proper written documents (handover notes) before he hands over the battalion to his replacement?
143	
144	
3.5.3.3.7 : Staff	Staff
145	Does the staff have skills and capability in planning, organising, directing, coordinating and controlling the operational and logistics activities of the battalion both during normal times and during crisis?
146	Does the staff have adequate communication, office support and reporting infrastructure and equipments to obtain/disseminate reports and information from subordinate units and to submit accurate and timely reports to higher HQ?
147	Is the staff capable of processing requests for, coordination and employment of force multipliers (e.g., attack helicopters, utility helicopters etc.)?



148	Does the battalion have a centralized monitoring system and coordinating mechanism to control all operational and logistics activities and movements?	
149	Are the respective section staff personnel well trained in their role, understand the responsibility in the mission organizational structure and competent to function in a multinational, multi-cultural and multi-linguistic peacekeeping environment effectively?	
150	Does the staff have the initiative and dynamism to plan and coordinate operational and administrative support to the battalion?	
151	Does the staff disseminate/share relevant information with all static and mobile elements in real time frame to ensure awareness?	
152	Have each section of the staff prepare a plan for execution and deliberated on contingency planning?	
153	Does the staff follow UN conventions on correspondence and mission SOPs?	
154	Does the staff maintain expertise in establishing liaison and interface with other stakeholders in the AOR and the local population to coordinate and integrate activities?	
155	Does the staff ensure the functions of planning, organizing and directing activities in the battalion effectively?	
156	Does the staff have an effective personal documentation procedure including details of personal particulars, the will, next of kin, health, discipline, finances, etc?	
157		
158		
Miscellaneous	snoa	
3.5.4: OP	3.5,4 : OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY	
(Based on	(Based on OMA/MPS Statement of Force/Unit Requirement, CONOPS, OPORD and Mission-specific Operational Plans and the UNIBAM Capability Standards)	AM Capability Standards)
3.5.4.1 :Ba	3.5.4.1 :Battalion Level Operational Capabilities	
159	Are all the subordinate units and the battalion as a whole been trained, equipped and capable of performing the operational and non operational METs as specified in the CONOPS and OPORD?	Chapter 4, UNIBAM



00	Are all commanders (up to piatoon) and the battailon HQ start qualined, trained and proncient in planning, coordinating, directing and controlling execution of MET in peacekeeping environment effectively?
161	Is the Battalion HQ capable of deploying and sustaining a temporary Tactical Command Post (TCP) by road or by air for minimum 14 days?
162	If earmarked as force reserve, have the battalion tactical groups been trained, equipped and capable of executing mission level tasks as per CONOPS and OPORD to restore any adverse situation?
163	Does the battalion maintain operational readiness to detach two companies for limited duration within 72 hours to deploy/conduct tactical operations anywhere in the mission area?
164	Are the reserve sub-units prepared to deploy outside the Battalion AOR under separate command and control arrangements for limited duration?
165	Does the battalion QRF Company have the capability to maintain readiness to move?
	- Within two (02) hours to operate anywhere in the battalion AOR.
	- Within six (06) hours anywhere in the mission AOR.
	- Within 24 hours for Inter-Mission Cooperation (IMC).
166	Has the battalion trained and equipped the reserves (including QRF) and a platoon per company be to be air transported for deployment or to undertake tactical operations?
167	Does the battalion maintain a trained and resourced platoon QRT to undertake special tasks including heli-borne operations in-mission area within two (02) hours?
168	Does the battalion maintain minimum a platoon QRT at each ICG level as battalion reserve to be deployed anywhere in the battalion AOR?
169	Are the Battalion Command Group and the staff capable and organized to exercise tactical control of additional two companies and the force multipliers for specific operation?
170	Do all static and temporary bases of the battalion maintain capacity to absorb minimum 50 percent additional elements under the operational control and provide logistics support?
171	Is the battalion organised and maintain readiness to execute operational re-deployment or relocation within its integral resources?



172	Is the Battalion Operations Centre organized, equipped and active to coordinate, monitor, control and respond to operational challenges?	
173	Does the battalion maintain an effective system of acquiring tactical information and maintaining situational awareness?	
174	Does the battalion have early-warning systems and mechanisms in place to facilitate pre-emptive actions?	
175	Does the battalion have capability to provide protected/motorised mobility to all operational elements and weapon systems of the battalion?	
176	Is the battalion capable of establishing a TOB with a company or a platoon for a period of 30 days or as specified using COE and assisted by UN?	
177	Are the infantry platoons of the battalion trained and equipped to undertake LRP for minimum of seven days?	
178	Is the battalion trained, organised and planned to undertake minimum five (05) composite joint patrols with other mission components or civilian experts for specific or as part of outreach and engagement?	
179	Is the battalion planned and organized to establish eight (08) Checkpoints (CP) and undertake fourteen (14) section level/six (06) platoon level (or a mix of both) patrolling activity in a 24 Hour cycle?	
180	Is the battalion organized, trained and coordinated for joint operations with other national contingents, host country security forces and UN Formed Police Units.	
181	Is the battalion capable of establishing effective information-sharing and partnerships with mission components?	
182	Is the Battalion Command Group, staff, subordinate commanders and earmarked troops organised and capable of carrying out extensive outreach and engagement of the local population?	
183	Are all subordinate units trained to handle civil unrest? Does the battalion maintain crowd control equipment for strength of two companies?	
184	Is the battalion capable of undertaking environmental baseline studies when establishing camps?	
185	Is the battalion capable to conduct AAR process IOT identify, capture and share BP and LL through among its maneuver elements and higher HQ?	Annex K of UNIBAM



			Chapter 4, UNIBAM											
		3.5.4.2 : Company Level Operational Capabilities	Is the company organised, equipped, trained and capable to perform designated mission essential tasks (operational and non-operational) either independently or as part of the company level operations?	If designated as reserve company, be ready to move within 72 hours with integral and/or battalion and/or mission resources.	As a QRF Company, does it have the capability to maintain readiness to move? - Within two (02) hours to operate anywhere in the battalion AOR.	- Within six (06) hours anywhere in the mission AOR.	- Within 24 hours for Inter-Mission Cooperation (IMC).	Does the company maintain operational readiness to get redeployed within 48 hours anywhere in battalion AOR?	Does the company maintain operational readiness to deploy or conduct operations anywhere in the mission AOR for limited duration within 72 hours?	Are the company and its subordinate personnel trained, organised and equipped to undertake helicopter mounted operation with a platoon within two (02) hours and a company less a platoon within six (06) hours?	Is the Company HQ be capable of receiving, coordinating and operationally employing additional one or two platoons from other national contingents (efficacy of C3 and inter-operability aspects)?	Does the company maintain a trained, equipped and capable platoon for execution of special tasks including heli-borne operations?	Are all platoons trained to perform the role of QRTs and maintain a readiness to launch within 30 minutes with integral transport?	Is the company capable of establishing a TOB with a composite Platoon capable of sustaining for specified duration using either COE and/or with mission assets?
186	187	3.5.4.2:	188	189	190			191	192	193	194	195	196	197



198	Is the company trained, equipped and capable of undertaking Long Range Patrol with a composite platoon for minimum seven (7) days within integral resources and for longer duration with mission support?
199	Are all platoons capable of executing "Local Quick Reaction" capability with readiness to move within ten (10) minutes?
200	Is the company planned and organized to undertake minimum two (02) composite joint patrols (with mission police or civilian components) in a week, for specific task or as part of outreach and engagement?
201	Is the company organised and capable of establishing two (02) CPs and undertake four (04) section level (or a mix of both) patrolling activity in a 24 Hour cycle as minimum operational engagement?
202	Are all personnel of the battalion trained, organised and capable of immediate action readiness (Stand To) in two (02) minutes?
203	Is the Company Operations Centre organized, equipped and active to coordinate, monitor, control and respond to operational challenges?
204	Does the company maintain an effective and proactive system of acquiring tactical information and maintaining situational awareness?
205	Is the company organised and prepared to protect the COB, UN Property and personnel from all kinds of physical threat by layered obstacles, sentry posts, and entry exit control and by fire and observation?
206	Are all operational elements and the Company Command Post mobile on organic transport and Armoured Personnel Carriers (APC) to conduct dynamic mobile operations in the battalion AOR?
207	Does the company maintain high readiness through effective day and night observation, electronic surveillance and support weapon platforms for force protection?
208	Are the personnel of the company able to exercise effective interoperability skills and conduct joint operations with other elements (UNPOL, civilian mission components, UN Agencies, Local Police and Security Forces etc.)?



		DPKO/OHCHR/ DPA/DFS Policy on Human Rights				Chapter 4, UNIBAM							
Are the earmarked personnel of the company organised and capable of carrying out extensive outreach and engagement of the local population?	Are all platoons of the company trained to respond to civil unrest and at least one platoon equipped with crowd control equipments?	Has the company been trained on human rights and international humanitarian law and notably how to recognise human rights violations and intervene in line with mandate, ROEs and capacity; how human rights intersect with their tasks and how to cooperate closely with the mission human rights component?			3.5.4.3 : Platoon Level Operational Capabilities	Is the platoon trained, equipped, organised and capable to perform the designated mission essential tasks (operational and non-operational) either independently or as part of the company level operations with integral C3, firepower, mobility logistics resources?	Is the platoon trained and organised to undertake heli-mounted or heli-borne (if tasked) operations?	Does the platoon maintain operational readiness to react as QRT within specified time as per tasking within the Company or Battalion AOR?	Is the platoon organised and equipped to establish a TOB/Patrol Base/OP as per specific task for 14 days or beyond with the support of organic resources and mission assets?	Is the platoon organised and equipped to undertake LRP anywhere in the battalion AOR for duration of seven (07) days with integral resources?	Is the platoon organised and equipped to establish one (01) CP and undertake two (02) section level patrolling activities or one (01) platoon level patrol in a 24 hour cycle?	Does the platoon have specified numbers of weapons, instruments and equipments for operational performance in serviceable condition?	Are all sections of the platoon trained and organised to conduct joint operations with other elements in the mission?
509	210	211	212	213	3.5.4.3:1	214	215	216	217	218	219	220	221



222	Do the platoon HQ and the sections have the ability to carry out outreach and engagement independently or jointly with other elements?		
223			
224			
3.5.5 : Trai	3.5.5 : Training Requirements and Standards		
225	Has the battalion conducted basic individual and collective infantry training up to and including company level, with special attention for weapons training (small arms, heavy machine gun/small cannon turret weapons, and short and medium range anti-tank weapons), basic cordon and search procedures?		TCC Guidelines, 2008 and UNIBAM
226	Are the sub-units trained in the use of helicopters?		
227	Have the unit conducted briefings on the Rules of Engagement (ROE) to be observed by the Mission, rules of impartiality and honesty, rules for behaviour and techniques on how to react when being obstructed by hostile elements, etc?		
228	Has all personnel been imparted instructions on the mandate and organization of the Mission and the area of operations?		
229	Have all personnel been imparted instructions on geographical, historical and cultural background of the local inhabitants and the neighbouring countries, including the origins of the current situation, religious aspects, customs and taboos, etc?		
230	Has the unit received pre-deployment training on conduct and discipline for military personnel?	(Core Pre-deployment Training Material Module 4)	
231	Have the unit conducted induction training on conduct and discipline for military personnel, including information on mission-specific rules and regulations or the obligations towards national and local laws and regulations, and conducted specific training on Sexual Exploitation and Abuse and the UN 'zero-tolerance' policy in this regard?		
232	Has the unit conducted exercises in short and longer term manning of operational checkpoints and patrol missions (including the use of night vision equipment), basic communication and voice procedure training?		



		•	
233	Has all personnel been briefed and imparted instructions on how to manage the environment properly in their daily operations?		
234	Have all the personnel undergone practical and operational human rights training aimed at providing military peacekeepers with an understanding of their human rights roles and responsibilities in UN peacekeeping operations?	DPKO/OHCHR/ DPA/DFS Policy on Human Rights –para 29 and 85.	
235			
236			
3.5.6 : Log	3.5.6 : Logistics Capability		
237	Is the unit carrying or in possession of the required number of personnel, arms, ammunition, equipment, accessories, spares, unit stores and expendables as per MOU and mission requirements?	Chapter 4, UNIBAM	
238	Are the COBs configured for independent and self-sustained logistics capability (Food, water, accommodation, hygiene and sanitation, transport, medical, etc.)?		
239	Has the unit streamlined procedures for daily logistics sustenance and routine replenishment as per mission logistics plan within integral resources?		
240	Does the unit maintain field kitchen facility with adequate running and reserve rations (dry and fresh rations, MRE/composite emergency rations etc.) as per specified quantity and have grease traps?		
241	Does the unit have an efficient system of daily sustenance of water to include water plant, storage facility and supply system for providing potable drinking/cooking/sanitation water in specified quantity as per the COE Manual 2011 and TCC guidelines of 2008?		
242	Does the unit maintain capability to install field water pump and provide temporary water supply for its companies and platoons until main supply is provided/restored?		
243	Does the unit have a system in place for wastewater treatment prior discharge?		
244	Does the unit have a system in place for waste segregation?		
245	Does the unit have containment basins under all fuel tanks and fuel collection points?		
246	Does the unit carry out turnover of rations and ammunition on a periodic basis?		



247	Has the unit carried out periodic testing of medical instruments and equipments for correctness and expiry date medicines removed from the bins?
248	Have the unit and subordinate units equipped with temporary field accommodation stores (tents, etc.) to support itself logistically for short duration?
249	Does the unit has adequate and safe storage facilities for ration, water, FOL, general and ordnance stores, ammunition, mechanical transport stores, engineer stores, etc?
250	Does the unit have reserve stocks of water, food, emergency ration, medicines, spares (for weapons, equipments and vehicles), and general and ordnance stores, FOL, etc?
251	Has the unit carried out necessary scheduled preventive maintenance of all operational stores and have adequate maintenance and reserve spares?
252	Does the unit have required capability to carry out repairs (in situ and mobile) and recovery of vehicles?
253	Are all the weapons, instruments and equipments inspected, zeroed/calibrated?
254	Are all the troops equipped with necessary protective clothing (protective vest and helmet)?
255	Does the unit maintain a movement control organization to plan and organize move of personnel?
256	Are the personnel and unit finances properly accounted for and judiciously used?
257	Does the unit have an effective system of personal documentation and administration?
258	Does the unit maintain an efficient postal service?
259	Has the unit carried out remedial actions as suggested in the quarterly COE inspection in the mission area?
260	Does the unit maintain an updated load list and list of dangerous cargo list?
261	Does the unit maintain 10 percent additional equipment, vehicles, stores to cater for unserviceable stores/equipment out of action until replenished?
262	Has a detailed load table for personnel baggage, unit equipment and stores been worked out as per UN parameters?
263	Does the unit carry/in possession of required ammunition for peacekeeping operations?



264	Is the unit carrying/in possession of minimum 10 percent reserve of all equipments and stores over and above the agreed upon quantities as per MOU to cater for unforeseen equipment out of action/un-serviceability/breakdown etc.?		
265	Does the unit maintain reserve stocks in the following category: Water -		As per missions requirements
	Dry ration -		
	Composite ration/MRE -		
	Expendable stores -		
	FOL -		
	Spares (weapon, equipment and vehicle) –		
	Medicines -		
266	Does the unit have separate facilities accommodation, ablutions, etc. for women?		
267			
268			
3.5.6.1 : Medical	nedical negative services and the services of		
269	Do all personnel meet the laid down criteria of medical fitness for deployment in a mission area and have been inoculated/immunized as per norms and mission requirements?	National and UN Medical Standards. TCC Guidelines of 2008, p. 33.	Medical Support manual 2012
270	Are all personnel trained and equipped in providing emergency first aid?	COE Manual 2011.	
27.1	Does each section have minimum one (01) field nursing assistant with medical kit?	COE Manual 2011.	
272	Do all COBs have life-saving resuscitation capability and means of surface and aerial evacuation of casualty?		
273	Does Battalion HQ have expert medical support with minor surgery and life saving resuscitation capability with means of surface and aerial (with mission support) evacuation of casualty?		



274	Does the unit have timely provisioning and stocking of medicines and are replacement of life expired medicines periodically carried out?	
275	Does the battalion maintain personal health cards for each individual (including blood group and allergy details)?	
276	Does the unit have a HIV/AIDS counsellor?	TCC Guidelines 2008 p. 29
772	Does the unit have women medic/nurse and attendant, and maintains separate facility for medical investigation and holding?	
278	Does the unit have an Environmental Focal Point to liaise with the appointed official for the environment in the military component of the mission?	
279		
280		
3.5.6.2:W	3.5.6.2 : Water Arrangements	
281	Does each COB have a water treatment/purification plant (1,000 litres per hour to 2,000 litres per hour) with sedimentation, filtration and disinfecting process or reverse osmosis and adequate storage and distribution facility (COE/UNOE)?	
282	Does the unit have trained personnel in treating and testing raw water (meet WHO standards and fit for human consumption)?	
283	Does a COB maintain three (03) days intake storage and 5,000 litres of output storage?	
284	Does the unit have minimum two (02) days bottled water as reserve stock?	
285	Does the unit have water storage capacity (with acceptable food grade materials) of minimum 170 litres per person?	
286	Does the unit have adequate water tankers and trailers for self-sustainment of the COBs	
287	Does the unit engineer section have the capability to provide water points with field pumps?	
288	Does each COB have a proper wastewater collection/treatment/disposal system (Special case)?	



289			
290			
3.5.6.3 : Pe	3.5.6.3 : Personal and Crew Served Weapons		
291	Are the weapons inspected and certified by the armourer for serviceability (barrel, firing and safety mechanisms)?		
292	Has greasing and oiling of the weapon parts been carried out?		
293	Does the weapon have necessary accessories (day and night sights, laser aiming pointers, sling, magazines, cleaning kit, tool kit with additional firing pin, muzzle cover, spare batteries for sights, etc.)?		
294	Have all weapons zeroed, day and night sights adjusted/calibrated and batteries (including spares) charged?		
295	Are the weapons equipped with authorized ammunition in good condition (new lot and not rusty)?		
296	Are the weapon index card/history sheet been maintained?		
297	Is the weapon given on charge of an individual for maintenance and accountability?		
298	Are the weapons and ammunition kept under proper storage?		
299			
300			
3.5.6.4: M	3.5.6.4 : Mechanical Transport		
301	Have all vehicles been painted in white overall and display black UN letters on all four sides and on top prominently?	COE Manual 2011 TCC Guidelines	(Min. 30 cm wide and 45 cm height)
302	Have all the national markings been removed from the vehicles?		



303	Are the vehicles of the agreed pattern (including 4×4) and category as per MOU?		
304	Are the vehicles fitted with HF radio sets for communication?		
305	Are the vehicles inspected and certified for serviceability (electrical, fuel supply and transmission system) and road worthiness?	90 perc	90 percent and 24 Hour Rule
306	Are the vehicles modified against small arms/IED threats as per mission requirements?		
307	Are the vehicles fitted with a GPS?		
308	Are the vehicles equipped with fast moving spares, spare tyres, pick axe and Shovels, spare FOL, spare water, emergency lighting arrangements, breakdown indicators, first aid kit and the repair tool kit?		
309	Are the vehicles fitted with speed governors, rear view mirrors, rear sensors, fog lamps, indicators and alarm for left/right turns and reverse?		
310	Have the tyre rotation, wheel alignment and headlight adjusting been carried out?		
311	Are the vehicles' fuel tanks topped up, greasing as per correct grade carried out, battery in good condition with correct level of distilled water, break fluid, engine oil, radiator water levels topped up, tyre pressures and condition checked?		
312	Are the vehicles provided with tow hook and tow chain/winch facility for self-recovery?		
313	Do the vehicles undergo daily, weekly and periodic maintenance tasks as part of preventive maintenance checks and the records maintained?		
314	Are the vehicle log books and car dairies maintained properly?		
315	Are the vehicles on charge of an individual peacekeeper for responsibility, accountability and safe driving?		
316	Are the odometers (vehicles) and hour-reading meters operational in all vehicles and generators to efficiently track fuel consumption? (For efficient record of fuel consumption, UN may install FUEL LOG on all contingent vehicles and equipment.)		
317			
318			



3.5.6.5:F	3.5.6.5: Fire Precaution	
319	Does the unit have a fire alarm system and possess adequate fire fighting equipments?	
320	Does the unit have SOP on fire fighting with clearly spelt out responsibilities and drills?	
321	Does the unit carry out regular fire fighting practices?	
322	Does the unit carry out regular inspection to identify fire hazards and institute remedial measures?	
323	Does the unit have fire points established near ammunition magazine, FOL dump and armoury, battalion stores and other key areas?	
324		
325		
3.5.7 : Legal Aspects	al Aspects	
326	Are all personnel sensitized to abide by International Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights Laws?	DPKO/OHCHR/ DPA/DFS Policy on Human Rights
327	Do all personnel understand the local laws of the host nation, their customs, traditions and practices?	
328	Are all ranks sensitized about the provisions, contained in the SOFA, ROE, MOU and all other mission specific UN Policies/SOPs, etc.?	
329	Does the unit have an effective internal oversights mechanism to monitor conduct of personnel, report possible misconduct or serious misconduct, carry out necessary investigations, discipline the involved individuals in order to ensure judicious disposal of cases?	
330	Does the Battalion Commander fully understand his/her specific role/obligation under the overall UN legal mechanism concerning conduct and discipline matters?	
331	Have the important relevant rules and regulations been interpreted in national language for easy understanding of the soldiers?	
332		
333		



3.5.8 : We	3.5.8 : Welfare : Does the unit maintain high standards in?
334	Recreational facilities and arrangements (sports/games facilities, TV and music systems, reading materials, etc.).
335	Quality and variety of food.
336	Living conditions (bathing and toilet facilities, laundry, lighting and ventilation, communications and Internet facility, etc.).
337	Quality of personal dress and equipment.
338	Management of individual finances.
339	Provision of Internet, ISD and mailing facilities for the troops.
340	
341	
3.5.9 : Mo	3.5.9 : Morale and Motivation : Do the unit personnel maintain high standards in?
342	Conduct and discipline as per UN standards (with minimal indiscipline cases).
343	Turn out, both on and off parade.
344	Maintain cheerful disposition.
345	Display pride, self-respect, camaraderie and esprit de corps.
346	Good camp layout (Perimeter fencing, accommodation, field kitchen arrangements, hygiene and sanitation arrangements including ablutions, etc.).
347	Operational readiness and equipment management.
348	Establish good rapport and gain reputation amongst locals.
349	
350	



3.6 : UN Infantry Battalion Capability Standards for Tasks

Task 2.1: Patrolling

Task Specific Capability	Capability Standards
Force Protection	Company/Battalion QRF is prepared to support patrol defence/extraction. Patrol reviews ROE and route and rehearses actions if attacked prior to initiation of patrol.
	Patrol personnel provide for all around 360 degrees defensible security, 24 hour a day, under all weather and light conditions.
	Patrol has rehearsed SOPs for defence and evacuation.
Sustainment	Patrol personnel have adequate supplies, potable water, ammunition, fuel, and transportation to sustain itself for the duration of the patrol and in all threat levels.
ß	Company commander determines requirements for the patrol and verifies requirements with the battalion staff.
	Progress of patrol is monitored utilizing patrol boundaries, phase lines, key terrain, and contact points.
	Patrol has an established chain of command with clear lines of C2.
	Patrol maintains constant, reliable, redundant, and secure communication with the next superior authority and other adjacent battalion patrols as the situation dictates.
	Radio and telephone transmissions are encrypted or encoded as required. Interpreters are attached to the patrol who can communicate in the local language and dialect, and the patrolling units language.
Protect Environment	Patrols should not degrade the environment or living conditions of the local population through containment of oil spills, water, wastewater and proper waste management.
	Wildlife is prohibited to buy/sell. Bring empty (plastic) water bottles used during patrols back to camps for proper disposal (Do not throw away bottles/wraps directly into nature).
Mobility	Patrol leaders, through digital or conventional map reconnaissance identify tentative patrol routes, rally points, contact points, and phase lines and patrol leaders brief company commander of these locations prior to initiation of patrol.
	All patrol plans and routes are briefed by the patrol leader to the stay behind commander and /or appropriate staff members.
	Patrol uses formation and appropriate technique of movement, adjusting the technique as required by mission, threat, time, terrain, troops available, and civil considerations.
	Patrol locates and plots minefields and obstacles along the route.



Civil Interaction	All patrol members should be sensitive (including gender sensitive) and respectful to local norms and customs. Patrol members should present a professional and alert posture.
Interoperability	Patrol has on call capability to support other battalion missions and assets including: other patrols and battalion/company activities protect or detain individuals act as a communications relay for long range battalion communications.
Information	Company commander and leaders involved with patrol, gain and maintain situational awareness using information that is gathered from battalion staff, company situational awareness teams, maps, information summaries, situation reports, and other available information sources. Patrol members are debriefed by key staff members and/or the commander as appropriate immediately after each patrol in order to extract and consolidate pertinent information relevant information and answers to PIR.
	Patrols should maintain all around 360 degrees observation under all weather and light conditions throughout the duration of the patrol. Patrol members should pay special attention to children and signal disturbances (such as child soldiers) to the Battalion's Child Protection Officer.
Firepower	Patrol has capability to defend itself in all threat conditions against all feasible threat COA's. Patrol has coordinated air and indirect fire support targeting with battalion assets.
Monitor, Verify, and Report	Patrol personnel should provide timely, accurate and relevant reports to higher HQ. Information reported is verified by multiple sources and documented though imagery and other forms of electronic media.
Operate and Maintain Equipment	Patrols should initiate operations with 100 percent operationally capable equipment. Patrol maintains spare parts, batteries, electrical supply and water purification capabilities. Patrol members are trained to use, maintain and repair their equipment at the operator level.



Task 2.2: Observation Post

Task Specific Capability	Capability Standards
Observe	OP allows all around 360 degrees observation and monitoring, 24 hour a day, under all weather and light conditions.
Monitor, Verify and Report	OP personnel provide timely, accurate and relevant reports to higher HQ. Information reported is verified by multiple sources and documented though imagery and other forms of electronic media
Force Protection	OP personnel provide for all around 360 degrees defensible security, 24 hours a day, under all weather and light conditions. OP force has rehearsed SOPs for OP defence and evacuation.
Operate and Maintain Equipment	Maintains observation, monitoring, and communications equipment at 100 percent operationally capable. Maintains spare parts, batteries and electrical supply. OP personnel are trained to use, maintain and repair equipment at the operator level.
Sustainment	OP personnel and their relief force have adequate supplies, potable water, ammunition and transportation to sustain themselves for an established amount of time in all threat levels. Adequate fire fighting and first aid materials are on site.
ប	OP has an established chain of command with clear lines of C2 (especially with a multinational OP). OP maintains constant, reliable, redundant and secure communication with the next superior authority and other Ops as the situation dictates. Radio and telephone transmissions are encrypted or encoded as required.
Protect Environment	OP occupation and maintenance should not degrade the environment or living conditions of the local population.
Mobility	Battalion forces and support assets have unencumbered access to OP. OP forces maintain freedom of movement in their area of operation. Battalion/company has capability to reposition OPs as required.
Civil Interaction	OP has established rapport and communication with civic actors, including women, belligerent factions, and non-UN organization in the AOR.
Interoperability	OP has capacity to support other battalion missions and assets including: support patrols, act as a supply depot, protect or detain individuals, act as a communications relay facility, serve as a medical dispensary, serve as a negotiation centre for interaction with local actors, or support other activities required by the battalion.



OP supports and conducts Information Preparation of the Area of Operations, Surveillance and Reconnaissance. Maintains and disseminates accurate information of activities and events in the AOR in support of battalion processes.	OP has capability to defend itself in all threat conditions against all feasible threat COA's.	OP has coordinated air and indirect fire support targeting with battalion assets.	
Information	Firepower		

Task 2.3: Checkpoint

Capability	Standards
C3 and Interoperability	CP commander knows the task and methodology of execution as per battalion SOP.
	CP commander aware of ROE and implications of host national law.
	CP command and control set up well coordinated and efficient.
	CP personnel, equipment and procedures in consonance with interoperability requirements of the mission and necessary coordination with other elements been carried out.
	Liaison and coordination with civil administration and local police/host military been carried out.
	All actions centrally monitored, controlled and executed.
Force Protection	Troops adequately protected with body armour against all kinds of threat
	CP adequately protected against likely threat prevailing in the AOR (against armed threat, small arms, VBIED or Vehicle based suicide bomber etc.)
Mobility	Adequate capability for rapid movement as per situation with organic transport.
	Protected mobility (APCs) deployed in location as reserve, based on the operational environment.
Firepower	Adequate Support Weapons (deployed on ground and mounted on vehicle to deal with any untoward situation.
Sustainment	Troops and attached elements self contained logistically for the duration of operations (food, water, medicines, weather protection,
	The routine administration requirements taken care of, if it is required to be there for longer periods.



Tactical Information	Battalion organised to acquire and process information from multiple sources to establish a reasonable belief to establish CP.
	Information Databank is maintained.
Civic Interaction	Carried out prior and post contact with local populace and leaders to establish close rapport or to gain information?
Techniques and	Personnel trained to search vehicles and frisk suspected personnel.
procedures	Personnel capable of handling arrest and detention
	Personnel capable of handling an explosive laden vehicle or able to confiscate contraband material.
	Key personnel have functional vernacular language skills.
	CP personnel capable of handling emergency drills and casualty care and evacuation.
	UN Identification marks installed in the CP.

Task 2.4: Outreach and Engagement

Capability	Standards
C3 and Interoperability	Battalion and Company HQ have an integrated policy and SOP on outreach and engagement.
	Effective liaison and coordination with civil administration and local police/host military carried out.
	Effective communication measures with redundancy with all participants and control HQ established.
	All actions centrally monitored, controlled and executed.
Force Protection	Troops interacting with local population adequately protected.
	Other troops on military tasks adequately protected with body armour against all kinds of threat.
	Actions to counter IED/Sniper/armed threat taken care of.
	Troops have weather and terrain specific clothing.



Mobility	Adequate capability for rapid movement as per situation by foot, surface transport or by air.
	Have required protected mobility based on the operational environment.
Firepower	Force equipped with necessary personal and support weapons for measured response in use of force (as per ROE).
Sustainment	Have the ability to self-sustain logistically for the duration of operations.
Tactical Information	Bat
	talion organised to acquire and process information from multiple sources to establish a reasonable belief to conduct search operations.
Civic Interaction	Establish rapport and contact with local populace and leaders to help smooth conduct and carry out constructive psychological engagement.

Task 2.5: Situational Awareness

Capability	Standards
C3 and Interoperability	Battalion structured to process information from an observation post/section level to the Battalion Commander in an effective manner.
	Effective liaison and coordination with UNCT entities, NGOs, civil administration and local police/host military carried out for obtaining information.
	Have secured communication means to pass confidential information
	All information-gathering activities centrally coordinated and monitored by respective commanders.
Force Protection	Troops involved in SA adequately protected and their security issues addressed.
Mobility	Maintain capability to employ GSR vehicle mounted for specific tasks.
Sustainment	SA personnel have the ability to self-sustain logistically for the duration of operations.
Tactical Information	Battalion organised to acquire and process information from multiple sources to establish a reasonable belief to conduct search operations.
	Have trained GSR and UAV detachments



Civic Interaction	Establish rapport and contact with local populace and leaders to gain early-warning/information.
Techniques and Procedures	SA personnel and commanders up to platoon level capable to interact and obtain human information.
	Comprehensive Information Data Folder maintained with each Company.
	Battalion key leaders and the staff capable of engaging interlocutors and Community Liaison Agents for early warning.
	Battalion maintains ability to interpret satellite imagery or air photos.
	Detailed risk assessment carried out and developed a comprehensive information collection plan.

Task 2.6: Cordon and Search Operations

Capability	Standards
C3 and Interoperability	Mobile command post established to exercise command and control of all elements taking part in the operations
	Effective liaison and coordination with civil administration and local police/host military carried out.
	Effective communication measures with redundancy with all participants and control HQ established.
	All actions centrally monitored, controlled and executed.
Force Protection	Troops adequately protected with body armour against all kinds of threat.
	Actions to counter IED/Sniper/armed threat taken care of.
	Troops have weather and terrain specific clothing.
Mobility	Adequate capability for rapid movement as per situation by foot, surface transport or by air.
	Have required protected mobility based on the operational environment.
Firepower	Force equipped with necessary personal and support weapons for measured response in use of force (as per ROE).
Sustainment	Have the ability to self-sustain logistically for the duration of operations.
Tactical Information	Organised to acquire and process information from multiple sources to establish a reasonable belief to conduct search operations.



Civic Interaction	Establish rapport and contact with local populace and leaders to help smooth conduct and carry out constructive psychological engagement.
Cordon	Has the required force level, force protection, effective C3 and involvement of local police coordinated.
	Grouping, deployment, link up and other activities integrated and coordinated between outer and inner cordon with the search activities.
Search	Battalion personnel and tactical entities conduct operations in a people friendly manner with out harassment and collateral damages in a systematic manner.
	Force adequately equipped with necessary weapons, observation equipments and stores to conduct the operations. Has the enablers and local authorities well integrated in the conduct.
Operation Culmination	Battalion assets geared to conduct post search damage assessment, mitigation of damages if any, obtain no clearance certificate, tend to casualty, if any, and conduct civic action programmes.
	Establish new civilian contacts and build faith and credibility in UN endeavours.

Task 2.7: Convoy and Escort

Capability	Standards
C3	Movement tactically organised, centrally coordinated, controlled and monitored by the Battalion HQ (Movement Control) or the designated COB.
	All UN/security elements on the route alerted and response coordinated. Communication means (HF, VHF, and Satellite) on move, within the convoy, with HQ, aviation elements, reserves and other static and mobile entities en route tied up.
Tactical Information	Battalion organised to acquire and process information from multiple sources to obtain early-warning of an impending situation and analyse local sensibilities.
	Community liaison teams providing real time inputs to help better situation awareness.
	Has good knowledge of the belligerent's organizational profile, tactics, capabilities and availability of local support.



Mobility	Ensure 100 percent serviceability of all vehicles, inspection and preventive maintenance carried out, adequate spares, repair and recovery coordinated.
	Convoy grouped with APCs, strengthened vehicles, mine protected vehicles, etc. for protected mobility.
	Have motorized and heli-borne reserves for quick response. Necessary reconnaissance of route (including alternative routes) carried out.
Firepower	Escorts have integral personal and support weapons to address 360-degree protection and have the ability to call and direct indirect fire/attack helicopter fire.
	Escorts trained to respond in a measured and calibrated manner as per ROE.
Force Protection	Vehicles strengthened against small arms fire and IED/Mine blasts, etc., troops have adequate weapons and protective clothing and grouped/supported by additional weapon platforms (APCs and Attack Helicopters) and surveillance means.
	Battalion cater for immediate medical support, casualty evacuation and coordination with hospitals in chain/in the vicinity.
Interoperability	Coordination of movement and sharing of information with humanitarian agencies and NGOs carried out.
	Liaison with local police authorities established for dealing with adverse situations.
	Brief all personnel and rehearse drills especially when composed of civilians from multiple agencies.
Sustainment	Have the ability to self-sustain logistically for the duration of operations.
Provide Convoy Escort	Escort adequately equipped, trained and briefed.
	Command, control and communication coordinated.
	Escorts spaced out at the head, middle and at tail as per requirements; vehicles have UN identification and distinguishing signs.
	Drills for commencing the move and halt coordinated.
	Have protected mobility to overcome obstacle, ensure security of personnel, vehicles and assets being transported and respond operationally as per Mission SOPs.
Handling of situations	Have envisaged threat and rehearsed reactions to deal with various contingencies.
	Cognisant of the vulnerabilities and the effect (positive or negative) of an operational engagement on the overall peace process.
	Execute immediate action tactical drills to secure the convoy when halted and capable of responding as per ROE.
	Has the capacity to analyse the situation, report to HQ, negotiate and de-escalate the situation and involve outside influence to resolve the issue while maintaining tactical balance.
	Capable of receiving and employing reserves and local/UN Police in dealing with the situation. Tend to casualties/damages if any.



Task 2.8: Operation Base

Task Specific Capability	Standards
Force Protection	Base personnel provide for all around 360 degree outside and inside defensible security, 24 hours a day, under all weather and light conditions.
	Base force (including QRF) has rehearsed SOPs for base defence and evacuation.
	Base commander establishes a QRF (QRF element designated, primary and alternate positions established for the QRF, QRF knows routes to places of employment, QRF control measures established, conditions for employment established, link up procedures coordinated).
	Base commander maintains capability to reinforce or support patrols with fires IAW ROE, higher HQ guidance, and base SOP.
	Entry control points are designed, manned, and equipped to control all ingress and egress to the base as well as prevent penetration by IEDs and VBIEDs.
	Presence patrols inside and out of the base actively patrol for gaps in base defence.
	Operation base equipped with surveillance cameras, CCTV, etc., for day and night close monitoring.
Operate and Maintain	Base equipment is at a minimum maintained 90 percent operationally capable.
Equipment	Base maintains spare parts, batteries and electrical supply.
	Base personnel are trained to use, maintain and repair equipment at the operator level.
Sustainment	Base personnel and their relief force have adequate supplies, potable water, ammunition and transportation to sustain themselves for an established amount of time in all threat levels.
	Adequate fire fighting and first aid materials are on site. UN environmental guidelines in regards to the disposal of all waste/wastewater are followed, same for energy/fuel management.
	Soldiers maintain a sanitary and healthy camp. Base has an established fire alert and control system (which may simply consist of night guards).
ຶ	Operational base has an established chain of command with clear lines of C2 (especially with a multinational base).
	Base maintains constant, reliable, redundant and secure communication with the next superior authority and other bases as the situation dictates.
	Radio and telephone transmissions are encrypted or encoded as required.
	All battalion and affiliated base personnel understand actions to take upon established alerts, signals and contingencies.



Task Specific Capability	Standards
Protect Environment	Base occupation and maintenance should not degrade the environment or living conditions of the local population through containment of oil spills, water, wastewater and proper waste management.
Mobility	Battalion forces and support assets have unencumbered access to base.
	Base forces maintain freedom of movement in their area of operation. Base maintains adequate fuel, Jubricants and spare parts to support mobile operations for a minimum of two weeks without resupply.
Interaction with Local Population	Operation base leaders and soldiers are sensitive to local customs and people living in AOR by attending local events, supporting quick impact projects (QIP), and regularly sharing information.
	Base has established rapport and communication with local actors, belligerent factions, and non-UN organization in the AOR.
	Base Commander is sensitive and respectful of local community's environmental interests and concerns and takes active measures to ensure the local environment is not degraded by base activities.
	Base Commander supports Quick Impact Projects, other community projects, and environmental improvement initiatives in the local community with base assets as authorized by higher HQ.
	Civil-military plans and informational programmes involving the base are coordinated with the peacekeeping operations force staff and relevant civilian components and local authorities, IOs, NGOs and PVOs in order to assess their impact and avoid counterproductive results.
	Base commander is available for open dialog local authorities, IOs, NGOs and PVOs.
Interoperability	Base has capacity to support other battalion missions and assets including: support patrols, act as a supply depot, protect or detain individuals, act as a communications relay facility, serve as a medical dispensary, serve as a negotiation centre for interaction with local actors, or support other activities required by the battalion.



Base Commander and leaders gain and maintain situational awareness using information that is gathered from battalion staff, company situational awareness teams, maps, information summaries, situation reports and other available information sources. Commander ensures base security patrols understand priority information requirements and reporting procedures. Company leaders review battalion MIPAOR data and provide changes impacting MIPAOR to the battalion information officer/staff (see Chapter XX Situational Awareness for MIPAOR capability standards). Company information gathering network across company AOR (key leaders is sovernment, community, religious affairs, factions, etc. identified and habitual relationships established. Information with key leaders is shared. Key leaders informed of prohibitions and restrictions in regard to operation base and AOR. Reconnaissance and surveillance routes and positions established. All patrols and CIMIC teams debriefed as required.	Base has capability to defend itself in all threat conditions against all feasible threats. Base has coordinated air and indirect fire support targeting with battalion assets.	Base OPs allow all around 360 degrees observation and monitoring, 24 hours a day, under all weather and light conditions.	d Base personnel provide timely, accurate and relevant reports to higher HQ. Information reported is verified by multiple sources and documented though imagery and other forms of electronic media.	The base has separate and functioning lodging and latrine facilities for males and females.	Coordination for road and air evacuation established. Rendezvous and Rally Points known to all personnel. Rehearsals of plan conducted	water source protected 24 hours a day, in all weather and light conditions. Water from source protected by sanitation and filtering measures. Water testing conducted on a regular basis. Civilian population does not compete with or is not excluded from limited water resources.	
Information	Firepower	Observation	Monitor, Verify, and Report	Male and Female Facilities	Evacuation Plan	Produce and Protect Water Source	



Task 2.9: Disarmament and Demobilization

Capability	Standards
C3 and Interoperability	Mobile command post established to exercise command and control of all elements taking part in the operations.
	Effective liaison and coordination with civil administration and local police/host military carried out.
	Effective communication measures with redundancy with all participants and control HQ established.
	All actions centrally monitored, controlled and executed.
Force Protection	Troops adequately protected with body armour against all kinds of threat.
	Actions to counter IED/sniper/armed threat taken care of.
	Troops have weather and terrain specific clothing.
Mobility	Have adequate capability for rapid movement as per situation by foot, surface transport or by air.
	Have required protected mobility based on the operational environment.
Firepower	Force equipped with necessary personal and support weapons for measured response in use of force (as per ROE).
Sustainment	Have the ability to self-sustain logistically for the duration of operations.
Tactical Information	Battalion organised to acquire and process information from multiple sources to establish a reasonable belief to conduct search operations.
Civic Interaction	Rapport and contact with local populace and leaders established to help smooth conduct and carry out constructive psychological engagement.
Provide Security	Grid deployment and capability to establish TOB's.
	Area domination with patrols.
	Effective situational awareness.
	Contingency plans.
	Liaison and interface.



Disarm	Establish checkpoints for registration and collection.
	Outreach defiant/inaccessible armed groups.
	Act as focal point.
	Capability to store and safeguard arms and ammunition.
	Destruction of arms and ammunition.
	Specialised personnel and equipments.
Help Demobilize	Transportation.
	Establishment of temporary camps.
	Conduct and coordinate activities in assembly areas.
	Help to provide security to the camp, maintenance of law and order and emergency administrative support.
	Reign in defiant armed groups.
Information Management	Establish effective information gathering system/network.
	Collate, analyse and interpret.
	Dissemination of information and public information campaign.
	Establish field-level contact with armed groups and bring them to the programme.



Task 2.10: Critical Infrastructure and Assets Protection

Capability	Standards
C3 and Interoperability	Liaison and coordination with civil administration and relevant agency carried out.
	C3 aspects defined, coordinated and implemented.
	Communication measures with redundancy with all participants and control HQ established.
	All actions centrally monitored, controlled and executed.
Force Protection	Troops adequately protected with body armour against all kinds of threat.
	Actions to counter threat to the installation taken care of.
	Internal responses and external support in terms of reinforcement catered for.
Mobility	Force provided with adequate transport for operational and logistics sustainment.
Firepower	Force equipped with weapon systems and other combat equipment as per threat analysis.
	Are the troops briefed and rehearsed for measured response in use of force (as per ROE)?
Sustainment	Have the ability to self-sustain logistically for the duration of deployment?
Tactical Information	Unit has adequate situational awareness and constant flow of information from the vicinity to provide early-warning.
	Unit organised to acquire and process information from multiple sources.
Civic Interaction	Establish rapport and contact with local populace and leaders to help smooth conduct and to obtain information.



Task 2.11: Crowd Management

Capability	Standards
C3 and Interoperability	Mobile command post established to exercise command and control of all elements taking part in the operations.
	Effective liaison and coordination with civil administration and local police/host military carried out.
	Effective communication measures with redundancy with all participants and control HQ established.
	All actions centrally monitored, controlled and executed.
Force Protection	Troops adequately protected with body armour against all kinds of threat.
	Actions to counter IED/sniper/armed threat taken care of.
	Troops have weather and terrain specific clothing.
Mobility	Have adequate capability for rapid movement as per situation by foot, surface transport or by air.
	Have required protected mobility based on the operational environment.
Firepower	Is the force equipped with necessary personal and support weapons for measured response in use of force (as per ROE).
Sustainment	Have the ability to self-sustain logistically for the duration of operations.
Tactical Information	Battalion organised to acquire and process information from multiple sources to establish a reasonable belief to conduct search operations.
Civic Interaction	Establish rapport and contact with local populace and leaders to help smooth conduct and carry out constructive psychological engagement.
Block/Contain	Battalion have the capability in the following to block and contain::
	Force required.
	Command and control.
	Blocking stores.
	Coordination with police.
	Monitor and control.
	Force security.



Battalion assets capable Deploy static posts. Establish mobile patroll Public announcements. Control mechanisms. Coordination with polic Interface/interact/enga Use of Force. Are all commanders and Control mechanisms. Coordination with the p Use of crowd control eq Adherence to ROE. Monitoring. Tending to civilian casu Recording and reportinn	Battalion assets capable of :	eploy static posts.	Establish mobile patrolling.	Public announcements.	ontrol mechanisms.	Coordination with police.	Interface/interact/engage civilian leadership.	se of Force.	Are all commanders and troops conversant with:	ontrol mechanisms.	Coordination with the police.	Use of crowd control equipments.	dherence to ROE.	lonitoring.	Tending to civilian casualty.	Recording and reporting		
	Impose Curfew								Disperse a Crowd									



Task 2.12: Detention

Canability	Standards
C3 and Interoperability	The commanders, staff and operational elements are aware of Policy and modalities of detention and Handover.
	Liaison and coordination with the police and civil administration and host military carried out.
	Reporting as per laid down channel and timings have been carried out.
Tactical Information	Unit has developed adequate human sources from the community.
	Unit organised to acquire and process information from multiple sources.
Civic Interaction	Establish rapport and contact with local populace and leaders to manage after effects of detention carried out.
	Unit able to get information, early-warning and support from the locals in effecting detention of wanted people.
Detention.	Unit has a clear operational plan of action executed by the staff and various operational elements.
	Coordination with relevant agencies or actors carried out.
	Operational teams have police representatives and means of taking under custody.
Holding	Unit has adequate detention facility (separate for men and women).
	Detention cells have specified facilities.
	Detainees provided with specified amenities and recreation facilities.



Task 2.13: Buffer Zone

Task Specific Capability	Capability Standards
Observe	Battalion OPs, CPs, patrols, aerial surveillance and electronic surveillance allow 360 degrees observation and monitoring, 24 hours a day, under all weather and light conditions.
	Battalion establishes and maintains squad-sized checkpoints on each vehicular (land or water) avenue of approach into the buffer zone; establish fire-team-sized checkpoints on dismounted avenues of approach.
	Battalion establishes platoon-sized Forward Operating Bases to control key terrain and avenues of approach within, and adjacent to, the buffer zone.
Monitor, Verify and Report	BZ personnel provide timely, accurate and relevant reports to higher HQ.
	Information reported is verified by multiple sources and documented though imagery and other forms of electronic media.
	Monitor and report beligerent parties' adherence to commitments regarding a ceasefire or demilitarized zone.
Force Protection	BZ personnel provide for 360 degrees all around defensible security, 24 hours a day, under all weather and light conditions.
	BZ force has rehearsed SOPs for OP, CP and Operational Base defence and evacuation.
Operate and Maintain	BZ force maintains vehicle, weapon, observation, monitoring and communications equipment at 100 percent operationally capable.
Equipment	Battalion maintains daily documentation of equipment status and reports equipment readiness status to its higher HQ at established times.
	Battalion and dispersed companies and sections maintain spare parts, batteries and electrical supply.
	OP and CP personnel are trained to use, maintain and repair OP and CP equipment at the operator level.
Sustainment	BZ personnel and their relief force have adequate supplies, potable water, ammunition and transportation to sustain themselves for an established amount of time in all threat levels.



C3 Protect Environment Mobility	Battalion HQs establishes and maintains command and control of all subordinate elements and operations (Ensure promulgation of all appropriate Commanders' intent statements). Promulgate and enforce rules of engagement; establish coordination measures for all tactical operations; plan for and implement logistics procedures to sustain the force; protect the force. BZ has an established chain of command with clear lines of C2 (especially with a multinational BZ force). BZ maintains constant, reliable, redundant and secure communication with the next superior authority and adjacent friendly forces as the situation dictates. Radio and telephone transmissions are encrypted or encoded as required. BZ force occupation and maintenance should not degrade the environment or living conditions of the local population. Battalion forces and support assets maintain unencumbered access to all BZ sectors.
Interaction with Local Population	BZ forces maintain freedom of movement in their area of operation. Battalion establishes safeguarded corridors in and out of the BZ for approved civilian traffic and BZ residents and workers. The battalion should be prepared to conduct unilateral demining operations within the buffer zone or supervise faction military demining efforts. Wehicles are 100 percent operational, drivers are tested and certified to operate vehicles in all weather and light conditions and over rough terrain, driver/motor pool performs daily preventive service and maintenance checks (PMCS) on the vehicle and this is recorded daily in a PMCS logbook that is signed off on by a motor pool technician. BZ force establishes rapport, liaison, and communication with local actors, women's groups, belligerent factions, UN and non-UN organization, and adjacent peacekeeping operations units acting within the battalions Area of Operations (AO). Battalion should be trained and prepared to conduct and/or facilitate negotiations with all area stakeholders as listed above. Battalion and Company HQs conduct regular liaison with local police officials of all factions to jointly resolve potential conflicts at the lowest level, pass information pertinent to the ceasefire to the civilian community, provide protection for civilians who live inside the buffer zone, provide for traffic control, prevent or curtail criminal activity. The Battalion staff and Company HQ should be capable of coordinating military security activities with civilian agencies who are engaged in diplomatic, economic, or informational activities designed to support the overarching goals of the peace operation.
Interoperability	BZ operational bases have the capacity to support other battalion missions and assets including: support patrols, act as supply depots, protect or detain individuals, act as a communications relay facility, serve as a medical dispensary, serve as a negotiation centre for interaction with local actors, or support other activities required by the battalion or UN entities.



Information	Battalion staff and all soldiers support the collection and dissemination of relevant tactical and atmospheric information that the battalion staff and higher HQ can utilize in order to conduct predictive analysis in support of battalion operations.
	Battalion maintains continuous Information Preparation of the Area of Operations (IPAOR), Surveillance and Reconnaissance.
	Battalion tactical information/information officer maintains and disseminates accurate information of activities and events in the AOR in support of battalion IPAOR processes.
	Battalion develops SOPs for information debriefing of each patrol and distributes debriefing reports horizontally and vertically throughout the battalion as well as to higher HQ.
Firepower	Battalion maintains the capability to defend itself in all threat conditions against all feasible and likely threat courses of action (COA).
	Battalion and Company HQs develop and implement fire-support plans to provide effective targeting of potential and actual threats to the force (include lethal—artillery, mortars, close air and naval support as appropriate—as well as non-lethal (e.g., information operations) fires.
	All weapons are 100 percent operational, soldiers have been qualified on their individual weapon and individual weapons have been zeroed (sight adjusted) to their soldier operator.



UN Mandate Support	Battalion establishes and maintains visible boundaries of the zones and lines of demarcation.
	Battalion investigates complaints of violations.
	Battalion assists as required in the issuance and inspection of identity cards and transport authorizations for BZ civilian personnel, their produce, and marketable goods.
	Battalion HQ staff plans, executes, and supports battalion-level Joint Military Commission (JMC) activities with faction commanders that have forces, or influence, in or adjacent to the battalion's AOR.
	Through the JMC (chaired by the peace force Battalion Commander, attended by factional counterparts), jointly mark the zone of separation to readily reveal the coordinated ceasefire line and the boundaries of the buffer zone on each side of the CFL).
	Leverage the JMC to resolve any confusion between the agreed upon maps of the ceasefire line and the actual situation on the ground;
	Resolve accusations of ceasefire violations; facilitate the separation of forces by the buffer zone; promote confidence in the ceasefire and conflict resolution (e.g., prisoner exchanges, response to provocations, etc.);
	Provide military security for civilian confidence-building projects (e.g., infrastructure repair, delivery of essential services, family reunification, economic initiatives, etc.).
	Conduct AARs for each JMC activity and forward report to higher HQ JMC representative.



Task 2.14 : Joint Operations

Capability	Standards
C3 and Interoperability	The C2 arrangements well defined and coordinated with police. Joint Operations Centre/HQ established for functional coordination.
	Incident Control Point established at the site of incident for coordinated employment.
	Liaison and coordination with civil administration and local police/host military carried out.
	Effective communication measures with redundancy with all participants and control HQ established.
	All actions centrally monitored, controlled and executed.
Force Protection	Troops adequately protected with body armour against all kinds of threat.
	Actions to counter IED/sniper/armed threat taken care of.
	Troops have weather and terrain specific clothing.
Mobility	Have adequate capability for rapid movement as per situation by foot, surface transport or by air.
	Have required protected mobility based on the operational environment.
Firepower	Are the force equipped with necessary personal and support weapons and crowd control equipments for measured response in use of force (as per ROE)?
Sustainment	Have the ability to self-sustain logistically for the duration of operations.
	In case required, is the battalion capable of providing temporary sustainment support to the police component?
Tactical Information	Arrangements for information acquisition and sharing between the two components effective.
	Regular interaction at respective levels to plan and coordinate activities in place.
	Coordinate and process information from multiple sources.
Civic Interaction	Establish rapport and contact with local populace and leaders to help smooth conduct and carry out constructive psychological engagement.



Task 2.15: Reinforce/Relief

Capability	Standards
C3 and Interoperability	Command and control aspects well defined and coordinated. Battalion and Company mobile command post organised to exercise command and control of all elements taking part in the operations. Multiple communication means with all elements complement the C2. Liaison and coordination with civil administration and local police/host military carried out. Responses and joint operations with other elements planned, coordinated and rehearsed. All actions centrally monitored, controlled and executed. Coordination in terms of reception, information on operational situation and employment coordinated with the troops in location. Unit able to conduct negotiations and mediation with key leaders during a crisis.
Force Protection	Has the unit conducted briefing, preparation and rehearsals of all operational elements moving out? All elements adequately protected with body armour against all kinds of threat, provided requisite mobility (including protected mobility) and have tactical ability to deal with envisaged threat. Actions to counter IED/sniper/armed threat taken care of.
Mobility	Have adequate capability for rapid movement of the force/reserves as per situation by foot, surface transport or by air. Have required protected mobility based on the operational environment.
Firepower	Unit equipped with necessary personal and support weapons in serviceable condition as authorised. All operational elements briefed and aware of conditions for use of force and measured response as per ROE.
Sustainment	Unit has planned, organised and coordinated logistics support during period of relief and subsequent logistics dependency. The reinforcing troops able to self-sustain logistically for the duration of operations.



Situational Awareness	Unit maintains situational awareness to foresee and analyse potential operational challenges and prepared to deal with them. Unit able to get early-warning of a potential threat or evolving ground situation. Unit has adequate information collection/acquiring means (human and electronic) which are real time and accurate. Information acquiring and sharing coordinated with other partners and actors in the AOR.
Civic Interaction	Establish rapport and contact with local populace and leaders to obtain information and help smooth conduct of operations. Carry out constructive confidence-building activities with the local population to obtain their cooperation and goodwill. Ability of unit in key leader engagement prior to and during a crisis to contain and de-escalate the situation.



Task 2.16: Extract and Evacuate

Capability	Standards
C3 and Interoperability	All operational movements and logistics activities centrally monitored, controlled and executed.
	Liaison and coordination with civil administration and local police/host military carried out.
	Communication measures with redundancy with all operational elements, partners, actors and the control HQ established.
	Joint training and rehearsals carried out.
Situational Awareness	Early-warning and information gathering mechanism in place.
	System and means for timely and accurate passage of information and feedback from the local people in place.
Force Protection	Unit has specially trained and equipped QRT to undertake extraction operation.
	Troops adequately protected with body armour against all kinds of threat.
	Actions to counter IED/sniper/armed threat taken care of.
	Ability to provide protection to other mission entities and UN system organizations with security, transport, temporary shelter and sustenance during evacuation.
Mobility	All operational elements have required mobility with protection arrangements.
	Protected mobility provided to elements based on the operational environment and threat profile.
	Reserves (QRF/QRT) have adequate capability for rapid movement as per situation by foot, surface transport or by air.
	Reinforcement and employment of reserves coordinated and rehearsed.
Firepower	Unit equipped with authorized and serviceable weapon systems.
	Commanders and troops know the ROE and understand the conditions for measured response in use of force.
Sustainment	Unit planned and organised to self-sustain logistically for the duration of operations.
	Capable of providing emergency logistics support to other UN elements in the AOR as a temporary measure.
Civic Interaction	Establish rapport and contact with local populace and leaders to gain early-warning and situational awareness.
	Ability to coordinate and co-opt support of civil authority and local populace during emergency.
	Contingency planning to offset negative impact from lack of cooperation from local people or potential aggressors.
	Planned and organised to protect vulnerable population under threat.







Annex: A

(Refers to Vol. I, Chapter 2, Section 2.16, p. 30)

WE ARE UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING PERSONNEL

The United Nations Organization embodies the aspirations of all the people of the world for peace. In this context, the Charter of the United Nations requires that all personnel must maintain the highest standards of integrity and conduct. We will comply with the Guidelines on International Humanitarian Law for Forces Undertaking United Nations Peacekeeping Operations and the applicable portions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as the fundamental basis of our standards.

We, as peacekeeping personnel, represent the United Nations and are present in the country to help it recover from the trauma of a conflict. As a result, we must consciously be prepared to accept special constraints in our public and private lives in order to do the work and pursue the ideals of the United Nations Organization. We will be accorded certain privileges and immunities arranged through agreements negotiated between the United Nations and the host country solely for the purpose of discharging our peacekeeping duties. Expectations of the international community and the local population will be high, and our actions, behaviour and speech will be closely monitored.

We will always:

- Conduct ourselves in a professional and disciplined manner, at all times.
- Dedicate ourselves to achieving the goals of the United Nations.
- Understand the mandate and mission and comply with their provisions.
- Respect the environment of the host country.
- Respect local laws, customs and practices and be aware of and respect culture, religion, traditions and gender issues.
- Treat the inhabitants of the host country with respect, courtesy and consideration.
- Act with impartiality, integrity and tact.



- Support and aid the infirm, sick and weak.
- Obey our United Nations superiors/supervisors and respect the chain of command.
- Respect all other peacekeeping members of the mission regardless of status, rank, ethnic or national origin, race, gender or creed.
- Support and encourage proper conduct among our fellow peacekeeping personnel.
- Report all acts involving sexual exploitation and abuse.
- Maintain proper dress and personal deportment at all times.
- Properly account for all money and property assigned to us as members of the mission.
- Care for all United Nations equipment placed in our charge.

We will never:

- Bring discredit upon the United Nations or our nations through improper personal conduct, failure to perform our duties or abuse of our positions as peacekeeping personnel.
- Take any action that might jeopardize the mission.
- Abuse alcohol, use or traffic in drugs.
- Make unauthorized communications to external agencies, including unauthorized press statements.
- Improperly disclose or use information gained through our employment.
- Use unnecessary violence or threaten anyone in custody.
- Commit any act that could result in physical, sexual or psychological harm or suffering to members of the local population, especially women and children.
- Commit any act involving sexual exploitation and abuse, sexual activity with children under 18, or exchange of money, employment, goods or services for sex.
- Become involved in sexual liaisons that could affect our impartiality or the well-being of others.
- Be abusive or uncivil to any member of the public.
- Willfully damage or misuse any United Nations property or equipment.
- Use a vehicle improperly or without authorization.



- Collect unauthorized souvenirs.
- Participate in any illegal activities, corrupt or improper practices.
- Attempt to use our positions for personal advantage, to make false claims or accept benefits to which we are not entitled.

We realize that the consequences of failure to act within these guidelines may:

- Erode confidence and trust in the United Nations.
- · Jeopardize the achievement of the mission.
- Jeopardize our status and security as peacekeeping personnel and;
- Result in administrative, disciplinary or criminal action.





Annex: B

(Refers to Vol. I, Chapter 2, Section 2.16, p. 30)

CONDUCT AND DISCIPLINE

1. General.

TCCs have undertaken to ensure that, without prejudice to their national laws, all members of their "National Contingent" comply with the UN standards of conduct. The existing UN SOP on implementation of amendments on conduct and discipline in the MOU between the UN and TCCs, dated 1 March 2011, approved by USGs DPKO/DFS read in conjunction with the MOU (Refer Chapter 9, Article 7 of the COE Manual 2011) between the TCC and the UN, which provides clear guidelines as to how the conduct and discipline issues of contingent members have to be processed or dealt with.

Therefore, it is extremely important for a Battalion Commander that he/she is aware of the relevant rules and regulations/procedures so that the cases of his/her unit personnel could be finalized expeditiously as per existing legal frame work. There might be a situation wherein the Battalion Commander, in a specific mission, besides being a unit commander, may also be the most senior officer, deployed by a TCC. Therefore, he/she should also remain current about the legal obligations, required to be fulfilled by the commander of the national contingent in a UN field mission.

2. Purpose.

The purpose of this Annex is to describe conduct and discipline as a command responsibility with guidelines on specific considerations, actions to be taken, conducting investigation, reporting and taking appropriate action by the Battalion Commanders.

3. Considerations for Infantry Battalion Commander/ Contingent Commander.

 The UN Infantry Battalion Commander/national contingent commander is responsible for the discipline and good order of all members of the contingent. He/she has to regularly inform the HoMC, inter alia, of all acts of alleged misconduct or serious misconduct, as well as any serious matter



involving the discipline and good order of members of his/her national contingent. He/she also have to regularly inform the HOMC of actions taken to prevent and, in accordance with their applicable national laws, any action taken to respond to misconduct or serious misconduct.

- He/she is expected to cooperate with the mission to ensure that all members of the national contingent receive induction and other mandatory training. Guidance from mission Conduct and Discipline Teams (CDTs) will be important in connection with conduct and disciplinary matters/training.
- Members of the military contingent are subject to the exclusive jurisdiction mission of their TCC's national laws, including the military law, in respect of any crimes or offences that might be committed by them while they are assigned to the military component of United Nations peacekeeping.
- TCCs have the primary responsibility for investigating any acts of misconduct or serious misconduct committed by a member of their national contingents. Such investigation must be conducted in accordance with the provisions of the MOU between the UN and TCCs. However, in a specific situation where the administrative investigation is conducted by the UN as provided for in the existing rules, the commander of the national contingent shall, subject to his/her national laws, cooperate fully in UN administrative investigation.
- If a UN administrative investigation or the TCC investigation concludes regarding suspicions of failure on the part of a Battalion Commander/ contingent commander to cooperate with a UN investigation, or to exercise effective command and control or to immediately report to appropriate authorities or to take action in respect of allegation of misconduct that are reported to him/her, DFS will request that the concerned TCC bring the case to the attention of the TCCs appropriate authorities for due action. Such matters shall also be reflected in a Battalion Commander/contingent commander's performance appraisal by the HOMC.

4. Actions on Receipt of Information About Misconduct/ Serious Misconduct.

- Information concerning alleged misconduct or serious misconduct may be received by Mission, TCC or the UN HQ.
- Any information received by the Battalion/Contingent Commander must be immediately brought to the attention of the HoMC.



- On receiving the information concerning the alleged misconduct/serious misconduct, the HOMC communicates the same to HOM and the mission's CDT. The mission informs UNHQ (CDU/DFS, OMA and Office of the Internal Oversight service (OIOS) as appropriate).
- CDTs, with the assistance from OIOS, determine if the allegation is to be qualified as misconduct or serious misconduct.
- UN HQ (CDU/DFS) notifies the TCCs concerned through the Permanent Mission.
- In a situation when the TCC firstly receives the alleged information about misconduct/serious misconduct of any of its contingent member(s), UN HQ (CDU/DFS) is to be notified by the TCC accordingly.

5. Safeguarding Evidence and Fact-Finding.

- On occurrence, personnel dealing with the issue shall ensure that evidence, such as, blood and semen samples, that could otherwise be lost due to the passage of time, mishandling, improper collection or storage, may obtain, keep, record and preserve the evidence. This includes the making of a photographic record of locations where the incident is alleged to have taken place and the recording of identification details for potential witnesses. This inquiry may involve collection of written statements but it will not normally include interviewing of witnesses/involved persons.
- Keeping in view the nature of a case and the available evidence, if it is
 determined that serious misconduct, on the part of a contingent member, has taken place and the TCC concerned, despite being notified, does
 not conduct fact-finding inquiry, OIOS will determine whether there is a
 need to conduct a preliminary fact-finding inquiry as per existing rules.
- OIOS may conduct the fact-finding inquiry itself or refer the matter to HOM for such inquiry through appropriate personnel, notably the FMP. However, this preliminary fact-finding inquiry shall include a representative of the concerned TCC, as designated by commander of the national contingent.
- Where the preliminary fact-finding inquiry is carried out by OIOS, it will
 forward its completed report to the USG/DFS with copy to concerned
 field mission. HOM forwards original copy of the report to UN HQ (CDU/



DFS). USG/DFS forwards all reports of fact-finding inquiries to the PM of the TCC concerned.

6. Investigation.

In addition to notifying the TCC of all allegations of misconduct and serious misconduct for which prima facie grounds are found to exist, the UN will request the TCC to deploy a "National Investigation Officer" (NIO) to conduct an investigation in high risk, complex matters and in cases of serious misconduct, and will request that the investigation be conducted in cooperation with OIOS. This request shall be made without prejudice to the sovereign right of the TCC to investigate any misconduct by its contingent member(s).

Investigation by TCC.

- When a TCC is notified by the UN about an alleged serious misconduct case and requested to appoint a NIO, TCC has ten working days to inform DFS that it will start its own investigation. On receiving feedback from TCC, DFS will inform OIOS and the field mission about the decision of TCC concerned.
- Where a TCC has been notified by the UN about an alleged misconduct for which the UN has not requested the appointment of NIO, the mission CDT will refer the matter, through HOMC, for investigation by the national contingent with the assistance of appropriate personnel in concerned mission, notably the FMP.
- Where investigations are conducted by TCC, the role of UN investigation personnel will be to assist the NIO(s) as necessary.

Investigation by the UN.

- Where a TCC decides not to conduct an investigation or where a TCC fails to respond to a notification within ten (10) working days, the UN may proceed to carry out its administrative investigation as per existing rules and procedure. USG/DFS will immediately inform the PM of the TCC and OIOS.
- In the conduct of UN investigation, full respect shall be given to the legal rights that are provided to the accused (contingent member) under national/international laws. In serious misconduct cases, OIOS may either carry out an administrative investigation itself or refer the case to



the concerned mission for conducting such investigation by appropriate personnel, notably by FMP. A representative of the national contingent may be part of any team carrying out administrative investigation, where such a representative is provided by the concerned contingent.

Forwarding of Investigation Reports.

- Where an investigation is carried out by a national contingent or appropriate personnel in the field mission and the report approved by the HOMC, the mission's CDT assists the HOM in reviewing/making recommendations on the report. Finally, the report along with such recommendations is forwarded to UN HQ (CDU/DFS), OIOS as appropriate.
- Where an investigation is carried out by OIOS, it will forward its report to the USG/DFS, with a copy to the concerned HOM. A copy of all reports will also be entered in Misconduct Tracking System (MTS) by CDTs or CDU/DFS, as appropriate.

7. Reporting.

- Provision of report to the UN.
 - Subject to their national laws, TCCs have undertaken to provide the UN with the findings of investigation conducted by their national authorities, including NIOs.
 - * DFS will request the TCC for provision of such investigation reports.
- Provision of report to the TCC. In cases where a UN administrative investigation is conducted, the USG/DFS will provide the PM of the concerned TCC with the findings of, and any evidence gathered in the course of investigation, together with a request that it provide information to DFS on any actions that the national authorities may have taken as a result of the report.

8. Repatriation.

Repatriation of the involved person(s) must be carried out as per existing SOP. The decision to repatriate a member of a national contingent on disciplinary grounds, in all cases, shall be communicated to the mission by the DFS, following approval by OMA/DPKO and based on the recommendation of the HOM.



Annex C

(Refers to Vol. I, Chapter 3, Section 3.6, p. 50)

MODEL RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

Purpose

The purpose of this Annex is to lay out a model ROE to describe UN peace-keeping specific engagement rules as applicable to the Military Component.

Introduction

This document, including all of its Annexes (A–E), constitutes the entire Rules of Engagement (ROE) for the United Nations Organization Mission in Country XX. This document provides the authority for the use of force and explains policy, principles, responsibilities and definitions of the ROE. These ROE are directions to operational commanders, which delineate the parameters within which force may be used by designated United Nations personnel during the UN peacekeeping operation in Country XX. They are founded on Security Council resolution number-----. Where issued as prohibitions, they are orders not to take specific actions. Where issued as permissions, they are the authority for commanders to take certain specific actions if they are judged necessary to achieve the aim of the Mission. While remaining predominantly defensive in nature, the ROE allow for offensive action, if necessary, in order to ensure the implementation of the tasks assigned to Mission XX military component. The ROE also provide definitions of the circumstances in which the use of force by Mission XX military personnel may be justified. In addition to the main document, the key elements are attached as follows:

- 1. Annex A Authorised Numbered ROE for MISSION XX.
- 2. Annex B Definitions.
- 3. Annex C Supporting directions and procedures, including those for challenging, warning shots, search and apprehension.
- 4. Annex D Weapon States.
- 5. Annex E Aide-mémoire.



Authority

The powers and authority of Mission XX are provided for in Security Council resolution Number -----, and all subsequent resolutions of the Security Council on Mission XX. They must be exercised in a manner consistent with Mission XX Mandate.

Mission

relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions that set out the circumstances in which force may be used by Mission XX to implement its mandate are set out in annex A – "Authorised Numbered ROE for MISSION XX."

Execution of ROE

Principles

- 1. General.
- (a) The conduct of MISSION XX military operations is controlled by the provisions of international law.
- (b) Mission XX military personnel must operate within the framework of this document, which has been formulated in accordance with the parameters set out in Security Council resolution Number ------
- (c) Mission XX ROE provide direction to commanders at all levels, governing the use of force within the Mission Area. They define the degree of force that may be used and the manner in which it may be applied. They are designed to ensure that the application of force is controlled and legal. The ROE inform commanders of the constraints imposed and the degrees of freedom they have, in the course of carrying out their mission.
- (d) The ROE are to be translated in a clear and concise way into the language(s) of each participating nationality. Throughout the conduct of military operations, where armed force is to be used, Mission XX military personnel must comply with the international legal principles of proportionality, the minimum use of force and the requirement to minimise the potential for collateral damage.
- (e) While the ROE may restrict the manoeuvre and operation of specific weapons systems, they do not describe specific doctrine, tactics and procedures; or address safety-related restrictions.



- 2. International Law, including Law of Armed Conflict. MISSION XX military personnel are required to comply with International Law, including the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC), and to apply the ROE in accordance with those laws.
- 3. Self-Defence.
- (a) Nothing in these ROE negates a Commander's right and obligation to take all necessary and appropriate action for self-defence. All personnel may exercise the inherent right of self-defence.
- (b) Pre-emptive self-defence against an anticipated attack must be supported by credible evidence or information that justifies a reasonable belief that hostile units or persons are about to attack.
- (c) Self-defence against a hostile force(s) may be exercised by individuals or by individual units that are under attack or in danger of being attacked, as well as by other UN forces that are able to assist those individuals or individual units. Potentially hostile forces which are beyond the range of their known weapon systems or which are not closing on friendly forces are not to be attacked without authority from a superior commander or clear and credible evidence or information that justifies a reasonable belief that a hostile act from those forces is imminent.
- 4. **Military Necessity**. The principle of military necessity authorizes the use of only that force which is required to accomplish the authorized objective. Military necessity does not and cannot authorize acts that are otherwise prohibited under international law, including the law of armed conflict.
- 5. Alternatives to the Use of Force. Whenever the operational situation permits, every reasonable effort must be made to resolve a potentially hostile confrontation by means other than the use of force (e.g., through negotiations or assistance from the local authorities).
- 6. **Duty to Challenge and Warn**. Before resorting to the use of force, every reasonable step must be taken to deter a party(s) or person from committing a hostile act. The procedure required by the UN to challenge and warn is given at Annex C.
- 7. **Duty to Identify Target Observe Fire**. Assured identification of hostile forces prior to engagement is required. Unobserved indirect fire is prohibited. Firing procedures are given at Annex C.



8. Duty to Use Minimum and Proportional Force.

- (a) Any force used must be limited, in its intensity and duration, to that which is necessary to achieve the authorized objective. In some circumstances, operational urgency may dictate the immediate use of deadly force.
- (b) The use of force must be commensurate with the level of the threat. However, the level of response may have to be higher than the level of the threat in order to minimise UN casualties and civilian casualties.
- (c) Commanders should, where appropriate, consider the use of alternatives to the use of physical force, such as, deception, psychological methods, negotiation and other non-lethal means, including the deployment or manoeuvre of larger forces in order to demonstrate resolve.
- 9. **Avoidance of Collateral Damage**. When force is used, all feasible precautions are to be taken with a view to avoiding and in any event to minimizing, collateral damage.
- 10. **Duty to Report**. Each and every confrontation resulting in a detention, or involving the use of deadly force, is to be reported through the chain of command as soon as possible, whether it results in casualties or not. More details are contained in Annex C.
- 11. **Right to Maintain Position**. MISSION X military personnel may maintain their position and equipment when confronted with a hostile act or intent. In such circumstances, they may also use necessary force, as authorised in these ROE.

12. Use of Force Beyond Self-Defence.

- (a) Use of force beyond self-defence may only be applied in the circumstances set out in paragraph 2 of Annex A of these ROE and is subject to the conditions set out in these ROE.
- (b) The Force Commander, or the commander to whom the authorisation has been delegated, retains direct control over the use of force in these circumstances.

Applicability. The ROE set out in this document apply to all military personnel assigned to the military component of MISSION XX as authorised by the Security Council.

Responsibility of Force Commander and Subordinate Commanders

1. The implementation of these ROE is a command responsibility. These ROE are addressed to the Force Commander, who is then responsible for issuing them to all subordinate commanders.



- 2. The Force Commander and his/her subordinate commanders are not permitted to exceed these ROE, but may, when and as appropriate, authorise more restrictive limits on the actions of assigned forces, subject to United Nations Headquarters (UN HQ) approval. A commander may issue these ROE as received from UN HQ, may add additional guidance or amplification, or may incorporate them into appropriate orders or instructions.
- 3. All commanders have an obligation to seek clarification if these ROE are considered to be unclear or inappropriate for the military situation.
- 4. It is the responsibility of the commanders of all national contingents to ensure that all those under their command understand these ROE. To assist in this process, they must issue a ROE Aide-Mémoire (Blue Card), translated into the language(s) appropriate for their own contingent, to each individual under their command. This must be done before the contingent can be considered to be fully operational.
- 5. Training in the application of these ROE is the responsibility of commanders at all levels. ROE training sessions should be conducted on a regular basis and, at a minimum, once per month and whenever MISSION X military personnel, including individual replacements or reinforcements as authorised by the Security Council, are deployed into the Mission Area.

ROE Contravention. The following procedures apply in dealing with ROE contravention:

- 1. Any ROE contravention is to be reported to DPKO at UN HQ through the UN chain of command, by the quickest possible means.
- 2. Flanking and subordinate commands should be informed, if the consequences are likely to affect them.
- 3. Remedial measures, including training, should be taken in order to avoid reoccurrence.
- 4. Any contravention must be subject to a formal investigation. The Force Commander is to convene a board of inquiry (BOI), which is to forward its findings to the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations as soon as possible.

Security Classification. The ROE should be classified as **CONFIDENTIAL**. **ROE Changes**. These ROE can only be amended or changed with the authority of the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations.

Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations



Annex A (Mission XX ROE)

RULES OF ENGAGEMENT FOR MISSION XX AUTHORIZED NUMBERED RULES SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION

1. The mandate of the United Nations Mission in the Country XX (Mission XX) is set out in Security Council resolution Number ------.

AUTHORIZATION TO USE FORCE

- 2. Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, the Security Council has authorized MISSION XX to use all necessary means, within the limits of its capacity and in the areas where its units are deployed, to carry out the following tasks:
- (a) xxxx
- (b) xxxx

SPECIFIC RULES OF ENGAGEMENT FOR MISSION XX

- 3. The following ROE have been authorized for use by armed personnel serving in Mission XX:
- Rule 1 Level of Force

Use of force, up to and including deadly force, is authorized:

Use of force, excluding deadly force, is authorized:

- Rule 2 Use of Weapon Systems
- Rule 3 Authority to Carry and Deploy Weapons
- Rule 4 Authority to Detain, Search and Disarm
- **Rule 5** Duty to Release or Hand-over Detained Persons to Appropriate Authorities



Annex B (Mission XX ROE)

RULES OF ENGAGEMENT FOR MISSION XX: DEFINITIONS

- 1. **Civil Unrest.**
- 2. Collateral Damage.
- Cordon.
- 4. **Force.**
 - (a) Armed Force.
 - (b) Deadly Force.
 - (c) Minimum Force.
 - (d) Unarmed Force.
- 5. **Hostile Act.**
- 6. **Hostile Intent.**
- 7. **Loaded Weapon**.
- 8. Persons under the Protection of MISSION X.
- 9. **Positive Identification**.
- 10. **Pre-emptive Self-Defence**.
- 11. **Proportionality**.
- 12. Reasonable Belief.
- 13. Self-Defence.
- 14. UN Personnel.
- 15. Warning Shots.



Annex C (Mission XX ROE)

RULES OF ENGAGEMENT FOR MISSION XX SUPPORTING DIRECTIONS AND PROCEDURES

GENERAL

- 1. Identification.
- 2. Civil Action.
 - (a) xxxx
 - (b) Prohibitions.
- 3. Weapons/Weapon Systems Restrictions.

Serial	Weapons/Weapon Systems/Targets	Release Authority	Lowest Level of
			Delegation

4. xxxx

WARNING PROCEDURES

- General.
- 6. **Graduation**.
 - (a) Verbal Negotiation and/or Visual Demonstration.
 - (b) Unarmed Force.
 - (c) Charge Weapons.
 - (d) Warning Shots.
 - (e) Armed Force.
- 7. **Opening Fire without Warning**.

FIRING PROCEDURES

- 8. Warning Procedure.
- 9. **Procedures during Firing**.
- 10. **Procedures after Firing**.
 - (a) Medical Assistance.
 - (b) Recording.
 - (c) Reporting.

SEARCH AND APPREHENSION PROCEDURES

- 11. Authority to Stop and Search.
- 12. Search Procedure.
- 13. **Authority to Apprehend**.
- 14. **Detention procedures.**



Annex D (Mission XX ROE)

RULES OF ENGAGEMENT FOR MISSION XX: WEAPON STATES

ROLLS OF LINGAGEMENT FOR MISSION AX. WEAF	JIN STATES
General.	
Graduated Weapon States.	

Annex E (Mission XX ROE)

RULES OF ENGAGEMENT FOR "MISSION XX" TROOPS : AIDE-MEMOIRE

General Rules for Use of Force:

- 1. xxxx
- 2. xxxx

SPECIFIC RULES FOR USE OF FORCE

You are authorized to use force, up to and including deadly force:

XXXX



Annex D

(Refers to Vol. I, Chapter 3, Section 3.3, p. 48)

DEPARTMENT OF PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS AND OFFICE OF MILITARY AFFAIRS

General.

1. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) provides political and executive direction to UN Peacekeeping operations around the world and maintains contact with the Security Council, troop and financial contributors, and parties to the conflict in the implementation of Security Council mandates. The Department works to integrate the efforts of UN, governmental and non-governmental entities in the context of peacekeeping operations. DPKO also provides guidance and support on military, police, mine action and other relevant issues to other UN political and peacebuilding missions. The Under-Secretary-General for the Department of Peacekeeping Operations is Mr. Hervé Ladsous.

Purpose.

2. The purpose of this Annex is to highlight the role, responsibilities, and main entities of DPKO and OMA to develop a general understanding of the strategic structure and command and control mechanisms at UNHQ level.

Main Offices/Divisions of DPKO.

- 3. The four main entities of the DPKO are:
- 3.1: Office of Operations (OO). The main role of the Office of Operations is to provide political and strategic policy and operational guidance and support to the missions. The OO is regionally organized and the cross-cutting management of missions is carried out in an integrated way, via Integrated Operational Teams (IOTs) in which all relevant functionalities (political, military, police, logistics, etc.) are included. The military input is provided through Military Liaison Officers (MLOs) representing the Military Adviser. The Assistant Secretary-General (ASG) of Office of Operations also acts as Deputy Head of DPKO.




- 3.2: Office of the Rule of Law and Security Institutions. The Office of the Rule of Law and Security Institutions (OROLSI) was established in 2007 to strengthen the links and coordinate the Department's activities in the areas of police, justice and corrections, mine action, the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants and security sector reform.
- 3.3: Office of Military Affairs. The Office of Military Affairs (OMA) is responsible for deploying the most appropriate military capability in support of United Nations objectives; and to enhance performance and improve the efficiency and the effectiveness of military components in United Nations Peacekeeping missions. It coordinates with IOT of OO for military related matters.
- 3.4: Policy, Evaluation and Training Division. The Division of Policy, Evaluation and Training (DPET) provides an integrated capacity to develop and disseminate policy and doctrine; to develop, coordinate and deliver standardized training; to evaluate mission progress towards mandate implementation; and to develop policies and operational frameworks for strategic cooperation with various UN and external partners.

Office of Military Affairs (OMA).

- 4. Overview. The OMA is the principle arm of DPKO for military matters. OMA is headed by an Assistant Secretary-General, a serving military officer with the rank of Lieutenant General as Military Adviser (MILAD). OMA includes the Military Adviser, the Deputy Military Adviser, the Chief of Staff and a number of seconded officers (currently 116 in total) and civilian staff. The key responsibilities of OMA are:
- Advise UN leadership, missions and member states and troop contributing countries on all military issues.
- · Identify required military capabilities.
- Generate adequate military capabilities.
- Monitor and provide oversight of current operations and UN HQ crisis response.
- Coordinate with regional and sub-regional organizations, and UN Agenices, Funds and Programmes.
- Contribute to UN HQ crisis response.
- Develop/integrate peacekeeping operations policies and doctrines as applicable to Military Component.
- Provide military strategic assessments and maintain information database.



5. DPKO Organizational Structure.






6. The Command and Control and Reporting Lines.

The command and control arrangements within the UN HQ and with a field mission are depicted below.

New York





Annex E

(Refers to Vol. I, Chapter 4, Section 4.5.3, p. 74)

OPERATIONS CENTRE

Purpose.

1. The operational constraints of peacekeeping environment in terms of new terrain, presence of multiple actors, sensitivity in public interaction, need for mature and calibrated response, unpredictable safety and security situations and the fact that a single negative incident could have wide ramifications to the peace process, entails maintaining effective command and control of activities by the commanders at all levels. Therefore, it is an imperative to establish an Operations Centre both at the battalion and company levels to monitor, coordinate and control all activities and responses for the execution of Mission Essential Tasks (MET) and logistics sustenance of the battalion.

Configuration and Set Up.

- 2. **General**. An Operations Centre is a Command, Control, Communication and Information centre designed to ensure coordination, integration and timely passage of information and orders in accordance with operational plans and commander's intention. Infantry Battalions are expected to establish Operations Centre at the Battalion HQ and in all the COBs. In addition, the battalion HQ and companies should have mobile command posts based on APCs and/or trucks to coordinate and control operations in close proximity with the troops on ground as per situational requirements.
- 3. **Battalion Operations Centre (BOC)**. The BOC will function under a dedicated Operation Centre Officer assisted by one Warrant Officer and four NCOs and two signal personnel. The BOC should have the following arrangements for effective functioning:
- Maps and Satellite Imageries. (Situation Maps, Situational Awareness and Information Map, Operations Map, CIMIC Map, Working Map, sketches/ enlargements, Air Photos and Satellite Imageries).
- Operational plans, patrolling plans, schedule of events, information collection plan, etc.



- Electronic GPS Tracking System to monitor movements of all elements of the battalion.
- Video Tele-Conferencing (VTC) Facility.
- A forward, rear and lateral voice and data communication link with redundancy.
- Hotline Communication to next higher HQ, the Company Operations Centres (COC) and neighbouring contingents using existing communication mediums.
- 4. **Company Operations Centre (COC)**. The COC will function under a dedicated Company Operation Centre Officer assisted by six NCOs. The COC should have the following arrangements for effective functioning:
- Maps and Satellite Imageries. (Situation Maps, Terrain Map, Situational Awareness and Information Map, Operations Map, CIMIC Map, Working Map, sketches/enlargements, Air Photos and Satellite Imageries).
- VTC Facility (where possible).
- Ground Surveillance Radar (to be used within the parameters laid down).
- A forward, rear and lateral voice and data communication link with redundancy.
- Hotline Communication to the Battalion Operations Centre using existing communication mediums (where possible).
- 5. **Joint Operations**. When conducting joint operations with police or other entities, a Joint HQ or control station will be established and colocated with the BOC/COC as the case may be.

Responsibilities.

6. The BOC and COCs must maintain utmost vigil at all times and are accountable for coordination and control of all activities and institute rapid responses in critical situations. Major responsibilities of the Operations Centre in a peacekeeping environment are:

Command and Control.

- * The BOC and COC will be under the direct supervision of XO/2IC and Company 2IC respectively.
- * The functional control at both levels will be maintained by the Operational Staff Section, which will be co-located with the BOC.



* Reporting to the higher HQ will take place both through the command and staff channel.

Readiness.

- * Maintain a 24/7 static Operations Centre at battalion and company levels.
- * Maintain Mobile Command Post at battalion and company levels.
- An Officer or a WO with minimum three NCOs will be manning the BOC and an Officer/WO with two NCOs will be manning COC at all times.
- * Ensure direct hotline communication and VTC with all commanders in the channel.

Routine.

- * Remain in radio contact and in listening watch with all operational and logistics elements to ensure immediate reporting of occurrence of incidents.
- * Receive and send messages and transmissions and maintain a message log.
- * Maintain liaison with neighbouring contingents and with the immediate UN higher HQ for coordination and control of activities.
- * Maintain contact with liaison officers and coordinate own actions.
- Provide situational updates and daily reports to the Operations Staff Section and the Battalion Commander.

Oversight.

- * Coordinate and monitor all operational and administrative movements in real time.
- * Monitor, coordinate and control MET/peacekeeping operations.
- Monitor progress and guide ongoing operations by passage of information simultaneously to commanders on ground and higher commanders.
- * Coordinate and control joint operations.
- * Monitor and coordinate helicopter movements for operational, administrative and MEDEVAC purposes.

Situational Awareness.

* Maintain peacekeeping information databank.



- * Act as an information collection, processing and sharing/dissemination hub.
- * Monitor UAV employment and processing of information.
- * Coordinate with COC in analysing inputs from GS Radar data inputs.

Response.

- * Ensure readiness of QRF and QRT as per SOP at all times.
- * Alert all COBs, TOBs, operational elements operating outside the static bases and other routine columns on occurrence of any incident and coordinate their movement/employment as per planned response.
- * Coordinate and control employment of QRF/QRT as proactive deployment or as reinforcements.
- * Monitor critical situations and develop appropriate responses within the battalion resources and the mission resources (force multipliers and reserves, etc.).
- * Ensure recreation of reserves once existing reserves are committed.
- * Assist Chain of Command in exercising operational coordination and control.

Integration.

7. The BOC will be integrated with the JOC/Operations Staff at the Sector/Brigade HQ through VTC and hotline communication systems. The Mission JOC and JMAC will also have a direct access up to the COC during critical times as laid down by the respective mission leadership.



Annex F

(Refers to Vol. I, Chapter 8, Section 8.3.4, p. 134)

NEGOTIATIONS

General.

- 1. The goal of negotiation and mediation in the context of peacekeeping operations are to bring parties together in order to reach agreements to which all parties have concurred in order to de-escalate and resolve conflicts. Negotiations are an integral aspect of all operations conducted by the battalion. Negotiations occur throughout the course of each day of deployment at all levels of the command. It is therefore essential that all battalion personnel involved in negotiations understand negotiation goals and techniques. Mediation is a part of negotiation whereby battalion personnel act as neutral go betweens to facilitate communication between two or more opposing parties. Negotiation and mediation may be conducted independently but more normally as an adjunct to other conflict resolution activities.
- 2. Negotiation and mediation may be conducted as part of a deliberate process or as an immediate response to a life-threatening incident. In these cases, it is important to remember that the negotiator representing the battalion may be perceived as part of the problem. In all cases, it is vital that battalion negotiators identify who key leaders are in any party, the goals of these individuals or groups, and the topics and rewards which can lead to agreement or alternatively disagreement. The battalion should ensure that the security of all parties involved in negotiations with the battalion is provided with security en route to, during, and after negotiations.

Purpose.

3. The purpose of this Annex is to describe the importance and the modalities of conducting negotiation and mediation by the battalion peacekeepers in the mission area.



Negotiation Categories.

- 4. **Support to Humanitarian Assistance**. Battalion negotiators may be called upon to assist other representatives of the UN or humanitarian agencies in order to establish access to assess humanitarian assistance resources. In this case, negotiations can include a variety of actors to include but limited to representatives of the host government, local military or police leaders, civic leaders, businessmen, and religious leaders. Such agreements should make decisions on methods of supply and distribution of humanitarian supplies with all parties along the distribution route that can impact on the ability of providers to distribute aid.
- 5. **Support to Military Agreements**. Battalion personnel may have to negotiate the terms and conditions on which opposing parties in the battalion AOR will function in support of political or humanitarian agreements. Battalion negotiators involved with establishing and maintaining ceasefires may consist of three stages:
- Getting the parties to reach an internal political agreement that they want a ceasefire.
- Achieving a military agreement on how to conduct the ceasefire.
- Negotiating a workable implementation of the agreement on the ground.

Characteristics of Battalion Negotiators.

6. Important characteristics of battalion-level negotiators are:

- Negotiators should have the sufficient rank, status and credibility compared with the rest of the parties.
- Negotiators should be able to maintain rapport and regular liaison between all parties involved in negotiations.
- Negotiators should be trained in practices and methodologies necessary to ascertain what factors will lead to compromise and ultimate settlement of disputes.
- Battalion negotiators should always remain cognizant of UN goals for a negotiated settlement in their AOR.
- Battalion negotiators should remain impartial and not pick sides in a disagreement.



 Negotiators should be trained and practiced in the use of interpreters and translators (see Annex G, Interpreters).

Guidelines.

- 7. There are no fixed principles for negotiation but there are several essential features of any negotiation that are useful guidelines for achieving results that can be further developed. These are:
- Impartiality. If parties believe a negotiator is no longer impartial, their trust, cooperation, and open-hearted relationship will be lost and negotiations probably will be unsuccessful.
- Long-Term View. Negotiators should recognize that it takes time to change from opposing positions to common ground and to establish a culture of negotiations in which the parties become used to meeting and solving small problems together in preparation for handling crises and tackling larger problems. A short-term negotiating success, won by conceding an apparently small point, may be damaging and set a longterm precedent.
- Imagination. Imagination and lateral approaches are vital for the identification of common ground between the parties, development of incentives and disincentives, and finding ways to overcome the many barriers in conducting successful negotiations.
- Acting with Determination. The parties will have more at stake and may have fewer constraints on their actions than negotiators from the international community. Faced with parties under emotional pressure, the negotiator or representative should also be prepared to act with determination.
- **Cultural Awareness.** Negotiators should be aware of how cultural issues may inflict on their negotiations.
- Human Rights. If involved, commanders and staff of the battalion must ensure that peace negotiations, peace agreements and their implementation take into account and incorporate human rights standards such as the non acceptance of blank amnesties.

Process.

8. **General**. The selection of individuals, or groups of individuals, who are acceptable to the parties, is fundamental to the successful conduct of



negotiations. There are three essential stages in the process of negotiation and mediation:

- (a) Stage 1 Preparation.
- (b) Stage 2 Conduct.
- (c) Stage 3 Follow-Up.
- 9. **Stage 1 Preparation**. A clear aim should be defined to determine what is to be achieved. This will take into account many factors including the objectives and capabilities of the belligerents as well as a realistic judgement of what is possible. In practice, the initial aim may be no more than to get competing factions to meet, and future objectives may be discussed and refined during subsequent meetings.

Specific preparations will include researching the background, history and status of the issue to be discussed to help the negotiator or mediator to identify those arguments that the belligerent parties may employ. Identification of options, limitations, minimum requirements, areas of common interest, and possible compromises are essential. The negotiator has to be clear on those points that should be won or protected and those that may be used as bargaining chips. If possible, a thorough study of the participants who will attend the meeting should be made. This should include their cultural origin, personality, authority, influence, habits and attitudes. If hosting the meeting, specific arrangements should take account of the following:

- Location. In the conduct of formal negotiations or mediation the site should be secure and neutral. Other important considerations of the location are accessibility, communications and comfort. In the control of an incident those persons relevant to defusing the problem should be identified and persuaded to conduct negotiations away from those more immediately involved in the incident.
- Administration. Administrative organization should include such items
 as arrival and departure arrangements, and the provision of parking,
 communications, meals and refreshment. The meeting should have an
 agenda, a seating plan and note-takers, perhaps supplemented with
 interpreters and other advisers on specialist subjects. Separate rooms
 will probably be required by each party to allow them to confer in private. Amenities such as drinks and food that participants are comfortable with should be provided to participants before, during, and after the



- negotiations as parties may have travelled far under harsh conditions to get to the negotiations.
- Attendance. Attendance should be at an appropriate and equal rank level. Offence may be caused if senior representatives from one faction are required to meet with junior representatives from another. To avoid unmanageable numbers attending, the size of each party should, where possible, be agreed upon beforehand. A policy on the carriage of weapons and protection teams should be announced in advance.
- 10. **Stage 2 Conduct**. In mediations the PSF force representative will act as a go-between to the parties of the conflict. In negotiations the PSF representative will act as an interest holder. The first item on any agenda should be for the participants to agree upon the purpose of the meeting. If hosting the occasion, the PSF representative should offer the customary salutations and exchange of courtesy and to ensure that all parties are identified and have been introduced to each other. Refreshments should normally be offered or received. Introductory small talk is essential to make the participants feel more at ease. Some basic guidelines for conducting negotiations are as follows:
- Preserve Options. The opposing sides should be encouraged to give their views first. This will enable the negotiator to re-assess the viability of his/her position. If possible, he should avoid taking an immediate stand and he should never make promises.
- Restraint and Control. Belligerent parties are often deliberately inflexible. They may distort information and introduce false problems to distract attention from discussions that might embarrass them. Visible frustration, impatience, a patronizing manner, or anger at such may undermine the negotiator's position. Loss of face is likely to increase the belligerence of faction leaders. Wherever possible, respect should be shown for the negotiating positions of other parties. Speakers should not be interrupted; unless incorrect information and matters of principle are to be corrected, with appropriate evidence. Facts should take preference over opinions. Whilst remaining impartial, the negotiations should be conducted in a firm, fair and friendly manner. Don't give any information about the opposite side, which can be of value to the counterpart. Always be restrained if the counterpart expresses anything about battalion peacekeepers or the morale, methods, politics of the opposite side, etc. Try to get the counterpart to accept a possible solution.



- Argument. If necessary, the negotiator should remind participants of previous agreements, arrangements, accepted practices and their own pronouncements. However, this should be done tactfully and accurately with regard to facts and detail.
- Compromise. Partial agreement or areas of consensus should be carefully explored for compromise solutions. Related common interests may offer answers to seemingly intractable differences.
- Linkage. Linkage is the connecting of aims to each other. For example, making the achievement of one aim a precondition to achieving another.
- Summary. Negotiation and mediation should be finalized with a summary of what has been resolved. The summary has to be agreed upon by all participants and, if possible, written down and signed by each party. Time and place for further negotiation should also be agreed upon. The outcome and the process of the meeting should be handled with discretion.
- 11. **Stage 3 Follow-up.** Effective follow-up is as important as successful negotiation. Without a follow-up, achievements by negotiation or mediation could be lost. The outcome of the negotiations or mediation has to be promulgated to all interested parties. Background files should be updated with all relevant information, including personality profiles of the participants. Agreements have to be monitored, implemented or supervised as soon as possible.





Annex G

(Refers to Vol. I, Chapter 8, Section 8.3.4, p. 134)

INTERPRETERS

Introduction.

- 1. Interpreters are used to bridge the language barrier between the battalion and different groups of the local population in the AOR. Interpreters are a necessary force multiplier and an effective force protection aid when used efficiently. However, all battalion personnel must be able to speak in local language to warn/interact as per procedures and according to ROE. Interpreters are used to:
- Translate in negotiations between the battalion and local representatives at all levels.
- Support patrols, OP's and CP's with direct language translation capacity.
- Interpret local media sentiments toward Battalion presence and operations.

Purpose.

2. The purpose of this Annex is to describe how interpreters support battalion operations and how to best utilize interpreters.

General.

3. Usually a battalion will work in a foreign language environment which causes communications problems between the battalion personnel and the local population. In some cases, there may be more than one language or dialect used in the mission area. The battalion's ability to communicate with the local population is often a prerequisite for accomplishing battalion missions. This will be the case starting from the sentry who is approached by locals, bringing forwards all types of questions, all the way to the Battalion Commander who needs to negotiate with civilian and military leaders at his/her level. The only way to overcome this challenge is to use interpreters to assist in the communication. Battalions will either use military



or civilian interpreters from their TCC or locally employed interpreters, who should normally be contracted and provided by the Mission Management Support (MMS), according to operational needs.

Considerations.

- 4. TCC military or civilian interpreters are usually nationally trained and have proficiency with at least one language in the battalion AOR. Because of their TCC affiliation and trustworthiness, TCC interpreters should be used when sensitive issues are negotiated.
- Locally employed interpreters are locals with a high enough language proficiency in the battalion's language or a third language that battalion members and the local interpreter can communicate in. Local interpreters should be evaluated on a daily basis for their trustworthiness and the accuracy of their message. The battalion should also consider the safety of the local interpreter. Strong consideration should be given to the utilization of both male and female interpreters so that battalion personnel can engage with the local population. Local interpreter considerations include:
- How loyal is the local interpreter to battalion interests and personnel considering that the interpreter lives in the area and will continue to do so after the battalion repatriates. Is the interpreter likely to be pressured by other local citizens to provide information about the battalion to threats, criminals, and other entities?
- How will the battalion provide for the safety of the local interpreter if the interpreter is operating with the battalion under high threat conditions?
- How accurate are the translations of the interpreter? Does the interpreter
 misrepresent battalion communications to local actors? Is the interpreter
 impartial or does his/her interpretations pursue a personal agenda? Is
 such a level of risk or demonstrated poor performance acceptable to the
 battalion asset for whom the interpreter is working for?
- Is the interpreter acceptable to the local actor that a battalion member will talk to? Does the interpreter have the proper role and status in his/ her community to act as an interpreter for the battalion when dealing with high-level local personages? Is the interpreter of the right age, gender or sex to be a credible interpreter to a local party?



- What are the interests of the interpreter? Can battalion assets avoid becoming engaged with a personal or business (black market) relationship with the interpreter that may be looked upon unfavourably by the local community during and after the battalion's deployment? Will the close relationship between the interpreter and battalion personnel result in providing the interpreter with information to take advantage of or blackmail battalion personnel?
- Misbehaviour, lack of proficiency or trustworthiness, or other eventual failures of local contracted interpreters, should be reported for their eventual replacement.

Organization.

5. Interpreters should be available at all levels of the battalion organization. All patrols should have an interpreter and this could be a male or female interpreter or both depending on the goals of the patrol. All battalion installations should maintain interpreters. However, the battalion and companies should determine what access the interpreter is to have on battalion installations.

Guidelines in Employing Interpreters.

6. Important guidelines in employing interpreters are:

- Generally, as a best practice, talk directly to the party and not to the interpreter. Ideally, the interpreter can stand to the side and interpret so that he/she does not become the centre of the conversation.
- Be aware of the body language signals the party displays to the interpreter's interpretation. This can give the battalion member just as many clues about how successful his/her message is being received by the other party than the interpreter's translation.
- Ideally, rehearse with the interpreter the message to convey to the party in order to get the interpreter in the proper frame of mind and in order to work out culturally acceptable messages.
- Use short sentences. Don't expect a local interpreter to remember a paragraph or longer discourse from a battalion member or the party you are trying to communicate with.
- Ideally, review the results of the interpretation with the interpreter outside of the presence of the party. The interpreter can provide local insight



to hidden meanings and cultural contexts conveyed in messages that may not have been apparent during the actual conversation.

- Do not let the interpreter take charge of the conversation or meeting.
- Make sure that the interpreter and all parties are provided with amenities and breaks in order to establish and maintain rapport with all parties involved in the conversation. Refreshments go a long way to break down communication barriers and establish respect between all parties.





Annex H

(Refers to Vol. I, Chapter 8, Section 8.5.2, p. 145)

ICTD/DFS INFORMATION GUIDE

Introduction.

1. The Information and Communications Technology Division (ICTD) has overall responsibility and oversight for the provision of telecommunications and information technology services to all the Department of Field Support (DFS) supported field missions. This mandate is executed in the field missions by a Communications and Information Technology Section (CITS) headed by a chief, designated as the Chief Communications and Information Technology Section (CCITS). In some large Missions CITS is a Service and it is referred to as ICTS or CITS.

Purpose.

2. The purpose of this Annex is to provide an overview of the Information and Communications Technology (ICT) facilities and services provided to Troop Contributing Countries (TCC) by the United Nations (UN) in field missions. It also clarifies the roles and responsibilities of both the UN and the TCCs in the field.

Information Communications Technology Division Overview.

3. The Information and Communications Technology Division (ICTD) at UN HQ provides strategic direction, exercises oversight and takes policy decisions for ICT delivery in the field, aligned with the Secretary-General's vision and ICT strategies. ICTD carries out these functions by ensuring reliable and secure ICT communications support combined with IT Infrastructure and services to support field missions in their programme delivery. ICTD assists in supporting Command and Control capabilities for military and police contingents (mission HQs only). In addition, ICTD develops implements and supports IT applications/systems that are not provided through existing enterprise systems.



Memorandum Of Understanding.

4. MOU for ICT equipment and services falls under the umbrella of the overall MOU between the UN and TCCs. This MOU is a negotiated, formal agreement that establishes the responsibility and standards for the provision of personnel, major equipment and self-sustainment support services for both the UN and the contributing country. The MOU is signed between the TCCs and the UN prior to deployment.

Key Points:

- 5. The key points to be kept in mind are:
- Communications between UN HQ New York and the Mission HQ, also between Mission/Force HQ and the Sector/Battalion HQs, will be provided by the UN as United Nations-Owned Equipment (UNOE).
- The UN will also provide a telephone network, within the Mission HQ and down to Battalion HO level.
- The UN will provide communications down to individual force level, or independent subordinate units.
- The rear link communications from the UN mission to the TCC and internal and tactical communications within the battalion is its own responsibility.
- Battalion should deploy fully equipped with suitable equipment for internal communications and to establish telephone communications from the UN missions to their respective countries and for access to Email /Internet for personal or welfare purposes.
- However, based on exceptional circumstances, the mission may extend the PIN Code facility to TCC's for welfare calls only on a cash-recovery basis.

Scale of Issue.

6. There are stipulated scales of issue for UNOE which is issued to TCCs to achieve a seamless flow of communications between between various HQ, the battalion and its companies and other entities. Any other assistance outside the scale of issue will be deducted from the TCCs reimbursement on COE. It is important to note that the scale can change from mission to mission and can also vary depending on established operational requirements. For clarity, the approved ICTD/CITS ratio is as shown below:



Equipment	Infantry Battalion	Independent Company
Telephone lines	5	2
Telephone sets	5	2
Fax machine	1	1
Handheld radios	8	4
Equipment	Infantry Battalion	Independent Company
HF base station	2	2
VHF/UHF base station	2	2
HF mobile radio	4	2
VHF/UHF mobile radio	4	2
DC-DC converter	4	2
Satellite phone	1	1
Desktop computer	4	2
Desktop printer	4	2
Digital sender	1	1

Notes: At the start-up phase of the mission, contingents will be issued with one (01) satellite phone per contingent. Once the UN Private Telephone Network is established this satellite phone should be used for backup purposes only.

- Mobile radios are to be issued only in scenarios where UN vehicles are provided to the battalion or contingent-owned vehicles require mobile connectivity to the UN radio network for operational reasons such as ambulances, escorting vehicles and vehicle recovery.
- DC-DC converters are to be issued only if the mobile radios will be installed in contingent owned vehicles that operate with 24 volts.
- Clarity on ICT support and services available to peacekeeping battalions are contained in the United Nations Military Peacekeeping Battalion ICT Training Booklet.

Reference:

More information can be found in the division's website: http://ictd.dfs. un.org/P.s/Home.aspx

ICTD Services.


7. Below are some of the services ICTD at UN HQ delivers to field missions:





CITS Services.

8. The services CITS provides are dependent on the specific entitlements and operational requirements of the users. Milltary components have level services specifically defined in the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the United Nations and the TCC. Some of the services CITS provides to clients in field missions are:





Annex I

(Refers to Vol. I, Chapter 5, Section 5.3.3, p. 81)

UN HANDLING OF IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICES (IED)

Introduction.

1. In missions that have experienced armed conflict, the military contingents may be confronted with considerable quantities of landmines, Unexploded Ordnance (UXO) Improvised Explosive Devices (IED) and other Explosive Remnants of War (ERW) which are scattered around as a major safety hazard to civil population, live stock and the peacekeepers alike resulting into a large number of casualties. Particularly, the IEDs have become a deadly weapon of choice of asymmetric forces against UN peacekeeping forces as well as civilians. Therefore, UN Infantry Battalions should adapt the peacekeeping procedures and day to day activities to reflect the threat and ensure applying the basic safety and security principles to substantially reduce the risk of accidents involving mines/UXOs/IEDs.

Purpose.

2. This annex details how to prevent, detect, defeat and mitigate IED threats.

Improvised Explosive Device.

3. **Definition.** An IED is a device placed or fabricated in an improvised manner incorporating destructive, -lethal, noxious, pyrotechnic, or incendiary chemicals and designed to destroy, incapacitate, harass, or distract. It may incorporate military stores, but is normally devised from non-military components.

Prevention.

4. Prevention consists of measures and actions taken to lower the likelihood of an IED event occurring and affecting the United Nations and requires coordination across all levels of command.



- Information exchange and management consists of noting, collating, and reporting significant events which could increase the likelihood of an IED incident. Significant events can include, but are not limited to historical IED attacks, unsecured explosive remnants of war (ERW), manufacturing homemade explosives (HME), and comments made by local nationals regarding the targeting of peacekeeping personnel with IEDs.
- Information exchanged with peacekeeping personnel in the mission allows entities an opportunity to adjust accordingly field mission attitudes and procedures to reduce the likelihood and an IED incident.
- Travel and route planning consists of modifying the conditions of travel so as to fall outside a predictable pattern of travel. IED incidents generally require reconnaissance and preparation of an often-used route, in order to effectively engage peacekeeping personnel and property. Accordingly, changing travel routes, times of departure and vehicle types reduce the risk of IED incidents.
- Defensive measures consist of protection measures for lodging and work areas which discourage vehicle- and person-borne IED attacks. Barriers to entry consisting of large immovable objects (large landscaping boulders) placed appropriately around peacekeeping buildings provide significant barriers against vehicle-borne IEDs. Access control limits nonpeacekeeping access to peacekeeping facilities. Limits can discourage intended person-borne IED attacks through proper entry control procedures. Barriers to entry and access control discourage and reduce the likelihood of IED incidents.
- Security-awareness programmes consist of an all encompassing approach to reduce IED incidents. IED identification and awareness training, measuring the prevailing local attitude toward peacekeeping personnel and the historical use of IEDs in the area are examples of successful programmes. Security-awareness programmes encourage peacekeeping personnel to incorporate IED security into daily activities.

Preventive Actions:

- 5. Important preventive actions to be taken are as under:
- Avoid routine behaviour.
- If possible vary routes and timings.



- Calculate and plan according to threat assessments such as hotspot areas, entities, earlier incidents, possible targets, etc.
- Train procedures for action during discovery or attack with IEDs.
- Act vigilant and be aware of out of the ordinary behaviour and IED-linked indicators.
- Assume that all attacks with IEDs are followed up with ambushes or further IEDs.
- Keep a safe distance between vehicles in convoys.
- Adjust the speed of the vehicles according to the situation and threat assessment.
- Be aware of canalizing terrain.

Detection.

6. Close-range detection of IEDs remains the specialty of "high risk" search teams. However, the UN Infantry Battalion configuration and equipment profile is designed with basic functional "Counter IED" capability. In a UN peacekeeping context, it should be noted that the UN mine action teams, while undertaking de-mining or EOD activity, may detect and locate IEDs by chance, whether directed against them or not. Therefore, any peacekeeping strategy should address the problem of such 'chance' finds and put in place appropriate procedures for teams to follow, such as, marking, evacuation, cordoning and liaison with the IED-Defeat (IEDD) team when it arrives to undertake EOD action. Such action should be regarded as 'passive' and not be seen as an offensive EOD action.

Furthermore, a UN Infantry Battalion may be encountered with targeted IED threat, which requires maintenance of situational awareness, careful threat analysis and institution of preventive and defensive measures in the day to day conduct of peacekeeping operations.

Basic Techniques Employed by Aggressors When Using IED.

- 7. The following basic techniques are often used by aggressors:
- Canalize traffic or transports at road junctions, bridges, tunnels, other vehicles etc to lower the targets speed and increase the possibility of a hit.



- Open areas are easy for the aggressors to supervise which gives them warning time, opportunity to escape and hard-defined firing points.
- "Come on" technique by using objects, which drawss attention, and stop or trap targets to a specified kill zone.
- Booby-traps connected to different types of items/equipment.

IED Indications:

- 8. Indications of IEDs are the presence of abnormal activities and the absence of normal activities. IEDs are usually camouflaged as daily life items to be placed without attention. Examples include:
- Garbage bags and cardboard boxes on the road shoulders.
- Standing, broken or abandoned vehicles.
- Soft packs and cases.
- Holes in the road.
- Glass fiber models of natural objects as e.g. rocks.

IED-Defeat.

9. IED Defeat should be considered a component of EOD. IED Defeat operators are by extension EOD operators who have undergone specific selection and certified training to deal with the requirements of an IED Defeat task. It involves positive EOD actions against the IED or IED components once placed or found. These actions may include, but are not limited to, placing a disruptive charge, the use of cutting equipment or moving to a safe area for further action.

Mitigation.

10. Mitigation consists of detonation defensive measures such as blast/ballistic protection and standoff distance. These measures provide protection against IEDs should a detonation occur near UN peacekeeping personnel and facilities. Implementation of physical mitigation measures lowers the impact of an IED incident with the use of blast and ballistic protection and standoff distance.

Blast and Ballistic Protection. It provides security against the shock wave and flying fragmentation and debris from a detonation. Examples of blast



and ballistic protection include HESCO barriers, window laminates, and sandbags.

Standoff Distance. Standoff distance is a purposeful separation between the target of an IED incident and the IED that allow the effects of a detonation to dissipate before affecting peacekeeping personnel and facilities.

- Standoff distance for facilities can be accomplished with the use of barriers and traffic flow control to minimize vehicle access to buildings.
- Stand off distance for personnel can be accomplished by giving wide margin to suspect IED emplacements whether on foot or in a vehicle.
- The greatest protection that can be given to a static position is distance from the potential seat of any explosion. The most likely target area for an IED attack could be the entry and exit points, especially for vehicles, and visible vulnerable points such as headquarter buildings or helicopter lading sites that attract indirect fire. Therefore it is necessary to maintain a significant distance between vehicle search areas and the actual entry/exit point.
- Likewise, specific measures should be undertaken to protect vulnerable points, such as, safe havens' or bomb shelters and maintain sufficient distances from secondary hazard areas; for example ammunition or fuel storage areas.
- It is an imperative that vehicles in areas with a high IED threat, keep adequate distance from UN peacekeepers, facilities and critical infrastructure in a mission area.

Training.

- 11. Training encompasses all those measures that prepare a UN Infantry Battalion to conduct operations in an IED threat environment. These measures include detailed IED awareness training, preparation of documentation such as recognition handbooks, co-ordinated Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) to direct what actions to take in an IED environment and dissemination of lessons learned. The following points may be kept in mind while conducting training:
- The content of IED training for the UN Infantry Battalion has many of the same features, as that is provided for military personnel deploying to "high risk" areas.



- However, training in a UN peacekeeping context must focus on avoidance; that is the ability to use good information to predict what might happen next, feed this into the training process so that IED attack patterns can be recognized, areas or routes of highest risk identified and, in simple terms, the risk of personnel coming into contact with IEDs minimized.
- Training must be information and operations-driven. It is of little use to train personnel to avoid IEDs if there is no prediction of where or what perpetrators might use, no knowledge of IED sign or if methods of avoidance compromise operational effectiveness.
- Preparing for actions after an IED incident is critical to minimizing the
 effects of IEDs. Crisis action planning consists of post IED-attack actions,
 e.g., medical response, personnel evacuation, and immediate actions
 after attack.
- Planning for these actions prior to an IED attack allows UN peacekeeping personnel to prepare to limit the impact of an IED incident.
- Training measures also consist of rehearsing courses of action of IED response action developed in the crisis action response plans. Rehearsals of post-attack actions provide the battalion personnel the confidence and ability to respond to the post-attack chaos.
- Training is necessary to ensure timely medical response to injured personnel and actions that do not further put UN Infantry Battalion personnel and facilities at risk.
- Implementation of training measures minimises the effects of and IED incident.
- When stopping a vehicle define the area and begin the search of the area in a five meters radius visual before you stop. Begin with the ground and continue with higher levels. Continue to search a radius of 20 meters, first from distance and then in the terrain. Be aware of other threats, e.g. mines.



Annex J

(Refers to Vol. II, Chapter 2, Section 2.8.4, p. 99)

FIELD SANITATION, HYGIENE, ENVIRONMENTAL AND OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY

Introduction.

- 1. Training and enforcing compliance with preventive medicine measures (PMM) and environmental safety and occupational health (ESOH) measures in the battalion is a command responsibility. Preventive medicine incorporates medical screening, immunization, disease prophylaxis, vector control, hygiene and sanitation. ESOH incorporates stress management training and mitigation; driver training, safe driving, vehicle and equipment maintenance sight, hearing, and other physical protection measures from machinery, noise, and hazardous material; and protection from sexually transmitted disease.
- 2. Compliance with PMM and ESOH measures starts in predeployment training with thorough medical examinations of all battalion peacekeepers to ensure all soldiers are physically and mentally fit for deployment and that they are not carriers of pathogens that can infect fellow peacekeepers and the population in the deployment AOR. Training continues with the establishment of daily routines to prevent disease and non-battle injuries through the development of disciplined practices to maintain field hygiene, sanitation, environmental and occupational safety throughout the battalion's deployment and repatriation.
- 3. Battalion maintenance of field hygiene and sanitation as well as the proper application of occupational health safety standards in accordance with the UN environmental policy protects the local population and environment from degradation and disease due to peacekeeper negligence. Not protecting the local population and environment through adequate hygiene and sanitation control measures or through operational safety measures can have devastating effects on the local population. Such negative effects can adversely impact the UN mission and reputation in the battalion AOR and around the world.



Purpose.

4. This Annex is designed to provide guidance to individual peacekeepers, unit commanders, unit leaders, and those responsible in the battalion's health and welfare on applying unit-level Preventive Medicine Measures (PMM) and Environmental Safety and Occupational Health (ESOF) measures for the prevention of disease and Non-Battle Injuries (DNBI).

Medical Threat and Principles of PMM and ESOH Measures.

- **5. Medical and Occupational Safety threats.** The medical and occupational safety threats include:
- · Heat.
- Cold.
- Arthropods and other animals.
- Food- and water-borne diseases.
- Toxic chemicals/materials/waste.
- Noise.
- · Non-battle injury.
- Vehicle and machinery accidents.
- The unfit service peacekeeper.
- Lack of rest and recreation to combat stress and failure to recognize it in self and others.
- Alcohol and/or drug abuse.
- Sexually transmitted diseases.
- **6. Principles of PMM and ESOH Measures.** The PMM and ESOH measures include:
- Battalion Commander and key leaders identify potential health and welfare risks to personnel in the deployment AOR prior to deployment and throughout the deployment and then devise and implements mitigation strategies to overcome risks.
- Peacekeeper performs individual techniques of PMM and ESOH.
- Chain of command plans for and enforces PMM and ESOH.
- Responsible members of health and welfare teams (usually unit medical personnel) train peacekeepers in PMM and ESOH and advise the com-



mander and unit leaders on implementation of unit-level PMM ESOH prevention and treatment. Contact with the military component's environmental focal point has to be done to get related instructions.

- Battalion and company safety officers and senior personnel train and enforce proper use of safety equipment and clothing and the proper handling and maintenance of food, water, equipment and material (e.g., vehicles, machinery, weapons, waste, and chemicals).
- The Battalion Senior Medical Officer is typically delegated the responsibility for implementing PMM and ESOH measures with assistance and enforcement by battalion leaders. It is that senior medical officer's task to monitor immunization status of troops under their care, as well as to directly manage any required vaccination or disease prevention program. This includes the distribution of anti-malarial tablets, the establishment of an aggressive HIV prevention and containment programme, and health inspections of food, water and sanitation. In addition, they are responsible for health education and medical training, which is generally conducted by medical personnel they supervise.
- Failure to apply the principles of PMM and ESOH can result in mission failure, alienate or cause harm to the local population, or turn the local population against peacekeepers.

7. Preventive Medicine Measures.

7.1: Heat Injuries.

- Heat injuries include heat exhaustion, heatstroke, dehydration and sunburn which lead to reduced work performance, injury, death, and degraded mission capability.
- Methods to avoid heat injuries include acclimatization, the drinking of adequate amounts of potable water and protection from direct sun.
- Drinking adequate quantity of water is a must to prevent heat injury and soldiers should take every opportunity to fill canteens at every opportunity with treated water.
- The colour and volume of the urine stream is a good indicator of a soldier's hydration status. If a soldier's urine stream is dark yellow and the volume is small or if stools are hard and small than a soldier is not drinking enough water. Soldiers should drink enough water to maintain a clear or light yellow urine stream.



- Rest and eating adequate meals also mitigate heat casualties. Ensure that soldiers receive adequate nutrition and rest.
- Ensure that soldiers have adequate, clean, and well-ventilated clothing and sunscreen to combat heat injuries. However, when there is a threat from biting insects, soldiers should keep their shirtsleeves down and pants bloused inside boots.
- Regular laundering of soldier uniforms protects soldiers from environmental conditions and improves morale. Battalions in new operation bases without laundry facilities should supply soldiers with wash buckets, detergent, and laundry line for cleaning and drying clothing on at least a weekly basis. Adequate length 4-6mm nylon laundry line gives soldiers alternatives to drying their clothes on the ground, vegetation and barbed wire surrounding camps.

7.2: Cold Injuries.

- Cold injuries include frostbite, hypothermia, trench foot, and immersion foot which also lead to reduced work performance, injury, immobilization of body parts, death, and degraded mission capability
- Frostbite and hypothermia can occur when temperatures are at or near freezing and these conditions can be accelerated with exposure of skin to winds.
- Trench foot and immersion foot result from prolonged exposure to a wet, cold condition, or the outright immersion of feet in cool or cold water. At the upper range of temperature, exposure of 12 hours or longer usually results in immobilization of a peacekeeper's feet which prevents him from performing duties and creates a burden for the command which should evacuate the soldier and care for him until recovery.
- Cold injury prevention consists of keeping soldiers warm and dry with layered and clean clothing, maintaining adequate nutrition and hydration with treated water, providing warming tents, and rotating guards or others performing inactive duty.
- Foot protection is key requirement for soldier mobility. Soldiers should deploy with enough boots and socks to allow for changing when socks and boots become wet. All soldiers should be provided with waterproof over boots in environments where they will encounter high levels of surface water in the conduct of their routine duties.



Soldiers operating in freezing or near freezing conditions should be provided with adequate gloves or mittens and inserts to prevent numbness and frostbite which will prevent soldiers from operating their weapons or taking measures to defend themselves from environmental and human threats.

7.3: Protection from Arthropods, Rodent and Other Animals of Medical Importance.

- Poor sanitation and improper waste management/disposal greatly increase the disease vector potential of common pests such as flies and rodents which can result in diarrheal disease epidemics. Battalion leaders should ensure that soldiers avoid the temptation to ignore or relax sanitation standards throughout their deployment and in the field and enforce good waste management as per the UN requirements.
- Safeguarding soldier health from environmental conditions inside and outside is during day and night and while working, resting, eating, and sleeping is a force multiplier that directly impacts operations.
- It is incumbent upon leaders to ensure that their soldiers have and use adequate skin insect repellent and mosquito netting as no peacekeeper is immune from diseases carried by arthropod vectors. One of the most threatening insects encountered by peacekeepers is the mosquito which carries malaria as well as yellow and dengue fever. Whereas there is a vaccine for yellow fever, there is none for malaria or dengue. Malaria and dengue have debilitated thousands of peacekeepers. Steps that should be taken to control these diseases include:
 - * Wear clothing over legs and arms and liberally use insect repellent in malaria and dengue infested areas.
 - Avoid setting up camp locations near insect/arthropod breeding areas such as stagnant water bodies (marshes, ponds, water filled holes, etc.) and areas with high grass or vegetation. Clear vegetation in and around camps.
 - * Drain or fill in temporary standing water sights in occupied areas (empty cans, used tires, or puddles and wheel ruts after rain).
 - Routine inspection and destruction of mosquito breeding sites in the camp vicinity. The use of oiling is recommended, while organophosphate insecticides should be considered for water bodies rich in vegetation.



- * Regular residual spraying of insecticides (in accordance with instructions and approved time schedules) on both internal and external walls, window sills, and areas where water collects to destroy resting adult mosquitoes.
- Properly use mosquito bed nets when sleeping. Impregnate bed nets and even clothing with Pyrethrum or similar compound which provides increased protection against mosquitoes. Reapply repellent compounds as directed per the repellent's instructions.
- * Enforce obligatory use of insect repellents after dusk, with repeat applications at night when a soldier is on duty. DEET-based sustained released repellent lotions and ointments (NN-diethyl-m-toluamide) are recommended.
- * Supervision and enforcement of malaria prophylaxis is a national responsibility.
- Directions for the use of skin, clothing, and area insecticides and lice removing solutions should be scrupulously followed.
- Soldier's skin should be covered with clean clothing when arthropod threats are high.
- Regular washing of uniforms not only helps prevent heat injuries and improves morale but also removes arthropods and their eggs which may be attached to uniforms (such as lice nits).
- Ensure that soldiers in high arthropod threat areas sleep under mosquito nets
- All soldiers should be trained to take precautions to prevent spider, scorpion and centipede bites. Soldiers should always shake out and inspect clothing, shoes and bedding before use.
- Soldiers should check the area where they plan to sit or lay down, including field latrines seats where spiders and scorpions may be resting. Soldiers should always use a ground cover such as a poncho over areas where they sit or lay down in order to avoid direct contact with the ground and vegetation where these creatures live.
- Snakes pose the same threats as arthropods do and peacekeepers should take the same precautions to avoid getting bit. As a general rule, soldiers should not handle, play with, or disturb snakes or other wildlife. If bitten, the soldier should try to kill the snake and bring it's head to the medical treatment facility ensuring that the snake is dead, the dead snake is han-



dled from a distance, and the snake cannot bite again (snakes can inflict fatal bites by reflex action after their death).

- Rodent control and elimination is vital battalion task.
 - Worldwide, rats and mice spread over 35 diseases. These diseases can be spread to humans directly, through handling of rodents, through contact with
 - * rodent feces, urine, or saliva, or through rodent bites. Diseases carried by rodents can also be spread to humans indirectly, through ticks, mites or fleas that have fed on an infected rodent.
 - * All battalion personnel should make an effort to eliminate sources of rodent food and shelter. Such methods include:
 - * Utilization of covered trash containers, not just plastic or paper bags.
 - * Do not leave food out to include birdfeed and garbage.
 - * Store firewood and lumber at least 12 to 18 inches off the ground.
 - ⋆ Keep grass cut around buildings and along fences.
 - * Dispose of fallen fruit from trees and shrubs that fall into the base.
 - * Seal holes in walls, pipes and utility lines.
 - * Carefully follow directions for rodenticides.
- It is incumbent upon the Battalion Commander, unit leaders, and members of the battalion field sanitation team to inspect and enforce food storage, preparation, and disposal standards that combat costly spoilage and disease due to weather and animal threats.

7.4: Poisonous Plants and Toxic Fruits.

Peacekeepers may encounter poisonous plants and toxic fruits they are not familiar with. The thorns, leaves and fruits can cause significant harm to peacekeepers, ranging from minor wounds to rapidly fatal poisoning. Soldiers should be made aware of new environmental threats they may encounter. Protective measures from harmful vegetation and fruits include:

- Wearing proper clothing including gloves, inhalation protection, and eye
 protection when working around or with poisonous and thorny plants
 and with herbicides or controlled burnings to eradicate noxious and
 dangerous vegetation in and around the base of operations.
- Training soldiers to recognize poisonous plants and avoid areas where they grow.



- Only eating plants, parts of plants, or fruit that are known to have been approved by battalion medical personnel.
- Not putting grass or woody twigs or stems into mouths as they may be poisonous.

7.5: Food-, Water-, and Waste-Borne Diseases and Illnesses.

Prevention of food-, water- and waste-borne diseases requires a combined UN and TCC effort and responsibility to ensure quality control for procurement, storage and preparation of food, as well as for the supply of potable water and a shared effort to ensure high standards of sanitation and proper management and disposal of wastes. Although not directly responsible, the battalion senior medical officer and other contingent medical personnel should assist logistics, engineering and hygiene inspection personnel in maintaining these standards.

Infectious diarrhoea that can cause varying levels of incapacitation and discomfort to peacekeepers results from contamination of water and food by bacteria, viruses and parasites. Such water- and food-borne diarrheal diseases are a major concern to the battalion because they can be spread to large numbers of peacekeepers simultaneously with disastrous consequences for battalion readiness. Parasites (amoebas, Guardia, and tapeworms) consumed in water or undercooked food, especially meat and fish, can cause prolonged illness. Diarrhoea, especially when vomiting or fever is present, can cause dehydration that soldiers also should recover from in order to effectively perform their duties and remain healthy.

7.6: Measures to Avoid Water Based Illnesses.

- Battalions should train peacekeepers at all levels on how to properly treat water and battalion leaders should enforce the discipline that all soldiers should only drink and cook with treated water that is free from bacteria, viruses, parasites, and other contaminates such as toxic metals and chemicals.
- Water may be properly purified by a variety of methods from the individual soldier canteen level to the camp support level. Methods include boiling, use of chemicals, and use of manual and mechanic filtration systems. These methods are in numerous military and equipment manuals in possession of most TCCs.



- TCCs should make sure their battalions are supplied with the proper supplies and equipment to purify water when UN water treatment assets are not initially or readily available.
- Inspect all water containers for contamination and clean all water containers with properly treated water before filling them with treated fresh water. Containers may contain debris, garbage, or other contaminants that can pollute water over time.

7.7: Measures to Avoid Food Based Illnesses.

- Wash hands thoroughly with soap and drinking (potable) water or hand cleanser prior to touching eating utensils or food and after handling any item that can potentially transfer germs.
- Wash mess kits and eating utensils with treated water and a disinfectant solution set aside for this purpose after eating. Not doing so is a sure way for a soldier to get diarrhoea.
- The battalion and its soldiers should not buy or handle foods, drinks, or snacks from civilian vendors unless food from that vendor is approved by medical or preventive maintenance personnel.
- Wild or bush meat should be especially avoided as it may not be properly cooked and may contain parasites or a pathogen, (such as the Ebola virus) that could cause incapacitation or death.
- Inspect and clean all food prior to cooking and eating.
- Inspect all cans and food packets prior to use. Discard all cans with leaks or bulges. Discard food packets with visible holes or obvious signs of deterioration.
- Locate latrines as far from food operations (100 metres or more) and water sources.

7.8: Measures to Avoid Waste-Borne Diseases.

- Battalions and dispersed companies should be in compliance with established UN environmental policies for the management and disposal of waste for the main duties deriving from the Environmental Policy that the Infantry Battalion has to implement.
- The DPKO and DFS have published dedicated environmental policies and guidelines for UN Field Missions that detail how the battalion



should manage human and other waste, wastewater and hazardous substances. All battalion personnel are required to conduct themselves and handle their waste in accordance with these guidelines.


- Many environments that the UN forces find themselves, due to conflict or remoteness from public sanitation works, have weakened or no infrastructure to accommodate the sanitation needs of the additional population of UN personnel. A battalion's improper treatment and disposal of solid waste and/or wastewater and its violation of sanitation and environmental guidelines found in UN publication *DPKO-DFS-Environment Policy*, 11 May 2009 and its associated guidelines may have grave consequences for UN personnel and the local population as well as on the public perception of the UN mission.
- Therefore, it is incumbent upon the Battalion Commander to ensure that all battalion bases of operation and soldiers comply with UN established methods for handling and disposing of waste/wastewater. Battalions following mandatory guidelines in this publication demonstrate positive, preventative and enduring actions that minimize the risk to the health and safety of peacekeepers, UN staff and the civilian populations that the battalion is mandated to protect.
- Temporary field expedient methods of human waste disposal while battalion personnel are on the move (and without proper toilet and waste facilities) may include the use of a small hole in the earth (20 cm deep), at least 30 metres from any water streams, to bury faeces and garbage that are not bagged and transported to a proper disposal site. This waste should be covered immediately to prevent flies from spreading germs from waste to peacekeeper food and buried deep enough to keep unwanted animals from digging up the faeces and trash or frequenting the peacekeepers bivouac area. Proper disposal of waste from temporary battalion camps and break sites in the field establish proper health conditions and present a positive message to the communities in which peacekeepers work.
- The management and disposal of battalion medical waste requires special attention as such waste is considered hazardous wastes. Medical waste includes all bio-medical wastes such as limbs, organs, blood and blood-stained materials, needles, syringes, pharmaceuticals and




- any medical associated such as X-ray fluids. Battalion medical waste should be disposed of either by incineration, other suitable methods (e.g., sterilization, microwave methods, and electro-thermal deactivation) or by local contracts with medical agencies of the host nations.
- Regardless of the chosen mode of disposal, it is pertinent that medical
 authorities ensure the disposal method does not present any immediate or future danger to personnel or the local population. Proper methods to handle medical waste include the use of disposable gloves when
 working with biological materials, use of coveralls or aprons to protect
 skin and clothing, the wearing of protective goggles, glasses or facemasks to prevent eye and internal contamination.
- Other hazardous waste such as POL, tyres, electronic waste, batteries, etc. should not be buried and should be segregated and handled in a very careful way. Segregation of waste before choice of disposal is the key to proper management. The battalion has to coordinate disposal actions of these hazardous wastes through the military environmental focal point with the mission HQ and the mission's environmental officer.
- At times, battalion elements may be required to establish temporary bases before UN support agencies can establish waste disposal facilities. In such cases, temporary solutions to last several days are required to prevent environmental degradation and to keep camp areas clean before facilities to handle human waste can be established in accordance with UN environmental and medical standards.
- Many military manuals worldwide provide examples and guidelines for improvised solutions for the maintenance of field hygiene and sanitation in start up operation bases and bivouac sites. Examples of three (03) site-specific human waste disposal methods common to militaries are below. Such solutions normally require just shovels and scrap material to set up for the protection of waste-borne disease illness. These are short-term solutions only and must be replaced by proper facilities as soon as possible.



Straddle trench latrine—Used on short bivouacs and field training exercises. Two trenches per 100 males and three trenches per 100 females.







- It is incumbent upon the Battalion Commander to ensure that the battalion takes actions to integrate environmental measures into its planning and operations in order to avoid and minimize the impact of activities carried out by the mission and its staff on the environment and to protect human health from such environmental impacts. This includes battalion observance of national environmental laws, regulations and local customs (if feasible in support of the mission mandate) governing the environment in general or those governing specific subjects such as health, nature and natural resources, wild life conservation, forestry as well as any UN related policies and guidelines and missions specific environmental objectives. It is therefore important to liaise with the Mission Environmental Officer and/or Military component's environmental focal point.
- It also includes the requirements to clean temporary waste sites and permanent waste sites that are no longer in use to their natural state in accordance with UN environmental guidelines; to conduct environmental impact studies at the battalion level on battalion waste disposal management that consider impacts on aspects such as water table, soil and air contamination effects on the operation base and local community; and the requirement to consult with any operations base property owners as well as local property owners and citizens.

7.9: Personal Hygiene and Physical and Mental Fitness.

Maintaining hygiene and physical fitness does not just start when peace-keeping soldiers begin predeployment training and stop when soldiers begin their deployment. These activities play a vital role throughout deployment by keeping a peacekeeper physically and mentally fit to perform their peacekeeping missions. It is incumbent upon Battalion Commanders to ensure that their peacekeepers of both genders initially deploy with enough hygiene and recreation supplies to support hygiene, physical fitness and mental health. Peacekeepers deploying to mission locations where key hygienic supplies are not likely to be resupplied or are in short demand should prepare to deploy with enough items they require to last them their entire deployment (e.g., prescription pills, sanitary napkins or tampons for females, razors for males). Considerations to keep soldiers fit and healthy for peacekeeping duties include:

 Ensure key battalion leaders and health personnel inspect soldiers and facilities such as kitchens, medical facilities and latrines on a daily basis to

300



enforce their daily cleaning and proper hygiene, sanitation, and occupational safety in and around operational bases and in the field.

- Develop, publish, and enforce an SOP on measures to maintain an environment with good hygiene and sanitation at battalion HQ, company, and team site locations. SOPs should include procedures reporting of unsatisfactory and unsafe infrastructure and acts and procedures to request and implement corrective action.
- Develop and implement an enduring awareness campaign on hygiene, public health and sanitation related issues.
- Monitor the immunization status and malaria and other prophylaxis of all uniformed personnel in the battalion. Take corrective action to ensure prescribed standards are maintained in accordance with immunization and prophylaxis regimens.
- Battalion officers should inspect food preparation and storage areas as well as ensure proper food handling and transportation on a daily basis.
 Officers and assigned medical personnel should conduct routine examination and certification of kitchen personnel, including bacteriological examination of stools for pathogens.
- Battalion medical personnel should immediately investigate and combat any suspected outbreak of food poisoning or gastroenteritis and report causes to their commander.
- The Battalion Commander with the aid of the chief medical officer should establish battalion policies concerning the procurement and consumption of local food and water by the battalion, sub-units, and individual soldiers.
- Develop policies and SOPs for the disposal of wastes/wastewater, including human and hazardous wastes (including medical).
- Ensure that logistics and medical personnel conduct regular and daily checks on the quality of the production and storage of potable water.
- Develop aggressive command strategies that that discourage unprotected sex and sexual relations between peacekeepers and locals. This is especially important when soldiers deploy with the HIV virus or deploy to areas with high rates of HIV. Such an aggressive zero-tolerance battalion policy in regards to avoidance of sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA) has the added benefit of putting the battalion in good standing with local leaders and protects the battalion and the UN from issues stemming from SEA or the proliferation of sexually transmitted diseases.



- Maintain peacekeeper physical fitness and cleanliness as clean and fit peacekeepers are less likely to get sick or injured.
- Discourage the sharing of personal hygiene equipment by ensuring soldiers have enough stock of hygienic items on hand and available or that soldiers deploy with enough hygienic items to see them through the resupply.
- Ensure soldiers prevent tooth decay and gum infections on long deployments through dental examinations immediately prior to and during deployments. Ensure soldiers are provided with an adequate supply of dental care supplies.
- Ensure all soldiers drink enough fluids and female soldiers in particular
 are provided with enough latrine privacy so that they are not inhibited
 from eliminating urine when they need to. This prevents female urinary
 tract infections which is one of the most frequent medical problems face
 in the field.
- Ensure soldiers get adequate sleep in clean and mosquito free environments and those peacekeepers only sleep in designated areas. Soldiers should never sleep in running vehicles or on or under vehicles that may run over them or cause carbon monoxide poisoning.
- Peacekeepers should be trained to recognize the signs and symptoms of stress in themselves and the soldiers around them. Ways to reduce and build resistance to stress which effect peacekeeper mental health and job performance include teaching soldiers how to relax quickly, encouraging soldiers to talk about any issues that are causing stress, establishing activities to reduce stress such as providing soldiers regular access to athletic equipment, videos, books, and Internet/phone access.

8. Environmental Safety and Occupational Health (ESOH).

8.1: General

ESOH is a cross-disciplinary area concerned with protecting the safety, health and welfare of the battalion's soldiers. Establishing and taking appropriate ESOH measures fosters a safe work environment for battalion personnel as well as for the local population and environment. Occupational hazards to peacekeepers typically fall into the following four broad categories:



- Chemical hazards which arise from excessive airborne concentrations of mists, vapours, gases and solids (fumes and dusts).
- Physical hazards which include exposures to excessive vibration, noise, ionising and non-ionising radiation, temperature extremes, infrared or ultraviolet light (e.g., welding), ergonomic hazards such as lifting, electrical hazards, such as, frayed electrical cords, and injuries resulting from, for example cuts, needle sticks.
- Biological hazards which are caused by living organisms that, upon exposure, may cause infections to humans such as HIV, hepatitis, Lassa Fever, Dengue Fever, TB,SARS, etc.
- Psychosocial stress hazards such as shift work, sexual harassment, verbal and physical violence, and actual or perceived danger encountered in the battalion AOR.

Good practices to prevent hazards from harming peacekeepers are generally easy to mitigate through minor construction works, the use of safety equipment (such as hearing protection, gloves and goggles), and the establishment of easily accessible safety features as well as policies and practices that enable corrective action. Illness due to HIV/AIDS and sexually transmitted infections and injury due to vehicle accidents are two particular ESOH hazards which effect battalion peacekeepers worldwide. Therefore, it is a command responsibility to control and mitigate these in the battalion.

8.2: HIV/ AIDS and Sexually Transmitted Infections.

Sexually transmitted infections (STIs) and HIV are particularly devastating occupational diseases that affect UN battalion peacekeeping troops and the local population they live amongst. Current UN policy, in accordance with ST/Secretary-General Bulletin/2003/13, establishes that the UN has a zero-tolerance policy with respect to sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA) and dictates, "United Nations forces conducting operations under United Nations command and control are prohibited from committing acts of sexual exploitation and sexual abuse, and have a particular duty of care towards women and children,...; sexual exploitation and sexual abuse constitute acts of serious misconduct and are therefore grounds for disciplinary measures, including summary dismissal", "Sexual activity with children (persons under the age of 18) is prohibited regardless of the age of majority of consent locally..."; and exchange of money, employment, goods or services for sex, including sexual favours or other forms of humiliating, degrad-



ing or exploitative behaviour, is prohibited. This includes any exchange of assistance that is due to beneficiaries of assistance".

STIs and HIV infections are largely preventable through proper health education and training. Elements of such a programme include detailing risk factors which contribute to the particular vulnerability of deployed peace-keepers to STIs and AIDS:

- Lengthy periods away from home and from regular sex partners.
- Influence of alcohol, recreational drugs, and peers in deployments where the zero-tolerance policy on SEA, alcohol and recreational drug consumption is not fully enforced.
- Less inhibitions and restrictions in new country.
- Money in the pockets, with less opportunity to spend this during operational deployment.
- Risk-taking ethos and behaviour in the military, which is part of the make-up of many soldiers regardless of nationality.
- Easy access to sex workers near campsites and off-duty areas.
- In some situations, higher tendency for drug abuse.

8.3: Road Traffic Accidents.

Road conditions can be unpredictable in the battalion AOR. Drivers should be trained and licensed to operate, conduct self-extraction, and conduct operator level maintenance on the vehicle they drive. All vehicles are required to be in good repair prior to use and be equipped with safety equipment. Road accidents are caused by three main factors:

- Human Factors (Road Users). The statistics show that 92 percent of road accidents have been caused by road users who infringed the traffic law, for instance driving faster than limited speed, driving carelessly, getting drunk during driving, etc.
- Road Defect. One part of road accident has been caused by road/bridge infrastructure, which is not yet in the appropriate safety to standard, for example, potholes in the road.
- Vehicle Defect. Vehicles have caused road accident because their owners did not properly maintain and regularly inspect the vehicle during the operation. So the road accident occurred due to brake failure, tire blowout, power steering failure and headlight failure.

Road Safety Programme. Most traffic accidents occur due to driver and supervisor errors. Basic components of a road safety programme include:



- Commander's emphasis on road and vehicular safety.
- Clearly documented safety regulations and Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) which are understood by all drivers and vehicle occupants.
 These measures have to be strictly enforced (e.g., speed limits, use of seat-belts, alcohol control, vehicle breakdown drill).
- Establish certified driving training programmes and standards for military and heavy vehicles new as well as experienced drivers deploying on UN missions.
 - * Drivers are trained, tested, and certified to operate vehicles in all weather and light conditions and over rough terrain that replicates conditions in AOR.
 - * Battalion maintains a pool of at least two trained and certified soldiers with additional skills as driver/operators for each vehicle in its inventory.
 - * Drivers drive with assistant driver on hand. Drivers are trained to respond to and report accidents and vehicle injuries IAW mission SOPs.
 - Driver is trained, tested, to perform operator-level emergency repairs including but not limited to self-extraction, tire repair and changing, towing, etc.
- The establishment and conduct of regularly scheduled maintenance that is accountable and closely supervised.
 - * Driver and motor pool personnel perform daily Preventive Maintenance Checks and Services (PMCS) prior to the operation of any vehicle and a record of this is maintained in the logbook assigned to the vehicle.
 - * PMCS as a minimum shall include a quick visual inspection and walk around of the vehicle to ensure that the tires are properly inflated and that brake, signal lights, headlights are working properly, and no obstructions or personnel are obstructing vehicle movement; petroleum, oil and lubrication levels are at the full level.
 - Vehicle being driven contains emergency repair, fire extinguisher, emergency triangles, and first aid equipment that is complete and in good working order.



Annex K

(Refers to Vol. II, Chapter 1, Section 1.4.1.1, p. 9)

AFTER ACTION REVIEWS AND HANDOVER NOTES

Guidelines for After Action Reviews.

- 1. **Definition.** An After Action Review (AAR) is a discussion of an action, activity or project that allows a team to reflect on what happened, why it happened, what was learned, what follow-up action should be taken and how it can be done better next time. Ideally, AARs should be a routine part of any action, activity or project with a view towards making recommendations for improving the efficiency and effectiveness of the organization.
- 2. **Purpose.** The purpose of AARs is to inform future projects and actions (either by the same team or by others in the same or other missions) by identifying lessons and actionable recommendations. AARs should be conducted in a spirit of openness and learning—they are not performance reviews and should not be conducted in order to allocate blame (or credit), but rather to encourage honest evaluation by practitioners. AARs allow a team to capture lessons immediately following a (phase of a) project or action. AARs can also contribute to team-building.
- 3. **Who.** AARs should be conducted by units or teams. All members of the unit or team (regardless of their rank or status), or in the case of a very large team someone representing each key aspect, should participate. If a project or action was carried out closely with another office or unit, they may be invited to participate as well. However, the larger the group, the more difficult it is to maintain an open environment for the exercise.

A facilitator could be appointed to promote discussion, draw out lessons learned, and ensure that an open environment is maintained throughout the exercise. The facilitator should be someone who was not closely involved in the project or action, and who will have no interest in the project in the foreseeable future, so s/he can remain objective. At the same time, it should be someone who has some knowledge of the subject matter and issues under discussion. The facilitator should not criticize any comments and should avoid personalizing the issues.



In field missions, the Best Practices Officer (BPO) will act as the facilitator as well as other staff members as they become familiar with how to conduct AARs. Although other officers undertake facilitation, the BPO is always available to assist or advise.

- 4. **When.** AARs should be conducted immediately (usually within two weeks) following a project or action (or a phase of a project or action), while the team is available and memories are fresh. AARs should be conducted after activities that fulfil any of the following conditions, but should also primarily be included as part of the BPO work plan:
- The activity is an identified Departmental priority for which HQ is developing, or planning to develop, guidance and policy.
- The activity/project will recur over time within the mission or office (e.g., budget or planning exercises).
- The activity constitutes a major event for the mission or office (e.g., resolving a hostage crisis).
- A similar activity/project is likely to take place at some point in another
 mission or office where the staff members can benefit from each others'
 experience (e.g., an ambush, a DDR exercise, a donor conference, organizing elections, a budget process, etc.).

The length of an AAR can vary, depending on the project or action reviewed. If possible, AARs should be conducted periodically throughout a project or action, so that the phase or activity to be reviewed is not overwhelming.

5. **How.**

Initiation of an AAR. Any team/office/unit member can suggest the convening of an AAR, as well as the BPO and the head of mission. The team should:

- Decide on whether to ask for a facilitator.
- If no facilitator is needed, decide who would be the discussion leader (preferably not the team leader).
- Identify a note-taker, who will summarize the AAR at the end and prepare the report.
- Decide on the length of the AAR (e.g., 30 minutes, 2 hours, half-day, etc.).
- Decide when to hold the AAR.



6. **Who**. All involved in the activity at all levels. Those who cannot attend the AAR and wish to contribute may be interviewed beforehand by telephone or through other means of communication.

AAR

- 7. **Introduction**. At the outset, the facilitator or discussion leader goes over the purposes and principles of an AAR, emphasizing that it is a learning exercise and not a performance evaluation. The facilitator or discussion leader should encourage a spirit of openness and trust and point out that all members will be treated as equal participants regardless of grade level.
- 7.1. **Process Mapping and Methodology**. The facilitator/discussion leader refers the group to the Guidance Framework to identify the specific "peace-keeping processes" that were involved in the action, activity or project. If possible, the facilitator could conduct a process mapping exercise with the group to clearly define how the processes fits together, including a discussion of key points in the overall action that were critical to its success or failure. Existing process guidance should be referred to, and conformity or divergence between how the process was conducted and official guidance should be noted and explained.

To help other colleagues avoid having to "reinvent the wheel", the AAR should summarize the methodology, sequence and tools used by the team in the course of the project. The purpose is to provide a clear and concise account of how the activity was carried out for the benefit of future colleagues conducting the same process in the same or another mission. Useful project documents such as checklists, staffing tables, terms of reference, planning documents, assessment sheets, etc. should be gathered and attached as annexes. This portion of the AAR, being quite factual, may be done ahead of the AAR meeting and constitutes a useful way for a facilitator to get briefed on the event prior to the AAR meeting.

7.2. **Review of Objectives and Deliverables**. The facilitator/discussion leader then asks a set of questions that help identify what the team had set out to do in the project/action and whether those objectives were met. Typical questions are: "What did we set out to do?" "What was supposed to happen?" "What did we actually achieve?" "What actually happened?". At this point, the participants do not yet explore why the objectives were met or not met. It may be useful to use a flowchart or identify specific tasks, deliverables or decision points.

308



- 7.3. **Identification of "Best Practices".** The facilitator/discussion leader asks a number of questions that attempt to identify best practices in the project/action. For example, the facilitator/discussion leader may ask "What went well? Why?" or "What are things that are worth repeating in a similar project? Why?" It is more constructive to start out with identifying these best practices rather than focus at first on what went wrong and will create an environment in which discussion is likely to flow more freely.
- 7.4. **Identification of Areas of Improvement**. The facilitator/discussion leader asks questions that help identify areas of improvement. Typical questions are: "What could have gone better? Why and how?" "What should we do differently next time? Why and how?" The questions should not focus on the negative but rather on how things could be improved for future projects and actions. If participants are not forthcoming, the facilitator/discussion leader may ask each member to write his/her comments anonymously, which will then be shared with the whole group. Another useful discussion tool could be to ask the members to rate the project/action on a scale of 1 to 10 and ask them to describe what would have made it a "10" for them.
- 7.5. **Identification of Actionable Recommendations**. In reviewing all of the above questions, the team should identify a number of actionable recommendations for similar projects and actions in the future. The recommendations should be specific, clear, actionable and achievable. For example, instead of "More time is needed for planning", the recommendation should say, "Allocate at least three meetings over a period of two weeks for planning." Recommendations that could be applied DPKO/DFS system wide should be specifically listed and directly correlated to address a specific issue.
- 7.6. **Documenting the AAR and Sharing the Lessons**. The note-taker summarizes the learning identified in the AAR session. The document should not exceed 2-3 written pages and should focus on specific actionable recommendations. However, annexes, including the process map created in step 2 and any other illustrative flowcharts, are strongly encouraged.

After the AAR

8. The note-taker shares the AAR with team members and facilitator to ensure that the learning is accurately reflected. The note-taker submits the AAR to all team members, the mission Best Practices Officer (if available),



and the relevant office at UN HQ and to PBPS at peacekeeping-bestpractices@un.org. Although the drafter should ensure that the AAR reflects the views of the participants, the AAR does not have to be cleared by senior management since it represents a personal learning account by individual staff members or teams. It is absolutely necessary, however, that the AAR be endorsed by the team.

- 9. **Follow-up**. PBPS will periodically review all After Action Reviews and, in consultation with relevant offices, provide an analysis of recommendations with potential system wide impact. Missions and individual offices are also encouraged to follow up on the recommendations contained in AARs in view of improving their effectiveness in real time.
- 10. **Comments received on the AAR**. Comments on AARs are welcome, and a specific section has been included in the template to insert comments received from readers after the AAR has been posted. Practitioners may write to peacekeeping-bestpractices@un.org mentioning their name, function, mission and the title of the report they are commenting on. Comments will be added to the report and a new version will be uploaded on the Peace Operations Intranet.
- 11. **Archive and Access**. The relevant office at HQ and the Policy and Best Practices Service will keep a copy of the AAR. PBPS will make AARs available to all staff, at HQ or in the field, through the Peace Operations Intranet.

12. After-Action Review Template

Name of event/project:

Date of AAR:

Date or Duration of event/project: If the AAR covers only part of a project, this should be indicated.

Team members:

List all team members of the project (by title and/or name), then identify those who participated in the AAR.

Individual who called the AAR:

Individual who facilitated/led the discussion at the AAR:

Background. Background to the event or project under review. This section could include a brief history of the project or event and facts and figures.

Objectives of the event/project. Indicate what the intended or stated objective of the event/project was. If there is no consensus among the participants about the exact objective, this should be noted here.



Achievements/results of the event/project. Summarize the main achievements and results of the event/project. Include achievements that led towards meeting the objective, as well as other unintended results (positive or negative).

Process Mapping and Methodology. This section should include references correlating the processes involved in the action to the Guidance Framework (e.g., 2000 Series: HQ Support to Operations/Command and Control and Executive Direction/Field Roles and Responsibilities). If possible, a process map should be included to describe the sequence of actions leading to the final result. Existing guidance on the process should be referred to, and conformity or divergence between how the process was conducted and official guidance should be noted and explained.

Help colleagues avoid having to "reinvent the wheel" by summarizing the methodology and tools used by the team in the course of the project. The purpose of this section is to provide an account of how the activity was carried out using what tools in view of facilitating replication in another mission. Useful project documents such as checklists, staffing tables, terms of reference, planning documents, assessment sheets, etc. should be attached as annexes.

Best practices/what worked well. Note activities or approaches that worked well. Specifically, note approaches/activities that, in the group's opinion, could or should be adopted or repeated by others conducting a similar exercise in the future.

Lessons learned/what did not work well or could be improved. Note activities or approaches that proved to be problematic. Specifically, note activities or approaches that should be avoided by others conducting a similar exercise in the future

Quotes from the AAR. Note memorable and highly descriptive quotes from the AARs. Select the quotes on the basis of how representative they are. They should succinctly describe the learning that occurred in the AAR.

Specific Actionable Recommendations.

Mission-Level. Provide recommendations on how best to execute the event/project under review. Recommendations should be action oriented. For example, when the "what did not work well" section above includes "We had no clue what was expected of us", the recommendation could be



"define and distribute the objectives of the tasks well in advance of the project".

DPKO/DFS-Level. Include actions that should either be repeated or avoided in a similar event or project in other missions or DPKO/DFS HQ, paying particular attention to how things should be done differently to improve the overall event/project. Recommendations that could be applied in DPKO/DFS system wide should be specifically listed and directly correlated to address a specific issue. Identify areas where policy development could provide a solution.

Keywords associated with this AAR. Identify some keywords to be associated with the AAR for search purposes.

Background documents. List relevant background documents, such as, a project proposal, project management documents, or any available guidance relevant to the activity or project.

Contacts. List a contact person (or people) for follow up questions. Include names, titles, phone numbers and e-mail addresses.

Comments received on AARs. Comments on this AAR are welcome. If you would like to add a comment, please write to peacekeeping-bestpractices@un.org mentioning your name, function, mission and the title of the report you are commenting on. Your comments will be added to this report and a new version will be uploaded on the Peace Operations Intranet.

13. Mission Handover Notes

13.1: Definition. Handover Notes are documents created by staff members who are about to leave their positions, either temporarily or permanently, to assist their successor to carry out their duties.

13.2 : Purpose. To provide the staff member's successor with key knowledge and information regarding the position so that the transition period is as short and smooth as possible.

13.3: Who. Any staff member who is about to leave his/her position, and holds a post that will continue to exist within the mission, is required to write a handover note. They shall be written even when a staff member is leaving his/her position to assume new duties within the same mission or office. In the case of a temporary absence, particularly if the absence is



longer than four weeks, it is strongly suggested that the staff member shall agree with the supervisor on whether a handover note should be written and if so how detailed it needs to be. A staff member who was temporarily covering the functions due to a colleague's absence shall also write a handover note to ensure a smooth transition back.

13.4: When. Handover notes shall be finalized during the week before the staff member leaves his/her position. Ideally, there should be a period of overlap with the staff member's successor. If this is not possible, the staff member should send the handover note to his/her successor before departing and supplement the note with phone conversations or by e-mail. The staff member should also leave a handover note with his/her supervisor. When staff members assume duties at new positions, they should request a handover note from their supervisor, if one was not already received.

13.5 : How. Handover notes should be no longer than 3-4 pages, excluding attachments. They should be factual rather than analytical. Handover notes of Section Chiefs are required to be accompanied by a list of, and a CD containing, all the manuals, standard operating procedures, guidance and training modules and all materials that his/her section produced. The attached template should be used. Sections of the template that do not apply to the staff member may be ignored.

13.6 : Reporting. The departing staff member should provide a copy of the handover note to his/her successor and his/her supervisor. Handover notes are a required step of the mission check-out process. The supervisor should indicate that they received a handover note from the staff member during the check-out process (for example, on check-out forms or in a separate note to Personnel).

13.7: Distribution, Archive and Access. The successor, his/her office and the mission's Personnel section shall maintain a copy in the files. If the information and knowledge is still valid and relevant, the successor may pass it on to the next successor, along with his/her own handover note. Handover notes may be widely shared, with the consent of the author. They are not intended as confidential documents nor are they distributed through the Peace Operations Intranet due to their temporary nature.



14. Handover Note Template

Name:
Index number:
Job Title:
Date of Handover Note:
Duration of Assignment (includes start and end date):
Brief Description of Duties:
This section may be kept brief when up-to-date terms of reference (TOR) are attached.
Supervisor and reporting procedures:
Regular/recurring meetings, reports or procedures:
Key Documents/reference material to read (attach when possible):
Status of recent and current activities/projects/reports/meetings:
Name of project/report/meeting:
Status.
Action needed.
Partners.
Budget (if applicable).
Critical issues/challenges/priorities.
Repeat as many times as necessary. Indicate priority projects.
Where to find files (hardcopy and electronic):
Calendar of major activities and/or events (optional):
Contacts (internal and external):



Name	Organization	Phone	E-mail	Comments
	J			

Your contact information after departure:
Phone:
E-mail:
Fax:
Suggested attachments:
TOR/Job description.
Mission/Office staffing table, division of labour, organization table.
Key documents relevant for the position.
For section chiefs only: all SOPs, manuals and training modules and rel evant materials.
Signature and Date



Annex L

(Refers to Vol. I Chapter 8, Section. 8.4, p. 138)

HIGH TECHNOLOGY EQUIPMENTS

1. Purpose.

The purpose of this Annex is to highlight some of the high technology equipment (but not limited to) that potentially enhance operational efficiency of military peacekeepers in performance of peacekeeping operations.

2. Helmet Cameras.

Purpose. To facilitate real time recording of information at the site of operations.

Equipment Features.





Specifications. High Definition, Light Weight, Built in Battery Pack, 5 hours and beyond recording capacity, Quick to Start, Easy to Mount.

Cost. Between 90\$ to 300\$.

3. Tactical UAV.

Purpose. Facilitate real time monitoring and relaying of critical information in support of peacekeeping operations in real time with live inputs.

Equipment Features.







Specifications. VTOL, Miniaturized/hand held, Compact, Automatic Flight Control, Direct Relay, Light Weight, Day and Night Sensors, Smart Imaging Technology, Long Range, Autonomous Operation,

Cost. Low cost (market price).

4. Ground Surveillance Radar.

Purpose. To provide early-warning of threat to COBs and Force Protection. **Equipment Features**.





Specifications. Locate and identify personnel and vehicle movements, Minimum 2000 Metres Range, Man-portable and with Alternate Power Source.

Cost. Market price.



5. Electronic Tracker.

Purpose. To track and monitor all personnel, vehicle and helicopter movements based on a digital map located in the Battalion Operations Centre.

Equipment Features.





Specifications. Real time tracking of GPS, Satellite Monitoring, Digital Map Display, Process 300 entities.

Cost. Market price.

6. Mine Protected Vehicle.

Purpose. Provide protection from mines, UXOs and IEDs.

Equipment Features.





Specifications. Protection from Mine/UXO/IED Blast, Ballistic Protection, High Protected Mobility, 4x4 Configurations, Turret Weapon Mountable.

Cost. Market Price.



7. Bullet Proof Vehicle.

Purpose. For escort duties, faster protected (Ballistic) mobility, Deterrence Value, Close Support.

Equipment Features.





Specifications. Ballistic Protection, Protected Mobility, 4x4 Configurations, Turret and Sideways Weapon Mountable.

Cost. Market Price.





Annex M

(Refers to Vol. II, Chapter 2 Section 2.8.4, p. 98)


UN MILITARY SYMBOLS

Purpose.

The purpose of this annex is to familiarise with UN Military Symbols that are in use in the UNHQ and the field missions, which can be adapted by UN Infantry Battalions to complement national military symbols for use in peacekeeping operations.

UN Military Map Symbols.

1. UN Guidelines for the publications of maps and use of symbols is governed by UN Publication ST/Al/189/Add.25/Rev.1. The basic symbols depicted below are generally in use at UN HQ and UN Field Missions.





United Nations Deployment Symbols

Actual location Proposed/Provisional location Group Section Platoon Company, Battery Battalion Regiment Brigade Division Corps Army Force Headquarters (FHQ) Brigade / Sector Headquarters Battalion Headquarters HQ Headquarters LOG Logistics SUP Support (OB) Operation Base (TOB) Temporary Operation Base Company Operation Base Platoon Operation Base Observation post Team site Check Point (Bottom point or an extension is exact location). (H) Helipad

Military Components

 \boxtimes Infantry • Field Artillery ∞ Fixed Wing Aviation N Communications Maintenance Recce Armour \boxtimes Mechanized Engineers Level 2 Field Hospital Level 3 Field Hospital -Transport Ammunition n Ordnance M Helicopter Support

Attack Helicopter

Marine

FPU Formed Police Unit

Special Force

United Nations Police
United Nations Military Observers

Quick Reaction Force
FRB Force Reserve Battalion
FRC Force Reserve Company

Bridging Company

Demining

United Nations Military Police

Mortar Platoon

Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
Ground Surveillance

Boundaries

Airfield

 \triangleright

Sector boundary

Inter-battallion boundary

Company boundary

Colour code for symbols

1. Blue for all UN elements

2. Green for all friendly forces

3. Black for neutral / other entities

4. Red for spoilers / aggressor


5. Yellow for unknown



Other Map Symbols.

- 2. All UN military components use a system of codified symbols to enable battalion staff to mark maps, charts, electronic displays and sand models. These symbols depict the location and activities of UN forces, UN agencies, and other relevant actors in the mission area. Military Map symbols can also show some basic information about UN forces, such as, a unit's location, ID, role, type, size, weapon's capabilities, and locations of weapon systems.
- 3. Currently, military components assigned to different UN missions use a variety of symbols to represent such as key terrain, obstacles, mobility corridors, hospitals, fire stations, Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) camps, religious buildings and sites, historical sites, types of roads, waterways, built up areas, vegetation, open areas, NGO/IO HQ, etc. Some of the most common and recognizable military map symbols used by many military components participating in UN peacekeeping operations are depicted below. The use of universal UN map symbols will facilitate standardization of the depiction of peacekeeping operations at UN HQ, Field Missions and contingents.

Mobility and Obstacle Symbols



NOTE: Ensure all graphics & symbols are listed in the Legend.



Affiliation Symbols.

4. Affiliation refers to the status of a particular entity (civilian or military) in the battalion AOR. The basic affiliation categories are Unknown, Friend, Neutral and Hostile. A green rectangle frame denotes friendly affiliation; a black square frame denotes neutral affiliation, a red diamond frame denotes hostile or potential threat affiliation and a yellow quatrefoil frame denotes unknown affiliation.

Friendly	Neutral	Hostile	Unknown	
			\bigcirc	





Annex N

(Refers to Vol. II, Introduction, Section 4, p. 3)

ABBREVIATIONS

Serial	Abbreviation	Meaning
1	AAR	After Action Review
2	AFP	Agencies, Funds and Programmes
3	AGL	Automatic Grenade Launcher
4	AO	Area of Operations
5	AOR	Area of Responsibility
6	APC	Armoured Personnel Carrier
7	BIR	Battalion Information Requirements
8	BOC	Battalion Operations Centre
9	BOI	Board of Inquiry
10	ВРО	Best Practices Officer
11	BZ	Buffer Zone
12	C3	Command, Control and Communication
13	CAN	Community Alert Network
14	CAO	Chief Administrative Officer
15	CDT	Conduct and Discipline Team
16	CDU	Conduct and Discipline Unit
17	CASEVAC	Casualty Evacuation
18	CFL	Ceasefire Line
19	CISS	Chief Integrated Support Services
20	CLA	Community Liaison Assistant
21	СМО	Chief Military Observer
22	CMOC	Civil-Military Operations Centre
23	CMS	Chief Mission Support
24	COB	Company Operating Base
25	COC	Company Operations Centre
26	COE	Contingent Owned Equipment
27	CONOPS	Concept of Operations
28	СР	Checkpoint
29	CPIO	Chief Public Information Officer
30	DDR	Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration
31	DFC	Deputy Force Commander
32	DFP	Detention Focal Point



22	DEC	D
33	DFS	Department of Field Support
34	DMS	Director of Mission Support
35	DMZ	Demilitarized Zone
36	DOA	Director of Administration
37	DPET	Division for Policy, Evaluation and Training
38	DPKO	Department of Peacekeeping Operations
39	DSR	Defence Sector Reform
40	DSRSG	Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General
41	DSS	Department of Safety and Security
42	DUF	Directives on Use of Force
43	EoAR	End of Assignment Report
44	EOD	Explosive Ordnance Disposal
45	ERW	Explosive Remnants of War
46	FBFD	Field Budget and Finance Division
47	FC	Force Commander
48	FCOS	Force Chief of Staff
49	FGS	Force Generation Service
50	FHQ	Force Headquarters
51	FPU	Formed Police Unit
52	FOB	Forward Operational Base
53	FOL	Fuel, Oil and Lubricants
54	GIS	Geographic Information System
55	GPS	Global Positioning System
56	HC	Humanitarian Coordinator
57	HIV/AIDS	Human Immunodeficiency Virus /Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
58	HoM	Head of Mission
59	HoMC	Head of Military Component
60	HoPC	Head of Police Component
61	HQ	Headquarters
62	IASC	Inter Agency Standing Committee
63	ICG	Infantry Company Group
64	ICTD	Information and Communications Technology Division
65	IDP	Internally Displaced People
66	IDDRS	Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards
67	IED	Improvised Explosive Device
68	IM	Infantry Mortars
69	IMC	Inter-Mission Cooperation
70	IMPP	Integrated Mission Planning Process



Total Color	71	INATC	lucks works of Mississan Tradition of Call
73 IO International Organization 74 OIOS Office of Internal Over Sights Services 75 IOT Integrated Operational Team 76 ISS Integrated Support Service 77 JMAC Joint Mission Analysis Centre 78 JLOC Joint Mission Analysis Centre 79 JOC Joint Operations Centre 80 LMG Light Machine Gun 81 LOA Letter of Assist 82 LOGOPS Logistics Operations 83 LRP Long Range Patrol 84 LSD Logistics Support Division 85 MACC Military and Civil Defence Assets 86 MCDA Military and Civil Defence Assets 87 MCMS MOU and Claims Management Section 88 MCOS Mission Chief of Staff 89 MEDEVAC Medical Evacuation 90 MET Mission Essential Tasks 91 MILAD Military Adviser 92 MLO Military Laison Officer 93 MMG Medium Machine Gun 94 MOA Memoranda of Agreement 95 MOU Memorandum of Understanding 96 MOVCON Movement Control 97 MP Military Planning Service 99 MRM Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism 100 MTS Misson Audional Service 104 NGO Non Governmental Organization 105 NSE National Support Element 106 OCHA Office of Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 109 OMA Office of Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 100 Office of Operations 111 OP Observation Post	71	IMTC	Integrated Mission Training Cell
74 OIOS Office of Internal Over Sights Services 75 IOT Integrated Operational Team 76 ISS Integrated Support Service 77 JMAC Joint Mission Analysis Centre 78 JLOC Joint Logistics Operations Centre 79 JOC Joint Operations Centre 80 LMG Light Machine Gun 81 LOA Letter of Assist 82 LOGOPS Logistics Operations 83 LRP Long Range Patrol 84 LSD Logistics Support Division 85 MACC Mine Action Coordination Centre 86 MCDA Military and Civil Defence Assets 87 MCMS MOU and Claims Management Section 88 MCOS Mission Chief of Staff 89 MEDEVAC Medical Evacuation 90 MET Mission Essential Tasks 91 MILAD Military Adviser 92 MLO Military Liaison Officer 93 MMG Medium Machine Gun 94 MOA Memorandum of Understanding 96 MOVCON Movement Control 97 MP Military Police 98 MPS Military Police 99 MRM Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism 100 MTS Misson Comment of Understanding 101 MTS Misconduct Tracking System 102 NSE NSE National Support Element 103 NCO Non Commissioned Officer 104 NGO Non Governmental Organization 105 NSE National Support Element 106 OCHA Office of Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 109 OMA Office of Legal Affairs 110 OO Office of Operations 111 OP Observation Post			
75 IOT Integrated Operational Team 76 ISS Integrated Support Service 77 JMAC Joint Mission Analysis Centre 78 JLOC Joint Logistics Operations Centre 80 LMG Light Machine Gun 81 LOA Letter of Assist 82 LOGOPS Logistics Operations 83 LRP Long Range Patrol 84 LSD Logistics Support Division 85 MACC Mine Action Coordination Centre 86 MCDA Military and Civil Defence Assets 87 MCMS MOU and Claims Management Section 88 MCOS Mission Chief of Staff 89 MEDEVAC Medical Evacuation 90 MET Mission Essential Tasks 91 MILAD Military Adviser 92 MLO Military Liaison Officer 93 MMG Medium Machine Gun 94 MOA Memoranda of Agreement 95 MOU Memorandum of Understanding 96 MOVCON Movement Control 97 MP Military Police 98 MPS Military Police 98 MPS Military Police			
76 ISS Integrated Support Service 77 JMAC Joint Mission Analysis Centre 78 JLOC Joint Logistics Operations Centre 79 JOC Joint Operations Centre 80 LMG Light Machine Gun 81 LOA Letter of Assist 82 LOGOPS Logistics Operations 83 LRP Long Range Patrol 84 LSD Logistics Support Division 85 MACC Mine Action Coordination Centre 86 MCDA Millitary and Civil Defence Assets 87 MCMS MOU and Claims Management Section 88 MCOS Mission Chief of Staff 89 MEDEVAC Medical Evacuation 90 MET Mission Essential Tasks 91 MILAD Millitary Adviser 92 MLO Millitary Liaison Officer 93 MMG Medium Machine Gun 94 MOA Memoranda of Agreement 95 MOU Memorandum of Understanding 96 MOVCON Movement Control			-
77 JMAC Joint Mission Analysis Centre 78 JLOC Joint Logistics Operations Centre 79 JOC Joint Operations Centre 80 LMG Light Machine Gun 81 LOA Letter of Assist 82 LOGOPS Logistics Operations 83 LRP Long Range Patrol 84 LSD Logistics Support Division 85 MACC Mine Action Coordination Centre 86 MCDA Military and Civil Defence Assets 87 MCMS MOU and Claims Management Section 88 MCOS Mission Chief of Staff 89 MEDEVAC Medical Evacuation 90 MET Mission Essential Tasks 91 MILAD Military Adviser 92 MLO Military Adviser 92 MLO Military Liaison Officer 93 MMG Medium Machine Gun 94 MOA Memoranda of Agreement 95 MOU Memorandum of Understanding 96 MOVCON Movement Control 97 <td>75</td> <td></td> <td>-</td>	75		-
78 JLOC Joint Logistics Operations Centre 79 JOC Joint Operations Centre 80 LMG Light Machine Gun 81 LOA Letter of Assist 82 LOGOPS Logistics Operations 83 LRP Long Range Patrol 84 LSD Logistics Support Division 85 MACC Mine Action Coordination Centre 86 MCDA Military and Civil Defence Assets 87 MCMS MOU and Claims Management Section 88 MCOS Mission Chief of Staff 89 MEDEVAC Medical Evacuation 90 MET Mission Essential Tasks 91 MILAD Military Adviser 92 MLO Military Liaison Officer 93 MMG Medium Machine Gun 94 MOA Memoranda of Agreement 95 MOU Memorandum of Understanding 96 MOVCON Movement Control 97 MP Military Police 98 MPS Military Planning Service 99 MRM Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism 100 MTS Misconduct Tracking System 103 NCO Non Commissioned Officer 104 NGO Non Governmental Organization 105 NSE National Support Element 106 OCHA Office of Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 109 OMA Office of Operations 110 OO Office of Operations 111 OP Observation Post	76	ISS	Integrated Support Service
79 JOC Joint Operations Centre 80 LMG Light Machine Gun 81 LOA Letter of Assist 82 LOGOPS Logistics Operations 83 LRP Long Range Patrol 84 LSD Logistics Support Division 85 MACC Mine Action Coordination Centre 86 MCDA Military and Civil Defence Assets 87 MCMS MOU and Claims Management Section 88 MCOS Mission Chief of Staff 89 MEDEVAC Medical Evacuation 90 MET Mission Essential Tasks 91 MILAD Military Adviser 92 MLO Military Liaison Officer 93 MMG Medium Machine Gun 94 MOA Memoranda of Agreement 95 MOU Memorandum of Understanding 96 MOVCON Movement Control 97 MP Military Planning Service 99 MRM Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism 100 MTS Misconduct Tracking System 103 NCO Non Commissioned Officer 104 NGO Non Governmental Organization 105 NSE National Support Element 106 OCHA Office of Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 107 OHCHR Office of Melitary Pafairs 109 OMA Office of Melitary Pafairs 100 OMA Office of Departation 101 OO Office of Melitary Pafairs 102 OMA Office of Operations 103 OO Office of Departation 104 NGO Non Governmental Organization 105 NSE National Support Element 106 OCHA Office of Legal Affairs 107 OHCHR Office of Departation 108 OLA Office of Military Pafairs	77	JMAC	Joint Mission Analysis Centre
Light Machine Gun Light Machine Gun Loya Letter of Assist LogOPS Logistics Operations Larp Long Range Patrol Log Range Patrol Logistics Support Division Some Action Coordination Centre Mission Chief of Staff MCDA Military and Claims Management Section Mission Chief of Staff MCDS Mission Chief of Staff MEDEVAC Medical Evacuation MET Mission Essential Tasks MILAD Military Adviser MLO Military Liaison Officer MMG Medium Machine Gun MOA Memoranda of Agreement MOA Memoranda of Agreement MOVCON Movement Control MP Military Police MRM Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism MOM MISSION Missioned Officer MISSION MISSION Mission Officer MISSION MISSION Mission Officer MOVCON Movement Control MOVCON Movement Control MISSION MISS	78	JLOC	Joint Logistics Operations Centre
81 LOA Letter of Assist 82 LOGOPS Logistics Operations 83 LRP Long Range Patrol 84 LSD Logistics Support Division 85 MACC Mine Action Coordination Centre 86 MCDA Military and Civil Defence Assets 87 MCMS MOU and Claims Management Section 88 MCOS Mission Chief of Staff 89 MEDEVAC Medical Evacuation 90 MET Mission Essential Tasks 91 MILAD Military Adviser 92 MLO Military Adviser 93 MMG Medium Machine Gun 94 MOA Memoranda of Agreement 95 MOU Memorandum of Understanding 96 MOVCON Movement Control 97 MP Military Police 98 MPS Military Planning Service 99 MRM Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism 100 MTS Misconduct Tracking System 103 NCO Non Commissioned Officer 104	79	JOC	Joint Operations Centre
82 LOGOPS Logistics Operations 83 LRP Long Range Patrol 84 LSD Logistics Support Division 85 MACC Mine Action Coordination Centre 86 MCDA Military and Civil Defence Assets 87 MCMS MOU and Claims Management Section 88 MCOS Mission Chief of Staff 89 MEDEVAC Medical Evacuation 90 MET Mission Essential Tasks 91 MILAD Military Adviser 92 MLO Military Liaison Officer 93 MMG Medium Machine Gun 94 MOA Memoranda of Agreement 95 MOU Memorandum of Understanding 96 MOVCON Movement Control 97 MP Military Planning Service 99 MRM Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism 100 MTS Misconduct Tracking System 103 NCO Non Commissioned Officer 104 NGO Non Governmental Organization 105 NSE National Support Element <	80	LMG	Light Machine Gun
83 LRP Long Range Patrol 84 LSD Logistics Support Division 85 MACC Mine Action Coordination Centre 86 MCDA Military and Civil Defence Assets 87 MCMS MOU and Claims Management Section 88 MCOS Mission Chief of Staff 89 MEDEVAC Medical Evacuation 90 MET Mission Essential Tasks 91 MILAD Military Adviser 92 MLO Military Liaison Officer 93 MMG Medium Machine Gun 94 MOA Memoranda of Agreement 95 MOU Memorandum of Understanding 96 MOVCON Movement Control 97 MP Military Police 98 MPS Military Planning Service 99 MRM Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism 100 MTS Misconduct Tracking System 101 NCO Non Commissioned Officer 104 NGO Non Governmental Organization 105 NSE National Support Element 106 OCHA Office of Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 107 OHCHR Office of Legal Affairs 109 OMA Office of Departations 110 OO Office of Operations 111 OP Observation Post	81	LOA	Letter of Assist
84 LSD Logistics Support Division 85 MACC Mine Action Coordination Centre 86 MCDA Military and Civil Defence Assets 87 MCMS MOU and Claims Management Section 88 MCOS Mission Chief of Staff 89 MEDEVAC Medical Evacuation 90 MET Mission Essential Tasks 91 MILAD Military Adviser 92 MLO Military Liaison Officer 93 MMG Medium Machine Gun 94 MOA Memoranda of Agreement 95 MOU Memorandum of Understanding 96 MOVCON Movement Control 97 MP Military Police 98 MPS Military Planning Service 99 MRM Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism 100 MTS Misconduct Tracking System 101 NCO Non Commissioned Officer 104 NGO Non Governmental Organization 105 NSE National Support Element 106 OCHA Office of Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 107 OHCHR Office of Legal Affairs 109 OMA Office of Operations 110 OO Observation Post	82	LOGOPS	Logistics Operations
85 MACC Mine Action Coordination Centre 86 MCDA Military and Civil Defence Assets 87 MCMS MOU and Claims Management Section 88 MCOS Mission Chief of Staff 89 MEDEVAC Medical Evacuation 90 MET Mission Essential Tasks 91 MILAD Military Adviser 92 MLO Military Liaison Officer 93 MMG Medium Machine Gun 94 MOA Memoranda of Agreement 95 MOU Memorandum of Understanding 96 MOVCON Movement Control 97 MP Military Police 98 MPS Military Planning Service 99 MRM Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism 100 MTS Misconduct Tracking System 103 NCO Non Commissioned Officer 104 NGO Non Governmental Organization 105 NSE National Support Element 106 OCHA Office of Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 107 OHCHR Office of H	83	LRP	Long Range Patrol
86 MCDA Military and Civil Defence Assets 87 MCMS MOU and Claims Management Section 88 MCOS Mission Chief of Staff 89 MEDEVAC Medical Evacuation 90 MET Mission Essential Tasks 91 MILAD Military Adviser 92 MLO Military Liaison Officer 93 MMG Medium Machine Gun 94 MOA Memoranda of Agreement 95 MOU Memorandum of Understanding 96 MOVCON Movement Control 97 MP Military Police 98 MPS Military Planning Service 99 MRM Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism 100 MTS Misconduct Tracking System 103 NCO Non Commissioned Officer 104 NGO Non Governmental Organization 105 NSE National Support Element 106 OCHA Office of Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 107 OHCHR Office of He High Commissioner For Human Rights 108 OLA	84	LSD	Logistics Support Division
87 MCMS MOU and Claims Management Section 88 MCOS Mission Chief of Staff 89 MEDEVAC Medical Evacuation 90 MET Mission Essential Tasks 91 MILAD Military Adviser 92 MLO Military Liaison Officer 93 MMG Medium Machine Gun 94 MOA Memoranda of Agreement 95 MOU Memorandum of Understanding 96 MOVCON Movement Control 97 MP Military Police 98 MPS Military Planning Service 99 MRM Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism 100 MTS Misconduct Tracking System 103 NCO Non Commissioned Officer 104 NGO Non Governmental Organization 105 NSE National Support Element 106 OCHA Office of Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 107 OHCHR Office of the High Commissioner For Human Rights 108 OLA Office of Military Affairs 100 OMA O	85	MACC	Mine Action Coordination Centre
88MCOSMission Chief of Staff89MEDEVACMedical Evacuation90METMission Essential Tasks91MILADMilitary Adviser92MLOMilitary Liaison Officer93MMGMedium Machine Gun94MOAMemoranda of Agreement95MOUMemorandum of Understanding96MOVCONMovement Control97MPMilitary Police98MPSMilitary Planning Service99MRMMonitoring and Reporting Mechanism100MTSMisconduct Tracking System103NCONon Commissioned Officer104NGONon Governmental Organization105NSENational Support Element106OCHAOffice of Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs107OHCHROffice of the High Commissioner For Human Rights108OLAOffice of Heligh Commissioner For Human Rights109OMAOffice of Operations110OOOffice of Operations111OPObservation Post	86	MCDA	Military and Civil Defence Assets
89MEDEVACMedical Evacuation90METMission Essential Tasks91MILADMilitary Adviser92MLOMilitary Liaison Officer93MMGMedium Machine Gun94MOAMemoranda of Agreement95MOUMemorandum of Understanding96MOVCONMovement Control97MPMilitary Police98MPSMilitary Planning Service99MRMMonitoring and Reporting Mechanism100MTSMisconduct Tracking System103NCONon Commissioned Officer104NGONon Governmental Organization105NSENational Support Element106OCHAOffice of Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs107OHCHROffice of the High Commissioner For Human Rights108OLAOffice of Legal Affairs109OMAOffice of Operations110OOOffice of Operations111OPObservation Post	87	MCMS	MOU and Claims Management Section
90 MET Mission Essential Tasks 91 MILAD Military Adviser 92 MLO Military Liaison Officer 93 MMG Medium Machine Gun 94 MOA Memoranda of Agreement 95 MOU Memorandum of Understanding 96 MOVCON Movement Control 97 MP Military Police 98 MPS Military Planning Service 99 MRM Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism 100 MTS Misconduct Tracking System 103 NCO Non Commissioned Officer 104 NGO Non Governmental Organization 105 NSE National Support Element 106 OCHA Office of Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 107 OHCHR Office of Heligh Commissioner For Human Rights 108 OLA Office of Military Affairs 110 OO Office of Operations 111 OP Observation Post	88	MCOS	Mission Chief of Staff
91 MILAD Military Adviser 92 MLO Military Liaison Officer 93 MMG Medium Machine Gun 94 MOA Memoranda of Agreement 95 MOU Memorandum of Understanding 96 MOVCON Movement Control 97 MP Military Police 98 MPS Military Planning Service 99 MRM Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism 100 MTS Misconduct Tracking System 103 NCO Non Commissioned Officer 104 NGO Non Governmental Organization 105 NSE National Support Element 106 OCHA Office of Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 107 OHCHR Office of the High Commissioner For Human Rights 108 OLA Office of Military Affairs 110 OO Office of Operations 111 OP Observation Post	89	MEDEVAC	Medical Evacuation
92 MLO Military Liaison Officer 93 MMG Medium Machine Gun 94 MOA Memoranda of Agreement 95 MOU Memorandum of Understanding 96 MOVCON Movement Control 97 MP Military Police 98 MPS Military Planning Service 99 MRM Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism 100 MTS Misconduct Tracking System 103 NCO Non Commissioned Officer 104 NGO Non Governmental Organization 105 NSE National Support Element 106 OCHA Office of Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 107 OHCHR Office of the High Commissioner For Human Rights 108 OLA Office of Military Affairs 110 OO Office of Operations 111 OP Observation Post	90	MET	Mission Essential Tasks
93 MMG Medium Machine Gun 94 MOA Memoranda of Agreement 95 MOU Memorandum of Understanding 96 MOVCON Movement Control 97 MP Military Police 98 MPS Military Planning Service 99 MRM Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism 100 MTS Misconduct Tracking System 103 NCO Non Commissioned Officer 104 NGO Non Governmental Organization 105 NSE National Support Element 106 OCHA Office of Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 107 OHCHR Office of the High Commissioner For Human Rights 108 OLA Office of Military Affairs 109 OMA Office of Operations 110 OO Observation Post	91	MILAD	Military Adviser
94MOAMemoranda of Agreement95MOUMemorandum of Understanding96MOVCONMovement Control97MPMilitary Police98MPSMilitary Planning Service99MRMMonitoring and Reporting Mechanism100MTSMisconduct Tracking System103NCONon Commissioned Officer104NGONon Governmental Organization105NSENational Support Element106OCHAOffice of Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs107OHCHROffice of the High Commissioner For Human Rights108OLAOffice of Legal Affairs109OMAOffice of Military Affairs110OOOffice of Operations111OPObservation Post	92	MLO	Military Liaison Officer
95 MOU Memorandum of Understanding 96 MOVCON Movement Control 97 MP Military Police 98 MPS Military Planning Service 99 MRM Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism 100 MTS Misconduct Tracking System 103 NCO Non Commissioned Officer 104 NGO Non Governmental Organization 105 NSE National Support Element 106 OCHA Office of Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 107 OHCHR Office of the High Commissioner For Human Rights 108 OLA Office of Military Affairs 109 OMA Office of Operations 110 OO Office of Operations 111 OP Observation Post	93	MMG	Medium Machine Gun
96 MOVCON Movement Control 97 MP Military Police 98 MPS Military Planning Service 99 MRM Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism 100 MTS Misconduct Tracking System 103 NCO Non Commissioned Officer 104 NGO Non Governmental Organization 105 NSE National Support Element 106 OCHA Office of Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 107 OHCHR Office of the High Commissioner For Human Rights 108 OLA Office of Legal Affairs 109 OMA Office of Operations 110 OO Observation Post	94	MOA	Memoranda of Agreement
97 MP Military Police 98 MPS Military Planning Service 99 MRM Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism 100 MTS Misconduct Tracking System 103 NCO Non Commissioned Officer 104 NGO Non Governmental Organization 105 NSE National Support Element 106 OCHA Office of Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 107 OHCHR Office of the High Commissioner For Human Rights 108 OLA Office of Legal Affairs 109 OMA Office of Military Affairs 110 OO Office of Operations 111 OP Observation Post	95	MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
98 MPS Military Planning Service 99 MRM Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism 100 MTS Misconduct Tracking System 103 NCO Non Commissioned Officer 104 NGO Non Governmental Organization 105 NSE National Support Element 106 OCHA Office of Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 107 OHCHR Office of the High Commissioner For Human Rights 108 OLA Office of Legal Affairs 109 OMA Office of Military Affairs 110 OO Office of Operations 111 OP Observation Post	96	MOVCON	Movement Control
99 MRM Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism 100 MTS Misconduct Tracking System 103 NCO Non Commissioned Officer 104 NGO Non Governmental Organization 105 NSE National Support Element 106 OCHA Office of Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 107 OHCHR Office of the High Commissioner For Human Rights 108 OLA Office of Legal Affairs 109 OMA Office of Military Affairs 110 OO Office of Operations 111 OP Observation Post	97	MP	Military Police
100 MTS Misconduct Tracking System 103 NCO Non Commissioned Officer 104 NGO Non Governmental Organization 105 NSE National Support Element 106 OCHA Office of Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 107 OHCHR Office of the High Commissioner For Human Rights 108 OLA Office of Legal Affairs 109 OMA Office of Military Affairs 110 OO Office of Operations 111 OP Observation Post	98	MPS	Military Planning Service
103 NCO Non Commissioned Officer 104 NGO Non Governmental Organization 105 NSE National Support Element 106 OCHA Office of Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 107 OHCHR Office of the High Commissioner For Human Rights 108 OLA Office of Legal Affairs 109 OMA Office of Military Affairs 110 OO Office of Operations 111 OP Observation Post	99	MRM	Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism
104 NGO Non Governmental Organization 105 NSE National Support Element 106 OCHA Office of Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 107 OHCHR Office of the High Commissioner For Human Rights 108 OLA Office of Legal Affairs 109 OMA Office of Military Affairs 110 OO Office of Operations 111 OP Observation Post	100	MTS	Misconduct Tracking System
105 NSE National Support Element 106 OCHA Office of Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 107 OHCHR Office of the High Commissioner For Human Rights 108 OLA Office of Legal Affairs 109 OMA Office of Military Affairs 110 OO Office of Operations 111 OP Observation Post	103	NCO	Non Commissioned Officer
106 OCHA Office of Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 107 OHCHR Office of the High Commissioner For Human Rights 108 OLA Office of Legal Affairs 109 OMA Office of Military Affairs 110 OO Office of Operations 111 OP Observation Post	104	NGO	Non Governmental Organization
107 OHCHR Office of the High Commissioner For Human Rights 108 OLA Office of Legal Affairs 109 OMA Office of Military Affairs 110 OO Office of Operations 111 OP Observation Post	105	NSE	National Support Element
108 OLA Office of Legal Affairs 109 OMA Office of Military Affairs 110 OO Office of Operations 111 OP Observation Post	106	OCHA	Office of Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
108 OLA Office of Legal Affairs 109 OMA Office of Military Affairs 110 OO Office of Operations 111 OP Observation Post	107	OHCHR	Office of the High Commissioner For Human Rights
109 OMA Office of Military Affairs 110 OO Office of Operations 111 OP Observation Post	108	OLA	
111 OP Observation Post	109	OMA	-
111 OP Observation Post	110	00	Office of Operations
112 OPCON Operational Control	111	OP	Observation Post
112 Of CON Operational Control	112	OPCON	Operational Control



113	OPORD	Operations Order
114	PC	Police Commissioner
115	PDT	Predeployment Training
116	PDV	Predeployment Visit
117	PEP	Post Exposure Prophylaxis
118	PIP	Predeployment Information Packages
119	PIR	Priority Information Requirement
120	PM	Permanent Mission
121	POC	Protection of Civilians
122	POINT	Peace Operations Intranet
123	PTIP	Peacekeeping Tactical Information Preparation
124	PPDB	Peacekeeping Policy and Practice Database
125	QIP	Quick Impact Project
126	QRF	Quick Reaction Force
127	QRT	Quick Reaction Team
128	RC	Resident Coordinator
129	RL	Rocket Launcher
130	RO	Regional Organization
131	ROE	Rules of Engagement
132	RPG	Rocket Propelled Grenade
133	2IC	Second-In-Command
134	SA	Situational Awareness
135	SEA	Sexual Exploitation and Abuse
136	SOFA	Status of Forces Agreement
137	SOMA	Status of Mission Agreement
138	SOP	Standard Operating Procedures
139	SRSG	Special Representative of the Secretary-General
140	SSR	Security Sector Reform
141	SUR	Statement of Unit Requirements
142	TCC	Troop Contributing Country
143	ТОВ	Temporary Operating Base
144	TOE	Table of Organization and Equipment
145	UN	United Nations
146	UN-CIMIC	United Nations Civil Military Cooperation
147	UN-CMCoord	United Nations Civil Military Coordination
148	UNCT	United Nations Country Team
149	UNIBAM	United Nations Infantry Battalion Manual
150	UNIBAT	United Nations Infantry Battalion
151	UNICEF	United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund
152	UNDP	United Nations Development Programme



153	UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
		<u> </u>
154	UNLB	United Nations Logistics Base
155	UNMAS	United Nations Mine Action Service
156	UNMO	United Nations Military Observer
157	UNOE	United Nations Owned Equipment
158	UNPKO	United Nations Peacekeeping Operations
159	UNPOL	United Nations Police
160	UNSAS	United Nations Standby Arrangements System
161	UNSCR	United Nations Security Council Resolution
162	UXO	Un-Exploded Ordnance
163	VBIED	Vehicle-Borne Improvised Explosive Device
164	VCCT	Voluntary Confidential Counselling and Testing
165	VTC	Video Tele-Conferencing
166	WO	Warrant Officer
167	XO	Executive Officer





Annex O

(Refers to Vol. II, Introduction, Section 4, p. 3)

REFERENCES

1.	Charter of the United Nations, 1945. (http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/index.shtml).
2.	Handbook on UN Multidimensional Peacekeeping Operations, 2003.
3.	DPKO/DFS United Nations Peacekeeping Operations Principles and Guidelines, 2008.
4.	DPKO/OHCHR/DPA/DFS Policy on Human Rights in UN Peace Operations and Political Missions, September 2011.
5.	United Nations Security Management System, 2008.
6.	DPKO/DFS Operational Concept on the Protection of Civilians in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (2009).
7.	DPKO/DFS Guidelines on Integrating a Gender Perspective into the Work of United Nations Military in Peacekeeping Operations, March 2010.
8.	DPKO/DFS Policy on Gender Equality in Peacekeeping Operations, 2010.
9.	Addressing Conflict-Related Sexual Violence, An Analytical Inventory of Peacekeeping Practice, 2010.
10.	DPKO-DFS Policy, Ref. [2009.17] on Mainstreaming the protection, rights and well-being of children affected by armed conflict within UN Peacekeeping Operations, 01 June 2009.
11.	DPKO/DFS policy on the prohibition of child labour in UN peacekeeping operations.
12.	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Vienna, 2004.
13.	Conduct of peacekeepers and other law enforcement personnel (Tool 9.17).



in the Mo (DPKO/D 15. The Role keeping	mplementation of Amendments on Conduct and Discipline odel Memorandum of Understanding Between UN and TCCs. FS Reference 2011.01). and Functions of HIV/AIDS Units in United Nations Peace-Operations and United Nations Security Management Sys-8. (DPKO/DFS Reference 2007.11).
keeping	Operations and United Nations Security Management Sys-8. (DPKO/DFS Reference 2007.11).
tem, 200	Congral's Pullatin on Chasial massures for protection from
	y-General's Bulletin on Special measures for protection from sploitation and sexual abuse [ST/SGB/2003/13], 2003.
	ndum of Understanding between the United Nations op Contributing Countries (including Annex H to the MOU) (Part III)].
18. Ethics in	Peacekeeping, 2005.
19. Engaging	g Civil Society in Peacekeeping, 2007.
20. Civil Affa	irs - (DPKO/DFS Policy Directive on Civil Affairs (April 2008)).
21. Civil Affa	irs Handbook, 2012.
· ·	es on the Use of Foreign Military and Civil Defence Assets in Relief (Oslo Guidelines, November 2007).
port Unit	es on the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets to Sup- ted Nations Humanitarian Activities in Complex Emergencies duidelines – November 2007).
	erence Paper on Civil-Military Relationship in Complex Emer- 28 June 2004.
25. Civil Mili (UN-CIM	tary Coordination in UN Integrated Peacekeeping Missions IC), 2010.
26. DPKO/DF ary 2007.	S Policy Directive on Quick Impact Projects (QIPs), 12 Febru-
27. DPKO/DF (Under R	FS Guidelines on Quick Impact Projects (QIPs), 01 March 2009 eview).
28. DPKO/DF	FS Environmental Policy for UN Field Missions, 2009.6.
29. Draft DF 2007.	CKO/DFS Environmental Guidelines for UN Field Missions,
30. Defence	Sector Reform Policy (UN DPKO/DFS Reference 2011.17).



31.	Report of the Secretary General 'Securing Peace and Development: The Role of the United Nations in Supporting Security Sector Reform' (A/62/659).
32.	UN DDR Web - (www.unddr.org).
33.	Integrated Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Standards, 2006. (IDDRS Module 4.10 on Disarmament, IDDRS Module 4.20 on Demobilization and IDDRS Module 4.40 on UN Military Roles and Responsibilities).
34.	Mine Action and Effective Coordination: The United Nations Inter- Agency Policy, June 2005.
35.	Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding: Clarifying the Nexus, September 2010.
36.	Report of the Secretary-General on peacebuilding in the immediate aftermath of conflict, A/63/881-S/2009/304, 2009.
37.	United Nations, Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field Support, Ref. 2008.4, Policy on "Authority, Command and Control in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations", February 2008.
38.	LCS/SUPPLY/GT Sourcing of UNOE Weapons and Ammunition in Peacekeeping Operations, 25 September 2002.
39.	DPKO/DFS Fuel Operations Manual Fuel Operations for Peacekeeping Missions (DPKO/DFS Reference 2008.26).
40.	Medical Support Manual for Peacekeeping Operations, 2012.
41.	DPKO-DFS Operational Concept on POC in UN peacekeeping, April 2010.
42.	DPKO/DFS Framework for Drafting Comprehensive POC Strategies in UN Peacekeeping Operations, April 2010.
43.	DPKO-DFS POC Resources and Capability Matrix, February 2012.
44.	DPKO/DFS Policy on Formed Police Units in UN Peacekeeping Operations, March 2010.
45.	DPKO-DFS Policy on Authority, Command and Control in UN Peace-keeping Operations, February 2008.
46.	DPKO-DFS Specialised Training Materials on POC and Prevention and Response to Conflict-related Sexual Violence, November 2011.



47.	DPKO-DFS Policy on mainstreaming the protection, rights and well-being of children affected by armed conflict within UN Peacekeeping Operations, June 2009.
48.	Secretary-General's Human Rights Due Diligence Policy on non-UN security forces, July 2011.
49.	Peace operations Intranet (DPKO & DFS) - (https://point.un.org/SitePages/dfs.aspx).
50.	COE Manual, 2011.
51.	Generic Guidelines for TCCs Deploying Military Units to UN Peace-keeping Missions (07/03/2008).
52.	SOP on Policy and SOP on Boards of Inquiry (28/05/2008).
53.	Notification of Casualties in Peacekeeping Operations and Political and Peacebuilding Missions (NOTICAS - 03/06/2006).
54.	Policy on UN Medal (29/08/2000).
55.	Interim SOP on Detention (25/01/2010).
56.	Medical Support Manual for Peacekeeping Operations (09/12/1999).
57.	Policy Directive on Contributing Country Reconnaissance Team Visits (05/10/2005).
58.	SOP on Planning and Implementing Contributing Country Reconnaissance Visits (05/10/2005).
59.	Policy Directive on Predeployment Visits (05/10/2005).
60.	SOP on Planning and Implementing Predeployment Visits (05/10/2005).
61.	Policy on Training for all UN Peacekeeping Personnel (01/05/2010).
62.	Policy on Knowledge Sharing (01/05/2009).
63.	UN ForceLink (https://cc.unlb.org/) MovCon tool for TCC deployments/ rotation/repatriation.
64.	DPKO/DFS Environmental Policy for UN Field Missions (2009.6).
65.	Draft DPKO/DFS Environmental Guidelines for UN Field Missions (2007).
66.	UN Field Mission Liquidation Manual.



67.	International Maritime Dangerous Goods (IMDG) Code.
68.	International Air Transport Association - Dangerous Goods Regulations (IATA DGR) Manual, 2012. (http://www.iata.org/ps/publications/dgr/Pages/index.aspx)
69.	Guidelines on levels of ammunition for peacekeeping operations issued by OMA/DPKO, September 2002.
70.	Guidelines for Death and Disability Claims - General Assembly document A/52/369, 17 September 1997.
71.	United Nations Peacekeeping Web – (http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/).
72.	Electoral Assistance Web – (www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/issues/electoralassistance.shtml).
73.	Peacekeeping Resource Hub website - (http://www.peacekeeping-bestpractices.unlb.org/PBPS/Pages/Public/Home.aspx).
74.	Pocket Reference Guide for Military Commanders in Peacekeeping Operations. (http://ppdb.un.org).
75.	OMA (http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/sites/oma/index.html) .
76.	UN Documents (http://www.un.org/en/documents/).
77.	UN Police – (http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/sites/police/).
78.	UNDPKO/DFS Reference 2009.32, Policy (Revised) on Formed Police Units in UN Peacekeeping Operations.
79.	UNDPKO – Police Division Reference DPKP/PD/2006/00015 Dated 08 May 2006 On Guidelines for Formed Police Units on Assignment with peace operations.
80.	Policies and Practices Database - (https://point.un.org/SitePages/PolicyAndPractices.aspx).
81.	UN Department of Safety and Security (DSS) – (https://dss.un.org/dssweb/).
82.	ICTD Web – (http://ictd.dfs.un.org/Pages/Home.aspx).





United Nations Infantry Battalion: Safety, Security and Stability

