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Foreword

As peacekeeping has evolved, particularly since the late 1980s, a growing number of United Nations peacekeeping operations have become multidimensional in nature, composed of a range of components, including military, civilian police, political affairs, rule of law, human rights, humanitarian, reconstruction, public information and gender. There are also a number of areas, such as mission support and security and safety of personnel, that remain essential to peacekeeping regardless of a particular mission’s mandate.

This Handbook, which is also available on CD-ROM, is intended to serve as an introduction to the different components of multidimensional peacekeeping operations. It is not intended to provide strategic or policy guidance. Rather, it is intended to provide field personnel who are new to the United Nations, or who are being deployed to one of our multidimensional peacekeeping operations for the first time, with general background on the responsibilities of each component of our operations and how these fit together to form the whole. We have tried to make the Handbook as brief and practical as possible, while doing justice to the broad areas of work in which many of our operations are engaged.

We hope to update the electronic version of the Handbook periodically and look forward to receiving your comments and questions.

All of us in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations wish you the very best as you embark on your new assignment in the field.

Jean-Marie Guéhenno
Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations

November 2003
### ACRONYMS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACABQ</td>
<td>Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADB</td>
<td>Asian Development Bank</td>
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<tr>
<td>APM</td>
<td>anti-personnel landmines</td>
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<td>APMBT</td>
<td>Antipersonnel Mine Ban Treaty</td>
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<td>ATM</td>
<td>anti-tank mine</td>
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<td>CAO</td>
<td>chief administrative officer</td>
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<td>CAP</td>
<td>consolidated appeals process</td>
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<td>CAS</td>
<td>country assistance strategy</td>
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<tr>
<td>CAT</td>
<td>Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCA</td>
<td>common country assessment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEDAW</td>
<td>Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CERD</td>
<td>International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CG</td>
<td>consultative group</td>
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<tr>
<td>CMIC</td>
<td>civil-military coordination cell</td>
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<tr>
<td>CPIA</td>
<td>country policy and institutional assessment</td>
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<td>CPR</td>
<td>conflict prevention and reconstruction</td>
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<td>CRC</td>
<td>Convention on the Rights of the Child</td>
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<td>DDA</td>
<td>Department for Disarmament Affairs</td>
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<td>DDR</td>
<td>disarmament, demobilization and reintegration</td>
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<td>DM</td>
<td>Department of Management</td>
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<tr>
<td>DOA</td>
<td>director of administration</td>
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<td>DPA</td>
<td>Department of Political Affairs</td>
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<td>DPI</td>
<td>Department of Public Information</td>
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<td>DPKO</td>
<td>Department of Peacekeeping Operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
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<tr>
<td>DSRSG</td>
<td>Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General</td>
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<tr>
<td>EAD</td>
<td>Electoral Assistance Division</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECOSOC</td>
<td>Economic and Social Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECPS</td>
<td>Executive Committee on Peace and Security</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECHA</td>
<td>Executive Committee on Humanitarian Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>EMB</td>
<td>electoral management body</td>
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<tr>
<td>EOD</td>
<td>explosive ordnance disposal</td>
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<tr>
<td>ERC</td>
<td>Emergency Relief Coordinator</td>
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<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>FAO</td>
<td>Food and Agricultural Organization</td>
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<td>FRY</td>
<td>Federal Republic of Yugoslavia</td>
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<td>GICHD</td>
<td>Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining</td>
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<td>HC</td>
<td>humanitarian coordinator</td>
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<tr>
<td>HI</td>
<td>Handicap International</td>
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<tr>
<td>HIPC</td>
<td>highly indebted poor country</td>
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<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>IACG-MA</td>
<td>Inter-Agency Coordination Group on Mine Action</td>
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<td>IASC</td>
<td>Inter-Agency Standing Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>IBRD</td>
<td>International Bank for Reconstruction and Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICBL</td>
<td>International Campaign to Ban Landmines</td>
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<td>ICCPR</td>
<td>International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights</td>
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<td>ICESCR</td>
<td>International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICR</td>
<td>implementation completion report</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICRC</td>
<td>International Committee of the Red Cross</td>
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<td>ICSID</td>
<td>International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes</td>
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<tr>
<td>IDA</td>
<td>International Development Association</td>
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<tr>
<td>IDP</td>
<td>internally displaced person</td>
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<tr>
<td>IFC</td>
<td>International Finance Corporation</td>
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<td>IFRC</td>
<td>International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies</td>
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<tr>
<td>IMAS</td>
<td>International Mine Action Standards</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>IMSMA</td>
<td>Information Management System for Mine Action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMTF</td>
<td>integrated mission task force</td>
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<tr>
<td>IOM</td>
<td>International Organization for Migration</td>
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<tr>
<td>IPTF</td>
<td>International Police Task Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>JAM</td>
<td>joint assessment mission</td>
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<tr>
<td>JMAC</td>
<td>joint mission analysis cell</td>
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<tr>
<td>JLOC</td>
<td>joint logistics operations centre</td>
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<td>JOC</td>
<td>joint operations centre</td>
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<tr>
<td>KFOR</td>
<td>Kosovo Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>LIS</td>
<td>landmine impact survey</td>
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<tr>
<td>MACC</td>
<td>mine action coordination centre</td>
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<tr>
<td>MAG</td>
<td>Mines Advisory Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>MIGA</td>
<td>Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>MINURSO</td>
<td>United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara</td>
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<tr>
<td>MONUC</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
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<tr>
<td>MoU</td>
<td>memorandum of understanding</td>
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<tr>
<td>MSF</td>
<td>Médecins Sans Frontières</td>
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<tr>
<td>NAM</td>
<td>needs assessment mission</td>
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<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>non-governmental organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>NPA</td>
<td>Norwegian Peoples Aid</td>
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<tr>
<td>NSGT</td>
<td>non-self-governing territory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OAS</td>
<td>Organization of American States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCHA</td>
<td>Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>OED</td>
<td>Operations Evaluation Department</td>
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<tr>
<td>OHCHR</td>
<td>Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights</td>
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<tr>
<td>OIOS</td>
<td>Office of Internal Oversight Services</td>
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<tr>
<td>OLA</td>
<td>Office of Legal Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>OMS</td>
<td>Office of Mission Support</td>
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<tr>
<td>ONUC</td>
<td>United Nations Operations in the Congo</td>
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<tr>
<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
PAD  project appraisal document
PCF  post-conflict fund
PRSP poverty reduction strategy paper
RC  resident coordinator
ROE  rules of engagement
SAC  Survey Action Centre
SDS  strategic deployment stocks
SHIRBRIG Stand-by High Readiness Brigade
SMT  security management team
SOFA status-of-forces agreement
SOMA status-of-mission agreement
SRSG Special Representative of the Secretary-General
SFOR Stabilization Force
TCC  troop-contributing country
TFET Trust Fund for East Timor
TSS transitional support strategy
UN  United Nations
UNAMA United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan
UNAMET United Nations Mission in East Timor
UNAMSIL United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone
UNAVEM United Nations Angola Verification Mission
UNDAF United Nations Development Framework
UNDP United Nations Development Programme
UNEF United Nations Emergency Force
UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNFICYP United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus
UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund
UNIFEM United Nations Development Fund for Women
UNIFIL United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon
UNIKOM United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission
UNMAS United Nations Mine Action Service
UNMEE United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea
UNMIBH United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina
UNMIK United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo
UNMIS United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor
UNMOGIP United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan
UNOPS United Nations Office for Projects Services
UNOSOM United Nations Operation in Somalia
UNPOS United Nations Political Office for Somalia
UNPREDEP United Nations Preventive Deployment Force
UNPROFOR United Nations Protection Force
UNSAAS United Nations Stand-by Arrangements System
UNSECOORD United Nations Security Coordinator
UNTAC United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia
UNTAG United Nations Transition Assistance Group
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Full Name</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UNTAES</td>
<td>United Nations Transitional Authority in Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNTAET</td>
<td>United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNTSO</td>
<td>United Nations Truce Supervision Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNV</td>
<td>United Nations Volunteers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USG</td>
<td>Under-Secretary-General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNWRA</td>
<td>United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UXO</td>
<td>unexploded ordnance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VTF</td>
<td>Voluntary Trust Fund for Assistance in Mine Action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WFP</td>
<td>World Food Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WHO</td>
<td>World Health Organization</td>
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INTRODUCTION

The Need for Peacekeeping

The United Nations (UN) was established on 24 October 1945 in the aftermath of two World Wars and was dedicated, in the enduring words of the UN Charter, to saving “succeeding generations from the scourge of war.” Since its creation, the UN has been called upon to prevent disputes from escalating into war, to persuade opposing parties to use the conference table rather than the force of arms and to help restore peace when conflict breaks out. Over the decades, the UN has helped to contain or end numerous conflicts, in many cases through the deployment of peacekeeping operations.

The Evolution of Peacekeeping

UN peacekeeping is based on the principle that an impartial presence on the ground can ease tensions between hostile parties and create space for political negotiations. Peacekeeping can help bridge the gap between the cessation of hostilities and a durable peace, but only if the parties to a conflict have the political will needed to reach the goal. Initially developed as a means of dealing with inter-State conflict, peacekeeping has increasingly been used in intra-State conflicts and civil wars, which are often characterized by multiple armed factions with differing political objectives and fractured lines of command.

These realities have, particularly since the late 1980s, led to an evolution in the structure of peacekeeping missions. A large number of peacekeeping operations are still based on the “traditional” model of a military operation deployed in support of a political activity. These operations involve military tasks such as monitoring ceasefires and patrolling buffer zones between hostile parties and are carried out by UN peacekeepers who may or may not be armed and who are widely known as "blue helmets" or "blue berets" because of their distinctive headgear. Although past military observer missions have also included non-military tasks, a growing number of UN peacekeeping operations have become multidimensional, composed of a range of components including military, civilian police, political, civil affairs, rule of law, human rights, humanitarian, reconstruction, public information and gender. Some of these operations do not have a military component but carry out their mandates alongside a regional or multinational peacekeeping force.

Depending on their mandate, multidimensional peacekeeping operations (also referred to as peace operations) may be required to:

- Assist in implementing a comprehensive peace agreement;
- Monitor a ceasefire or cessation of hostilities to allow space for political negotiations and a peaceful settlement of disputes;
• Provide a secure environment encouraging a return to normal civilian life;
• Prevent the outbreak or spillover of conflict across borders;
• Lead states or territories through a transition to stable government based on democratic principles, good governance and economic development; and
• Administer a territory for a transitional period, thereby carrying out all the functions that are normally the responsibility of a government.

While military personnel remain vital to most operations, civilians have taken on a growing number of responsibilities, which can include:

• Helping former opponents implement complex peace agreements by liaising with a range of political and civil society actors;
• Supporting the delivery of humanitarian assistance;
• Assisting with the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) of former combatants;
• Supervising and conducting elections;
• Strengthening the rule of law, including assistance with judicial reform and training of civilian police;
• Promoting respect for human rights and investigating alleged violations;
• Assisting with post-conflict recovery and rehabilitation; and
• Setting up a transitional administration of a territory as it moves towards independence.

Peacekeeping missions are not the UN’s only presence in conflict zones. Field staff of UN entities, among them the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the World Food Programme (WFP), the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), often work closely with peacekeepers. In addition, peacekeepers have been called upon to support the activities of non-governmental and other organizations engaged in providing humanitarian assistance to victims of conflicts. In many mission areas, a Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) provides, in addition to his or her other responsibilities, overall coordination for the UN funds and programmes working in the mission area.
Role of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations

The Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), which was established as a separate department of the UN Secretariat in 1992, is responsible for planning, managing, deploying, supporting and, on behalf of the Secretary-General, providing executive direction to all UN peacekeeping operations. It also performs similar functions in support of peace and security operations that are predominantly civilian, such as the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA). DPKO works very closely with the Department of Political Affairs (DPA), which is the focal point in the UN system for conflict prevention, peacemaking and peacebuilding.

Establishing Peacekeeping Operations

Peacekeeping operations are established by the Security Council, which is, under the UN Charter, the organ with “primary responsibility for international peace and security”. In each case, a new mission must be designed and its components assembled to meet the requirements of that particular situation. Since the UN has no army or police force, this requires that the Organization generate troops and civilian police from Member States and recruit international and national civilian staff, as required by the mission’s mandate.

There is no set sequence of events leading to the establishment of a peacekeeping operation, but in most cases, some combination of the following events occurs:

Consultations/peace agreements. As a particular conflict develops or worsens, or as the hostile parties approach agreement on a negotiated settlement, ongoing consultations take place among Member States, the Secretariat, the parties on the ground, states in the region concerned and countries that are potential contributors of troops, police and other resources, regarding the possible need for a UN presence and the shape it might take. It is particularly critical that the parties concerned provide consent for UN involvement. Often, one or more of the parties will insist, as a precondition for signing the peace agreement, on a UN role in verifying compliance with or helping to implement the agreement. As such, peace agreements often define the contours of any future UN operation, and the UN can provide, during the negotiations phase, valuable advice as to the kind of mandate that the UN would be able to implement—based on its capacity, expertise and previous experience—should the Security Council agree to authorize such a mandate. Early and ongoing consultation with the Security Council and other Member States, thus, is essential to ascertain if they are prepared to support the course of action envisaged for the UN and provide the resources required to do the job.

Technical assessment mission. As soon as security conditions permit, an integrated technical assessment mission involving the relevant UN departments, funds and programmes travels to the country or territory where the mission is to be established to assess the overall security, political, humanitarian, human rights and military situation on the ground and the implications for a UN operation.
**Report of the Secretary-General.** The Secretary-General makes recommendations to the Security Council, taking into account the findings and recommendations of the technical assessment mission, on the options for establishing a peacekeeping operation, including its size and resources.

**Security Council resolution.** The Security Council passes a resolution authorizing the operation’s deployment, and determining its size and mandate. (Such decisions require at least nine out of 15 votes in favour and are subject to a veto by any of the Council's five permanent members -- China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States). The budget and resources of the mission are then subject to General Assembly approval.

**Appointment of senior official.** The Secretary-General appoints a senior official, who may have already been serving as part of a UN good offices capacity, to head the operation.

**Planning.** In the meantime, planning for political, military, operational and support (i.e., logistics and administration) aspects of the peacekeeping operation is ongoing, with the SRSG (or other senior official) and DPKO in the lead. The planning phase usually involves the establishment of a Headquarters-based joint working group or integrated mission task force (IMTF), with participation of all relevant UN departments, funds and programmes.

**Contribution of troops and other resources.** Member States are asked to contribute military troops and civilian police, if required, as well as supplies, equipment, transportation and logistical support.

**Deployment.** Deployment proceeds as quickly as possible, taking into account the security and political conditions on the ground, often starting with an advance team to establish mission headquarters and leading to a gradual build-up to encompass all components and regions, as required by the mandate.

**Reporting by the Secretary-General.** The Secretary-General reports regularly to the Security Council concerning the activities of the operation.

**Reviews by the Security Council.** The Security Council renews and adjusts the mission’s mandate, as required, until the mission is completed or closed.

**Deployment**

To date, hundreds of thousands of personnel, the vast majority of them soldiers, have served in 56 UN peacekeeping operations. Military and civilian police personnel in peacekeeping operations remain members of their own national establishments but serve under the operational control of the UN and are expected to conduct themselves exclusively in accordance with the international character of their mission. They wear their national uniforms, but also wear blue berets or helmets and the UN insignia.
Civilian staff serving in peacekeeping operations include personnel drawn from within the UN system (including the United Nations Volunteers), loaned by Member States, or recruited internationally or locally to fill specific jobs.

International civilian personnel with specialized areas of expertise are indispensable to the successful implementation of peacekeeping mandates. At the same time, the UN places great priority on the development of local capacities. The “light footprint” approach—a term that was coined during the planning of UNAMA—advocates that UN activities should be limited to those that are appropriate to the local needs and context, and that international staff should be limited to the minimum required, with an effort to ensure local capacity-building, so that nationals can take over from the UN as soon as possible.

The lead time required to deploy a mission varies and depends on a number of factors, particularly the will of Member States to contribute troops to a particular operation and the timely availability of financial and other resources. In 1973, for example, elements of the second United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF II) were deployed in the Middle East within 24 hours. For missions with highly complex mandates or difficult logistics, however, or where peacekeepers face significant security risks, it may take several weeks to assemble and deploy the necessary elements. DPKO is using a number of mechanisms to build its capacity to deploy missions rapidly by:

- Establishing United Nations Stand-by Arrangements System (UNSAS) with Member States;
- Maintaining strategic deployment stocks (SDS) at the UN logistics base in Brindisi, Italy;
- Maintaining a rapid-deployment roster for civilian personnel who are trained in advance and can be rapidly deployed to start up missions; and
- Using the authority of the Secretary-General to commit needed funds before a peacekeeping operation has actually been authorized.

**Financing Peacekeeping Operations**

All Member States share the costs of UN peacekeeping operations. The General Assembly apportions these expenses based on a special scale of assessments applicable to peacekeeping. This scale takes into account the relative economic wealth of Member States but the five permanent members of the Security Council are required to pay a larger share because of their special responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. Over the past decade, the cost of peacekeeping has ranged from an all-time high of US$3 billion in 1994/1995 to a low of US$1 billion in 1998/1999.

In response to a request from the Secretary-General, Member States may volunteer soldiers, military observers, civilian police, equipment, supplies or other support for a
peacekeeping mission. Member States providing these essential elements are reimbursed from the mission budget at agreed-upon rates. Contributing personnel to peacekeeping is not obligatory and a troop-contributing country (TCC) retains the right to withdraw its personnel from an operation. Many countries also voluntarily make available, on a non-reimbursable basis, additional resources to support UN peacekeeping efforts, in the form of transportation, supplies, personnel and financial contributions, above and beyond their assessed share of peacekeeping costs.

The Brahimi Report

In August 2000, the Secretary-General published an externally commissioned report on enhancing the effectiveness of UN peace operations. The panel, chaired by Lakhdar Brahimi, former Foreign Minister of Algeria, issued its report (commonly referred to as the Brahimi Report) in August 2000.

The Brahimi Report contained 57 explicit recommendations to the Secretary-General, the Security Council, the General Assembly and Member States in general. The report focused attention on strategic, political and basic operational matters. Many peacekeeping reforms have been instituted as a result of the dialogue that ensued following the report’s issuance and continued implementation of its recommendations remains a very high priority for DPKO and the Secretariat in general.

The main recommendations of the report can be summarized as follows:

- The international community must ensure that peacekeeping is an appropriate option, given the nature of the conflict.
- There must be a peace to keep. The parties to a conflict must be willing to cease fighting and pursue their objectives through political and other non-violent means.
- All key parties to a conflict must agree to the UN’s involvement and its role in helping them resolve their conflict.
- The peacekeeping operation must be part of a more comprehensive strategy to help resolve a conflict. This often includes political, economic, developmental, institution-building, humanitarian and human rights elements, which must involve other parts of the UN system—both UN bodies and Member States—and other international organizations.
- The comprehensive strategy must take into account the regional dimension to ensure that gains made in addressing the problems that contributed to a conflict are not undermined by problems in neighbouring countries.
- The Security Council, particularly its five permanent members, must agree on the objective of an operation and provide it with a clear mandate.
• The Security Council must ensure that the mandate is achievable. This includes authorizing the deployment of an appropriate number of troops to implement a mission’s mandate and the provision by Member States of adequately trained and equipped troops.

• The credibility and ability of a mission to implement its mandate is often determined at the outset, so the rapid deployment of personnel and material is essential.

• Member States must be prepared to work together and commit to peacekeeping and peacebuilding efforts long enough to secure the conditions for their consolidation in a country recovering from war. Peace is not made overnight, particularly in countries or societies that have experienced conflict and suffering for long periods.

• UN international civilian personnel at all levels, both at Headquarters and in the field, must perform their functions with professionalism, competence and integrity. Great attention must therefore be given to selecting the most qualified staff, from the mission leadership to staff working on the front lines.

Conclusion

More than half a century after the establishment of the first UN field operation in 1948, the size and scope of UN peacekeeping operations has expanded dramatically. The UN can bring unique skills and resources to bear on conflicts that are ready for resolution, thus helping to alleviate the suffering of people affected by war and assisting them in the reconstruction of their post-conflict societies. Multidimensional peacekeeping cannot be rolled out at will, however, and there is no “one-size-fits-all” model. To succeed, peacekeeping operations must have clear mandates and adequate resources and must be tailored to fit the political, regional and other realities of the country or territory in question. Most important, they must respond to the desires and aspirations of the local population. Only then do multidimensional peacekeeping operations serve as a truly effective tool as the UN strives for a world at peace, the goal envisioned at its creation 58 years ago.
CHAPTER I: THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

Introduction

The mandate for a peacekeeping operation, as established by the Security Council, is the starting point for defining a mission’s responsibilities. The command of peacekeeping operations is vested in the Secretary-General under the authority of the Security Council. The Secretary-General, in turn, has delegated the overall responsibility for the conduct and support of these missions to the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations. The Secretary-General also, with the consent of the Security Council, appoints a Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG), who serves as Head of Mission and is responsible for implementing the mission’s mandate. The SRSG reports to the Secretary-General through the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations.1

As the mandates for peacekeeping operations become more complex, so too do the responsibilities of the SRSG. The SRSG is responsible for implementing the mission’s mandate, and developing strategies for achieving these goals using the political, institutional and financial resources available. The challenges of managing a conflict situation, its aftermath and an administratively complex operation are enormous. Responsibility for unifying these various elements effectively on the ground rests with the SRSG.

SRSG Profile

The SRSG should serve as a role model and set high professional standards of work and conduct and should lead by personal example. The SRSG should have team building and leadership skills and be able to mobilize partner support and resources. The SRSG establishes legitimacy through impartial and transparent dealings with both the parties to the conflict and the international community. The SRSG must also be able to mediate and build consensus for the political process, which requires effective planning and communication skills and a willingness to become engaged directly and personally at all levels.

Relations with United Nations (UN) Headquarters

The SRSG’s relationship with Headquarters can determine success or failure. To gain and maintain the necessary influence on the ground, the SRSG must have a clear reporting line to the highest-level decision makers in the Secretariat, including the Secretary-General. The parties to the conflict and Member States will be aware of the SRSG’s

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1 For peacekeeping operations that have a primarily military mandate, the Secretary-General may appoint a force commander or chief military observer as Head of Mission.
personal authority and influence with Headquarters, which can affect a mission’s success, and close working relationships between the SRSG and Headquarters boosts the SRSG’s credibility.

The SRSG reports to the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations and through him or her keeps the relevant offices at Headquarters fully informed of developments in the field, including achievements, challenges and obstacles so that Headquarters can better provide substantive guidance and support. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) also undertakes or facilitates consultations with other offices and departments at Headquarters level, in particular the Department of Political Affairs (DPA).

It is important that the SRSG informs Headquarters of major issues before taking decisions or beginning implementation, despite exigencies that sometimes necessitate quick decision-making. Given the responsibility entrusted to the SRSG, she or he may address the Secretary-General directly on fundamental questions but normally works at the level of DPKO. In turn, DPKO keeps the SRSG informed of all relevant developments at Headquarters. DPKO is also responsible for conveying information from the field to the Security Council and the Secretary-General.

Headquarters and the mission have complementary roles and comparative strengths in developing the political roadmap for the mission and managing its resources. The concerns of Member States and other entities may vary and the perspective in the field, which focuses primarily on regional bilateral relations, needs to be carefully coordinated with the multilateral framework in New York. Headquarters can focus the attention of and mobilize support from the Security Council and the international community. DPKO encourages Member States and other entities to work out solutions on the ground, but Member States will often raise concerns directly with DPKO.

Properly used, multiple information channels—in the field, in capitals and in New York—help maintain open communication and bring different perspectives together. Headquarters also works with the parties to the conflict on the political process and plays a key role in addressing the regional dynamics of the conflict. Headquarters may also assist the mission, particularly an SRSG new to the UN, in responding to developments on the ground by sharing its institutional memory of peacekeeping activities as well as its knowledge of UN principles, rules and precedents.

Headquarters has delegated significant responsibility to the field but has retained oversight and guidance functions. These responsibilities, which are described in Standard Directives for SRSGs (an internal document issued directly to a new SRSG once he or she has arrived at the mission), require managing a dynamic and complex situation on the ground as well as a sizeable operation. The SRSG is on the frontline of emerging developments and his or her autonomy and ability to make decisions expeditiously is of paramount importance. Thus, Headquarters relies on the SRSG’s judgement and counts on his or her being resourceful. In doing so, the SRSG must ensure that she or he always
works within the mandate and in close cooperation with Headquarters. The final decision on important policy and legal matters necessarily rests with Headquarters.

The responsibilities of the SRSG necessitate a structured and focused dialogue between Headquarters and the mission based on mutual trust, transparency and complete candour. Headquarters and the mission work to resolve most differences through open communication and continuous contact. A two-way comprehensive flow of information between the mission and Headquarters ensures that both sides stay abreast of developments and possible problems. In addition to frequent correspondence, Headquarters and the mission foster their relationship through daily informal exchanges at all levels, mutual visits and exchange of personnel. Appropriate informal contacts are encouraged, but decisions and actions should be conveyed through official communications.

Relations with Partners

Peacekeepers alone cannot achieve a lasting peace. The mandate may include a mix of responsibilities to address the causes and legacies of the conflict, but the means to carry out the mandate may not always be within the mission’s control. The various partners involved in implementing the mandate include the parties to the conflict, the host government, opposition groups, irregular forces as well as administrative entities and other parties such as neighbouring countries and communities, civil society and the local population and media.

Other key partners include:

- Countries contributing personnel;
- Other Member States;
- UN agencies, funds and programmes;
- Donors;
- Regional military or police forces;
- Regional and sub-regional organizations;
- Bretton Woods institutions;
- Inter-governmental organizations;
- Non-governmental organizations (NGOs); and
- International media.
Member States may establish informal groups to support the Security Council mandate, such as a “Group of Friends of the Secretary-General” or “Core/Contact Group.” These groups are often replicated on the ground in the mission area. The main function of these groups, at the Headquarters and field levels, is to ensure an integrated and focused political strategy and extend additional support to the mission.

Where the police and military components are under UN authority, the chain of command in the field must be firmly established. Resolving chain of command issues between the UN and personnel contributed by Member States requires extra effort. Where the military or police in the mission area are under the operational authority of another organization, such as in the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), close cooperation at all levels is required. Headquarters and the SRSG play complementary roles in fostering formal and informal relations with non-UN military or police contributors and components.

A peacekeeping operation is a joint venture of many players with legitimate interests operating within the parameters of the mandate. To be effective, the mission must work with its partners as an integrated and inclusive unit. After the deployment of a peacekeeping operation, additional partners often arrive on the scene and can include bilateral agencies, international organizations and other entities involved in social and economic development, institution building and reconciliation.

In complex missions, some partners such as UN agencies, funds and programmes or regional organizations may be integrated into the structure of the operation. This creates special coordination requirements because they staff and fund their work separately but operate under the umbrella of the mission. These components will still have a special relationship with their own headquarters, which in turn have long-standing relations with the Secretariat on issues beyond the mission.

Work is coordinated at the Headquarters level through integrated taskforces, chaired by DPKO, in which the relevant UN entities and other stakeholders are represented. Other coordination mechanisms within the UN system include the Executive Committee on Peace and Security (ECPS) and the Executive Committee on Humanitarian Affairs (ECHA), comprising the leadership of all relevant entities.

It is increasingly recognized that all actors need to take an integrated and comprehensive approach to conflict situations to achieve peace. Some partners, however, may pursue distinct interests and different strategic objectives. The SRSG must seek, therefore, to reconcile conflicting viewpoints by identifying priorities, building support with all partners and mediating between divergent interests and objectives. Relevant views should be considered prior to making decisions. A comprehensive mandate implementation plan, developed by the mission, can optimize the contributions of all partners by providing linkages and unity of purpose.

A unique relationship exists between a peacekeeping mission and the host government, which exercises sovereignty over the area in which a peacekeeping operation is deployed. Relations are generally formalized through the conclusion of a status-of-forces agreement (SOFA) or status-of-mission agreement (SOMA) between the UN and the host government, covering the rights, privileges and immunities of the mission and its personnel and the mission's obligations to the host government. The practical aspects of the daily running of a mission—from flight clearances to issuance of visas to clearance of incoming and outgoing goods and contractual services—depend on good relations with the host government.

Some host governments have appointed a primary person or office with whom the mission interacts, which has often eased communication and facilitated access between relevant interlocutors of the host government and the mission. At the same time, the relationship with the host government may be complicated because it is often a party to the conflict. In such cases, the SRSG must treat it as such and retain an objective position. The SRSG may need to remind the host government of its obligations under international law and applicable agreements and commitments negotiated as part of the political process. In some cases, particularly in an interim or transitional administration, the host government may not exercise all attributes of sovereignty or administrative responsibility over the area within which the mission operates. In such a case, the UN may opt for a political or other arrangement instead of a legal agreement.

**Responsibilities of the SRSG**

The SRSG's responsibilities can be divided into several broad areas:

- Facilitator of a political process;
- Head of UN presence;
- Head of Mission; and
- Interim or transitional administrator.

**Facilitator of a political process.** The goal of any Security Council resolution establishing and governing a peacekeeping operation is to set out the generally recognized principles and objectives of the international community’s involvement. Mandates are often the result of long and complex negotiations between Council members, however, and reflect those compromises. Moreover, the resolution of the conflict itself may remain uncertain. Compromises resulting in certain ambiguities at the time of the establishment of the mission's mandate can be viewed as necessary for building international consensus. Consequently, Security Council resolutions, while defining to the best extent possible the terms of a mandate, often do not provide detailed guidelines for implementation. Therefore, the mandate is usually further elaborated through documents and decisions of the Security Council and the Secretary-General.
The SRSG contributes to the interpretation and practical application of the mandate on the ground, in consultation and coordination with Headquarters. To this end, the SRSG develops the political strategy and plans for mandate implementation, taking into account the legal and political framework. The SRSG also makes practical and functional decisions on the interpretation of the mandate through the use and deployment of the various components within the mission. He or she ensures the active engagement of all partners and continually assesses the implementation in light of evolving imperatives. Thus, while the overall objective of sustainable peace remains firm, the actual political process depends on many factors including the dynamics on the ground and within the international community. The Security Council, as the UN organ with the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, has the final say in supporting or rejecting any proposed priority or course of action for the mission.

The main interlocutors for the SRSG in the political process are the parties to the conflict, which can include the host government, local administrative or governmental entities, armed regular and irregular forces, local militia groups and opposition groups. Focal points for contacts and relations with or among the parties may, of course, change in the course of the peace process due to evolving political and military realities. As appropriate, the SRSG takes the lead in solving any problem that may arise between the parties, as well as any that may arise between the UN and one or more of the parties. The SRSG retains flexibility within the confines of the mandate and must maintain impartiality and fairness toward all sides. At the same time, the SRSG must demonstrate resolve and firmness, as necessary, when balancing these sensitive relationships. The SRSG develops and maintains these relations through regular contact and information sharing.

In cases of intra-State conflict, the SRSG's role in the political process can become even more delicate because the SRSG works with a recognized sovereign State and perhaps an entity or rebel group that is not internationally recognized. The host government may be sensitive about the SRSG’s contacts with such entities and rebel groups. The relationship with the host government may be further complicated by demands from the opposing party or entity that it be treated as an equal political entity. At the same time, armed opposition or rebel groups may be fractured in their command structure, uninterested in constructive engagement or fail to fully demobilize and disarm. The SRSG must maintain a firm and consistent position in keeping with international law and principles while at the same time working to ensure unhindered implementation of the mandate. He or she also needs to be aware that the local population might have goals that are different from those of both the international community and the host government.

As a neutral party, the SRSG is well placed to propose measures that build confidence between the parties and promote reconciliation within the larger population. The SRSG may also bring together local and international military, police and civilian leadership in formal commissions to work on security, rule of law or civilian matters in a coordinated and cooperative manner. Such commissions are important tools as disparate groups within the local population are brought together to work on practical issues facing the community as a whole, especially in situations of ethnic conflict. Other consent-
promoting mechanisms can include civil administration, economic development, public information and donor assistance.

Outreach to the local community and civil society is extremely important. The SRSG personifies the will of the international community. In an interim or transitional administration, the SRSG exercises executive and legislative powers that directly affect the population. Direct contact with the local population and civil society allows the SRSG to better understand local realities and to influence public opinion. This can be accomplished through the direct involvement of civil society within the mission in, for example, a joint consultative body.

In some missions, the SRSG may have access to resources for quick impact projects through the mission budget or a special trust fund. These projects have proven to be valuable in enlisting public support or rectifying inequities at critical junctures in the political process. Such projects should always, however, be coordinated with the development and humanitarian communities to avoid duplication of efforts.

Outreach to the local population and the international community includes public information and communication activities in which the SRSG plays a central role as a high-profile public figure and spokesperson for the mission. Initial support for a mission can turn to apathy or even resentment as a result of sometimes-exaggerated expectations for a quick solution to the conflict. The SRSG can generate and maintain public support through effective relations with the media to explain the mandate, provide updates on progress and obstacles and build consensus for the peace process. The media, including the mission’s public information and communication component, may also be in a position to counter misinformation by the parties to the conflict and reduce the potential for dangerous expectations.

When a UN peacekeeping operation is launched, it is understood that Member States will ensure that the decisions of the Security Council are carried out; a peacekeeping operation has little chance of success without the continuing political and material support of the international community. A Member State or groups of Member States can play an extremely important role in facilitating the political process. The UN may therefore involve the Security Council and Member States that are in a position to persuade the parties to cooperate and respect the decisions of the Council.

The SRSG is responsible for managing international consensus for the mission goals and mobilizing the necessary support. The SRSG’s credibility and standing with the parties is often closely linked to support from the international community. It is important for the SRSG to maintain contact with local diplomatic representatives, senior officials in capitals as well as representatives of relevant regional/sub-regional organizations through continuous engagement and information sharing.
International donor agencies and organizations can also play a key role in securing funding for programmes not covered by assessed contributions.\(^3\) The SRSG maintains close contact with these organizations, especially with the funds and programmes of the UN, and needs to be able to work effectively within the system’s culture.

Increasingly, the World Bank and, to a lesser extent, the International Monetary Fund are providing social and economic sector assistance in post-conflict situations. They help the mission identify and procure funds for reconstruction and development, coordinate donors and establish development and reconstruction priorities.

In many conflicts, regional or sub-regional actors have a powerful influence over the parties to the conflict or may be involved in a wider conflict in the region. Therefore, a unified regional or sub-regional approach to a conflict is often a critical part of an international strategy to achieve stability in the mission area and the region. The SRSG therefore works closely with special envoys or Special Representatives of the Secretary-General or other UN representations in the region as well as with regional organizations and entities. In some cases, regional organizations may even be integrated into the structure of the mission.

Facilitating a peace process is never easy, and the SRSG is often limited by external factors outside of his or her control. The security situation may deteriorate despite the best efforts of the peacekeeping force. Long-standing issues underlying the conflict typically cannot be solved quickly; their resolution requires patient diplomacy and long-term confidence building. Even then, continued friction among the local population, especially in ethnic conflicts, can undermine progress. The local administrative structure may be in a fledgling stage and unable to assume certain responsibilities critical for sustainable peace and stability.

There can also be operational limitations. The SRSG may not have sufficient resources to achieve certain aims of the mandate. The assessed budget for the mission tends to cover core peacekeeping functions rather than all objectives included in the mandate, and new requirements may emerge unexpectedly as political dynamics change. The SRSG then takes on the additional responsibility of mobilizing the resources needed to implement the mandate. These limitations and obstacles must be taken into consideration when assessing progress in the implementation of a mandate.

**Head of UN presence.** As the highest-ranking UN official in the area acting on behalf of the Secretary-General, the SRSG has the authority to establish the political framework for, and provide leadership to, the UN presence in the mission area. In some cases, organizations of the UN system may be integral components of the mission. It is important to remember that UN development and humanitarian organizations have often operated in the mission area for many years before the start of a peacekeeping operation and have separate programmes, budgets, funding sources, reporting and operational

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\(^3\) Assessed contributions are amounts to be paid by Member States toward the UN regular and peacekeeping budgets in accordance with the scale determined by the General Assembly; see also Article 17 of the UN Charter.
requirements, structure, staffing and governing bodies. The SRSG exercises his or her leadership over the UN system organizations on the ground with consideration for their mandates and their operational and administrative requirements. UN HQ plays an important role in facilitating the relationship between the SRSG and the heads of the UN system organizations on the ground.

Peacekeeping operations are sometimes perceived as disruptive, invasive and quick to depart when trouble emerges. Nonetheless, given the extraordinary need for a peacekeeping operation in the first place, the UN's top priority is to prevent a return to conflict. The SRSG must therefore ensure that the mission and the wider UN presence pursue an integrated approach and that activities are coordinated and mutually reinforcing. This becomes even more important when the peacekeeping phase of the international community's involvement is nearing an end and responsibility for sustaining the peace is transferred to UN entities and other partners.

To support the members of the UN country team, which is the combined presence of all UN agencies, funds and programmes within a particular country, the SRSG should be informed of their priorities, identify complementarities, draw upon their expertise and work that knowledge into the overall political strategy. The SRSG can support the agencies by facilitating access to the parties, supporting fund-raising efforts, conveying concerns to the appropriate entity, and offering security and political leverage. The UN agencies, in turn, can provide the SRSG with in-depth knowledge of the local situation and their vast networks of local contacts and may implement important elements of the mandate, such as humanitarian and developmental assistance, that are not covered in the mission's budget. To this end, the SRSG convenes regular meetings of all UN entities in the mission area and maintains continuous contact to ensure that the activities of the UN system in the mission area are mutually supportive and coordinated. In some cases, it has proven useful to appoint the resident coordinator/humanitarian coordinator as Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General (DSRSG) to ensure greater strategic coherence and an effective transition from emergency relief to recovery and reconstruction.

The Secretary-General may also appoint the SRSG as the Designated Official, which is an integral element of UN security management. In that capacity, the SRSG takes on responsibility for the security and protection of staff of the UN funds, programmes and specialized agencies as well as their eligible dependants. The SRSG, as Designated Official, reports directly to the United Nations Security Coordinator (UNSECOORD) at Headquarters in this regard, and chairs the UN Security Management Team in the mission area. In all cases, peacekeeping operations should coordinate closely with all other UN entities in security management matters.

**Head of Mission.** As Head of Mission, the SRSG is responsible for managing the mission and its results, including the security and safety of personnel, discipline and morale and the effective management of resources. The SRSG provides direction and guidance to each component and ensures that activities are undertaken in an integrated manner. The SRSG initiates the development of a mandate implementation plan in close consultation with the senior management team of the mission.
The plan is designed to translate the broad objectives of the mandate into concrete tasks and measurable objectives for the mission. The SRSG closely monitors the implementation process and adjusts the plan to changing circumstances. The SRSG also manages the budget process to ensure that resource requests reflect mission priorities. In some missions, SRSGs have issued a statement that affirms the principal objectives of the operation and outlines how the mission is to be carried out. A mission statement helps to focus senior management and mission personnel on the primary aims of the mandate.

The senior management reporting to the SRSG consists of DSRSGs, heads of components and advisers in specialized areas, including legal affairs and security. In larger multidimensional operations, components may include the military, civilian police, political affairs, human rights, civil affairs, public information, mine action and administration. Depending on the size and mandate of the mission, additional components may include judicial and penal, legislative support, civil administration, institution building, electoral assistance and socio-economic development.

The SRSG also has a support office for aspects of daily work, which may consist of a chief of staff or director, a special assistant, and small units of specialized advisers, including, in most cases, a legal adviser. It may also include individuals tasked with the coordination of strategic planning and cross-cutting issues. A complex mission may include advisers on humanitarian issues, human rights, child protection and gender issues.

The SRSG is responsible and accountable for the maintenance of good order and discipline in the mission area and can take appropriate measures to ensure compliance with the standards of conduct expected of personnel associated with the UN. The SRSG may appoint a personnel conduct officer to assist in the monitoring of personnel behaviour, to raise awareness of the standards of conduct among mission personnel and to act as a point of notifications for allegations of misconduct.

A mission with many separate components and advisers will only work well if the leadership pulls together as a team. The ability to maintain team spirit and unity of effort is often one of the most challenging tasks faced by the SRSG in managing a multidimensional operation. This task becomes even more complex when partners outside of the Secretariat are integrated into the structure of the mission, such as UN agencies and regional organizations. In managing the team, the SRSG also works to balance a variety of national and professional backgrounds and different cultures and operational requirements of components.

The SRSG must be able to delegate responsibilities as far down the chain of command as possible. This is not always easy because of the tendency to keep a tight rein on key activities and rely on a small number of close staff. Decentralizing operational decisions can strengthen the mission's management and increase its output, and a strong team of Deputies and senior staff will ensure clear lines of responsibility and accountability.

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4 See Ten Rules: Code of Personal Conduct for Blue Helmets and We are United Nations Peacekeepers for standards of conduct for uniformed personnel serving in UN field missions and Status, Basic Rights and Duties of UN Staff Members (ST/SGB/1998/19) for standards applicable to civilian staff.
An SRSG typically has one DSRSG or a designated officer-in-charge during temporary absences. Additional deputies can be appointed in particularly complex missions. A DSRSG may be selected for a particular expertise, e.g., economic development, civil administration or humanitarian assistance. While a DSRSG always acts as Head of Mission in the absence of the SRSG, her or his specific functions depend on the structure and mandate of the mission.

A DSRSG provides critical support to the SRSG in the day-to-day management of the mission and in the development of strategies for mandate implementation. In addition, she or he is usually responsible for specific aspects of the mandate and oversees the components concerned. For example, a DSRSG for humanitarian and development efforts may be appointed to ensure a smooth transition from relief to recovery. Another DSRSG may be responsible for a component delegated to a regional organization within the mission.

The division of responsibilities and command relationships between the SRSG, force commander and/or police commissioner, in cases when the military and police components are under the UN, have been carefully delineated in the respective official directives and their effective implementation is critical to the success of the peacekeeping operation. The SRSG exercises operational authority over the military component, and the force commander has primary responsibility for its operational organization and efficient functioning. The same applies to the police commissioner.

The division of responsibility between the SRSG and chief administrative officer (CAO) or, in more complex missions, director of administration (DOA), has also been clearly defined in directives. The CAO/DOA assists the SRSG in ensuring that the mission is managed, administered and supported within the rules of the UN and with support from Headquarters. The CAO/DOA must carefully balance respect for the SRSG as Head of Mission with his or her responsibilities to the Organization as the mission's certifying officer, appointed directly by the UN controller. It is crucial that the SRSG has access to effective and qualified legal support from a legal adviser to ensure that operational decisions are based on the parameters of the mandate, international law, UN rules and procedures and local laws.

A "cabinet approach" has proven to be the best way to achieve mission integration and coordination. An executive body of senior managers meets regularly, usually daily, to discuss political direction, strategies and implementation, defining the tasks and benchmarks of all components and discussing their respective needs and concerns. Permanent or ad hoc working groups or committees, which can include a wider range of internal or external participants, may be established to complement the cabinet and deal with tasks such as minority protection, returns or sectoral economic development. The host government and/or local leadership may also interact with senior management in a formalized structure, including appropriate consultative fora, particularly in interim or transitional administrations.
Mission personnel should be informed of all developments that are relevant to their work. Admittedly, communication and information flow can be a challenge in a fast-moving environment where strategies can change quickly and where the communications infrastructure may not be adequate. Nevertheless, the SRSG must promote a free flow of all but the most sensitive information among the various components of the mission, especially communications received from Headquarters, such as code cables. Heads of components are expected to disseminate this information to their staff. The SRSG should also encourage information exchange through appropriate informal contacts between mission personnel and their counterparts at Headquarters. Finally, mission components need to communicate directly with one another on day-to-day operational matters.

**Interim or transitional administrator.** In a few exceptional cases, the UN has governed an area under an interim or transitional administration mandate, as in Cambodia, Eastern Slavonia (Croatia), Kosovo (Serbia and Montenegro) and Timor-Leste (formerly East Timor). In addition to the functions fulfilled by other multidimensional peacekeeping operations, a UN interim or transitional administration has authority over the legislative, executive and judicial structures in the territory or country. Such a mandate adds an additional layer of complexity to the SRSG role; the SRSG must ensure that the exercise of administrative authority does not adversely influence any political agreements reached with the parties.

As the head of an interim or transitional administration, the SRSG is directly responsible for governmental functions and is accountable to both the local population and to the Secretary-General. The SRSG holds full executive and sometimes legislative authority, even during the transition period, when selected functions are being devolved to local authorities. In exercising authority, the SRSG needs to be aware of the provisional status of the UN peacekeeping operation. This implies that all activities and obligations should be undertaken in a manner that does not prejudge the final settlement (if not clearly defined in the mandate) and does not create legal or political liabilities for the UN after its departure from the mission area.

One of the main challenges for the SRSG is the need to balance international expectations of the speedy implementation of the mandate with the importance of bringing the local population on board and building local capacity. This becomes even more difficult in situations of ethnic conflict. The mission's executive responsibilities include running governmental entities at different administrative levels (central, regional and municipal), maintaining law and order through an executive police force, administering justice, building institutions and local capacity, managing local assets (such as public funds, bank accounts, property and enterprises) and developing the economy. Depending on the specific needs in the area, this may also require the coordination of the return of refugees and IDPs, reconstructing housing, holding elections, creating a legal framework for governance and other administrative actions, demining, demobilizing and reintegrating former combatants, monitoring borders or boundaries, ensuring freedom of movement and protecting human rights. These responsibilities may be executed directly through international staff or indirectly through local authorities.
A rule-of-law vacuum in post-conflict situations can be another significant challenge for the SRSG in an interim administration. Vested with legislative authority, the SRSG is responsible for building up a legal and regulatory framework. With the legal adviser as focal point, the mission prepares legislation for promulgation by the SRSG, which may be subsequently published in an official gazette. The mission may also interpret local laws, assess their compliance with international laws and human rights standards and principles, and modify them as appropriate. The SRSG may exceptionally use executive orders and decrees to promote the rule of law, including provisions for the deployment of international judges and prosecutors. To minimize the need for extraordinary measures, the SRSG should focus, at the outset, on the speedy establishment of a robust international law enforcement capability to be eventually supplemented and replaced by local personnel.

The SRSG may face the added challenge of administering the mission area within an existing sovereign State. Local authorities, or self-proclaimed representatives, may have already set up pseudo administrative structures that challenge the authority of the SRSG. The SRSG will have to impose authority on them from the outset and continue to ensure that parallel administrative structures do not compete with the authority of the UN bodies. These parallel structures may or may not have the support of the local population. The SRSG needs to convince the local population and local leaders that cooperation with the UN administration is in their best interests. In cases where there is a threat to security or law and order, the SRSG, in consultation with Headquarters, must be prepared to use military or police force in accordance with the mission’s rules of engagement.

During the period of interim or transitional administration, the political role of the SRSG becomes more prominent as she or he becomes a political advocate in and for the area. Locally, she or he needs to provide an effective administration and build public consensus for the end game. Internationally, the SRSG serves as a “diplomatic” representative of the country, territory or province being administered vis-à-vis the Security Council, the international community and donor organizations. Such a role requires the SRSG and the Secretariat to be sensitive to any identification with partisan positions. Governmental agencies and NGOs working within the area need to understand that they must relate to the mission as the governmental authority and coordinate their work with the objectives and priorities of the administration.

The success of an interim or transitional administration is ultimately determined by its effectiveness in devolving the powers held by the UN to local authorities. The mission needs to pave the way for this transition by creating sustainable political, administrative and legal institutions and work to develop a positive local administrative culture and public perceptions of the local authorities and institutions. The transition often includes the organization of local elections.

Managing this transition is crucial and the international community needs to ensure the long-term viability of the new structures, including accountability to the public. This often requires time beyond the mandate of the mission. The SRSG may employ different mechanisms to reinforce these changes, such as political agreements with the successor
administration, which the UN may use to measure progress and adherence to the mandate. In cases where the final status of an area has not been agreed to, the SRSG needs to take the wider political realities into account when managing the devolution of responsibilities, making the task even more complex and sensitive.

**Transition/Exit Strategy**

A peacekeeping operation is designed to be temporary and the goal is to stabilize the situation and lay the groundwork for a stable and sustainable peace. The decision to end a mission's mandate is a political one and rests with the Security Council. The Council assesses when peacekeeping operations can cease and remaining responsibilities can be handed over to local authorities. These assessments are not easy and the timetable is determined by the Security Council, with input by the Secretary-General, Headquarters, key Member States and the SRSG.

Mission planning must, from the outset, include a transition/exit strategy with the understanding that the strategy will require constant adjustment. This may include coordinating, planning and preparing the political groundwork for a successor mission, a systematic handover of responsibilities to local authorities and other partners or a joint UN system effort to move from post-conflict priorities to a peacebuilding process.
CHAPTER II: POLITICAL AFFAIRS

Introduction

The fundamental concern of political affairs in a peacekeeping context is to understand the dynamics of the armed conflict that created the requirement for a peacekeeping operation, to follow closely the evolution of these dynamics and to develop strategies to help the parties in conflict resolve disputes through peaceful means. Political affairs work is, therefore, at the heart of conflict management in a peacekeeping mandate.

Regardless of the size or scope of the operation, political affairs officers must never lose sight of the larger national and international political context. Dissecting whose interests are served by the perpetuation of the conflict and, within the confines of the mandate, devising innovative solutions for changing the underlying dynamics are the great challenges of political affairs officers. The job typically includes the following tasks, under the overall direction of the Head of Mission:

- Compiling profiles of key players in a conflict or peace process;
- Analysing political developments;
- Establishing contacts with parties to the conflict at all levels;
- Developing strategies to achieve or implement peace agreements;
- Working with diplomats to use the leverage of Member States;
- Developing disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programmes with military colleagues and humanitarian and development organizations;
- Providing policy advice to government officials, including the development of roadmaps for political progress;
- Conceptualizing, planning and establishing new political institutions under a transitional administration mandate; and
- Interacting with donors to mobilize resources for peace negotiations or peace-building activities.

Structure

Political affairs originated with the recognition that political advice needed to be internally available to Heads of Mission who, under traditional peacekeeping mandates, were typically drawn from the military. The function was usually fulfilled by a political
adviser, sometimes assisted by a political affairs officer. The adviser monitored the political implications of the activities of the military contingents or observers.

This model continues to be used in operations whose mandate is primarily military, like the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). In most missions with a political mandate, however, political affairs is a substantive civilian component, although its size and structure can vary from mission to mission. Some missions have only a few political affairs officers who are part of the Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, or the Head of Mission. Larger missions like the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM) and the United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) may have more than 30 political affairs officers under an organizational unit headed by a director of political affairs at mission headquarters, with field deployments throughout the country.

The responsibilities of political affairs officers are assigned directly by the Head of Mission or by the head of the section. The division of labour is usually based on standard functions that political affairs officers are expected to perform (as detailed below). The team will function at its best when assignments are tailored to the specific backgrounds of political affairs officers, and the SRSG, together with the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), should ensure a balanced composition through recruitment choices.

The profiles of political affairs officers have become as varied as the tasks they are expected to undertake. While an academic grounding in political science or international relations, as well as knowledge of the country or region, is often preferred, political affairs officers now include lawyers, diplomats, journalists, humanitarian aid workers, human rights activists, teachers and anthropologists, to name a few. The main requirements are versatility and an ability to analyse and communicate clearly. When crises hit a mission, political affairs officers are often at the front lines; these crises can include the resumption of military hostilities, hostage incidents and diplomatic fallouts. The SRSG will usually rely on his or her political staff to devise a quick response -- a task that requires good instincts and sound judgement.

**Functions**

Political affairs staff report directly to the SRSG. A line of communication is also maintained between designated members within the political affairs component and the political desk officer in the Office of Operations in the DPKO. The political affairs component supports the SRSG in translating the mandate into objectives and targets on the ground and monitors and reports on the status of their implementation. With varying emphasis, these functions broadly encompass the following:

- Negotiation and liaison;
- Monitoring and reporting on developments;
- Coordination; and
- Research, analysis and policy planning.

**Negotiation and liaison.** The Political affairs component establishes and maintains the mission’s primary contacts with the parties to the conflict by gathering information, resolving disputes and responding to queries. If there is no peace agreement in place when the mission is deployed, if subsidiary agreements/protocols need to be brokered or if an agreement breaks down, political affairs officers take on major additional responsibilities in supporting the SRSG during negotiation processes.

Most agreements reflect a strenuous compromise among competing interests, which is often further complicated by differing interpretations of the agreement by their signatories. It falls on the SRSG and her/his team of political affairs officers to continuously remind all sides of the commitments made and the need for compliance. Ongoing mediation is required to resolve issues on which the parties “agree to disagree” under the original peace treaty. This takes on particular significance as the peace process evolves because power balances shift and may favour different groups at various stages. Political affairs officers should be aware of the emergence of potential winners and losers, especially in the lead-up to elections and in the immediate aftermath, in order to prevent a breakdown in cooperation.

In addition to the parties to the conflict, the political affairs component interacts closely with other partners in the peace process, including the wider United Nations (UN) community, diplomats, international and regional organizations and civil society groups and leaders. Since the mission represents the collective will of the international community, contacts with embassy personnel of Members States at all levels should be frequent and transparent to ensure that capitals are well informed of the mission’s work and priorities. The political affairs component is also responsible for the primary liaison with the host government, including the office of the president or prime minister, the cabinet, parliament and the relevant local authorities.

Although all components of the mission have external contacts in their respective functional areas, for example with line ministries, security forces or humanitarian organizations, the political affairs component manages the overview. UN military observers are usually best placed to interact with the rank and file of rebel and militia groups while senior military or civilian personnel at mission headquarters focus on the leadership of such groups. These contacts at various levels must be synchronized to maximize impact and portray a unified mission. This is an important task for political affairs officers who advise the SRSG on the appropriate level and nature of contacts between mission personnel and external partners, including when it becomes necessary for the SRSG to intervene personally at the highest level.
Aspects of Negotiations

A critical but often overlooked element of successful negotiations is a clear agreement on the process. In their haste to get to the table, parties and mediators may give short shrift to the pre-negotiation stage of setting up the framework within which substantive issues can be discussed. It has been repeatedly proven that bad processes will almost definitely lead to failure. Pre-negotiations can also help establish the concept of dialogue between the parties, even when substantive issues are still too contentious to discuss.

Major elements of pre-negotiation include:

- Agreeing on basic principles, rules and procedures for discussion and decision-making;
- Deciding on participation and methods of representation;
- Assessing preconditions and barriers;
- Creating a level playing field for the parties;
- Determining the resources for the negotiations;
- Determining the venue, form and timeframe of negotiations;
- Facilitating communication and information exchange, including level of confidentiality; and
- Determining forms of third-party intervention.


Monitoring and reporting. To provide thorough and accurate analyses of the status of mandate implementation and cooperation between the parties in conflict, political affairs officers are expected to maintain comprehensive knowledge of the overall situation in the mission area. They continuously review and evaluate political developments as well as security, humanitarian and economic developments. The component may divide its monitoring responsibilities by assigning political affairs officers to focus on specific aspects such as humanitarian activities or sub-regional developments. In missions that do not have a dedicated civil affairs or human rights capacity, political affairs officers may be charged with tracking and reporting on reconstruction, reconciliation and human rights issues. In the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM), for example, political affairs officers were in charge of organizing national reconciliation conferences throughout the country.
The monitoring role of the political affairs component goes beyond the mission area to cover developments in the sub-region which may affect the peace process. In addition, all political affairs officers must keep themselves informed of developments at UN Headquarters pertaining to the mission, in particular the deliberations and decisions of the Security Council and the General Assembly, as well as the concerns of Member States, including the countries contributing personnel to the mission. This information should form part of the informal exchange between the field and the political desk officer in DPKO.

Transparency and comprehensiveness in the exchange of information between the mission and DPKO Headquarters is crucial to the success of any operation because Headquarters has a broader perspective on the priorities and concerns of the international community. At the same time, Headquarters can only represent the views and requirements of a mission effectively if it has access, at all times, to precise information from the people on the ground. Political affairs has the primary responsibility for drafting reports from the mission to DPKO, thus providing the essential link between the global vision at Headquarters and developments on the ground.

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**The Somalia Experience**

Political work in UNOSOM meant being catapulted from one extreme to the next, wavering between efforts to promote peace and rebuild the government and relapses into chaos and violence. A small group of three political affairs officers was there from the beginning, supporting the first tentative steps towards dialogue and reconciliation among the fighting clans, and their efforts finally led to the signing of a peace agreement in March 1993.

Backed by an expanding mission, political affairs officers assisted in developing disarmament plans and restoring local government structures, paving the way for setting up district and provincial councils and presiding over the selection process for district council members. Although fragile, the peace process seemed on track when suddenly everything came to an abrupt halt in the aftermath of warlord Aideed’s murderous attack on Pakistani peacekeepers.

While the hunt for Aideed was under way, political affairs officers worked long hours under harsh conditions to salvage the peace process. They concentrated their efforts on opening dialogue with accessible associates of Aideed, desperately trying to keep factions outside of the battle zone committed to the peace agreement, and talking non-stop with religious and traditional leaders in their work to de-escalate the crisis.

In the end, their efforts were in vain. International resolve waned and the UN was forced to pull out. After the peacekeeping force was withdrawn, two political affairs officers accompanied the special representative to Nairobi where a small office was set up to continue monitoring developments in Somalia. They maintained contacts with sources inside the country and worked closely with organizations and agencies that still had local staff in Somalia. A follow-on office (UNPOS) has since continued to assist in monitoring the Somali conflict from Nairobi.
Formal reporting falls into four broad categories:

**Daily, weekly and monthly situation reports** form the backbone of the mission’s regular formal communication with DPKO. Situation reports are factual summaries of the main developments in the mission area and relate to the mandate of the peacekeeping operation, from ceasefire violations to election results. Inputs for situation reports are generally provided by all the components in the mission.

**Substantive communications** with DPKO (usually in the form of code cables) focus on a single key event or development in the mission area and provide greater detail than the situation reports. These communications focus on analysis and recommendations. Where necessary, particularly sensitive information sent by code cable may be classified and distributed to a limited number of people.

**Providing information for briefings** to the Security Council and meetings of troop-contributing countries enables the Secretariat to keep Member States abreast of developing situations or key events, especially crises, during the period between periodic reports of the Secretary-General. Briefings also provide an opportunity to discuss particularly complex issues that cannot be fully addressed within the page limits of formal reports. In some cases, oral briefings may become a monthly requirement. Whether regular or *ad hoc*, briefings are integral to the dialogue between the Secretariat and Member States and can be initiated by either side.

**First drafts of reports of the Secretary-General to the Security Council** are fact-based, chronological narratives of developments and progress. Most peacekeeping operations report to the Security Council at regular intervals, ranging from twice a year to almost monthly reports, depending on the volatility of the situation in the mission area. There are exceptions, however, such as United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP), which, because of its specific mandate, has not submitted a report to the Council since 1972. The draft of the report from the field is usually revised by the desk officers in the Office of Operations, in consultation with the mission. Before submission to the Office of the Secretary-General, these reports are cleared by senior DPKO officials and other relevant department heads.

While these reporting tasks may sometimes seem mundane, they are a crucial means of keeping Headquarters apprised of developments and enable Member States to make informed decisions on the nature of UN involvement in a conflict situation. The Secretary-General’s reports to the Security Council provide, by their tone and approach, important contributions to the international debate about the issues in question. Their impact in shaping the international community’s perceptions of a given conflict should not be underestimated, although the decisions and actions of Member States are naturally influenced by a variety of factors.

Political affairs officers may also be charged with taking notes during meetings held by the SRSG with the parties to the conflict or the main regional and international players.
The political affairs officer will then often be responsible for developing these notes into reports for DPKO, including the appropriate analysis and observations. DPKO provides all peacekeeping missions with standard reporting requirements as well as guidelines for preparing situation reports, code cables and draft reports of the Secretary-General. Because the UN uses unique terminology and language, all political affairs officers in peacekeeping missions should be familiar with the official style of UN documents and DPKO’s reporting guidelines.

**Coordination in the mission.** The political affairs office also plays an important coordinating role within the mission. As part of its reporting responsibilities, political affairs coordinates inputs for reports to UN Headquarters in New York from all mission components as well as other UN organizations. In some missions, field offices or regional headquarters are headed by a political affairs officer who coordinates reporting to the mission headquarters by all the other components deployed in that area. The coordinating function of political affairs ensures that reporting reflects the integrated approach required from multidimensional operations and that the different offices and components are not providing repetitive or conflicting information.

Political affairs also has the critical task of providing guidance and advice to other components of the mission on potential political implications of any activity. This ranges from the more obvious consequences of planned military or human rights activities to seemingly non-controversial issues such as administrative support, since even procurement decisions can have political implications. Political affairs officers should therefore stay abreast of the activities and priorities of all components and encourage unity of effort, and an agreed-upon system should be in place within the mission to ensure that political affairs officers can effectively fulfil this advisory function.

Political affairs officers are also primarily responsible for coordinating the visits of political officials. These visits include regular regional office visits by the SRSG as well as large diplomatic delegations or mission visits from senior UN officials. Political affairs officers prepare the itinerary and provide appropriate briefing material.

**Political analysis and policy planning.** The political affairs component takes the lead in assessing how the mandate of a multidimensional operation can be achieved in the specific and evolving conditions on the ground. This requires analysis of all factors that influence the peace process, including the level of cooperation by the parties to the conflict and the incentives and disincentives available to the international community in encouraging compliance with the agreements reached.

An important element of this task is the identification of the main political players in the peace process, which may include, in addition to the parties to the conflict, influential elders, religious leaders, civil society groups and external players. This enables the political affairs officers to target the mission’s strategy for the peace process to the objectives and constituencies of these key players, either in preparing for negotiations or in implementing an agreement.
The political strategy resulting from such analyses should incorporate the views of all components and provide the basis of a mandate implementation plan, stating the basic assumptions, goals, benchmarks, desired sequencing of events and key activities of the mission as well as factors that could undermine its effectiveness.

In a multidimensional operation, it can be particularly difficult to balance competing priorities of mandate implementation. For example, missions are given increasingly strong and distinct human rights mandates that may seem to conflict with the need for quickly achieving political and military stability. A good implementation plan will define complementary tasks and time lines (sequencing) for all components so that the mission can move forward in each area of the mandate. It must take into account logistics and other support capacity and be closely linked to the budget process to ensure that any strategy is properly resourced.

The political strategy should also provide clarity about the central messages that all components of the mission will convey to the outside, especially those in the regions and municipalities, as they are the most visible presence of the mission. To remain valid, the strategy must be subject to continuous review and adjustment. Vital guidance is provided in this process by political affairs, in consultation with all other components, but it is the senior management team and, ultimately, the SRSG, who make final decisions.

**Partnerships within the Mission**

To be effective, political affairs must build a network of dynamic partnerships with a broad range of stakeholders in the peace process. Partnerships offer mutual benefits in the form of information sharing, expertise, experience and even resources; they can also be a valuable way to ensure that players inside and outside the mission clearly understand its purpose and tasks, thus enhancing the likelihood of the mission’s success.

All mission personnel, including local staff, constitute a vital resource for political work. While political affairs officers may provide guidance to other components, they in turn frequently provide political affairs with invaluable information and support for its analyses and negotiating strategies. UN military observers and civilian police as well as civil affairs and human rights officers often make observations on the ground that provide an early warning for looming crises.

Equally important is a close relationship with the spokesperson and public information officers. Political affairs provides the public information component with the latest developments, and public information reciprocates with analyses of media events or interpretations gleaned from local journalists. The two components can thereby jointly advise the SRSG on the messages that need to be sent to the parties to the conflict or other stakeholders as well as on issues surrounding the mission’s public image.

At times, tensions arise between the mediation efforts of political affairs officers and the activities of other components. For example, the activities of public information or the activist nature of human rights work may be seen by political affairs as disruptive to the
fragile relations between the mission and the parties to the conflict. However, if the UN
aimed to please all stakeholders at all times, it would be impossible to effectively address
the many layers of a conflict situation. Moreover, parties may use allegations against the
mission as a tactic in the ongoing conflict with their political opponents.

Political affairs officers must uphold the credibility and integrity of the UN at all times,
including by defending the principles of public information and human rights work and
any other mission task as mandated by the Security Council. All components need to
keep in mind that every role is invaluable to overall success and the SRSG should
exercise his/her leadership abilities in forging a strong team.

**External Partnerships**

There is a special relationship between a peacekeeping operation and the country
representatives of UN specialized agencies, funds and programmes, given the many ways
in which development and humanitarian objectives interact with political and security
concerns. The overall leadership role played by the SRSG vis-à-vis the resident
coordinator (RC) and UN country team (see Chapter XIII on Humanitarian Assistance) is
usually directly supported by the political affairs component, which organizes meetings at
the senior level and liaises with various agency counterparts at the working level.

In some cases, UN agencies may form a component of the mission, such as in the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) where the United Nations
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) headed one of the four pillars. Even where
the agencies are not an integral part of the mission, cooperation has often been
institutionalised to such an extent that agency personnel participate in the mission’s
senior management team meetings or the work of joint operations centres. The UN
country team is a critical source of information for a mission as they have often operated
in the area for many years and maintain a widespread network of personnel and contacts.
For that reason, political affairs should actively solicit the views and contributions of the
UN system partners with regard to the mission’s activities.

Other partners include representatives of Member States, international or regional inter-
and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), international financial institutions,
diplomats, civil society groups and local NGOs, as well as local and international
journalists. Partnerships can manifest themselves in different ways. For example,
disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programmes in Sierra Leone and the
Democratic Republic of the Congo have brought together a broad coalition of funding,
technical and operational partners.

In some instances, UN agencies, humanitarian NGOs and local partners cooperate closely
with the peacekeeping mission by sharing resources and facilities to address a very
specific issue of concern. Regional organizations can be a component of the mission,
such as in UNMIK with the European Union (EU) and the Organization for Security and
Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) each heading one of the four pillars. Missions with a
military mandate can have a more limited network of outside partnerships, while for the
United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor (UNMISET), the task of nation-building has required a particularly intense focus on external partnerships.

Political affairs will assess which external partnerships are appropriate to pursue within the mandate of the mission. Local and international NGOs are invaluable sources of information, especially concerning remote or outlying areas where they are often based. However, certain partnerships may be frowned upon in highly politicised environments. Humanitarian organizations may prefer to distance themselves from the peacekeeping operation for fear of being drawn into political disputes. It is important that political affairs addresses such concerns because these partners may have to continue functioning in the area long after the peacekeepers are gone and therefore may make decisions from a different perspective.

### Timor Sea Treaty

In the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET), the political affairs office, at the request of and together with the Timor-Leste (East Timor) leadership, negotiated a treaty with Australia governing the substantial oil and gas resources in the Timor Sea. The Timor Sea Treaty, which went into effect on 20 May 2002, the date of Timor-Leste’s independence, places these resources largely under the control of Timor-Leste.

The negotiations were intensive and took 18 months to conclude. The political affairs officers needed to be skilled negotiators and become familiar with oil and gas issues and maritime boundary law, consulting each step of the way with the legal component. They had to work closely with the Timor-Leste leadership, maintain the confidence of nervous investors and develop a media strategy for what was a high-profile issue in both Australia and Timor-Leste. The treaty will provide Timor-Leste with significant revenues over the next 20 years -- critical income for a country with a limited government budget.

It is vital to have partnerships with neighbouring countries and regional organizations that have an interest in the peace process. A political affairs officer is often designated as the focal point for such contacts, with the role of keeping these regional stakeholders informed of major developments, gathering information on their interests and policies relating to the peace process and organizing meetings between them and the Head of Mission. Since neighbouring countries often have competing interests, dealing with them may require seasoned political affairs officers with extensive diplomatic experience. Heads of Mission may wish to ensure such capacity is available to them. In some missions, it is necessary to establish political liaison offices in neighbouring countries, which are supported and often headed by political affairs officers.

### Challenges

Political affairs can have many interpretations, and the function can carry great responsibilities and expectations, and even give rise to suspicion amongst those outside
the UN. The close working relationship with the SRSG often means that this component has access to privileged information in the mission and at UN Headquarters. As a result, political affairs officers will often have their work closely scrutinized, particularly in tense or highly politicised environments, and can easily find themselves in the middle of controversy.

Parties to the conflict will usually try to convince their interlocutors at the mission that they are without blame and that the other side is entirely at fault. Any criticism of their actions on the part of the UN often leads to accusations of partiality. As representatives of the international community, mission personnel must assess the situation fairly and objectively and must have the courage to convey their conclusions in unmistakable terms. This task often falls to political affairs officers as they provide the final analysis of developments and advise the SRSG on the recommended course of action.

Another important challenge for political affairs officers is that they are often expected to provide creative solutions to problems faced by and within the mission even beyond the strictly political arena. The ability to think quickly and creatively, anticipate obstacles and provide alternative solutions is as important as the courage to present new ideas and push for them if necessary. Although these demands can be daunting at times, and officers need to be both resourceful and resilient to cope well, there is tremendous satisfaction when analysis and action come together successfully to bring stability to war-torn countries.
CHAPTER III: CIVIL AFFAIRS

Introduction

The role of civil affairs is to engage and assist local civilian authorities and communities in efforts to consolidate peace by restoring the political, legal, economic and social infrastructures that support democratic governance and economic development. The civil affairs component has successfully fulfilled this role in missions as diverse as the United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH) and the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL).

Throughout the 1990s, the increasing complexity of peacekeeping mandates required specialization within the mission structure. In transitional administrations in the mid-1990s, such as the United Nations Transitional Authority in Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium (UNTAES), the civil affairs component was, in effect, responsible for practically all aspects of reintegration and reconstruction.

In interim administration missions beginning in the late 1990s, such as the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) and the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET), the United Nations (UN) performed ever more specialized governmental functions at all administrative levels in the mission area. In these cases, civil affairs became a civil administration responsible for directly managing all aspects of civilian life while simultaneously working to devolve its responsibilities to local authorities. It should be strongly emphasized, however, that governance mandates are the exception rather than the norm in peacekeeping.

Profile

Because of the range of specialized expertise required, whether in a civil affairs, civil administration or other multidimensional mandate, there is a broad range of professional backgrounds among civil affairs officers. These include political science, law, international relations, business administration, engineering, economics or a specific sectoral area pertinent to the needs of a mission, such as education, health and finance. In addition to providing expert advice, civil affairs officers should also be able to conduct independent analysis; identify strategic issues, opportunities and risks; exercise good judgment; negotiate; develop operational plans; establish and maintain productive partnerships and communicate and operate effectively in a multicultural and multi-ethnic environment.

Civil affairs officers are the civilian face of the mission to the local population and it is therefore particularly important that they understand local culture, customs, institutions and laws and are prepared to learn from local stakeholders. With increasingly complex mandates, civil affairs work inevitably spans both peacekeeping and peacebuilding.
functions. Thus, civil affairs officers often have one of the most diverse and multi-dimensional roles in the mission.

**Structure**

The distinction between the political affairs and civil affairs components in missions is not always clear. In missions where only one of the two components is deployed, their work has sometimes encompassed tasks from both areas. In missions where both components are deployed, civil affairs develops specific work programmes within the overall mandate implementation plan, while political affairs performs broad, strategic analysis and coordination functions within the mission (see Chapter II on Political Affairs).

In an interim or transitional administration, the civil affairs component performs governmental functions, which necessarily have a political dimension. Depending on the mandate and structure of the mission, both political affairs and civil affairs may have interlocutors at the national, ministerial, regional or municipal level. The substantive focal point in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) at UN Headquarters for both components is the desk officer in the respective regional division of the Office of Operations.

The civil affairs component is typically based on a field structure with a core presence at mission headquarters and civil affairs officers deployed throughout the mission area, depending on the nature and size of the mission. In missions without governance functions, civil affairs officers at mission headquarters liaise with other units, organizations and local institutions at the central level, contribute to the mission’s overall strategy development and oversee the network of civil affairs regional and sub-regional offices to ensure coordinated and consistent fieldwork. The head of this component is expected to maintain extensive high-level contacts with local and international counterparts.

In the field, civil affairs coordinators or, in the context of transitional or interim administrations, regional or municipal administrators, manage a regional network of field offices. They supervise civil affairs officers deployed to regional and sub-regional offices and are responsible for pursuing common strategic goals and ensuring timely and accurate reporting from all field locations.

At the local level, civil affairs officers of any rank are often the most visible civilian representatives of the UN. They develop and maintain a wide network of contacts at all levels of local and regional government and interact with other key players in the community, such as traditional leaders or civil society representatives and the local media (see Chapter IV on Public Information). In some missions, civil affairs officers have been co-located with UN military or civilian police units at headquarters to provide essential civilian expertise. The purpose of co-location of civil affairs officers is to ensure that approaches reflect the political context and that progress and challenges are comprehensively and accurately reported and linkages with other partners are maintained.
For example, civil affairs officers have been deployed in civilian police programmes to assist with project design, implementation and political reporting. In UNMIBH, civil affairs officers assisted in the selection, deployment and monitoring of police as part of the mission’s work to establish a multi-ethnic police force. Similarly, the International Police Task Force (IPTF), UNMIBH’s police component, relied on the political insights and support provided by civil affairs officers to broker agreements with local authorities to construct a state border service.

In missions with governance functions, the structure is more complex. The head of civil administration holds a higher position within the mission, typically as a Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General (DSRSG), and is comparable to a prime minister of the central level governing bodies and administrator of regional and municipal bodies. She or he is responsible for leading the administration while ensuring the creation of the necessary conditions for a transition from an international administration to local governance at all levels. Civil affairs and political affairs officers assist the DSRSG in coordination, political analysis, policy development, reporting, management and oversight. In addition, civil affairs officers are assigned to key administrative positions at the central, regional and municipal levels.

**Civil Affairs at Work**

There are three broad phases in the work of a mission: getting started in a post-conflict environment, implementing the mandate in partnership with local and international counterparts and transferring responsibility to local government authorities. The work of civil affairs usually comprises three main functions:

- Work with the local population in providing civil service liaison with the parties to a conflict, other components of the mission, international partners and local non-governmental organizations (NGOs);

- Provide “good offices” or policy and operational advice and assistance to local authorities, including mediation and negotiation; and

- Ensure accurate and timely reporting.

**Liaison**

Civil affairs officers play a major role in the mission’s relations with the civilian population, including local authorities and communities. In a traditional peacekeeping model (in which officers observe and report), civil affairs officers may be deployed at the very beginning of a mission along with UN military staff. Civil affairs officers facilitate contacts between previously warring factions once a ceasefire or settlement is reached.

An essential initial task is to establish communication with civilian officials from both parties to the conflict and commence face-to-face dialogue. Civil affairs officers can provide vital information on local power structures and personalities to help the mission
understand the interests of the parties, relationships between them and respective negotiating positions. There may also be multiple or competing local authorities and structures, or perhaps none at all. Civil affairs officers may be called upon to fill an administrative void or provide a neutral and impartial administrative presence.

In the immediate aftermath of a conflict, building confidence between the parties in conflict and instilling trust in the mission is a key role of civil affairs. This is accomplished through contacts with political, military and police authorities and also through consistent outreach to grass-roots and other groups within the area. Contacts with local community-based groups can help identify avenues for immediate action. Possible counterparts include community leaders, religious institutions, local committees, women’s groups and groups working on children’s issues. This might include liaison in support of the mission’s priority to demobilize, disarm and reintegrate former combatants.

Liaison can be more complex in an interim or transitional administration mission because civil affairs officers also have responsibilities related to their governmental tasks, including with neighbouring countries, regional and international bodies, and even internally vis-à-vis different administrative bodies.

Civil affairs officers also facilitate and maximize the impact of the work of other mission components, especially those deployed in the regions, municipalities and local communities. The closest links typically occur between civil affairs officers and UN military and civilian police personnel. While they have different interlocutors, stability in post-conflict situations depends partly on the relations between a civilian government and its security forces. These can be strengthened through joint messages and activities implemented by civil affairs officers with their UN military and civilian police colleagues.

In larger missions, human rights officers, and occasionally electoral or humanitarian officers, may also be deployed at regional headquarters and smaller team sites. Civil affairs can assist these colleagues by providing access to local officials and records. Finally, civil affairs officers may also act as political advisers at the local level, unless political affairs officers are deployed as well.

Throughout all stages of a mission, it is important to establish coordination mechanisms with other multilateral and bilateral organizations. In an environment where many organizations are vying for the time and commitment of a limited number of local interlocutors, civil affairs assists in coordinating assistance and ensuring the ability of the local administration to absorb the aid provided. These partners may be in a position to support the work of civil affairs officers through, for example, the organization of reconciliation programmes, human rights awareness campaigns, return of displaced persons initiatives and economic development. Contacts with multilateral and bilateral donors may also lead to technical assistance and/or funding support for the implementation of objectives that are outside the mission’s budget but deemed critical for the implementation of the mandate.
Liaison with international organizations and relevant NGOs in the field helps avoid duplication, mixed messages and uncoordinated activity. The civil affairs officer should therefore be thoroughly familiar with the work of others in the field, especially other UN organizations. Ideally, a weekly or monthly meeting should be held to discuss priorities and share information between all actors about individual activities. In some areas, local “spoilers” seek to play one international organization against another by being cooperative with one while being obstructionist with another. Regular and open communication with partners is the best way to avoid manipulation and maximize common efforts and resources.

Developing regional action plans can strengthen coordination efforts among international organizations. For example, UNMIBH was one of five principal international organizations working in Bosnia. It became a regular practice of the civil affairs coordinator, along with the senior local representatives of the other organizations, to prepare comprehensive regional action plans for endorsement by the senior management in their respective headquarters.

In other cases, partners may work within the mission structure. In UNTAES and UNMIK, for example, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) and the Council of Europe provided expertise on educational curricula and the European Commission assisted with economic reconstruction. In UNMIK, four different organizations worked under the umbrella of the UN and were coordinated at the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG), DSRSG and working levels with the active involvement of civil affairs officers. In this context, differences in the scope of work as well as organizational structure and culture among partners can create additional challenges. It is, therefore, of the utmost importance to clearly define objectives, responsibilities and reporting procedures of all entities at the outset.

**Provide “Good Offices”**

Civil affairs officers play an important role in encouraging local actors to start thinking beyond the immediate post-conflict stage. The establishment of initial dialogue enables civil affairs to assist local parties in focusing on practical objectives and timelines for reconciliation and reconstruction. Building upon their close relations with local authorities, civil affairs officers must be able to translate the mission’s objectives into practical measures on the ground and advise local authorities on their role in implementing the mandate.

In most post-conflict situations, privileged groups, often with strong ties to the leadership, may try to obstruct the work of a mission. It is the task of civil affairs to analyse problems and chart a way through the obstruction. It is also the responsibility of civil affairs, in all its work, to ensure the meaningful engagement of all local partners, including the various ethnic, political and social groups. In some missions, funds for quick impact projects are available through the mission’s budget or separate trust funds.

There are many different vehicles for establishing dialogue and cooperation. Civil
affairs officers use consent-promoting measures and must rely on their mediation and negotiation skills. For example, confidence building can be promoted by establishing a market on the former confrontation line to enable civilians to meet while restoring natural economic linkages; democratization can be promoted by holding town hall meetings in local communities and conducting elections; and reconciliation can be advanced by bringing women’s groups together on issues central to women, irrespective of differences in their ethnic, religious or other backgrounds. This can be a particular challenge in areas of recent internal conflict and requires additional sensitivity and impartiality on the part of the civil affairs officers.

The most common means of engaging local authorities and bringing conflicting parties together is by working through specialist joint committees, such as the Joint Implementation Committees established by UNTAES. Civil affairs officers chaired many of these committees with a view to concluding agreements on political or socio-economic issues and proceeding on reintegration, civil administration, restoration of public services, economic reconstruction, education and culture, return of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs), as well as monitoring human rights and promoting reconciliation.

**Housing Committees in UNAMSIL**

In Sierra Leone, UNAMSIL civil affairs officers were deployed in all 12 districts of the country to push for reconciliation and reconstruction after 10 years of civil war had ended. One of the innovative approaches they used was to create housing committees to deal with tension over the return, to their rightful owners, of houses occupied by former rebels.

In some cases, the rebels had established strongholds, had lived in the area for many years and had no place to return to, because the memory of atrocities they had committed was too fresh in people’s minds. The rightful owners had often languished for years in squalid refugee camps or as IDPs and were desperate to return to their homes and former lives.

The issue was fraught with dilemma. To evict the former rebels by force would have led to further tension or even bloodshed, but it was unconscionable to let the victims of the conflict continue to suffer. The tenacious mediation efforts of civil affairs officers, who brought the ex-combatants, homeowners and local community together in housing committees, resulted in successful compromises more often than was expected. Sometimes this meant the departure of the ex-combatants; at other times, the solution was payment of rent.

Civil affairs officers successfully negotiated the return of the majority of occupied houses within a few months.

A central secretariat maintained links with the Head of Mission and senior officials designated to develop an overall strategy. In UNAMSIL, civil affairs officers are active participants in the government’s National Recovery Committee to re-establish state authority in formerly rebel-held areas. They have provided significant support to the
committee in facilitating the return of civil servants, traditional leaders and elected officials to the district and chiefdom levels.

Joint administrative bodies were also established by UNMIK and UNTAET, bringing together local and international political leaders and experts to jointly administer areas in certain sectors. As local actors take on more responsibility, civil affairs assumes a supporting and advising role. This can include capacity-building through training programmes or awareness, reconciliation and community education initiatives.

Providing advice and assistance may also include supervising and monitoring the local administration, parties or host government to ensure compliance with the objectives of the mandate. Civil affairs officers may participate in the negotiation of agreements with local authorities to ensure adherence to the mandate. Civil affairs officers therefore formulate their advice and guidance in ways to promote the mandate, and may even directly intervene, particularly in interim administrations, to assert authority on behalf of the SRSG. This can help civil affairs officers initiate programmes to benefit the local people in the area; such programmes must stay within the terms of the mandate.

**Reporting**

Accurate and timely reporting and analysis are essential for the mission to develop informed assessments, plans and policy recommendations. In most conflict situations, independent media is the first casualty of war, and peacekeeping missions play an important role in providing a certain degree of objective and transparent information. Within this context, civil affairs officers add perspective and bring significant developments to the attention of mission headquarters. The civil affairs field structure is an essential part in the information and analysis chain that leads first to the SRSG and then to the Secretary-General and his reports to the Security Council.

As with all components, civil affairs field units are typically required to produce daily and weekly reports that feed into the mission’s regular reports to the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) at UN Headquarters in New York. In missions without a separate political affairs component, civil affairs usually coordinates adding the consolidated daily and weekly field inputs to the mission’s situation reports, which are submitted to DPKO Headquarters. It is crucial that reports on mandate implementation are accurate and that local political developments are reported objectively.

**Interim, Transitional Administration Mandates**

Civil administration is entrusted with implementing the mission’s mandate in the administrative area and faces the challenge of not allowing political pressures to influence the running of an impartial administration, despite the high-profile political role of the SRSG. At the central level, civil affairs officers run ministerial-level bodies and work within them in executive functions. They may also manage public enterprises and regulatory bodies and exercise control over organizations comprised of former combatants. Civil affairs officers, therefore, work in diverse areas that include health,
education, civil protection, judicial administration, transportation, civil protection, communications, environment, mine clearance, public enterprises, social welfare, customs, business registration, taxation and insurance.

They are also responsible for advising local officials, providing technical support and performing executive functions. Civil affairs officers seek to work themselves out of a job by creating the conditions in which their positions and responsibilities are gradually taken over by local civil servants and leaders or, where agreed, by specialized agencies and other international partners. Outside the capital, civil affairs officers manage administrative bodies at regional, municipal and local levels.

Civil affairs officers in an interim administration represent not only the UN, but also the administrative body to which they have been assigned, whether a ministry, public enterprise, regulatory body, municipality or local community. Thus, a civil affairs officer may function as a minister, mayor, or general manager of an enterprise, civil registrar or court administrator. They are responsible for establishing and overseeing participatory structures for local government and fulfilling basic administrative functions in all municipalities.

Civil affairs officers also re-establish public services and build local capacity through training. As functions are progressively assumed by local structures, the role of civil affairs, depending on the mandate, may be redefined to cover reserved executive responsibilities, core peacekeeping functions, security coordination, political oversight and reporting, financial auditing, minority integration or protection and coordination of refugee and displaced person return initiatives.

### Civil Administration in Kosovo

In UNMIK, the civil administration pillar was divided into three levels: central or ministerial, regional and municipal, including local communities. The central level originally consisted of a number of sectoral departments, headed by civil affairs officers, which were gradually localized into 20 joint interim administrative departments with local and international co-heads.

Civil affairs officers carried out functions in all parts of the departments. With the transfer of a number of responsibilities directly to the democratically elected representatives, the organization changed and the administration was divided into "transferred" ministries and "reserved" (to the mission) bodies. Civil affairs officers continue to perform governmental functions in both structures.

In the field, five regional administrations, 30 municipal administrations and 24 local community offices were established. This structure has remained constant; degrees of responsibility and resources have varied depending on the phase of the mission.
**Transferring Responsibilities**

A peacekeeping operation is by nature temporary. The goal of civil affairs and civilian administration is to assist in securing lasting stability by helping to build effective local administrative structures. Key mission objectives are the social reintegration and re-establishment of functioning institutions and infrastructure, which are often politically contentious and susceptible to manipulation. Managing this transition successfully is an enormous challenge for civil affairs officers, who play a central role in supporting reconstruction and, in cases of ethnic conflict, encouraging the meaningful public participation of all communities.

The process by which civil affairs sets priorities and implements programmes should allow for progressive disengagement of peacekeepers, which must be measured against established and quantifiable benchmarks. When developing partnerships, civil affairs officers need to understand fully local political complexities and sensitivities while maintaining their objectivity and commitment to achieving results. To do this, it is vital that civil affairs officers identify not only local counterparts but also international partners, such as specialized agencies and regional organizations that are willing to take on continuing tasks. This involves institution and capacity-building to ensure a sustainable transition. Civil affairs provides the coordination to move from a peacekeeping operation to addressing longer term socio-economic objectives, with the ultimate aim remaining a sustainable peace.
CHAPTER IV: PUBLIC INFORMATION

“The United Nations is committed to being open and transparent in its dealings with the press. It is in our interest to work with the media quickly and honestly and to develop a coherent communications strategy based on those same principles. We should not only react to events but, where appropriate, project the Organization’s point of view on international developments. However, we must sometimes keep confidences—not to mislead or conceal, but to protect a diplomatic process. Our media policy must, therefore, balance the need to be open and the need to respect confidentiality.”

Secretary-General Kofi A. Annan
Memorandum to all heads of department
28 April 1999

Role of Public Information in Peacekeeping Operations

In all United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operations, an effective communications strategy, which includes good relations with both local and international media, is a political and operational necessity. A peacekeeping operation may enjoy initial worldwide support, but without an effective and consistent public information programme, support can quickly turn to apathy and even opposition. Peacekeeping operations require the understanding, cooperation and support of all players, local and external, to fulfil their mandates. These include the parties to the conflict, the local population and the international community, whose political and material support are fundamental to the success of a peacekeeping mission.

A public information programme plays a crucial role in explaining the operation’s mandate to the local population, local and international media, the donor community, Member States, agencies, funds and programmes of the UN system and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), keeping them abreast of progress and obstacles in the peace process and building support for the operation’s activities. This is particularly true for complex, multidimensional missions with mandates that may cover a wide range of activities requiring the cooperation of the local population, financial support from the donor community and political support from key Member States. A good mission public information programme can quickly become a trusted source of news and information and help counter the negative effects of irresponsible, hostile and controlled media. It has proven to be an excellent tool for enhancing confidence in the peace process, building trust among parties to a conflict and generating support for national reconciliation.

A good public information strategy enhances the credibility and effectiveness of a peacekeeping mission and contributes to the security of mission personnel. Public
information should be among the first elements to be deployed in the mission area and should become operational as soon as possible.

**Public Information and the Media**

Credible and accurate information can be rare in conflict or post-conflict environments. The public may perceive official sources of information as instruments of propaganda and there may be little or no tradition of an independent, non-partisan media. Journalists may be biased in their reportage or intimidated into self-censorship. People who seek out sources of independent information may face persecution. This is the environment in which a peacekeeping operation may be deployed.

History repeatedly demonstrates the lethal power of misinformation and media manipulation by parties to conflicts. In 1994, the infamous radio station, *Radio Mille Collines*, played a crucial role in launching, inciting and directing the Rwandan genocide, which resulted in an estimated 800,000 deaths and led to conflict throughout the Great Lakes region of Africa. During the conflict in the former Yugoslavia in the early 1990s, radio and other media played a key role in the ethnic cleansing of villages, towns and even entire regions.

The best antidote to such “hate media” is a thriving, independent media. Although the development of a strong, independent local media is not a primary responsibility of UN peacekeeping operations, it merits support from the public information component of peacekeeping missions. One way of supporting the development of a sustainable, independent media is to establish a radio station under UN auspices and use it to set standards for objectivity and accuracy, while building local capacity to produce such programmes by employing local journalists, producers, technicians and translators. Another way is to encourage donors, NGOs and other entities of the UN system to provide funding, training or other assistance to strengthen independent, local media and build local capacity for accurate reportage. Each mission must have an effective media-monitoring capability and must act quickly to counter disinformation, misinformation, rumours and hate messages. The mission leadership should be aware of such trends and may develop appropriate countermeasures.

Peacekeeping operations can be important international news. Political and military leaders, as well as parties to a conflict and affected populations, monitor international media coverage of an operation and are influenced by it. UN public information officials must know how to compete successfully in an intensely competitive and easily distracted market. They must understand the priorities and needs of international news organizations and facilitate their work in the field.

**Public Information Priorities and Objectives**

Public information performs vital tasks during the initial stages of a peacekeeping mission and public information officers must be among the first personnel deployed. Once on the ground, the public information component must develop a coherent public
information strategy based on mission objectives and secure the necessary resources and administrative support for its activities. It must immediately explain the presence and mandate of the peacekeeping operation to the local population, the parties to the conflict and other international entities and agencies operating in the mission area. It should provide unbiased and accurate information on the peace process, and in this way helps allay concerns of parties to the conflict that the UN might intervene in a partisan way. It can promote realistic expectations about what the UN peacekeeping operation can achieve, helping to avoid future disappointment or anger directed at the operation.

\textit{Radio Okapi: Bringing Reliable News to the Congo}

One example of a successful and innovative public information initiative that used radio to inform people spread across a vast geographic area was in the United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC). \textit{Radio Okapi} was established jointly by the peacekeeping mission and Fondation Hirondelle, a Swiss NGO with experience in broadcasting in post-conflict environments. The venture created the first functioning national radio in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) in more than 10 years, allowing listeners on one side of the divided country to hear news from the other.

By mid-2002, \textit{Radio Okapi} was broadcasting across the country in five languages with radio stations in eight cities and planned to create two more local stations and two additional relay stations. Each local station produced and broadcast local news and fed the national network, which broadcast nationwide by shortwave and satellite downlink to local FM transmitters. Although the radio was run under UN auspices, it treated the peacekeeping mission like every other news source and covered the peace process in great detail.

Listeners throughout the DRC were delighted with the service and reliability of \textit{Radio Okapi}, which was soon being quoted as a reliable news source by other Congolese media. The success of \textit{Radio Okapi} has helped set standards for accuracy and independence in the local media and built local capacity to produce good radio broadcasts. \textit{Radio Okapi} continues to work towards the long-term objective of leaving behind an independent radio network run by Congolese radio editors and journalists after the UN mission departs.

The public information strategy and the overall programme must be developed in close consultation with the Head of Mission, who will establish mission priorities at each stage. The programme should also be closely coordinated with other mission components so that it reflects their activities and needs. A good mission public information programme can facilitate the work of all components of the mission and help them achieve their objectives. For example, if the mission priority is disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) of former combatants, the public information programme can assist by widely publicizing the agreement to disarm and demobilize combatants, encouraging fighters to come out of hiding to surrender their weapons, extolling the advantages and incentives of a return to civilian life and providing accurate information on assembly sites and demobilization camp locations.
Another priority for the public information component is to establish itself as a credible, non-partisan source of information about the peace process and the role of the UN and to make information widely available to those involved in and affected by the process. Transparency and credibility are the professional watchwords for public information officers. UN public information must also reflect the highest professional and ethical standards and promote respect for human rights, tolerance and reconciliation. This requires a professional approach to communications that combines an understanding of the political challenges facing the mission with a principled approach to its work and respect for the various audiences. Mission public information activities can play a critical role in establishing an environment that promotes the development of free and independent media and the highest journalistic ethics and standards.

Public information officers should play a proactive role in addressing negative public perceptions and attitudes about the mission and should initiate clear, accurate and timely public information programmes and campaigns to address them. They must also be prepared to handle negative media coverage of the mission with quick and transparent responses as well as feedback to senior mission personnel on how to prevent, repair or recover from such coverage.

Public information that is credible, accurate and reliable may be challenged by parties to the conflict that are accustomed to controlling news and information, especially when content reflects negatively on them. The public information component must carefully balance the need to further the peace process, which may include taking into account the

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**Six Public Information Objectives**

A UN peacekeeping operation’s public information programme has six primary objectives:

- Ensure the peacekeeping operation’s mandate and responsibilities are fully and widely understood;

- Promote all aspects of the work of the peacekeeping operation to the national and international community;

- Implement a communications strategy that actively supports the peacekeeping operation’s objectives;

- Advance the peace process through the creation of timely and relevant information products;

- Defend and protect the peacekeeping operation from unjustified criticism and misinformation; and

- Counter propaganda, false information and hate messages that are harmful to the objectives of the UN and the peace process.
opinions and needs of the parties to the conflict, with the need to provide credible, reliable and accurate information. Efforts to take into account the views of the parties to the conflict should not come at the expense of credible and accurate public information.

**Contributing to Free and Fair Elections in Cambodia**

The United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) undertook an ambitious public information effort to inform the Cambodian public and the international community on the purpose and progress of UN activities in the country and on developments in the peace process. The mission ran a radio station, Radio UNTAC, which broadcast nationwide and also produced a regular video series that was broadcast over local television stations and at community centres and other village gathering places on UN-provided televisions. The video series included an extremely popular soap opera, using local actors and languages, which covered issues of concern in the peace process. The mission also distributed informational print products, such as booklets, comic books, brochures, leaflets and posters.

The information effort helped clarify the role of the UN mission and its objectives throughout the country, including the areas controlled by the Khmer Rouge. The information strategy demystified the official peace process and agreements for the general public. The role of public information was crucial during the electoral period. UNTAC was able to inform and educate the public about the registration and electoral process, thus encouraging participation.

Informational materials showing the public how to register and vote were developed for use in a variety of settings, such as public meetings and other outreach efforts. During the election campaign, Radio UNTAC and other mission media resources followed an equal access policy, providing coverage and access to all political parties on an equal basis. This ensured that all participants could be heard by the electorate and could counter negative comments by opponents. Banners, billboards, radio plays and soap operas encouraged the voting population to let its voice be heard and to participate in a process that was determining the future of their country.

The information strategy educated the public on both the technical aspects of the electoral process as well as the fundamental concepts of a democratic process. An issue of particular concern to Cambodian voters was the secrecy of the vote. Political threats and intimidation were a common feature of Cambodian political life and had undermined confidence in the electoral process. The public needed reassurance that UNTAC could guarantee the secrecy of the vote. Free and fair elections and secrecy of the vote became key messages in the informational material developed by the mission and were also emphasized in the soap operas and other programmes developed by UNTAC.

There was considerable tension in the run-up to the elections because the Khmer Rouge had threatened to disrupt the process and there was widespread fear that the elections would be accompanied by violence. On election day, as the process unfolded and no major incidents of violence occurred, Radio UNTAC worked to reassure Cambodians by providing live reports of the polling and electoral activities throughout the country. During the vote count, results were also reported live, contributing to the transparency and credibility of the process.
Structure and Tasks of Public Information Components

Public information components in UN peacekeeping operations have varied widely, depending on the mandate and operational needs, from single-person operations to large and diversified divisions. In some operations, the chief of information and the spokesperson are the same person. In others, it may be advantageous to separate the two functions, particularly in missions where the public information component is relatively large and diversified. In this arrangement, the spokesperson would tackle daily media relations and the chief of information would be responsible for the overall management and supervision of the public information component as a whole, concentrating on strategy and development of information products.

Chief of information. The chief of public information formulates the mission’s public information strategy in close consultation with the Head of Mission and other senior mission officials and supervises the work of the component. This includes the development, production and dissemination of all public information material and the mission web site. The chief supervises monitoring of local and international media and advises mission officials and UN Headquarters in New York of trends and developments, and potential crises or challenges. The chief ensures that information products reach the target audiences, both local and international, as well as relevant offices of the UN, including the Office of the Spokesman for the Secretary-General, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and the Department of Public Information (DPI) at UN Headquarters in New York.

Mission spokesperson. The mission spokesperson is the focal point for all media relations, gives press briefings and interviews, issues press releases and provides information to the relevant UN offices. The spokesperson maintains daily relations with local and international media, liaises with all mission components to have the latest, accurate information on mission activities and priorities, makes official statements on behalf of the mission, arranges for media representatives to meet with senior mission officials and facilitates the daily work of journalists covering the mission.

The spokesperson must work very closely with the Head of Mission to accurately reflect mission priorities and objectives and advise him or her on public relations and dealing with the media. The mission spokesperson may be assisted by individuals with specialized expertise from a particular component of the mission, such as a military spokesperson for military issues and a civilian police spokesperson for matters pertaining to police and law enforcement.

Radio and television. The radio and television sections of the public information component produce live or taped programmes in local languages, such as news and topical programmes, educational and cultural shows, including drama, song and dance, and audience-participation programmes. Popular music shows and soap opera-style serials and dramas incorporating developments in the peace process into the story line have been particularly successful. Collaboration with local peacebuilding efforts, such as shows on police crime solving, have also been popular. It is important that the mission
maintains editorial control over the content of the programmes, even if they are disseminated using a medium not controlled by the mission. Other products can include programmes to be used by the mission for training or briefings or raw footage for global distribution by the mission or DPI.

**Print collateral.** The publications and photo and graphic design section may produce magazines, newsletters, leaflets, brochures, posters and all other printed material for distribution in the mission area, including publications for specialized mission components. In countries where the literacy rate may be low, the print products could include comic strips or books, cartoons, calendars and other graphic products. The section also provides photographic products for use by the mission, the media and DPI. Media monitoring makes the mission aware of the opinions and activities of local and regional actors. The public information component monitors the local press, radio and television daily and prepares a media summary, using translations if necessary, for dissemination to senior mission officials, DPKO, DPI and the Office of the Spokesman at UN Headquarters in New York.

**Web site.** A mission web site is a useful means of publicizing mission activities and providing background information on the mission, including relevant documents and key data, especially in local languages. It can provide links to the UN and other relevant web sites and must conform to the guidelines for UN web sites developed by UN Headquarters in New York.

**Community outreach.** Community outreach is another important public information task. Depending on the level of literacy, communications infrastructure, media environment and level of civil society activity in the mission area, the public information programme can include public relations activities targeted at community groups, including briefings, “town hall” meetings, concerts and theatrical performances.

The public information component sometimes trains local journalists and broadcasters by offering seminars on professional ethics and practices or international assistance to develop local media capacity, including infrastructure and media training, as appropriate.

Local staff of the peacekeeping operation can play a crucial role in community outreach. Their thorough knowledge and understanding of the society, culture, languages and history of the mission area is essential to the success of public information activities. They are usually well-informed and the first to be aware of rumours, threats and incidents that could affect the mission. Their knowledge can also be crucial to countering disinformation and ensuring that the mission’s messages are clearly understood by the local population. Local staff may face pressure or intimidation from groups unwilling to cooperate with the UN or seeking to influence the mission and the mission must be aware of these pressures.
Public Information Strategy

To ensure that the mission’s key objectives and tasks are identified and supported, the head of the public information component must develop a strategy in close consultation with other mission components. The strategy should have three purposes:

- Identify the target audiences, such as local and international media, parties to the conflict, civil society groups and organizations, local opinion makers, key Member States, NGOs, donors and mission personnel;
- Identify and develop key messages that support mission priorities; and
- Identify the most appropriate medium to reach each target audience (radio, television, print, theatre, dance and music performances, town criers, etc.).

Public information messages should reflect mission priorities or phases in the peace process (e.g., voter education messages during electoral processes, or promoting disarmament and national reconciliation to support DDR). The barriers that specific groups, especially women, have to contend with in accessing information should be taken into account. Mainstreaming a gender perspective in public information activities will ensure that female audiences can be reached through appropriate media and that women’s concerns are addressed.

Cooperation and Coordination with Key Partners

Ideally, the public information component should be fully planned and budgeted for before the mission is established. Its structure and requirements should be understood by the chief administrative officer and other mission support components under his or her direction, such as administration, finance, logistics and communications. These partners are critical to the effective functioning of public information.

The public information component requires the full support of the Head of Mission, who is de facto the mission’s chief spokesperson. To be effective, the head of the public information component must have regular access to the Head of Mission and other senior mission officials to develop a programme that meets the mission’s information needs. The spokesperson, in particular, must work closely with senior mission officials and have access to mission information to speak authoritatively on policies and activities. The spokesperson and head of the public information component also advise senior officials on media relations. Senior mission officials and component heads should cooperate closely with the public information component to provide background information and clarification so that public information officers can be prepared to respond appropriately to questions from journalists and, more importantly, to present information in a clear and credible way on sensitive and important issues. Mission components should also keep the public information component informed of developments in areas of interest to the press and public.
Public information officers support the activities of other mission components by providing advice on message content and effective means of dissemination. Public information officers need the cooperation of other mission component personnel to be able to move throughout the mission area, to cover all mission activities and to support the work of journalists by facilitating access and providing information on a timely basis.

The efforts of the public information and other components must be mutually supportive, and mechanisms for regular consultation should be established to determine public information priorities and tasks. The public information component should assist other mission personnel in making themselves available to the media, as needed, to speak on particular subjects, participate in mission radio or television programmes and disseminate public information material in the course of their daily work.

The public information component provides information on all aspects of a peacekeeping operation’s mandate and activities: political, military, civilian police, mine action, human rights and other areas. Some components, such as the military and civilian police, may have their own public information personnel. A close and collaborative working relationship between these specialized public information personnel and the mission’s public information component is crucial to the success of the public information strategy of the mission. In missions that also have military or police spokespersons, they should cooperate with the mission spokesperson to ensure that the mission always speaks with one voice, for accuracy and to prevent attempts by the media to point to a division within the ranks.

In any mission area there will inevitably be several international actors operating in addition to the peacekeeping mission. These could be UN agencies, funds and programmes of the UN system, international humanitarian agencies and NGOs, donor agencies and other intergovernmental bodies, who may all have a part to play in the peace process. Coordination and coherence in public information activities among this diverse group of players is essential and public information officers should maintain regular contact with their counterparts in all UN entities in the mission area. Mission leadership should establish mechanisms to share information and coordinate activities to maximize the effect of available resources and avoid duplication.

**Responsibilities of Public Information Officers**

The public information officer is a professional guided by the mission mandate and the directives of the Head of Mission. His or her primary objectives are to communicate timely, accurate and relevant information to target audiences in accordance with mission priorities and plans and to foster understanding of and support for the mission and its goals. Public information activities are highly visible and subject to immediate evaluation by the local population, media and mission personnel.

While mission public information activities and officers are the main source of information on the peacekeeping operation for the local population, all mission personnel should be conscious of the effect their actions have on the mission’s image and their role...
as sources of information for the local population. International staff have a particular responsibility to be sensitive to the potential impact of their comments and actions on public perceptions. While all mission personnel must remain non-partisan and objective in their behaviour, public information personnel, in particular, must be conscious of maintaining impartiality in their conversation and private statements. Sympathy to a cause or a party must not be permitted to undermine the mission’s credibility and affect the public information output or the behaviour of its personnel.

**Measuring Success**

The impact of public information activities can be measured by the reaction of the public to the mission’s programmes and publications and by the public's trust and confidence in news and information disseminated by the mission. Success of the public information strategy may also be gauged by the degree to which the public perceives the peacekeeping operation and its activities as fair, impartial and useful to the peace process. The legacy of public information in a peacekeeping operation should be a better understanding by the local population of the UN and its achievements in the mission area. The local population should also expect ethical and professional reporting from local media and information organizations. Finally, the peacekeeping operation should leave behind a cadre of local public information and media professionals whose skills have been enhanced through service with the UN mission.
CHAPTER V: MILITARY

Introduction

The international peacekeeping response to breaches of peace and security has evolved steadily since the first peacekeeping operation of the United Nations (UN) in 1948. UN peacekeeping operations have grown in complexity and scope from largely military observer missions to multidimensional operations overseeing the implementation of comprehensive peace agreements. The tasks of the UN military components have become increasingly complex because conflicts in which they intervene no longer involve national armies alone but irregular forces, guerrilla factions and even armed criminal gangs. Consequently, the military capability under UN command has also changed and is no longer the lightly armed intervention that was typical during the Organization’s first 40 years of peacekeeping.

Military forces serving in UN peacekeeping operations, called “blue helmets” or “blue berets” because of their distinctive headgear, are a critical part of the multidimensional response. The primary function of the military component is usually to provide a secure environment so that other elements of the peace process can be implemented, including the monitoring of human rights, national reconciliation and institution building, and the distribution of humanitarian assistance.

Military capability can also be used to provide the space and opportunity for peacemaking and political negotiations to take place by preventing further violence. In places where a ceasefire agreement or agreements for other military arrangements are in place, the military component oversees their implementation, provides monitoring and liaison expertise and serves as an interlocutor with local armed forces.

Military components of UN peacekeeping operations increasingly have to work in conjunction with the military forces of other entities, such as regional military groupings or international military coalitions, to implement a common international strategy for peace in a country or region. The increasing number of participating actors and the widening scope of work in multidimensional peacekeeping operations require a broader interface between military and non-military components. The complexity of the environments in which the military components of UN peacekeeping operations must operate and the increasing need for rapid and sustained military deployments have resulted in new challenges that must be addressed for peacekeeping operations to be effective.

Basic Principles for Military Activities

While armed forces of a State operate under national doctrine and guiding principles, when they serve as part of a UN peacekeeping operation there are certain basic international principles that govern their actions.
“Blue Helmets” or UN-Authorized “Coalitions of the Willing”

In the mid-1990s, following the peacekeeping experiences in Somalia, the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, it became obvious that UN forces could not keep the peace when there was no peace to keep. In such circumstances, the Security Council judged it wiser to authorize an enforcement action by a coalition of willing States, directed by a lead nation, that had both the military capability and political will to bring an end to the conflict using all necessary means. These interventions, although authorized by the Council, are not conducted under UN command.

In some instances, such interventions have occurred alongside or in support of a UN peacekeeping operation, for example the United States-led force sent to Somalia under Security Council resolution 794 (1992) and the French-led force authorized by resolution 1484 (2003) for eastern Congo. In other instances, a coalition of the willing may go into a conflict area first, establish a basic level of security and then hand the operation over to a UN peacekeeping operation. Examples include the international force sent to Haiti in 1994 and the Australian-led force authorized by Security Council resolution 1264 (1999) to quell the violence following the referendum in East Timor. In some instances, the troops that form part of the coalition of the willing may be assimilated into the UN peacekeeping operation and be “re-hatted” as “blue helmets”.

There are important differences between UN-commanded operations and military interventions by coalitions of allied States. “Blue helmets” are under the operational command of the UN and report to the UN Secretary-General. Their mandate will typically be set out in a resolution of the Security Council. Coalitions of the willing, on the other hand, remain under the command of a lead State or alliance/regional organization and report to their national or allied chain of command. Their intervention is approved in a decision of the Security Council, which will authorize them to take all measures necessary to achieve a specified objective.

**Impartiality.** Impartiality and even-handedness should always guide the actions of a military component of a UN peacekeeping operation. Impartiality is understood as an objective and consistent execution of the mandate, regardless of provocation or challenge. Impartiality does not mean inaction or overlooking violations. UN peacekeepers should be impartial in their dealings with the parties to the conflict, but not neutral in the execution of their mandate, i.e., they must actively pursue the implementation of their mandate even if doing so goes against the interests of one or more of the parties.

If the peacekeeping force is perceived as being partial, people may lose confidence in the UN’s ability to act as a neutral party, which can damage the credibility of the mission and threaten the peace process. At worst, a perception of UN partiality could lead parties to the conflict to withdraw their consent to the presence of the mission and return to violence as a means of resolving the conflict.
**Consent and cooperation.** Peacekeeping and progress towards a just and sustainable peace rely on the consent and cooperation of the parties to the conflict.\(^1\) In the absence of freely given consent, the military component of the peacekeeping operation as a whole will find it hard to implement its mandate. There is often very little trust between parties in the immediate post-conflict phase and consent for a UN intervention may be uncertain. While political and military leaders may consent to a UN military presence, groups of combatants lower down the chain of command may disagree with their leaders and challenge the authority or mandate of the peacekeeping operation through violence or other acts of non-cooperation.

Consent may be withdrawn when a party or parties decide not to abide by terms of the ceasefire or peace agreement. If consent is withdrawn or uncertain from the outset, the Security Council may also exercise the option of authorizing a robust, deterrent military capability to promote consent by closing the option of war. Consent, at all levels, must be encouraged by building confidence among the parties and enhancing their stake in and ownership of the peace process. Impartiality is the best guarantee that a mission will gain and retain the consent of all parties.

**Appropriate use of force.** Since peacekeeping operations need the consent of the parties to a conflict, military forces under UN command are not usually required to use force beyond that necessary for self-defence. Self-defence includes the right to protect oneself, other UN personnel, UN property and any other persons under UN protection.

The use of force by the military component will depend on the mandate of the peacekeeping operation and the rules of engagement; sometimes the Security Council will authorize a peacekeeping operation to use armed force in situations other than in self-defence. The circumstances under which the operation may use armed force will then be spelt out in the relevant resolution of the Council. The rules of engagement for the peacekeeping operation will clarify the different levels of force that can be used in various circumstances, how each level of force should be used and any authorizations that may need to be obtained from commanders.

**Unity and international character.** To be effective, a peacekeeping operation must function as an integrated unit reflecting the will and presence of the international community as a whole. This is particularly true of a military component composed of several different national contingents. Military forces under UN command must always respect the international character of their duties and not serve any national or other interests. International forces may be vulnerable to attempts by parties to a conflict to exploit differences between the contingents. Maintaining the integrated, strictly international character of the operation is the best safeguard against such attempts and enhances the legitimacy of the overall mission.

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\(^1\) The Security Council may authorize a UN peace-enforcement operation without the stated consent of the parties to the conflict if it believes that the conflict presents a threat to international peace and security.
**Respect for principles of international humanitarian law.** The fundamental principles and rules of international humanitarian law are applicable to military forces under UN command. In case of violations of international humanitarian law, UN military personnel are subject to prosecution under their own national systems of military justice. Military forces under UN command must make a clear distinction between civilians and combatants and direct military operations only against combatants and military objectives.

The right of a UN force to use means and methods of combat is also not unlimited. The UN force must respect the rules prohibiting or restricting the use of certain weapons and methods of combat under the relevant instruments of international humanitarian law. In the treatment of civilians, women and children require special protection from rape, enforced prostitution and any other form of indecent and criminal assault.

**Respect for local laws and customs.** All peacekeeping operation personnel must respect local laws and customs and maintain the highest standards of integrity in their personal conduct. When a peacekeeping operation includes a military component, especially formed military units of several thousand personnel, the presence of the peacekeeping operation is seen and felt throughout the mission area. Respect for the peacekeeping force is directly related to its success in maintaining high standards of professionalism, integrity, impartiality and in its general behaviour in relations with the local population. This respect is required to sustain the cooperation and consent of the local population. Although the peacekeeping mission and its personnel will enjoy certain privileges and immunities accorded to the UN to facilitate its effective operation, these do not change the obligation of all mission personnel to obey local laws and respect social, cultural and religious norms. In particular, in their personal behaviour military personnel must always maintain exemplary standards of conduct, in accordance with the Code of Conduct. Those that breach the Code must be duly disciplined by their national authorities, including the imposition of legal sanctions, when appropriate.

**Types of Military Personnel**

The military component of a peacekeeping operation can include any combination of the following:

**Military advisers.** In situations where a peacekeeping operation has not been authorized, but the Secretary-General has appointed a special representative or envoy to undertake political negotiations and provide good offices for peacemaking or conflict prevention, a small number of military officers may be assigned to advise the special representative or envoy on military issues. A political or peacebuilding UN presence that remains behind after a peacekeeping operation has withdrawn may also retain military advisers to provide expertise on security sector reform, elements of disarmament, demobilization and

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3 See *Ten Rules: Code of Personal Conduct for Blue Helmets* and *We are United Nations Peacekeepers*, which contain the standards of conduct for uniformed personnel serving in UN field missions.
reintegration of ex-combatants (DDR), recruitment and training criteria for newly formed armed forces and other military tasks.

**Military observers.** UN military observers are unarmed military officers generally deployed to monitor and supervise any military arrangements that parties to a conflict may have agreed to, such as a ceasefire or armistice, withdrawal of forces or the preservation of a demilitarized or neutral buffer zone. The primary task of military observers is to monitor and report on the parties’ observance of these military arrangements and the military situation in general in their area of responsibility.

Being unarmed and not part of a formed military unit, military observers do not have any coercive authority and depend entirely on the cooperation of the conflicting parties for their security and effectiveness. Since they represent the moral authority of the international community, they exercise a degree of moral suasion and can be an effective deterrent to violations of peace agreements. In peacekeeping operations where a military force is also present, the military observers work in conjunction with the force but under a separate chain of command. Since military observers can be drawn from any country, they can enhance the international character of a peacekeeping mission.

**Military liaison officers.** In peacekeeping environments where security is being provided by a military force not under UN command, such as a regional peacekeeping force or a coalition force of allied States, the UN will often deploy military liaison officers to maintain a link between the largely civilian UN peacekeeping operation and the non-UN military force. Military liaison officers can also be used in UN peacebuilding missions or offices to liaise with national military authorities.

**Formed military units.** Member States also contribute formed military units, which correspond to traditional military formations, such as companies, brigades or battalions. Each contribution is called a contingent. The UN uses military contingents of varying strengths and capabilities in its peacekeeping operations, depending on the mandate. In situations where a visible international military presence is required to build confidence or maintain momentum in a peace process, the military forces provided to the UN are typically lightly armed and rely on the consent and willingness of the parties to a conflict to honour their obligations under a peace agreement. Lightly armed military peacekeeping forces are neither equipped nor expected to use force to prevent a resumption of hostilities.

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4 The UN military observer missions in the Syrian Golan Heights, on the India-Pakistan and Iraq-Iran borders, in Georgia and on the Prevlaka peninsula in the former Yugoslavia are some examples of past and ongoing military observer missions.

5 For example, the small military component of the United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH) and the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) acted as liaison to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)-led forces responsible for maintaining security in those places.

6 The deployments in Cyprus (since 1964), Namibia (1989), Cambodia (1992-1993) and Angola under the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM) III mandate (1995-1997) are all examples of the use of lightly armed formed military units in UN peacekeeping.
Under a more robust mandate, military forces under UN operational control can also be used to deter a resumption of hostilities by their presence and to establish and maintain a secure environment to support the implementation of a peace process. In such cases, military forces will need to be appropriately armed and structured to present a credible military deterrent.\(^7\)

**Military Tasks in Peacekeeping Operations**

The tasks of the military component of a UN peacekeeping operation can vary from technical advice on military issues to a political negotiation or peace process to robust military action and complex activities.

**Support to peacemaking and political negotiations.** Military expertise is essential to the successful conduct of peacemaking and peace negotiations in situations of armed conflict. A small number of military officers can provide technical support to political mediators conducting negotiations. The advice could range from the practical arrangements for monitoring ceasefire agreements to establishing the feasibility of proposals for the use of military capability and the suitability of military arrangements such as weapons-free and demilitarized zones, zones of separation and requirements for effective disarmament and demobilization.

**Providing a secure environment.** Military forces, as part of a UN peacekeeping operation, are often tasked with providing a secure environment to allow other aspects of the mission’s mandate or peace process to be implemented. A secure environment is generally a precondition for moving ahead on several elements of peace agreements, such as safe return of refugees and internally displaced persons, cantonment, disarmament and demobilization, the free flow of persons and goods and delivery of humanitarian assistance. As part of the task of providing a secure environment, the military component may be asked to provide a visible deterrent presence, control movement and access through checkpoints, provide armed escort for safety and to facilitate access, conduct cordon and search operations, control crowds or confiscate weapons.

**Observation and monitoring.** The military component in a peacekeeping operation may be asked, as its primary task, to monitor and supervise, through observation and reporting, a military arrangement such as a truce or ceasefire agreement, a demilitarized zone or a buffer zone. This is done through both static (observation posts) and mobile (regular patrols, inspections and investigations of suspected violations) means. There have been several UN peacekeeping operations in which observation and monitoring are the only tasks of the military component. In more complex operations, however, observation and monitoring may be just one element of the military component’s activities.

**Interposition.** An interposition operation may be authorized between conflicting States or between conflicting parties within a State, depending on the circumstances. It involves

\(^7\) The United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) and the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) are examples of missions with robust military mandates.
placing a UN military presence between warring parties to prevent a recurrence of hostilities. Interposition often leads to the creation of a buffer zone or a zone of

United Nations Truce Supervision Organization

The very first UN peacekeeping operation was established in the context of the Middle East conflict in 1948. Following the outbreak of hostilities in April 1948, the Security Council called for a ceasefire and established a Truce Commission for Palestine to supervise it. As the situation worsened, the Truce Commission, which consisted of consular representatives of Belgium, France and the U.S., asked the Council to send military observers to assist it in supervising the ceasefire.

Through resolution 50 (1948), the Council reiterated its call for a cessation of all acts of armed force and decided that the truce should be supervised by the UN Mediator, who had been appointed by the General Assembly to promote, with the assistance of a sufficient number of military observers, a peaceful adjustment of the future situation of Palestine. This became the basis of what would be the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO).

The unarmed military observers arrived in the region in June 1948. They were to operate with the consent of the parties and were dependent on the cooperation of the parties for their effectiveness. Although there was no element of coercion in their functioning, their very presence was a deterrent to violations of the truce. Because they represented the will of the international community, they exercised a degree of moral suasion. These elements remain the basis for the methods of operation and involvement of military observers in UN peacekeeping today.

Following the assassination of the UN Mediator, Count Folke Bernadotte of Sweden, in September 1948, Ralph Bunche, a senior UN official, took over as Acting Mediator. By early 1949, his efforts resulted in four General Armistice Agreements between Israel and its four Arab neighbours: Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria. The Security Council assigned new functions to UNTSO in line with these Agreements. The role of Mediator was ended and UNTSO became an autonomous operation, officially a subsidiary organ of the Council, responsible for assisting the parties in supervising the application and observance of the Agreements. In 1951, the head of UNTSO was given an appointment as a senior official of the UN Secretariat, giving the Secretary-General greater control over UNTSO.

In two cases, the armistice arrangements included the establishment of demilitarized zones and UNTSO observers were responsible for monitoring the full implementation of those provisions. In addition, UNTSO continued to be responsible for the supervision of the ceasefire. UNTSO's role became increasingly important because disagreements between the parties often led to deadlock over sensitive issues and the military representatives of the parties found it difficult to cooperate. Following the wars of 1956, 1967 and 1973, the functions of the observers changed along with the circumstances, but they remained in the area, acting as go-betweens for the hostile parties and as the means by which isolated incidents could be contained and prevented from escalating into major conflicts.
separation in which only UN personnel are allowed, forcing the parties to physically pull back from each other. In some situations, parties may agree to weapons-free areas on either side of the buffer zone, further contributing to the reduction of tension and building confidence.


One of the best examples of a preventive deployment of military force by the UN occurred in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia during the Balkan wars of the 1990s. In December 1992, the Secretary-General requested an expansion of the mandate and strength of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR), which until then had been operating only in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, to establish a preventive presence of the UN in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. The mandate was to monitor and report any developments in the border areas of the republic with Albania and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) (which comprised Serbia and Montenegro) that could undermine confidence and stability in the republic and threaten its territory. Although the conflict had not spread to the republic, the international community was concerned that without such an international military presence, the republic would be engulfed in the same inter-ethnic conflict that was ravaging Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The military element of UNPROFOR deployed in the republic consisted of formed troops and unarmed military observers. Since the border with the FRY had not been definitively delineated, one of the first tasks UNPROFOR military had to undertake was to defuse tense situations arising from unauthorized border crossings and encounters between military patrols from both sides. In 1994, UNPROFOR negotiated a military administrative boundary between the two parties to manage the border-crossing incidents. UNPROFOR also monitored developments inside the country with a view to promoting reconciliation among various political and ethnic groups.

In March 1995, to do justice to the complex peacekeeping tasks in the former Yugoslavia, UNPROFOR was renamed and restructured into three separate but inter-linked peacekeeping operations: one in Croatia, the second in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the third in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. The last was called the United Nations Preventive Deployment Force (UNPREDEP) with essentially the same mandate and tasks that UNPROFOR had in the republic. The UNPREDEP Force Commander established mutually beneficial contacts with the military authorities of Albania and the FRY to push for a more tolerant reaction to border crossings, thus significantly reducing tensions. In conjunction with its major tasks of monitoring and reporting on the situation along the borders, the military component of UNPREDEP cooperated with civilian agencies and offered ad hoc community services and humanitarian assistance to the local population.

Preventive deployment. While all peacekeeping operations are preventive in nature—a major objective in deploying a peacekeeping operation is to prevent conflict from
recurring—in certain instances, military forces can be deployed before conflict has even broken out to prevent it from occurring or spreading. Preventive deployments also serve as a confidence-building measure and may be purely military or have a combination of military and civilian elements.

**Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR).** If a UN peacekeeping mandate includes the supervision of a DDR programme, the military component will normally be directly involved only in the disarmament phase and partially involved in the demobilization phase. The reintegration task is a civilian function normally undertaken by the national authorities and assisted by the international community, including the peacekeeping operation. The three phases are inter-linked and interdependent, however. Reintegration of former combatants into a viable civilian life has important repercussions for the peace process and can often determine the extent to which even the disarmament and demobilization phases will be successful. Therefore, the DDR process needs to be properly planned as a continuous process and appropriately resourced from the outset.

**Demining.** The military component will normally be responsible for mine and explosives clearance for the operational needs of the peacekeeping operation, such as movement and deployment of troops and other personnel, maintenance of supply lines to deployment sites and increased access to all parts of the mission area. The military will normally not undertake demining for strictly humanitarian purposes, such as reclaiming land for agriculture and the return of displaced persons, because these are seen as civilian activities requiring long-term and sustainable solutions implemented by national authorities.

**Enforcement of sanctions.** The enforcement of sanctions authorized by the Security Council, particularly arms and *materiel* embargoes, may be tasked to a military component of a peacekeeping operation.

**Security sector reform and training.** The military component may be asked to provide advice on security sector reform and related issues.

**Restoration and maintenance of law and order.** In situations where there is no effective national or international policing capability, the military component may be tasked to assist in the restoration and maintenance of law and order. This is not normally a military task and requires significant specialized training. For these reasons, maintenance of law and order will be a task for the military only in exceptional circumstances, with the goal of returning to civilian policing as soon as possible.

**Human rights monitoring.** As with the maintenance of law and order, the monitoring of human rights is a specialized and essentially civilian function, and military forces are not trained to act as human rights monitors. The military component can assist in this function, however, by observing, gathering information and reporting it to UN civilian or political authorities. Human rights violations are a good indicator of the potential for conflict in an area of operation, and the military component collects it as essential input for its own threat and risk assessments.
Support to humanitarian activities. The military component will not normally be structured, trained or funded for the direct delivery of humanitarian assistance, which is a civilian task. The military is more likely to be asked to provide a secure environment in which humanitarian assistance can be delivered successfully or to provide security and protection for humanitarian relief operations. This may take the form of ensuring freedom of movement, convoy escorts, protection of humanitarian personnel and storage sites, among other assistance. The military component often, however, has assets and capabilities, such as transport and other logistical support, that are useful in a humanitarian effort. Use of military assets for humanitarian tasks should be coordinated by an appropriate civilian authority as part of a coordinated plan of emergency relief. Within the UN system, managing humanitarian assistance is normally the task of the humanitarian coordinator in that particular mission area.

Military contingents also undertake humanitarian activities on their own initiative, using their own resources. Some governments consider this humanitarian dimension an essential part of their peacekeeping contribution and, often, an important factor in mobilizing national support for the military deployment. Humanitarian projects undertaken by the military can contribute significantly to improving relations with the local population and the parties to the conflict, thereby increasing security and building consent. These activities should be based on the international humanitarian objectives and policy framework in the mission area and avoid duplication of effort with humanitarian agencies. It is vital that the initiatives help build local capacity and be sustainable in the long term.

Protection of civilians. In specific circumstances, the mandate of a peacekeeping operation may include the need to protect vulnerable civilian populations from imminent attack. The military component may be asked to provide such protection in its area of deployment only if it has the capacity to do so.  

Force Generation

Identifying and assembling military capability for deployment in a peacekeeping operation is called force generation. Since the UN does not maintain military capability of its own, it is dependent on contributions from Member States. The peacekeeping costs of the UN are shared among the entire membership of the Organization according to a pre-agreed scale of assessments; the five permanent members of the Security Council pay a slightly higher proportion because of their special responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. Contributing States are reimbursed by the UN for the personnel and equipment they provide for peacekeeping service.

Within the Secretariat of the UN, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) coordinates the Organization’s needs for military expertise and capability. As soon as DPKO becomes aware of the need for a military element in any particular situation, it

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8 For example, UNAMSIL and the United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) were both mandated to afford protection to civilians under imminent threat of physical violence within their capabilities and areas of deployment.
establishes informal contacts with potential troop and personnel-contributing States. Based on a proposed concept of operations, DPKO identifies the type and capability of military elements needed. DPKO must also consider a number of political issues when selecting contributions for a specific situation, including the stated preferences of the parties to the conflict, the need for broad geographic representation and the historical or cultural ties a potential contributor may have with the region or State in question.

### Types of Military Forces and Military Formations

Armed forces can be broken down into three broad categories:

- **Combat forces**, which generally include the infantry, tank forces, combat aircraft, offensive and defensive naval platforms (ships, boats and submarines) and marines and Special Forces;

- **Combat support forces**, including artillery and engineers, airborne and maritime surveillance platforms and command and control facilities; and

- **Logistic and service support forces**, including communications, medical support, air, land and maritime lift and transportation capabilities.

Land forces, which are the most commonly contributed forces for UN peacekeeping operations, are grouped by size as follows:

- **A section**, squad or brick is the smallest unit and generally consists of seven to 12 individuals, commanded by a corporal or sergeant;

- **A platoon or troop** generally consists of three to four sections or squads, totalling 30 to 40 personnel, and is commanded by an officer, normally a lieutenant;

- **Companies, squadrons and batteries** consist of companies (infantry), squadrons (cavalry) and batteries (artillery), which are generally commanded by a captain or major. They consist generally of three to four platoons or troops totalling 120 to 150 personnel;

- **Battalions and regiments** consist of approximately 500 to 1,000 personnel (four to seven subordinate companies, squadrons or batteries) and comprise all elements necessary for self-sustainment. These include combat and support elements, such as specialists in heavy weapons, communications (signals), logistics and engineering. In some armies, battalions and regiments specialize in a particular activity, e.g., artillery, engineering or armour (tanks); and

- **Brigades** generally consist of three combat units of infantry and/or armour, an artillery regiment, a squadron of combat engineers, a headquarters and communications (signals) squadron and a logistics company. Brigadier-generals may command brigades. Depending on prime function (parachute brigade, infantry brigade, artillery brigade, etc.), brigades consist of anywhere between 4,000 to 10,000 personnel.
Rapid Deployment

The General Assembly has endorsed a requirement to be able to establish a traditional peacekeeping mission within 30 days and a complex mission within 90 days of the authorization of a Security Council mandate. To improve the response time of the UN to deploy a peacekeeping operation, a system has been developed under which countries earmark in advance specific contributions for a potential UN peacekeeping operation. The system is called the United Nations Stand-by Arrangements System (UNSAS) and consists of conditional pledges of military units, equipment and individuals by Member States. UNSAS allows DPKO to know ahead of time what types of contributions countries are willing to make on short notice.

Stand-by High Readiness Brigade

The Stand-by High Readiness Brigade (SHIRBRIG) is a multinational brigade consisting of military units from a number of Member States \(^9\) trained to the same standard, using the same operating procedures and inter-operable equipment and taking part in combined exercises at regular intervals to maintain a level of readiness for immediate deployment in a UN peacekeeping operation (15 to 30 days’ notice). When fully deployed, it has a strength of 4,000 to 5,000 troops and is designed to conduct operations for a maximum of six months and then hand over to other UN forces, allowing SHIRBRIG to return to its state of high readiness.

SHIRBRIG is supported by a permanent planning element based in Denmark and consists of a small multinational staff responsible for developing standard operating procedures for the brigade, working on the concept of operations of future deployments and organizing and conducting joint exercises. Once the brigade is deployed, the planning element forms the nucleus of the deployed SHIRBRIG headquarters staff.

In November 2000, SHIRBRIG had its first deployment; SHIRBRIG units from Canada, Denmark and the Netherlands deployed to the Horn of Africa for the newly established United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE). SHIRBRIG forces remained on the ground for six months and were instrumental in the successful establishment of the mission. In 2003, SHIRBRIG provided headquarters staff support to the interim force headquarters of the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) and assisted the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) plan their UN-authorized operation in Côte d’Ivoire.

The SHIRBRIG concept, which is consistent with a wider UN-supported concept of a brigade-size standby force, is being encouraged for other regions of the world, particularly Africa.

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\(^9\) Austria, Canada, Denmark, Netherlands, Norway, Poland and Sweden were founding members, with Argentina, Italy and Romania joining later and Finland, Portugal, Slovenia and Spain having signed various documents related to membership in the group.
Part of the force generation process involves visiting potential contributors to provide advice on equipment, preparedness and training for peacekeeping. Stand-by resources are used exclusively for peacekeeping operations mandated by the Security Council. When specific needs arise, stand-by resources are requested by the Secretary-General and, if approved by participating Member States, are rapidly deployed to set up new peacekeeping missions or to reinforce existing ones. To improve the Organization’s ability to deploy a peacekeeping mission rapidly, the UN maintains a roster of candidates for a rapidly deployable mission headquarters.

**Logistics and Support**

After security, logistics is the area of activity where the military component makes its greatest contribution to peacekeeping operations. Troop-contributing countries are one of several sources of logistic support to peacekeeping operations. The UN also secures logistical support for its peacekeeping operations from stocks of UN-owned equipment, commercial contracts for logistics or an arrangement by which a third country provides direct or bilateral support to specific national contingents that may lack certain logistic assets.

Since the early 1990s, logistic planning for peacekeeping operations where formed military units are part of the operation’s structure has envisaged an integrated support services system involving the military component, the civilian administration and support component and an external contractor element. Integration and consolidation of support resources is vital to the success of peacekeeping missions, which often operate in areas where the infrastructure is severely damaged or destroyed and the UN must rely on its own resources for basic necessities and support.

Support units, such as engineer squadrons or companies, transport units, hospitals and evacuation units, aircraft loading and movement control teams, supply units, maintenance units and others are expected to integrate their work with UN personnel and private contractors to make the best use of resources available to support all components of the mission. The management and control of these joint resources is the responsibility of the chief integrated support services or the chief technical services, as appropriate, who reports directly to the mission’s chief administrative officer but is responsible for delivery of support to the mission as a whole.

Command of all military units, including logistics units, rests with the mission’s force commander and the military chain of command. The integrated support structure, however, provides the ability to carry out integrated and coordinated planning which allows all mission support elements to work together to achieve overall mission priorities.

**Command and Control**

Military personnel contributed by Member States to a UN peacekeeping operation remain under full command of their national armed forces. However, the operational authority over these forces and personnel is transferred to the UN and vested in the Secretary-
General, under the authority of the Security Council. UN operational authority includes the authority to issue operational directives within the limits of a specific mandate, a specific geographic area (the mission area) and for an agreed period of time, with the stipulation that an earlier withdrawal of a contingent would require the contributing country to provide adequate prior notification.

The head of a peacekeeping operation or Head of Mission is appointed by the Secretary-General with the approval of the Security Council and the Head of Mission exercises UN authority on behalf of the Secretary-General. He or she determines the further delegation of authority in consultation with UN Headquarters in New York. The head of the military component of a peacekeeping operation, whether it is a force commander or a chief military observer, is also appointed by the Secretary-General.

In some situations, where the peacekeeping operation is carrying out a strictly military mandate, the head of the military component may also be the designated Head of Mission. Usually, though, the Head of Mission will be a civilian and will be appointed as the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG). The SRSG will exercise UN authority in the field on behalf of the Secretary-General. The head of the military component is responsible to the SRSG for the implementation of the tasks assigned to the military component. The head of the military component, when not serving as the Head of Mission, reports to the Head of Mission. The force commander exercises “operational control” over all military personnel, including military observers, in the peacekeeping operation. The force commander may delegate “operational control” of the military observers to the chief military observer.

Commanders of the different contingents that make up the UN peacekeeping force report to the force commander on all operational matters and must not be given or accept instructions from their own national authorities that are contrary to the mandate of the operation. In the field, common sense and sound management practice dictate that the Head of Mission and force commander ensure that national contingent commanders are involved in operational planning and decision-making, especially where their respective contingents are concerned. Such involvement should take the form of regular consultations in a unified force.

**Relations with Other Mission Components**

In multidimensional peacekeeping operations, the military component interacts with all other mission components. The interaction with the political component includes joint strategic planning for mandate implementation and adjusting the tasks of the military component to the changing political realities on the ground. The military component also interacts frequently with the administrative and support components of the mission, particularly on joint logistics and supply issues.

Public information is another area that requires close cooperation. The military component may have its own public information personnel and spokespersons. To ensure a common strategy and messages, they must work in close collaboration with the
mission’s public information component, particularly the designated mission spokesperson, who is responsible for media relations for the mission as a whole. Close coordination between the military component and other mission components is also necessary for DDR, humanitarian activities, human rights monitoring, civil affairs and the restoration of law and order.

There are several mechanisms that may be used to ensure that the work of the military component is integrated into the efforts of the mission as a whole, including:

- A strategic planning and coordination cell that includes military experts and is part of mission headquarters. Ideally, this cell reports directly to the Head of Mission;

- An integrated support services section under the authority of the mission’s chief administrative officer/chief technical services, which includes civilian and military logisticians;

- An integrated joint operations centre (JOC) to coordinate daily mission activities, including military, political, civil affairs, human rights, public information and other mission components. The JOC may even be used for coordination with elements external to the mission, such as other entities of the UN system;

- An integrated civil-military coordination cell to harmonize activities with other civilian actors in a mission area, such as UN development funds, programmes and specialized agencies, humanitarian non-governmental organizations, international financial institutions, the donor community and local civil society representatives. The integrated cell can facilitate information sharing, mutual support, joint assessments, integrated planning and common strategies that are particularly useful during times of crisis. The cell can be reproduced at the regional and sectoral level; and

- The mission should establish a structure and staff process that optimises civil and military information management and analytical processes through the mechanism of a joint mission analysis cell (JMAC). The JMAC is responsible for the management (collection, coordination, analysis and distribution of information and reports) of the mission’s civil and military information in order to support the SRSG’s and force commander’s decision-making process.

**Conclusion**

The role of the military component in peacekeeping operations continues to evolve in response to new challenges and political realities. To stay relevant, troop contributors and DPKO, with the assistance of donor governments, must work together to improve the readiness and capability of troops for the complex challenges of multidimensional peacekeeping. To some extent these challenges have been met through the creation of new mechanisms promoting coordination and joint planning and improved training,
preparedness, rapid deployment and logistical support. Work remains to be done to improve equipment interoperability and compatibility among different national contingents and the standardization of operating procedures. Troop preparedness and self-sustainment also require continued attention.

The military component must work in close cooperation with all components of the mission, because the success of a multidimensional peacekeeping operation is measured by much more than simply the absence of conflict. The re-establishment and further development of strong democratic institutions and respect for the rule of law and human rights of all citizens are also important measures of success. The military component must work with all other partners in this wider context to help consolidate peace.
CHAPTER VI: MINE ACTION ASSISTANCE

The Threat from Landmines

Conflicts during the last century have left millions of unrecorded anti-personnel landmines (APMs), anti-tank mines (ATMs) and other items of unexploded ordnance (UXO) scattered around the world. APMs are victim-activated, or detonated by anything or anyone that makes contact with them. They are designed to be exploded by the presence, proximity or contact of a person and will incapacitate, injure or kill one or more persons. These indiscriminate weapons are a constant threat to combatants, civilians and their livestock and make vast tracts of land and the resources on them unusable. ATMs are mines designed to disable or destroy vehicles and tanks and can be activated by many types of fuse mechanisms, including pressure, tilt rod, influence or command.

“Landmines are cheap to buy and profitable to sell. They are easy to use and hard to detect and they kill, maim and terrorise indiscriminately. They remain vigilant long after the guns fall silent. The social and economic costs are enormous. Mines destroy livelihoods and deny access to land, water sources, schools and pathways. They cripple recovery in countries emerging from conflict.”

Humanitarian Mine Action Objectives

United Nations (UN) policy clearly states that the danger from landmines is a humanitarian concern and must be addressed as such. Mine action is a programme designed to recreate a safe environment conducive to normal life and development and refers to activities that address the problems created by landmines or UXO contamination.

UN Mine Action: A Strategy for 2001-2005

“We envision a world free of the threat of landmines and unexploded ordnance, where individuals and communities live in a safe environment conducive to development and where mine action survivors are fully integrated into their societies.”

This strategy was endorsed on 26 September 2001 by the Inter-Agency Coordination Group on Mine Action (IACG-MA) during a meeting chaired by the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations.

Humanitarian mine action refers to mine action activities where priorities are based on socio-economic impact and emergency situations, where safety standards are defined and

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implemented to ensure 100 percent clearance and all activities are based on humanitarian principles and priorities.

### Core Components of UN Mine Action

- Mine risk education;
- Mine clearance, including survey, mapping and marking;
- Victim assistance;
- Destruction of stockpiled APMs; and
- Advocacy to stigmatize the use of landmines and support a total ban on APMs.

UN mine action is undertaken in both peacekeeping and non-peacekeeping contexts. In a peacekeeping scenario, the landmine situation may be assessed before or after a mission is established. When the Security Council mandate establishing or extending a peacekeeping mission includes explicitly or implicitly mine action deployment, a UN official is assigned responsibility for the mine action work and the mission structure supports the mine action coordination centre (MACC). Examples of mine action activities in support of peacekeeping missions include the following:

- United Nations Missions in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE);
- United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL);
- United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO); and

### Military Mine Clearance and Mine Action in Support of Peacekeeping Operations

Military mine clearance refers to minefield breaching (in land mine warfare, the process of clearing a lane through a minefield under tactical conditions) and counter-mine warfare (the countering of enemy-laid mines to permit friendly manoeuvre or use of selected land or sea areas).

Mine action in support of peacekeeping operations refers to mine action activities in support of a peacekeeping mission mandated by the UN Security Council.
UN mine action activities are also implemented in non-peacekeeping contexts. In Chad and Sudan, for example, the mine action intervention is in response to landmine contamination. In Afghanistan, a mine action programme was started long before a peacekeeping operation was mandated there.

**Mine Action in Mission and Non-Mission Areas**

Security Council Resolution 1291 (2000) on the situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) mandated MONUC to undertake mine action activities to contend with the UXO problem. As a result, a MACC was established in Kinshasa. The primary tasks of the MACC are to provide mine action expertise, including to act as the focal point and coordinator for mine action, develop a mine/UXO information system, implement emergency surveys and implement emergency mine action activities. The MACC also works with the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) to develop risk prevention campaigns and with national authorities to develop medium- and long-term mine action plans.

In Chad, on the other hand, mine action activities were implemented as a national priority rather than as a mandated component of a peacekeeping mission. The Chadian government approached the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) to help coordinate a comprehensive national mine action programme. The programme was designed to promote stability in the country and support overall humanitarian and economic development plans.

**Key Mine Action Activities**

**Inter-agency assessment missions.** Requests from governments for assistance in mine action are reviewed by the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS), which organizes a multidisciplinary assessment mission in consultation with the UN Resident or Humanitarian Coordinator and other agencies. The assessment mission defines the scope and nature of the mine problem, identifies constraints and opportunities relating to mine action initiatives and makes recommendations for a comprehensive response.

**Landmine impact survey (LIS).** LIS surveys assess socio-economic impact and address the planning and prioritisation of the mine action programmes and projects. Impact surveys make use of all available sources of information; certification of an LIS through quality assurance monitoring is part of UNMAS core responsibilities.

**Fact-finding and technical missions.** These are often deployed to strengthen existing programmes and projects or to evaluate the situation in areas where operations have become dormant.

**Marking.** Minefield marking is used when a mined area is identified but clearance operations cannot immediately take place. Signs, markings or physical barriers are used to identify the boundaries of hazardous areas. Minefield marking is designed to warn
people not to enter mined areas and is carried out in combination with mine risk education so that local populations understand the meaning and importance of the signs.

**Mapping.** Maps based on impact and technical surveys are stored in an Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) and provide baseline data for clearance organization and operational planning.

**Mine clearance.** In its broadest sense, mine clearance includes surveys, mapping and minefield marking as well as clearing mines from the ground. Clearance operations rely on three main methods:

- Manual clearance relies on trained deminers using metal detectors and long thin prodders to locate the mines, which are then destroyed.
- Mine detection dogs locate explosives in the ground through smell. Dogs may be used in combination with manual deminers.
- Mechanical clearance uses machinery, including flails, rollers and vegetation cutters and excavators, often attached to armoured bulldozers, to destroy the mines in the ground. These machines, which are expensive to operate, can only be used when the terrain is suitable. In most situations, this technique is not completely reliable and follow-up work is required.

**Information management.** The UN plays a key role as the central repository of information on mine action, which is constantly being developed and enhanced.

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<tr>
<th>Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA)</th>
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<tr>
<td>IMSMA is the UN’s information system for the management of critical data on UN-supported field programmes. Developed by the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining, it offers data collection, information analysis and project management. It is used by staff at national-level mine action centres as well as by project implementers, such as demining organizations.</td>
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**Mine risk education and awareness.** Mine risk education aims to prevent casualties caused by mines and UXO through public information and education programmes for communities living with the threat from mines. Strategies commonly involve mass media campaigns, including posters, television spots and radio messages. Education programmes are presented at the community level and are integrated into school curricula.

**Victim assistance.** As both a core component of mine action and an obligation of States Parties under the Antipersonnel Mine Ban Treaty (APMBT), victim assistance refers to all aid, relief, comfort and support provided to victims of mines to reduce the immediate and long-term medical and psychological trauma.
**Stockpile destruction.** Article 4 of the APMBT requires States Parties to destroy their stockpiles of APM no later than four years after the entry into force of the Convention for that State Party.

**Advocacy.** Advocacy refers to efforts to stigmatize the use of landmines and support a total ban on APMs.

**Quality management.** Quality control is used to determine when land is cleared of mines and safe for use. Quality assurance confirms that management practices and operational procedures are appropriate and safe and will be used in an effective and efficient way. Internal quality control is normally conducted by demining organizations themselves, but external inspections by other monitoring bodies should also be conducted. UNMAS is responsible for the development and maintenance of technical and safety standards for the mine action community. The International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) were first published in October 2001 and are widely recognized as the basis for national standards in mine-affected countries.

**Training.** Training is an essential component of mine action activities. Since 2000 the international mine action community has emphasized management training and provided forums for training and dialogue among mine action personnel.

**National capacity-building.** National capacity-building involves developing sustainable indigenous institutions to address land mine problems over the long term. Within the UN system, UNDP is responsible for addressing the socio-economic consequences of landmine contamination and supporting national and local capacity-building.

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**E-MINE**

E-MINE is a public and freely accessible website found at www.mineaction.org. It is designed to support the planning and coordination of global mine action activities by providing reliable information on problems, programmes, resources, best practices and technologies.

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**The Mine Action Community**

The international mine action community is diverse and includes national authorities; a number of UN departments, funds, programmes and agencies; and international and national NGOs, donors, military units and commercial companies. Mine action entities typically have very specific mandates but are also required to coordinate and collaborate. This is essential if the international mine action community is to respond effectively to the complicated and dangerous problems resulting from landmine contamination.
The UN System

Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO). DPKO supports the inclusion of mine action activities in the mandate of peacekeeping missions and recruits specialized military contingents to work in mine action operations. It does this through UNMAS.

United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS). UNMAS, a component of DPKO, is the focal point within the UN system for all mine-related activities and is responsible for UN mine action activities in support of peacekeeping operations and urgent humanitarian needs. It ensures an effective, proactive and coordinated UN response to landmine contamination.

Emergency Situations

In the absence of recognized national government authorities and in situations in which urgent humanitarian and operational requirements need to be addressed, the UN is often required to initiate a programme under its own auspices. In such cases, UNMAS is responsible for developing the initial response in consultation with all relevant mine action stakeholders.

Department for Disarmament Affairs (DDA). DDA supports the role of the UN Secretary-General in relation to the Antipersonnel Mine Ban Treaty (APMBT), also referred to as the Ottawa Convention.

Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). OCHA shares information regarding the humanitarian implications of landmines.

Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR). OHCHR gives particular emphasis to promoting the rights of persons disabled by landmines.

Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). In the context of mine action, UNHCR ensures that the needs of refugees and displaced people are addressed.

United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF). UNICEF is the UN focal point for mine risk education and provides guidance for mine awareness programmes; it also supports victim assistance and advocates for a total ban on landmines.

United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). UNDP addresses the socio-economic consequences of landmine contamination and supports national and local capacity-building. It develops integrated and sustainable mine action programmes and currently provides technical advice and support to governments in 16 countries.
United Nations Office for Projects Services (UNOPS). UNOPS is a principal service provider within the UN system for integrated mine action and capacity-building programmes.

World Food Programme (WFP). WFP is involved in providing food assistance and logistic support services to UN humanitarian operations related to mine action.

Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO). FAO works in the recovery of the agricultural sector in countries affected by complex emergencies.

World Bank. The World Bank views mine contamination as a development problem with long-term consequences that requires long-term solutions.

World Health Organization (WHO). Working through Ministries of Health, WHO develops standards and methodologies and promotes health service capacity-building for sustainable victim assistance.

International Entities

International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). The ICRC develops mine risk education activities, collects data on mine victims and provides medical assistance and advice to clearance teams.

International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL). The ICBL is a network of 1,400 NGOs in 90 countries that actively advocates for a total ban on APMs. ICBL also prepares the annual Landmine Monitor Report, an initiative monitoring governments' implementation of and compliance with the APBMT.

Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD). The Centre promotes cooperation in mine action in three main areas: research studies, operational assistance and support of the Mine Ban Treaty.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Organization of American States (OAS) and the European Union (EU) are also actively involved in mine action activities.

Non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Humanitarian NGOs play a key role in mine action activities. Examples include Handicap International (HI), Halo Trust, Mines Advisory Group (MAG), Norwegian Peoples Aid (NPA) and Survey Action Centre (SAC).

Commercial operators. International and local commercial companies often contract for mine-clearance and explosive ordnance disposal projects. Commercial companies can also provide experts for training local technicians and developing national capacities.
**Donors.** Without regular financial and in-kind donor support, most mine action activities would not be possible. Resource mobilization is therefore crucial for the success of UN mine action work. There are different types of donors, including governments, international organizations, charities, foundations and private companies. Donors often have specific areas of interest, which may be geographic, programme-specific or a combination of both.

**Host Countries**

**Government of the affected country.** The primary responsibility for taking action on landmines lies with the concerned State. When required, UNDP, in consultation with all stakeholders, including UNMAS, relevant local partners, NGOs, donors and other UN entities, will assist in creating sustainable national capacities and in preparing and implementing an overall programme plan.

**National mine action authority.** A central mechanism that is politically and legally mandated to plan, coordinate and regulate all mine action activities of national and international entities in the country is normally required. A national mine action authority is often established to provide policy guidelines and serve as the highest body for regulation of mine action activities in the country.

**Inter-ministerial working group.** An inter-ministerial working group is often established to review and adopt strategies, policies and plans proposed by the national mine action authority. It generally oversees the activities of the central authority and ensures the integration of mine action within the overall government rehabilitation and development policy.

**National NGOs with operational responsibilities.** National NGOs can carry out mine action operations such as survey, minefield marking, clearance, mine risk education and explosive ordnance disposal (EOD). They will usually operate under the coordination of the central national mine action regulatory body.

**UN Peacekeeping Operations**

Mine action coordination in a peacekeeping operation requires the involvement and support of a number of elements:

**Mine action coordination entity.** If the landmine problem is relatively large, the mission may establish a MACC. This is the central location for the mission’s mine action programme. Usually, a Programme Manager is the head of the MACC and he/she will be responsible for coordinating assistance in support of the goals established by a government or peacekeeping mandate. The programme manager is responsible for coordinating all mine action-related matters between the UN and the national authority as well as other mine action partners. If the landmine problem is limited in scope, the mission will usually operate with a mine action cell.
**Senior UN official.** In missions where the mandate includes mine action, a senior UN official such as the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General (DSRSG) may be designated to oversee mine action coordination activities. This arrangement may be the subject of letters between the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) and the Director of UNMAS.

**Force commander.** In a mission where specialized troops for mine clearance are present, the Force Commander is responsible for their deployment in coordination with the Manager of the MACC.

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**United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE)**

As part of the UN peacekeeping mission in Eritrea and Ethiopia, in 2000, UNMAS established the UNMEE MACC to support the peacekeeping and humanitarian relief efforts in the temporary security zone. MACC also assists the Eritrean authorities with collecting, analysing and disseminating mine/UXO information.

The Centre’s programme manager reports to the DSRSG on mine action issues that concern the peacekeeping operation in the temporary security zone and to the UN Resident Coordinator on issues that relate to the longer term development of national mine action institutions.

UNMEE also established a Mine Action Coordination Group to effectively and consistently oversee implementation of the mine action programme for Eritrea. This group, chaired by the DSRSG, included the Resident Coordinator, the Force Commander and other senior UN officials along with technical staff from mine action organizations.

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**Engineer troops from troop-contributing countries (TCCs).** If the peacekeeping mandate refers to mine action, the TCCs may contribute engineer contingents, which could be made responsible for mine-related tasks. Normally, these contingents are responsible for mine clearance in support of the mission as a priority.

**Financing Mine Action Activities**

**Resource mobilization.** The vast majority of UN mine action activities are funded from voluntary donor contributions. In 2000, an estimated US$200 million was donated for mine action activities worldwide, 40 percent of which was channelled through the UN system. Various UN actors conduct their own fundraising activities for mine action at both the field and headquarters levels and coordinate these activities with UNMAS. Peacekeeping mandates now frequently include a provision in the mission budget for mission-related mine action.

There are several mechanisms for mobilizing and channelling donor funds to UN mine action efforts. These include:
Handbook on UN Multidimensional Peacekeeping Operations

- Voluntary Trust Fund for Assistance in Mine Action (VTF), managed by UNMAS;
- Country-specific trust funds, generally managed by UNDP; and
- Adopt-a-Minefield programme of the UN Association of the U.S. and the Better World Fund.

Under the overall coordination of UNMAS, the departments and agencies of the UN system work to keep the donor community informed through the annual publication of *Portfolio of Mine-Related Projects*. The portfolio includes brief descriptions and budget requirements for all UN mine action programmes and projects (see [www.mineaction.org](http://www.mineaction.org)).

### Voluntary Trust Fund for Assistance in Mine Action

VTF is managed by UNMAS and is primarily used to finance:

- Overall coordination of UN mine action;
- Missions to assess the scope of the landmine threat and established programmes;
- Initiation of new mine action activities and programmes when and where required; and
- Bridging funding delays in ongoing programmes.

### Limitations of Mine Action Activities

The success of a mine action programme or project depends on a system of central coordination, resources and the provision of relevant information by the parties involved. The absence of any one of these factors can seriously limit the work of implementing and sustaining a mine action programme.

The coordination of mine-related activities is critical for effectively addressing the problem in affected areas, and the UN Policy on Mine Action and Effective Coordination defines the roles and responsibilities of the actors within the UN system. To avoid duplication of efforts and to ensure effective coordination, all mine action activities are organised in consultation with UNMAS and with the UN Resident and Humanitarian Coordinators in the field. UNMAS also ensures that all like-minded partners outside the UN system, including NGOs, the ICRC and other components of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, are fully involved.

To fulfil this role, UNMAS relies on two mechanisms: the Inter-Agency Coordination Group on Mine Action (a forum bringing together 13 UN entities) and the Steering
Committee on Mine Action (which includes ICRC, the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining, the International Campaign to Ban Landmines and other NGOs).

**Concluding UN Support to a Mine Action Programme**

In most mine-affected countries, it can take years to eradicate UXO and declare the country mine-free. The UN’s support for a mine action programme is considered successfully concluded when the national government and its entities are able to implement the mine action programme without external support.
CHAPTER VII: POLICE, JUDICIARY AND CORRECTIONS ASPECTS OF RULE OF LAW

Introduction

The establishment of effective police, judiciary and corrections structures to uphold the rule of law is essential to building a sustainable peace. The need for United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operations to support the restoration of the rule of law has grown dramatically over the past decade as the international community has recognized that peacekeeping operations, particularly those that involve conflict within States, have an important role to play, alongside the interventions of other organizations, in strengthening internal security and criminal justice structures.

UN support for the promotion of an environment promoting the rule of law encompasses a broad range of activities, but this chapter addresses three primary areas in which peacekeeping operations have played a role: civilian police, the judiciary and corrections. Security Council mandates for rule of law activities in peacekeeping operations have included monitoring national law enforcement organizations, reforming and restructuring internal security structures (primarily local civilian police services) and assuming executive law enforcement functions. More recently, activities in support of the criminal justice system, namely the judiciary and corrections systems, have complemented the law enforcement and police reform efforts in providing greater security and justice to people in conflict-torn societies.

One of the key lessons learned by peacekeeping operations in this area is that, in addition to the legislative system, three pillars of the criminal justice system—police, judiciary and corrections institutions—are closely interconnected and should all receive international attention and support. Only with effective institutions and balanced interventions across those areas can there be substantial strengthening of the rule of law. Also essential is the involvement of a broad array of local actors in planning and implementing strategies to strengthen rule of law institutions. This partnership with local government officials, professionals and civil society is necessary for the success of the efforts of the peacekeeping operation.

UN Civilian Police

Although rule of law activities in peacekeeping operations have increased in recent years, the involvement of peacekeeping personnel in this sector is not new. Civilian police have been part of UN peacekeeping operations for over 40 years and their mandates and roles continue to change and evolve in response to changing needs. The role of civilian police has grown from monitoring and advising functions to reforming, restructuring and institution building of local police services and performing executive law enforcement. Judicial affairs and corrections officers have also been deployed in peacekeeping operations in recent years to provide the necessary expertise to rebuild and support these
crucial institutions and to complement the role of a transitional authority in the application of the due process of law.

The first civilian police deployments were to the United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC) from 1960-64 and the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) in 1964 in support of UN military observers and other UN military personnel. During the next 25 years, UN peacekeeping operations continued to use civilian police to monitor and report on local police activities. Following the police deployment with the United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) in Namibia in 1989, civilian police operations began to take on new and complex roles in the missions in Mozambique, Haiti, El Salvador, Cambodia, Somalia, Angola, Eastern Slavonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Sierra Leone, Timor-Leste (formerly East Timor) and Kosovo. Civilian police officers were tasked to monitor local police services, to assist in the development and restructuring of law enforcement structures and, in the cases of Kosovo and Timor-Leste, to act also as the executive law enforcement authority.

Civilian police officers are usually law enforcement personnel on active duty in their home countries and are seconded by Member States to UN peacekeeping operations. The Civilian Police Division of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) coordinates the recruitment and deployment of civilian police officers and is responsible for ensuring that candidates for peacekeeping operations meet certain minimum UN standards, which are determined through an assessment and selection process in collaboration with Member States. The Civilian Police Division is responsible for overall planning, management, operational oversight and policy development for all civilian police activities in peacekeeping operations, as well as providing them with technical advice and support.

The civilian police component is generally established as a separate component within a peacekeeping operation, usually under the operational control of a police commissioner, who reports to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) or Head of Mission. There is usually a single chain of command within the civilian police component with all personnel accountable to the commissioner. The Civilian Police Division of DPKO provides advisory and operational support to peacekeeping operations from Headquarters in New York by advising, providing technical guidance and supporting the police commissioners and SRSGs. The administration and support component of the peacekeeping operation provides logistics and administrative support to the civilian police as it does to all components of the peacekeeping operation.

As with all UN personnel, civilian police officers must abide by local laws and are expected, at all times, to promote internationally accepted principles of ethical, legal and democratic policing as well as to ensure compliance with human rights standards. Principles of democratic policing demand a high level of representative, responsive and accountable policing for the community. Civilian police officers must always uphold human rights and democratic policing principles and conduct themselves according to the highest standards of integrity and professionalism. These standards must also extend to
their own personal conduct. Civilian police officers contributed for service with the UN must always be beyond reproach in their integrity, impartiality and personal behaviour.¹

### Principles of Democratic Policing

**Representative policing** ensures that:

- Police personnel sufficiently represent the community they serve;
- Minority groups and women are adequately represented through fair and non-discriminatory recruitment policies in police services; and
- The human rights of all people are protected, promoted and respected.

**Responsive policing** ensures that:

- Police are responsive to public needs and expectations, especially in preventing and detecting crime and maintaining public order;
- Policing objectives are attained both lawfully and humanely;
- Police understand the needs and expectations of the public they serve; and
- Police actions are responsive to public opinion and wishes.

**Accountable policing** is achieved in three ways:

- Legally: police are accountable to the law, as are all individuals and institutions in States;
- Politically: police are accountable to the public through the democratic and political institutions of government as well as through police and citizen liaison groups; and
- Economically: police are accountable for the way they use resources allocated to them.


### Civilian Police Tasks and Responsibilities

Reflecting the increasingly complex and multidimensional nature of peacekeeping operations, civilian police responsibilities encompass a wide range of activities that can be broadly categorized as follows:

¹ See Ten Rules: Code of Personal Conduct for Blue Helmets and We are United Nations Peacekeepers, which contain the standards of conduct for uniformed personnel serving in UN field missions.
- Advising and reporting;
- Reforming and restructuring of local police services;
- Training, mentoring, skills transfer and police capacity enhancement;
- Establishing new national police services; and
- Performing executive law enforcement functions.

**Advising and Reporting**

In the early 1990s, civilian police components were tasked mainly with monitoring local police services to ensure observance of the principles of democratic policing. This required observing the behaviour of local police in the performance of their duties and reporting issues of concern to the Head of Mission for appropriate action. In UNTAG, for example, the civilian police component was to ensure that the South West Africa Police fulfilled their duty of maintaining law and order in an efficient, professional and non-partisan manner. UN civilian police officers investigated public complaints against the local police and reported any violations of human rights by the police services. Their presence in tense border areas helped build confidence in the impartiality of the UN and reassured the general public. Although UN civilian police had no direct authority for the maintenance of law and order and could influence the standards of policing only indirectly, they contributed significantly to keeping the transition plan for Namibia on track.

Monitoring approaches and concepts have shifted increasingly towards a process of advising and working with local counterparts. This process of advising local police, which includes observation, advice, supervision and reporting on counterparts, continues to be a core civilian police role in multidimensional peacekeeping missions. The process is not an end in itself, but a means to detect problems, identify steps to address them and assess the effectiveness of existing measures for redress. When working with a local police service, civilian police may look at the effectiveness of the local police command structure; its ability to conduct internal investigations; its relations with judicial authorities; and, most importantly, its relations with the community it is responsible for serving and protecting.

In a number of situations, civilian police have found that an effective technique of working with local and national police forces is by co-locating UN civilian police personnel with the local police. Working together with the local police and community on a daily basis can facilitate trust, good communication and mutually beneficial working relationships to promote democratic and community policing practices. Thorough institutional assessment of local police institutions, made possible by co-location, has been an effective way for civilian police to understand the strengths and weaknesses of the local police and to ensure that reports on their activities are grounded in local realities and based on the local context.
The passive monitoring style of early civilian police missions—simply noting problems in local policing practices—proved to be of limited utility because it is less likely to significantly change the standards and methods of operation of the local police. The evolution toward more active interventions through active monitoring, which identifies weaknesses and ways to address them, has been a more effective approach and increasingly is being adopted as part of the civilian police’s growing advisory role. To the greatest extent possible, these approaches should work with, not against, the institutional structures of the local police.

The effectiveness of the process often depends on the willingness of the local police service to cooperate with the civilian police. For example, the role of the civilian police component in the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) was to supervise the local police service, primarily through monitoring and reporting. UNTAC’s civilian police was able to make substantial progress only where the local police service had self-interest in cooperating with the UN or where moral authority provided sufficient leverage.

Early on in a peacekeeping operation, it is important that appropriate standards and guidelines be established for civilian police on how to advise and report on the local police. These must be implemented in a rigorous, programmed manner, albeit with flexibility, if they are to be effective. Advising and monitoring at local levels has been a resource-intensive exercise in the past, requiring a large number of civilian police officers. On the other hand, if efforts are focused on senior ranks of a local police service, then fewer civilian police officers, but with more managerial experience and seniority, may be needed. In this scenario, spot checks and targeted support at lower levels may still be required.

**Reforming, Restructuring, Training and Strengthening Institutions**

Another task for civilian police has been to reform, restructure and train national police services to help ensure that they become respected, sustainable, well-structured law enforcement institutions. Examples of these mandates include the missions in Haiti, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Eastern Slavonia in Croatia. Missions mandated to support local police reform initially did so by providing training and mentoring. The primary goal of training local police has been to strengthen police services so that their conduct and services are professional, effective and comply with international standards for democratic policing.

Reforming, restructuring, training and strengthening efforts need to consider the national context, including cultural, political, economic and social realities. Imported models may not be best suited for the local situation and these models may need to be adapted to local realities if they are not to be counter-productive. Working closely with national authorities will ensure local ownership of any reform and restructuring efforts and their involvement will ensure sustainability of the initiatives in the long run.

The four main local target groups for police training are new recruits, active police officers, middle and senior managers in the police service and police trainers. Police
training courses developed by UN civilian police have covered such subjects as democratic policing standards, human rights, crisis management, relations between police and judicial authorities, personnel management, finance, logistics, procurement, facilities and equipment maintenance and asset management. Courses on organized crime and human trafficking were also part of the training curriculum for local police in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Good training programmes have been based on a flexible curriculum that can be tailored to the local situation. In Haiti, case studies used in training of police cadets were based on actual cases that UN human rights monitors had investigated in the country.

Civilian police may not always be directly responsible for designing and delivering training, but may complement or coordinate development activities (e.g. training and support) provided bilaterally by Member States and regional organizations that may have greater resources and capacity to conduct such police enhancement programmes in certain situations. Examples of such bilateral initiatives include the International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program of the United States Government, which provides training to police services and judiciaries in many different countries; the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), which assists and trains police in the countries of Eastern Europe and Central Asia; and the European Union, which has taken over and continued UN police assistance projects in Bosnia and Herzegovina and has supported UN police capacity enhancement activities in peacekeeping operations in Africa. In Afghanistan, assistance to the police is also being provided bilaterally by Germany. Bilateral support for the enhancement of national law enforcement capacity, such as the support provided by some Member States to African countries that are hosting peacekeeping operations, supports the UN efforts in this area and should be encouraged even after the peacekeeping operation has departed.

Civilian police officers have also become increasingly responsible for the selection, screening and training of local police candidates, on-the-job mentoring and monitoring, and evaluating their performance in the field. Peacekeeping missions with mandates for reforming and restructuring of national police services have also been responsible for advising national authorities on how to design and establish more appropriate (often significantly smaller) administrative and operational structures for national police services in addition to overseeing efforts to instil more professional, democratic and community-oriented principles of policing. An important element of this work has been to emphasize the strict separation of military and paramilitary entities from civilian police in developing national law enforcement structures.

Effective personnel management and recruitment is vital to the reform of police services and includes removing undesirable personnel from the police service and developing systems to ensure that they are not recruited in the future. In addition to direct screening activities, internal oversight and investigation capacities are important in any police service. In the process of screening and selecting local police officers it is frequently important to ensure that recruits from former warring parties are incorporated into a single policing structure and that minority groups and women are sufficiently well-represented in police ranks.
Local police and authorities can perceive civilian police reform and restructuring activities as unwelcome interference, but their cooperation is critical to success. In situations where the international community has faced resistance, UN civilian police officers have at times faced tremendous difficulties in implementing reform and restructuring solutions. In such instances, civilian police officers need sufficient influence and leverage over the parties to effect change in local structures, procedures and behaviour. This is an important lesson learned from the experience of the United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH), where an innovative non-compliance reporting tool was developed to provide some leverage to the International Police Task Force (IPTF), the civilian police component of UNMIBH.

**Non-Compliance Reporting and De-Certification in UNMIBH**

“Non-compliance reporting” and “de-certification” were techniques used in Bosnia and Herzegovina to support UNMIBH’s monitoring and restructuring mandate by providing UN civilian police officers with some leverage over the local police services when monitoring revealed problems. Until the introduction of this mechanism, the mission had made little progress with the police entities in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The non-compliance reporting evolved out of the expanded powers provided to UNMIBH and the IPTF and was based on increasing political will to address the institutional reform agenda in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Non-compliance reports were issued when local police officials failed to comply with reasonable requests for information and access by IPTF personnel or in any way obstructed the work of the civilian police. If several non-compliance reports were filed against a police official, the IPTF had the authority to seek issuance of a de-certification warning or to de-certify the police officer, resulting in the police officer losing the authority to exercise policing functions. While non-compliance reports and de-certification of police officers did not vest any executive authority in the IPTF, they nevertheless provided some leverage to help it influence the policies, procedures and operations of the local police. UNMIBH de-certified nearly 500 police who were unwilling to comply with democratic policing standards.

**Educating the Public**

An important and sometimes overlooked aspect of police reform and restructuring is the need to ensure that the general public is aware of its rights and has appropriate expectations of local law enforcement structures. Experience has proven the importance of public information strategies, community policing and engaging civil society groups in developing respect for the reformed police. In the absence of public understanding of, and support for, police reform, the civilian population may see the process as a technical exercise with minimal impact on their lives.

Public forums, roundtables, seminars, radio broadcasts and other outreach efforts can help build understanding and support for police in local communities. In Haiti and
Rwanda, for example, human rights non-governmental organizations (NGOs) were invited to speak to police cadets during their basic training. Similar meetings were arranged between NGOs and judges and prosecutors in training at the judicial academy. Some grass-roots human rights organizations in Haiti even invited national police to attend their human rights training sessions.

**Community Policing**

Community-based policing is an increasingly important element of policing in post-conflict environments and is closely linked to public education. The community policing approach enhances the confidence of the local community in the police and fosters cooperative relationships. It provides reassurances to vulnerable groups, returning refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs), owing to the visible presence of police officers working with local populations in and among the community. Addressing common community and policing concerns through, and with, the community can help to ensure that improvements in law and order are better understood and accepted by the population. As such, community policing is a key approach for civilian police in peacekeeping missions. Many host countries of peacekeeping operations have certain entrenched local policing practices. These can be adapted to include modern community policing practices. The local communities must be encouraged to address their own social problems. Civilian police can act as a catalyst for the participation of the local communities in finding solutions to their security and justice problems.

**Electoral Assistance**

The role of the police is important in all phases of an election process, including: 1) the pre-election phase, which involves security for voter registration and campaigning, as well as identification of secure polling sites; 2) the election day itself, which can pose security challenges such as the potential abduction of candidates, intimidation of voters when casting ballots and sabotage at the polling booths; and 3) the post-election phase, which includes security of the ballot papers and general security after the election. During each phase, police provide security and can help ensure that basic human rights, such as freedom of expression and association and the right to peaceful demonstrations, are protected. Protecting voters and candidates from intimidation, harassment, abduction and retribution are key police responsibilities during the entire period. UN civilian police can assist local police through training and advising on security planning and operations for the election.

**Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration**

Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) are complex and interconnected processes, which have the ultimate objective of reintegrating ex-combatants into society. The role of civilian police is often not recognized, but a number of experiences have shown that the more civilian police are involved in DDR-related confidence-building initiatives, the greater the acceptance of ex-combatants and their relatives into society. Civilian police can assist other components of the mission in several DDR-related
functions such as coordination, advising and monitoring. The reintegration of ex-combatants into the local police service has often been an element of DDR programmes, and civilian police assistance with this process can be essential to success.

**Building New Police Institutions**

The establishment of new law enforcement institutions has been the long-term objective of police activities in the transitional administration missions of Kosovo and Timor-Leste as well as in peacekeeping operations such as UNMIBH. In the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), more than 5,000 Kosovo Police Service officers had graduated by 2003 and entered active service alongside their UNMIK civilian police counterparts. In Timor-Leste, civilian police were mandated to maintain law and order as well as to establish and train a credible and professional national police service. Within the first two years, more than 2,000 local police officers had graduated from the police academy and were co-located with UN civilian police officers throughout the country, as part of a mentoring programme. A gradual handover of civilian police activities to the certified officers of the newly established *Policia Nacional de Timor-Leste* has taken place successfully.

Building an adequate cadre of trained, professional police officers is usually the primary focus of civilian police missions with institution-building mandates and is an important and highly visible confidence-building activity. Establishing basic administrative and financial management arrangements for the local police services early on is vital for institution building. It is particularly important to identify sources of funding, prepare budgets and accounting systems, develop office procedures, effective procurement and asset management tools and human resources systems. The early establishment of strong internal oversight, audit and internal investigations units is critical for transparent, accountable institutions.

In some peacekeeping operations, local police salaries have been an issue of some concern. In these situations, a cost of living analysis can be conducted to help determine a fair and equitable police salary scale, without which it could be difficult to adopt democratic and community policing practices or attract the best candidates.

Police reform and restructuring require short- and long-term resource requirements to be effective. Priority areas for funding should be the infrastructure necessary to build the police service, such as training facilities, police stations, communications equipment, information management networks, police vehicles and police uniforms. This capital investment must be balanced, however, against sustainability considerations, so that the recurrent costs of the new facilities and equipment do not overburden the police service and the government in the longer term and lead to a situation where the government is unable to pay police salaries or maintain equipment.
Executive Law Enforcement

A significant new development in the role of civilian police in peacekeeping missions occurred with the mandates approved for the transitional administration missions of Kosovo and Timor-Leste in 1999. As part of the legislative and executive authority given to these missions, the civilian police component was vested with broad responsibilities: maintaining law and order; developing local law enforcement systems; and training local personnel to assume law enforcement duties at the end of the transition period. This type of mandate is referred to as an “executive law enforcement” mandate and effectively requires the UN civilian police to serve as the national police service until domestic capacities are developed. In UNMIK, for example, the executive policing mandate required civilian police to carry out all normal policing duties, including:

- Protection of property and lives;
- Investigation of crime and criminality;
- Enforcement of law and order; and
- Assistance and support to capacity-building for the local police.

In addition, UNMIK special police units carried out public order functions, such as crowd control and area security, while UN border police ensured compliance with immigration laws and other border regulations.

A civilian police component mandated with executive authority requires a large number of experienced personnel to carry out the full range of law enforcement tasks. In fulfilling executive responsibilities, civilian police are expected to evaluate and respond to the constantly changing situation in the mission area while working strictly within the parameters of the mandate.

Cooperation and Key Partnerships

Police and military cooperation. An important issue for civilian policing in UN peacekeeping missions is the relationship between the civilian police and the UN military component. Civilian police and the military are natural partners in a peacekeeping operation but coordination between the two is sometimes a challenge in the field. In some peacekeeping missions, cooperation between the civilian police and the military components has been excellent, characterized by close coordination of activities and shared responsibility for different aspects of security. In Kosovo, for example, UNMIK police gradually assumed increasing security and law and order responsibilities from the multinational peacekeeping Kosovo Force (KFOR), led by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). In Bosnia and Herzegovina, UNMIBH police and the NATO-led Stabilization Force (SFOR) also worked well together and conducted joint patrols.

There are important limits to this cooperation, however, particularly because police need to maintain a civilian profile distinct from the military. The need for a distinct police
profile is important to make clear the civilian nature of policing, which helps to maintain the moral authority and public trust needed for effective policing. The ability to maintain separate profiles while establishing strong functional relationships between civilian police officers and military peacekeepers is a difficult balance but is critical to the success of policing in peacekeeping operations.

**Civilian police and civilian cooperation.** Coordination with the civilian component of the mission, as well as partners external to the mission, is essential. Civilian police can benefit from close cooperation with UN funds, programmes and specialized agencies working in the mission area as well as NGOs and civil society groups. Human rights personnel are key partners in building effective rule of law structures and procedures. Human rights specialists, for example, can provide information on human rights conditions in the country and historical information on the record of state institutions. They can also provide valuable inputs on human rights principles and standards for police training curricula. Humanitarian workers, another partner, are often in contact with local grass-roots organizations and can provide crucial insights into the population's opinions of the police and on sensitive issues such as how to deal with past human rights abuses, reconciliation and victim support. Humanitarian personnel often have a good understanding of issues related to the protection of vulnerable groups and other beneficiary populations.

Within the peacekeeping mission, input and advice should be sought from the political affairs, civil affairs, human rights and humanitarian assistance components when designing reform programmes for local police. Personnel from these components may be able to provide valuable insights into organized crime, property disputes, corruption and the special concerns of children, adolescents, IDPs and returning refugees. Public information officers in a peacekeeping operation are also important partners as they can help the civilian police develop public information strategies and key messages for the public to raise awareness about human rights issues and the role of police in society.

**Other police entities.** Coordination and cooperation is also essential with other entities, including bilateral partners, who may be able to provide support and training to local police. New operational and institution-building capabilities for police reform and training are emerging in other organizations, most notably in the OSCE and the European Union, which can be tapped. The UN can benefit by cooperating closely with these entities, who may be able to take over the institution-building role once the UN mission departs, as was the case in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2003.

**Future Directions**

It is not possible to predict the future directions of UN civilian police mandates as they will continue to change and evolve based on the needs of future post-conflict situations. The civilian police component has developed a significant track record in monitoring, advising and training local police services in addition to assisting in police reform and restructuring activities. Each of these areas continues to develop and be refined with experience. Mandates for executive law enforcement, while they cannot be ruled out for
the future, are less likely to recur. Lessons learned from these experiences will, however, continue to inform the development of civilian police doctrine, as will the experience of other regional and multinational policing entities. Civilian police may also be engaged in initiatives to pre-empt potential problems, which are often a contributing factor for the conflict, within the administration of law and order in a particular country. Such efforts would mitigate known problems before the country collapses into chaos.

UN civilian police have proven to be a valuable and often critical component of multidimensional peacekeeping and can continue to be a valuable tool for the international community in helping consolidate peace and security in post-conflict societies. The sustainable enhancement of national police capacity, given its vital role in the maintenance of the rule of law, can serve as a viable exit strategy for a peacekeeping operation.

**The Judiciary**

Until recently, rule of law efforts in peacekeeping operations consisted, almost entirely, of working with local police, while support for the judiciary was left mainly to human rights organizations, development agencies and bilateral actors. With the growing recognition that reforming police is not sustainable in the absence of effective administration of justice, support for the judiciary has become a part of a few, recent peacekeeping missions. Regardless of how effective, humane and responsive a police service is, it is likely to lose credibility and public cooperation if other elements of the justice system, such as the judiciary and the corrections system, are not functioning or dysfunctional.

In a democratic society, law enforcement officers and members of the judiciary are partners in maintaining civil order and play equally important roles in establishing the rule of law. A reliable and non-partisan judicial system is essential for democratization, good governance and the establishment of respect for human rights. Moreover, the absence of a fair and effective judiciary and perceptions of a failure of the justice system in a post-conflict environment can impede peacebuilding efforts. In this regard, the satisfactory functioning of the judicial sector is essential to keeping and building a sustainable peace.

Interventions in the justice sector should be predicated on two fundamental principles:

**Independence of the judiciary.** Judicial independence is fundamental to the rule of law; therefore, establishing judicial independence in post-conflict situations is critical to effective law enforcement and criminal justice. An independent judiciary is impartial, its decisions are respected and it is free from interference. To this end, insulating the judiciary from inappropriate influences by other branches of government is essential to its independence and effectiveness.

**An appropriate legal framework.** A national legal framework or penal code, consonant with international human rights norms and standards, is the basis for establishing the rule
of law and is the starting point for effective law enforcement and criminal justice. This requires the enactment of legislation that demonstrates the government’s commitment to internationally recognized minimum standards of justice and human rights. This can be achieved in several ways, including ratifying appropriate international treaties or covenants and incorporating them into national legislation or through the overhaul of existing legislation to ensure compliance with international norms and minimum standards for criminal justice. The law of the land must provide ordinary citizens with the means of legal redress if their rights have been violated.

**The Judiciary and UN Peacekeeping**

UN peacekeeping operations have only recently become directly involved in judicial assistance and support efforts. The peacekeeping operations in Kosovo, Timor-Leste and Afghanistan—all established since 1999—have been mandated to provide such assistance. In Kosovo, the Department of Justice remains under international control through UNMIK with minimal involvement of local actors. In Timor-Leste, the office of judicial affairs of the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) was established to assist in building a national judiciary and justice framework. International advisers continued to assist the East Timorese in the justice sector even after independence in May 2002. In Afghanistan, the mandate of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) is of an advisory nature: to support the new Afghan Government’s efforts to establish a credible governance capacity, including for the rule of law and administration of justice. UNAMA provides advisory support to the Government and its bilateral partners in the justice sector.

Supporting the national judiciary can be complex and extremely sensitive and interventions will vary depending on mandate, country and need. The interventions can range from providing technical advice, institutional restructuring and drafting or revising laws to rehabilitating infrastructure, training and improving public access to justice. Judicial reform activities can target an array of institutions, including courts and prosecutors’ offices, court administration and registration offices, legislative bodies, law schools, judicial training centres and bar associations. In post-conflict settings, formidable challenges in restoring the judicial system can be exacerbated by political or criminal interference, lack of experience and resources and weak law enforcement structures.

In broad terms, judicial reform activities occur on three main levels: institutional, technical and legislative, and political. The institutional dimension addresses the management of court administration, including the rehabilitation of infrastructure, logistical and administrative support and the organization and operation of the courts. The technical and legislative dimension concentrates on reform of the applicable law and associated regulations. The political dimension focuses on ensuring judicial independence, including the appointment and disciplining of judges and prosecutors.

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2 This is mainly due to the unique legal and political status of Kosovo, the volatile security situation and organized crime activities.
The exact terms of a peacekeeping intervention will be decided by the Security Council, which will make this decision based on many factors, such as a technical assessment of the needs in the justice sector, political considerations, available resources, the agreement of parties to the conflict, etc.

**Support for the Judiciary**

In providing assistance to the judiciary, a peacekeeping mission may be called on to perform the following roles:

- Promote the independence of the judiciary and highlight any improper pressure on judges, prosecutors and courts;
- Advise on the appointment and selection of judges, judicial tenure and judicial discipline;
- Monitor the judicial process, including observing trials;
- Collect, analyse and disseminate criminal justice data;
- Strengthen court administration and case management;
- Develop ongoing training programmes (both on- and off-the-job training);
- Mentor and advise judges, prosecutors and lawyers;
- Improve the quality of justice and access to justice through reform of criminal law, policy and practice; and
- Provide personnel for positions where local capacity is lacking.

Where peacekeeping mandates have included executive authority, as in UNMIK and UNTAET, missions have had the dual responsibility for the administration of justice and the re-establishment of the justice system. In these missions, international personnel have performed critical functions in the justice system, including working as judges and prosecutors, in order to expedite and assist with judicial proceedings, especially in sensitive and controversial cases and to ensure that these proceedings were conducted in an independent and impartial manner and in accordance with international standards.

In recognition of the need to create a capacity at Headquarters for advice on criminal law, judicial and penal matters, the Criminal Law and Judicial Advisory Unit was established in February 2003 within the Civilian Police Division of DPKO. This built on the recommendations made by a UN task force on rule of law strategies in 2002, which looked at internal UN system capacity in support of the rule of law in post-conflict
countries. While UN peacekeeping is a relatively new player in providing support to the judicial sector, several agencies in the international community have substantial existing capacity and experience in a range of these functions. The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), and numerous human rights organizations, development funds and programmes, such as the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), all perform a range of important technical advisory and institution-building roles to support judicial reform. They are also more likely to have the capacity to work at the grass-roots and civil society level and are thus indispensable partners in peacebuilding efforts. Bilaterally, governments are also often interested in directly funding or supporting courts and judicial systems as well as in building the capacity of prosecutorial and public defence institutions. Coordination and integration of assistance programmes in the justice sector is essential.

Applicable Law

In some post-conflict environments there may not be agreement between the parties on the applicable legal code, whether substantive or procedural. The question of which law to apply is essentially a political issue that cannot be resolved by a peacekeeping mission. Agreement among the parties as to the applicable law is an important first step in judicial and rule of law reform.

UN judicial advisers may also be responsible for reviewing and revising the existing penal code to ensure its conformity with appropriate minimum international standards. The authorities, the local legal community and the population may resist change if they view their existing laws as legitimate, well integrated into legal practice, fairly applied and in harmony with traditional values and customs. In such situations, judicial advisers, in collaboration with their local interlocutors, may be asked to formulate a process that would encourage the evolution of the post-conflict legal order in keeping with international norms and standards but in a culturally acceptable manner. The emergent legal code should be recognized and seen to be legitimate by the local population or it will not be sustainable and the local judiciary may not be able to enforce it.

War Crimes and Serious Human Rights Violations

Some UN peacekeeping operations have assisted in establishing mechanisms to address alleged war crimes, crimes against humanity and serious human rights violations. They have advised national authorities on options, such as special tribunals, truth and reconciliation commissions, reparations programmes and traditional justice procedures. In both Sierra Leone and Timor-Leste, the peacekeeping mission, in close cooperation with human rights and judicial assistance organizations, provided such assistance. This work is often distinct from the establishment of a national judiciary and a judicial framework, but in some cases it may be necessary to integrate these special arrangements into the broader justice sector reforms.

3 The task force was a subsidiary of the Executive Committee on Peace and Security (ECPS), which comprises the leadership of Secretariat departments and offices, and other UN entities dealing with issues of peace and security.
Corrections System

The corrections sector, an essential element of an overall rule of law strategy, has an enormous impact on the freedoms, liberties and rights of individuals. Without the capacity to provide humane treatment to prisoners, investments in police and the judiciary will have a limited effect. Like judicial assistance, support for corrections systems was not included in peacekeeping mandates until recently. At times in the past, however, peacekeeping missions were required to intervene on an ad hoc basis in the area of corrections because of compelling humanitarian or human rights reasons. For example, in post-genocide Rwanda, tens of thousands of prisoners were detained in overcrowded prisons under terrible conditions on suspicion of being involved in the genocide. The peacekeeping operation and the UN system at large provided assistance to the Government of Rwanda to improve the conditions of prisoners.

In some instances, peacekeeping missions have been mandated to train local authorities in corrections issues, including the treatment of prisoners, as was the case in Cambodia, Haiti, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Rwanda. More recently, peacekeeping operations have been mandated to provide direct assistance and support for corrections systems, particularly when the UN civilian police component has had powers of arrest or detention. The missions in Kosovo and Timor-Leste were tasked with the establishment and operation of complete correctional systems, which included not only the management and administration of correction facilities, but also the development of human, institutional and legislative capacity. UNAMA has had a high-level advisory role in relation to corrections, providing advice and support to the Afghan authorities. It should be noted that the corrections system may include not only prisons and other penitentiary institutions, such as furlough and halfway houses and detention centres, but also correctional measures other than incarceration, including parole and probation programmes, work and educational release and community service.

Basic principles. International instruments, norms and standards provide the basic standards and principles that govern corrections management, including the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners, the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for Non-Custodial Measures, the United Nations Rules for the Protection of Juveniles Deprived of their Liberty, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the International Labour Organization (ILO) conventions on forced labour, the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations and the Council of Europe Convention on the Transfer of Sentenced Persons. These instruments constitute a code of norms, standards and practice for the establishment of humane corrections systems, practices and legislation.

Corrections functions. Since the administration of correctional services has important implications for the protection of human rights and state security, UN peacekeeping missions engaged in rule of law activities may provide assistance ranging from the operational upgrading and short-term management of prison administration to monitoring and providing expert advice and training in correctional services. Support in the corrections field includes:
- Upgrading prison infrastructure and corrections operational capacity;
- Assisting in the preparation of laws on prisons, prison policies and regulations;
- Assisting in the preparation and adoption of human rights policies and guidelines for prison officials and in the implementation of relevant human rights instruments;
- Selecting, vetting and training local corrections personnel;
- Monitoring issues such as bribery, corruption, manipulation and abuse of power;
- Developing reporting procedures to address abuses;
- Developing systems, procedures and guidelines for the operation of corrections systems, including all elements of institution building;
- Developing objective and independent inspections of correctional institutions;
- Assisting in the development of effective and enforceable civil remedies and criminal prosecution for torture and ill-treatment of persons deprived of their liberty;
- Providing international specialist personnel to manage or assist corrections;
- Assisting in developing programmes for the reintegration of offenders into society after the prison sentence has been served; and
- Developing prison workers' training and reintegration programmes.

When the management of detainees and prisoners falls within the mandate of a UN peacekeeping operation, as it did in Kosovo and Timor-Leste, the mission must uphold international standards and principles. These include:

- The right to be treated with dignity; recognizing that persons are sent to prison as punishment, not for punishment;
- Respect for basic rights;
- Due process in disciplinary matters;
- Access to a grievance system; and
- Inspection or oversight of the correctional system.

Many of these basic standards are incorporated into various international and regional legal instruments and provide basic protections for detainees.
International Standards for the Treatment of Detainees

- All persons deprived of liberty shall be treated with humanity and with respect for the inherent dignity of the human person;

- Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty;

- Pre-trial detention shall be the exception rather than the rule;

- No detainee shall be subject to torture or to cruel or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment or to any form of violence or threats;

- Detained persons shall be held only in officially recognized places of detention and their families and legal representatives are to receive full information;

- Decisions about duration and legality of detention are to be made by a judicial or equivalent authority;

- Detainees shall have the right to be informed of the reason for detention and charges against them;

- Detainees have the right to contact the outside world and to visits from family members and the right to communicate privately and in person with a legal representative;

- Detainees shall be kept in humane facilities, designed to preserve health and shall be provided with adequate water, food, shelter, clothing, medical services, exercise and items of personal hygiene; and

- Every detainee shall have the right to appear before a judicial authority and to have the legality of his or her detention reviewed.


In the future, UN peacekeeping operations may have more advisory, capacity-building and training responsibilities relating to corrections. Responsibilities may include designing and conducting training packages, monitoring local personnel and supporting the development of institutional capacity, both operational and administrative, by providing technical advice. The service standards of UN personnel in these roles will also need to reflect international standards. The UN may also be asked to ensure that the corrections system in post-conflict situations is lawful and safe and operates in full compliance with international correctional standards. The corrections system should work alongside the local police, courts and other partners in the criminal justice system and should strengthen the rule of law, which is critical for building a sustainable peace.
CHAPTER VIII: HUMAN RIGHTS

The Role of Human Rights in Peacekeeping Operations

As large-scale human rights violations are both a root cause as well as an outcome of many modern conflicts, addressing human rights issues has become an integral part of most major United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operations. Depending on the mandate of a peacekeeping operation, human rights work may include:

- Reporting human rights violations and working to prevent future abuse;
- Investigating and verifying past human rights violations;
- Promoting and protecting civil, cultural, economic, political and social rights;
- Conducting capacity-building initiatives with local governmental agencies and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), including national and local human rights institutions;
- Assisting relevant judicial and truth and reconciliation processes to foster a culture of accountability and address impunity;
- Collaborating with UN and international development and emergency relief organizations on human rights issues;
- Designing and conducting human rights training programmes for UN peacekeeping personnel and local and national institutions, such as the military and police forces;
- Providing advice and guidance on human rights to all peacekeeping components;
- Working to address the human rights aspects of problems associated with most modern conflicts, including massive movements of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs), the increasing conscription of child soldiers and the sexual exploitation and trafficking of women and children; and
- Identifying and integrating a human rights perspective into programmes to disarm, demobilize and reintegrate combatants.

Peacekeeping operations have addressed human rights issues by including a human rights component in many peacekeeping operations, as in Angola, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cambodia, Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Eastern Slavonia, East Timor, El Salvador, Ethiopia and Eritrea, Guatemala, Kosovo, Liberia and Sierra Leone.
The human rights component is under the authority of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) and may even be part of the SRSG’s office (see Chapter I on the SRSG). Like all components, the human rights component seeks guidance from the SRSG on all aspects of its work, as he or she is in the best position to offer an overview of the political context of the mission area. The SRSG can also provide guidance on how to most effectively pursue a human rights agenda within the particular circumstances of a mission.

A memorandum of understanding (MoU) concluded between the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) in November 2002 governs how human rights components function within peacekeeping operations. The MoU provides, among other things, for dual reporting lines to both the SRSG and OHCHR and joint responsibilities for the recruitment of human rights officers for peacekeeping operations.

Although the human rights component has the lead role on human rights issues in a peacekeeping operation, human rights work is everyone’s responsibility. Consistent with the Secretary-General’s directive in his 1997 UN reform proposals, human rights should be central to every activity undertaken by the UN.¹

All peacekeeping personnel should be aware of human rights issues and, through their work and conduct, be ready to promote human rights values with their colleagues and counterparts in the host society. Human rights information and analysis should systematically inform the mission’s strategic thinking and policy making at all levels.

The early involvement of human rights experts in the planning of human rights activities of peacekeeping operations can contribute to the effectiveness and full integration of such activities within the mission, as well as to their sustainability after the withdrawal of the mission. Specifically, the inclusion of human rights experts in an integrated mission task force (IMTF), which is established at UN Headquarters for the planning of future missions, is essential. Similarly, the early deployment of human rights officers in the first phase of mission deployment is important.

**Personnel and Training**

A common misconception holds that human rights officers must be lawyers. While many lawyers, judges and prosecutors work in human rights components, many other professions are also represented. With the proper training or experience, political scientists, doctors, nurses, journalists, anthropologists, professors, economists, engineers, teachers, public information experts, geographers, police and retired military personnel can all contribute to the diverse work of a typical human rights component.

Whatever their background or experience, human rights officers should receive pre-deployment and induction training. Human rights components in some missions have

created comprehensive pre-deployment trainings that have covered the mission's mandate as well as the politics, history, culture and language of the mission area. Some training courses also cover essential human rights job skills, including conducting interviews, writing reports, observing demonstrations and conducting meetings with military, government and prison officials.

There is an increasing tendency within human rights components to dedicate some posts to specialists in the fields of gender, child rights, rule of law, national institutions, civil society, training and other relevant thematic areas. The inclusion of staff with gender expertise is of particular importance if there is no dedicated gender adviser post or gender unit within the mission.

**The Legal Framework**

The work of the human rights component is guided by specific mandates and a legal framework. The comprehensive nature of the international legal framework governing situations of armed conflict, peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding includes international humanitarian law, human rights law, refugee law and international criminal law.

The seven principal human rights instruments, in addition to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, are the following:

- International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and its two Optional Protocols;
- International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR);
- International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD);
- Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT);
- Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) and its Optional Protocol;
- Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) and its two Optional Protocols; and
- International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families.²

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² These documents are available on OHCHR’s web site at www.ohchr.org.
Monitoring and Investigating

One of the primary tasks of most human rights components is to monitor the human rights situation, which means actively gathering information from a variety of sources. Human rights officers must have excellent skills in interviewing witnesses, victims, government officials and others who may have knowledge about specific cases. In addition, human rights officers should monitor all local media, including reading all available publications, listening to radio and watching television. Language skills are an important tool and a human rights officer who speaks the local language has an enormous advantage in collecting information.

The early positioning of human rights officers in the sectors or provinces, wherever security permits, greatly increases systematic access to information and aids in building confidence with the local population. At times, a more permanent presence of human rights officers can act as a deterrent to further violence and human rights violations.

Human rights officers and other peacekeeping personnel should collaborate and strategize on how to gather information without endangering the local population or themselves. Human rights officers and others must always be aware of the potential dangers victims or witnesses face when they provide information to a peacekeeping operation. Because of the danger of reprisals, officers must take every possible precaution to ensure their work does not endanger the very people they are there to assist. Field officers must defer to sources in choosing the place and time of interviews and scrupulously honour all requests for confidentiality.

Human Rights Reference Materials

A human rights component should develop a manual to assist human rights personnel serving in the mission area. The manual may be based on training materials from other peacekeeping operations but should be tailored to the local situation. The best manuals include those developed for El Salvador, Haiti, Guatemala and Rwanda.


These manuals cannot answer every question or anticipate every situation, but they can provide general guidance, specify clear best and worst practices and, at the very least, signal when an officer should seek guidance from a superior.

In some situations, human rights officers may also investigate or provide support to international commissions of inquiry relating to past violations. Human rights monitors in
the Democratic Republic of the Congo located mass graves, and with the assistance of forensic experts and other specialized professionals documented conflict-related human rights violations for possible future use by judicial mechanisms. Human rights officers in East Timor and Sierra Leone have worked with local authorities and organizations to establish truth commissions that attempt to establish records of the past and seek non-judicial relief for victims of violations.

It is crucial for human rights officers to create good working relationships with local NGOs, religious leaders, journalists, grassroots organizations, women’s groups and local government officials. Officers should also regularly visit police stations, prisons and courts. Officers should not wait for the local population to come to their offices but should seek them out. Human rights officers in Kosovo, Sierra Leone and East Timor, for example, had a regular schedule for visiting every village and district within their area of responsibility. This was important both in terms of collecting information and because it showed the local population that the peacekeeping mission was actively working on their behalf. In some cases, these visits provided a form of protection to vulnerable populations.

Human rights officers must pay special attention to populations at risk. In many peacekeeping theatres this means women, children, the elderly and the disabled. IDPs, the majority of whom are typically women and children, often face serious threats to their physical security (see Chapter XIV on Refugees and IDPs). Officers need highly specialized interviewing skills when dealing with women and children, particularly in cases involving sexual and gender-based violence.

Human rights components may include medical and mental health specialists who can provide assistance until local practitioners can take over. In some missions, such as the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) and the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC), child protection advisers may also be deployed and work closely with the human rights component.

**Assessment, Analysis and Advice**

Once information has been gathered, human rights officers must assess, analyse and act. It is crucial that officers check, recheck and confirm the accuracy of their information. Nothing destroys the credibility of a human rights component, or that of a peacekeeping operation, more quickly and completely than disseminating incorrect information about human rights violations. Sometimes, false information may be planted to gain political advantage so human rights officers must scrutinize all information.

After corroborating the information, human rights officers must then analyse the specific case and determine if and how it fits into identified trends. In larger missions, an analysis and research team will review reports from all over the mission area and look for trends or patterns of violations. The team will spot whether a particular region is experiencing
an upsurge in human rights violations and whether certain types of violations are more prevalent than others.

The SRSG or component heads may need advice on human rights and humanitarian law issues. In particular, during a negotiation of agreements, the SRSG or the political affairs component may request guidance on human rights aspects of political agreements. For example, peace accords may contain an amnesty for crimes committed by both sides during the course of a conflict, as was the case with the 1999 Lomé Agreement to end the conflict in Sierra Leone. The UN, however, cannot endorse any amnesty that extends to war crimes or crimes against humanity. Therefore, if the UN were to be a guarantor of such an agreement, a careful disclaimer to this effect would have to be incorporated. Advice from the human rights component in such matters is critical to avoid compromising the UN.

**Reporting**

Reporting is a crucial and sometimes controversial part of human rights work. Most terms of reference for human rights components include reporting on the human rights situation and the component will usually submit daily, weekly, monthly and other periodic reporting to the SRSG. These are internal reports and generally should not include the names of victims, witnesses or suspected perpetrators, but rather describe the overall human rights situation and emphasize recent developments or serious incidents. A human rights component will also contribute a few paragraphs summarizing the human rights situation in the general weekly and monthly reports that a peacekeeping mission sends to UN Headquarters in New York. The human rights component will also send its reports to OHCHR in Geneva, in accordance with the provisions of the MoU between DPKO and OHCHR. Human rights components have also produced reports on specific themes such as torture, pre-trial detention, fair trials, prison conditions and conflict-related sexual and gender-based violence.

Difficulties may arise when a peacekeeping operation issues public reports on human rights violations, but if human rights reporting is part of the mandate of the mission, then public reporting may be essential to the credibility and effectiveness of the peacekeeping operation. A proper assessment of the human rights situation may also be an important gauge of progress in fulfilling commitments in a peace agreement. SRSGs need to manage the tension between engaging in political negotiations and publicly urging governments and insurgents to uphold their obligations under international human rights and humanitarian law.

**Strengthening Local Capacity**

As conflicts are resolved and peace is restored, human rights work should shift to enhancing local capacity for human rights work. The process of handing work over to local counterparts should accelerate as the peacekeeping operation winds down.
Depending on the mandate of the mission, one of the objectives of a human rights component may be to support the creation of sustainable local institutions capable of protecting human rights and effectively addressing human rights violations, including the punishment of perpetrators. The ultimate goal of most human rights monitoring is to identify problems and then, in close consultation with local partners, design solutions. Monitoring and reporting are not ends in themselves, but means to enhancing local capacity to protect and promote human rights. The impact of human rights work on its beneficiaries, the local populace, should always guide the work of the human rights component. Monitoring and reporting are diagnostic tools that enable the entire UN peacekeeping operation to identify, plan and implement corrective measures in collaboration with local authorities, NGOs and other UN funds, programmes and agencies in the mission area.

A report by a group of experts convened by the Aspen Institute in 1997 summarizes this link between monitoring and capacity development relationship:

“Monitoring and institution building are complementary mandates and both should be included in the work of human rights missions … Human rights monitoring can identify problems with the armed forces, the police, the judicial system, the prisons and other areas of concern while the technical cooperation for institution building helps ensure that these concerns are addressed by the appropriate institutions. Monitoring, in turn, provides feedback on the effectiveness of the technical assistance projects in improving human rights.”

Assistance in institution building is key to ensuring sustainable peace and development. Increasingly, human rights components of peacekeeping operations are involved in providing technical and substantive assistance in building national institutions, such as national human rights commissions, ombudsman’s offices and truth and reconciliation commissions. For example, through an OHCHR-sponsored technical cooperation project, the UNAMSIL Human Rights Section has provided legislative, substantive and technical advice in the establishment of the Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission and the Sierra Leone Human Rights Commission.

**Training and Education**

Human rights components should devote time, energy and resources to training and educational activities and every team should include staff with expertise in these areas. Human rights teams frequently design and deliver human rights training programmes to local military, police, judicial personnel and prison guards. Human rights officers also train local NGOs and civil society groups and may offer specialized courses for local journalists, parliamentarians, medical professionals and community leaders. Courses on mediation and alternative dispute resolution have brought together community groups and police, sometimes helping to break down mistrust and encourage reconciliation. Within a peacekeeping operation, human rights officers also design and conduct general human rights training as well as specialized gender and child rights training to UN military and civilian police personnel.
Human rights officers should consult local partners as soon as possible to identify training priorities, appropriate pedagogy and local target audiences. Local actors should, to the greatest extent possible, participate as trainers with UN officers occupying supporting roles. In missions with child protection advisers, human rights officers should work closely with them in training activities. Experience has proven that the best training courses use highly participatory methods such as role-plays, small group work and case studies, adapted to the local context.

Local teachers and education officials also help design human rights curricula for schools. Education professionals in the human rights component work with every level of the local educational systems—primary, secondary and university—to ensure the formal educational system in the host country has a solid human rights curriculum.

Human rights components have learned that rather than attempt to train the entire police force or army, it is better to identify existing or potential local trainers in each segment of society and train them to conduct local human rights courses. This training of trainers approach uses limited resources more efficiently, and more importantly, is more sustainable after peacekeepers leave. Another way to increase the likelihood of sustainability is to hire local human rights officers to work in human rights components as has been done in Kosovo, Bosnia and Herzegovina and East Timor.

In many countries that host peacekeeping operations the literacy rates are very low. To reach illiterate populations, human rights officers have adopted several approaches. In many illiterate societies people get their news and form their opinions based on what they hear on the radio. Consequently, in collaboration with a mission’s public information office and local journalists and educators, human rights components have designed and produced radio shows that discuss human rights issues. For example, in Sierra Leone, the

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**Human Rights Activities in Sierra Leone**

In UNAMSIL the Human Rights Section worked with two drama groups to produce plays on women’s rights and the search for truth and justice. The Section also produced documentary films on amputees and victims of other abuses along with radio programmes on the local human rights struggle. Radio UNAMSIL also devoted several programmes on and close to 10 December, Human Rights Day, to the discussion of human rights issues.

The Human Rights Section also produced a series of publications, including a book and several leaflets on the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, some with drawings and text in both Krio and English. In addition, the Section produced a brochure entitled *Elections and Human Rights, A Guide for the Sierra Leone Police*. The Section also supported the publication of a comprehensive report, *War-Related Sexual Violence in Sierra Leone*, which was researched by an international NGO, Physicians for Human Rights, in cooperation with local women’s rights activists (full text available at www.phrusa.org).

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Human Rights Section worked with the Public Information Office to make airtime available on Radio UNAMSIL for local human rights activists and women leaders. Formats differed for these shows, but included round table discussions, call-in shows and debates.

Finally, human rights components actively distribute human rights materials not only to the local population but also to peacekeeping personnel. In Kosovo, the mission disseminated several thousand copies of the UN publication *International Human Rights Standards for Law Enforcemen* to the UN civilian police. The mission also arranged for the book to be translated into Serbian and Albanian and it was subsequently used in the training of the new Kosovo Police Service.

**Handbook on Children’s Rights**

The United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) and the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) launched, in 2001, a handbook on child rights, designed for use by the UN military. The handbook is a reference on issues that affect children in conflict and post-conflict situations, including HIV/AIDS, sexual abuse, child soldiers and landmines. It also includes the full text of the Convention on the Rights of the Child.

The objectives of the handbook are to provide UN peacekeepers with a practical, user-friendly guide to help them better understand and monitor the conditions of vulnerable children and to equip them with the international conventions related to children in armed conflict.

**Peacekeeping Partners**

Human rights components also need to forge close partnerships with the UN military, civilian police, the political component, the civil affairs component, UN funds, programmes and agencies and other international partners. Information sharing, policies on protecting vulnerable groups, enhancing the capacity of the local judiciary and police and training local counterparts all require joint efforts. In Kosovo, the Joint Task Force on Minorities includes representatives from the Kosovo Force, the UN civilian police, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe’s (OSCE) human rights office, UNICEF, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the SRSG’s Human Rights Adviser. The task force identifies groups at risk and develops strategies to protect them while simultaneously working to address the root causes of the violence.

Other major human rights players in a peacekeeping operation include the UN military and civilian police (see Chapter V on Military and Chapter VII on Police, Judiciary and Corrections Aspects of Rule of Law). Their understanding of human rights principles is often critical to the work of a human rights component. Since there are usually many more UN military and civilian police personnel than human rights staff in a peacekeeping theatre, their access to information and remote areas, not to mention their relations with local military and police counterparts, can provide a wealth of information to the human
rights component, as long as adequate safeguards of confidentiality and witness protection are observed by all parties.

Other key partners include humanitarian and development actors, who are playing an increasingly important role in human rights work (see Chapter XIII on Humanitarian Assistance and Chapter XVI on Recovery, Development and Sustainable Peace). The first documented cases of atrocities by the rebel forces in Sierra Leone came from the international NGO Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) and UN aid workers. In the UN system, UNICEF, UNHCR, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), in particular, have made human rights protection a priority in their work.

In Angola, the human rights component and various UN agencies and international humanitarian organizations conducted joint training on human rights and humanitarian law for their staff and local NGO representatives. In Liberia and Sierra Leone, a code of conduct for all humanitarian agencies based on human rights law and humanitarian principles was agreed to by all relevant parties.

Information sharing, action plans and training are all enhanced by these partnerships. In the important areas of economic, social and cultural rights, these agencies and organizations have the knowledge, experience and resources to assist the human rights component. In turn, the human rights component can provide advice and analysis, especially on legal matters relating to these rights. A human rights component may also cooperate with the UN country team to develop rights-based programmes in the transition from emergency relief to post-conflict reconstruction to ensure sustainability and continuity on the ground.\(^3\)

It is also important for human rights components to cooperate closely with development agencies and organizations to benefit from their knowledge of and experience in the country concerned. Human rights capacity-building and technical assistance programmes should be developed in consultation with development partners on the ground to build on existing programmes, ensure continuity and increase the likelihood of sustainability.

Because humanitarian agencies may have greater access to populations in need than human rights components, informal and formal arrangements on information sharing have evolved over time. A primary concern in the collection of information for both aid workers and human rights officers is that the source of information be protected. Humanitarian agencies are particularly concerned with losing access to vulnerable populations if it becomes known they are sharing information about human rights violations. Despite this challenge, humanitarian agencies have found creative ways to share critical human rights information with peacekeeping operations.

Most importantly, a human rights component will succeed or fail based on the quality of its partnership with local counterparts. Local NGOs active in the mission area will be, in

\(^3\) The UN country team is composed of representatives of operational UN agencies in a given country or territory.
many cases, well-placed to advise the human rights component on the most effective avenues to pursue. Local stakeholders know best what the priority human rights issues are and what initiatives are most likely to succeed in strengthening human rights protection.

**Evaluating Human Rights Work**

Human rights components have improved their ability to measure the impact of their work in the field. "You can’t improve what you can’t measure" is an axiom from business management that applies to human rights components as well. Measurement and improvement are inextricably linked and to gauge performance effectively, human rights components need to identify certain key measures of their work.

Performance measures, if properly chosen, can both motivate and provide a structure for accountability. Performance measures can highlight both progress and obstacles, information that can get lost in the rush of a field operation. Regular evaluation can also assist in holding human rights officers accountable for implementing the mission’s overall strategy and mandate. Moreover, evaluation can reinforce teamwork, which is crucial to any field operation, as well as sharpen focus and boost individual and team morale.

The indicators chosen should be simple, measure small representative samples and balance process or “output,” such as getting reports out on time, with “outcome,” such as determining whether reports helped raise awareness of human rights issues and led to improved behaviour of the local military or a change in policy by the international community toward the host state. Evaluating the work of a human rights component should not be a singular event in the life of a peacekeeping mission but should become part of the component’s daily work.

One important measure of the impact of a human rights team should be feedback from their primary counterparts and the local population. Their perception of the mission is crucial to its success. To measure this perception, surveys and other feedback mechanisms are useful evaluation tools.

Measuring the effectiveness of human rights work is often challenging because much of the work does not have clear results for a long time. Building a human rights culture and creating respect for the rule of law in post-conflict environments are long-term projects, but must be considered when developing evaluation plans.

**Challenges in Human Rights Work**

Security concerns and accessibility can be challenges in human rights work. Some areas, especially those experiencing the worst violations of human rights and humanitarian law, are often off-limits to human rights officers. Even when such areas are accessible, they can be dangerous. In Rwanda, five members of the Human Rights Field Operation were murdered after being stopped en route to a meeting despite travelling in UN vehicles and
carrying UN identity cards. Close cooperation between the human rights component, the chief security officer and the security management team of a peacekeeping operation are critical to protecting staff in the field.

Another challenge facing human rights components in peacekeeping missions is the absence of resources for carrying out activities. Human rights components will need to be creative in identifying alternative sources of funding or work together with other relevant UN partners, such as OHCHR, to raise extra-budgetary funds for research, training and capacity-building activities. Human rights components may also be able to draw funding from trust funds for quick impact projects that exist for some peacekeeping operations. Finally, while many peacekeeping operations have short life spans, many human rights problems are deep-rooted and require long-term attention, making it even more imperative for human rights officers to identify local partners who will continue the work after the peacekeeping mission has ended.

Where a national human rights agenda reflecting international standards already exists, the UN should support its further development and promote local capacity. The best exit strategy for a human rights component is to leave behind strong institutions with well-trained personnel who will continue to protect and promote human rights.
CHAPTER IX: GENDER MAINSTREAMING

Gender Mainstreaming

Gender refers to the socially constructed, rather than physical or biological, roles ascribed to women and men. Gender roles vary according to socio-economic, political and cultural contexts and are also affected by other factors such as age, race, class and ethnicity. Gender roles are learned and are therefore, changeable. For example, many societies ascribe the role of homemaker and caregiver to women, while men are seen as breadwinners and protectors. This has changed to a certain degree in some societies over the last century as increasing numbers of women from all social classes assume more important economic roles. Men, too, are being increasingly accepted as caregivers and homemakers.

Glossary of Terms

**Gender analysis:** The systematic effort to identify and document the roles of women and men within a given context and the potential impact of planned interventions.

**Gender balance:** Equitable representation of women and men in all areas. Promoting gender balance requires explicit support of women’s participation, particularly in decision-making.

**Gender equality:** Equal rights, responsibilities and opportunities for women and men and girls and boys. Equality does not mean that women and men will become the same, but that women’s and men’s rights, responsibilities and opportunities will not depend on whether they were born male or female. Gender equality implies that the interests, needs and priorities of both women and men are given equal consideration.

**Gender focal points:** Staff members assigned to support the incorporation of gender perspectives in the substantive work of their departments or offices.

**Gender mainstreaming:** The process of systematically incorporating gender perspectives into areas of work and assessing the implications for women and men of any planned action, including legislation, policies or programmes. It is a strategy for making women’s and men’s concerns and experiences an integral dimension of the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of policies and programmes in all political, economic and societal spheres so that women and men benefit equally and inequality is not perpetuated.

The roles ascribed to men and women in most societies tend to perpetuate certain inequalities. For example, women continue to have fewer economic and educational opportunities than men and are often paid less than men for the same work. Global trends include inequalities in political and personal power within their households, in legal
status and entitlements and economic recognition in the domestic/unpaid sector. Women and men both may face de facto discrimination if they venture outside of their socially accepted gender roles; men may not be treated seriously or may face ridicule if they seek jobs in nursing or childcare, while women are not likely to be hired for traditionally “masculine” jobs, such as construction, mining, police and correctional services, and may even be legally barred from them.

The international community has committed itself to overcoming inequalities and to working towards the ultimate goal of gender equality. The goal is to ensure equal rights, responsibilities and opportunities for women and men, girls and boys, and gender mainstreaming is the strategic tool for achieving this goal.

The Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) defined gender mainstreaming as “a strategy for making women's as well as men's concerns and experiences an integral dimension of the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of policies and programmes in all political, economic and societal spheres so that women and men benefit equally and inequality is not perpetuated.”

### International Agreements and Commitments on Gender Mainstreaming

Several international agreements and commitments obligate all entities of the UN system to mainstream a gender perspective into their work. These include:

- Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action (1995), adopted by the Fourth World Conference on Women
- ECOSOC Agreed Conclusions on gender mainstreaming (annually since 1997)
- Beijing + 5 Political Declaration and Outcome Document (2000)

### Gender Mainstreaming and Peacekeeping

In contemporary conflicts the civilian population has increasingly become a primary target of violence, but men and women tend to experience conflict differently. The experience of women and girls in armed conflict is a reflection of both gender relations and women’s status in the society and culture and women often suffer disproportionately.

In contemporary intra-State conflicts and civil wars, men and boys are often recruited into warring factions and women and girls are commonly left behind to care for families, resulting in a marked increase in female-headed households vulnerable to dangers that

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1 Economic and Social Council conclusions 1997/2.
include torture and rape (and the accompanying risk of unwanted pregnancy, HIV and other sexually transmitted infections), economic and food security and the social stigmatization that follows sexual abuse in many societies. There may also be legal, social or cultural restrictions to women owning or inheriting land or property and limited access to education and employment. All these factors may further constrain the ability of women to care for their families. Conflict also tends to displace women more than men; women and children constitute the vast majority of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) around the world.2

During conflict, traditional forms of moral, community and institutional safeguards disintegrate, leaving women and girls particularly vulnerable to all forms of physical, emotional and sexual violence. Torture, rape, sexual slavery, forced prostitution, mutilation, forced termination of pregnancy and sterilization are some of the acts of violence perpetrated against women during conflict. When a woman is sexually abused or raped, the intent is often to victimize both her and her male relatives by demonstrating the failure of men in their protective role.

Men and boys are also subject to sexual abuse, torture and mutilation. Gender-based and sexual violence is used as a weapon of war to demoralize and humiliate the targeted group, and the deliberate endorsement of these acts by military commanders and political leaders underscores their significance as more than random assaults.

Conflict also tends to exacerbate existing inequalities between women and men and can put women at increased risk of physical and emotional abuse from male family members. Sociologists have noticed a rise in domestic and criminal violence against women in countries ravaged by conflict. The proliferation of weapons during times of conflict increases the probability of those weapons being turned against civilians, most often women, even when the conflict is over.3

UN peacekeeping operations must understand these differentiated effects of conflict and must seek to protect women’s rights and ensure they are integrated into all actions promoting peace, implementing peace agreements, resolving conflict and reconstructing war-torn societies. If peacekeeping operations are to succeed in ensuring a sustainable peace and long-term reconciliation based on democratic principles and internationally recognized human rights, it is crucial that their activities and policies uphold the principles of gender equality and non-discrimination.

It is important that peacekeepers realize that conflict has different consequences for women and children and that they have particular post-conflict priorities and needs. A peacekeeping operation will enjoy greater success in the implementation of its mandate if planners and implementers take the differing needs of women and men and girls and boys into account.

2 In 2001 the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) estimated that women and children constituted 80 percent of the world’s refugees and IDPs.
3 Women-run emergency hotlines for abused women and children reported high levels of abuse that involved the use of weapons during and following the wars in the former Yugoslavia.
In 2000 the UN Security Council, increasingly aware of the need to mainstream a gender perspective into the peace and security activities of the Organization, adopted resolution 1325, aimed at improving the protection of women and girls during armed conflicts and encouraging women’s participation in conflict prevention, peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding. Some of the provisions of resolution 1325 are as follows:

- Increase participation of women at decision-making levels in conflict resolution and peace processes;
- Expand the role and contribution of women in UN field-based operations, especially among military observers, civilian police, human rights and humanitarian personnel;
- Incorporate a gender perspective into peacekeeping operations and ensure that field operations include a gender component;
- Provide training guidelines and materials to Member States on the protection, rights and particular needs of women, as well as on the importance of involving women in all peacekeeping and peacebuilding measures;
- Adopt a gender perspective when negotiating and implementing peace agreements;
- Call upon parties to armed conflict to take special measures to protect women and girls from gender-based violence, particularly rape and other forms of sexual abuse;
- Consider the different needs of women and men ex-combatants as well as the needs of their dependants when planning for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration;
- Ensure that Security Council missions consider women’s rights and gender issues, including consultations with local and international women’s groups; and
- Include, in Secretary-General reports to the Security Council, progress on gender mainstreaming in peacekeeping missions and all other fronts relating to women and girls.
Gender Mainstreaming in Peacekeeping Operations

The international presence of a peacekeeping operation has the potential to positively affect gender relations and inequalities within a society. For example, initiatives supporting elections can facilitate women’s participation as voters and political representatives. Civilian police in a peacekeeping operation may assist in the training, monitoring or restructuring of local law enforcement agencies and emphasize addressing crimes that affect women, including rape, sexual assault, domestic violence and other gender-based crimes, such as trafficking in women and girls. Professional women serving in peacekeeping missions, particularly in leadership roles, may act as role models for local women, especially in societies where women have traditionally played a secondary role.

In designing activities and policies, peacekeeping operations must focus on both women and men in a war-torn society and take local societal structures and cultural norms into account. Gender roles, or the socialized roles associated with being female or male in a particular economic, social, political or cultural context, are one of the fundamental ways in which a society and culture are structured. Socialization affects the activities men and women undertake, their access to and control of resources and how they participate in decision-making.

It is crucial that peacekeeping operations look at the impact their policies and activities will have on women and men in the local culture and society. For example, vocational training or other incentives to encourage disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) of former combatants may not be relevant for women if they do not take into account women’s particular skills and responsibilities, for example, as possible single mothers.

A crucial component of any successful peacekeeping operation is free and fair local elections. In the conduct of elections, it is important to understand the norms and customs of a society prior to the election and determine whether women will face particular obstacles in exercising their right to stand for office and to vote. Addressing these obstacles is a prerequisite for conducting free and fair elections.

The principle of gender equality is a fundamental precept of UN activities and policies. It is important that peacekeeping operations reflect and practice this principle to ensure a sustainable peace which is based on inclusiveness and does not perpetuate gender-based discrimination. While gender equality is an important human right and programmatic goal, steps towards gender equality also contribute to other social, economic and political goals. For example, providing equal educational opportunities to women and men increases women’s ability to care for themselves and their families and has a direct and positive impact on family health.

A gender perspective contributes to a more informed view of policy options and results and should enable decision-makers to assess the potential to narrow gender gaps. For example, for a mission mandated to provide technical assistance in institution building
and the development of national legislation, it is important to include gender equality in all national institutions and domestic laws, including laws on inheritance, marital property, domestic violence, political participation, employment and social security. Peacekeeping operations that have governance mandates can support women’s public participation and their roles in decision-making functions by providing incentives to political parties that include a minimum number of women in their candidate lists for political office and training and opportunities for potential women candidates.

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<tr>
<th>Gender Mainstreaming in Technical Assistance</th>
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<tr>
<td>The most effective way to mainstream gender in technical assistance is to include gender considerations in the project definition and initial discussions. If a peacekeeping operation is to provide technical assistance of any kind, these are some of the steps that can be taken to support appropriate planning for gender equality:</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Draw on national commitments to women’s rights and gender equality;</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Ensure that the technical assistance team includes experts with explicit gender analysis experience;</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Ensure that the views of women as well as men are included in the consultation process; and</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Consult with local experts on gender equality, including academics, local civil society groups and governmental departments or offices for women’s affairs.</td>
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A peacekeeping operation’s mandate determines the nature and scope of the activities it will undertake. When the mandate is restricted to a specific military activity, as in the case of military observer missions, possibilities for influencing wider political or social environments are limited. When mandated tasks include monitoring human rights or establishing or restructuring institutions, however, there is great potential for integrating gender perspectives into these activities. In Timor-Leste (formerly East Timor) and Kosovo, UN operations served as transitional civil administrations, which allowed for a special focus on the needs and concerns of women in all areas of governance, including the justice system, police force, constitutional and legislative development and the electoral process.

**Gender Perspectives in Peacekeeping Activities**

Depending on its mandate, a peacekeeping operation might be responsible for conducting a wide range of activities, including:

• Military and police activities;
• Protecting and delivering humanitarian assistance;
• Conducting political or ceasefire negotiations;
• Strengthening the rule of law;
• Training and restructuring local police forces;
• Monitoring human rights;
• Providing voter education and other electoral assistance; and
• Disarming, demobilizing and reintegrating ex-combatants.

The civilian police component of a peacekeeping mission may be charged with monitoring local police forces and training new or restructured forces. In the latter case, the objective is to create professional law enforcement agencies that adhere to international standards of democratic policing, and recruiting and retaining women officers must be an important objective. New or restructured police forces must develop the ability to work in a gender-sensitive way to address gender-based and sexual crimes, including sexual assault and domestic violence, and develop strategies to combat the trafficking of human beings. When peacekeeping operations include human rights monitoring, support for electoral processes, establishing civil administrations or promoting national reconciliation, it is crucial both to identify and address gender perspectives in all of these areas.

Women and girls may be combatants in armed conflicts. Therefore, DDR programmes for ex-combatants conducted by peacekeeping operations must identify and address the needs and priorities of both men and women ex-combatants. Demobilization programmes conducted by the UN in the early 1990s in Mozambique and El Salvador, among others, did not initially plan for the particular needs of female ex-combatants, including health and security issues. Planners did not anticipate that ex-combatants would arrive at demobilization sites and assembly areas accompanied by large numbers of dependants who had to be housed and fed. Some women and children may have been abducted by the fighting factions and forced to serve as sexual slaves, porters and messengers. Again, mainstreaming a gender perspective ensures that these vulnerable women and children are not excluded from rehabilitation and reintegration programmes.

Public information and media campaigns run by peacekeeping missions should be targeted at both men and women in the host population, which may require tailoring the message and medium for different audiences. Successfully reaching targeted audiences requires an understanding of the roles and responsibilities of women and men, as well as gender-specific norms and customs within the host society.

**Conducting a Gender Analysis or Assessment**

Before formulating and deciding on a policy option, each situation and activity should be analysed from a gender perspective with the goal of reducing inequalities. Below are some general starting points that can be useful in conducting a gender analysis:

• Ask questions about the responsibilities, activities, interests and priorities of women and men and how their perceptions of problems may differ;
Successful mainstreaming of a gender perspective will affect all stages of a peacekeeping operation, from planning through deployment and final liquidation of the mission. In developing gender perspectives, peacekeeping operations can benefit from collaboration with local women’s organizations, which often provide local expertise on education and both reproductive and general health issues. Women’s organizations can be important partners in the service delivery including creating political structures and holding elections, as was demonstrated in Timor-Leste. This partnership can be facilitated by working with existing contacts with women’s groups made by UN funds, programmes and agencies, such as the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM), World Food Programme (WFP) and international non-governmental organizations (NGOs).

**Promoting Gender Mainstreaming in Peacekeeping**

The Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) is responsible for ensuring that a gender perspective is incorporated at the initial stages of planning for any peacekeeping mission. This facilitates the inclusion of gender considerations in the structure, resources and budget requested for the mission. Once deployed, every staff member in the mission has an obligation and responsibility to integrate a gender perspective into his or her work,
but the ultimate responsibility for ensuring that this happens lies with the Head of Mission. Experience shows that missions making progress in promoting gender equality and women’s rights have support at the highest levels of authority within the mission.

The Head of Mission is responsible for promoting and facilitating attention to gender perspectives in all areas of work and demanding accountability from managers and personnel at all levels. In developing mandate implementation plans, gender mainstreaming goals and requirements for their achievement should be clearly defined from the outset. To be effective, a clear commitment to promoting gender equality throughout the entire mission is required from the beginning. This commitment must be translated into concrete actions in all areas of the mission and should be the responsibility of all personnel, particularly senior managers.

The importance of gender perspectives can be reinforced in high-level meetings with political parties and consultative bodies as well as through mission information activities. Peacekeeping missions need to ensure that sufficient awareness and the capacity to identify and address gender perspectives are developed among all personnel, particularly senior managers. Concrete resources—such as guidelines, checklists, training programmes and standard operating procedures to help mainstream gender perspectives into the daily work of all mission components—can raise awareness and build capacity for gender mainstreaming.

**Mechanisms for Gender Mainstreaming in Peacekeeping**

Gender adviser positions and gender units and offices provide crucial support to heads of missions as they incorporate gender perspectives into the work of the mission. If well-resourced and strategically placed, gender units and offices, led by senior-level gender policy advisers, can provide the Head of Mission with guidance on mainstreaming gender perspectives across the policy spectrum of the mission. They can liaise with the national women’s ministry or office and civil society groups working on women’s issues to ensure that the needs and concerns of women are factored into mission activities.

Where the mission’s mandate extends to building or strengthening rule of law institutions, the gender units and offices can advocate for gender equality and for special measures to increase women’s participation in all areas. Within the peacekeeping operation, gender units and offices can develop strategies and programmes to build capacity for gender mainstreaming within the mission and enable each component to develop mandate-specific goals and benchmarks for gender mainstreaming. They can also help monitor and evaluate progress in meeting those benchmarks.

In missions where senior gender advisers or units and offices may not exist, gender focal points can be an important mechanism for facilitating mission-wide gender mainstreaming. In a full- or part-time capacity, these focal points can be established either within a substantive section, such as the human rights section, or within the office of the Head of Mission to promote the mainstreaming of gender perspectives, help in internal mission capacity-building and enhance monitoring and evaluation of gender-
sensitive policies and activities in key areas. An important partnership is also emerging with HIV/AIDS policy advisers, which exist in some of the larger peacekeeping missions, for the promotion of gender-sensitive policies in the context of the pandemic. At Headquarters, too, DPKO has an HIV/AIDS policy adviser, who provides policy guidance to the Department and coordinates and assists practical responses in all the missions.

**Secretary-General’s Recommendations on Mainstreaming Gender in Peacekeeping Operations**

In response to an invitation contained in Security Council resolution 1325 (2000), the Secretary-General conducted a study on the impact of armed conflict on women and girls, the role of women in peacebuilding and the gender dimensions of peace processes and conflict resolution. He presented his findings in a report to the Council in October 2002 (document S/2002/1154) and made recommendations on how peacekeeping operations could more effectively incorporate gender perspectives into their activities.

- Incorporate gender perspectives explicitly into the mandates of all peacekeeping missions, including provisions to systematically address this issue in all reports to the Security Council;

- Require that data collected in research, assessments and appraisals, monitoring and evaluation and reporting on peace operations is systematically disaggregated by sex and age and that specific data on women and girls and how interventions affect them is provided; and

- Ensure necessary financial and human resources for gender mainstreaming, establish gender advisers and units in multidimensional peacekeeping operations and capacity-building activities and develop projects targeted at women and girls as part of approved mission budgets.

The most important partner in gender mainstreaming efforts is the national authorities. To be sustainable, gender mainstreaming strategies need the active commitment and participation of national authorities. These partnerships can be reinforced by collaboration with UN agencies and international NGOs in conjunction with local civil society organizations, particularly women’s groups.

In complex emergencies that have both security and humanitarian aspects, various UN agencies, funds and programmes, as well as Secretariat departments, play a major role in emergency relief and post-conflict reconstruction. In conjunction with these entities, donors and the World Bank, which is a key funder of post-conflict reconstruction and rehabilitation, the gender unit or office can set up a consultative or advisory mechanism to mainstream gender in joint reconstruction efforts. All of these agencies have developed policies, tools and resources for gender mainstreaming in their specific areas of intervention. Such collaborative efforts could facilitate a better use of resources and reduce duplication, which can be critical if the gender unit or office is under-resourced.
In conclusion, gender mainstreaming is a crucial element of a successful peacekeeping operation with sustainable results. Gender mainstreaming, which improves women’s educational and economic opportunities and prospects, ultimately promotes healthier families and strengthens and stabilizes local communities. By focusing on improving women’s health, education, and welfare, a peacekeeping operation gives local women the tools to lay the groundwork for the rebuilding of a peaceful and sustainable social order.
CHAPTER X: ADMINISTRATION AND SUPPORT

Introduction

United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operations have evolved to encompass a wide range of mandated tasks, all of which require a support structure. The support component of a peacekeeping operation provides the administrative and logistic support services that enable the mission to carry out its core functions in an effective, coordinated and timely manner consistent with the regulations and procedures prescribed by the Organization.

Mission support tasks include but are not limited to:

- Establishing working premises and services for the mission, including electricity and utilities, building maintenance, waste disposal services, etc.;

- Installing, operating and maintaining communications, including telephone, radio and data systems; proprietary information management systems; internet; intra-mission mail and diplomatic pouch service;

- Supplying all assigned equipment, e.g., vehicles, computers and stationery and providing bulk supplies of water, fuel products and foodstuffs;

- Managing mission personnel including recruitment, training, career development and separation of staff;

- Transporting people and cargo within and outside the mission area;

- Preparing and executing the mission budget;

- Paying staff and settling vendor bills;

- Ensuring the health and safety of mission personnel;

- Ensuring the delivery of medical assistance;

- Handling personnel and commercial claims, conducting investigations and convening required boards; and

- Monitoring mission compliance with local laws and respect for UN privileges and immunities and the status-of-forces or status-of-mission agreement.
Mission Support in Field Missions

Based on the strategic direction provided by the Head of Mission on mandated activities, all mission components forecast their operational requirements so that the administration can define support requirements, determining whether operational plans are administratively or logistically feasible.

The chief administrative officer (CAO) heads the support component of field missions. The CAO is responsible for managing the mission’s human, financial and material resources and serves as the senior adviser to the Head of Mission on administrative and logistic issues. The number of staff serving under a CAO will vary with the size of the mission and the workload. In larger missions, specialists in all the administrative functional areas of finance, personnel, procurement and asset management as well as the technical and logistic functions of supply, communications and information technology, engineering and transport may work under the CAO. In small missions, the support component may be limited to an administrative officer and some specialized staff performing those tasks.

In a complex mission involving assigned aircraft and formed military and civilian police units, there is a greater need for harmonizing the support effort with the operational activities of the mission. This requires larger, more integrated components of civilian and uniformed specialists organized into discrete administrative and technical sub-levels supervised by senior managers who report to the CAO or director of administration.

Human resources. The civilian personnel section is responsible for the overall management and delivery of human resources services in the mission. The section manages various aspects of human resources management, including extension of staff contracts, recruitment of local personnel, coordination of civilian training, management of reporting on staff performance and staff conduct and behaviour, career development and the issuance of mission ID cards.

Planning and budgeting. One of the primary functions of the administration component is to develop support plans and cost estimates and obtain the necessary resources for all mission activities. As a member of the mission’s senior management team, the CAO is the principal adviser on financial and budgetary matters. The Head of Mission, guided by the CAO, oversees the planning and budgeting exercise, which is based on strategic mission objectives, expected accomplishments and outputs. On the basis of this framework, the CAO coordinates the preparation of a budget for a mission.

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1 In most peacekeeping missions, the CAO is the head of administration. In larger missions, the CAO is replaced by a director of administration and in small missions the support component may be headed by an administrative officer.

2 Certain larger missions have been delegated the authority to recruit international personnel, such as the missions in Kosovo and East Timor.
Sources of Civilian Personnel in Field Missions

Personnel sources include:

- UN Secretariat staff on assignment;
- Staff of specialized agencies, funds and programmes of the UN system as well as UN regional offices on assignment;
- UN staff recruited for service limited to the mission;
- Locally recruited staff;
- United Nations Volunteers (UNV);
- Consultants/individual contractors; and
- Personnel seconded from their national governments.

Funding for peacekeeping operations is provided by all Member States on the basis of an agreed scale of assessment. All requests for resources (i.e. budgets) are submitted to the Fifth Committee (Administrative and Budgetary) of the General Assembly for review and approval. The Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ), a body that advises the Fifth Committee, also plays a key role in the budget review process. The CAO, and occasionally the Head of Mission, may be required to defend the mission’s budget before these two bodies.

Peacekeeping missions operate on a 12-month budgetary cycle from 1 July to 30 June. Given that the budget represents a projection of future mission requirements, accurate forecasting by all mission components of their realistic support needs is crucial. The senior management team of the mission, which oversees the development of all strategic planning, is responsible for ensuring that resource requests are aligned with the overall mission plan.

**Financial management.** The mission’s finance section is responsible for processing the mission’s payroll, making vendor payments, banking transactions, collecting payments and maintaining the mission’s accounts. These activities are governed by the financial rules and regulations of the Organization and supplemented by procedural guidelines issued by the UN Controller. The chief financial officer is directly accountable to the Controller for the proper management and use of mission funds. In some peacekeeping environments where the national banking system may be severely compromised or non-existent, managing the mission’s financial affairs represents a major challenge. The CAO is responsible for implementing and monitoring a system of internal controls that includes a variety of procedural checks and balances intended to ensure transparency and accountability in the management of the mission’s resources.
**Material management and acquisition.** Acquiring and managing material for the mission’s activities is another function of the mission’s administration and support component. Authority to procure material for field missions rests with the Department of Management, which would normally delegate limited authority for procurement to the CAO as well as to the chief procurement officer. Missions are responsible for ensuring the receipt and inspection, storage, inventory management and maintenance as well as write-off of UN assets in the mission area.

In addition to material procured by the mission through the internal process, military and police contingents transport equipment and supplies with them when they are deployed to the mission area. Because contributing States are reimbursed by the Organization for the use of contingent-owned equipment, the mission is also responsible for verifying the quantity, quality and condition of the items upon arrival in the field, periodically throughout the deployment period and prior to departure from the mission area. The specifications of the material and equipment brought by contingents is agreed by the Organization and the contingent country and is set out in a memorandum of understanding that is concluded between the contributing government and the UN prior to deployment. Final reimbursement will depend on the terms of the memorandum and the verified reports on the contingent-owned equipment provided by the mission.

**Logistic support and integrated support services.** Mission assets must be distributed to all mission components on an equitable basis, depending on functional need and assessed priorities. Delivering common support services is part of the administrative functions of a mission and thus falls under the responsibility of the CAO, who has up-to-date information on the status of all resources available within the mission and direct access to all available means of acquiring items. Certain logistic support functions in a peacekeeping mission are considered common to the mission as a whole:

- Provision of accommodation, buildings management and civil engineering and geographical information system services;
- Assignment of transportation resources, fleet management and major vehicle repair and maintenance services;
- Movement control and air or riverine/maritime support services;
- Installation and maintenance of mission-wide communications and computer equipment and facilities;
- Provision of medical and dental services and emergency medical evacuation capability; and
- Provision of general supply items, fuel, water, rations and construction and defence materials.
When formed military units are deployed in a mission, the logistic support concept is based on the integration of UN-provided and contingent-provided resources to support all components of the mission. The management and control of these joint resources is the responsibility of the chief of integrated support service, who is responsible for the delivery of support to the mission as a whole.

The consolidation and integration function of integrated support services is focused in a joint logistic operations centre. The centre, staffed by military and civilian logistics personnel, coordinates the logistical needs of all mission components. Movement control, which is responsible for arranging and executing the mission's personnel and freight movements, including the deployment and rotation of troops, using the mission's air and ground transport assets, is often incorporated into the joint centre approach.

### Coordinating Logistic Support: Joint Logistics Operations Centre

Peacekeeping missions must work in an integrated fashion with all partners in the field, including a number of other UN and non-UN actors operating in the mission area. A joint logistics operations centre (JLOC) is a useful mechanism for coordinating logistic assets and needs. The JLOC often becomes a focal point for many areas of cooperation and mutual assistance between the mission and other agencies and non-governmental organizations, including support issues.

- **Information sharing:** The JLOC brings together logistics officers from all participating entities in weekly meetings and helps in information sharing, including geographic information systems data and maps, logistic surveys and other information;

- **Joint planning:** Planning common use of airports, seaports and access routes can be facilitated through the JLOC as well as implementation of support requests for quick impact projects, infrastructure improvements, etc.;

- **Joint operations:** Joint movement control can be effected through the JLOC, including joint convoys and joint air operations. In addition, shared use of communications network, engineering initiatives and shared facilities can be organized along with local procurement and contracting negotiations with contractors and local authorities.

### Mission Support at Headquarters

Mission support at UN Headquarters in New York is provided by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations’ Office of Mission Support (OMS), which assists field missions to obtain and manage required resources and services. Under the direction of the Assistant Secretary-General for Mission Support, OMS provides support planning and policy guidance, training guidelines and monitoring mechanisms for field support structures to promote efficient and effective management of resources and services throughout the mission’s life, including the planning, start-up and liquidation phases. OMS, in consultation with other departments and offices of the UN Secretariat, provides
strategic planning on logistics and support issues for field missions and acts as the interlocutor with legislative and intergovernmental bodies, such as the General Assembly and its Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, and Member States on those issues.

Rapid Mission Deployment

For rapid and effective mission deployment, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) aims to meet the following standards for mission establishment:

- Mission headquarters to be installed and functional within 15 days of the adoption of an authorizing Security Council resolution;
- A traditional, single-focus mission to be deployed and operational within 30 days of a Council mandate; and
- A complex, multidimensional mission to be deployed and operational within 60 days.

To reach these ambitious goals, OMS has adopted a rapid deployment strategy that includes selecting and assembling a nucleus of senior support staff to help in planning new missions. OMS also maintains a roster of candidates pre-selected for rapid deployment to help in the establishment of a new mission headquarters. All personnel on the rapid deployment roster must be willing to deploy at short notice to help provide essential services to get the new mission up and running. They will remain in place for up to 90 days until they can hand over to longer-term staff. Regular mission recruitment and placement will continue in parallel with the rapid deployment of the start-up team.

Stocks of material needed for mission start-up is maintained at the UN Logistics Base in Brindisi, Italy, to assist with rapid deployment. These reserves of material, also called strategic deployment stocks, dramatically reduce the lag time for identification, procurement and deployment of needed material for mission start-up. These supplies and equipment are sorted into modules for quick selection then air freighted or shipped to the mission area.

When the Security Council decides to establish a new operation, OMS is involved from the outset, guiding the sequencing and development of crucial timelines for the establishment of the mission (see illustration of sequence). This includes defining the staffing and material start-up requirements, preparing the initial budget proposal, facilitating the strategic procurement of goods and services and positioning critical assets in the mission area. During the sustainment phase of a mission, OMS plays a monitoring and backstopping role, with most of the administrative and logistic support decisions being taken directly in the field. OMS guides field mission decision-makers to ensure compliance with UN policies and procedures. Similarly, during the draw-down and liquidation phases, OMS provides overall guidance, with the bulk of operational decisions being taken at the field level.
### Mission Planning and Preparation Sequence

#### D -60 days
- Establish a planning team
- Issue warning order for deployment

For technical survey mission and planning in New York

#### D -50 days
- Request pre-mandate commitment authority from ACABQ

For advance team; procurement with long lead time; recruitment of core personnel; and establishment of mission headquarters

#### D -30 days
- Contract strategic sealift and/or airlift and other services
- Commence procurement
- Activate stand-by arrangements for personnel and material

#### D -15 days
- Prepare strategic deployment stocks for shipment

#### D-day (Security Council mandate)
- Finalize the concept of operations
- Prepare an initial budget

#### D +30 days
- Submit an initial budget for approval
- Budget approval

#### D +30/90 days
- Rapid deployment

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3 The number of days is indicative. Actual number of days will depend on the situation on the ground and the mandate approved for a new mission.
The work of OMS is generally divided between two main components: administrative support and logistic support.

**Administrative support.** The Administrative Support Division of OMS oversees the interpretation and application of policies relating to finance, budget and human resources management in the field. The Division comprises two main elements: personnel management and financial management. The personnel element is responsible for all personnel-related issues, including recruitment, administration, travel, career development and separation of international civilian staff in the field, including issues such as staff performance, promotions, disciplinary matters and career development. It advertises vacancies, identifies qualified candidates and provides screened candidates for a particular vacant post to the missions for selection. It is also responsible for the planning and delivery of training for all civilian field staff and developing training policies and programmes.

The financial management element provides support to field missions on UN financial policies and procedures relating to the preparation and implementation of budgets, ensuring proper budget control and monitoring budget performance, processing claims for reimbursement and maintaining accurate information on expenditure. It coordinates the preparation of mission budgets for submission to the Office of the Controller and assists the Controller in presenting these resource requests to the legislative bodies of the UN. It also negotiates the financial aspects of memoranda of understanding signed with contributing nations and verifies and certifies all claims relating to contingent-owned equipment to facilitate reimbursement to those countries.

**Logistic support.** The other main component of OMS is the Logistics Support Division, which is responsible for the implementation and monitoring of policies and procedures for all logistic issues in peacekeeping. The Division consists of three distinct elements that deal, respectively, with operational support, specialist support and communications and information technology. The operational support provided includes logistics, planning, contract and property management and programme support. Specialist support includes a range of technical logistic sections comparable to those in the field, including supply, engineering, air and surface transport and medical support. The communications and information technology element provides systems development and operational support to all field missions and to other parts of the department.

An aviation safety unit in OMS is entrusted with overseeing the development and compliance of aviation safety standards in missions. The Division also oversees the operations of the United Nations Logistics Base in Brindisi, Italy, which manages reserve equipment stocks and strategic deployment stocks that assist in rapid establishment of new missions.

**Other UN departments.** In addition to the dedicated support provided by OMS, other UN departments and offices also provide policy guidance and backstopping to field missions on administrative issues. These include the Department of Management (DM), the Office of Legal Affairs (OLA) and the Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS).
DM provides assistance in the areas of finance, budget, human resources and procurement. OLA prepares the critical legal documents for mission operations, such as memoranda of understanding and the status-of-forces or status-of-mission agreements. It also provides legal advice on contractual issues and commercial disputes. OIOS provides independent oversight through audits and investigations as well as inspections, monitoring and evaluation.

**Relations with Other Mission Components**

The administrative, logistical and other specialized support for a mission are crucial for the effective implementation of mandated tasks. All components are heavily dependent on the support structure to be able to perform and meet mission objectives. The relationship between the substantive components and the mission support elements is, therefore, of critical importance. Innovative approaches, such as the concept of integrated support services, have been adopted to improve cooperation among all components and integrated planning for a more rational use of mission assets and resources. Mission support elements, which must comply with strict rules and regulations of the Organization, sometimes face criticism for not being responsive enough to mission operational requirements, especially during crises. Knowing the roles and responsibilities of all components and elements can contribute to a common understanding of priorities and the provision of optimum support with necessary controls.
CHAPTER XI: SECURITY AND SAFETY OF PERSONNEL

Introduction

Peacekeeping personnel are exposed to a variety of risks and occupational hazards in their fieldwork. During the 1990s, almost 900 men and women lost their lives while on United Nations (UN) peacekeeping assignments and many more suffered injuries, trauma and disease.

The Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations is responsible for the security and safety of all peacekeeping personnel deployed in the field. On his/her behalf, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), in close cooperation with the Office of the United Nations Security Coordinator (UNSECOORD), works to minimize the risks faced by mission personnel through security and safety management procedures.

In UN terminology, references to safety and security are sometimes used interchangeably. DPKO, however, draws a clear distinction between security issues, which are external threats ranging from military assault to petty crime, and safety concerns, which are the occupational hazards of any field deployment and include the handling of unfamiliar equipment or exposure to tropical diseases. The distinction is important because of the different responsibilities and mechanisms involved in ensuring prevention, protection and enforcement.

I. Security Management

Legal Basis

The primary responsibility for the security and protection of UN staff members, their spouses, dependants, property and the property of the Organization rests with the host government. Every government is responsible for protecting persons and property and maintaining order within its jurisdiction. A government hosting a UN body or entity, including a peacekeeping operation, is responsible for protecting UN personnel and property and both the UN and the host government are party to an agreement detailing this responsibility. For peacekeeping operations, these provisions are laid out in the status-of-forces agreement (SOFA) or the status-of-mission agreement (SOMA).

Host governments have not always been able to fulfil their responsibility to protect UN personnel and property for a variety of reasons. Faced with a significant increase in casualties among UN personnel in the early 1990s, Member States started discussing proposals for a legal response to the lack of adequate protection. This led to the General

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1 For example, the Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel deals exclusively with external threats to UN personnel, ranging from military attacks to criminal offences, which DPKO considers security issues.
The Convention covers two aspects:

- The fundamental obligations of States and of the UN and associated personnel; and

- A mechanism to ensure that those who have attacked UN personnel are brought to justice through prosecution or extradition.

The scope of the Convention extends to “persons engaged or deployed by the Secretary-General of the United Nations as members of the military, police or civilian components of a United Nations operation; and other officials and experts on mission of the United Nations or its specialized agencies . . . who are present in an official capacity in the area where a United Nations operation is being conducted.”

Because Member States were slow to accede, despite having been adopted in 1994, the Convention entered into force on 15 January 1999. By the end of 2001, only one-third of the UN’s member countries had opted to sign the Convention, many of them troop contributors to UN peacekeeping.

The international track record on arrests for the assault or murder of UN personnel remains appalling. Between 1992 and 2001, only three perpetrators were brought to justice for the murder of peacekeeping personnel. It is too early to tell whether the Convention will have any protective effect in the longer term, but the Organization must, for the time being, continue to take all possible measures to provide independently for the security of its personnel.

**Peacekeeping Security Management**

In 1980 the UN established guidelines and procedures for security management, which were codified in the *United Nations Field Security Handbook*. In 1988, UNSECOORD was established to support security arrangements for field-based personnel of UN specialized agencies, funds, programmes and UN field offices.

When it came to peacekeeping operations, however, the general perception was that peacekeepers were mostly military personnel and therefore expected to be equipped with the means to defend themselves. This perception changed during the 1990s with the rise of multidimensional peacekeeping operations with large numbers of civilians and unarmed civilian police personnel deployed alongside the military component but given separate operational tasks.

With the start of efforts to provide adequate protection for all peacekeeping personnel came the realization that peacekeeping missions could not be easily incorporated into the UN security management system. The UN Legal Counsel stated in 1993 that “the arrangements provided for in the *Field Security Handbook*, which is oriented towards
civilian personnel engaged in normal peace-time activity, cannot accommodate peacekeeping operations, which have special mandates and are often deployed in situations where other activities have to be suspended.”

Because the Security Council decides which conflicts require peacekeepers and tailors the mandate of a peacekeeping operation to the situation, the basis for deployment is quite different from that of other UN agencies. Because of these special mandates, paragraph 13 of the Field Security Handbook stipulates that “with respect to United Nations peacekeeping operations, military and civilian personnel are under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and/or Force Commander or Chief of Staff, as applicable.”

Moreover, while UNSECOORD is clearly the focal point for security management, it does not have the authority to address one of the main challenges of peacekeeping security management, namely the integration of security planning for military, civilian police and civilian personnel. Since dividing responsibility for the security of personnel would compromise the chain of command within the mission, all personnel remain under the jurisdiction of the Head of Mission. Thus, DPKO bears a special responsibility for managing security requirements in its operations.

**Peacekeeping and the UN Security Management System**

While the full integration of peacekeeping missions into the UN security management system may not be possible, DPKO and UNSECOORD work very closely together at Headquarters and in the field. Such cooperation is vital for security of personnel and for technical and political reasons; the UN system must speak with one voice on security matters, especially when it comes to assessing and managing threats to its personnel or property.

In 1994, the General Assembly approved the first post in UNSECOORD to provide support to peacekeeping operations. In 2001 and 2002, three additional security coordination officers were approved for UNSECOORD to backstop peacekeeping missions. Over the years, there have been many improvements in promoting the security of mission personnel. Specifically, UNSECOORD provides technical expertise and support in the following areas:

- Providing advice and guidance on the security and protection of UN personnel at every duty station;
- Providing security advice to Headquarters and the field;
- Conducting security assessment missions;
- Assisting with mission start-up;
- Managing hostage incidents;
• Training designated officials, security management teams and officers and area security coordinators and wardens;

• Training in security awareness for peacekeeping personnel;

• Screening security officer candidates;

• Reviewing mission security plans;

• Providing insurance coverage against malicious acts; and

• Providing support for stress management.

In the field, the security system in peacekeeping operations is closely associated with the mechanisms established by UNSECOORD under the provisions of the Field Security Handbook. The system is based on the appointment by the Secretary-General of a designated official, who is responsible for the security and protection of UN personnel at every duty station. The designated official establishes and chairs a security management team (SMT) composed of all heads of UN agencies, the field security officer, medical staff, and other personnel, as appropriate, to conduct collective security assessments and develop coordinated contingency plans.

The SMT also recommends security phases applicable to agency personnel and their dependants as well as the dependants of civilian peacekeeping personnel (dependants of military and police personnel are not included in these arrangements). The security phase determines the type of restrictions imposed on operational activities in the country as well as the relocation/evacuation of personnel.

In places where peacekeeping operations are deployed, the Head of Mission may be appointed as the designated official for the mission area and is therefore responsible not only for the security of mission personnel but also for UN agency personnel and their authorized dependants. In this capacity, he/she has two distinct reporting lines: on matters concerning the security of peacekeeping personnel, he/she continues to report to the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations; and on matters pertaining to the security of agency personnel, he/she reports to the UN security coordinator. Under this arrangement, the resident coordinator may be appointed as the deputy-designated official.

Even when the designated official function is fulfilled by another senior UN official, the Head of Mission is always a member of the SMT at the duty station and consults closely with all UN colleagues on security-related issues. A mutual and comprehensive exchange of information on all developments with security implications is critical to effective cooperation and coordinated action. Some missions provide agency personnel with unrestricted access to their joint operations centres, which has proven to be a useful means to encourage an open flow of information.
Current Security Arrangements

In the initial stages of operational planning, UNSECOORD advises DPKO on the security arrangements needed for civilian staff, especially on the creation of a dedicated security section, depending on the operational requirements of the mission and the threat it faces. All multidimensional operations have a chief security officer who is the principal adviser to the Head of Mission on issues affecting the security of mission personnel. He/she should have direct access to the Head of Mission at all times.

In addition to overseeing the preparation of the security plan, the chief security officer’s responsibilities include:

- Coordinating security arrangements with all UN and external partners as well as the local authorities;
- Conducting assessments of the general security situation, office and residential security and investigations;
- Ensuring that an emergency communications network is in place; and
- Managing the guard force that protects mission premises, if no contingent is provided for that purpose.

The security plan is the primary management tool for security preparedness at any duty station. It details individual responsibilities as well as the security measures for emergency situations such as military confrontations, internal disorder and natural disasters. It also provides instructions on emergency communications and supplies, coordination and concentration points and how to reach safe havens. All mission personnel should understand their role in the security plan, which is developed by the chief security officer. The security plans for missions and UN agencies should be coordinated and harmonized as much as possible through the SMT, especially concerning use of communications equipment and evacuation assets.

To facilitate the coordination of security arrangements, the chief security officer appoints, on behalf of the Head of Mission, a number of wardens and deputy wardens, each of who ensures the implementation of the security plan in a specified geographical zone. Wardens function as a channel of communication between the chief security officer and the staff members, monitor compliance with precautionary measures and stay informed of the location of staff members’ residences in their zone in case of an evacuation. In large missions, area security coordinators may be appointed to coordinate and oversee the security arrangements in a particular region and to prepare an area-specific security plan. More details on these arrangements are contained in the Field Security Handbook and are discussed during a new staff member’s orientation with the mission’s security section.

UNSECOORD has also issued a document, Security in the Field, that is available to all staff members and contains practical measures staff can take to minimize risks at the duty station, including how to protect themselves and their homes and how to react in extreme
Periodic security awareness training is also provided by UNSECOORD at the duty station, and when courses are scheduled civilian staff participation is mandatory.

In addition to security training, staff must have access to stress counselling to help them cope with the day-to-day stress of being in an unfamiliar environment or with trauma suffered as the result of a security incident. A number of missions have a stress counsellor on staff or provide access to counsellors from another organization. All mission personnel are encouraged to use these services.

**Discipline**

It is critical that all staff members strictly follow the instructions of the chief security officer. Observance of curfew and other security measures can be burdensome for staff, especially when they remain in force for an extended period of time, but compliance is mandatory. Maintaining disciplined adherence to the measures requires leadership by the Head of Mission.

Supervisors at all levels are accountable for ensuring both that their staff comply with security measures and that they never place their staff in harm’s way. It is very important that the Head of Mission set an example in his/her own conduct. There have been cases when senior managers, even Heads of Mission, have asked their staff to stay late at the office to finish work, forcing them to find their way home in darkness, violating curfew and jeopardizing their security.

Staff members refusing to comply with security arrangements should be informed by the Head of Mission, in writing, that non-compliance might result in disciplinary proceedings and the imposition of disciplinary measures. They should also be advised that their actions could endanger the lives of others, jeopardize evacuation arrangements and may void their coverage under the UN insurance policy for malicious acts. For military and civilian police observers, any violation of mission security procedures may result in repatriation.

**Role of Military and Civilian Police**

Military contingents often need to adjust aspects of military doctrine and training to the different challenges encountered in peacekeeping. This also applies to security management because the defensive posture of peacekeepers limits the usual military options for action and reaction in countering a threat. The use of force of any kind by a member of a peacekeeping contingent is defined by the rules of engagement (ROE). The ROE are tailored to the specific mandate of the mission and the situation on the ground. Contingent commanders are responsible for ensuring that all troops comply with the mission-specific ROE.

Unarmed military observers, who are usually responsible for monitoring ceasefires and liaising with combatants, should also be aware of the special security requirements in peacekeeping operations. Force commanders and chief military observers should work
closely with chief security officers, who often have considerable expertise and UNSECOORD training in peacekeeping security management.

A number of Security Council resolutions have specifically tasked peacekeeping contingents with the protection of UN and associated personnel. The force commander plays a crucial role in translating this responsibility into standing orders on the ground. While DPKO addresses the security management in its pre-deployment training sessions, contingent commanders should also be briefed upon arrival by the force commander. If there is a civilian Head of Mission, he/she should ensure close cooperation between the force commander and the chief security officer to ensure that military and civilian assets and logistic arrangements are used in the most effective manner to support common security objectives.

Civilian police components play a special role in staff security in missions where UN police have executive authority, which is usually in the context of an interim or transitional administration mandate, as in the case of the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). Where UN police are in charge of law enforcement, mission personnel will be able to count on the kind of protection against internal threats that democratic police forces normally provide to citizens. As with the military component, the police commissioner should work closely with the chief security officer to ensure that the best possible security arrangements are put in place for mission personnel.

**Challenges**

While peacekeeping security management has come a long way, there are particular and unique challenges for multidimensional missions. These missions must integrate security arrangements for components with different operational requirements, orchestrate deployment and patrol activity covering large geographical areas, deploy large numbers of personnel rapidly before logistic support is on the ground and contend with a high rate of personnel turnover.

DPKO continues to address these challenges in close consultation with UNSECOORD and Member States. A study commissioned by DPKO in April 2001 made recommendations that are being implemented jointly with UNSECOORD. While far from perfect, lessons learned from past crises as well as an increasing awareness of the need for better protection have significantly improved the security arrangements for peacekeeping personnel.

**II. Safety Management**

As mentioned above, safety management concerns the protection of all categories of mission personnel, equipment and material from unnecessary hazards. Safety can be enhanced, to a large extent, when DPKO, field missions and individual personnel take actions such as:

- Establishing clear policies, procedures and standards;
• Providing the requisite training; and
• Ensuring compliance with standards through effective oversight and management.

Preventing Accidents and Enhancing Safety

The Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations is responsible for the safety of peacekeeping personnel. The Head of Mission has direct responsibility for managing safety concerns on the ground and, therefore, takes the necessary measures to ensure the safety of mission personnel and reports to the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations on this. DPKO supports safety management in the missions through the development of policies, procedures and guidance to missions, training for mission personnel, monitoring compliance with these policies and procedures and enhancing awareness both at Headquarters and in the field. DPKO considers it essential to improve safety by ensuring accountability in the field missions, particularly by enforcing measures when required.

DPKO’s main areas of responsibility for safety in peacekeeping operations include:

• Road safety;
• Aviation safety;
• Weapons, ammunition and explosives;
• Landmines and unexploded ordnance;
• Workplace safety; and
• Environmental safety.

Most of these issues are handled within the Office of Mission Support (OMS) in DPKO. Within this framework, several sections, particularly within the logistic support division, perform many of the activities related to safety issues, either exclusively or in conjunction with other Headquarters offices.

Road safety. The motor transport section manages the global peacekeeping vehicle fleet and is a member of the DPKO safety council. The section ensures that motor transport equipment procured for use in peacekeeping missions meets with international safety standards and that there are procedures in place to ensure that UN- and contingent-owned equipment are maintained and operated safely. Policing safe operating procedures within missions may require coordination with UN security staff, civilian police and the military. This should be achieved, in part, through the mission’s road safety committee.

Aviation safety. The aviation safety unit plans, coordinates and monitors peacekeeping air operations to ensure their compliance with UN regulations, safety and efficiency. The Unit has developed a comprehensive safety policy and procedures as outlined in the
**Aviation Safety Manual.** Within missions, an aviation safety unit is normally established to deal with this important issue.

**Landmines/unexploded ordinance.** As part of its overall responsibility, the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) of DPKO develops mine action-related policies and international mine action standards (including safety) and monitors the activities of mine action coordination centres in countries with a landmine and unexploded ordnance problem.

**Workplace safety.** As part of its function to provide basic infrastructure, including office accommodation to field missions, the engineering section provides safety standards for heavy and other equipment. In the field, the respective engineering unit or section is responsible for safety aspects of these items and also for fire safety.

**Environmental safety.** The medical support unit establishes policies and advises on health and medical issues in field missions.

**DPKO Safety Council**

The department has established mechanisms to improve safety in field missions. The DPKO safety council identifies procedural changes and specific actions required to improve safety in the field. The council, chaired by the Assistant Secretary-General for Mission Support, is an advisory body to the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations and consists of representatives from all components of DPKO. Other offices or departments of the Secretariat may also be invited to participate.

The terms of reference for the safety council include:

- Identify safety trends in field operations to assess the risk of accidents and their human, material and financial costs;

- Develop a risk management strategy, including policies and procedures that enable missions to minimize the risk of accidents and the associated human, material and financial costs;

- Develop a communications plan to increase the awareness of safety issues; and

- Determine ways to provide better information on the causes of accidents to improve preventive measures, capture lessons learned and develop best practices.

**Aviation Safety Council**

The department plans to establish an aviation safety council at Headquarters and in each UN field operation that routinely conducts flight operations to ensure the implementation of aviation safety programmes. The council will comprise the senior management of DPKO as well as representatives from other departments of the Secretariat, such as the
Office of the Deputy Secretary-General, UNSECOORD, the Office of the Spokesman for the Secretary-General, the Office of Legal Affairs, the Office of Central Support Services, the Office of Human Resources Management and the Department of Political Affairs.

**Road Safety Committee**

Missions are responsible for establishing a road safety committee with representation from all areas of the mission. The committee should report on a bi-annual basis to the Assistant Secretary-General for OMS, forwarding a copy to the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations. The committee is charged with:

- Publishing mission road safety standard operating procedures;

- Conducting detailed analyses of the causes and frequency of traffic incidents and making recommendations on preventive measures;

- Instituting measures to detect and deter traffic offences, including police patrols and sobriety checks by security personnel at the exits of UN facilities;

- Publishing a road safety bulletin detailing the results of accidents and trend analyses focusing on practical accident avoidance measures for all personnel; and

- Holding regular safety stand down periods and briefings to focus attention on safety issues.

**Mission Aviation Safety Council**

For aviation safety, the mission’s aviation safety council promotes safety awareness among all personnel concerned with aviation. The council identifies safety-related issues and evaluates, from a safety point of view, flight operations, search and rescue procedures, mission pre-accident plans (emergency response plan) and mission medical and casualty evacuations.

A mission aviation safety council consists of selected UN staff members, civil and military aircrew members and experts from air transport, air traffic control, flight following, medical, crash rescue/fire fighting, communications and other areas as required. The council should be chaired by the director of administration or the chief administrative officer or, in his/her absence, by the chief of integrated support services. The council should meet whenever necessary (but not less than once a month). The mission aviation safety officer acts as the secretary of the council and reports to the safety aviation unit at Headquarters.
Safety Stand Down Days

DPKO has instituted safety stand down days, which are conducted regularly in field missions, to raise awareness of safety issues. Missions have been provided guidelines for the conduct of the stand down day, including advice on the appropriate focus for the day, activities to be conducted and post-activity reporting requirements. To allow for an appropriate focus on safety, it is recommended that only emergency or essential activities be undertaken on safety stand down days to allow mission personnel to concentrate on safety issues and not be distracted by other activities.

Conclusion

Safety management must be a priority in the conduct of peacekeeping operations. Awareness and preparedness are crucial to prevent and mitigate hazards and effectively manage risks for field personnel serving. DPKO is committed to ensuring good safety management and enhancing preventive measures, including the monitoring and implementation of clear policies, standards and procedures, and providing regular training.
CHAPTER XII: ELECTORAL ASSISTANCE

Introduction

The United Nations (UN) has been involved in electoral assistance since its founding in 1945. Its Charter enshrines the principle of self-determination and identifies the promotion and protection of human rights as one of its central purposes. While the electoral work of the UN is most closely associated with comprehensive modern peacekeeping operations, such as those undertaken in Cambodia, El Salvador and Mozambique, these efforts represent the culmination of decades of work in developing international standards and supporting trust and non-self-governing territories (NSGTs) in their efforts to achieve self-determination.

UN electoral assistance has historically included advancing the principle of self-determination through the development of self-government and decolonization. More recently, it has entailed establishing and advancing democratic principles and political rights. Today the UN system is engaged in a wide range of development assistance activities that support the efforts of governments around the world to promote democratic election processes. As one of the most credible and experienced global organizations in the implementation of electoral projects and operations, the UN receives more requests for electoral assistance than it can address. Since 1989, the UN has received over 290 requests for electoral assistance from Member States and has responded to more than 200.

Electoral Assistance in Peacekeeping Operations

The role of elections in a post-conflict situation is to replace a violent contest for political power with a non-violent one. An election is only effective, however, when the electoral process is widely accepted by the participating population as legitimate and binding. As an inherently sovereign process and one of the highest expressions of political self-determination, the electoral process is measured against internationally accepted standards of practices and principles. Although elections are ultimately judged by the citizenry of the country, States often request and even require the presence of external actors to overcome the electorate’s distrust for the process or to contribute to the international acceptance and recognition of the regime. In such cases, the UN is

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1 At the time the UN was established, there were 11 Trust Territories and 72 NSGTs. The Trust Territories were mainly colonies of the countries defeated in the First and Second World Wars and were placed under the UN International Trusteeship System; all have since exercised their right to self-determination. All other colonies were considered NSGTs under Chapter XI of the Charter. Since 1946 most of the NSGTs have exercised their right to self-determination by choosing one of three options: Free Association with an Independent State, Integration with an Independent State or Independence. The last NSGT to exercise the right to self-determination was East Timor, which became independent in 2002. As of 2003, there are 16 remaining NSGTs. United Nations and Decolonization, Department of Public Information (DPI) publication DPI/2237, December 2001.
perceived as an impartial actor that can ensure that elections are carried out in a free and fair manner.

UN participation in the electoral process spans activities from coordinating observers and technical assistance to the full conduct and implementation of an election. UN involvement may be initiated through a formal request from a Member State or by a General Assembly or Security Council resolution. With every electoral operation, the UN must act in a transparent and globally consistent manner to uphold its credibility as a neutral arbiter in electoral processes around the world.

UN involvement in electoral matters is regulated by resolutions of the General Assembly. In 1991, pursuant to General Assembly resolution 46/137, the Secretary-General has designated the Under-Secretary-General of the Department of Political Affairs (DPA) as the focal point for Electoral Assistance Activities. The focal point, with the direct support of the Electoral Assistance Division (EAD) of DPA, determines electoral standards, assesses the needs and scope of an electoral operation, formulates and staffs the mission and monitors the implementation of UN electoral operations.

In many peacekeeping operations, a free and fair election is a critical milestone in achieving a mission’s objectives. Whether the purpose is to create the foundation of a newly democratic State or rehabilitate an existing democracy, a credible election will strongly influence the course of the mission and its relationship with the host government.

**Multidimensional Peacekeeping**

Holding a free and fair election requires close coordination between a mission’s various components and its resources. Peacekeeping mandates are increasingly complex and have several objectives, one of which may be electoral assistance. While the extent of the electoral mandate may vary, it generally “... is likely to be one of the most important aspects of the operation, because the holding of an election tends, in such cases, to be a fundamental element of the overall political agreement giving rise to the operation (as has been the case in numerous missions, including those mounted in Namibia, Cambodia, Mozambique and Timor-Leste [formerly East Timor]) ...”

Most agreements underlying a peacekeeping mission also define deadlines and the schedule for elections. This timetable forces a need for strategic cooperative planning between mission components to ensure that simultaneous objectives can be met.

Three major trends have contributed to the introduction of electoral elements into peacekeeping operations:

- The widespread acceptance of the concept of self-determination set out in the UN Charter (Articles 1(2), 73(b) and 76(b), particularly in the context of decolonization and trusteeship;

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The recognition that internal problems of a country can threaten international peace; and

The growing emphasis on the need for countries to adopt democratic mechanisms to ensure good governance, which is increasingly important to the international donor community, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank.

**Electoral Assistance in Timor-Leste**

In July 2000, as part of the preparations for Timor-Leste’s constitutional development and elections, the UN dispatched a mission to Timor-Leste to conduct a technical needs assessment, evaluate the capacity of local and regional actors and prepare an initial planning document for the development of Timor-Leste’s electoral capacity. The mission also held in-depth discussions with Timor-Leste leaders and civil society to ensure that the mission’s recommendations would reflect their hopes and expectations. It was crucial to outline realistic expectations based on the relatively short time frame that was proposed for the transition to independence without compromising the integrity and credibility of the constitution-making electoral processes.

In October 2000, the UN sent two teams of electoral experts to Timor-Leste to establish the electoral component of the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET), an electoral systems education team and a planning and design team. Their main tasks were to design the structure of the electoral management body (EMB) in charge of preparing and conducting the elections, develop a comprehensive operational plan for the conduct of the 2002 elections, design a capacity-building programme and establish a voter education and information programme.

The electoral component of UNTAET was fully staffed in March 2001 and in May, the Secretary-General appointed five members of the Independent Electoral Commission of East Timor. The elections for the Constituent Assembly in Timor-Leste were held on 30 August 2001. Timor-Leste became independent on 20 May 2002 and joined the UN on 27 September 2002.

**UN Electoral Planning**

Although planning for an electoral operation in the context of a peacekeeping mission can be separated into several interrelated phases, an election can rarely be fully planned from the outset. Political, military and economic factors generally dictate that the electoral plan be developed in stages as other benchmarks are met (e.g. disarmament, demobilization and reintegration). To plan or launch electoral activities, a needs assessment mission (NAM) must be undertaken as soon as a written request for UN involvement is received. EAD, on behalf of the UN focal point, conducts all electoral NAMs. Electoral planning typically comprises the following stages.

**Pre-agreement mission planning.** A multidisciplinary task force is established in UN Headquarters in preparation for a peacekeeping mission. EAD represents the focal point
in this forum to identify and ensure that the majority of contentious electoral issues are resolved in the initial agreement. From an electoral perspective, two factors dominate the discussion—the electoral system to be adopted and the criteria of enfranchisement (the entitlement to vote). At this point, operational planning revolves around identifying the appropriate level of UN involvement and the activities that may be feasible in a given time frame.

**Agreement planning.** Typically, a special representative or envoy of the Secretary-General negotiates UN involvement in an agreement or recommends to the Secretary-General a course of action to be presented to the Security Council. If the proposed agreement or mandate relates to electoral matters, EAD must become involved. If decided by the UN focal point, EAD may dispatch one or more electoral experts to assist in this process or prepare adequate briefing materials.

**Post-agreement planning.** An electoral NAM is deployed by EAD to conduct a comprehensive analysis of the electoral situation. This initial survey includes input from local, international and other UN actors (mission components and other agencies) to evaluate national conditions and the prospects of an election. A broad operational plan is then formulated. If possible, a basic staffing table for an electoral component is produced along with cost estimates. If a complex multidimensional mission or extensive electoral mandate is decided on, the NAM may recommend the deployment of an advance planning team to provide a detailed design of the electoral operation. The NAM may also outline a schedule of subsequent EAD missions to be conducted at key junctures of the process to assess quality and review progress.

**Mission planning.** The outcome-driven nature of electoral operations has led to the adoption of a project management approach that focuses on achieving key benchmarks within strict timeframes, timely resource allocation (personnel, finances and materials) and multidisciplinary input. Different phases of an election require varying skills and personnel so staff may be rotated as the process evolves. Five types of personnel are employed: local staff, United Nations volunteers (UNV), international mission staff, consultants and personnel seconded from other components.³

A regular feature of complex missions is to develop local capacity for sustainable development of the electoral administration. Capacity can be built through a dedicated parallel project or by hiring local staff. Because electoral activities require close working relationships, staff of other components like the military, civilian police and public information may share space with the electoral component to foster collaboration. This has proven effective in enhancing coordination and emerged as a best practice for large-scale electoral operations.

EAD closely monitors the planning and implementation of electoral activities by a mission component to ensure compliance with UN electoral standards. The appointed

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³ EAD maintains the General Assembly-mandated UN system roster of electoral expert consultants who are used for staffing all UN electoral projects and operations.
chief electoral officer (CEO) or chief technical adviser (CTA) submit regular technical reports to EAD for ongoing consultation and evaluation.

**Post-election planning.** The post-election period has become an increasingly important opportunity for Member States to consolidate the gains of a credible election. Peace agreements tend to focus on national elections for the executive (for example, President) and legislative bodies (for example, a parliament) and local or municipal elections normally follow within one to two years. The electoral component is required to submit a comprehensive final activities report and provide recommendations for follow-up activities. If then required, EAD may deploy a post-election assessment mission to undertake an evaluation and form recommendations for continued UN engagement in the electoral process.

**Implementation Considerations**

Comparative analysis of the electoral systems of different countries is an important tool for the design and planning of electoral assistance. Every framework, however, is unique and electoral systems cannot be transplanted; customization and national ownership make them truly effective. While the UN relies on a range of operational templates, electoral components are formulated as functional teams with particular tasks and phases in a given electoral process. Several factors must be addressed when designing an electoral component:

**Staffing.** An electoral operation is highly dependent on the quality of experts deployed. EAD is mandated to maintain a roster of UN electoral experts for use in all UN system electoral operations or projects. After a staffing plan has been decided, EAD provides one or more recommendations for each post based on available personnel from the roster.

**Component inter-operability.** Circumstances usually dictate a strong interdependence with other mission components and UN agencies. While central forums for inter-component liaison should be a constant feature of peacekeeping operations, certain phases of an electoral operation may require extra facilitation at the working level.

**Command, control and communications.** Electoral work normally requires personnel to be deployed widely throughout a territory and an effective operational structure requires that Headquarters and regional offices communicate easily and often. Depending on the nature of the operation and infrastructure constraints, electoral sub-offices are established for broad coverage and localized coordination. The general model allows for a CEO, possibly supported by one or more area coordinators. The CEO is ultimately responsible for the conduct of the electoral activities, reports directly to the SRSG and

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4 These include the Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) (political negotiation), political affairs (monitoring), military (territorial integrity), civilian police (law and order), public information (civic and voter education campaigns), the legal unit, the office of administration and support (short- and long-term local staff recruitment, procurement and transport), the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the UN Volunteer Programme.
provides technical reports to the assigned project officer in EAD. In periods of intense negotiation or electoral activities, a member of the electoral staff may be assigned to the Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for support purposes.

**HQ political support.** By its mandate, EAD reports to the General Assembly every two years on UN system electoral activities. The engagement of the UN in any electoral process, and especially in a peacekeeping mission, is a substantive investment of political credibility and resources. Continuous consultation with the electoral component of a peacekeeping mission, provision of technical briefs and the assignment of staff from UN Headquarters to the field to address problematic issues are among some of the services EAD provides to the field.

**Partnerships with third parties.** EAD maintains several memoranda of understanding (MoU), agreements and notes of guidance with various international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and other UN agencies on electoral work. In some circumstances, it may be necessary to engage these organizations in some aspect of the electoral framework, and EAD can provide advice on existing arrangements or on the relative strengths of different agencies.

**Phases of an Election**

A typical election can be broken down into five overlapping phases.

**Expanding the legal framework.** The importance of establishing a binding legal framework for the conduct of an election cannot be overemphasized. The legal framework defines the rules that all actors must accept as legitimate and fair and determines whether the UN can and will be involved in the process. The UN cannot endorse elections that have little support from the citizenry or violate civil or political rights. Consequently, the legal framework may heavily influence the parameters and scope of possible UN involvement and the resources required to meet its obligations.

The legal framework for an election may be embodied in the Constitution, an electoral law of the host country or in an agreement reached between parties to end or resolve a conflict. Due to the importance of these decisions and the level at which they are negotiated, the SRSG is normally the principal interlocutor on behalf of the UN. As in any strategic negotiation, inputs are required from a multitude of components including political, civil and military, police, logistics and public information. To coordinate these diverse considerations into a feasible and acceptable set of electoral rules, one or more electoral experts may be attached to the office of the SRSG for this phase.

Electoral procedures are critical to the success of an election and are the means through which the basic agreements reached during the negotiation phase are translated into practice. The period during which electoral procedures, directives and regulations are drafted usually requires continuous and intense UN technical and political involvement.
Establishing the electoral administration. Electoral procedures transform principles into shared and detailed practices. In any given election, an EMB is the institution solely dedicated to the organization and conduct of elections. The EMB formulates the regulations as the electoral process evolves. Typically, these include a set of criteria for the formal recognition and nomination of candidates and/or political parties, regulations on campaign financing, codes of conduct for political parties and security forces, the definition of electoral offences, guidelines on the registration of voters and procedures for polling, counting and tallying.

When a UN peacekeeping operation is deployed in a post-conflict situation, State institutions, if they exist at all, are often relatively weak. Unless the UN has been asked to organize and conduct the election itself, the EMB plays a crucial role during the electoral process, even though it may have been severely undermined by conflict.

In addition to managing the process, the EMB must be perceived as doing it in a fair and impartial manner. The credibility of the institution is key to keeping contending parties engaged and can be undercut by both intentional actions as well as by technical blunders due to limited capacity or experience. Extensive communication and negotiation between parties and the EMB, facilitated by the UN, prevent operational difficulties from escalating into allegations of political bias. The UN may also reinforce the EMB through extensive technical assistance in areas of weakness.

In cases where the UN takes on the role of the EMB, there must be a distinction between the overall mission and the electoral component in order to preserve neutrality and independence. This formula was used successfully in Timor-Leste with the establishment of the Independent Electoral Commission.

The Rice Bowl Analogy

The scope of the challenge facing an EMB is regularly explained by a bowl of rice analogy; this comparison provides an overview of what must be operationally achieved:

Every willing and eligible adult person (participating eligible voters) in a country receives a bowl of rice (opportunity to vote) in a single day. Every person who wishes to obtain a bowl of rice needs to know why s/he is getting it (civic education), when it is available (date of election), where to claim it (a polling location) and how to claim it (voter education). No one can receive more than one bowl (one person, one vote), no one may be obstructed from receiving her or his bowl of rice (security and accessibility) and no one else can know if s/he ate the rice (secrecy of the vote). Afterwards, every bowl must be accounted for, counted and collated (counting and tallying of the vote), after which someone must do the dishes.

Electoral personnel are usually widely dispersed throughout a territory, which creates one of the most pressing demands on UN logistical support and security forces. A UN mission will normally set up a joint command among its components to provide
consolidated reporting and coordinate activities in the electoral and subsequent phases. In most peacekeeping operations, electoral authorities tend to rely heavily on UN logistical support. Such assistance must be coordinated through an electoral liaison unit with the EMB because even logistical support can have political implications for the process.

**Registering voters.** Voter registration is a critical phase of any election because it deals with voter enfranchisement and the realization of civil and political rights. How voter registration is carried out can enhance or undermine the credibility of the electoral process. If the UN is conducting the registration exercise, EAD closely monitors the planning and conduct of this phase. In a post-conflict situation, however, voter registration may not always be feasible. An alternative method, for example, may allow voters to simply produce existing documentation at polling stations to verify their identity and eligibility.

The registration and participation of refugees, internally displaced persons and exiled and migratory populations are negotiated under the legal framework because these considerations relate directly to the breadth of enfranchisement (criteria for those eligible to vote in an electoral process). In accordance with the *Universal Declaration of Human Rights* and other international human rights instruments, the UN does not endorse criteria based on race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin or ownership of property. At the same time, there is general agreement that voter eligibility may be based on citizenship, residency and age.

There are different methodologies for voter registration (continuous, periodic or civil registry) but the process is generally as follows:

- Eligibility criteria are determined;
- A public information campaign is launched;
- Data is collected from eligible persons who choose to register at fixed and mobile registration locations;
- A preliminary list of voters is prepared;
- An exhibition and challenge period is held for the public to review the preliminary list, challenges are resolved by a judicial or quasi-judicial body and appropriate amendments, deletions and additions are made pursuant to the challenges;
- A final list of voters is prepared; and

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7 A civil registry or national index is a larger set of records from which a list of voters is extracted. For example, a civil registry may include persons too young to vote. A continuous methodology of maintaining civil registries is an ongoing service, whereas a periodic methodology is normally associated with a stand-alone electoral registration exercise.
The final list of voters is produced and distributed to polling stations for use on polling day.

It is important to determine whether the voter will need to produce an identity card and if so, when it will be produced and distributed (at point of registration or later) and what information it will contain (photograph, fingerprint, personal information). These considerations have a significant impact on the cost, duration and complexity of voter registration. In terms of logistical demands, the registration phase is second only to the polling and counting phase of the electoral process.

The registration process has significant benefits and challenges. First, pre-determining eligibility removes a potential cause of dispute and violence at polling stations in case voter eligibility is challenged. Second, the opportunity to gather detailed information on the numbers and distribution of voters throughout the country allows for precise logistical planning of the polling exercise. Third, the exercise is an excellent basis on which to assess and adjust the arrangements put in place to conduct the election, effectively a dry-run of command and control, logistics, security and communications. Finally, the registration exercise can reinforce the independence and political authority of the EMB as an arbiter in disputes as well as the overall credibility of the electoral process.

**Nominating candidates and campaigning.** In most electoral systems, candidates and parties are required to meet several conditions when formally registering to compete in an election. The nomination of candidates and political parties normally follows the voter registration phase. Among other criteria for nomination, potential candidates and/or parties will be required to demonstrate public support by submitting a minimum number of registered voters’ signatures to the EMB. The minimum number of signatures required by an independent candidate and a political party will vary based on the level of organization and resources available to them. This criterion may be used as a mechanism to inhibit spoilers or inconsequential competitors from entering the race.

Unfortunately, it can also be abused by effectively barring new or emerging parties from being able to compete at the national level by requiring, for instance, that signatures be collected from all regions in the country. This exemplifies one of a multitude of decisions in an electoral system that can radically affect the nature and outcome of an election.

Transforming violent groups into non-violent political parties may require additional external assistance. In both Timor-Leste (2001-2002) and Sierra Leone (2001-2002), projects for facilitating non-violent political party development were successful on the ground. The political neutrality and impartiality of the peacekeeping operation is fundamental, so projects like these are usually implemented through a third party (such as UNDP) not directly engaged in the conduct or the organization of the election.

During the campaigning period the UN usually launches a major public information campaign for civic and voter education based on a theme of tolerance. The issue of UN or state support to political parties may become a politically sensitive topic, so civic and voter education messages require careful filtering by the electoral and political
components prior to dissemination. In some peacekeeping operations, the UN may have a monopoly on the public broadcast system. In such cases, the UN and EMB will usually formulate an agreement allowing equal airtime for registered national political competitors for campaigning purposes.

An open campaigning period is widely recognized as an essential benchmark of a free and fair election. The campaigning period is also the time, however, when political violence is most likely to occur. Several measures can be implemented to minimize this risk, including establishing a consensual code of conduct among political parties and legal consequences for electoral campaigning offences.

Political rallies are usually required to be scheduled through the electoral administration to prevent groups from campaigning at the same time and place. Depending on the UN mandate, electoral observers and civilian police and UN military observers may monitor their national counterparts during these activities to confirm compliance with agreed-on codes of conduct. In a post-conflict situation, a three- to seven-day period between the end of official campaigning and polling day is encouraged and sometimes even enforced to provide a “cooling off” period before the election.

Polling and counting phase. With or without an electoral mandate, the polling and counting period of an election is one of the most intense periods for a peacekeeping mission. When the UN is directly involved in the conduct of an election, a mission must normally devote the bulk of its resources to polling and counting. The wide distribution of personnel and secure materials like ballots and other electoral paraphernalia make this phase the most vulnerable to breaches of security. Even if the UN is not directly involved in the electoral process, its security operations should be reviewed in preparation for this phase.

Security planning for polling and counting activities is formulated and coordinated between the electoral, UN military and civilian police components of a peacekeeping operation. A critical resource during this period is transportation, such as vehicles and air support. While military forces tend to deploy to UN operations fully equipped, the civilian police component commonly requires extra resources from the mission to achieve its security goals. Prior planning generally dictates that civilian component vehicles are reallocated to civilian police officers until several days after polling and counting.

Electoral legislation, regulations and procedures prohibit security personnel from entering a polling station unless asked to do so by the presiding electoral officer. Similarly, no weapons or campaigning are allowed around a polling station to prevent voter intimidation. Experience has shown that it is preferable for civilian police to conduct close proximity security. Military forces are generally used to maintain a secure environment and ensure that illegal obstacles like roadblocks do not hinder voter access. A ready reaction military force is usually held in reserve for rapid deployment to any site requiring its presence. The responsibilities and expectations of UN security forces are
usually agreed on between electoral, UN military and civilian police components based on the electoral procedures in place.

The polling and counting phase is also a period of intense activity for international as well as domestic electoral observers. International and domestic observers are usually registered and provided with some form of official identification after they meet certain criteria. In most elections the only non-participants allowed to enter polling stations and counting centres are accredited observers, party agents and media representatives. The host government is normally responsible for ensuring the general security and freedom of movement of accredited observers.

Counting may occur at the polling station level, regional centres or at a central site depending on the infrastructure, resources and the need to strike a balance between guaranteeing the secrecy of the ballot and ensuring maximum transparency. At the community level, secrecy of the vote is the foremost issue. Some level of decentralization may be required to keep the voting pattern of a village level community (200 to 500 people or one polling station) anonymous.

During the counting of ballots, political competitors are discouraged from making public statements about anticipated outcomes. The UN also maintains a low profile, though it may launch a public information campaign to enhance tolerance and acceptance of the results of the election and reinforce the credibility of the process. The provisional results of an election are normally declared by the EMB as soon as it is feasible. Formal results are released subsequently after all complaints and objections have been resolved.

**UN Electoral Operations in Peacekeeping Missions**

Following the *Guidelines for Member States Considering the Formulation of Requests for Electoral Assistance*, several operational concepts have been identified as categories of UN electoral assistance. Of these, five are particularly relevant to peacekeeping mandates:

**Organization and conduct of elections.** In this case, the UN is called on to run an election, fulfilling the function and responsibility of a national electoral administration, such as in Cambodia (1992), or hold a referendum or ballot, as in Timor-Leste (1999). When organizing an election, the UN must recruit, train, deploy and pay all polling staff, provide voting stations with all required equipment and provide the necessary logistical support for the process. The UN is also frequently responsible for providing security for the process.

**Supervision.** Under a supervision mandate, an SRSG must certify the results of an election as well as each step of the process. The scope of supervision may vary, but it typically includes ensuring the impartiality of the electoral authorities, the freedom of organization,

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8 A/47/668/Add. 1. of 24 November 1992, in response to General Assembly resolution 46/137 of 17 December 1991 calling for the Secretary-General to elaborate terms of reference and guidelines for UN electoral involvement.
movement, assembly and expression of political parties and alliances, equal opportunity for all parties to deploy their agents to observe all aspects of the process, fair access to national media and other resources and organizing voter registration, polling and the vote count. This type of mandate is rare since the certification process impinges on the sovereignty of the country involved. A supervision mandate is most likely to take place as part of a peacekeeping operation in circumstances where national sovereignty has not been established or is in dispute.

**Verification.** This covers situations in which a country conducts its own election but asks the UN to verify the freedom and fairness of certain aspects of the process. Typically, these are UN electoral observation missions that are sustained over an agreed-upon period and are resource intensive. Verification may take place as part of a peacekeeping mission with a military element, as in Angola and Mozambique, or may be purely civilian in character, as in South Africa.

**Technical assistance.** This is the most common type of UN involvement in electoral matters. Based on the specific requirements of the country in question, activities can include providing analyses, advice, equipment or training to governmental institutions. Assistance may be provided in any area of electoral administration, including in a peacekeeping context such as in Haiti.

**Coordination and support for international observers.** This approach is used when several countries, intergovernmental organizations or NGOs have been invited by a country to send election observers. The aim of the process is to integrate and coordinate the observation efforts. Various mechanisms were adopted in South Africa, where the UN played the lead role in coordinating the work of the observer missions of the Commonwealth, the European Union (EU) and the Organization of African Unity (OAU). Such coordination needs may also arise in a peacekeeping mission, as in Mozambique.

A host country may request more than one type of UN electoral assistance. In these cases, careful consideration must be given to perceived conflicts of interest and may call for the UN to engage a third actor (for example, UNDP or a specialized NGO) to implement some aspect of the assistance. Given the potential impact on the perception of the UN, the focal point for Electoral Assistance Activities is the final arbitrator on this issue.

**Conclusion**

Electoral assistance in a multidimensional peacekeeping mission is extremely challenging and the strict operational timelines and political complexity of elections test mission staff’s abilities and resources. Electoral assistance can play a critical role in helping a fledgling, popularly elected democracy get off to a strong start and significantly improve a country’s prospects for peace and prosperity. Not surprisingly, many UN personnel have cited elections as one of their most satisfying field experiences.
CHAPTER XIII: HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

Humanitarian Assistance and Peacekeeping Operations

Deploying peacekeeping operations and providing humanitarian assistance are two long-standing United Nations (UN) responses to armed conflict. In the past, when peacekeeping forces were deployed between warring States and along agreed ceasefire lines, there was little, if any, interaction between the forces and the UN’s various humanitarian funds, programmes and agencies. During the 1990s, however, the nature of conflicts changed dramatically with more than 90 percent of conflicts taking place within, rather than between, States. Due to this dramatic increase in intra-State conflicts, the UN has had to work to both establish peace and provide emergency relief to affected populations. This scope of work requires much greater interaction and coordination among the many aspects of a UN response.

Humanitarian assistance has always been grounded in the idea of providing aid based on the consent of the government or governments involved. This model was effective when wars were between States and space could be created for humanitarian organizations, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), to assist prisoners of war and others in need. In the internal conflicts of today, however, the dividing line between civilians and combatants is frequently blurred. Combatants often live or seek shelter in villages, and sometimes use civilians, even children, as human shields. In some cases, communities provide logistic support to armed groups either voluntarily or under compulsion and become targeted as a consequence.

Humanitarian assistance never occurs in a vacuum and is never simply a matter of the delivery of food or medicine. The way in which assistance is designed and delivered, especially the selection of local partners and intermediaries, will almost invariably have important political consequences. It is critical to strategize, maximize the effectiveness of humanitarian assistance for beneficiaries and ensure that UN humanitarian assistance complements UN efforts to resolve conflict.

The provision of humanitarian assistance is often politically complex and an effective response requires both a thorough understanding of the local political context and the ability to negotiate the delivery of assistance. Faced with an expanding role in conflicts around the globe while continuing its work to establish peace and promote sustainable economic recovery, it is more important than ever that UN departments, funds, programmes and agencies work in close coordination.

Humanitarian Assistance

Humanitarian assistance is emergency, life-saving assistance provided to victims of war and natural disasters. It is intended to protect lives and safeguard the health of those in need, regardless of nationality, race, gender, class or religious or political beliefs. It
includes efforts to provide adequate food, water, health care (including psychological support), shelter and other essential supplies. Humanitarian assistance may also encompass a range of “enabling” programmes, such as operations to clear mines and emergency repairs to transport and communications infrastructures. It may also be linked to efforts to provide basic physical security as well as measures to build or revive institutions needed to deliver assistance or prepare for future emergencies.

Humanitarian assistance is based on three key principles:

- **Humanity.** To protect life and health and ensure respect for the human being as an individual;

- **Impartiality.** To make no discrimination on the basis of nationality, race, gender, class or religious or political beliefs; to relieve the suffering of individuals guided solely by their needs; and to give priority to the most urgent cases of distress; and

- **Neutrality.** To take no side in hostilities or engage at any time in controversies of a political, racial, religious or ideological nature.

Providing humanitarian assistance is the responsibility of the national government or governments concerned. When a natural disaster leads to a humanitarian crisis, a national government may seek help from foreign governments, the UN and other organizations. The UN and other organizations may also be involved in assisting a government in developing its capacity to meet future crises.

In times of war, however, when two or more States are engaged in armed conflict, it may not be possible for any government to provide adequate assistance to those in need. In situations of civil war, opponents of the national government may hold considerable territory or there may be a state of anarchy and the national government may be unable or unwilling to provide assistance. In extreme situations, the Security Council may choose to authorize the provision of direct assistance independent of the national government and call on all local parties to the conflict to facilitate the provision of aid. Security Council mandates establishing peacekeeping operations may also authorize the provision of humanitarian assistance.

**The International Humanitarian Assistance System**

In addition to the UN, there is a vast array of national and international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) working to provide humanitarian assistance around the world. Governments also often have their own departments or agencies devoted to emergency and development assistance.

The UN has been involved in providing humanitarian relief since its inception in 1945. Specialized agencies, such as the World Health Organization (WHO) and the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), have long responded to humanitarian needs, as have geographically specific agencies such as the United Nations Relief and Works Agency
for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA). Within the UN, various funds and programmes also provide emergency humanitarian aid, most notably the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), the World Food Programme (WFP) and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).

Coordinating humanitarian assistance is increasingly important and, to this end, the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) was established in 1992. Within the humanitarian community the IASC provides a unique forum to bring together members of the UN family, the Red Cross movement and three groupings of major international NGOs to shape humanitarian policy and work together to improve emergency response.¹

For example, the IASC has worked on several guidelines to support humanitarian assistance workers in dealing with issues such as internally displaced persons (IDPs), use of armed escorts and field security. The IASC has issued reports on the humanitarian impact of sanctions, the humanitarian impact of small arms and the protection of civilians in armed conflict. The IASC has also worked to improve emergency response on the ground and ensure that gaps in assistance are quickly addressed—notably in West Africa, Indonesia, the Horn of Africa, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, North Caucasus, Sudan and Afghanistan.

The Secretary-General plays an important role in coordinating international humanitarian efforts, a role that has been strengthened by the creation of the post of Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs. Supported first by the Department of Humanitarian Affairs and now by OCHA, the USG for Humanitarian Affairs chairs the IASC as Emergency Relief Coordinator (ERC).

When there is a humanitarian crisis, the ERC, after consultations with IASC members, will normally appoint a humanitarian coordinator (HC) for the crisis. The HC is expected to provide leadership and direction to the UN agencies operating in the region or country and to the broader humanitarian community represented through the IASC. In nearly all cases, the Resident Coordinator, who is appointed by UNDP, is selected to be the HC.

The Need for Coordination

When a peacekeeping operation is deployed, the UN may be operating under several mandates: the Security Council mandate of the peacekeeping operation, which may include language on the provision of humanitarian assistance, along with the mandates of

¹ The members of the IASC are the Heads, or their designated representatives, of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), UNICEF, UNHCR, WFP, FAO, WHO and the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). In addition, there is a standing invitation to the International Organization for Migration (IOM), the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC), the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), the Representative of the Secretary-General on Internally Displaced Persons and the World Bank. The non-governmental consortia International Council of Voluntary Agencies, InterAction and the Steering Committee for Humanitarian Response also have a standing invitation to attend.
The Role of the Humanitarian Coordinator

The Emergency Relief Coordinator, in consultation with the members of the IASC, may conclude that there is a need for an HC because a situation demands:

- Intensive and extensive political management, mediation and coordination to enable the delivery of humanitarian aid and assistance, including negotiated access to affected populations;

- Massive humanitarian assistance requiring action by a range of participants beyond a single national authority; and

- Extensive external political support, often from the Security Council.

UN humanitarian funds, programmes and agencies that may already be working in the mission area. When dealing with so many players, coordination is key and means ensuring that humanitarian assistance is provided in the most effective and efficient manner possible by avoiding duplication, sharing resources where appropriate and setting common strategies.

Coordinating humanitarian assistance is becoming an increasingly important and difficult undertaking for three reasons. First, there is the large number of humanitarian organizations that are often present in crises, a situation that leaves room for confusion and duplication. When numerous organizations are involved, there is a basic and critical need to share information and identify areas in which a particular organization may be most useful.

Second, humanitarian crises require a broad range of support services and enabling activities that can often be shared. For example, information and communication technology, which is increasingly sophisticated and costly, is a support service that can be shared among humanitarian organizations in the field. Perhaps more important are the enabling activities, which may include mine clearance, basic security for humanitarian workers and negotiating access to populations in need.

The third reason coordination is critical is the political environment that often surrounds a humanitarian crisis. When a humanitarian crisis is the result of a natural disaster, the partnership between international humanitarian organizations and local authorities is often straightforward and usually involves UN support for the efforts of the national government. In situations of war, however, and especially where there is an ongoing attempt by the UN to bring about a peace settlement, the political environment may be fluid and extremely complex. In some emergencies there may be several parties to the conflict, regional and sub-regional dimensions and multiple ways in which the UN and other international bodies and governments are involved.
**Coordination Services**

The coordination of humanitarian assistance varies depending on the situation. At one end of the spectrum, a national government or administration established through a peace agreement is able to provide strong coordination and relatively few humanitarian organizations would be involved. At the other end of the spectrum, there is a state of anarchy with no national government or authority to assist in a crisis. In this situation, many humanitarian organizations would be involved and an ERC would be needed, working with the IASC and through the HC, to provide coordination services.

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**Coordinating Humanitarian Assistance**

“Ensuring a coordinated humanitarian response to crises is an immense task, regardless of the size of the emergency.

As the coordinating body for international humanitarian assistance in complex emergencies and natural disasters, OCHA staff must interact and build consensus among many different types of actors, including governments, militant groups, donors, UN agencies, other Secretariat departments, the Red Cross movement and NGOs.

While ultimately working towards a common goal, the immediate interests of these groups may sometimes be at odds. The World Bank, for example, might call on a government to increase taxes while UN agencies and NGOs are seeking tax exemption on the importation of local goods and local staff salaries. What’s more, even within the UN system, perceptions of what needs to be done to improve the humanitarian situation might differ. Aid workers may seek access to vulnerable groups in areas that UN peacekeepers wish to restrict for security reasons.

As a result, coordination is rarely straightforward and never easy. But when done well, coordination can make the difference between a timely and effective response and none at all.”

OCHA Humanitarian Affairs Officer

Coordination services often include some combination of the following:

**Strategic planning and monitoring**, including contingency planning, organizing strategic planning sessions, establishing close working relations with local government authorities and monitoring strategies of cooperation in the field.

**Resource mobilization**, including creating appeals and donor alerts, coordinating the consolidated appeals process (CAP), managing the Central Emergency Revolving Fund, mobilizing resources on behalf of the humanitarian community and tracking and reporting performance and humanitarian assistance delivery.
Facilitating the work of humanitarian agencies, including arranging for assistance from the civil-military cooperation units; arranging for staff security; negotiating access to populations in need; coordinating logistics (e.g., flight support and movement of personnel, joint logistic services); managing the procurement and provision of non-food items; organizing meetings of key humanitarian actors, such as UN agencies, donors, NGOs and others; and providing in-country services for international and national NGOs.

Emergency coordination in the field, including organizing OCHA field units to support the HC, supplying a UN disaster assessment and coordination team for on-site coordination, establishing and operating an on-site operations coordination centre and/or a civil-military operations centre, ensuring specialized coordination functions for international urban search and rescue teams and ensuring coordination of the response to environmental emergencies.

The Consolidated Appeals Process

One of the most powerful coordination tools available to the HC is the CAP.

The CAP is both the main fundraising mechanism for relief assistance in conflict-affected areas and a broader effort in which the HC works with a range of humanitarian partners to present donors with a common humanitarian strategy. The goal is to assess and define basic needs, develop a strategy for addressing those needs and design projects that reduce gaps and meet urgent needs without overlap between programmes.

Approximately 40 percent of the world’s total commitment of resources for international relief assistance in conflict-related emergencies is channelled through the CAP. In 2002, HCs launched 20 CAPs around the world, and, in response, donors provided some US$1.6 billion, or approximately 53 percent of the total resource sought.

Communications, information and data management, including setting up communications systems and services such as mailboxes, radio networks, etc.; compiling and disseminating databases; managing the humanitarian information centres; and collecting, analysing and disseminating relevant information such as situation reports, maps/geographic information systems, ReliefWeb and the Integrated Regional Information Network.

Advocacy and donor relations, including advocating on key issues to governments and local authorities, particularly in support of NGOs, and maintaining media and donor relations.

Humanitarian Assistance in a Peacekeeping Operation

The UN humanitarian response typically precedes a peacekeeping operation, continues to exist throughout the peacekeeping operation and sometimes continues after the peacekeeping operation ends.
Working with Civil Society in the Democratic Republic of the Congo

A conflict between the Lendu and Hema ethnic groups is at the heart of the tension in the Ituri province in northeastern Democratic Republic of the Congo. Although these two communities lived together in relative peace for generations, recent disputes over land and power have escalated into violence.

The conflict was triggered in June 1999 by unscrupulous individuals from both groups who took advantage of the local political vacuum to appropriate resource-rich land and manipulate tensions in the surrounding communities to establish control.

The fighting that ensued caused 10,000 deaths and displaced more than 140,000 people. Villages were razed, crops rotted in the fields and the local population was devastated by various epidemics including measles, the plague and cholera. OCHA, together with the NGOs Agoair, Agroaction, ICRC, Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) Holland and Oxfam, quickly mobilized to respond to the crisis.

By December 1999, however, both of the ethnic groups distrusted the humanitarian community and accused aid organizations of choosing sides. In January the Hema community accused MSF Holland of only treating the Lendu, which led to an attack on a MSF team at a roadblock. Ultimately MSF removed its staff from the area.

To convince people of the humanitarian community’s neutrality, an OCHA negotiator met with leaders from both communities and toured the areas affected by the violence. “We were able to demonstrate that there was equal need and equal treatment,” said the OCHA senior humanitarian adviser on the ground at the time. “We gave them a reason to go back to their communities and explain why we were there helping both sides.” OCHA then organized several humanitarian liaison committees made up of Hema and Lendu community leaders and asked them to guide the international community’s response. This served to empower local leaders and restore their positions in their communities.

By focusing its response on inter-community collaboration, OCHA and other international humanitarian actors were able to contribute to periodic reductions in violence. The establishment of these local committees with representatives from the main ethnic groups allowed for the immediate clarification of misunderstandings that were often fabricated or exacerbated by individuals.

Before a peacekeeping operation is mandated by the Security Council and deployed, the UN’s response to an armed conflict is typically twofold. The Secretary-General may offer to help mediate an end to the conflict and appoint a Special Envoy or Special Representative. In addition, the UN may mount an emergency relief response through the aforementioned mechanisms and structures and appoint an HC.

After a Special Envoy or Representative is appointed, it is important that all relevant departments, funds, programmes and agencies at Headquarters work to ensure that UN humanitarian and political efforts complement and reinforce one another while protecting the fundamental principles of humanitarian assistance. Key players in this effort include
the Executive Committee on Peace and Security, the Executive Committee on Humanitarian Affairs, OCHA, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and the Department of Political Affairs.

When the Special Envoy or Special Representative is living in the area of conflict, it is understood that he or she is responsible for establishing the overall UN political framework within which the HC and all other parts of the UN system will operate.

If negotiations are successful and resultant peace accords call for the deployment of UN peacekeepers, and if humanitarian organizations are already on the ground, then a clear relationship between the existing humanitarian operation and the new peacekeeping operation must be established. Ideally, the UN Secretariat, the IASC and the HC would work together to design the model for this new relationship.

The shape this relationship takes will depend on the mandated aims of the peacekeeping operation and the humanitarian environment in the country or region. In all cases, however, close cooperation between DPKO and the other UN entities on the ground is crucial to the ultimate success of the UN’s efforts in the host State.

Different models have been tried and tested in recent years and experience suggests that in places where armed conflict has ceased and negotiation of humanitarian access is no longer a challenge, an integrated UN presence may be useful in ensuring a speedy and effective transition from relief to development.

**Working Towards Sustainable Solutions**

Humanitarian assistance is distinct from development assistance. While humanitarian assistance is meant to be short-term and a response to emergency needs, development aid is geared towards longer-term economic and social support. There can be, however, areas of overlap between the two, as well as complex transitional periods post-conflict when both are needed, requiring careful coordination and management.

In an ideal world, emergency humanitarian assistance would be quickly complemented by a successful peace process (or vice versa), which would then be followed by the new national government leading an internationally supported recovery programme. In this scenario, humanitarian organizations would no longer be necessary. In reality, however, a humanitarian crisis may go on for a very long time or there may be, even in the midst of conflict, opportunities to assist in recovery and reconstruction. By choosing to resuscitate a particular health care system or support local efforts to revive elementary school teaching, humanitarian organizations may undertake activities that have a longer-term impact.

There are specific coordination needs, however, during the fragile transition from conflict to peace to ensure the necessary linkages between humanitarian and development assistance, if the peace is to be sustainable. In a situation where warfare may have subsided, and peace is not yet consolidated, timely and appropriate assistance is a key
challenge for humanitarian, development and political players alike. Instability frequently persists and a relapse into violence is a possibility. Recovery assistance must do more than rebuild structures and institutions; it must aid in the consolidation of the peace, counter the negative social impact of the conflict and counteract the tensions that led to the conflict. In other words, it must help to re-establish the enabling conditions for a functioning peacetime society.

Immediate transitional needs, alongside continued relief activities, include disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programmes that offer former combatants an alternative to the war economy, programmes to achieve the return, resettlement and reintegration of IDPs and refugees in a sustainable fashion, the revitalization of agriculture and trade and the restoration of basic social services, all of which will help to reduce potentially destabilizing population movements. Among the longer term processes that are needed are programmes to monitor and address new protection issues. Such programmes are needed to avoid creating or aggravating social tensions, particularly over issues such as land access, tenure and property restitution. In addition, restorative justice is needed to foster conditions for co-existence.

Post-conflict transition strategies are by nature complex; they need to incorporate and integrate many more dimensions and a wider range of players than is the case in humanitarian planning and include recovery, peacebuilding and reconstruction elements. Joint planning, both at Headquarters and in the field, may help ensure an integrated humanitarian and development approach that will facilitate a more rapid stabilization and recovery.

**Challenges in the Humanitarian-Peacekeeping Relationship**

Much of the recent discussion of the relationship between humanitarian assistance and peacekeeping has revolved around the question of humanitarian space and the need to defend basic humanitarian principles. It has also focused on UN efforts to prevent conflict and build peace through coherent and integrated responses.

Impartiality remains a fundamental organizing principle for humanitarian organizations. Humanitarian principles require that assistance be delivered on the basis of need rather than to serve political ends. For peacekeepers, impartiality may mean that all parties to a conflict are treated in the same way based on international law and Security Council resolutions and that sanctions may be imposed or enforcement action taken against spoilers. For humanitarian staff, however, impartiality means that emergency life-saving assistance and protection be provided to the needy civilian population, regardless of politics.

There are also issues of strategy and tactics. Tactically, peacekeepers may, on occasion, need to keep a particular faction at arm’s length or under sanction (for example, for violation of a Security Council resolution). At the same time, it may be tactically important for humanitarian staff to maintain a close dialogue with the same faction to ensure access to civilians under their control. Strategically, in places of active conflict or
where access is contested, it is critical for humanitarian workers to be able to continue to reach beneficiaries regardless of how the peace process develops. This, however, cannot mean simply divorcing UN humanitarian action from UN efforts to build peace and security. On one hand is the need for a coherent UN response, one that assists in finding a lasting solution to a crisis, and on the other hand is the need to ensure that however long a conflict lasts, civilians are provided basic protection, including humanitarian aid.

There are no easy answers to what may at times be a conflict between a humanitarian imperative to provide assistance and a political need to adopt a robust approach in the interest of future peace and security. What is always needed is a well-managed approach to dealing with these differences. This includes working together when a peacekeeping operation is being designed to anticipate differences that may arise and trying to avoid conflicting approaches as much as possible. It also means sharing information and undertaking common analyses to avoid situations in which very different perspectives may emerge.

ReliefWeb

For more information about humanitarian responses to unfolding emergencies around the world, visit www.reliefweb.int.

Updates on refugee movements, the needs of affected populations, the international response to a range of emergencies and the resources committed to the humanitarian response are provided hourly from 600 sources on three continents. Topographical and customized maps of the world’s major humanitarian crisis areas are also available and can be downloaded. For some emergency areas, geographic information systems have been developed and can be accessed through ReliefWeb. For detailed sectoral information and for information on the activities of different humanitarian organizations, links to the web sites of the UN operational agencies are provided.

ReliefWeb offers a searchable archive of 150,000 documents that makes it the site of preference for planners and decision makers in humanitarian operations. A link to the CAP provides financial data by donor, beneficiary and sector while another link provides a searchable record of IASC policy decisions.
CHAPTER XIV: REFUGEES AND INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS

Definitions

Refugee. A refugee is a person who is outside her or his country of origin and who is unwilling or unable to return there because of:

- A well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group or political opinion; or
- A threat to life or security as a result of armed conflict or other forms of widespread violence that seriously disturbs the public order.

Group determination of refugee status. A practice by which all persons forming part of a large-scale influx are accepted as refugees until proved otherwise. At the outset of an emergency when asylum-seekers arrive in large numbers over a short period of time, it is often impractical to determine refugee status for each member of a group. Group determination ensures that protection and assistance needs are met without prior individual status determination.

Asylum-seeker. An asylum-seeker is a person whose request or application for asylum has not been decided on by the prospective country of asylum.

Internally displaced person. IDPs are persons who have had to flee largely for the same reasons as refugees but have remained within the boundaries of their own countries. Typically, IDPs have been displaced because of armed conflict and other types of violence, violations of human rights or natural or man-made disasters.

Returnee. A returnee is a former refugee or IDP who has made an informed and voluntary decision to return to her or his country or place of origin.

Population Displacement and Peacekeeping Operations

The global refugee crisis affects every continent and almost every country in the world today. In 2002, some 16 million people were categorized as refugees, stateless or asylum seekers and an estimated 25 million as internally displaced persons (IDPs), bringing the worldwide total of persons displaced due to violence or persecution to an estimated 41 million.¹ These statistics reflect an alarming post-cold war trend of increasing intra-State

¹ Statistics from the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). In 2002, UNHCR provided protection and assistance to 20.6 million persons fleeing war or persecution, including 10.4 million refugees, 1 million asylum seekers, 2.4 million returnees, 5.8 million IDPs and 951,000 stateless and others of concern to the
and intra-community conflict in which civilian populations are being subjected to gross human rights violations, targeted by combatants and used as human shields.

**Providing International Protection**

International protection is defined as interventions on behalf of asylum-seekers and refugees to ensure that their rights, security and welfare are recognized and safeguarded in accordance with international standards. Such interventions include ensuring respect for the principle of non-refoulement, admission to the State in which they seek refuge, access to fair procedures for the determination of refugee status, humane standards of treatment and implementation of long-term or “durable” solutions.

**Rights of Refugees and Asylum-Seekers**

Asylum and non-refoulement form the cornerstone of international refugee protection. The principle of non-refoulement prohibits States from returning refugees in any manner to countries or territories where their lives or freedom would be threatened. In the same manner, asylum-seekers should not be forcibly returned until their claim is examined through a fair procedure.

The prohibition of refoulement is part of customary international law, which means all States must respect the principle of non-refoulement, even if they are not party to the 1951 Refugee Convention.

Violations of the principle of non-refoulement occur when:

- Asylum-seekers are rejected at the frontier;
- Refugees are expelled from their country of asylum and sent to a territory where their lives, liberty or physical security may be in danger; and
- Refugees are forcibly returned to their country of origin where they fear persecution or are sent to a country from where they can be deported to their country of origin.

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1 The principle of non-refoulement is set out in Article 33 of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and states, “No contracting State shall expel or return (refouler) a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion.”

2 Durable solutions aim to put a definitive end to situations of internal or external displacement and are achieved by facilitating voluntary repatriation or assimilation of refugees into new national communities.
Legal Basis for Protection

Human rights law. Basic human rights and fundamental freedoms are detailed in a number of international, regional and national texts and legislation and apply to refugees, IDPs and returnees, as they do to all people. At the international level, the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights is the cornerstone of this legal structure. It is complemented by a number of conventions, including the 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) and the 1979 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) and its 1999 Optional Protocol.4

Humanitarian law. International humanitarian law addresses humanitarian issues arising directly from armed conflict, whether international or intra-State. It seeks to protect civilian victims of a conflict and combatants who are no longer taking part in the conflict. This body of law should be observed not only by governments and their armed forces but also by armed groups and all others party to a conflict. The 1949 Geneva Conventions and their 1977 Additional Protocols are the principal instruments of humanitarian law.5

Refugee law. The 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol are the foundation of international refugee law. These texts define the term refugee and set minimum standards for the treatment of eligible persons. The 1969 Organization of African Unity’s Convention governing the specific aspects of refugee problems in Africa and the 1984 Cartagena Declaration on Refugees have broadened the definition of a refugee to include persons crossing borders as a result of armed conflict or serious civil disturbance. Also relevant is the Statute of the Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees. Several General Assembly and Security Council resolutions as well as UNHCR’s Executive Committee of the High Commissioner’s Programme’s conclusions on voluntary repatriation are also part of this body of normative texts. The landmark Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security of 2000 is of primary relevance to the protection of women refugees and IDPs during and after armed conflict.6

Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement. The absence of a normative framework explicitly related to IDP protection, such as exists for refugees, has hindered the international humanitarian response to situations of internal displacement. In 1998 the Representative of the Secretary-General on IDPs presented a set of Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement to the United Nations Commission on Human Rights. The principles are not laws in themselves but are a set of international standards for IDPs based on existing human rights, humanitarian and refugee laws.7

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4 For additional information, see Chapter VIII on Human Rights. For full texts, see the web site of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) at www.ohchr.org.
5 For additional information, please see Chapter XIII on Humanitarian Assistance. For full texts, see the web site of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) at www.icrc.org.
6 For full texts and additional information, see UNHCR’s web site at www.unhcr.ch.
7 For the full text of the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement and additional information, see www.reliefweb.int.
In general, most of the rights considered crucial for the protection of refugees, IDPs and returnees are also fundamental human rights:

- Right to life, liberty and security of person;
- Right to seek and enjoy asylum;
- Freedom from torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment;
- Freedom from slavery or servitude;
- Recognition as a person before the law;
- Freedom of thought, conscience and religion;
- Freedom from arbitrary arrest and detention;
- Freedom from arbitrary interference in privacy, home or family;
- Freedom of opinion and expression;
- Right to be educated; and
- Right to participate in the cultural life of a community.

Refugees also have certain obligations; they have to abide by the laws and regulations of their country of asylum, and refugee camps and settlements must maintain a purely civilian character and remain free of any military activity. Persons excluded from refugee status include those responsible for war crimes, acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations (UN) and violations of human rights and humanitarian law, including terrorism and genocide.\(^8\)

**Rights of IDPs**

IDPs have a right to be protected against arbitrary displacement. During displacement they have a right to enjoy all of their rights and freedoms as human beings and citizens. They also have the right to return voluntarily to their former residences, the right to move to new locations in their own country and the right to the support of competent authorities during their reintegration. The international strategy for responding to situations of internal displacement will depend on the circumstances that caused the displacement and the willingness and capacity of national authorities to fulfil their responsibilities to their displaced citizens.

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\(^8\) UN Security Council Resolution 1377 (November 13, 2001) declared that acts of international terrorism are contrary to the purposes and principles of the UN Charter.
Monitoring the Situation of Refugees and IDPs

Humanitarian organizations monitor the situation of refugees and IDPs and intervene to ensure they receive adequate protection both during displacement and upon return. Specifically, humanitarian organizations will seek to do the following:

**Gain access to vulnerable populations.** Humanitarian workers need direct and unrestricted access to vulnerable populations. This includes access to conduct full assessments and analyses of the different protection needs of refugee and displaced women, men, girls and boys. Personal data collected during such assessments or through registration should be strictly protected in accordance with relevant international standards.

**Engage authorities.** Through advocacy and, in exceptional cases, public denunciation, humanitarian organizations will endeavour to persuade authorities, including *de facto* authorities, to put an end to human rights violations.

**Seek and establish partnerships.** To the extent possible, humanitarian organizations will establish collaborative arrangements with regional and national institutions, including non-governmental organizations (NGOs), particularly human rights groups, to strengthen advocacy and action to protect the uprooted.

**Build capacity.** Capacity-building activities include the strengthening of national institutions, laws and policies to enable proper handling of refugee and asylum issues. These activities are designed to complement host country initiatives and engage regional and international partners in a spirit of solidarity and participatory burden sharing. Capacity-building activities may include the following:

- Promotion of international refugee law and human rights and international humanitarian treaties;
- Training;
- Technical cooperation and advisory services to develop legal frameworks and the capacities of those involved in the process;
- Material and financial support to build institutions and structures; and
- Organizational and community development.

**Integrate protection concerns in programme design.** Humanitarian organizations are often perceived strictly as providers of emergency relief and assistance. Protection, however, remains the primary mandate of organizations designated to assist refugees and IDPs, such as UNHCR and ICRC. These organizations design their assistance programmes to ensure they address the different protection needs of refugee and displaced women, men, girls and boys.
**Implement protection measures for vulnerable groups, including protection from sexual and gender-based violence.** Protection measures to address the needs of vulnerable groups, such as unaccompanied minors, women, the elderly and the disabled, are critical. Development of effective mechanisms to prevent and respond to sexual and gender-based violence is also a critical component of refugee protection. Displaced children, particularly girls, face risks that include separation from their families, military recruitment, sexual violence, abuse, exploitation and forced labour.

Programme planning, therefore, needs to address prevention of family separations, identification of unaccompanied and separated children, placement of these children in foster families, rapid tracing services to reunite families and facilitation of family reunifications. In addition, mechanisms need to be set up to identify, report and address problems of military recruitment and sexual and gender-based violence.

**Address the need for physical safety.** Refugees and IDPs, as well as the national and international humanitarian workers who protect and assist them, need physical security. National authorities are responsible for the protection of refugees and humanitarian personnel, operations and installations. In exceptional circumstances, particularly when host countries are unable to provide such security on their own, assistance from the international community can strengthen local capacity to ensure the physical security of refugees, IDPs and humanitarian workers.

In conflict and post-conflict environments, landmines and unexploded ordnance can also lead to displacement, threaten the security of returnees, impede reintegration, restrict freedom of movement, inhibit life from returning to normal and, therefore, prevent the sustainability of refugee and IDP returns. As a large number of returnees, particularly women and children, are victims of landmine explosions, it is critical to focus on mine awareness before the repatriation process begins.9

**Liaise with military forces.** Humanitarian organizations will be in contact with international and national militaries and even armed groups to gain access to vulnerable populations and ensure the safety and security of their staff, beneficiaries, the operation and its material assets.

**Providing Assistance**

Humanitarian organizations that work with refugees begin emergency deployment during or immediately following a sudden and massive movement of people. Once the emergency is under control, the situation typically moves into a phase when more comprehensive programmes can be developed and implemented. Finally, particularly when returns are possible, international support favours activities leading to safe return, reintegration and development. Of course, not all situations evolve in this linear manner. Emergencies may develop in previously stabilized situations and, at times, sustainable solutions may become so elusive that both refugees and the international community are

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faced with a protracted situation of displacement, such as in the Middle East, where some Palestinian refugee camps have existed since 1948 and in Kenya where refugee camps have existed on the border with Somalia since 1991.

Emergency relief operations generally occur in the initial phase of an international humanitarian intervention and, in the case of refugees and IDPs, are launched when there is a situation “in which the life or well-being of refugees will be threatened unless immediate and appropriate action is taken, and which demands an extraordinary response and exceptional measures.”\textsuperscript{10} The objectives of emergency operations are to save lives, ensure protection and meet as rapidly as possible the most basic and urgent needs of displaced persons in terms of food, water, sanitation, shelter and emergency health care services, including services for survivors of sexual and gender-based violence. Special attention must be paid to the identification of the urgent needs of groups that are at particular risk, such as women, children (especially separated and unaccompanied children), the elderly and the disabled.

Throughout the emergency response period, it is important to keep longer-term objectives in mind and begin planning for the more comprehensive humanitarian programmes that will be possible in a more stable environment. Many of the decisions made, standards achieved and partnerships established during the emergency phase will continue to influence the operation well beyond the emergency phase. This is the case, for example, in choosing a site for a refugee or IDP camp, where longer-term legal, technical, environmental and security factors, as well as self-reliance prospects, need to be considered to avoid problems later on.

As soon as possible, emergency programmes need to be responsive to the different personal and social needs of refugee and displaced women, men, girls and boys. Programmes should be based on a thorough gender and age assessment and the different protection needs of the displaced population. Ongoing participation of both refugee women and men in the development of protection and material assistance is critical to making the assistance as useful as possible. Activities promoting self-sufficiency, such as those that allow refugees to earn income, should be established wherever possible. Programming will also need, from the start, to look at linkages between the refugee or IDP community and the surrounding local population in terms of access to services, general area development and environmental and security concerns.

For children, such programmes include rapid assessment of education needs, followed by the implementation of emergency education and recreation programmes. These types of programmes for children provide important protection against forced labour, military recruitment and sexual exploitation while giving children some sense of normalcy and stability. In addition to these programmes, mechanisms to identify, report and address problems of military recruitment and sexual and gender-based violence need to be established.

\textsuperscript{10} Handbook for Emergencies, UNHCR, Second Edition, 2000, page 4. This handbook, an important resource for persons working with refugees and IDPs, is available on the UNHCR web site at www.unhcr.ch.
Refugee and IDP Camps

When most people think of refugees and IDPs, they think of people living in sprawling tented camps. Fortunately, most of the world’s refugees and IDPs do not have to live in camps but are allowed to settle among a local population with whom they often share cultural affinities.

In most cases, camps are hostile, insecure and dehumanizing environments that increase dependency rather than encourage self-sufficiency and dignity. However, when there is no choice but to establish a camp, it is important to ensure that:

- Camps are located at a safe distance from a zone of conflict or from an international border (for refugee camps, a distance of at least 50 kilometres from the border is recommended);
- All problems of land rights and authorizations have been resolved and the surrounding population is fully informed of the plans;
- Camps are planned and designed so as to avoid overcrowding (camps should not exceed a total population of 20,000 and should be smaller when possible);
- Former military or militia personnel and persons responsible for war crimes or grave violations of human rights are identified and, to the extent possible, separated from the refugee or IDP group;
- Refugee men and women participate equally in the management of refugee camps, including in the planning, development and implementation of all protection, security and material assistance programmes;
- The refugee population in the country of asylum participates in the planning of programmes and chooses representatives through a democratic process; and
- Provision is made to ensure a permanent presence of law enforcement authorities aware of the special protection needs of the population.

Promoting the self-reliance of refugees and IDPs and reducing their need for external support is in the interests of refugees and IDPs, host States and the international community in general. Self-reliance means that refugees and IDPs are able to provide for themselves and their communities in terms of food, housing, healthcare services and education and no longer require assistance.

Self-reliance, however, can only be achieved if there is an enabling environment, which means there has to be a viable economy, availability of affordable housing or access to land as well as receptive attitudes in the host community. The skills and capacities of refugees and IDPs will also determine their potential for self-sufficiency. For example,
refugees and IDPs with professional qualifications are more likely to be productive in an urban environment where there is need for their skills while farmers are more likely to be productive in a rural environment with access to land.

**Promoting Durable Solutions**

The pursuit of durable solutions is an essential component of protecting refugees and displaced persons. Durable solutions aim at putting a definitive end to the situations of internal and external displacement by facilitating voluntary repatriation, integration into a country of asylum or resettlement elsewhere. Voluntary repatriation, in most cases, means displaced persons can return safely to their former homes and enjoy the full protection of the authorities of their own country. Integration into their country of asylum means the acquisition of permanent residency rights and eventual citizenship. Resettlement is the transfer of refugees from the country where they sought refuge to another State that has agreed to admit them.

Successful voluntary repatriation of refugees is often an indicator of the success of a peace process. Peacekeeping missions can contribute to the creation of a more favourable environment to which the displaced can return. It is important to note that the critical element in repatriation is one that planners cannot control; the decision to repatriate belongs to the refugee alone and should be made freely and without external pressure.

Reintegration into communities and establishing sustainable peace requires the full and equal participation of women and men at all stages of conflict resolution, peacemaking, peacebuilding, peacekeeping and reconstruction. It is essential to develop clear strategies and action plans that incorporate gender perspectives and the concerns of women and girls into initial appraisals, needs assessments, rehabilitation and reconstruction programmes and implementation plans for all sectors.

Humanitarian organizations have a duty to ensure that refugees and IDPs can make a free and informed decision to repatriate voluntarily. After the decision to repatriate is made, humanitarian organizations should support the return movement, contribute to the initial needs of returnees and help promote full reintegration. Humanitarian organizations should lead these activities, developing partnerships with peacekeepers and other actors in order to do the following:

**Create a secure environment.** In most cases, security is the foremost concern for refugees and IDPs when deciding whether to return to their homes. Creating a secure environment for returnees is the primary responsibility of national authorities and, in the long run, returns will be considered durable only if security is assured through a national effort. The presence of a UN military force or other stabilizing military forces, however, may reassure returnees in an initial phase and may be necessary for an orderly return process. Landmine awareness and demining programmes may also become essential components of return operations in many situations.

**Provide logistic support.** Many refugees and IDPs return spontaneously, making their own arrangements for transport while others need an organized transport operation. Often
they require logistic support to ensure that food, water, sanitation, medical services and, if needed, overnight rest facilities are in place during travel and upon arrival. In the case of large-scale movements of people, humanitarian organizations may need outside support to supplement their limited capacity.

**Ensure national protection and assistance structures are in place.** Ideally, a formal agreement, a law or another form of an official binding document will provide the legal framework defining the conditions, guarantees and procedures for the return of refugees and IDPs. This is the case, in particular, if the return of displaced persons is part of a peace agreement or a negotiated settlement. With or without a formal text, the long-term sustainability of returns requires that the local and national authorities take the lead role in the process of return and reintegration as early as possible.

**Seek to involve returnees and local authorities.** Humanitarian organizations should seek to involve returnees and local authorities in the planning and implementation of reintegration activities as early as possible and, as required, assist authorities in enhancing their capacity to meet the challenge.

**Incorporate the special needs of women and children.** Overall planning of a repatriation operation must address the special needs of vulnerable groups, such as women, children, the elderly and the disabled. Every effort should be made to keep families together in the repatriation process and to provide adequate services in transit centres. Additional services should be in place for unaccompanied, separated and abandoned children.

**Meet initial needs upon return.** Returnees may need to be provided with essential commodities for a certain period of time after their return. Food distributions, for example, are generally planned to bridge the gap until the next harvest or the next full agricultural cycle begins. In other cases, temporary shelter may be needed until returnees reconstruct their dwellings. This type of relief assistance will vary depending on circumstances and must be based on a direct assessment of the needs of each particular returning population.

**Support reintegration and development.** Returnees will need to reintegrate fully into national systems and services. Many practical problems may arise in this process, including the re-acquisition of national documentation, the transfer of assets from a country of asylum, the restitution of land and property and the recognition of schooling and diplomas acquired outside the country. In order to attain a reasonable level of economic self-sufficiency as early as possible, returnees may need support in rebuilding a house or acquiring means of production, such as seeds, farming equipment or building materials. This area of intervention requires close coordination between humanitarian and development institutions at the national and international levels.

Social services should be available to assess, monitor and assist families, especially returnee children, in the process of reintegration. Initiatives may be required to assist the educational system in absorbing repatriated children or to assist returnees in gaining recognition of scholastic achievements attained abroad. Unaccompanied and separated
children need to be placed with foster families, groups under the management of an assigned agency or responsible adults from the same community, while also ensuring that tracing programmes to locate family members are in place. Specific attention needs to be paid to facilitating the reintegration of former child-soldiers with a special focus on the needs of former girl-soldiers.

**Monitor the human rights situation of returnees.** The international community assumes a moral responsibility for the refugee or IDP population it helps to return. People who have suffered a trauma so severe they flee to distant places need reassurance about the human rights situation at home before they can make a decision to return. As part of creating a strategy for the facilitation and promotion of returns, it is important to be in a position to provide feedback on the situation of early returnees to those who have not yet decided to return. A collaborative effort to monitor the situation of returnees, particularly their basic human rights, constitutes an essential component of international operations to support returns.

**Rule of law issues.** The challenges faced by countries experiencing returns are enormous, especially in post-conflict situations. In some situations, the return of refugees has not been a priority for the authorities of the country of origin, whereas in others it has become the main vehicle to achieve reconciliation or reverse ethnic separation. The main challenge in facilitating reintegration is to restore effective national protection, which is difficult in the best of times, but particularly so when tensions arise between returnees and those who stayed behind.11

In countries of origin, a functional legal system needs to be in place for repatriation to be sustainable. Legal systems, including traditional legal structures, often need to be revived and/or reformed. Humanitarian organizations, such as UNHCR, can assist by identifying and then working towards removing legal and administrative barriers to repatriation. In close cooperation with other organizations, UNHCR provides expert advice and technical support for the drafting of legislation related to amnesties, citizenship, property, documentation and return. It also contributes more generally to the reform of legal systems and works to ensure compliance with international human rights standards.

**Humanitarian Assistance to Refugees and IDPs**

General principles and mechanisms related to UN coordination of humanitarian relief and the role of the UN humanitarian coordinator are discussed in Chapter XIII on Humanitarian Assistance. The purpose of this section is to further clarify the specific institutional mandates and responsibilities for refugees and IDPs.

**Nature of humanitarian mandates.** The mandates of UN humanitarian agencies generally derive from General Assembly decisions or special international conferences that adopted their statutes or constitutions. These mandates are universal and are not

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11 For more information, please see Chapter VII on Rule of Law: Police, Judiciary and Corrections and the Final Report of the Executive Committee on Peace and Security Task Force for Development of Comprehensive Rule of Law Strategies for Peace Operations, which can be found at www.unlb.org/ecps/ruleoflaw.html.
bound by time, which means that humanitarian agencies will often have ongoing operations in a host State at the time a peacekeeping mission is deployed. Likewise, these agencies will often remain in the host State after a peacekeeping operation ends. Therefore, humanitarian agencies may have a planning horizon that differs from that of a peacekeeping mission, particularly during the period leading to the draw down of the peacekeeping operation.

**UNHCR mandate.** UNHCR’s core mandate has not changed since 1951; the organization’s objectives continue to be the protection of refugees and the search for solutions to their problems. Through its Statute, adopted by the General Assembly in 1950, UNHCR is mandated to lead and coordinate international action on behalf of refugees. The work of the organization is guided by the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol.

On a case-by-case basis, and particularly when a situation of human displacement involves both refugees and IDPs, UNHCR has been requested by the General Assembly, the Secretary-General and the country concerned to address the needs of categories of persons other than refugees, including IDPs. In helping people under its mandate, UNHCR works in partnership with governments and regional institutions as well as other international agencies and organizations. The World Food Programme (WFP), the World Health Organization (WHO), UNICEF, the International Organization for Migration (IOM), the Red Cross Movement and many other UN and intergovernmental organizations play key roles in assisting refugees. Some 400 NGOs, including a majority of smaller, local organizations, are UNHCR partners.

**Leadership and collaboration on IDPs.** The Representative of the Secretary-General on IDPs, appointed in 1992 on the basis of a recommendation from the Commission on Human Rights, plays a leading role in raising awareness about the plight of IDPs and in developing internationally accepted norms and standards for their protection and assistance. The Representative also issues reports on specific displacement situations. The Secretary-General has entrusted the head of OCHA (Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs), who is referred to as the Emergency Relief Coordinator (ERC), with the responsibility of ensuring the needs of IDPs around the world are met. In cooperation with the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC), and as chair of that body, the ERC promotes global advocacy for the IDP cause, helps mobilize resources for IDPs through the Consolidated Appeals Process, monitors IDP situations and, when necessary, provides support to field operations, including negotiation of access to the internally displaced. The ERC is assisted by the Internal Displacement Unit located in OCHA’s Headquarters in Geneva.

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12 The members of the IASC are the Heads, or their designated representatives, of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), UNICEF, UNHCR, WFP, the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), WHO and OCHA. In addition, there is a standing invitation to IOM, ICRC, the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC), OHCHR, the Representative of the Secretary-General on Internally Displaced Persons and the World Bank. The non-governmental consortia International Council of Voluntary Agencies, InterAction and the Steering Committee for Humanitarian Response also have a standing invitation to attend.
At the operational level, IASC members have developed a policy paper outlining the main features of a collaborative approach to addressing IDP protection and assistance. This important policy paper clarifies the coordination mechanisms between the field and UN Headquarters and delineates the capacities and role of each of the relevant operational organizations.

**Coordination with UN peacekeeping operations.** The relationship between the various components of a UN peacekeeping mission and the humanitarian organizations mandated to protect and assist refugees and IDPs is critical to the proper handling of refugee and IDP issues. Depending on the mandate and structure of a peacekeeping operation, there will be different mechanisms to ensure optimum coordination between its various components, including a civil-military coordination cell, a joint operations centre and a joint logistics operations cell.

The humanitarian organizations charged with protecting and assisting the uprooted benefit from these coordination facilities and services provided through an appointed humanitarian coordinator. In some instances, the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General (DSRSG) in a peacekeeping operation may also be the humanitarian coordinator. This arrangement allows for greater coordination between the peacekeeping mission and the humanitarian agencies and organizations providing assistance to refugees and IDPs.

When refugees or IDPs have been the major humanitarian concern of a mission, the senior officer responsible for overall coordination of humanitarian affairs is often from one of the UN agencies with a specific mandate for such issues. For example, in Kosovo the Special Envoy of UNHCR participated in meetings with the peacekeeping operation, the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), under the chairmanship of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG). Other mechanisms have also been put in place to ensure that all members of a mission work in a coordinated fashion to find solutions for refugees and IDPs. In the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET), this was achieved through the creation of a joint operations centre, where military and civilian members of the mission worked together to develop contingency plans and procedures for refugee returns under the leadership of UNHCR.

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CHAPTER XV: THE WORLD BANK IN POST-CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION

The World Bank and Post-Conflict Reconstruction

Conflict prevention and post-conflict reconstruction are critical parts of the World Bank’s poverty reduction mandate. Since its founding in the aftermath of World War II to support the reconstruction of Europe, the Bank has been engaged with countries around the world emerging from crises and violent conflict. Drawing on the lessons of intervention in the West Bank and Gaza, Bosnia and Herzegovina and several other recent post-conflict situations, the Bank has re-examined its need to balance short, high-impact projects that consolidate peace with longer term projects that lay the foundations for growth and development.

Guided by the Bank’s new operational policy on development cooperation and conflict, approved by its board in January 2001, the Bank’s conflict prevention and post-conflict work is broad in scope. Working with member countries around the world, the Bank aims to minimize potential causes of conflict by stimulating economic growth and reducing poverty through development assistance that promotes social cohesion, institutional capacity building and good governance. In areas affected by conflict, the Bank continues its poverty reduction efforts and the maintenance of socio-economic assets where possible, advises on the socio-economic impacts of emergency assistance—as requested by its member countries, the United Nations (UN) and other partners—analyses the impact of conflict on economic development and prepares for renewed lending once conflict has ended.

The Bank usually becomes involved in a post-conflict situation as soon as security conditions permit and a credible political authority has been established. The Bank provides critical advice on investment, macroeconomic policy and the socio-economic impacts of post-conflict reconstruction policies on sustainable development. The Bank also advises on rebuilding in sectors that include:

- Community-driven development;
- Health and nutrition;
- Education;
- Energy;
- Environment;

• Rural development;
• Water and sanitation;
• Roads and infrastructure;
• Governance;
• Financial reform; and
• Private sector development.

The Bank has recently developed several new practice areas to better respond to the challenges of conflict prevention and reconstruction. These include the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants; community-driven development funds to facilitate the social and economic reintegration of displaced persons; a global anti-corruption initiative and legal reform programmes to address governance issues. The Bank’s post-conflict work seeks to break the cycle of conflict and help countries resume development by supporting efforts at establishing security, good governance, economic recovery and social stability.

Cycle of Post-Conflict Reconstruction

For example, the Bank has provided the following support for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) efforts, building upon 10 years of experience in Africa, Asia and Latin America:
• Built government capacity to oversee and manage DDR programmes, enhancing national ownership of programmes and fortifying peace processes;

• Convened donors and partners to agree on a common DDR framework and secured necessary resources;

• Provided direct and substantial financing through emergency recovery instruments that quickly and flexibly disbursed funding;

• Alleviated poverty, a root cause of conflict and civil unrest, by monitoring public expenditures to support a shift away from military spending towards servicing the poor and enhancing macro-economic stability and economic recovery through policy dialogue and balance of payment support; and

• Provided substantive expertise and financing to assist governments with social sectoral investment needs following conflict.

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**Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration in Sierra Leone**

The World Bank has supported the Government of Sierra Leone’s successful DDR programme since its inception in 1998. Working in close collaboration with the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), the British Government, the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) and several other partners, the World Bank has:

• Provided technical assistance to develop a national DDR programme that the international community adopted as a model for subsequent projects;

• Established a US$34 million multi-donor trust fund to provide grant support to the DDR programme, ensuring overall programme coherence through a single financing umbrella for the majority of donor resources and lessening the administrative burden on the Government of Sierra Leone;

• Approved an International Development Association (IDA) credit of US$25 million to finance part of the trust fund;

• Strengthened government leadership of DDR by building the capacity of local institutions;

• Assisted in stabilizing the macro-economic situation of Sierra Leone through the World Bank Emergency Recovery Credit and balance of payment support from other donors;

• Invested in a community development project that supported returning refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) in conjunction with DDR efforts; and

• Provided ongoing support to social sector recovery activities for health (including HIV/AIDS), education and community rehabilitation.
Planning and Financing Reconstruction Priorities

Coordinating reconstruction priorities. The World Bank places a premium on cooperation with national counterparts and development and multilateral organizations in its work to support transitions from conflict to peace. Drawing upon both international and national technical expertise, joint assessment missions (JAM) among the Bank and its UN, government and international financial institution partners have recently become the norm in post-conflict operations.

Trust Funds for Reconstruction: The Case of Timor-Leste (East Timor)

World Bank collaboration with the UN during the transitional process in Timor-Leste began in April 1999 with forward planning and the establishment of close contacts with the Timorese leadership and the UN Department of Political Affairs, which was responsible for the preparation of the August 1999 referendum on self-determination.

Following post-ballot violence, the Bank organized a meeting of donors and UN agencies, who then asked the Bank to coordinate a JAM to Timor-Leste to identify priority reconstruction objectives. The JAM was planned jointly with the United Nations Assistance Mission in East Timor (UNAMET), who also seconded a coordinator to the mission. Local ownership and Timorese capacity building were essential to ensure that programmes were both designed for and adapted to local conditions and sustainable. The JAM paired 25 East Timorese sector specialists with 25 experts from five donor countries, the European Commission, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, UN agencies, the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and the Bank.

The JAM presented its findings at the Tokyo Donor Conference in December 1999, contributing to a framework for donor coordination. The Donor Conference endorsed the principle of financial assistance channelled through the Consolidated Trust Fund, administered by the UN, and the Trust Fund for East Timor (TFET), administered by the World Bank. The TFET received pledges of US$168 million, or 45 per cent of the three-year reconstruction needs estimated at the Tokyo meeting.

The World Bank has also helped leverage and coordinate donor resources by establishing multi-donor Trust Funds for Reconstruction in other post-conflict settings. The 1994 Holst Fund for the West Bank and Gaza was a pioneering example that included 27 donors and generated US$380 million. Other examples include Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo and Sierra Leone.

The Bank encourages strong national leadership and participation in assessment and planning missions to support effective ownership of reconstruction priorities. These missions work to improve the coordination between relief and development, provide estimates of external financing needs, reduce inefficiencies and duplication in the use of external resources and identify priority short-term reconstruction initiatives. In many post-conflict countries, the World Bank works closely with governments to coordinate donors by chairing or co-chairing meetings typically, known as the consultative group (CG) process. In a post-conflict environment, CG meetings are often
convened annually to ensure continued financial support for reconstruction and provide regular progress updates. The Bank also frequently helps organize additional local or international donor coordination structures or processes to leverage funds, report on the state of the country’s economy, track donor funding activities, monitor progress on targets or action plans and avoid duplication of activities. One effective mechanism to coordinate aid-financed programmes has been the use of trust funds for reconstruction.

Wherever possible, the Bank supports the national budget of a post-conflict government as an effective framework to maintain the alignment between assistance and national objectives and to help donors consistently address reconstruction priorities in a mutually reinforcing manner. In addition, a national budget framework can prevent inefficient use of scarce donor resources and help prevent gaps and overlaps. The Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) will support post-conflict governments, including UN administrations, in developing a national budget for recurrent, reconstruction and development expenditures. Cooperation with UN and bilateral donors in the budget process and subsequent donor meetings to align aid financing with national priorities is important.

The World Bank’s multilateral cooperation in post-conflict situations also includes participation in UN meetings (e.g., Executive Committee on Peace and Security), bilateral consultations with UN departments and agencies, presentations at UN fora such as the Security Council and regular coordination with regional development banks and organizations. In addition, the Bank participates regularly in donor fora such as the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s Network on Conflict, Peace and Development.

**Post-Conflict Financing**

In addition to devastated economies, most low-income, conflict-affected countries have unsustainable debt levels and are in arrears to one or more international financial institution. These countries face serious difficulties in adequately funding crucial recovery efforts in the rapid and effective manner that is critical for breaking the cycle of violence, low growth and poverty. In the past several years, the World Bank has improved its ability to finance peace and sustainable development in post-conflict settings on a timely basis.

For instance, the post-conflict fund (PCF) supports planning, piloting and analysing ground-breaking activities by funding governments and partner organizations in transition from conflict. During the early stages of peacekeeping missions, PCF grants serve as bridging mechanisms that lay a foundation for traditional World Bank financial support in the future. In Timor-Leste, for example, the PCF supported a comprehensive human resources survey to identify critical skill areas. A CG meeting used this information to target World Bank and other donor support for critical institution-strengthening activities in support of Timor-Leste's reconstruction.
PCF grants can apply to places where UN peacekeeping missions operate and where other World Bank loans or credits cannot: they can fund activities in both sovereign countries and non-sovereign jurisdictions as well as in countries where the Bank is not a member or not a member in good standing. The PCF can also apply to post-conflict countries before outstanding debts to the Bank have been cleared, unlike other World Bank loans.

Another means by which the Bank is improving its ability to support a successful transition to peace and the resumption of sustainable development in post-conflict settings is through early access to the Bank’s debt relief programme, the highly indebted poor country (HIPC) initiative. Many of the post-conflict HIPC eligible countries do not have a recent track record of macroeconomic stability and structural reforms, which is a precondition for HIPC assistance. The Bank is therefore devising programmes to help such conflict-affected countries access needed technical assistance to meet requirements for HIPC debt relief as quickly as possible. A third mechanism of newly established post-conflict financing, as already mentioned, is multi-donor trust funds for reconstruction.

Finally, the Bank has recently improved its allocation system for post-conflict countries to receive IDA resources, which are grants and interest-free credits reserved for the world’s poorest countries. Generally, the Bank’s IDA resources are dispersed based on policy performance evaluated by the country policy and institutional assessment (CPIA) indicators. A country gets more resources the better its implementation of economic and social policies that promote growth and poverty reduction. This often works against post-conflict countries, however, since they typically have performed poorly on this front at the very time they most need financial resources. The Bank, therefore, devised a new set of indicators better tailored for post-conflict countries, such as human security and progress towards peace and governance. A country is typically expected to return to IDA’s regular (CPIA-based) allocation process within three years.

Although the range of Bank financing for post-conflict reconstruction is increasingly flexible and responsive to needs on the ground, the Bank’s mandate, as defined in its articles of agreement, is to finance or facilitate investment for productive purposes and promote international trade through loans. In accordance with this mandate, the Bank does not directly engage in peacemaking or peacekeeping nor does it provide humanitarian relief.

**World Bank Structure and Staffing**

The World Bank Group consists of five closely associated institutions, each playing a distinct role in the mission to fight poverty and improve living standards for people in the developing world. The group includes:

- The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD);
- International Development Association (IDA);
- International Finance Corporation (IFC);
• Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA); and

• International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID).

The World Bank refers specifically to two of the five institutions of the World Bank Group, the IBRD and the IDA. While the IBRD reduces poverty in middle-income and creditworthy poorer countries by promoting sustainable development through loans, guarantees and analytical and advisory services, the IDA focuses on assisting the world’s poorest countries. Contributions to the IDA enable the World Bank to provide between US$6 and US$7 billion per year in interest-free credits to these countries, facilitating access to better basic services and supporting reforms and investments aimed at productivity growth and employment creation. IDA employs a performance-based allocation system to channel its resources to countries that are undertaking reforms.

In its operations around the world, the Bank has three types of offices offering varying services:

Country office. A country office works with the client government and its agencies but is not under their direction and is responsible only to the Bank. The country manager is based in this office.

Regional office. A regional office supports the Bank’s country assistance programmes and covers the work programme of more than one country. The country director and task team leaders are posted at the regional office or at Headquarters.

Headquarters. Based in Washington, D.C., Headquarters supports regional and country offices on administrative, legal and technical issues. Sector managers, regional vice-presidents and sometimes country directors and task team leaders are based at Headquarters.

The country director and country manager collaborate with sector managers and task team leaders to develop proposed programmes for the approval of the World Bank board. Executive directors of the board representing the governments of World Bank member countries must always approve programmes before they can be implemented.

The Bank’s matrix structure ensures that both a country focus and a sector focus are given equal weight and responsibility in every country programme. Within this framework, the country director and country manager manage the budget and are responsible for formulating country programmes that are driven by the country assistance strategy (CAS) or transitional support strategy (TSS). Sector managers and task team leaders are responsible for delivering timely products that are technically excellent, serve the client’s business context and are informed by global best practices. The Bank’s decentralized management approach permits considerable decision-making at the regional and country level.
**Country manager.** Reports to the country director and acts as a focal point for all Bank activities within a country, including:

- Understanding and conveying government concerns and important economic, political and social developments to the Bank’s country team;
- Assisting the government in translating broad policy objectives into concrete development programmes and projects;
- Providing government access to technical knowledge and information on relevant development experiences worldwide;
- Coordinating policies and programmes with the donor community and fostering working relations among government authorities and bilateral and multilateral development partners;
- Deepening the development consultation and participation process of civil society, including non-governmental organizations (NGOs), the private sector, journalists, village officials and women's groups; and
- Supporting portfolio management, including procurement, financial management and timely and effective disbursement of resources in post-conflict situations. This means implementing a TSS and, upon completion, preparing and implementing a full CAS.

**Country director.** Reports to a regional vice president, is supported by the country manager and is responsible for managing the Bank’s overall relationship with the country, including:
• Heading the country management team in the design and delivery of the TSS and/or CAS, including periodic reviews of portfolio quality;

• Leading the sectoral and technical teams associated with country management issues and managing the budget and work programme in collaboration with a sector manager and respective sector units; and

• Coordinating donors and partnering with key stakeholders in the country.

Task team leader. Consults with the country manager, reports to a sector manager in Headquarters, travels regularly to the field and is responsible for:

• Assisting the country director and country manager in formulating and implementing sectoral aspects of a TSS or CAS;

• Contributing technical expertise in project identification, preparation, costing, appraisal, negotiation, launch and supervision missions;

• Performing project administration tasks, such as reviewing terms of reference, processing internal project documentation and monitoring budgets;

• Providing guidance to government or other government-selected implementing agencies on issues related to project management, including procurement, disbursement and financial management, audit and improving project performance and assessment of performance indicators;

• Coordinating donor and NGO implementation activities when the Bank’s financing is complemented by other donors; and

• Monitoring and evaluating programme quality, including the preparation of project implementation plans and reports and comparing projected and actual results for the implementation completion report.

The Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction Unit

In 1997 the World Bank established the post-conflict unit, now known as the conflict prevention and reconstruction (CPR) unit, as a focal point to handle conflict-related issues and to assist operational departments and country directors in formulating and implementing programmes in conflict-affected countries. Located in the Social Development Department in World Bank Headquarters in Washington, D.C., the unit supports the Bank in conflict analysis and project design in conflict-affected countries and develops tools and strategies to deal with development in conflict areas. The CPR unit is also responsible for the PCF, which supports the planning, piloting and analysis of ground-breaking activities by funding governments and partner organizations in early stages of transition from conflict to peace.
The Bank’s operational policy mandates analytical work, including conflict analysis, to ensure sensitivity to conflict in Bank assistance. Conflict analysis identifies problem areas and sources of conflict to help countries develop strategies to become more resilient, that is, develop their capacity to resolve conflict issues through political and social processes rather than through violence. These analyses help Bank teams consider factors affecting conflict when developing strategies, policies and programmes. They can also contribute to the development of strategic planning frameworks for UN peacekeeping missions.

The CPR unit is also responsible for collecting information generated through studies of conflict conducted by World Bank staff and other institutions and processing this information so it can be used to strengthen knowledge generation, best practices capacity and peacekeeping missions worldwide. Areas of emphasis in a post-conflict context include education, international governance of trade in primary commodities, community-driven development, best practices in needs assessments and the use of multi-donor trust funds. The web sites of the World Bank’s CPR unit as well as the conflict prevention and post-conflict reconstruction network, a joint multilateral and bilateral project, offer extensive additional information.

The PCF supports innovative activities in uncertain and fragile conflict-affected societies that are critical for securing peace and economic development. It makes grants to a wide range of partners—UN agencies, transitional authorities, governments, institutions, NGOs and other civil society institutions—to restore the lives and livelihoods of war-affected populations, enhance partnerships with donors and executing agencies and leverage resources through a variety of funding arrangements. Priority themes for PCF grant eligibility include:

- Socio-economic conflict analysis;
- Watching briefs on countries in conflict where the Bank is not active;
- TSS planning and development;
- Small-scale pilot activities undertaken within a TSS framework; and
- Policy studies and forums with operational relevance for the Bank.

One-third of all PCF grants have been for less than US$150,000 and the largest grants awarded were for US$2 million, approved for only two projects. When the PCF became a trust fund in 1999, it became eligible to receive contributions from donors and enter into co-financing agreements with UN agencies. Entities seeking grants develop their projects in close collaboration with the relevant country operations offices of the Bank and must have the approval of the country director. The PCF does not provide support for large-scale capital reconstruction, emergency relief, projects that can be funded using other Bank resources or research or media proposals with no direct operational use for Bank-supported reconstruction activities.
Standing Ready: The Afghanistan Watching Brief

Following World Bank participation in a 1997 UN mission to Afghanistan as part of efforts to improve coordination among aid agencies, the Bank assumed a proactive status, referred to as a watching brief, in line with the Bank’s policies for countries in conflict. The watching brief status supports both work in preparation for a reconstruction program as well as future operational work. To this end, the Bank collected and shared information on key economic and social issues and developed contacts with both members of Afghan society and the international assistance community.

The watching brief also funded short-term training for Afghan women’s NGOs based in Pakistan. This training was designed to improve the capacity of Afghan professional women and their NGOs and reached 350 women in the first year and 450 in the second. In May 2001, a US$1.5 million PCF grant was approved for training Afghan teachers in the refugee camps of Pakistan. This was implemented by the international NGO Save the Children and various other bilateral aid agencies.

As fighting raged in Afghanistan in late 2001, the Bank deepened its involvement and organized a conference, Preparing for Afghanistan’s Reconstruction, in Islamabad in November. The conference was hosted in conjunction with the ADB and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and was attended by a large number of Afghans, NGOs and donors. Discussion focused on identifying priorities, challenges and opportunities for contributing to Afghanistan’s reconstruction. Afghans sent a strong message to the donors at the conference that, although the country needed all the help it could get, the reconstruction process had to be led by Afghans. When the Taliban regime fell in late 2001, the Bank had already begun work on a preliminary needs assessment for the rebuilding of the country.

World Bank Project Cycle

The World Bank does not implement lending projects but works primarily through governments or non-governmental partners contracted by governments and emphasizes building government capacity to oversee and manage programmes. There are two main categories of Bank lending: investment projects, which provide support to sector such as health, infrastructure, private sector development and financial reform; and adjustment, which provides general budgetary support to a country.

The World Bank’s project cycle is the same for post-conflict environments as it is for all other countries, although the process can be expedited for emergency recovery assistance. The project cycle, represented in the diagram below, involves four phases:

- CAS or TSS in the case of a peacekeeping operation or post-conflict country;
- Lending;
- Supervision; and
- Evaluation.

**Identification.** The client and the Bank work together to identify projects in the context of developing strategies—a TSS in post-conflict situations, or, in cases where the country is stabilized, a poverty reduction strategy paper (PRSP) and a CAS. Project identification is also based on the Bank's economic and sector work, the client's feasibility studies and prior projects. Projects should be financially, economically, socially and environmentally sound. All projects undergo a screening to determine whether or not an environmental assessment is required.

**Preparation.** The client is responsible for project preparation, but the Bank often provides technical and financial assistance. The country's project team considers methods for achieving objectives and the technical, institutional, economic, environmental and financial conditions required for the project to succeed. If required, an environmental assessment is undertaken in this phase.

**Appraisal.** In project appraisals, Bank staff, sometimes with consultants, review the identification and preparation work over the course of three to four weeks in the client country. The appraisal team prepares a project appraisal document (PAD) for investment projects and a programme document for structural operations that are submitted to Bank management and ultimately made available to the public upon approval.
Negotiation. During negotiations, the Bank and the client determine measures required for project success, the client reviews the final documents and both sides concur on the terms and conditions of the loan. Project agreement is reached upon completion of all documentation and with the consent of the client.

Approval. The PAD, along with a memorandum of the president and loan documents, are submitted to the Bank’s board of executive directors for approval. Once approved, the loan or credit is signed by the Bank and the client.

Effectiveness. The loan or credit agreement is then submitted for final processing, which can take several months, as required by the borrowing government. For example, agreements often have to be ratified by a country’s legislature. Upon successful completion, the loan or credit is declared effective, or ready for disbursement, and is then registered with the UN and made available to the public.

Implementation and supervision. Project implementation is the client’s responsibility with agreed-upon technical assistance and supervision from the Bank. The client prepares the specifications and evaluates bids for the procurement of goods and services related to the project. The Bank disburses funds in tranches after determining that procurement guidelines have been followed. Supervision entails monitoring, evaluating and reporting on project progress. At the end of the disbursement period, anywhere from one to 10 years, an implementation completion report (ICR) identifies accomplishments, problems and lessons learned.

Ex-post evaluation. The Bank's Operations Evaluation Department (OED) reviews the ICR and evaluates the outcome of completed projects against the original objectives. The audit and ICR are then submitted to the Bank’s executive directors and the client. These reports are internal, but OED periodically prepares public impact evaluations on sets of projects based on these reports.
## GLOSSARY OF TERMS

### Country Strategy and Policy Papers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Full Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CAS</td>
<td>Country assistance strategy</td>
<td>Paper laying out the Bank’s assistance strategy. It sets out the selective programme to be supported by the Bank Group in relation to the country’s needs, the government’s development strategy or objectives and the activities of donors, multilateral organizations and NGOs. The CAS is prepared in close consultation with country authorities and other development partners.</td>
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<tr>
<td>TSS</td>
<td>Transitional support strategy</td>
<td>Equivalent document for a country that is in transition from conflict to peace. A country in transition may not have a CAS or its CAS may no longer be a responsive strategy because of the effects of conflict. Like a CAS, a TSS is prepared in consultation with country authorities and other development partners.</td>
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<tr>
<td>PRSP</td>
<td>Poverty reduction strategy paper</td>
<td>Government paper describing a country’s macroeconomic, structural and social policies and programmes to promote growth; it also summarizes the country’s objectives, policies and measures for poverty reduction. PRSPs, which provide the basis for assistance from the World Bank and IMF as well as debt relief under the HIPC Initiative, should be country-driven, comprehensive in scope, partnership-oriented and participatory.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I-PRSP</td>
<td>Interim poverty reduction strategy paper</td>
<td>Report produced to avoid delays in the transition period to a full PRSP. It summarizes current information and analyses the poverty situation, describes the existing poverty reduction strategy and lays out the process for producing a fully developed PRSP in a participatory fashion.</td>
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### Types of Projects and Financial Support

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<th>Acronym</th>
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<tr>
<td>Investment projects</td>
<td></td>
<td>One of two categories of Bank lending and targeted at projects that support education, health, infrastructure, agriculture and private sector development, among others.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Adjustment projects</td>
<td></td>
<td>The second category of Bank lending, it supports projects that provide general balance of payments and budgetary support to a country.</td>
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<tr>
<td>HIPC initiative</td>
<td>Highly indebted poor country initiative</td>
<td>Initiative launched in 1996 by the World Bank and IMF to respond to the poor country debt crisis. It brings all creditors, bilateral, multilateral and commercial lenders, into a coordinated framework and places debt relief within an overall context of poverty reduction. For HIPCsWith demonstrated commitment to</td>
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reform, creditors cancel all debt above a threshold that inhibits economic growth regardless of the amount.

Trust funds

Financial arrangements between the Bank and a donor, who entrusts the Bank with funds for a specific development-related activity. The Bank has helped leverage and coordinate donor resources by establishing multi-donor trust funds for reconstruction in several post-conflict settings.

IDF Institutional development fund Funds for capacity building to government.

PCF Post-conflict fund Quick disbursing funds for assessments, pilot projects and capacity building.

Project Documents and Supporting Documentation

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<tr>
<td>LDP</td>
<td>Letter of development policy</td>
<td>Letter from government outlining actions, objectives and policies to be supported by an adjustment-lending operation.</td>
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<tr>
<td>PID</td>
<td>Project information document</td>
<td>A brief factual summary of the main elements of a potential project; may be revised during the course of project preparation until approval by the Bank’s board of executive directors.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAD</td>
<td>Project appraisal document</td>
<td>Document that outlines the description, technical, economic and financial appraisal, feasibility and justification for a project. The Bank prepares a PAD for each proposed investment project.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOP</td>
<td>Memorandum of the President</td>
<td>Equivalent document for an adjustment program.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICR</td>
<td>Implementation completion report</td>
<td>Review of results and assessment of Bank’s operations upon completion of each lending operation financed by the Bank.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESW</td>
<td>Economic and sector work</td>
<td>Country-based analytical and advisory services commonly used in lending operations to inform policy dialogue, develop and implement country strategies, respond to country requests and needs and provide analysis for the development community.</td>
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CHAPTER XVI: RECOVERY, DEVELOPMENT AND SUSTAINABLE PEACE

Introduction

Since the early 1990s, United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operations have been deployed in increasingly complex conflict and post-conflict environments that have required a more flexible and multidimensional response that goes well beyond establishing a secure environment. To the extent that democratic governance is increasingly identified as forming the basis for both lasting peace and sustainable development, the international response has included support for the development of institutions that:

- Provide representative and accountable government;
- Ensure respect for human rights, particularly those of ethnic minorities, women and vulnerable groups;
- Provide for the peaceful settlement of potentially violent disputes; and
- Implement strategies for national economic and social recovery.

Such institutions and processes constitute the central element of a lasting national capacity for conflict prevention. In a post-conflict environment, such institutions do not emerge from a limited negotiation between the primary protagonists alone, but require the development of substantive consensus among multiple stakeholders over a period of time.

In his 2001 report on the prevention of armed conflict, the Secretary-General points out that the primary responsibility for conflict prevention lies with national governments and civil society. The main role of the UN, hence, is to support national efforts for conflict prevention and to assist Member States in building their capacities for settling disputes before they lead to violent conflict. In this context, the 2002 Human Development Report issued by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) establishes a strong linkage between democratic governance and the ability of governments and civil society to address disputes peacefully before they escalate to violent conflict. Consequently, most of the UN system’s operational programming now emphasizes building democratic governmental institutions and promoting respect for human rights. Nearly 60 per cent of UNDP’s core programming, for instance, supports the strengthening of democratic governance. In the aftermath of violent conflict, such programming—developed and implemented over the long run—becomes even more critical in ensuring lasting peace.

**Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding**

UN peacekeeping operations typically provide some of the initial elements required for sustaining peace in war-torn societies. These elements may include:

- Facilitating and monitoring an agreement for a cessation of hostilities and the establishment of a climate of security;
- Facilitating a process of political dialogue and negotiation;
- Disarming and demobilizing former combatants and developing a strategy for their reintegration into civilian life;
- Supporting and monitoring a national electoral process;
- Monitoring human rights in the short term and supporting a national truth and reconciliation process; and
- Assisting in the establishment of institutions of good governance and rule of law, including monitoring and mentoring local law enforcement services.

Peacekeeping operations, being of a limited duration, can only begin the process of building peace through reforming and restructuring national institutions; they cannot build long-term national capacity. Peacekeeping operations that have a mandate to act as a UN transitional administration, such as the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) and the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET), have broad responsibilities for governance and administration but are only able to support the building of national institutions and capacity for the duration of their mandate. These types of peacekeeping missions may enable significant short-term progress in a host country but may not always be conducive to longer term national capacity-building, and the flow of international personnel and resources may diminish considerably once the operation ends.

The UN system as a whole, however, typically does have a presence in the country both before and after the conflict, and this presence remains long after the peacekeeping operation has departed. The funds, programmes and specialized agencies of the UN system work with national authorities to build long-term capacity in their respective areas of expertise. The UN country team, which is the combined presence of all UN funds, programmes and agencies in the country, is uniquely placed to play a significant role in supporting local efforts for building lasting peace.

**Resident Coordinator System**

The resident coordinator (RC) system was established in 1977 to ensure the operational activities of the UN system in a particular country were properly coordinated. The RC, who is designated wherever the UN has a development presence, heads the UN country
team and works collaboratively with national authorities to ensure that UN activities support national development priorities. In both conflict and post-conflict situations, the RC system has coordinated UN activities to build sustainable peace. In these settings, the RC can play an especially critical role in ensuring the emergence of long-term capacity for conflict prevention in the form of a system for democratic governance that is based on consensus among multiple stakeholders.

The RC is the designated representative of the UN Secretary-General in a particular country, except when a peacekeeping operation headed by a Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) is deployed. While peacekeeping operations are mainly present in post-conflict contexts and are normally of a limited duration, the UN country teams, headed by an RC, are typically a more long-term and constant UN presence in the country.

In many crisis situations, the RC also plays the role of humanitarian coordinator (HC). The HC function was established in 1988 in recognition of the special exigencies of humanitarian coordination in crisis situations. The HC is responsible for ensuring timely, effective and well-coordinated humanitarian assistance and for monitoring and reporting on the impact of armed conflict on especially vulnerable groups, such as women and children. The integration of the RC and HC roles, where appropriate, allows for a more effective transition from the provision of emergency relief in the short term to support for lasting recovery.2

In many post-conflict situations, sustainable peace may partly depend on the degree to which former combatants, refugees, returnees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) are able to return to viable livelihoods within their communities. This, in turn, may depend on macroeconomic factors, such as economic recovery and a return to normal economic and commercial activity. While the HC is charged with the coordination of short-term relief during and immediately after the conflict, it is the RC and the UN country team that are often best placed to support the long-term national efforts for a return to normal economic activity at the community and national levels.

**Role of Resident Coordinators in Peace Processes**

The RC is a strategic partner at every stage of a peacekeeping operation. At the planning stage, the initial assessment team can draw on the RC and UN country team’s knowledge of the local situation—the root causes of the conflict, including regional factors and the roles and positions of political players, parties to the conflict and other key stakeholders—to better understand the key forces at play. The RC can also ensure that a strategy for a transition from relief to recovery is included in the concept of operations from the outset. The RC can advocate for including special attention to the protection of vulnerable groups, including women and children, the elderly, IDPs and disabled persons, in the mandate of the peacekeeping operation.

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2 For more information on the HC, see Chapter XIII on Humanitarian Assistance.
Being on the ground before the deployment of a peacekeeping operation may allow the RC to build support for the international community’s objectives and to lay the groundwork for the peacekeeping mission. The RC can promote the participation and engagement of a wide range of stakeholders in the peace process, including civil society and community leaders, and a wide spectrum of political actors, donors and international financial institutions, such as the World Bank. The RC can assist in the development of a peacebuilding strategy that includes inputs from all these stakeholders. The RC can also facilitate participatory forums for national dialogue that allow all actors to have a say in the shaping of post-conflict arrangements, including possibly a constitutional or legislative framework for good and accountable governance.

In the short term, the RC may facilitate civil society and media initiatives to promote a culture of peace and national reconciliation, which can help create a positive and receptive climate for a peacekeeping operation’s activities. Drawing upon resources, such as UNDP trust funds established for this purpose, the RC may initiate small arms recovery and mine action efforts, coordinating closely with the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS), with the aim of providing an impetus to economic recovery. These initiatives would further support the incoming peacekeeping operation’s deployment and operational activities.

The RC may be able to provide valuable inputs for reforming rule of law institutions, including the judiciary and the national police, at the planning stage of peacekeeping operations. The peacekeeping operation’s mandate and operational plan on these issues must be appropriate to the local context, draw significantly on local resources, be centred on the building of long-term local capacity and have adequate resources. The RC can assist in identifying local needs and capacities in this area.

Once the peacekeeping operation has ended, continuing international support and technical assistance for reform of rule of law institutions will fall to the RC. Therefore, the RC’s input should be sought during the planning and conceptualization stages, which will ensure that fundraising and development assistance frameworks reflect similar priorities, easing the transition from peacekeeping to peacebuilding.

**Cooperation and Coordination in the Field**

To improve cooperation and coordination between peacekeeping operations and UN country team in the field, some RCs have been designated as the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General (DSRSG) in a peacekeeping operation headed by an SRSG. This is particularly the case when the mandate of the peacekeeping operation includes institution building and longer term capacity-building elements. Currently, RCs in Afghanistan, Angola, Sierra Leone and Timor-Leste (formerly East Timor) are also DSRSGs. The integration of the RC function into a peacekeeping operation provides a useful mechanism for ensuring that there is congruency and continuity between peacekeeping and peacebuilding efforts, both of which may continue after the peacekeeping operation has ended.
In the field, the RC can play a number of useful roles in support of the overall peacebuilding strategy determined by the SRSG, the host government and the international community. The RC can support the peace process by coordinating fundraising for common priorities through donor conferences and roundtables. For example, working in collaboration with the World Bank, the UN country team can provide substantive support to the process of organizing multi-donor conferences aimed at raising funds for peace processes and for implementation of the priorities established at these conferences, as was the case with the Tokyo conference for Afghanistan in 2001 and the Oslo conference for Sri Lanka in 2002. In Sierra Leone and Angola, UN country teams have also played significant roles in shaping donor priorities for the post-conflict recovery period.

UN country teams play important roles in the development of consolidated, inter-agency UN appeals to donors, known as transitional appeals, which are specifically targeted at alleviating a humanitarian crisis or bringing about a transition from emergency relief to longer-term recovery. In the formulation of transitional appeals, the substantive input of the UN country team is vital to ensuring that short-term recovery priorities, such as funds for the reintegration of former combatants and displaced persons, are balanced with early support for long-term processes and institutions necessary for democratic governance.

The RC may advise the SRSG on strengthening institutional capacity in the post-conflict system of government. This advice is particularly critical when the UN is the transitional authority (and will hand over this authority to a local government at the conclusion of its mandate) because there is likely to be a serious gap in personnel and financial resources between the transitional authority and the new government. The RC may also be able to encourage local participation and ownership of the emerging institutions of government. Through public forums, civic dialogues and other mechanisms, the RC and the UN country team can assist in ensuring greater accountability and transparency in government.

Support for long-term development needs. In collaboration with the SRSG, the RC may support a participatory and transparent process of consultation aimed at the identification of long-term development needs, including strengthening democratic governance. This process, which should include key national political and civic actors, members of the UN country team, international financial institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund and regional financial institutions such as the Asian Development Bank and the African Development Bank, can also identify ways in which the short-term, largely humanitarian assistance of the international community can contribute to long-term institutional development and reform. It can assist donors, the UN country team and local actors to move beyond short-term priorities set by transitional appeals for assistance and provide the basis for the preparation of a solid common country assessment (CCA), a United Nations development assistance framework (UNDAF) or a poverty reduction strategy paper (PRSP), as appropriate, that addresses long-term peacebuilding needs.
More fundamentally, this process can identify future gaps in development, which if not addressed, can foster further tensions that may lead to renewed violence. Such a participatory consultation identifying long-term needs was a key element of the Guatemalan peace process and contributed to both peacebuilding efforts and to generating agreement among international donors on common peacebuilding priorities. Roundtable conferences supported by UNDP can provide advice on conducting such consultations.

Another recent example is the UN’s Peacebuilding and Recovery Strategy for Sierra Leone, which integrates humanitarian and development assistance into a comprehensive strategy for building lasting peace and provides the basis for both the transitional appeal for 2003 as well as the UNDAF for 2004-2007. The Consultative Group meeting on Sierra Leone in Paris in November 2002 was co-chaired by the World Bank and UNDP and dealt with the Sierra Leone’s peace and security, humanitarian, and development needs in an integrated way.

**Support for national capacity for coordination of assistance.** In any post-conflict situation, it is essential that assistance and subsequent support for the CCA and UNDAF be implemented with the participation of national governments and civil society. The RC may assist the SRSG and local authorities in establishing a national office for the coordination of humanitarian and development assistance (of the type established in Afghanistan). This office can serve as the focal point for the consultative process discussed above and for receiving, coordinating and reporting on international assistance. The RC may also assist staff of this office in drafting proposals, fundraising and establishing reporting procedures that meet international standards. In the longer run, this office can form the core of a national capacity for planning and fund-raising for sustainable development.

**Continued technical support for national institutions.** During the lifetime of a peacekeeping mission, the RC may take steps to ensure continuity in the technical support provided by the peacekeeping mission to government departments and ministries and to key local organizations. Additional resources may be necessary to ensure that work continues without interruption once the peacekeeping mission ends.

**Resource Requirements**

To be effective in their peacebuilding efforts, it is critical that RCs have the necessary funding and support. A number of additional posts could be created, for example, within the RC’s office to support peacebuilding efforts. In Côte d’Ivoire, UNDP has provided a senior governance adviser to the RC to ensure that governance issues are adequately addressed in the peace consolidation strategy. Creative ways of funding these posts can be explored, including the use of trust funds, bilateral donors or including the posts in the peacekeeping operation’s budget. Provisions for additional personnel posts, especially those involved in the implementation of reintegration and recovery programmes, should be included in all transitional appeals. Efforts to increase staff and other resources for
RCs should be centrally managed by an appropriate entity at UN Headquarters, such as the United Nations Development Group (UNDG).

While RCs generally have considerable UN and professional experience in development and humanitarian coordination, some crisis situations may require substantial prior experience in political negotiations, conflict prevention and peacebuilding. This determination should be made early in the process by the members of the UNDG in close consultation with the SRSG and other relevant actors so that the right individual is designated as the RC.

**Conclusion**

UN country teams, led by the RC, provide a ready successor to many peacekeeping operations for activities that build sustainable peace in post-conflict situations. If properly planned, coordinated and managed, the exit strategy of a peacekeeping operation could very well constitute handing over key activities and programmes to the RC and UN country team for continued implementation. RCs can work to deepen and strengthen the short-term economic recovery that may have been established during a peacekeeping operation. With appropriate funding and political support, RCs can undertake and facilitate the long-term initiatives necessary to stabilize fragile political systems according to the principles of participation, accountability, good governance and rule of law.