Study Report

Optimizing the Use of Training and Capacity-Building Coordination Mechanisms in Support of United Nations Peace Operations

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November 2025

the LIGHT COORDINATION MECHANISM

United Nations Peacekeeping
Integrated Training Service

The views expressed in this study do not necessarily reflect those of the United Nations.

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Acknowledgements

The author would like to thank Herbert Loret and Sophie Aloë from the United Nations Light Coordination Mechanism (LCM) for entrusting her with this project and for their guidance and support through this process. The author would also like to convey appreciation to Matilde Barbieri of the LCM team for her invaluable research and note-taking contributions. The author is deeply grateful for the many individuals from Member States, UN entities, and civil institutions who contributed their valuable time and expertise, participating in interviews, completing surveys, and joining discussion groups to support the study outcomes. Finally, the author is indebted to her colleague and friend Dana Houk for providing editing and “sanity check” support.

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Executive Summary

Despite the ongoing downsizing of United Nations (UN) peace operations, sustained investment in training and capacity building for uniformed peacekeepers is critical, both to address the increasingly complex and volatile environments to which peacekeepers are deployed as well as to develop more flexible and specialized capabilities to meet future operational needs. However, unfolding UN budget cuts and reductions in assistance from some traditional capacity-building providers are impairing efforts to develop peacekeepers' capabilities. Collaborative solutions are vital to bridge the divide between requirements and means. The UN, troop- and police-contributing countries (T/PCCs), and capacity-building partners must work together to minimize duplication, promote cooperation, and maximize the impact of available resources.

Toward this end, the UN Light Coordination Mechanism (LCM)—responding to the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (C34) mandate to strengthen regional cooperation networks and building on its ongoing work in this area—commissioned this study to compile information and raise awareness regarding the scope of existing mechanisms that foster training and capacity-building coordination in support of UN and UN-mandated peace operations, as well as to generate recommendations for reinforcing such coordination. For the purpose of this study, a coordination mechanism is considered an organization, association, conference, forum, or other affiliation that facilitates multilateral exchange, de-confliction, alignment, or integration related to peace operations training and capacity-building activities. The report centers on mechanisms for which the primary purpose is the *coordination* versus the provision of peace operations training and capacity building.

Drawing on literature reviews, surveys, and interviews with stakeholders across all regions, the study explores the differing roles, structures, and financing methods of various mechanisms. It further considers key achievements, challenges, and lessons learned to propose recommendations for optimizing effective coordination. While findings varied across the span of mechanisms reviewed, overarching themes emerged.

Key Findings

- International and regional coordination mechanisms have significantly increased information sharing, raised awareness of training and capacity-building needs, and promoted cooperation, prompting a greater partnership mindset among T/PCCs, donors and capacity-building providers, and the UN.

- For the UN, coordination networks multiply reach, extending information dissemination and enabling connection with a wider audience of Member State leaders and stakeholders.

- Sustained UN engagement, at both leadership and technical levels, has strengthened international and regional coordination mechanisms, reinforcing their perceived legitimacy, expanding the scope of Member State involvement in training and capacity-building efforts, and bringing new donor/provider partners to the table.

- Nevertheless, the institutionalization of

information sharing remains problematic, constrained by challenges that include ensuring information reaches the stakeholders responsible for implementation, the need for continuous re-education of uniformed and diplomatic stakeholders due to routine rotations, Member States' willingness and/or ability to share information, and language barriers.

- Additionally, funding constraints and limited staffing capacity are significant obstacles to more robust coordination. As training and capacity-building institutions are increasingly stretched, it can be difficult to prioritize external collaboration, even if interest in collaborating is high.

- For both international and regional coordination mechanisms, various organizational and governance structures can be effective, accounting for political context and intended purpose. Regardless of structure, the effectiveness of any mechanisms grows with consistency and time, as trust is built, participation deepens, and information sharing becomes more routine.

- Existing coordination mechanisms focus more heavily on military requirements, with fewer encompassing police peacekeepers and uniformed corrections personnel. Additionally, few mechanisms exist to coordinate equipment and capacity requirements beyond training.

Stemming from these findings, recommendations uphold that investments in training and capacity-building partnerships and the mechanisms that facilitate such collaboration must be purposeful, prioritized, and impactful to maximize outcomes and advance the effectiveness of peace operations.

Recommendations are divided into two areas, including those directed at: (1) UN Department of Peace Operations (DPO) and Department of Operational Support (DOS) stakeholder offices and (2) all UN, Member State, and other stakeholders.

Recommendations for UN Stakeholder Offices

- Prioritize priorities: Clearer prioritization of training and capacity-building requirements will help concentrate coordination efforts and resource investments on the most critical needs.

- Break down information silos: Stronger linkages across UN teams responsible for strategic planning, force generation, performance evaluation, and military and police doctrine and training are essential for more clearly defining operational priorities.

- Message the value to motivate the will: Given the current political and operational context, consistent, persuasive engagement by UN leadership is needed to demonstrate the value of sustained Member State and other partner investments in peace operations training and capacity building.

- Engage purposefully: Given the limited time and resources of UN personnel, end state objectives and target audience should be clear to determine the most effective coordination mechanisms through which to engage.

Recommendations for All Stakeholders

- Focus on impact: UN, Member States, and other partners should ensure that training and capacity-building investments directly address prioritized operational requirements, with

evaluation frameworks to measure outcomes and capture lessons learned.

- Leverage collective funding: Consider replicating models like the Triangular Partnership Programme and Elsie Initiative Fund to enable collective contributions, diversify the donor base, and amplify smaller donations.

- Tailor regional approaches: Coordination mechanisms should reflect regional and national dynamics; one size will not fit all. Various organizational arrangements can deliver results as long as the mechanism has a clearly defined purpose and reaches its target audience.

- Match coordination structure to the need: Thought should be given in terms of where to invest resources in the establishment of formalized associations versus employing more ad hoc forums to address end-state objectives.

- Build enduring mechanisms: Longevity is key to building trust, fostering genuine collaboration, and realizing effects. Establishment of any new mechanisms, as well as reinforcement of existing mechanisms, should ensure sustainability in terms of financial viability, institutional bandwidth, and stakeholder attention.

- Harness lead agents: The most effective coordination mechanisms are championed by a lead agent—ranging from an actively-engaged Secretariat, a donor or external partner, or a committed individual—to organize activities and ensure follow-through action.

- Tap into technology: Recognizing the benefits of sustained in-person engagements, coordination networks should further exploit virtual exchanges and online collaboration platforms to engage more frequently while minimizing cost and time demands.

- Leverage wider stakeholder engagement: Coordination mechanisms should consider how to distribute the workload and harness the comparative advantage of various organizations, including tapping into civil society entities to support research, analysis, and innovation.

- Connect the networks: Greater exchange across technical-level coordination mechanisms (e.g., regional training center associations) could reduce duplication, enhance knowledge sharing, and ensure scarce resources are used for complementary initiatives.

- Adopt a more holistic approach: Coordination mechanisms should expand beyond classroom training and consider ways to promote long-term partnerships that address equipment, operational, and sustainment challenges.

- Deepen cross-component collaboration: Where appropriate, mechanisms should integrate military, police, and civilian perspectives to better prepare peacekeepers for complex operational environments.

Introduction

Despite the ongoing downsizing of UN peace operations, the imperative for sustained training and capacity building for uniformed peacekeepers remains more critical than ever. The scale of operations may be shrinking; however, the complexity and volatility of environments to which peacekeepers are deployed continue to escalate, exposing personnel to increasing threats ranging from asymmetric attacks to sophisticated disinformation campaigns. Moreover, as highlighted in the Secretary-General's "New Agenda for Peace" and ongoing discussions about new models of peacekeeping, debate continues regarding how to adapt UN operations to provide more agile, tailored responses to security challenges.[1] This evolving landscape demands not only the preservation of core competencies but the development of increasingly flexible and specialized capabilities to meet future operational requirements.

This necessity for deeper investment in the capability development of uniformed peacekeepers comes at a time of acute resource constraints. The UN's operational budget, including funding for training support and performance evaluation of deployed personnel, is facing unprecedented cuts, and some traditional capacity-building providers are withdrawing or reducing assistance. Creative, collaborative solutions are vital to bridge the growing divide between investment needs and the means to meet essential requirements. The UN, as well as current and aspiring T/PCCs, will need to fully leverage available tools to maximize the engagement of Member States, organizations, and institutions able and willing to provide support.

Toward this end, the LCM, within the UN DPO's Integrated Training Service (ITS), commissioned this study in response to the C34's encouragement to foster regional cooperation networks that enhance collaboration in the preparation, deployment, and sustainment of peace operations. Building on the LCM's work supporting the establishment of regional capacity-building networks in Africa, Asia-Pacific, Central Asia, and Latin America and the Caribbean, this study seeks to provide a comprehensive mapping of existing coordination mechanisms and actionable recommendations for strengthening them. Specifically, the study seeks to:

- Survey the international, regional, and sub-regional mechanisms that support the multilateral coordination of information sharing, training, and capacity-building for uniformed peacekeepers;
- Examine achievements and challenges in the establishment and operationalization of these mechanisms; and
- Draw on identified lessons learned and good practices to provide practical and forward-looking recommendations with a view to strengthening mechanisms, addressing gaps and overlaps, and supporting the replication or scaling-up of successful models.

[1] See, for example, the October 2024 UN Department of Peace Operations-commissioned independent study *The Future of Peacekeeping, New Models, and Related Capabilities* by El-Ghassim Wane, Paul D. Williams, and Ai Kihara-Hunt.

Maximizing the potential of multilateral coordination mechanisms will enhance the UN's and Member States' ability to target peace operations training and capacity-building priorities, avoid duplication through better deconfliction, foster collaborative engagement, and drive innovative initiatives that more effectively meet the evolving demands of current and future missions.

Study Methodology

This study report is based on an extensive literature review of websites and statutory documents for cited organizations, as well as related policy reports and papers prepared by academic institutions, think tanks, and research organizations. Findings and recommendations additionally draw on non-attribution study interviews conducted with more than 30 representatives of coordination mechanism secretariats, training centers and research institutions, UN stakeholder offices, and Member States. To further ensure study inputs from all regions, a survey was distributed to the Military and Police Advisors at all Member State permanent missions to the UN, soliciting information on the range of mechanisms in which respective countries participate, as well as the achievements and challenges of those mechanisms. A discussion roundtable was also conducted in New York with Member State Military and Police Advisors, attended by more than 40 permanent missions, to solicit inputs.

For the purpose of this study, a coordination mechanism is considered an organization, association, forum, conference, or other affiliation or network that facilitates multilateral exchange, de-confliction, alignment, and/or integration related to the peace operations training and capacity-building activities of Member States, the UN, relevant regional organizations, and/or other providers. The study centers on mechanisms for which the primary purpose is the coordination of *peace operations* requirements. The study also highlights a sampling of mechanisms focused on broader defense and security issues, which are or could potentially be leveraged to facilitate support for peace operations. While coordination networks that address other thematic areas, such as humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, maritime security, small arms and light weapons, etc., may also support training and capacity-building for uniformed peacekeepers, those mechanisms were not addressed as part of this study.

Additionally, to bound the scope of the study, the report compiles information on mechanisms for which multilateral *coordination* is the primary area of focus. This study does not address organizations that primarily support the *provision* of information, training, and capacity building and, therefore, does not encompass national or regional training centers, academic institutions, think tanks, non-governmental organizations, etc.—although it is acknowledged that the functions of such organizations may incorporate a multilateral coordination role.

Existing Peace Operations Coordination Mechanisms

A range of mechanisms exists at the international, regional, and sub-regional levels to support information sharing and coordination of members' training and capacity-building activities. Such mechanisms include UN- and Member State-managed initiatives, regional organizations, associations, conferences, and other forums. These mechanisms target differing audiences, serve distinct purposes, and are characterized by varying organizational structures and levels of formality. Table 1 provides examples of mechanisms that directly enable the coordination of information sharing, training, and/or capacity building in support of uniformed personnel deploying to UN and UN-mandated peace operations. As noted in the Methodology section above, this list is limited to mechanisms for which multilateral *coordination* is a primary area of focus. The list does not include organizations primarily focused on the *provision* of training and capacity-building assistance, recognizing that the functions of such organizations may incorporate a multilateral coordination role.[2]

Table 1: Peace Operations Coordination Mechanisms[3]

International	
UN-Managed Initiatives	• UN Light Coordination Mechanism (LCM) • UN Triangular Partnership Programme (TPP) • Elsie Initiative Fund for Uniformed Women in Peace Operations (EIF)
UN Conferences/Forums	• UN Peacekeeping Ministerial (UNPKM) • UN Chiefs of Police Summit (UNCOPS) • Partnership for Technology in Peacekeeping Symposium
International Associations	• International Association of Peacekeeping Training Centres (IAPTC) • Challenges Forum
Groups of Friends	• Group of Friends of Corrections in Peace Operations
Multinational Exercises	• ACCORD Exercises (sponsored by the United States, African host country rotates) • BLUE FLAG Exercise (sponsored by Austria, Germany, the Netherlands, and Switzerland) • FELINO Exercise (sponsored by the Community of Portuguese Speaking Countries)

[2] Based on this methodology, international organizations such as the UN Institute for Training and Research, UN Mine Action Service, or the European Security and Defence College, among others, were considered but not included, as their primary role was determined to be the provision of institutionalized training/assistance versus the coordination of training/assistance executed by external providers.
[3] Mechanisms outlined in Table 1 serve as key examples based on inputs from study interviews and surveys and may not be inclusive of all mechanisms that exist in each category.

	• Multinational Peacekeeping Exercise (sponsored by the United States, Asia-Pacific host country rotates)
	  ○ Garuda Canti Dharma (Indonesia)
	  ○ Keris Aman (Malaysia)
	  ○ Khaan Quest (Mongolia)
	  ○ Shanti Doot (Bangladesh)
	  ○ Shanti Prayas (Nepal)
	• VIKING Exercise (sponsored by Sweden)

Africa	

Regional Organization Bodies	• African Standby Force (ASF) Components / Planning Elements
	  ○ African Union (AU) Peace Support Operations Division (PSOD)
	  ○ Eastern Africa Standby Force (EASF)
	  ○ Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) Standby Force
	  ○ Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Standby Force
	  ○ North African Regional Capability (NARC)
	  ○ Southern African Development Community (SADC) Standby Brigade

Regional Associations	• African Peace Support Trainers Association (APSTA)
Conferences/Forums	• African Counter-Improvised Explosive Devices (C-IED) Conference
Asia-Pacific	
Regional Organization Bodies	• Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Defence Ministers' Meeting Plus Experts' Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations (ADMM-Plus PKO-EWG) • ASEAN Peacekeeping Centers Network (APCN)
Regional Associations	• Association of Asia-Pacific Peace Operations Training Centers (AAPTC)
Conferences/Forums	• Peacekeeping Operations Coordination Board – Technical Working Group (PKOCB-TWG)
Central Asia	
Conferences/Forums	• Central Asian Regional Roundtable on UN Peace Operations
Europe	
Regional Associations	• European Association of Peace Operations Training Centres (EAPTC)
Latin America and Caribbean	
Regional Associations	• Latin American Association of Peacekeeping Training Centres (ALCOPAZ) • Latin American and Caribbean Network for Cooperation in Peacekeeping Operations (RELACOPAZ) / Latin American and Caribbean Conference on UN Peacekeeping Operations (ALCONU)

The discussion below provides an overview of the coordination mechanisms outlined in Table 1, compares and contrasts organizational structures, and highlights some of the respective successes and challenges to draw out lesson.

International Coordination Mechanisms

At the international level, mechanisms that directly support peace operations information sharing, training, and capacity building fall into several categories, including UN-managed initiatives, UN conferences or forums, international associations, groups of friends, and multilateral exercises.

UN-Managed Initiatives

Over the past decade, the UN Secretariat has assumed a more active role not only in identifying and prioritizing peace operations training and capacity-building requirements but also in facilitating partnerships to better address identified needs. The **UN Light Coordination Mechanism (LCM)** serves as one evident example, established for the specific purpose of fostering information sharing, training, and capacity-building partnerships to assist the deployment of uniformed peacekeepers to UN and UN-mandated peace operations. Embedded in UN DPO/ITS, the LCM is not an implementing actor but, rather, supports a "match making" function.[4] It coordinates with T/PCCs and other UN DPO and DOS stakeholder offices, which identify capability gaps for deployed and pledged peacekeeping personnel or units. The LCM then works to match appropriate donor-provided training, equipment, or other capacity-building support with requesting T/PCCs, facilitating partnerships to address identified needs.

Toward this end, the LCM convenes coordination meetings and conferences to cultivate bilateral and multilateral partnerships and supports the establishment of regional capacity-building networks, as mandated by the C34. The LCM also manages an online gateway—the LCM Online System (LCMOS), which includes tools like the "Global Peacekeeping Training Calendar" and "LCM Marketplace." Such initiatives provide T/PCCs a means to request assistance and help donor/provider countries better understand assistance priorities. The establishment of an international capacity-building exchange seeks to enable faster, more focused responses to assistance requests. However, study interviewees cited the inconsistent willingness and/or ability of both T/PCCs and donor/provider countries to share information—for reasons spanning from political sensitivities to domestic bureaucratic stovepipes—as a challenge for maximizing effectiveness. Additionally, the advertisement through such a network of both assistance needs and offers of

[4] In his 15 December 2017 letter to the UN Security Council (S/2017/1079), the Secretary-General noted, "There is a need to improve the coordination of training and capacity building to further enhance the outcome of our strategic force generation efforts… To this end, I propose the establishment of a light coordination mechanism that would bring together Secretariat entities involved in training, capacity building and force generation, potential troop- and police-contributing countries that would benefit from training and capacity building, and Member States that can provide the necessary support, resulting in the deployment of pre-trained units and personnel to peacekeeping operations. This coordination mechanism would be limited to matching troop- and police-contributing countries registered in the Peacekeeping Capability Readiness System with Member States willing to provide support for further bilateral, or where relevant, trilateral, engagement."

support are sometimes generic in nature versus tailored to address specific operational requirements.

Nevertheless, such a coordination function within UN DPO leverages UN credibility to help foster collaboration. LCM efforts to build Member State buy-in have helped bring new capacity-building partners to the table. The LCM provides a support structure for Member States that may be willing to provide assistance but lack the experience or technical knowledge to do so. In other cases, engagement via the UN enables the provision of assistance that might be politically untenable bilaterally. Overall, the LCM has helped promulgate a "partnership mindset" among Member States, promoting the idea of working together in support of both military and police components to explore creative solutions for addressing gaps.

The UN DOS-managed **Triangular Partnership Programme (TPP)** plays a more programmatic role, facilitating coordination to provide T/PCCs with technical training, training-of-trainers (ToT), and limited equipment assistance across three pillars: engineering, including counter-improvised explosive device (C-IED); medicine; and command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR), including camp security technologies. Many course offerings support T/PCCs from around the world. However, the TPP has pursued a more targeted approach with respect to its engineering pillar, primarily focusing on African and Southeast Asian TCCs to increase regional interoperability and exchange.[5] The program has invested in phased and ToT courses to help T/PCCs retain and build national capabilities and promote long-term ownership of knowledge and skills. The TPP is additionally investing in a fourth pillar: a telemedicine project to enhance the safety and security of deployed peacekeepers with remote medical care.

While supporting the provision of assistance, the TPP serves as an umbrella framework to foster "triangular" partnerships between T/PCCs that seek training or other capacity-building assistance; Member States that provide funding, trainers and subject matter experts, and/or equipment; and the UN. Importantly, the TPP facilitates the pooling of financial contributions and expertise, implementing assistance activities funded through donor contributions and drawing on a pool of experts and trainers from Member States, as well as UN entities such as the Capacity Development and Operational Training Service (CDOTS), Division of Healthcare Management and Occupational Safety and Health (DHMOSH), DOS Office of the Under-Secretary-General Environment Section, Office of Information and Communications Technology (OICT), UN C4ISR Academy for Peace Operations (UNCAP), and UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS). An annual Stakeholders' Workshop brings together all Member States, as well as internal and external TPP partners involved in funding and implementing the program to take stock of achievements, outline requirements, and shape recommendations for future program activities. Such a joint programming model magnifies the impact of contributions both large and small. This model further provides an implementation mechanism for countries that might otherwise lack the resources, administrative capacity, or political latitude to execute bilateral assistance.

The **Elsie Initiative Fund (EIF)** similarly facilitates programmatic coordination at the global level, functionally focused on supporting and incentivizing the meaningful

[5] "TPP Overview," United Nations Department of Operational Support, accessed July 2025, https://operationalsupport.un.org/en/triangular-partnership-programme-tpp.

participation of uniformed women in UN peace operations. The EIF aims to accelerate progress towards achieving UN targets for uniformed women through funding for three types of activities: barrier assessments to identify the main factors impeding the deployment of uniformed women peacekeepers; projects designed to increase the meaningful participation of uniformed women peacekeepers in UN missions (which must be supported by a barrier assessment report and recommendations); and provision of a premium for the deployment of a "gender-strong" military or police unit.[6]

The EIF pools voluntary donor contributions through a Multi-Partner Trust Fund (MPTF) administered by the UN Development Programme's MPTF Office. The EIF Secretariat is hosted by UN Women and manages the Fund, in coordination with a Technical Committee of operational experts and a Steering Committee that includes donor partners.[7] Like the TPP, by combining funding contributions from multiple donors, the EIF is able to fund projects on a scale larger than any single donor may be willing to execute on its own. This funding innovation enhances multilateral coordination and collaboration in support of shared priorities. Unlike the TPP, the EIF program office is not responsible for program execution. Rather, the MPTF construct enables transfer of funds directly to grant recipients, who are responsible for the implementation of approved activities.

Neither the LCM, TPP, nor EIF are funded through the UN's regular budget; all are fully dependent upon extra-budgetary contributions. Accordingly, budgets can be inconsistent, challenging long-term planning and initiatives. Moreover, complete reliance on donor contributions may render work plans subject to donor priorities, which may not always align with UN priorities. Donor funding can be tied to restrictions and, in some cases, direct the pursuit of activities with only loose linkages to operational requirements or deployments. However, development of organizational strategies with clear objectives, as well as the diversification of donors, help mitigate some of these challenges.

One possible structural advantage of donor-funded budgets is that these coordination functions are insulated from ongoing UN budget cuts. Member States that endorse such UN coordination functions can ensure sustainment through direct funding. In fact, these organizations report that they continue to see consistent support from many traditional partners and that, with the withdrawal of some large donor countries, non-traditional partners are emerging to support in new and diverse ways.

UN Forums

In addition to coordination mechanisms managed by the UN Secretariat, the UN supports the organization of high-level forums that raise awareness of peace operations training and capacity-building needs for uniformed peacekeepers. In particular, the **UN Peacekeeping Ministerial (UNPKM)**, co-hosted by the UN and several Member States, brings together defense, foreign affairs, and interior ministers to strengthen political support for UN operations and generate concrete

[6] "Proposals," The Elsie Initiative Fund for Uniformed Women in Peace Operations, accessed July 2025, https://elsiefund.org/proposals/.
[7] "Structure of the Elsie Initiative Fund," The Elsie Initiative Fund for Uniformed Women in Peace Operations, accessed July 2025, https://elsiefund.org/structure-eifund/.

commitments to improve operational effectiveness. The first UNPKM was held in 2016, following the 2015 Leaders' Summit on Peacekeeping. The Summit aimed to revitalize international support for UN peacekeeping, and the Ministerial meetings were subsequently established to maintain that momentum. Ministerials have since been held approximately every two years in host countries around the world.[8]

Member States participating in UNPKM events are urged to announce concrete, substantive pledges to help close peace operations capability gaps for uniformed peacekeepers. UN DPO compiles a pledging guide in advance of each Ministerial to articulate UN priorities and shape meaningful Member State commitments. Active engagement by the UN and other co-hosts to promote impactful pledges, as well as an emphasis on "smart" (i.e., collaborative) pledges, have fostered cooperation among T/PCCs and capacity-building providers. Through such engagement, the Ministerials have played an important coordinating function and helped bring new partners to the table.

The **UN Chiefs of Police Summit (UNCOPS)** is also a high-level, biennial forum. Convened by the UN DPO's Police Division with the support of Member State sponsors, events are typically held at the UN Headquarters in New York. UNCOPS brings together UN police commissioners, national Ministers of Interior and police chiefs, and senior representatives from regional and professional policing organizations to discuss and strengthen international peace and security through the lens of policing. These conferences provide a platform to raise awareness regarding emerging UN policing challenges and requirements, promote greater integration between national and UN policing efforts, and enhance UN Police capabilities. Like the UNPKM process, the UN welcomes Member State pledges of support as part of the UNCOPS events. These conferences provide opportunities for Member States to announce political and financial support, as well as the commitment of police personnel, training, and equipment to advance police priorities.

Both the UNPKM and UNCOPS forums provide important platforms for information sharing, enabling the UN to directly engage Member State leadership across Ministries of Defense, Foreign Affairs, and/or Interior.[9] UNPKM and UNCOPS pledging processes also help advance collective action and partnerships. Challenges can stem from balancing focus with inclusivity, as hosts and participants often seek to prioritize their own diverse agendas, making it difficult to maintain programs that center around core objectives. Additionally, follow-up processes often fall short, as some countries fail to implement commitments announced in these forums. Regardless, the involvement of Member State decision-makers in such high-level events helps raise the visibility of peace operations priorities and build political will to address requirements.

At the more technical level, the UN additionally facilitates the conduct of a regular **Partnership for Technology in Peacekeeping Symposium**. Organized by UN DOS, together with OICT, the symposium seeks to align technological capacities with the practical needs of peace operations. The Symposium has drawn wide

[8] "UN Peacekeeping Ministerials," United Nations Peacekeeping, accessed July 2025, https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/un-peacekeeping-ministerials.
[9] The UN DPO additionally held biennial Chiefs of Defence Conferences in New York between 2015 and 2019. However, no post-COVID iterations of this forum have been conducted, and it is unclear when or if this forum will resume.

participation from Member States, academia, and research centers, facilitating knowledge sharing, brainstorming, and synchronized efforts. Importantly, the forum has proven a fertile ground for fostering partnerships resulting in practical initiatives, such as UNCAP (sustained under the TPP program office highlighted above) and a range of field-based projects.[10]

While its growing attendance and thematic breadth are strengths, some stakeholders cited a risk of over-diversification, with too many themes diluting focus and creating difficulties in prioritizing which technologies to develop or scale. Some of the pilot initiatives struggle with resource constraints. Additionally, ensuring equitable access to emerging technologies, including reconciling differing levels of Member State technical capacity—as well as technical standardization and interoperability—create complications. Finally, maintaining momentum both for and between annual/biennial symposia requires active follow-up by UN leadership and stakeholders.

International Associations

Beyond UN initiatives and forums, Member States have also organized international associations specifically focused on training and capacity-building in support of UN and UN-mandated peace operations. One prominent grouping is the **International Association of Peacekeeping Training Centres (IAPTC)**, which serves as an open and voluntary association of institutions, agencies, and individuals that address peace operations research, education, and training. The Association's primary activity is the conduct of an annual conference. Participation varies by year but includes military, police, and civilian representatives at the technical level from Member States, academic and research institutions, and UN peacekeeping agencies. The conference serves as one of the largest global platforms to build networks, share ideas and experiences, and promote good practices and lessons learned, with a view toward aligning training to address evolving peace operations trends.[11]

The IAPTC plays a unique role, bringing together cross-component practitioners and experts from around the world to engage on peace operations training topics. The conference host rotates annually across different regions, energizing more balanced regional engagement. The IAPTC's loose affiliation with regional training center associations also fosters wider engagement. The conference benefits from high-level UN participation and, reciprocally, provides the UN an important opportunity to disseminate peace operations policies and standardized training materials directly to, and seek inputs from, the institutions responsible for implementation. Of note, since 2019, the inclusion of an IAPTC Police Day at the onset of the annual conference offers the UN Police Division one of the few opportunities to coordinate across PCC training institutions, supporting implementation of the new Police Training Architecture Program. As peace operations evolve, conference sessions also raise awareness and promote dialogue on emerging topics and training/capacity-building considerations.

[10] "Partnership for Technology in Peacekeeping," United Nations Department of Operational Support, accessed September 2025, https://operationalsupport.un.org/en/partnership-technology-peacekeeping.
[11] "About Annual Conference," IAPTC, accessed July 2025, https://iaptc.org/about-annual-conference.

The annual IAPTC conference is coordinated by an Executive Committee, with the support of an elected Secretariat that serves for a five-year, renewable term (currently held by the Cairo International Center for Conflict Resolution, Peacekeeping, and Peacebuilding [CCCPA]). The association's Executive Committee structure is well-institutionalized, engaging host country representatives for a four-year cycle to ensure continuity (with posts for the prior host country, which serves as President; the current host country; the host-designate country; and the President from the previous year); military, police, civilian, and pedagogical chairs (ideally filled by representatives from different regions); a Consolidation and Development Committee Chair; a UN representative (generally the UN ITS Chief); a representative of the Secretariat; and an Honorary Chair for a founding member.[12] The diverse regional and functional backgrounds of Executive Committee members help ensure various perspectives are integrated in the annual conference agenda. Moreover, the extended terms of the Executive Committee and Secretariat build institutional knowledge and foster consistency.

The IAPTC has no central budget. Conference expenses are covered by the respective host country, with participants responsible for their own travel costs. Similarly, the country holding the Secretariat is responsible for its staffing and operational costs.

Criticisms have pointed to the IAPTC's large conference format as constraining dialogue and noted that participation of T/PCC training centers is inconsistent, depending on location. Some participants have further suggested that the lack of actionable outcomes and absence of a work plan or sustained engagement between annual conferences limits the IAPTC's full potential. Responding to past recommendations, the IAPTC Executive Committee has adjusted conference agendas, incorporating syndicate discussions to foster greater dialogue and an Ideas Bazarre to showcase innovative concepts. The Committee has also considered possibilities such as a communique to convey event takeaways or the conduct of thematic meetings throughout the year to sustain member involvement. However, study interviewees largely contended that the association's true value stems from the conference's information sharing and in-person networking opportunities. Despite any arguable shortcomings, the association serves a valuable coordination function, bringing together an inclusive spectrum of peace operations stakeholders from across military, police, and civilian institutions.

The **Challenges Forum** also operates as an international association for a spectrum of military, police, and civilian stakeholders; however, it serves a different function than the IAPTC. While the IAPTC is focused on training practitioners operating at the tactical and operational levels, the Challenges Forum is primarily focused on policy and doctrinal issues at the strategic level. Through events, workshops, and publications, the Challenges Forum convenes policymakers, practitioners, and academics from around the world to deliberate various dimensions and approaches to peace operations.[13] The Forum fosters impartial dialogue on complex peace operations topics, shapes recommendations for UN leaders and Member State policymakers, and catalyzes collective engagement and action.

While the Forum promotes inclusive participation, its primary audience is its

[12] "Members: 2024-2025 Executive Committee Members," IAPTC, accessed October 2025, https://iaptc.org/members.
[13] "About," Challenges Forum, accessed July 2025, https://challengesforum.org/about/.

formal partner members, who are guided by a partnership framework agreement. Partners include representatives from both government agencies and non-government institutions with peace operations competencies in areas such as conflict resolution, security and justice reform, development, and doctrine development, in addition to military operations and policing. Partner representatives are encouraged to step out of their official roles and, rather than carrying their countries' policy positions, approach dialogue from a facts-based perspective, drawing on their respective areas of expertise.

Like the IAPTC, the Challenges Forum has no central budget; all partners are responsible for their respective expenses. Different from the IAPTC, partner members carry out a robust and continuous work plan of activities, including seminars and research, in addition to its annual meeting. The forum has particularly been credited for its contributions to specific products, such as training materials for UN senior mission leadership. An International Secretariat, hosted by the Folke Bernadotte Academy in Sweden, plans and coordinates the daily work of the Forum, implementing the strategy and operation plan established during an annual Partners' Meeting and developed in close partnership with the UN.

Groups of Friends

At the international level, Groups of Friends (GoFs) serve as an additional type of coordination mechanism. GoFs are informal coalitions of Member States or organizations that elevate awareness, provide political capital, generate financial or technical resources, and/or facilitate unified action in support of a particular issue. One active example is the **Group of Friends of Corrections in Peace Operations**. With approximately 45 Member States, the GoF of Corrections facilitates collaboration among members' Permanent Missions to the UN, their national correctional services, subject matter experts across the UN, and relevant non-governmental and civil society organizations and training institutes engaged on corrections topics.[14]

Beyond core pre-deployment training, specialized requirements for the more than 300 uniformed corrections officers deployed to UN peace operations differ from other UN Police training needs. Corrections considerations are not widely incorporated under other existing coordination mechanisms. Accordingly, the GoF of Corrections has played a critical role in information sharing, political advocacy, and integration of corrections issues into peace operations mandate discussions. This GoF further provides a platform for coordinating the provision of pre-deployment training for corrections personnel. The effectiveness of this particular group is largely attributable to the sustained and active engagement of "anchor" Member States, including Sweden and Canada.

The GoF of Corrections is guided by a Terms of Reference document and elects a rotating Chair. However, different from other mechanisms, the GoF's membership is comprised of representatives from the Permanent Missions of Member States. Such networks are often less institutionalized and may be more personality-dependent than other coordination mechanisms, unless

[14] "Members," Group of Friends of Corrections in Peace Operations, accessed September 2025, https://www.friendsofcorrections.com/about-us/members.aspx.

consistently prioritized by active member governments. Nevertheless, GoFs can serve as valuable platforms for coordinating specific issue areas, especially where more institutionalized mechanisms are absent.

Multinational Exercises

Finally, it is worth noting the coordination functions served by multinational peace operations exercises. Tabletop, computer simulation, and field exercises all bring participants together to support joint planning, harmonize procedures, and enhance interoperability. While not a comprehensive list, some relevant examples include the VIKING exercise, led by Sweden, which brings together military, police, and civilian participants, as well as UN representatives, across distributed locations for a computer-aided international peace and crisis management command post simulation. The United States has historically hosted numerous command post and field-based military exercises, including annual multinational peacekeeping exercises in the Asia-Pacific region (exercise name changes depending on host country, with Indonesia hosting GARUDA CANTI DHARMA, Malaysia hosting KERIS AMAN, Mongolia hosting KHAAN QUEST, Bangladesh hosting SHANTI DOOT, and Nepal hosting SHANTI PRAYAS), as well as the ACCORD series of exercises held in various African countries. Exercise FELINO is another example of a peace operations-focused command post and field exercise, sponsored by the Community of Portuguese Speaking Countries. Additionally, the peacekeeping training centers of Austria, Germany, the Netherlands, and Switzerland—conducting joint training under a partnership called Fo(u)r Peace Central Europe (4-PCE)—hold a multinational field training exercise, BLUE FLAG, to conclude their UN Military Observer Course.

In all example cases, participants include cross-regional representatives to incorporate international perspectives and foster collaboration. These exercises increase shared understanding and prepare contingents to operate more effectively together in actual deployments. Challenges most often stem from the extensive logistical coordination of bringing together multinational participants, as well as the high costs, especially in the case of field exercises. Large-scale exercises often require a sponsor country resourced to bear the financial and logistical burden of such engagements.

Regional Coordination Mechanisms: Africa

In addition to the international mechanisms discussed above, regional and sub-regional groupings have evolved to facilitate greater information sharing and coordination in support of UN and UN-mandated peace operations. In Africa, regional organizations, including the African Union (AU) and regional economic communities (RECs), have played a central role in shepherding peace operations requirements on the continent. The African Standby Force (ASF) framework, under the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), sits at the heart of this effort, with coordination driven by ASF planning elements in the following:

- **AU Peace Support Operations Division (PSOD)**
- **East African Standby Force (EASF)**
- **Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) Standby Force**
- **Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Standby Force**
- **North African Regional Capability (NARC)**
- **Southern African Development Community (SADC) Standby Brigade**

While the primary focus of the AU and RECs is on preparation for and management of regional operations, which may or may not be mandated by the UN, the roles of these organizations in the coordination of peace operations training and capacity-building must be considered.

The AU PSOD serves as the continental planning element and is responsible for planning, launching, directing, monitoring, sustaining, managing, and liquidating AU-mandated peace operations.[15] The PSOD is actively engaged in the identification of training requirements and standardization of curricula for uniformed peacekeepers. While the AU seeks to align training with UN requirements, it has distinguished the AU's curricula from that of the UN. The AU holds that the context of regional peace enforcement missions differs from UN operations and that this distinction must be reflected in doctrine and training materials.

The PSOD organizes regular seminars and workshops, such as the annual **ASF Training Implementation Workshop**, to review ASF Training Directives and address implementation challenges, as well as to foster collaboration, share best practices, and address thematic topics.[16] Additionally, to promulgate training, the PSOD organizes regional ToT courses hosted at various training centers across the continent, often funded and supported by donor partners. The PSOD seeks to maintain and disseminate an annual training calendar to support the alignment and deconfliction of regional training efforts, as well as a roster of trainers, comprised of personnel who have completed ToT courses.

Instructor exchanges are common between training centers but are primarily organized at the REC level. RECs are also responsible for assessing the operational readiness of units pledged for regional standby forces. However, interviewees noted that, while

[15] *The Peace Support Operations Division: Silencing the Guns, Sustaining Peace* (African Union, 2016), https://www.peaceau.org/uploads/02-au-psod-brochure-23sep16.pdf, 9.
[16] "16th ASF Training Implementation Workshop Held in Nairobi, Kenya, Focuses on Technology in Peace Support Operations," EASF, accessed September 2025, https://www.easfcom.org/index.php/en/about-easf/history-and-background/9-news/1733-16th-asf-training-implementation-workshop-held-in-nairobi-focuses-on-technology-in-peace-support-operations.

identified gaps are reported, follow-up actions are limited. No UN LCM-like mechanism exists on the continent, nor is there any formal connection to UN coordination mechanisms. Any support for addressing T/PCC shortfalls usually stems from bilateral engagement with capacity-building partners.

Research and interviews suggest that, at the continental level, the greatest coordination challenges stem from staffing gaps. The PSOD is cited as grossly understaffed, especially given the scope of envisioned functions, with donors noting the organization largely lacks the capacity to absorb assistance. Staffing gaps are, in part, due to financial constraints but are further driven by political sensitivities. Lack of political consensus regarding the balance of authority between the AU and RECs has been a major impediment to the coordination of peace operations capabilities on the continent,[17] with Member States largely unwilling to sufficiently resource or empower continental mechanisms. Overlapping functions at the REC level and duplication of effort across various ASF Planning Elements further undermine harmonization. Given the scope of training and capacity-building requirements across the continent, there is a need for better coordination to optimize resources.

Debate regarding the role of the AU versus the UN with respect to regional peace operations further fuels sensitivities, with the AU reflecting Member States' preferences for regional ownership. The deep reduction in foreign assistance to the continent has reinforced this inward focus. However, resource shortfalls rationalize the continued need for alignment between the AU and UN to draw on each organization's comparative advantages. The Joint UN-AU Framework for an Enhanced Partnership in Peace and Security outlines a structure to strengthen collaboration between the UN and the AU. Additionally, the passage of UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 2719, which opens the door for UN funding of AU-led operations, has generated extensive, ongoing engagement from the strategic to the technical level to foster greater synergies.

At the more technical level, continued coordination among the AU, regional, and national training institutions is needed to standardize, deconflict, and maximize training opportunities across the continent. The **African Peace Support Trainers Association (APSTA)** provides one mechanism for supporting these functions. APSTA operates as a non-profit organization, established to facilitate exchanges among regional training centers, foster the sharing of best practices, and promote standardization of training in support of the APSA and ASF. APSTA serves as the Africa affiliate of the IAPTC, and membership includes training centers from at least 10 countries across the continent.

APSTA has played a less active role in the coordination of regional training schedules and instructor exchanges than some of the other regional training center associations, as those functions are largely led by the AU PSOD and the RECs. However, the AU and APSTA have partnered to support the standardization of training, with APSTA's role historically including assistance with the development and dissemination of training materials, as well as support for training delivery.

Of the four regional peace operations training center associations, APSTA is the only one that employs dedicated personnel,

[17] "Update on the Operationalisation of the African Standby Force (ASF)," Amani Africa, 29 January 2025, https://amaniafrica-et.org/update-on-the-operationalisation-of-the-african-standby-force-asf/.

including an Executive Secretary, a Deputy Executive Secretary, and a small staff. These personnel serve as a permanent Secretariat with diplomatic status, hosted at Cameroon's École Internationale des Forces de Sécurité (EIFORCES). Benefits of this structure include the availability of full-time staff members committed to supporting association activities. Additionally, a permanent Secretariat provides consistency and historical memory.

However, such a model entails higher overhead costs, and financial challenges have significantly constrained the association's operations. Secretariat expenses are covered by the Cameroon government, with supplemental funding from annual membership dues, but the payment of dues has been inconsistent. APSTA has sought additional financial support from the AU, but the AU lacks resources to provide such contributions.

Resource limitations have hampered the association's activities. However, APSTA conducted its first post-COVID, in-person Board of Directors and General Meeting in January 2025, aimed at reviving the association's activities.[18] Toward this end, the Secretariat is exploring options such as virtual events to minimize costs.

Overall, study interviewees suggested that APSTA would benefit from a more sustainable financial model, more inclusive membership, and greater clarity regarding its roles and relationship with the AU PSOD and RECs. Implementation of UNSCR 2719 could provide an opportunity to reinvigorate this partnership and more effectively leverage APSTA to support ASF Training Directives.

On the African continent, regularized forums, such as the **African C-IED Conference**, also provide useful platforms for coordinating peace operations-related training and capacity-building activities. This annual conference is jointly sponsored by the British Peace Support Team (Africa) (BPST(A)), Kenya's International Peace Support Training Centre (IPSTC), and UNMAS and held at the Humanitarian Peace Support School in Nairobi. The conference convenes technical experts to enhance situational awareness of current C-IED threats and emerging trends, as well as to share lessons and best practices from peace operations across Africa. Participants include experts from UN and AU missions, relevant African T/PCC institutions, and international partner organizations. A key objective is to enhance the preparedness of T/PCCs to respond to C-IED threats. The conference further seeks to support the AU PSOD's efforts to develop C-IED policy and doctrine.[19]

Functional initiatives such as the African C-IED Conference support deeper coordination on a specific issue area and can play an important role in complementing broader mechanisms. Such forums are particularly useful for sharing information and addressing requirements in technical areas that benefit from collaboration among subject matter experts.

Because such forums are not institutionalized or supported by a formal governance structure, they are dependent on one or more lead countries or institutions to organize. However, they can be relatively cost-effective mechanisms for facilitating collaboration, especially if lead agents are committed to sustaining the

[18] Wandile Langa, "APSTA Held its 17th Board and General Meeting," ACCORD, 7 February 2025, https://www.accord.org.za/news/apsta-held-its-17th-board-and-general-meeting/.
[19] British Peace Support Team (Africa), *Concept Note for the 7th Annual African C-IED Conference, 7 – 9 October 2025*, (UK Ministry of Defence, 16 October 2025), 1.

forum. Interviewees noted that the effectiveness of such forums tends to improve over time, as they refine processes and build on prior achievements, creating continuity and a stronger foundation for collective action.

Regional Coordination Mechanisms: Asia-Pacific

Like the AU in Africa, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has played an active role in coordinating peace operations training and capacity-building activities in this sub-region. A range of ASEAN defense and security bodies address peace operations topics. Notably, the **ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting-Plus Experts' Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations (ADMM-Plus PKO-EWG)** is a working group under the ADMM-Plus framework that fosters peace operations cooperation among ASEAN member states and their dialogue partners. The ADMM-Plus PKO-EWG meets annually as part of the larger ADMM-Plus forum, with participation also including representatives from observer states, the UN, and other relevant organizations. The working group aims to deepen trust and security cooperation among participating militaries and enhance their peace operations capacities.[20] It is co-chaired by one ASEAN Member State and one Plus Country for a three-year cycle. Working group chairs facilitate the development of a three-year plan of support activities, including workshops, seminars, and training exercises.[21]

More internally focused on ASEAN Member States, the **ASEAN Peacekeeping Centres Network (APCN)** directly fosters engagement and collaboration across peace operations training institutions in the sub-region. The APCN provides a platform for members to share lessons learned, align training standards with UN requirements, and develop joint activities that strengthen regional interoperability. By fostering collaboration among national peacekeeping centers, the network reduces duplication of effort and builds a stronger collective capacity to contribute to peace operations.

The APCN conducts a roughly annual conference organized by the APCN chair, which rotates in conjunction with the ASEAN Secretariat. The APCN further organizes joint peacekeeping training exercises, such as the **ASEAN Peacekeeping Staff Exercise (APSE)**, to enhance the preparedness of national peacekeeping contingents. Additionally, the network addresses thematic issues, such as women, peace, and security topics related to peace operations.

ASEAN has, at times, been criticized for its proliferation of defense and security structures, which facilitate coordination but may dilute attention and confuse lines of responsibility. Additionally, findings from research and interviews suggest that ASEAN's consensus-based approach can slow decision-making and make it difficult to move efforts forward. However, interviewees noted that coordination at the technical level is often more productive than political-level structures, and networks such as the APCN have demonstrably enhanced collaboration among member training institutions.

[20] Li Jiayao, "20th meeting of ADMM-Plus Experts' Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations to be held in Nanjing: Defense Spokesperson," China Military Online, 9 June 2025, http://eng.mod.gov.cn/xb/News_213114/TopStories/16390503.html#:~:text=Ministry%20of%20National%20Defense,-Home&text=BEIJING%2C%20June%209%20%2D%2D%20%22The,their%20capacities%20of%20peacekeeping%20operations.

[21] "About the ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting Plus," ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting, 28 April 2025, https://admm.asean.org/index.php/about-admm/about-admm-plus.html#:~:text=The%20Inaugural%20ADMM%2DPlus%20was%20convened%20in%20Ha,environment.%20The%20objectives%20of%20the%20ADMM%2DPlus%2C%20are:.

The **Association of Asia-Pacific Peace Operations Training Centers (AAPTC)** similarly fosters collaboration among training institutions. While membership overlaps with the APCN, the AAPTC engages training centers across the wider Asia-Pacific region and serves as the regional affiliate of the IAPTC. The AAPTC is an open and voluntary association of centers and institutions working on peacekeeping research, education, and training in the Asia-Pacific region, although membership is currently focused on military training centers. Its annual conference is the primary venue for member engagement, and agenda topics focus on enhancing understanding of UN training doctrine, standards, and requirements.

The AAPTC has played a particularly useful role in promoting information sharing across member institutions. Annual AAPTC meetings support the exchange of training calendars and facilitate efforts to deconflict and coordinate course schedules to maximize regional training opportunities. Members additionally identify opportunities for instructor and participant exchanges.

The conference host rotates annually, generally following the alphabetical order of member countries. The Secretariat is selected by the membership for a three-year, renewable term. Although, due to lack of expressed interest by other institutions, the Bangladesh Institute of Peace Support Operation Training (BIPSOT) served this function from 2011-2024, until the United States assumed the role. Like the IAPTC, the AAPTC has no organizational budget. Members are responsible for the costs of their respective contributions and participation. However, donor partners have funded the travel costs of many member institutions to enable participation, and donor funding has actively facilitated regional instructor and participant exchanges. The impact of funding cuts by key donor partners remains to be seen. Transition of the Secretariat may also negatively affect the association's level of engagement.

In the Asia-Pacific region, donor/provider partners have also actively engaged to better deconflict and coordinate training and capacity-building assistance. For example, since 2014, the United States Indo-Pacific Command has facilitated a near-annual meeting of the **Peacekeeping Operations Coordination Board – Technical Working Group (PKOCB-TWG)**. The working group brings together representatives from approximately eight key capacity-building provider countries to share information regarding peace operations-related military training and assistance activities in the region, including building a shared training calendar. Through improved coordination, the working group helps minimize duplication of effort and maximize the reach and impact of limited capacity-building resources.

The working group operates as an informal coordination mechanism, with no governance structure. The meeting host rotates based on which country volunteers, and all participants are responsible for their respective costs. Given the United States' reduction in support for peace operations capacity-building activities, however, the future of this working group is uncertain.

Regional Coordination Mechanisms: Central Asia

No association of training centers or other formal peace operations coordination mechanisms exist in the Central Asia region. However, since 2024, the Kazakhstan Peace Operations Centre (KAZCENT) has hosted two **Central Asian Regional Roundtables** to foster dialogue on UN peace operations and broader regional security issues. Planned in coordination with the UN LCM, the roundtables promoted information sharing and cooperation. While participation in the first roundtable was more limited, the second gathered police and military representatives from Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan, as well as participants from the Republic of Korea, the UN, the International Committee of the Red Cross, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, and academic institutions and students. Participants reflected on key thematic areas and discussed practical ways to enhance collaboration among regional and international partners. The UN LCM's support for the roundtables builds on similar efforts in other regions and is driven by encouragement from the C34 to foster regional cooperation networks that enhance collaboration in the preparation, deployment, and sustainment of peace operations.[22]

Member States participating in the roundtables expressed desire to focus on training versus wider cooperation topics, such as equipment sharing or co-deployments. To deepen training-related engagements and further the exchange of best practices, they proposed conducting a series of knowledge management initiatives on thematic topics. The UN LCM has agreed to support such initiatives.

To date, the Roundtables have functioned as ad hoc events to convene regional stakeholders through an informal mechanism. The UN LCM has facilitated the planning of these events in partnership with the host organization and with the financial support of a donor country. No governance structure is currently in place or planned, although participants discussed the development of terms of reference or a political declaration to formalize the roundtable process. Participating countries have expressed reluctance to institutionalize a more structured coordination mechanism, given political dynamics and resource constraints. If the conduct of roundtables or other forums can be regularized, establishment of more formalized associations may be unnecessary in this region. In fact, Kazakhstan has already proposed hosting the next meeting in 2026, tentatively at the ministerial level to generate greater political buy-in. However, this format may require sustained investment by the UN LCM or other partners to supplement resources and maintain momentum.

[22] *Report of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, 2024 substantive session (New York, 19 February–15 March 2024)*, A/78/19, (United Nations General Assembly, 2024), 17.

Regional Coordination Mechanisms: Europe

In the Europe region, numerous organizations, associations, and forums support regional coordination related to peace and security issues, including many under the umbrella of the European Union (EU). Many of these mechanisms encompass peace operations requirements but few emphasize training and capacity-building for UN and UN-mandated operations. The **European Association of Peace Operations Training Centres (EAPTC)**, which serves as the European affiliate of the IAPTC, may most directly address relevant training and capacity-building activities, although the EAPTC heavily centers on European-led crisis response missions in addition to UN peace operations.

The EAPTC is an open and voluntary association of military, police, and civilian entities across Europe that address peace operations and crisis management education, training, and research. The EAPTC facilitates the inclusion of non-EU countries and further welcomes the participation of relevant organizations from outside the region. While there are myriad military, police, and civilian forums across Europe, few foster cross-component coordination. The EAPTC emphasizes this role, providing a bridging platform to advance cross-functional communication and cooperation. The active engagement of police institutions is particularly notable relative to some of the other regional associations, possibly due to the prioritization of policing functions and strong national police forces in many European countries.

Similar to other training center associations, the EAPTC's primary focus is the conduct of an annual conference. This event supports knowledge sharing and dialogue on training methodologies and innovations. Discussions further explore approaches for addressing the increasing complexity, risks, and challenges of regional and UN operations.

Also similar to most other training center associations, there is no organizational budget; members are responsible for the costs of their respective contributions and participation. Unlike other associations, the EAPTC employs a loose governance arrangement. Initial organizers did not perceive a need for formalized processes given how routinely many regional institutions already work together across the spectrum of regional affiliations. Accordingly, there is no established Secretariat. A group of core members, referred to as the Group of Friends, guides the association. By statute, membership in this Group is open and renewed during the administrative meeting at the annual conference. The Group of Friends approves the host for the subsequent annual conference. That host is then responsible for convening the Group of Friends to support formulation of the conference agenda.

Some interviewees noted that the lack of a Secretariat or more institutionalized governance structure undermines continuity and communications. Some suggested that the establishment of a light, non-bureaucratic Secretariat (e.g., a troika of past, current, and future hosts or some other minimal structure) could strengthen institutional memory, reinforce handover mechanisms, and support more consistent engagement. Interviewees also suggested that the association could benefit from greater efforts (via a Secretariat or other) to produce a compilation of regional training courses, assemble a data repository of

relevant information and research, and maintain a more interactive website. Overall, a more structured governance mechanism could help sustain coordination among EAPTC members and strengthen association outcomes.

Regional Coordination Mechanisms: Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC)

The **Latin American Association of Peacekeeping Training Centres (or the Asociación Latinoamericana de Centros de Entrenamiento para Operaciones de Paz; ALCOPAZ)** serves as one of the most active of the regional training center associations and is the regional affiliate of the IAPTC. ALCOPAZ works to strengthen the operational capabilities and readiness of its member institutions, supporting the coordination and standardization of education and training activities in alignment with UN policies and training materials.[23] By statute, ALCOPAZ is comprised of training centers, government partners, and affiliated organizations focused on training military, police, and civilian personnel for peace operations. In practice, it is largely focused on coordination across the region's military training centers. Member countries have generally not resourced the participation of police and civilian personnel, and accordingly, ALCOPAZ is currently assessing the value of maintaining its police and civilian committees.

ALCOPAZ sustains an active agenda, including an annual conference and monthly academic exchanges, and it promotes routine engagement among regional training centers. Like the AAPTC, ALCOPAZ facilitates the exchange of training calendars and advances efforts not only to deconflict but also to coordinate course schedules. ALCOPAZ further coordinates instructor and participant exchanges across training centers, and in some cases, promotes regional specialization by encouraging training centers to focus on distinct areas of expertise. This approach reduces duplication, ensures that limited resources are used more efficiently, and allows member states to benefit from each other's comparative strengths. By cultivating complementary capabilities across the network, ALCOPAZ strengthens collective training capacity while fostering greater collaboration and interoperability among participating centers.

Like most of the other regional training center associations, there is no central budget; members are responsible for the costs of their respective contributions and participation. Donor partners have helped fund the travel costs of some member institutions to enable participation in ALCOPAZ events, the sponsorship of regional courses, and instructor and participant exchanges. Again, the impact of funding cuts by key donor partners remains to be seen. Interviewees noted that instructor exchanges may continue as a high priority activity. However, the number of regional courses may decrease, or training centers might increasingly conduct virtual courses. Diversification of donors in this region may also help mitigate impacts.

In part, ALCOPAZ's success can be attributed to its well-institutionalized organizational structure and the committed engagement of member training centers. The ALCOPAZ host country rotates annually, proceeding alphabetically among Full Member countries. The host country is responsible for coordinating, hosting, and chairing the Executive Committee meetings and annual conference. Generally, lead responsibility is assigned to the Commander or Director of the host

[23] "Institutional Review," ALCOPAZ, accessed July 2025, https://alcopaz.org/resena-institucion/.

country's peace operations training center. The association includes five committees (i.e., the Executive Committee; Consolidation, Development & Planning Committee; Military Committee; Police Committee; and Civil Committee) that develop annual work plans, lead association activities, and produce reports. Among other tasks, the Consolidation, Development & Planning Committee maintains the ALCOPAZ website and preserves institutional memory and documentation, including compiling and posting the association's reports and research on the website. Each committee includes at least three members, with membership rotating every two years.

Interviewees also noted that training center Commanders/Directors have demonstrated considerable motivation and commitment to ALCOPAZ's goals, as they carry the responsibility for preparing their country's personnel for deployments and hold each other accountable for fulfilling association duties. Additionally, cooperation at the technical level has enabled concrete outcomes. In signing the ALCOPAZ charter, Ministries of Defense have authorized their respective peace operations training centers to directly liaise and coordinate with counterparts in other countries, as well as to engage directly with the UN ITS. This was highlighted as a significant step for centralized militaries, facilitating coordination less encumbered by politics and administrative bureaucracy.

Building on ALCOPAZ's success, and consistent with the C34's encouragement to foster regional networks, the UN LCM has supported LAC efforts to operationalize a complementary **Latin American and Caribbean Network for Cooperation in Peacekeeping Operations (RELACOPAZ)**.

The RELACOPAZ initiative is an outcome of the **Latin American and Caribbean Conference on UN Peacekeeping Operations (ALCONU)**, first organized in 2022 and again in 2023. ALCONU I brought together Ministry of Defense representatives to consider regional cooperation beyond training, exploring opportunities for collaboration on broader issues of financing, equipment, deployment, and sustainment of peacekeeping units. Participants agreed to establish a regional cooperation network, and at ALCONU II, Ministers of Defense or their representatives signed the RELACOPAZ Statute of Incorporation.

RELACOPAZ commits to optimizing or increasing the participation of LAC countries in UN operations. Objectives include promoting collaboration to expand the operational, technical, and human capacities of its members, supporting binational or multinational contingents, creating guidelines and procedures to standardize interoperability, and advancing knowledge sharing, among others.[24]

Continued conduct of a biennial ALCONU conference will facilitate discussion of issues related to RELACOPAZ (with ALCONU III scheduled for October 2025). Coinciding with these conferences, a RELACOPAZ Plenary Session will serve as the work meeting for members, observers, and guests. Plenary Sessions are to be chaired by the country that holds the Pro-Tempore Presidency of the ALCONU Conference, elected by consensus at the prior ALCONU meeting. The ALCONU President holds office for two years and, additionally, serves as the President of RELACOPAZ. The country holding the RELACOPAZ Presidency is also responsible for serving as its Secretariat. With inputs

[24] *Statute of Incorporation*, *Latin American and Caribbean Network for Cooperation in Peacekeeping Operations*, (RELACOPAZ, 12 September 2023), https://relacopaz.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/RELACOPAZ-2023-09-12-Estatuto-Constitutivo-Ingles-.pdf, 3-4.

from other members, the President and Secretariat propose the work agenda, including the envisioned creation of Thematic Working Groups.[25]

The UN has been actively engaged in planning processes for both ALCONU and RELACOPAZ activities. UN engagement in the region is viewed as positive for increasing awareness and fostering cooperation, particularly given the two UN-mandated peace missions in the region (Colombia and Haiti). However, interviewees expressed doubt that the establishment of RELACOPAZ would expand regional contributions to peace operations, noting that, without a major driving force or active regional leadership (e.g., Brazil's role generating forces for the UN Mission in Haiti [MINUSTAH]), most LAC countries may be unlikely to prioritize peace operations deployments given domestic politics and other budgetary pressures. Regional engagement in UN operations may be further complicated by the withdrawal of traditional capacity-building partners, as the provision of equipment and other assistance historically helped incentivize or enable deployments.

While political agreement to establish RELACOPAZ is, in itself, a success, some interviewees further noted that a ministry-level network risks being too political to achieve concrete outcomes. They cited reaching consensus-based political decisions as a considerable obstacle. Members have, so far, been slow to establish Technical and Thematic Working Groups. Staffing and resource commitments to achieve substantive progress may be difficult to secure given the scope of priorities ministries are working to balance. That said, RELACOPAZ is still a nascent network. It will take time to institutionalize new structures and achieve meaningful results. In the meantime, sustained engagement by the UN LCM and support securing supplemental resources from donor partners will likely be critical to maintain momentum.

[25] *Statute of Incorporation*, *Latin American and Caribbean Network for Cooperation in Peacekeeping Operations*, (RELACOPAZ, 12 September 2023), https://relacopaz.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/RELACOPAZ-2023-09-12-Estatuto-Constitutivo-Ingles-.pdf, 5-6.

Other Relevant Defense and Security Coordination Mechanisms

In addition to reviewing existing peace operations coordination mechanisms, study objectives included surveying networks that support coordination on wider defense and security issues. These mechanisms either already address peace operations under a larger umbrella of topics or could do so if the topic were approached in a way that is relevant to the membership of the respective mechanism. The table below highlights examples of networks that could be further leveraged in support of peace operations requirements. It is intended as an illustrative versus comprehensive list.

Table 2: Other Relevant Defense and Security Coordination Mechanisms[26]

International	
Associations and Initiatives	• Community of Portuguese Language Countries (CPLP) • Effectiveness of Peace Operations Network (EPON) • Global Alliance for Peace Operations • International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) • International Association of Gendarmeries and Police Forces with Military Status (FIEP) • International Association of Women Police (IAWP) • International Corrections and Prisons Association (ICPA)
Conferences and Forums	• Munich Security Conference / Munich Leaders Meetings
Groups of Friends	• Group of Friends of UN Police
Africa	
Regional Organization Bodies	• AU Specialized Technical Committee on Defense, Safety, and Security (STCDSS) • Committee of the Eastern Africa Chiefs of Defence Staff (EACDS) • ECCAS Committee of Chiefs of Defence Staff (CCDS) • ECOWAS CCDS • NARC CCDS • SADC CCDS
Associations and Initiatives	• African Network of Think Tanks for Peace (NeTT4Peace) • European Union Security and Defence Initiative in Support of West African Countries of the Gulf of Guinea (EU SDI in the Gulf of Guinea)
Conferences and Forums	• African Air Chiefs Symposium (sponsored by U.S. Air Forces Europe/Africa and rotating host country) • African Chiefs of Defense Conference (sponsored by U.S. Africa Command and rotating host country)

[26] Mechanisms outlined in Table 2 serve only as a selection of examples based on research and study survey inputs. This table is not inclusive of all mechanisms that exist in each category.

	• Dakar International Forum on Peace and Security in Africa (sponsored by France and Senegal) • European Union-African Union Summit • Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC; sponsored by China) • Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD; sponsored by Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs)
Asia-Pacific	
Regional Organization Bodies	• ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) • Pacific Island Forum (PIF)/Forum Officials Committee (FOC) Sub-Committee on Regional Security
Associations and Initiatives	• Multinational Planning Augmentation Team (MPAT; led by U.S. Indo-Pacific Command) • Pacific Island Chiefs of Police (PICP)
Conferences and Forums	• ASEAN Chiefs of Defence Forces Meeting (ACDFM) • ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting/ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting Plus (ADMM/ADMM+) • IISS Shangri-La Dialogue (Asia Security Summit) • Indo-Pacific Chiefs of Defense (CHODs) Conference (sponsored by U.S. Indo-Pacific Command) • South Pacific Defence Ministers' Meeting (SPDDM)
Europe	
Regional Organizations and Bodies	• European Security and Defence College (ESDC) • European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation (EUROPOL) • European Union/European External Action Service (EEAS) • Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)
Associations and Initiatives	• NATO Defence and Related Security Capacity Building (DCB) Initiative • NATO Partnership for Peace (PfP)
Conferences and Forums	• Central Europe Chiefs of Defense Conference • European Police Congress (EPC) • IISS Prague Defence Summit (Euro-Atlantic Summit) • NATO Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) • Northern Europe Chiefs of Defense Conference
Latin America and Caribbean	
Regional Organizations	• Caribbean Community (CARICOM) • Organization of American States (OAS)
Conferences and Forums	• South American Defense Conference (SOUTHDEC; sponsored by U.S. Southern Command)
Middle East	
Regional Organizations	• League of Arab States

Mechanisms such as those outlined in Table 2 may serve as useful vehicles for the UN to expand outreach and connect with wider audiences. Many facilitate capacity-building partnerships that develop core military and police skills central to effective

peacekeeping. Engraining a greater awareness of peace operations requirements within these mechanisms could increase understanding of how partnerships do or could support T/PCC deployments to UN and UN-mandated operations and the value that stems from those deployments.

In some cases, UN peace operations stakeholders already engage these networks. In other cases, however, securing the attention of these mechanisms on UN peace operations amidst the scope of other priorities may be challenging and will take investment of time and resources. Thought needs to be given as to whether the participants of respective mechanisms are the correct audience to achieve intended end states. Given limited bandwidth, UN stakeholders need to be clear on desired outcomes and ensure outreach is targeted at the most appropriate outlet to achieve return on investment.

Key Findings

Drawing on the findings, achievements, challenges, and lessons from the peace operations coordination mechanisms reviewed above, a number of themes emerge. First, there is consensus that such **networks have significantly increased information sharing and raised awareness regarding training and capacity-building needs and opportunities**. These networks have further helped de-conflict assistance activities and heightened interest in the possibilities and value of partnerships among T/PCCs, other donors and capacity-building providers, and UN stakeholders.

At the regional level, **these networks strengthen ownership of training and capacity-building initiatives and encourage neighboring countries to work together to generate, prepare, and sustain peacekeepers**. For example, through regional associations, national training centers share training calendars and facilitate instructor and participant exchanges. In particular, associations such as ALCOPAZ and AAPTC actively work to deconflict course schedules and coordinate the conduct of regional staff training courses. At the international level, establishment of online platforms such as the LCMOS and the "Peacekeeping Global Training Calendar" offer greater visibility into training offerings.

For the UN, international and regional coordination networks multiply reach, extending the dissemination of information and deepening understanding of peace operations training and capacity-building requirements. These networks enable the UN to directly connect to a wider audience of Member State leaders and stakeholders. Participation in the IAPTC, for example, allows the UN to roll out new policies, frameworks, and training materials directly to T/PCC training center directors responsible for preparing their peacekeeping personnel.

Sustained UN engagement, at both leadership and technical levels, has played an important part in strengthening peace operations coordination mechanisms. The UN's organization of high-level forums (e.g., Peacekeeping Ministerials) advances Member State leaders' understanding of requirements and builds political backing. Technical-level involvement in international and regional associations and forums has prompted collective action. Moreover, UN-managed mechanisms for mobilizing funding and expertise (e.g., the TPP and EIF) facilitate joint programming, reducing duplication of efforts. Collective funding mechanisms further enable contributions from Member States that might otherwise be unwilling or unable to provide bilateral assistance and help amplify the impact of smaller contributions. Overall, UN engagement is viewed as reinforcing the perceived legitimacy of coordination mechanisms and expanding the scope of Member State involvement in capacity-building efforts, bringing new donor/provider partners to the table.

Despite the best efforts of both UN and non-UN led initiatives, however, the **institutionalization of information sharing and awareness remains problematic**. Study interviewees cited a continued information gap between New York and many Member State capitals, while information that does reach capitals is not always distributed across the range of stakeholders responsible for implementation. Accordingly, stakeholders often still lack awareness and understanding of peace operations requirements, processes, and standards. This challenge is further

complicated by the routine rotations of uniformed and diplomatic personnel engaged on peace operations issues, requiring the constant redistribution and reinforcement of pertinent information.

With respect to both UN and non-UN coordination mechanisms, **inconsistency regarding Member States' willingness and/or ability to share information can further undermine efforts** to institutionalize information sharing. External and even internal political divisions, institutional policies, and bureaucratic obstacles all affect the scope of information countries release regarding their training and capacity-building needs or offerings. The inconsistency of available information complicates efforts to clearly articulate T/PCC assistance requirements or capture and share the scope of available training and assistance resources. Moreover, language barriers complicate the compilation and sharing of information.

Across the board, **funding constraints are the most frequently cited limitation for coordination mechanisms and their Member States**. UN-managed mechanisms are reliant on extra-budgetary funding. While some Member States remain committed to supporting such efforts, the inconsistency of contributions can undermine long-term planning. For other international and regional mechanisms, most lack an operating budget, relying instead on member institutions to fund their respective participation and provide staffing bandwidth. Constrained national budgets can limit the ability of some T/PCCs to take advantage of collaborative opportunities, as they may lack the resources to engage.

Closely tied to funding constraints, **limited staffing capacity is a significant obstacle to more robust coordination**. The scope of peace operations training and capacity-building requirements is expansive, and—at the international, regional, and national levels— organizational bandwidth is limited. Moreover, it is often the same limited number of government offices or non-government institutions that participate across the range of coordination networks, and simply stated, collaboration takes time. As institutions responsible for peace operations training and capacity-building are increasingly stretched, it can be difficult to prioritize external engagement, even when the desire and will to collaborate is there.

Research suggested that, for both international and regional mechanisms, **various organizational and governance structures can be effective depending on their intended purpose**, but structures should account for financial and staffing considerations, as well as political context. That said, at the technical level (e.g., training center associations), mechanisms have generally benefited from more structured governance arrangements that institutionalize transition processes, facilitate consistent engagement, and strengthen organizational outcomes. At the strategic level, however, heavily formalized structures may add less value. Regularized forums are often sufficient to provide the needed platform for high-level dialogue and collaboration. In all cases, **the effectiveness of coordination mechanisms generally grows with consistency and time**, as trust is built, participation deepens, and information sharing becomes more routine.

Finally, research found that **existing peace operations coordination mechanisms predominantly focus on military training requirements**. Fewer mechanisms encompass police requirements, even where associations' mandates incorporate police, and almost none address uniformed corrections officers. Moreover, efforts to foster cross-component collaboration are limited. It is worth noting some of the unique challenges related to the coordination of training and capacity

building for police and corrections personnel. At the UN, few missions have police or justice advisors, so information regarding training standards and requirements is often pushed through military advisors or other diplomats, complicating efforts to ensure the information reaches the target audience. For police, where there is no federal force, PCCs draw police peacekeepers from state and local forces, and coordination across local police jurisdictions creates further complications.

Additionally, most international and regional mechanisms center around the coordination of training requirements—specifically, peace operations training courses. While coordination in this area is essential, classroom-based training, alone, is insufficient to address operational shortfalls for many T/PCCs. Yet, **few mechanisms exist that foster creative or cost-effective solutions for addressing field-based training or equipment shortfalls, let alone logistics, sustainment, training infrastructures, or other institutional capacity gaps**.[27] Few donors/providers have the financial resources or technical expertise to help address such requirements, and complex administrative challenges (e.g., technical analysis of detailed requirements, procurement considerations, logistics and sustainment implications, legal or reimbursement repercussions, etc.) can be a further hindrance.

[27] For example, the UN has facilitated limited equipment partnerships through the LCM and TPP, and ASF components are seeking to support equipment gaps through the establishment of regional logistics depots (although funding shortfalls have delayed their operationalization). However, most associations and forums, while acknowledging broader capacity gaps, primarily focus on the coordination of training activities.

Recommendations

Stemming from these overarching findings, recommendations uphold that investments in training and capacity-building partnerships—and the coordinating mechanisms that facilitate such collaboration—must be purposeful, prioritized, and impactful to maximize outcomes and advance the operational effectiveness of UN and UN-mandated operations. Recommendations are divided into two areas, including those directed at: (1) relevant UN DPO and DOS stakeholder offices and (2) all UN, Member State, and other stakeholders.

For UN DPO and DOS Stakeholder Offices:

1. **The clear prioritization of peace operations training and capacity-building requirements, at an actionable level, is critical.**

Given resource constraints, the UN should help coordination mechanisms prioritize training and capacity-building investments to support the most acute needs. This can be a difficult, even divisive, exercise given the legitimate spectrum of capabilities required to achieve operational objectives. For example, the Pledging Guide for the 2025 Berlin UN Peacekeeping Ministerial was 21 pages, covering a wide range of unit and rapid deployment capabilities, core military and policing skills, thematic trainings, peacekeeper safety and conduct and discipline imperatives, medical capabilities, mine action proficiencies, environmental objectives, strategic communications needs, and goals related to the digital transformation of peace operations, among others.[28] All are valid, important requirements. However, this expanse of requirements can overwhelm and distract T/PCCs and capacity-building partners, ultimately diffusing coordination efforts, diluting investments, and potentially leaving the most critical needs unmet.

2. **Continued efforts to strengthen information sharing and coordination across relevant UN stakeholder offices are essential to more clearly defining priorities.**

More deliberate linkages between various UN teams responsible for strategic planning, force generation, performance evaluation and assessment, and doctrine and training across military and police components are crucial to clearly define operational priorities for coordination mechanisms' action.[29] Recognizing that UN80 and other ongoing reform efforts might affect organizational structures, the division of functions across multiple DPO, DOS, and other offices can be overcome if personnel and leadership commit to collaboration. Effective processes should be put in place to break down information silos, facilitate greater integration of efforts, and establish a framework for analyzing and prioritizing operational requirements. Moreover, DPO and DOS leadership must

[28] *Pledging Guide for the 2025 Berlin United Nations Peacekeeping Ministerial*, (United Nations Department of Peace Operations, April 2025), https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/pkmin_pledging_guide_2024_april2025.pdf.

[29] Such functions are currently supported by offices and teams including the Strategic Force Generation and Capability Planning Cell, Office of Military Affairs, Police Division, Integrated Training Service, Uniformed Capabilities Support Division, and Conduct and Discipline Unit, among others.

play an active role in mediating across equities to help "prioritize priorities."

3. **Sustained, high-level messaging is essential to reinforce the importance of continued investment in peace operations training and capacity-building.**

Today's political climate has eroded confidence in UN peace operations. With the downsizing of UN missions, T/PCCs may be unwilling to invest in addressing capability gaps if there is uncertainty regarding the longevity of their deployments. Moreover, donor partners may question the need to prioritize resources for training and capacity-building initiatives, undermining engagement through coordination mechanisms. To buttress the role of these mechanisms, UN leadership must clearly and persuasively message the value of sustained partnerships to meet evolving operational demands.

4. **Engagement through a wider spectrum of peace and security networks could support UN outreach but should be purposeful.**

The continued participation of UN leadership and stakeholders in peace operations associations and forums supports outreach and creates a network of international and regional "ambassadors" who understand and carry messaging regarding the importance of training and capacity-building investments. Beyond existing peace operations coordination mechanisms, an extensive range of networks exists in support of broader defense and security objectives, as outlined in Table 2. UN engagement through these wider networks could potentially amplify information sharing and foster partnerships in support of UN and UN-mandated operations. However, given the limited time and resources of key UN stakeholders—and the potentially limited return on investment from forums with expansive mandates—such engagement should be deliberate and based on clear objectives. The end state purpose and target audience should be clear to determine the most effective engagement vehicle.

For All UN, Member State, and Other Stakeholders:

5. **Maximizing the potential of peacekeeping training and capacity-building coordination mechanisms will require a greater focus on impact.**

Given the expansive scope of requirements and the limited resources to address them, it is imperative that investments are deliberately shaped to meet prioritized needs and advance operational effectiveness. Coordination mechanisms should concentrate funding and staffing resources on initiatives that yield the greatest return on investment. Acknowledging political considerations, the UN should be cautious about accepting Member State offers of assistance or endorsing initiatives that only loosely link to operational priorities. For their part, Member States and other partners should ensure training and capacity-building activities yield concrete outcomes that address identified needs.

6. **Reinforcement of evaluation frameworks and feedback loops can help maximize the positive impact of training and capacity-building partnerships.**

Training and capacity-building partnerships should consider evaluation methods and feedback loops as part of their planning processes to ensure impacts can be measured.[30] Greater efforts to assess outcomes and cull lessons will help foster impact-oriented initiatives. Likewise, over the past decade, the UN has significantly progressed its performance and evaluation framework for uniformed peacekeepers.

UN stakeholders should continue to strengthen feedback loops with T/PCCs and capacity-building partners to communicate positive gains and articulate outstanding challenges. Such feedback could assist Member States in better tailoring effective partnerships. Multilateral coordination mechanisms may serve as a valuable avenue for institutionalizing this communication.

7. **The UN and Member States should explore additional opportunities for collective funding mechanisms to support fundraising and address targeted training and capacity-building requirements.**

Creative solutions are required to help bridge training and capacity-building gaps, particularly at a time when several key donor partners are reducing or withdrawing their support. Collective funding mechanisms such as the TPP (which fosters collaborative UN and partner country programming financed through extra-budgetary funding) or the EIF (which facilitates project grants through a multi-partner trust fund) serve as models that could be replicated in other target areas. Such an effort would require a lead Member State to initiate engagement and provide seed funding for a program team. However, once established, these mechanisms enable smaller contributions from interested Member States to achieve amplified results.

8. **Coordination mechanisms should factor in regional and national considerations; one size will not fit all.**

The organization and governing arrangements of existing regional coordination networks vary considerably in terms of formality and structure based on regional dynamics. Some associations employ a defined governance structure, while others opt for looser arrangements. Some regions prefer coordination through more ad hoc forums versus dedicating resources to establish more formal associations. Coordination mechanisms will be most effective if they account for regional considerations. Overall, various organizational arrangements can deliver results as long as the mechanism has a clearly defined purpose and reaches its target audience.

9. **While high-level mechanisms foster information sharing and political buy-in, training and capacity-building coordination is most effective at the technical level.**

[30] For further discussion on this topic, see the UN LCM-commissioned study report *Military Capacity-Building Support to Troop-Contributing Countries—Ascertaining its Effectiveness and Seizing New Opportunities*, written by Maj. Gen. (Ret.) Adrian Foster and published in May 2024.

Interviewees noted that engagement through high-level meetings and forums is critical for directly reaching decision-makers and generating political support for overarching coordination objectives. However, coordination efforts at the technical level (e.g., regional training center associations) have been most effective in accomplishing concrete, practical outcomes. Accordingly, thought should be given in terms of where to invest resources in the establishment of more formalized associations versus employing more ad hoc meetings or forums to address end-state objectives. Establishment of new, formalized peace operations coordination associations at the political level may not yield desired outcomes.

10. Continuity matters; build enduring mechanisms to yield greater outcomes.

Longevity is key to developing trust in coordination mechanisms and fostering member buy-in sufficient to motivate meaningful information sharing and genuine collaboration. Enduring engagement is further required to implement follow-up actions and fully realize effects. Accordingly, the establishment of any new mechanisms, as well as reinforcement of existing mechanisms, should be approached deliberately to ensure sustainability in terms of financial viability, institutional bandwidth, and stakeholder attention.

11. Coordination mechanisms need engaged lead agents to sustain momentum.

Drawing on lessons from the mechanisms reviewed for this study, those that have most effectively sustained member engagement and/or fostered concrete training and capacity-building partnerships are championed by a lead agent that drives initiatives forward. Even among networks where the will to collaborate is high, institutional bandwidth is limited. A lead agent—which could range from an actively-engaged Secretariat, a donor or other external partner, or even a committed individual—is needed to dedicate the time and attention to organizing follow-up and follow-on activities. In some regions, for example, passionate retired uniformed officers have volunteered time to move initiatives forward. Replicating this model in other regions, tapping into the network of retired peacekeepers who may desire to remain engaged and support regional efforts, could help supplement limited personnel resources in national institutions.

12. Coordination mechanisms should leverage technology to extend engagement opportunities and support more routinized outreach.

Coordination networks—particularly training center associations—should further exploit virtual exchanges and online collaboration platforms as cost- and time-efficient ways to sustain engagement in between annual meetings. Recognizing the considerable benefits of in-person meetings, virtual engagements would complement, not replace, annual meetings and enable networks to connect on a more frequent basis.

13. Similarly, the inclusion of relevant civil society institutions should be maximized to "outsource" relevant requirements.

Across all regions, peace operations coordination mechanisms are exploring how to "do more with less." Mechanisms need to consider how to maximize wider stakeholder engagement, distribute the workload, and harness the comparative advantage of various organizations. Toward this end, coordination mechanisms should consider how to tap into civil society entities such as think tanks, research centers, and academic institutions to support studies and analysis in alignment with objectives. Such organizations could, for example, conduct research, explore innovative ideas and opportunities, and increase information awareness. While still nascent, the AU's NeTT4Peace, which establishes a strategic partnership between the AU and the region's research community, may serve as an interesting model to replicate in other regions.

14. Explore opportunities for greater intersection across technical-level coordination mechanisms.

While the range of coordination mechanisms addressed in this study serve various purposes and reach different audiences, greater connectivity across networks could help reduce overlap and ensure limited resources are directed toward complementary, rather than competing, initiatives. Additionally, cross-coordination could further knowledge sharing. Some regional mechanisms have already taken steps to invite representatives from other regional networks to participate as observers, and such outreach should be expanded. As another example, strengthening linkages between the IAPTC and regional training center associations could advance sharing of best practices and lessons learned across regions.

15. Peace operations coordination mechanisms should explore feasible options for investing more holistically in capacity-building efforts.

Investments in training are critical but, alone, insufficient to address the capability gaps of many T/PCCs. Deeper investment is needed in T/PCCs' institutional capacity to effectively generate, prepare, and deploy peacekeepers. Moreover, innovative solutions are required to address widespread equipment, operational, and sustainment challenges. Enduring bilateral or multilateral capacity-building relationships, as well as joint or co-deployments, are examples of partnerships that foster more comprehensive investments in T/PCC competencies. Coordination mechanisms should consider ways to promote such long-term partnerships to build sustainable capabilities.

16. Finally, peace operations coordination mechanisms should consider how to deepen cross-component collaboration, where appropriate.

Effective mission outcomes depend on cooperation among military, police, and civilian actors. Increased efforts to incorporate diverse perspectives can enhance peacekeepers' understanding of the complex environments in which they operate. Some international and regional mechanisms are already working to strengthen this integration. However, some interviewees countered that networks focused on specific issue areas may produce more tangible results. For this

reason, clearly defining end-state objectives will be critical to determining which forums are best suited for broad cross-component collaboration and which better support targeted, component-specific engagement.

Conclusion

A wide spectrum of mechanisms supports the coordination of training and capacity-building requirements for uniformed peacekeepers deploying to UN and UN-mandated peace operations. While they vary in structure and institutionalization, their common value lies in fostering cooperation. Such mechanisms improve information distribution, cultivate greater awareness of and support for training and capacity-building requirements, and facilitate partnerships. Yet, coordination efforts remain challenged by limitations, such as inconsistent information sharing, financial and staffing constraints, diffusion of efforts, and gaps in cross-component coordination and holistic capacity-building initiatives.

Reinforcing the efficacy and impact of collaborative efforts is essential to addressing evolving training and capacity-building needs in the face of shrinking budgets and competing priorities. Coordination mechanisms will prove most effective if they are appropriately structured to meet defined objectives, account for regional dynamics, and consider sustainability. Such mechanisms will further benefit from lead agents that help sustain momentum, as well as from leveraging technology and harnessing the comparative advantage of an inclusive range of stakeholders. UN leadership will remain essential for prioritizing requirements to ensure partnerships center on the most decisive needs, as well as messaging the value of sustained training and capacity-building investments. Such steps will help optimize coordination mechanisms to close resource gaps and better support present and future operational needs.

This study represents a critical first step in mapping and understanding the landscape of coordination mechanisms. However, its value will only be realized through committed implementation of its recommendations, regular monitoring of progress, and sustained political and financial support from all stakeholders.

List of Abbreviations

4-PCE	Fo(u)r Peace Central Europe (Austria, Germany, Netherlands, Switzerland)
AAPTC	Association of Asia-Pacific Peace Operations Training Centers
ACDFM	ASEAN Chiefs of Defence Forces Meeting
ADMM	ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting
ADMM-Plus	ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting-Plus
ALCONU	Latin American and Caribbean Conference on United Nations Peacekeeping Operations
ALCOPAZ	Latin American Association of Peacekeeping Training Centres
APCN	ASEAN Peacekeeping Centers Network
APSA	African Peace and Security Architecture
APSE	ASEAN Peacekeeping Staff Exercise
APSTA	African Peace Support Trainers Association
ARF	ASEAN Regional Forum
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
ASF	African Standby Force
AU	African Union
BIPSOT	Bangladesh Institute of Peace Support Operation Training
BPST(A)	British Peace Support Team (Africa)
C34	UN Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations
C4ISR	Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance
CARICOM	Caribbean Community
CCCPA	Cairo International Center for Conflict Resolution, Peacekeeping, and Peacebuilding
CCDS	Committee of Chiefs of Defence Staff
CDOTS	UN Capacity Development and Operational Training Service
CHOD	Chiefs of Defense
C-IED	Counter-Improvised Explosive Devices
CPLP	Community of Portuguese Language Countries
DCB	Defence and Related Security Capacity Building
DHMOSH	UN Division of Healthcare Management and Occupational Safety and Health
DOS	UN Department of Operational Support
DPO	UN Department of Peace Operations
EACDS	Committee of the Eastern Africa Chiefs of Defence Staff
EAPC	Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council
EAPTC	European Association of Peace Operations Training Centres
EASF	Eastern Africa Standby Force
ECCAS	Economic Community of Central African States
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EEAS	European External Action Service
EIF	Elsie Initiative Fund for Uniformed Women in Peace Operations
EIFORCES	Ecole International des Forces de Securité (Cameroon)
EPC	European Police Congress
EPON	Effectiveness of Peace Operations Network

ESDC	European Security and Defence College
EU	European Union
EUROPOL	European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation
FIEP	International Association of Gendarmeries and Police Forces with Military Status
FOC	Forum Officials Committee
FOCAC	Forum on China-Africa Cooperation
GoF	Group of Friends
IACP	International Association of Chiefs of Police
IAPTC	International Association of Peacekeeping Training Centres
IAWP	International Association of Women Police
ICPA	International Corrections and Prisons Association
IPSTC	International Peace Support Training Centre (Kenya)
ITS	UN Integrated Training Service
KAZCENT	Kazakhstan Peace Operations Centre
LAC	Latin America and the Caribbean
LCM	UN Light Coordination Mechanism
LCMOS	Light Coordination Mechanism Online System
MINUSTAH	UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti
MPAT	Multinational Planning Augmentation Team
MPTF	Multi-Partner Trust Fund
NARC	North African Regional Capability
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NeTT4Peace	African Network of Think Tanks for Peace
OAS	Organization of American States
OICT	UN Office of Information and Communications Technology
OSCE	Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PCC	Police-Contributing Country
PfP	NATO Partnership for Peace
PICP	Pacific Island Chiefs of Police
PIF	Pacific Island Forum
PKOCB-TWG	Peacekeeping Operations Coordination Board – Technical Working Group
PKO-EWG	Peacekeeping Operations Experts' Working Group
PSOD	Peace Support Operations Division
REC	Regional Economic Community
RELACOPAZ	Latin American and Caribbean Network for Cooperation in Peacekeeping Operations
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SDI	Security and Defence Initiative
SOUTHDEC	South American Defense Conference
SPDDM	South Pacific Defence Ministers' Meeting
STCDSS	AU Specialized Technical Committee on Defense, Safety, and Security
T/PCC	Troop- and Police-Contributing Countries
TCC	Troop-Contributing Country
TICAD	Tokyo International Conference on African Development
ToT	Training-of-Trainers
TPP	UN Triangular Partnership Programme
UN	United Nations
UNCAP	UN C4ISR Academy for Peace Operations
UNCOPS	UN Chiefs of Police Summit

UNMAS	UN Mine Action Service
UNPKM	UN Peacekeeping Ministerial
UNSCR	UN Security Council Resolution
XB	Extrabudgetary

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