

WHITE PAPER

Impact-Driven Peacekeeping Partnerships for Capacity Building and Training

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The present White Paper serves as an input to the next United Nations Peacekeeping Ministerial-level Meeting in April 2021 in Seoul, Republic of Korea, and to the preparatory meeting on training, capacity building and partnerships co-chaired by Ethiopia and Japan and due to take place in Addis Ababa (TBC). This paper does not represent the views of the Governments of Ethiopia or Japan or of any other participants in the meetings.

In the context of the Secretary-General's Action for Peacekeeping initiative (A4P), the objective of the 2021 Ministerial is to strengthen UN peacekeeping, including by improving the performance and impact of UN operations; closing capability gaps through concrete pledges; facilitating new partnerships and strengthening existing ones; and promoting systemic changes that will improve operations.

This White Paper is meant to help member states plan for and prepare to make concrete, meaningful and impactful capacity building and training pledges at the 2021 Ministerial. This paper submits that capacity building and training partnerships are most meaningful and impactful when:

- A. They are built on a longer-term partnership which are more likely to produce **sustainable, systemic and institutional capabilities within TCC/PCCs** (e.g., ability to identify/vet, deploy, sustain, rotate, etc. qualified uniformed personnel and to learn from past deployments) over the medium to longer term;
- B. they are **tailored to the specific needs of the recipient country and help address pressing or envisioned capability gaps** in ongoing operations;
- C. they help **speed up deployments** and limit gaps when one TCC takes over from another, notably for critical capabilities in short supply, such as aviation, medical or engineering; and
- D. they **lead to a measurable improvement in the overall performance and impact** of the UN peacekeeping operation on the ground.

The first section of the paper summarizes the current state of play and recent trends in capacity building and training of personnel for UN peacekeeping. The second section highlights major challenges and constraints. The last part of the paper suggests a number of priorities and makes recommendations for how member states together with the UN can move towards more impact-driven capacity building and training partnerships.

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1. Current state of play and recent trends in training and capacity building

Improving training and capacity building is a major shared commitment of the Action for Peacekeeping initiative (A4P) and the 25 September 2018 A4P Declaration captured the broad state of play among member states' perspective:

“As Member States, we commit to provide well-trained and well-equipped uniformed personnel and to support the effective development and delivery of peacekeeping training. We further commit to support pre-deployment preparations of personnel and capabilities required for effective performance, and the existing human rights screening policy. We collectively support a light coordination mechanism related to training and capacity building and emphasise the need for increased funding to better support training. The Secretary-General commits to provide Member States with training materials and standards which match operational requirements.”²

Training and capacity building are a shared responsibility between Member States and the UN Secretariat that relies on many different types of partnerships. On the one side, it is the **responsibility of member states to provide well-trained and equipped peacekeepers**, which in turn requires resources many TCC/PCCs do not necessarily readily have but other member states can help them with. TCC/PCCs are also responsible for delivering training prior to deployment - including through context-specific and scenario-based training – up to required UN standards to all personnel provided to UN peacekeeping operations, in accordance with General Assembly resolution A/RES/49/37.

On the other side, it is the **responsibility of the UN Secretariat to provide policies, standards and training materials** (including the UN Military Unit Manuals, Core Pre-Deployment Training materials and the Comprehensive Protection of Civilians course as well as Specialized Training materials), which it regularly reviews and adapts to the evolving UN policies, guidelines and Standard Operating procedures which themselves result from evolutions in operational requirements and mandates. These materials are provided to Member States through Permanent Missions and DPO online tools. In order to ensure that materials reach the hands of those involved in the preparation of uniformed contingents and personnel, the Department of Peace Operations' Integrated Training Service (ITS) started sending out a useful newsletter to Member States, which includes updates on policies and guidelines, training materials and manuals, as well as ITS training courses.

Although the self-certification of all contingent rotations by TCCs themselves has not always been a guarantee that national-level training efforts meet standards, there has been considerable progress over the past couple years, notably thanks to the Force Commander's Assessments and **enhanced pre-deployment visits**, which better assess unit operational readiness. On the UN Police side, similar standardized pre-deployment readiness verification mechanisms exist for both individual police officers - which comprise civilian experts and specialized police teams - and formed police units (FPUs).³

² Para 14, <https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/a4p-declaration-en.pdf> . In May 2019, a Security Council presidential statement welcomed the Secretary-General's efforts to mobilize all partners and stakeholders through A4P and specifically recognized the added value of the Declaration of Shared Commitments in relation to training and capacity building (S/PRST/2019/4, May 7, 2019).

³ 2019.19 Assessment for Mission Service of Individual Police Officers (SOP) <http://dag.un.org/handle/11176/401039> and Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) on assessment of operational capability of FPUs (2017) <https://police.un.org/en/standard-operating-procedure-sop-assessment-of-operational-capability-of-fpus-2017> (under revision).

The UN Police Division launched the UN Police Training Architecture Programme, which aims at improving existing and develop new UN police training materials. Training modules are being developed in the following area: (i) community-oriented policing; (ii) intelligence-led policing; (iii) police monitoring, mentoring and advising; (iv) capacity-building and development; (v) public order/protection of civilians/use of force; and (vi) crime intelligence. Following initial Trainer Certification workshop and pilot training course, the programme is expected to be rolled out to PCCs in 2021.

The August 2017 background paper to the last Ministerial had noted that important developments in training had stemmed from the “evolution of mission mandates and threats; the growing numbers of UN peacekeepers; a shift in the approach of some major training providers [with some major donors shifting away from ‘train and equip’ towards building sustainable training institutions in partner states]; and geopolitical trends.”⁴ At the UN Peacekeeping Ministerial on Uniformed Capabilities, Performance and Protection in March 2019, ministers were encouraged to announce progress on relevant A4P commitments alongside pledges of new capabilities. Some of these capacity building pledges aligned with commitments under A4P, including training for medical personnel and Francophone police, and funding for the ‘light coordination mechanism.’⁵

The focus on the safety and security of peacekeepers has since continued⁶, and related to this a focus on medical standards and training. There is also a growing focus on performance, which directly contributes to safety and security, but comes at a time UN peacekeeping is experiencing downward pressure on the number of troops deployed and the annual peacekeeping budget. While the focus on the security of peacekeepers benefits from a high degree of unity among member states and that there is no disagreement about the importance of effective performance, some member states prefer to emphasize the need for increased accountability for under-performance, while others, including some TCCs, argue for the broadening of the focus of these discussions, underlining that performance and security cannot be delinked from other factors related to the Security Council’s mandate formulation.⁷

There is also now a more widespread recognition that pre-deployment training and in-mission training is insufficient to notably improve performance and effectiveness, and that there is a need for an increased focus on institutional capacity building and developing systems responsible for force generation, training, deployment, logistical sustainment, human resources, financial management, etc. in order to achieve meaningful results.

The broader context of a crisis of multilateralism and its impact on the peacekeeping ‘triangular cooperation’ between an increasingly divided Security Council, major financial contributors, and TCC/PCCs also needs to be kept in mind.⁸ That said, the fact that **some European member states which were mainly capacity providers have in recent years reengaged in UN peacekeeping in Africa as TCCs**

⁴ Richard Gowan & Paul D. Williams, “Innovation in Training and Capacity-Building for United Nations Peace Operations,” 14 August 2017.

⁵ <https://www.ipinst.org/2019/09/a4p-one-year-into-implementation-of-the-declaration-of-shared-commitments>

⁶ On 7 May 2019, at the initiative of Indonesia, the Security Council held an open debate on “Investing in peace: improving safety and performance of United Nations peacekeepers.” On 26 March 2020, China organized a Security Council debate on “UN peacekeeping operations: Better capacity building, more safety and security.”

⁷ <https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2020-03/peacekeeping>

⁸ <https://theglobalobservatory.org/2020/01/will-peacekeeping-weather-crisis-multilateralism/>

and PCCs⁹, and that some Member States that were already TCCs have also emerged as **new capacity building providers**, may present opportunities for redefining ‘burden sharing’ in a positive way.

The implications of COVID-19 for peacekeeping have so far been mainly felt in terms of delayed troop and police rotations and the need for enhanced medical support in the field and/or evacuations as well as planning capacities. The pandemic is taking place a decade after the introduction by some peacekeepers of cholera to Haiti, a few years after the UN established its first-ever emergency health mission, the UN Mission for Ebola Emergency Response (UNMEER)¹⁰ in West Africa and in the wake of MONUSCO’s contribution to the Ebola response in the DRC. The **impact that such a large health crisis and related economic crisis will have on peacekeeping and peace and security more broadly** – as the Security Council has been divided over how to handle the pandemic - has yet to be seen, but it will likely negatively impact the resources both TCC/PCCs and capacity providers dedicate to peacekeeping.

In the **A4P Implementation Action Plan** issued by the UN Secretariat four priority areas were identified in relation to training and capacity building:

- A. improving the **security of peacekeepers**;
- B. advancing **UN-AU capacity-building** of AU peace support operations;
- C. expanding **triangular partnership** between TCC/PCCs and member states; and
- D. supporting effective **performance and accountability**, including by operationalizing the light coordination mechanism to deconflict & share best practices of training programmes.¹¹

Under priority area A, significant progress has been made, in the context of the implementation of the *Action Plan to Improve the Security of UN Peacekeepers*¹² focusing on the five high-risk missions (MONUSCO, UNAMID, UNMISS, MINUSCA and MINUSMA), which intended to respond to the recommendations made in the December 2017 report by General dos Santos Cruz ‘Improving Security of United Nations Peacekeepers’ (otherwise known as the ‘dos Santos Cruz report’). This has included instituting **casualty evacuation (CASEVAC) training, “stress testing” and crisis management exercises, as well as both pre-deployment training and in-mission training to help address the threat of improvised explosive devices (IEDs), ambushes** and other dangers. Some member states have focused their resources on TCC/PCCs deploying to the five highest-risk UN operations with some successes.

On the UN Police side, a greater focus has been put on the use of technology and **intelligence-led UN policing** which enhance the security of peacekeepers. In addition to strengthening host-State police and other law enforcement institutions in general, the UN police in some peacekeeping operations has also been supporting host state capacities to prevent and address serious and organized crime (SOC).

Priority area B seems to have been overshadowed by the politically contentious issues of financing for AU peace support operations and the Libya crisis. That said, within the April 2017 *Joint UN-AU Framework for Enhanced Partnership in Peace and Security*, the UN provided training and capacity building support (including in mediation and military and police aspects of AU peace support operations and the African Standby Force) and supported the organization of workshops for the **development of**

⁹ https://www.ipinst.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/European-Canadian_Final.pdf

¹⁰ <https://www.ipinst.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/IPI-Rpt-Mission-to-Stop-Ebola.pdf>

¹¹ https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/a4p-implementation-handout-9may2019_0.pdf

¹² https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/summary_of_the_action_plan_to_implement_the_report_on_improving_security_of_peacekeepers.pdf

the training curriculum for the AU compliance and accountability framework and the validation of harmonized compliance training standards. This is helping the AU develop a policy and standard operating procedures for the selection and screening of personnel for AU peace support operations, as well as an enhanced compliance framework and architecture. Work was also initiated to develop training curriculums for gender mainstreaming at the AU and within member states, as well as capacity-building for female police officers for senior leadership appointments.¹³

Priority area C on triangular partnerships has seen a continued expansion under the **Triangular Partnership Project (TPP) established in 2015**, under which supporting member states provide trainers, equipment and funds, required for the training of TCC/PCCs uniformed personnel, while the UN coordinates and manages the overall program. The **TPP, overseen by the Department of Operational Support (DOS) has expanded from the training of military engineers** from Africa (including AMISOM troops) in Kenya, to now include **field medics training and signals training in Entebbe, and engineering training courses in French language. TPP has extended its scope to Asia and surrounding regions** (with engineering training conducted in Vietnam, and planned in Indonesia, Thailand and Cambodia). Training of trainers (ToT) and women’s outreach have also been a focus of the TPP. The project has been supported through member states’ contributions of funding and instructors.¹⁴

Other donors have supported triangular partnerships directly, outside the TPP framework, but coordinating closely with the UN to expand joint training, synchronize priority regional training efforts, and supplement ITS resources to expand training opportunities. The UN Chiefs of Police Summits (UNCOPS) held every second years since 2016 - which brings together Ministers, Chiefs of Police and senior representatives of regional and professional policing organizations - have also proven to be a useful platform for exchanges including on police training and capacity building.

Priority area D on supporting effective performance and accountability includes several diverse issues, which can be broken down into two: **the basic core skills required to be an effective soldier (sometimes referred to as “green training”) and police officer, and the “supplemental UN-specific training to make a good peacekeepers** (sometimes referred to as “blue training). If basic core skills foundations are not there, UN-specific training will have little impact on effective performance.

UN-specific trainings include the strengthening of **conduct and discipline** (notably to prevent sexual exploitation and abuses and reduce missions’ environmental footprint but not only) through training and sensitization at all levels, including the development of a National Investigations Officer training course; the roll out of **context-specific in-mission training on POC in missions; women, peace & security (WPS) and gender training**, including the female military officer’s course (a talent pipeline for senior women military officers is under development) and the Female Senior Police Officer Command Development Course¹⁵, aimed both at promoting WPS and increasing the number of women in peacekeeping; and the **strengthening of peacekeeping leadership training** for civilians, military and

¹³ Strengthening the partnership between the United Nations and the African Union on issues of peace and security in Africa, including on the work of the United Nations Office to the African Union, 19 September 2019, S/2019/759

¹⁴ https://operationalsupport.un.org/sites/default/files/20191216_fact_sheet_-_triangular_partnership.pdf

¹⁵ The course was delivered to 192 female police officers ranked from Police Lt. Colonel to Police Major-General in 2017-2018 and resulted in a 170-strong UN Police Female Command Cadre. While a steady number of the Cadre members continue to be selected for P3-P4 professional-level posts, in March 2020 the first member of the Cadre was deployed as the Head of a Police Component in UNFICYP.

police, including through **scenario-based exercises**.¹⁶ Last, the UN **National Planners Courses** for senior TCC/PCCs officials/uniform officers involved in preparing contingents for UN Peacekeeping Operations and advise their Governmental authorities on the subject, have been particularly useful for exposing prospective contributors to the intricacies and challenges of the negotiation, planning, preparation, deployment, support, sustainment, and termination process of national contingents deploying.

The **operationalization of the Light Coordination Mechanism (LCM) with the provision of dedicated staff and resources since 2019** is also a new development aimed at strengthening the UN Secretariat's efforts to be proactive and identify training requirements and help match capacity-building providers and TCCs in need of such support and help coordinate and deconflict member states activities. The LCM will also include police needs and a first police-specific LCM meeting will be held to look at both Formed Police Units and Individual Police Officers.

In addition to these priority areas the UN Secretariat has focused on, recent years have seen a number of **innovative partnerships** between member states, some of which also broadly qualify as capacity building partnerships. These include:

- a. **Multinational rotational concepts** whereby a number of member states join together to provide an advanced capability to a peacekeeping operation, which no single TCC can provide alone, and/or not over an extended period of time. The capacity building partnership element comes from the fact that such arrangement enables smaller TCCs to be part of it because a larger and/or wealthier member state accepts to play the time consuming and expensive role of framework country, getting different member states to partner with clear timelines and exit strategies, and providing the infrastructure (and staffing) for other contributors to plug into.¹⁷
- b. **Joint Deployments**, although not a new concept and can take different forms (e.g., attached, embedded, co-deployed, or composite)¹⁸ also offer the potential for capacity building partnerships when a better capacitated and/or more experienced TCC partners with another TCC and allows the latter to participate in a peacekeeping mission it could not have otherwise participated in. In some cases, this has also allowed newer TCCs to gain the experience required to later deploy by itself.
- c. **Rapid deployment/handover partnerships**, whereby one or multiple member states support a TCC scheduled to deploy to a peacekeeping operation to ensure that it actually deploys in a timely fashion and with the right capability, and thereby prevent too long a gap in a critical capability. (Examples of this include the UK's preparation over two years for the transition of its level II hospital in UMISS to Vietnam through the provision of a "advise, assist, and mentor" package; with the US providing equipment and Australia language training and strategic airlift.)
- d. **In-mission training teams**, an extension of the concept of Mobile Training Teams (MTTs) into the mission environment, are used by some member states to provide targeted and flexible support to carry out trainings on IED threats, buddy first aid, jungle warfare, or base and convoy protection, and in few cases to follow-up on a pre-deployment training provided. In-mission trainings are an evolving concept but have to date been conducted within the security of UN

¹⁶ The UN Department of Peace Operations/Department Operational Support's Integrated Training Service (ITS) is the primary provider of formal training for senior leaders of peacekeeping missions.

¹⁷ https://www.ipinst.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/NUPI_rapport_Boutellis_Karlsruud.pdf

¹⁸ <https://www.ipinst.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/IPI-E-pub-Operational-Partnerships-in-Peacekeeping.pdf>

camps, and although “operational mentoring” or “accompanying” of TCCs in operations could be very valuable, very few member states have experimented with it in part due to risks associated.

2. Major challenges and constraints

Most of the challenges and constraints in relation to training and capacity building partnerships are not new. The 10-11 December 2018 Montevideo preparatory meeting on “training and capacity development” to the last Ministerial Conference¹⁹ had identified the following: persisting needs for consistent standards, training courses in the languages of TCC/PCCs, a lessons learned and/or identified process based on issues encountered in the field, a thorough pre-deployment evaluation, stable and sustainable funding for language training, gender mainstreaming and force protection training.

The first and main structural challenge is the continued tendency of training and capacity building partnerships to be **supply-driven** to a large extent, i.e., based on the kind of trainings and trainers a capacity provider has available, rather than the actual needs of a TCC, PCC or of a specific peacekeeping operation. This leads to a **continued mismatch between training needs and supply**. The establishment of the Light Coordination Mechanism (LCM) should help the UN better inform capacity builders of the needs and gaps but may not change the fact that most capacity providers operate primarily on the basis of their national interest and training capacities – they may want to showcase particular specialized training and/or use it to strengthen bilateral relations with a specific member state – rather than a dedication to improving peacekeeping, or to meet a priority need.

The **UN itself struggles to produce real-time information on the needs of its operations and TCC/PCCs** and to properly manage – process, analyze and share – the performance information it gathers (through assessment and advisory visits and pre-deployment visits, Force Commander and Police Commissioner evaluations, various audits and investigations conducted by the Office for Peacekeeping Strategic Partnership, Conduct and Discipline Officers, the UN Office of Investigative and Oversight Services (OIOS), boards of inquiry (BOI), or evaluations capacity providers themselves carry out, etc.) which are confidential. TCC/PCCs have been assured that evaluations of performance will not be shared with other Member States. Despite the promulgation of new training materials through Permanent Missions and their availability on UN websites, not all those involved in TCC/PCC preparation are fully aware of the training materials and requirements. These materials are available in English but only a comparatively small number are available in the other official UN languages.

The second challenge concerns the fact that most training and capacity building efforts remain **short term ‘one-offs’** – or for a few rotations over a determined period of time – **and too heavily focused on pre-deployment training rather than dedicated to building the institutions and systems of a TCC**, which will allow it to recruit, train, equip, and deploy a unit but also to sustain, rotate and improve its performance overtime through learning, etc. Many TCC/PCCs remain significantly under-equipped and many lack sufficient training facilities to support effective training and addressing this requires a long-term partnership, which very few capacity builders are currently willing and able to make, but that is often the result of long term bilateral relations. The United States, for instance, has invested in for example, building self-sufficient peace operations training capacity in partner countries over many years and developing critical enabling capabilities (an engineering unit in Rwanda for instance).²⁰

¹⁹ UN peacekeeping ministerial conference preparatory meeting “training and capacity development” co-chairs’ summary, Montevideo, 10-11 December 2018

²⁰ <https://www.state.gov/u-s-peacekeeping-capacity-building-assistance/>

The third challenge is the fact that **some of the units and individuals trained still do not actually deploy to UN peacekeeping operations**. This is not a new issue either but is of concern given the important but limited resources invested when only a limited number of units and individuals member states and the UN have invested in training actually deploy to a UN operation thereafter. Conversely, many units which deploy have not necessarily received the required training, and too often different rotations of the same TCC/PCCs have not received the same level of training, which makes it very difficult for the UN to predict if not ensure performance. This again emphasizes the importance of longer-term capacity building partnerships to develop the institutional capacity of a TCC/PCC to field a specific capability, versus a focus on pre-deployment training.

Some efforts are underway to address this challenge. For instance, all 29 uniformed personnel who received TPP field medics training Triangular Partnership Project (TPP) are serving in missions, and many women who received signals training through the TPP, will also deploy, thanks to the UN prioritizing their deployment through closer coordination between UN departments to which DOS provide the lists of trainees to DPO's Office of Military Affairs for deployment consideration. Although UN communication on female participation has been helpful (with some TCC/PCCs having developed their own national strategies but others resenting what they consider unrealistic targets), it remains a challenge to get **member states to nominate women** to take part in trainings such as the 50/50 male/female UNMO courses, for instance, unless the issue is addressed upstream as part of longer-term institutional capacity developments.

The fourth challenge is the **lack of follow-up on training and more generally lack of impact assessment** of capacity building efforts. Although a number of capacity providers are trying to develop evidence-based approaches, few are actually able to properly assess the effect of their capacity building efforts once these units ultimately deploy to a UN operation. This is in part due to the lack of resources for monitoring and evaluation and lack of professional trainers and evaluators, but also to the challenge of accessing those units once deployed and to having access to UN performance reports or those developed by the TCC/PCC itself.

Some of the ways capacity providers have been able to get a more accurate picture has been by **sending in-mission trainers** into peacekeeping missions where trained units are deployed (like France did in Kidal by sending the same training unit to follow-up on the pre-deployment training it had provided to a MINUSMA TCC prior to deploying), and/or in a few cases having their own uniformed units serving in these same peacekeeping operations. The performance frameworks being implemented by the Office of Military Affairs and Police Division and Force Commander and Police Commissioner's assessments of each unit's operational effectiveness can also help get a better sense of the impact of capacity building efforts at the operational level; while the new Comprehensive Performance Assessment System (CPAS), although focusing more at the strategic level, could also contribute to instigating a culture of data collection and analysis towards collective – military, police and civilians - performance into peacekeeping missions.

The above-identified **innovative capacity building partnerships also come with their own set of challenges**. **Rotational arrangements require a lead TCC** to play the time-consuming and expensive role of a framework country - something few countries are willing to do – and the fact that it may not be applicable to many capabilities beyond certain enablers and specialized units. **Joint deployments are too seldom used as capacity building partnerships** between more and less experimented TCCs, in part

due to risk aversity and concerns about duty of care and command and control. **In-mission training teams present legal status as well as administrative and logistical challenges²¹ and can distract TCCs from their operational obligations** while already deployed in the peacekeeping operation if not part of a longer-term capacity building investment. This is part of the reason why some TCCs turn down such offers and lament the fact that certain specialized trainings without the donation of necessary corresponding equipment is of little use to them.

As member states plan for and prepare to make concrete, meaningful and impactful training and capacity building pledges at the 2021 Ministerial, they should keep in mind these constraints and challenges.

²¹ In its 2020 report, the Special Committee C-34 requests the Secretariat, to “elaborate, in consultation with Member States, a standardized mechanism to deal with commitments of Mobile Training Teams and their legal status considerations when deployed in peacekeeping missions recognizing the importance of effective mobile training team.”

3. Priorities and recommendations

This paper submits that training and capacity building partnerships are most meaningful when:

- A. They are built on a longer-term partnership which are more likely to produce **sustainable, systemic and institutional capabilities within TCC/PCCs** (e.g., ability to identify/vet, deploy, sustain, rotate, etc. qualified uniformed personnel and to learn from past deployments) over the medium to longer term;
- B. they are **tailored to the specific needs of the recipient country and help address pressing or envisioned capability gaps** in ongoing operations;
- C. they help **speed up deployments** and limit gaps when one TCC takes over from another, notably for critical capabilities in short supply, such as aviation, medical or engineering; and
- D. they **lead to a measurable improvement in the overall performance and impact** of the UN peacekeeping operation on the ground.

Member states training and capacity building pledges that meet these four objectives should therefore be prioritized and TCC/PCCs (and the UN) should not accept training and capacity-building offers if they do not meet at least one of the A-B-C conditions above. Both longer term A type of support and short-term B & C type of support are needed, but all should be aimed at D, i.e., improving the overall performance and impact of the field operation.

Below is a list of more specific recommendations that could and should guide TCC/PCCs and capacity providers towards greater mutual accountability and sustainability:

- a. **Leadership being key to bringing about positive change, it requires sustained dedicated funding (rather than voluntary funding) to building stronger mission leadership teams.** No newly appointed leaders (SRSG, Deputy SRSG, Force Commander, Police Commissioner, Director of Mission Support, Chief of Staff, but also Sector Commanders and civilian Heads of Offices who are often in the front lines of crises) should deploy without having completed the necessary in-briefing and training (prioritizing both leadership and management skills in multinational and integrated multidimensional operations) required as determined by an individual training needs assessment, and sufficient time should be allocated and budgeted for this before deployment. Participation in the Senior Mission Leaders (SML) course should also be more closely linked to the process for recruiting senior mission leaders, and sufficient funds should be allocated to supporting participants from developing countries. New information technology tools, scenario-based exercises, drills and rehearsals, should also be generalized for in-mission training, learning and team building.²²
- b. **Training and capacity building start at home.** TCC/PCCs should be committed to building their own capacity overtime. One of the best investments TCC/PCCs and capacity providers alike can make in the medium to longer term is to properly **integrate (and value) peacekeeping into their national curricula**, notably as part of their male and female officer and senior NCO corps career training. TCC/PCCs committed to peacekeeping should also **develop, if not yet established, their own national support system dedicated to peacekeeping**, i.e., ‘someone’ at home in charge of making sure units are properly generated, trained and equipped, commanded, evaluated,

²² See https://www.ipinst.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/1902_Senior-Leadership-Training.pdf

sustained, rotated, etc. over time (even if there is a change in government) and with whom the UN Secretariat and capacity providers can communicate and work with.

- c. **Capacity providers with the means to do so could prioritize longer-term investments in a few 'motivated' TCC/PCCs to help build national systems and institutions that will allow them to deploy mission-ready units over multiple rotations** (i.e., invest in recruiting/vetting, training and equipping, but also in the support system including administration, planning, logistics, procurement, sustainment, etc.); rather than provide one-off trainings to successive rotating units without measurable and/or visible impact in operations on the ground.
- d. Capacity providers interested in contributing to improved peacekeeping performance, but that do not have the resources to do it alone, should **consider joining existing training partnership programs such as the TPP or forming joint capacity building and training partnerships**: two or more Member States, possibly leaning on one framework partner, could establish multinational capacity building and training offers, on regional or global level.
- e. **Capacity providers should define the content and character of their offers on the basis of critical capacity building and training needs defined by the UN beforehand**. They should prioritize support to units the UN needs most that preferably are already - but are not necessarily - registered in the UN Peacekeeping Capability Readiness System (PCRS). The aim should be to help TCCs progress through PCRS readiness levels, achieve deployment readiness, or be selected for the Rapid Deployment Level (RDL) in order to speed up their deployment and limit gaps in ongoing operations when this TCC is being considered for taking over from another TCC. In some cases, bringing a new **technology** to an existing capable unit (such as night vision or small unarmed aerial systems) can also be relevant provided that the TCC has the ability to absorb and sustain such capability over time. Enhancing the performance of force
- f. **TCC/PCCs which benefit from training and capacity building explicitly geared towards contributions to UN peacekeeping should make a formal commitment to deploying** their units and/or officers within a given timeframe if requested by the UN. The UN Secretariat should in turn keep track of units and officers which received relevant training and capacity building support in order to prioritize their deployments where possible. The Triangular Partnership Project (TPP) should prioritize the training of engineers, medics and signals officers – and prioritize qualified female officer candidates - whom are already scheduled to deploy to a UN peacekeeping operation.
- g. **In-mission trainings should be limited to addressing capability gaps that are identified by the UN as critically hampering the security of TCC/PCCs and/or the implementation of the mandate** notably when it comes to the protection of civilians (PoC), even though ideally these gaps would be addressed upstream in pre-deployment trainings. In-mission trainings should be tailored to the specific contexts and operations as well as to the TCC (including in terms of language of instruction); sometimes a focus on basics (force protection, command and control, sustainment, buddy first aid) and PoC is just as needed and impactful as more sophisticated technical trainings (such as counter-IED or forward air controllers) which can't necessarily be

fully absorbed and sustained, particularly if this is not built on previous training or they don't come with the relevant technical equipment. Where training in the "basics" is required, it should not be seen as a substitute for the TCC/PCC responsibility to provide adequate pre-deployment training.

- h. **Member States and the UN should explore practical modalities for increasing the feasibility of "operational mentoring" or "accompanying" of TCCs** in the riskier peacekeeping operations. This model can be effective especially as follow-up and complement to capacity building support received prior to deployment - and could also usefully be expanded and adapted to supporting national security forces in contexts of peacekeeping transitions, provided Human Rights Due Diligence is applied. Given the complex legal and practical issues involved, member states and the UN may wish to consider the option of such mentors (as well as some professional trainers and evaluators) to come and go in a peacekeeping operation as blue helmets (and to therefore be factored in the troop ceiling) possibly as part of a multinational rotational concept, and/or consider giving them a formal legal status (expert on mission).
- i. **Member States and the UN should continue to strengthen the Light Coordination Mechanism (LCM).** The LCM should be more than a registry listing national training calendars. TCC/PCCs should be forthright about their needs and capacity providers should be open and flexible about what they can offer. From its side, the UN should improve provision of timely information to member states regarding gaps (based on AAVs and PDVs, Force Commander and Police Commissioner evaluations, various audits and investigations conducted by OPSC, OIOS or BOI, evaluations capacity providers themselves carry out, etc.) while respecting the needed degree of confidentiality. The LCM should also start communicating its success stories to attract more member states while keeping meetings to a relatively small group of committed capacity providers and TCC/PCCs and focus on coordination of the most pressing needs.
- j. **Member states and the UN should work closely together to better link performance evaluation to training and capacity building efforts** and introduce better feedback loops that will allow capacity providers to better prioritize their support in the future. A full training cycle should be developed that encompasses both needs assessment, capacity-building and training support, training evaluation, mission conduct, mission performance evaluation, lessons learned definition, and renewed needs assessment. The Integrated Mission Training Centres (IMTCs) in peacekeeping operations could play a greater role in this if revamped into more robust and dynamic multidimensional teams capable of to assess and consolidate mission training gaps and suggest training solutions in liaison with ITS and the LCM. IMTCs could also help emphasize the importance of having more integrated trainings between TCC/PCCs and civilian staff in missions to improve coordinated approaches and familiarize TCCs in particular with the multidimensional and integrated nature of most peacekeeping operations.
- k. **Increasing the number of women peacekeepers should be approached as both an urgent and long-term endeavor.** While in the short-term member states should be encouraged and incentivized to nominate qualified women for training and subsequent deployments including in leadership positions, member states also need to invest upstream in the recruitment, training

and career management of female military and police officers over years. TCC/PCCs should carry out barrier assessments to identify national factors hampering the deployment of women in peacekeeping. Women’s expertise should also be leveraged where it already exists in addition to training both men and women in gender sensitive ways, e.g., women should not be assigned to gender postings simply because they are women.

- l. Training in French language and ‘working with language assistants’ for leadership positions** remain needed as more than half of peacekeepers serve in francophone operations, even though the priority should be for deploying more French-speaking military and police officers and units in such contexts. Member state and national and regional peacekeeping training centers which have both the language and the technical expertise could also support the **translation of updated peacekeeping training materials and manuals in at least the key working languages.**
- m. National and regional peacekeeping training centers should support each other** (via sharing lessons, training curricula, facilitators/trainers, etc.), harmonize their standards, and build on their comparative advantages. Since the training of both units and staff officers is a national responsibility, investments in national peacekeeping training centers should however be prioritized. Civilian training is a UN responsibility and should be provided to all who are contracted to join a peacekeeping operation, but a better analysis of training and capacity-building gaps for civilian components (focusing on specific expertise the UN is either not recruiting for) that member states could help fill could be helpful. Regional associations and the International Association of Peacekeeping Training Centres (IAPTC), if adequately supported and led, could play a useful interface role between the under-resourced UN ITS and national training centers. The concept of network of member states police training centres the UN Police Division and ITS launched at the 2018 IAPTC Conference to help ensure “the right persons are trained on the right thing in the required quantities at the right time” could serve as a model.