DDR WAM eBook

















eBook information

In line with the new approach to disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) launched by the United Nations in 2019, the United Nations Department of Peace Operations (DPO), the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (ODA), and the United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR), produced this interactive eBook designed to support DDR and WAM practitioners navigate and operationalize the content of the second edition of the Handbook 'Effective Weapons and Ammunition Management in a Changing Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Context' in a mobile-accessible format that can be accessed online and offline.

For offline use, download the eBook to your device.

Tap here to access the eBook ready for download (internet connection required)

Read more about UN's new approach to DDR

Read more about the Handbook

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UN's new approach to DDR

In 2019, the United Nations conducted a comprehensive review of its Integrated DDR Standards (IDDRS) and launched its new approach to DDR, which provides guidance to DDR practitioners working in both mission and nonmission settings.

You can read more about the new approach in IDDRS 2.10.

Tap here to access IDDRS 2.10 (internet connection required)

The revised IDDRS provide guidance not only on DDR programmes but also on a range of other options for DDR practitioners under the umbrella of a **DDR process**, which includes any combination of the following:

- DDR Programmes: set of related measures falling under the operational categories of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration.

Go to section 'DDR programmes' to read more about this











UN's new approach to DDR

- DDR-related tools, which includes pre-DDR, transitional weapons and ammunition management (TWAM), community violence reduction, DDR support to mediation, DDR support to transitional security arrangements.
- Reintegration support, including when complementing DDR-related tools.

The new emphasis on DDR processes recognizes the need for innovative and adaptive DDR responses, including two arm control components, which we cover in depth in this eBook.

- **Disarmament,** as part of the DDR programme.
- Transitional weapons and ammunition management (TWAM), as a DDR-related tool.

Go to section 'Disarmament and TWAM activities' to read more about this











Handbook information

In 2016, DPO and ODA initiated a joint project to provide expert resources and guidance to DDR practitioners in the design and implementation of tailored WAM (Weapons and Ammunition Management) activities as part of integrated DDR processes.

In the framework of this project, in 2018, DPO and ODA published the first edition of the Handbook on 'Effective Weapons and Ammunition Management in a Changing Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Context'.

In 2021, a second edition of the Handbook was published. This edition reflects developments at the policy level since 2018, including the launch of the revised Integrated DDR Standards, as well as ensures consistent gender mainstreaming and systematic integration of youth considerations.

This Handbook provides UN DDR practitioners with practical guidance regarding disarmament and other WAM activities at both programmatic and technical levels.









Handbook information

The aim of the Handbook is not to turn DDR practitioners into WAM experts responsible for handling arms and ammunition but to enable them to understand the technical requirements necessary for effectively implementing WAM activities and encourage them to engage partners with the appropriate WAM expertise early in the process.

> Tap here to access the Handbook (internet connection required)













CVR

Community violence reduction.

DDR

Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration.

DDR programme

Set of related measures falling under the operational categories of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration with common results frameworks.

DDR-related tools

Immediate and targeted measures. They include pre-DDR, transitional weapons and ammunition management, community violence reduction, initiatives to prevent individuals from joining armed groups designated as terrorist organizations, DDR support to mediation, and DDR support to transitional security arrangements.

DDR-related tools may be used (a) before, after or alongside DDR programmes; (b) when there is no DDR programme; and (c) alongside reintegration support.









Demobilization

It is the separation of combatants and persons associated with armed forces and groups from military command and control structures and their transition to civilian status.

Formal demobilization is the controlled discharge of members of armed forces and groups in designated temporary sites and requires the existence of a national DDR framework outlining the political, legal, institutional and programmatic parameters for the transition from military to civilian status.

Disarmament

It is the collection, documentation, control and disposal of arms, ammunition and explosives voluntarily handed over by combatants, persons associated with armed forces and groups, and sometimes also the civilian population.

It aims to reduce the number of illicit arms, ammunition and explosives in circulation and/or prevent their diversion to unauthorized users.









Diversion

It is the movement-physical, administrative or otherwise-of a weapon and/or its parts, components or ammunition from the legal to the illicit realm.

DPO

Department of Peace Operations.

EOD

Explosive ordnance disposal.

It is the detection, identification, evaluation, rendering safe, recovery and final disposal of unexploded explosive ordnance.

IATG

International Ammunition Technical Guidelines.

IDDRS

Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards.

IMAS

International Mine Action Standards.













Light weapons

They are any portable lethal weapon designed for use by two or three persons serving as a crew (although some may be carried and used by a single person) that expels or launches, is designed to expel or launch, or may be readily converted to expel or launch a shot, bullet or projectile by the action of an explosive.

They include, inter alia, heavy machine guns, hand-held under-barrel and mounted grenade launchers, portable anti-aircraft guns, portable anti-tank guns, recoilless rifles, portable launchers of anti-tank missile and rocket systems, portable launchers of anti-aircraft missile systems, and mortars of a calibre of less than 100 mm, as well as their parts, components and ammunition.

MOSAIC

Modular Small-arms-control Implementation Compendium.

ODA

Office for Disarmament Affairs.









OSCE

Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe.

Reinsertion

It is transitional assistance offered for a period of up to one year as part of demobilization and prior to reintegration. Reinsertion assistance is offered to combatants and persons associated with armed forces and groups who have been formally demobilized.

Reintegration

It is the process through which ex-combatants and persons formerly associated with armed forces and groups transition sustainably to live as civilian members of society. It takes place at the individual, family and community levels and has psychosocial, economic, political and security dimensions. Reintegration processes are part of local, national and regional recovery and development, with the international community playing a supporting role if requested. Where appropriate, dependants and host-community members may be provided with reintegration support.











Reintegration support

It may be provided as part of a DDR programme or when there is no DDR programme in place. In addition, reintegration support may also complement broader security sector reform or DDR-related tools.

SALW

Small arms and light weapons.

Small arms

They are any portable lethal weapon designed for individual use that expels or launches, is designed to expel or launch, or may be readily converted to expel or launch a shot, bullet or projectile by the action of an explosive. They include, inter alia, revolvers and self-loading pistols, rifles and carbines, submachine guns, assault rifles and light machine guns, as well as their parts, components and ammunition.

SOP

Standard operating procedure.



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TWAM

Transitional weapons and ammunition management.

It is a series of interim arms control measures that can be implemented by DDR practitioners before, after and alongside DDR programmes. TWAM can also be implemented when the preconditions for a DDR programme are absent. The TWAM component of a DDR process is primarily aimed at reducing the capacity of individuals and groups to engage in armed violence and conflict. TWAM also aims to reduce accidents and save lives by addressing the immediate risks related to the possession of weapons, ammunition and explosives.

UN

United Nations.

UNMAS

United Nations Mine Action Service.














WAM

Weapons and ammunition management. It is the oversight, accountability and management of arms and ammunition throughout their life cycle, including the establishment of frameworks, processes and practices for safe and secure materiel acquisition, stockpiling, transfers, tracing and disposal. WAM does not only focus on small arms and light weapons but also on a broader range of conventional weapons including ammunition and artillery.

WAM Technical Advisor

Advisors have the qualifications of an Ammunition Technical Officer (or equivalent).

They also have operational field experience in ammunition and weapons storage, inspection, transportation and destruction/disposal, including in fragile settings, as well as experience in the development and administration of new storage facilities.









If the DDR component does not include such profiles among its staff, it may rely on support from other specialist United Nations agencies or non-governmental organizations.

The WAM Technical Advisor, among other things, advises on explosive safety, certify that ammunition and explosives are safe to move, identify a nearby demolition site for unsafe ammunition, conduct render-safe procedures on unsafe ammunition, and determine safety distances during collection processes.















Arms control regulations



DDR normative framework



WAM standards and guidelines



Gender and age sensitive frameworks







Arms control regulations

All DDR WAM activities shall comply with the legally binding instruments which the host countries have ratified. These instruments aim to prevent and combat the illicit trade in arms, ammunition and/or other related components.

Global instruments

Regional instruments

National arms control legislation

UN arms embargo measures







Global instruments

Legally binding

- 1. The Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and Components and Ammunition.
 - It supplements the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime.
- 2. The Arms Trade Treaty.
 - It regulates the international trade in conventional arms and seeks to prevent and eradicate the illicit trade and diversion of conventional arms by establishing international standards governing arms transfers.
- 3. United Nations human rights conventions (e.g. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights).
 - They require States to curb the proliferation of small arms and regulate access to them as part of the duty to protect the right to life.













Global instruments

4. Other binding global instruments may be relevant, including the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention, the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, and the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

Politically binding for United Nations Member States

- 1. The Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects.
- 2. The International Instrument to Enable States to Identify and Trace, in a Timely and Reliable Manner, Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons.
 - It operationalizes the marking, recordkeeping and tracing obligations contained in the Programme of Action.

Tap here to access the documents (internet connection required)











Regional instruments

Legally binding

These instruments were adopted in Europe. Latin America and Africa to support the implementation of the Programme of Action.

- Kinshasa Convention Nairobi Protocol
- FCOWAS Convention
- 2018 FU SAI W and
- SADC Protocol
- ammunition strategy

- CIFTA

See map of the countries implementing each agreement

Politically binding

- 1. The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.
 - It is the global community's centralized effort to address sustainable socioeconomic development.
 - Goal 16 commits States to "significantly reduce illicit... arms flows" by 2030.











Regional instruments

- Indicator 16.4.2 focuses on the "proportion of seized, found or surrendered arms whose illicit origin or context has been traced or established by a competent authority in line with international instruments".

Tap here to access the 2030 Agenda (internet connection required)

- 2. African Union Agenda 2063.
 - It is the strategic framework for the socioeconomic transformation of the continent. It states that Africa should have ended the illicit trade in and proliferation of small arms and light weapons by 2063.

Tap here to access the AU Agenda 2063 (internet connection required)

- 3. Lusaka Master Road Map.
 - Adopted under **The Silencing the Guns initiative**, this road map's objective is to ensure the non-proliferation of small arms and light weapons, particularly through effective DDR programming.

Tap here to access the document (internet connection required)












Countries that have ratified regional instruments



- **ECCAS:** Kinshasa Convention
- **ECOWAS Convention**
- SADC Protocol
- RECSA: Nairobi Protoco
- 2018 EU SALW and ammunition strategy
- OAS: CIFTA
- Kinshasa Convention and SADC Protocol
- Wairobi Protocol and SADC Protocol

The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.

Zoom in on the graphic to see the details.







National arms control legislation

Most countries have domestic legislation regulating the life cycle of weapons and ammunition, including manufacture, marking, import, export, record-keeping and civilian possession.

Generally, countries will have the provisions of the global and regional instruments they have ratified reflected in their own national legislation.

However, the degree to which national legislation has been adopted or updated may vary from country to country.







UN arms embargo measures

DDR practitioners shall undertake no action in violation of United Nations arms embargoes.

They shall also consider arms embargo provisions when advising the national authorities on the planning and implementation of DDR processes.







DDR normative framework

DDR practitioners should be familiar with the source and scope of their mandate, including specific United Nations Security Council resolutions for peace operations in mission settings.

In non-mission settings, the work of United Nations DDR practitioners should be in line with the **United Nations Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework**. If a peace agreement exists, it should be one of the first documents that DDR practitioners consult.

Tap here to read more about the UNSDCF (internet connection required)

Actions should be implemented in a manner that ensures that the relevant rights and obligations under that broader legal framework are respected. See IDDRS Submodule 2.11 on the legal framework for UN DDR.

Tap here to access IDDRS 2.11 (internet connection required)











DDR normative framework

Integrated DDR Standards

The IDDRS are a set of policies, guidelines and procedures for undertaking DDR, ranging from planning, design, monitoring and evaluation, to the protection of specific groups such as children, youth and women, and mainstreaming of cross-cutting issues such as health, gender and youth.

Module 4.10 focuses on disarmament and Module 4.11 focuses on Transitional Weapons and Ammunition Management (TWAM).

Tap here to access IDDRS 4.10 (internet connection required)

Tap here to access IDDRS 4.11 (internet connection required)











WAM standards and guidelines

The United Nations developed two sets of guidelines for effective WAM:

International Ammunition Technical Guidelines (IATG)

The IATG consists of 12 volumes, which provide practical guidance for a "through-life" approach to ammunition management, and offer an incremental approach that allows for adaptation according to the setting and circumstances.

Tap here to access the IATG (internet connection required)

Modular Small-arms-Control Implementation Compendium (MOSAIC)

Provides practical guidance on all aspects of SALW control, including legislation, programme design and operational support. MOSAIC Module 2.30 focuses on SALW control in the context of DDR processes.

Tap here to access the MOSAIC Module 2.30 (internet connection required)







Gender and age sensitive frameworks

Gender and WAM

Youth, Peace and Security Agenda







Gender and WAM

The gender mainstreaming of WAM has a firm basis in several international normative developments related to the following:

Women, peace and security agenda

All Member States and relevant actors should implement the United Nations Security Council resolution 1325 (2000), which calls for the increased participation of women at all levels of security-related decision-making and for enhanced efforts to address the security of women and girls in conflict, among other targets.

Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women

This convention has:

- Recognized violence against women and gender-based violence as forms of discrimination (general recommendation No. 19, 1992).
- Highlighted the need to consider discrimination against women in conflict prevention, conflict and post-conflict situations (general recommendation No. 30, 2013).











Gender and WAM

- Elaborated international standards on gender-based violence against women, recognizing the need to rigorously apply these standards as a legal and moral obligation (general recommendation No. 35, 2017).

The Agenda 2030 for Sustainable Development and its Sustainable Development Goals

In Goal 5, Gender equality is considered to be an "accelerator" – meaning that improving gender equality will help to achieve all the Sustainable Development Goals.

Tap here to access the 2030 Agenda (internet connection required)

Small arms and light weapons and other conventional arms control frameworks Including:

- 1. The Outcome Document of the third Review Conference on the Programme of Action on small arms and light weapons.
 - It refers to the gendered impacts of arms and armed violence.











Gender and WAM

- It calls for the participation of women in addressing illicit arms and armed violence, as well as for the collection of sexdisaggregated data.

2. The Arms Trade Treaty.

- This is the first legally binding treaty in which the link between the arms trade and gender-based violence is recognized, including not only conflict related gender-based violence but also femicides, "honour killings" and intimate partner violence.













Youth, Peace and Security Agenda

DDR processes are often conducted in contexts where most combatants are youth. They should be involved in all stages of **planning**, **implementing** and **monitoring** of DDR WAM activities.

United Nations Security Council resolution 2250 (2015) is the first international policy that recognizes the positive role young people play in preventing and resolving conflict, countering violent extremism and building peace.

Peace and security is also a fundamental pillar of the United Nations Youth 2030 Strategy, which acts as an umbrella framework to guide the entire United Nations as it steps up its work with and for young people in all contexts.

The important and positive contribution that young people can make in sustaining peace and security was reaffirmed by the United Nations General Assembly through its unanimous support for a new resolution entitled "Youth, disarmament and non-proliferation" (74/64), adopted on 12 December 2019.

The Office for Disarmament Affairs launched its youth outreach initiative, #Youth4Disarmament, in 2019 to facilitate the participation of Youth in the field of disarmament and non-proliferation.















Data collection and assessment



Mission-specific WAM SOPs for DDR



Evaluating WAM activities



Public information and strategic communication







UN DDR approach and mandate

UN DDR principles

DDR UN mandate

UN DDR support in non-mission settings







UN DDR principles

Voluntary

- Removing or controlling weapons forcibly risks creating a security vacuum and a power imbalance that may generate increased tensions and lead to a resumption of armed violence.
- Voluntary disarmament should be facilitated through strong sensitization and communication efforts.
- It should also be underpinned by firm guarantees of security and immunity from prosecution for the illegal possession of a weapon (or weapons) handed in.

People-centered

- Unconditional release and protection of children.
- Agreeing on child-specific disarmament procedures reduces the risk of further possible abuse and exploitation of children, especially for political or tactical gain.
- It also prepares children for separate and specific children-related demobilization and reintegration processes.











UN DDR principles

- Specific attention should also be given to the disarmament of youth and their inclusion in the design, implementation and monitoring of TWAM activities.
- Voluntary disarmament should be facilitated through strong sensitization and communication efforts.

Tap here to read more about this in IDDRS 5.20 (internet connection required)

Gender responsive and inclusive

- All disarmament and TWAM activities should integrate gender and age considerations.
 - This requires gender expertise, gender analysis, the collection of sex and age-disaggregated data, an inclusive approach to integrate different views and needs into all programmes and policies, and the meaningful participation of women at each stage of the process.
- A gender sensitive approach:
 - It actively examines, questions and attempts to change unequal gender norms and imbalances of power.









UN DDR principles

- It acknowledges, incorporates and addresses messages on masculinities and violence, including the linkage between masculinities and weapons ownership.
- It ensures that there are both male and female United Nations personnel in all roles, including leadership roles, during the implementation of WAM activities.

Conflict-sensitive

- Disarmament or TWAM operations shall not increase the vulnerability of communities, groups or individuals to internal or external threats.
- Operations need to be based on a thorough analysis of the security context, relevant actors and their military capabilities to avoid creating a security imbalance or vacuum.

Nationally and locally owned

- National Governments have the right to apply their own national standards to all disarmament and TWAM operations on their territory. They also shall act in compliance with international arms control instruments and applicable legal frameworks.











UN DDR principles

- There are UN specialists at the disposal of the National Governments to support the planning and implementation of DDR WAM activities.
- Building national and local institutional and technical capacity is essential for the effective, successful and sustainable continuation of disarmament and TWAM efforts.

Safe and secure

- All disarmament and TWAM operations require the involvement of qualified WAM technical advisers. They shall have the qualifications of an Ammunition Technical Officer (or equivalent).
- Among other things, they advise on explosive safety, certify that ammunition and explosives are safe to move, identify a nearby demolition site for unsafe ammunition, conduct render safe procedures on unsafe ammunition, and determine safety distances during collection processes.

Tap here to read more about this in IDDRS 2.10 (internet connection required)











DDR UN mandate

DDR is often a priority area for the United Nations Security Council when setting the mandate of a United Nations peace operation.

Mandates may include detailed provisions regarding DDR WAM, such as requesting the mission to support the authorities in collecting, registering, securing and disposing of weapons held by armed forces and groups.

United Nations missions' mandates may include other WAM activities, such as those related to illicit civilian possession of weapons, monitoring arms embargoes or the seizure of weapons from warring parties following United Nations military operations. While this may not form part of the official remit of the DDR section, all WAM activities conducted by the mission, including the management of UN troops' own material, should be coherent and in compliance with global standards.

You can read more about the integration of WAM into Security Council decisions in the second edition of the Aide-Memoire.

Tap here to access Aide-Memoire (internet connection required)







UN DDR support in non-mission settings

In countries where there is no United Nations peace operation mandated by the Security Council, the UN will provide support, when the national government and/or the UN Resident Coordinator request assistance.

The disarmament and demobilization components of a DDR programme will be carried out by national institutions with the support of relevant UN entities, the UN country team, regional organizations and bilateral actors.

When the preconditions for a DDR programme plan are not met, implementing specific DDR-related tools (e.g.: TWAM) can be considered.

Decision-making and accountability for the UN-supported DDR is the responsibility of the UN resident coordinator, who should establish a UN DDR Working Group co-chaired by the country-level lead agency/agencies to coordinate the contribution of the UN country team to integrated DDR.

DDR programmes, DDR-related tools and reintegration support require the allocation of national budgets and/or the mobilization of voluntary contributions.







Potential national normative frameworks

For each potential national normative framework there is a different DDR WAM strategy. For example:

- 1. The framework is under construction in a country with no ongoing peace process, and the preconditions for a DDR programme are absent.
 - WAM Policy Officers and/or Technical Advisers could support the national authorities in developing their DDR strategy to incorporate relevant TWAM components, including linkages to other DDR related tools.
- 2. The framework is under construction in a country with an ongoing peace process, and the preconditions for a DDR program are absent.
 - Negotiators or advisers with DDR and WAM expertise should be involved to ensure that peace agreements include appropriate WAM provisions.
 - CVR or DDR support to transitional security arrangements could support this sensitive phase.







Potential national normative frameworks

- 3. A national agreement has been signed, which should contain the framework for the national DDR strategy.
 - A national DDR strategy should be developed by the national DDR institution with the support of the DDR section, WAM Policy Officers, and Technical Advisors.
 - The implementation of CVR, pre-DDR and TWAM could support the process.
- 4. A national agreement and a national plan for a DDR process are in place. The legals and the institutional basis for a DDR programme should be complete.
 - Disarmament and demobilization may be the first activities to be implemented and will be key in building the foundations for the success of the whole DDR process.
 - If the implementation of a DDR programme is delayed, DDR-related tools that include TWAM activities can help generate the right conditions to start the DDR programme.









Data collection and assessments

Integrated assessments and weapons surveys are the two main ways to collect evidence-based data to plan and design disarmament and TWAM activities. Data collected can serve as baseline to identify indicators against which to monitor and evaluate DDR processes.

Integrated assessments

Weapon surveys

Risk assessments








Integrated assessments

Assessments should start as early as possible in the peace negotiation process and the preplanning phase.

- DDR practitioners should employ information management systems and data protection measures.
- They should help determine if disarmament or other TWAM initiatives are desirable or feasible in the current situation, as well as the potential positive and negative consequences of such actions.
- The collection of data relating to weapons and those who carry them can present significant risks to DDR practitioners and their sources so United Nations security guidelines shall be always followed and the anonymity of sources ensured.

What is being analysed during an integrated assessment?

Integrated assessments should include information related to the political and security context and the main drivers of armed conflict, particularly:









Integrated assessments

- A gender-responsive mapping of armed forces and groups (number, origin, age, sex, rank, etc.) and their arsenals (estimates of the number and the type of weapons, ammunition and explosives).
- An understanding of the WAM capacity of armed forces and groups.
- An analysis of the patterns of weapons in possession among men, women, boys, girls and youth.
- A mapping of the locations and access routes to materiel and potential caches (to the extent possible).
- An understanding of the power imbalances and disparities in weapons possession between communities.
- An analysis of the use of weapons in the commission of serious human rights violations or abuses and grave breaches of international humanitarian law, as well as crime, including organized crime.
- An understanding of cultural and gendered attitudes towards weapons and the value of arms and ammunition locally.











Integrated assessments

- The identification of sources of illicit weapons and ammunition, as well as possible trafficking routes.
- Lessons learned from any past disarmament or weapons collections initiatives
- An understanding of the willingness of and incentives for armed forces and groups to participate in DDR.
- An assessment of the presence of armed groups not involved in DDR and the possible impact these groups can have on the DDR process.

Once sufficient and reliable information has been gathered, collaborative plans can be designed.

They can be developed by the National DDR Commission and the United Nations DDR section in mission settings, or the National DDR Commission and lead United Nations agency/agencies in non-mission settings.

Tap here to read more about this in IDDRS 4.10 (internet connection required)











They are the collection and analysis of quantitative and qualitative data about weapons and ammunition, which is conducted in a specific geographical area.

- They enable the accurate definition of the extent of the disarmament or TWAM operations, allowing for planning of the collection and future storage and destruction requirements.
- They are an opportunity to build capacity for continuous data gathering and analysis, as well as to establish baseline indicators to support monitoring and evaluation.
- Data disaggregated by sex and age is a prerequisite for understanding age- and gender-specific attitudes towards weapons, ammunition and explosives, and their age- and gender-specific impacts.

When should a weapons survey be conducted?

- Complementary to the integrated assessment, it should be implemented as early as possible in the planning of DDR operations.









- However, it requires significant resources, access to sensitive and often unstable parts of the country, buy-in from local authorities and ownership by national authorities all of which can take considerable amounts of time.
- It can take more than a year from the time resources are allocated and mobilized to the completion and the publication of results and recommendations.

Who should implement the weapons survey?

- It is critical to ensure that ownership of the project sits at the national level due to the sensitivities involved.
- Buy-in must also be secured from local authorities on the ground where research is to be conducted. They must also be kept informed of developments.
- Weapons surveys are often subcontracted out by United Nations entities and national authorities to independent and impartial research organizations and/or an expert consultant to design and coordinate the survey components.









Who should be in the survey team?

- A gender-balance of independent experts and surveyors who are nationals of the country in which the DDR section is operating and who speak the local language(s).
- Gender specialists and all surveyors should have gender training.

What information should be gathered during a weapons survey?

- Contextual analysis (conflict analysis, mapping of armed actors, and political, economic, social, environmental and cultural factors).
- Weapons and ammunition distribution assessment (types, quantities, possession by women, men and children, movements of small arms and light weapons, and illicit sources of weapons and ammunition).
- Impact survey (impact of weapons on men, women, children, vulnerable groups, DDR beneficiaries, etc., social and economic developments, and number of acts of armed violence and victims).









- Perception survey (attitudes of various groups towards weapons, reasons for armed groups holding weapons, trust in security forces, and alternatives to weapons possession, etc.).
- Capacity assessment (community, local and national coping mechanism, legal tools, and security and non-security responses).

Methodology

- In order to collect, compare, and confirm data, the survey should use a variety of research methodologies and sources. For example, desk research, collection of official quantitative data (including crime and health data related to weapons), and interviews with key informants.
- Information on the WAM capacity, processes and procedures of the national authorities is key to identifying the needs, opportunities and requirements with regard to the planning of DDR WAM activities.

Tap here to read Annex C of MOSAIC 5.10 for a list of sample questions (internet connection required)











Risk assessments

During a risk assessment, risks are analysed, considering likelihood and impact, as a basis for determining how they should be responded to. They should be conducted with the support of qualified WAM Technical Advisors and implemented at strategic and operational levels:

- 1. At the strategic level, they are part of the operational planning of the DDR process and should be conducted as part of the integrated assessment.
 - The most common risks are political, security and programmatic.
- 2. At the operational level, they would support the planning of a specific activity.
 - It should focus on the primary safety and security risks related to WAM activities including diversion through theft or loss of materiel, unplanned explosions of ammunition and misuse of weapons during activities.
 - The level of risk is partly dependent on the mitigations that have been put in place.
 - A range of techniques for estimating the level of risk is contained in IATG 2.10.

Tap here to access IATG 2.10 (internet connection required)







Mission-specific WAM SOPs for DDR

A standard operating procedure (SOP) is a set of mandatory step-by-step instructions designed to guide DDR practitioners in the management of weapons, ammunition and explosives during disarmament or TWAM activities. It is becoming a common practice across United Nations DDR processes.

Also, It allows for coherence in the delivery of activities, ensuring greater safety and security, as well as adherence to regulations, standards and guidelines.

Development

Sections

Materiel covered

Updating the DDR WAM SOP







Development

The Department of Peace Operations and the Office for Disarmament Affairs have developed the United Nations Template SOP on WAM in DDR Processes (forthcoming).

The mission's DDR WAM SOP should be developed by the DDR section with the support of WAM technical experts drawn from UNMAS, the Force and military observers, depending on availability and expertise within the mission. The SOP is signed off by the Head of the United Nations mission and all staff from the DDR section, national counterparts, as well as Force members supporting DDR activities, UNMAS staff and other implementing partners, shall be familiar with the SOP.

It should be informed by the integrated assessment and the weapons survey, be tailored to the national DDR strategy, and be in line with international norms and technical guidance, as well as relevant national legislation.

Go to section 'Normative framework' to read more about national legislations







Sections

Depending on the nature of activities planned under the DDR programme, the DDR WAM SOP could include the sections below:

Reception of weapons and/or ammunition in static disarmament camps or mobile units

Compliance with DDR programme eligibility criteria

Weapons storage management

Ammunition and explosives storage management

Accounting for weapons

Accounting for ammunition

Transportation of weapons

Transportation of ammunition

Reporting and investigations of loss or theft

Disposal of weapons

Disposal of ammunition and explosives

Tap on the coloured items to read more about them.







Materiel covered

UN peace operations are increasingly deployed in conflict areas with mandates allowing for offensive military operations, during which illicit weapons and ammunition are retrieved or confiscated.

The DDR WAM SOP should therefore clearly state which arms and ammunition collection efforts are considered part of the DDR process and which are not.

Materiel collected by other mission components, such as weapons seized from armed groups during military operations or recovered from caches by United Nations troops or national forces, should be explicitly excluded from the DDR WAM SOP and managed in line with international standards and guidelines.







Updating the DDR WAM SOP

The content of all SOPs must be kept up-todate. The DDR Chief should appoint a DDR officer with an appropriate background to manage the process of reviewing and updating the DDR WAM SOP.

The officer should keep the content of the SOP current by conducting periodic reviews and making amendments, as required.







Evaluating WAM activities

Monitoring and evaluation are critical mechanisms for determining whether a project or process is working as expected and, if not, identifying where changes in approach are required based on evidence. The primary differences between monitoring and evaluation are their scope and timing.

Monitoring

Evaluation

Importance of monitoring and evaluation

Planning monitoring and evaluation for DDR WAM activities







Monitoring

Monitoring is a continuous process of gathering and analysing data to support programme management, track implementation progress and allow for regular reporting, with a particular focus on timelines, outputs, budgets, compliance with guidelines, etc.







Evaluation

Evaluation is conducted at specific points in time-generally the mid- and end-points of a programme-and focuses more on building an assessment of the efficiency, performance and impact of a programme, as well as determining its added value to the general objectives of the mission.

Evaluations can be performed internally or by external actors, including consultants, to ensure greater objectivity.







Importance of monitoring and evaluation

Monitoring and evaluation allow:

- Assessing the progress of activities based on evidence.
- Improving the management process and timekeeping.
- Confirming that activities are conducted in line with guidelines and good practice.
- Adjusting programming based on findings and in line with the evolution of the context on the ground.
- Producing accurate and timely reporting to the host State, donors and other stakeholders.
- Objectively verifying the outcomes and impact of the overall programme in line with the core objectives of the mission's mandate.
- Ensuring accountability for effective and efficient use of resources.
- Sharing lessons learned and building institutional memory.







Planning monitoring and evaluation for DDR WAM activities

The monitoring and evaluation system should be designed during the planning phase of the DDR process. Key factors to consider include:

- Deciding what change(s) to measure and how to measure them.
- Fitting monitoring and evaluation systems to context.
- Scheduling key activities.
- Allocating suitable resources.
- Assigning specific roles and responsibilities.
- Establishing a baseline.

Participatory approach

- Monitoring and evaluation should involve and promote a participatory approach and involve a wide range of stakeholders within the context of an open and democratic process.
- Particular attention should be paid to seeking the views of the intended beneficiaries of any intervention, including those affected by the misuse of weapons.









Planning monitoring and evaluation for DDR WAM activities

- This will require prior analysis of these target groups and their particular needs, which requires special measures and tools to capture their views.

Tap here to read more about this in MOSAIC Module 4.40 (internet connection required)

Gender sensitive-approach

In order to be gender-sensitive, the following shall be incorporated:

- Consider the different needs, positions and resources available to men and women to voice their concerns.
- Seek ways to involve both women and men in all processes.
- Consider the gendered aspects of objectives and indicators used.
- Include gender-sensitive indicators in monitoring and evaluation systems.
- Use and produce sex- and agedisaggregated data and recommendations.











Planning monitoring and evaluation for DDR WAM activities

Performance indicators

Standardized indicators should be identified early in the programme to allow for comparison over time and geography. The selection of indicators should be driven by the objectives of the programme, tailored to the local context and be gender-responsive.

- Examples of quantitative indicators:
 - Number of weapons and rounds of ammunition collected from men/ women and recorded.
 - Number of items destroyed.
 - Number of items stolen or lost in the process.
 - Number of men/women killed or injured and human rights abuses by sex and age resulting from the use of weapons.
 - Armed criminality rates in the target area.
 - Local prices of weapons and ammunition.











Planning monitoring and evaluation for DDR WAM activities

- Examples of qualitative indicators:
 - The extent to which MOSAIC and IATG are adhered to
 - Perceptions of security by women and men.
 - The perceived need for arms ownership for self-protection by men and women.
 - Visible prevalence of weapons among female and male community members.













Public information and strategic communication

They are key support activities used to inform DDR participants, beneficiaries and other stakeholders of the process (public information) and to influence attitudes towards DDR (strategic communications).

The DDR communications strategy on WAM interventions should align with the mission's broader communications policy.

Main objectives

- Inform by providing accurate information about the DDR process.
- Mitigate the potential negative impact of inaccurate and deceptive information that may hamper the success of DDR and wider peace efforts.
- Sensitize members of armed forces and groups, as well as communities, to the DDR process.
- Transform attitudes in communities in such a way that is conducive to DDR.

Strategy planning







Strategy planning

DDR practitioners should take the following key factors into account:

1. Who are the primary and intermediary target audiences?

Go to section 'Data collection and assessments' to read more about this

- 2. What behavioural/attitudinal change is the public information and strategic communication strategy trying to bring about?
- 3. How can this change be achieved (taking into account literacy rates, the presence of different media, etc.)?
- 4. What are the different networks involved in the dissemination of information? Which members of this network have the greatest degree of influence?
- 5. What language does the information need to be delivered in (also taking into account possible foreign combatants)?











Strategy planning

- 6. What other organizations are involved in supporting DDR WAM activities and what are their public information and communication strategies?
- 7. How can the public information and strategic communication strategy be monitored?
- 8. Where are disinformation and misinformation coming from?
- 9. Who are the key local influencers/amplifiers?
- 10. What dominant media technologies are in use locally and by what segments/demography of the population?
- 11. Once the strategy is created, the resulting messages and activities can be channelled using the different media types.

Read more about media

Read more about public information and strategic communication in IDDRS 4.60 (internet connection required)











Media

The decision of which type of media to use should be based on a thorough analysis of the geographic availability of that media.

Different types of media include:

- Online and web presence.
- Local, national, international radio stations.
- Print media.
- Visual media (TV, video, billboards).
- Interactive mechanisms (theatre, debates, seminars).
- Local town hall events.
- Hotlines.











TWAM activities







Disarmament operations



















Introduction to disarmament

The disarmament process is part of a DDR programme alongside two other components: demobilization and reintegration.

Read more about DDR programmes and their preconditions to take place

The aim of the disarmament process is to control and reduce arms, ammunition and explosives held by combatants before demobilization in order to build confidence in the peace process, increase security and prevent a return to conflict.

The voluntary handover that takes place is symbolic of the end of the individual's role as a combatant, and the end of the armed conflict.

Tap here to read more about disarmament operations in IDDRS 4.10 (internet connection required)







DDR programmes

DDR programmes are a set of related measures falling under the operational categories of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration.

In order for a DDR programme to take place, the following preconditions need to be in place:

- Signing of a negotiated ceasefire and/or peace agreement that provides a framework for DDR.
- Trust in the peace process.
- Willingness of the parties to the armed conflict to engage in DDR.
- A minimum guarantee of security.

When the preconditions for a DDR programme are not in place, DDR-related tools may be used to contribute to stabilization, to make the returns of stability more tangible and to generate more conducive environments for peace processes, possibly even paving the way for a DDR programme if necessary. Following or in absence of DDR-related tools, Reintegration may be supported in line with the sustaining peace approach.












DDR programmes

When preconditions for DDR programmes are in place, DDR-related tools may also be used before, during and after DDR programmes as complementary measures.











Planning disarmament

The planning of disarmament operations should be initiated at the peace negotiations stage when the appropriate modus operandi for disarming combatants and persons associated with armed forces and groups will be set out.

Main phases

Determining eligibility criteria

Disarmament team composition

Considerations for the timeline implementation of disarmament







Main phases

Operational planning

Information collection

Risk assessment

Identification of eligibility criteria

Development of SOP

Identification of the team structure

Realistic timetable for operations

Weapon collection

Static and mobile disarmament

Procedures for disarming combatants

Spontaneous disarmament

Stockpile management

Accounting for weapons/ ammunition

Transportation of weapons/ammunition

Weapons/ ammunition storage

Disposal

Weapons Ammunition Transfers Deactivation destruction to national of weapons authorities

Tap on the coloured items to read more about them.







Establishing rigorous, unambiguous and transparent criteria that alow people to participate in DDR programmes or pre-DDR is vital to achieving the objectives of DDR.

Eligibility criteria must be carefully designed and agreed to by all parties, and screening processes must be in place in the disarmament stage.

Eligibility for a DDR programme must be gender-inclusive and shall not discriminate based on age or sex.

Depending on the context, eligibility criteria for a DDR programme may or may not include specific weapons and ammunition-related criteria

Eligibility criteria for disarmament or pre-DDR generally include the following...













Age

- Over 18.
- Combatants under 18 are regarded and legally treated as children. Eligibility for participants under 18 years old shall not be made conditional on the possession and handover of a weapon or ammunition.
- There shall be no conditions of any kind for the participation of children associated with armed forces and groups in child DDR which is a separate process from adult DDR. If there is doubt as to whether an individual is under 18 years old, an age assessment shall be conducted.
- Read more on this on Annex B in IDDRS
 5.20 on children and DDR.

Tap here to access IDDRS 5.20 (internet connection required)

Status

- Proof that the combatant is a member of an armed group or force that has signed a peace agreement.









- And/or:

- The combatant eligible for DDR activities (e.g., she/he knows how to handle a weapon and/or is recognized by a group commander).
- Participants in support and noncombative roles may be eligible for demobilization and reintegration, but not disarmament.
- Read more participants, beneficiaries, and partners in IDDRS 3.21 (forthcoming).

Weapons Procedure Test:

- Combatants may also need to take a weapons procedures test, which will identify their ability to handle weapons.
- Children should always be disarmed and are not required to take this test to be admitted.











Materiel to be handed over

Assessing the type, status, and quantities of materiel held by groups to be disarmed is key. Depending on the setting, armed groups' arsenals vary in size, quality and types of weapons.

- In contexts where manufactured military weapons are used, combatants should hand over:
 - Serviceable manufactured arms and/or ammunition.
 - Hunting rifles and shotguns should be excluded to ensure that illicit military items are taken out of circulation.
- In contexts where non-military weapons are used, combatants should hand over:
 - Serviceable hunting rifles and shotguns, including craft weapons, can be permitted.











According to the context, the ratio of arms and ammunition to individual combatants can vary and may include small arms and most light weapons, as well as heavy weapons and ammunition.

In certain settings, heavy weapons could be included in the eligibility criteria for a DDR programme, and the ratio of arms to combatants could be determined based on the number of crew required to operate.

Female eligibility criteria

Historically, women who are eligible to participate in DDR programmes have not been aware of it or have been deprived of their weapons to the benefit of men.


DDR practitioners should ensure proper sensitization with potential female participants.

















Composition

A Disarmament Team, led by the DDR section, should include a gender-balanced composition:

- DDR practitioners.
- A representative of the national DDR commission (and potentially other national institutions).
- A technical support team from a specialized UN entity or NGO, including:
 - A team leader/WAM Technical Advisor.
 - Weapons inspectors.
 - Registration officers.
 - Store men/women.
 - A medic.
- Military observers and representatives from the Protection Force.
- National security forces armament specialists (police, army and/or gendarmerie).
- A representative from the mission's component for child protection.













- A national gender specialist from the national authorities or civil society organizations.
- A national youth specialist from the national authorities or civil society organizations.
- Depending on the provisions of the ceasefire and/or peace agreement and the national DDR policy document, commanders of armed groups may also be part of the Disarmament Team.

Training

- Disarmament teams should receive training on the DDR WAM standard operating procedures (SOPs).
- Weapons handling and security training:
 - Trainers: WAM Technical Advisers (UNMAS, force or specialized subcontractor).
 - **Participants**: Disarmament team members.
 - Duration: 1 to 2 days.











- Objectives:

- Training should be developed in accordance with the mission's WAM standard operating procedure.
- Each actor should leave with a clear understanding of the chain of operations, their role in the process, and security requirements.
- The training aims at harmonizing practice between those qualified to handle small arms and light weapons (military and police backgrounds) but does not provide instruction to personnel not qualified to do so (DDR officers).
- These individuals will not be handling materiel but need to know what the disarmament process entails and to be aware of security procedures to ensure they are implemented.
- Training should provide an opportunity for the various components to learn to work together, learn about each other's responsibilities, and develop a collective, team spirit.











- Training should involve a mixture of theory and practical modules, safe handling of weapons, group exercises. and simulation of the disarmament process.

- Potential training components:

- Understanding the operational organization of the disarmament/other relevant DDR WAM activity.
- Understanding the structure of a disarmament site.
- Behaviour in the handling of small arms and light weapons.
- Security rules.
- How to react in case of an incident.
- Identification of hazardous items.
- Small arms and light weapons manipulation.
- Maintenance and functional control of small arms and light weapons.











- Small arms and light weapons markings and identification of main weapons in circulation in the host country.
- DDR weapons and ammunition registration database.
- Ammunition basic principles and identification of main items in circulation in the host country.
- Behaviour in handling ammunition.
- Visual quality control of ammunition.

Sections of this training could be built on the training course on "Effective WAM in a Changing DDR Context" developed by the Department of Peace Operations, the Office for Disarmament Affairs and the United Nations Institute for Training and Research (contact wamddr@unitar.org for further information).











Considerations for the timeline implementation of disarmament

Timelines for the implementation of the disarmament component of a DDR programme should be developed by taking the following factors into account:

- The provisions of the peace agreement. The availability of accurate information about demographics (sex, age, size of group to be disarmed).
- The location of the armed forces' and groups' units and number, type, and location of their weapons.
- The nature, processing capacity and location of mobile and static disarmament sites.
- The time it takes to process each excombatant or person (approx. 15/20 mins per person).







Disarmament approaches

The UN should support the national authorities in identifying the best disarmament approach. The selection of the approach, or combination of approaches, should be based on the following:

- Findings from the integrated assessment and weapons survey.

Go to section 'Data collection and assessments' to read more about this

- Discussions and strategic planning by the national authorities.
- Exchanges with leaders of armed forces and groups.
- Risk assessment.
- Gender analysis.
- Financial resources.

Approach 1: Static or site-based disarmament

Approach 2: Mobile disarmament

Information to participants







Static or site-based disarmament

This approach:

- Uses specially designed sites. These sites require significant planning and organization.
- It relies on coordination of a range of implementing partners.
- Establishment and management of disarmament sites should be included in the peace agreement to ensure former warring factions agree and are aware of their responsibility to go to such sites.
- Depending on the disarmament plan, aeographic and security constraints, persons associated with armed forces/ groups can move directly to disarmament sites or their transportation may be arranged through pick up points.
- Read more on this in IDDRS 4.10 for more information on activities conducted at pickup points.

Tap here to access IDDRS 4.10 (internet connection required)











Static or site-based disarmament

Advantages

- Combatants and persons associated with armed forces and groups are in one location and therefore more easily controlled.
- Disarmament logistics are easier to plan.
- Security is easier to ensure for the DDR team and participants.
- An arms and ammunition storage facility can be created and kept on-site, which increases transparency over WAM.
- Infrastructure can be transformed afterwards to be used by communities (e.g., social centres).

Disadvantages

- Costly to construct and maintain, especially when taking into account the needs of special groups.
- Female combatants and women associated with armed forces and groups may experience security issues in cantonment.
- Risk of temporary camps becoming longerterm or even permanent if operations are delayed.











Static or site-based disarmament

- Potential security risks for communities living close to camps and added pressure on local resources.
- Movements of armed combatants and persons associated with armed forces and groups require significant transportation logistics.
- Sites could become a target for armed violence.













Mobile disarmament

This approach:

- Usually consists of a group of modified road vehicles
- Gives advantage of decreased logistical outlay, increased flexibility, reduced cost, and rapid deployment and assembly.
- Can be used when weapons are concentrated in a specific geographical area when moving collected arms or when assembling members of armed forces/ groups would be difficult or trigger insecurity.

Advantages

- Flexible approach.
- Limited movement of armed individuals who remain in their communities.
- Often more accessible to women, children, youth, elderly, persons with disabilities, and persons with chronic illnesses.
- Limited movement of unsafe ammunition.













Mobile disarmament

Disadvantages

- Requires several disarmament teams and significant logistics.
- Security is more difficult to ensure for DDR teams, participants, and beneficiaries.
- More dependent on the willingness of combatants and persons associated with armed forces and groups to participate in DDR.
- Transportation of collected weapons and ammunition requires safety management and security by the force.













Information to participants

Regardless of the approach selected, all persons associated with armed forces and groups should be informed of the following:

- The time and date to report and the location to which to report.
- Appropriate weapons and ammunition safety measures.
- The activities involved and steps they will be asked to follow.
- The level of the United Nations or military security to expect on arrival.







Layout of disarmament sites

The exact layout of the site will depend on geographical considerations and the amount of real estate available:

- Plan the layout to enable convenience for combatants while ensuring security for the operating staff.
- Establish separate collection and storage areas within the site for weapons and ammunition.
- Written approval on the disarmament site needs to be obtained by the national authorities.

Constructing disarmament site principles

- The site must provide a secure area for the Disarmament Team to operate. It includes adequate fencing and barriers. In remote or mobile sites, security may depend solely on the presence of force protection elements of the UN Peacekeeping Force and UN police. National security forces may provide additional support.
- A loading and unloading bay shall be constructed as close to the entrance as possible, to promote safe handling of weapons.









Layout of disarmament sites

- Safe and secure storage shall be provided for weapons, ammunition, and explosives handed over by members of armed forces/ groups.
 - For mobile and remote sites, transportation of the recovered items to the permanent storage pending disposal to be planned beforehand.
- Use of International Organization for Standardization containers may be appropriate and the numbers required should be calculated according to the anticipated quantity of weapons to be collected.
- Small arms ammunition of Hazard Division 1.4 may be stored no less than 100 m from working and/or accommodation sites.
- Ammunition and explosives of other Hazard Divisions should be stored according to the hazard and quantity received.

Read more about the explosive hazard classification system











Explosive hazard classification system

Ammunition that has a **EXPLOSIVES** 1.1 mass explosion hazard. 1.11 Ammunition that has a projection hazard but **EXPLOSIVES** 1.2 not a mass explosion hazard Ammunition that has a fire hazard and either a minor blast **EXPLOSIVES** 1.3 hazard or a minor projection hazard or both, but not a mass explosion hazard. Ammunition that presents no significant 1.4 hazard. Very insensitive substances, which have a 1.5 mass explosion hazard. Extremely insensitive articles which do not 1.6 have a mass explosion hazard.







Layout of disarmament sites

- The WAM Technical Advisor shall identify the location and any protective measures that may be required.
- A demolition/burning area, for the destruction of any items of ammunition and explosives that are assessed to be unsafe for storage or transportation, shall be identified at a safe distance from all other activities.
- The WAM Technical Advisor will specify the location for this area, based upon the principles contained in Annex D of IATG 10.10.

Tap here to access IATG 10.10 (internet connection required)













Arms Reception Procedures

A disarmament SOP should state the step-bystep procedures for receiving weapons and ammunition. These procedures include:

Before entering the perimeter

After entering the perimeter procedure

Processing heavy weapons and ammunition

Also, the SOP should include:

- Identification of responsibility for each step and the gender-responsive provisions required.
- A diagram of the disarmament site(s) (either mobile or static).

See an example of a disarmament camp diagram

Go to section 'Missionspecific WAM SOPs for DDR'







Before entering the perimeter

- Combatants should be treated with respect and courtesy when arriving at a holding area adjacent to the disarmament site.
- A briefing on the disarmament process should be delivered to the combatants.
- Members of armed forces and groups should then be invited to start the disarmament process.
- The individual is identified by his/her commander at the verification desk.
- Special measures will be required for children.

Go to section 'Gender and-age responsive WAM' to read more about this

- Since both women and men will be checked, there should be male and female officers available from among UN military/DDR staff in mission settings and national security/DDR staff in non-mission settings.









Before entering the perimeter

- If the individual is carrying ammunition or explosives that might present a threat, she/ he will be asked to leave them outside the handover area, in a location identified by a WAM Technical Advisor/EOD specialist.
- The individual is asked to enter the disarmament site with his/her weapons pointing towards the ground, the catch in the "safe" position and with fingers away from the triggering/firing mechanism.









After entering the perimeter procedure

- The individual is directed to the unloading bay.
- Here she/he will proceed with the clearing of his/her weapon under the instruction and supervision of a military observer or; a representative of the United Nations military component in mission settings or; a designated security official in a non-mission setting.
- If the individual is under 18 years old, child protection staff shall be present throughout the process.
- Once the weapon has been cleared, it is handed over to a military observer or representative of the military component in a mission setting or designated security official in a non-mission setting.
- This representative will ensure that it is safe to handle and confirm that it meets the eligibility criteria.












After entering the perimeter procedure

Consideration for serviceability includes the following factors:

- Is the weapon complete, including all its working parts (e.g., breech block, firing pin)?
- Does the weapon appear to be well maintained? Is there corrosion inside the breech and/or barrel?
- If the individual is also in possession of ammunition, she/he will be asked to place it in a separate pre-identified location, away from the weapons.
- A WAM Technical Advisor shall inspect the ammunition to ensure it is safe for handling, storage and transportation.
- The materiel handed in is recorded by a DDR practitioner with guidance on weapons and ammunition identification from weapons and ammunition specialists, along with information on the individual concerned.
- Photographs should be taken of each weapon to aid identification and tracing.









After entering the perimeter procedure

- Photographs of ammunition should be taken by technical staff.
- The individual is provided with a receipt that proves he/she has handed in a weapon and/ or ammunition.
- The receipt indicates the name of the individual, the date and location, the type, the calibre, the status (serviceable or not) and the serial number of the weapon.
- Weapons are tagged with a code to facilitate storage, management and record-keeping throughout the disarmament process until disposal.
- Information on the tag should include the serial number, the date and the location of the reception.
- Weapons and ammunition are stored separately or organized for transportation under the instructions and guidance of a WAM Technical Advisor.
- Ammunition presenting an immediate risk, or deemed unsafe for transport, shall be destroyed in situ by qualified EOD specialists.











Processing heavy weapons and ammunition

Processing heavy weapons and their ammunition requires a high level of technical knowledge.

- Heavy weapons systems can be complex and require specialist expertise to ensure that systems are made safe, unloaded and all items of ammunition are safely separated from the platform.
- Conducting a thorough weapons survey is vital to ensure the correct expertise is made available.

Go to section 'Weapon survey'
to read more about this

- The UN DDR section in mission settings or UN lead entity/entities in non-mission settings should provide advice with regard to the collection, storage and disposal of heavy weapons.









Processing heavy weapons and ammunition

- Procedures regarding heavy weapons should be clearly communicated to armed forces and groups prior to any disarmament operations.
- This is to avoid unorganized and unscheduled movements of heavy weapons that might stir up further tensions among the population.
- Destruction of heavy weapons requires significant logistics; thus critical to ensure that these weapons are physically secured to reduce the risk of diversion.

The SOP should include:

- Identification of responsibility for each step and the gender-responsive provisions required.
- A diagram of the disarmament site(s) (either mobile or static).

See an example of a disarmament camp diagram












Example disarmament camp diagram



Zoom in on the graphic to read the details of the diagram.







Spontaneous disarmament

In some contexts, a strategy for receiving combatants at any time may be needed in order to encourage individuals to leave armed groups. This may include the identification of a network of reception points, such as DDR offices or peacekeeping camps, or the deployment of mobile disarmament units. Procedures should be communicated to authorities, members of armed groups, and the wider community on a regular basis to ensure all are informed and sensitized.

In cases where peacekeeping camps are designated as reception points:

- Identify specific focal points within the camp to deal with combatants and persons associated with armed groups in coordination with the military component and the battalion commander.
- These focal points should be trained in handling and disarming new arrivals; gendersensitive and age-sensitive approaches; and registering and storing materiel until DDR practitioners take over.

Unsafe items should be stored in a pre-identified or purpose-built area as advised by WAM Technical Advisors until specialized UN agency personnel or force EOD specialists can assess the safety of the items and recommend appropriate action.








TWAM activities















Introduction to TWAM

Transitional Weapons and Ammunition
Management is a DDR-related tool that
includes a series of interim arms control
measures. It can be used when the
preconditions for a DDR programme are not in
place. It can also be implemented alongside
the DDR programme, as a complementary
measure.

It aims at:

- Reducing the capacity of individuals and groups to engage in armed violence.
- Reducing accidents.
- Saving lives by addressing the immediate risks related to the possession of weapons, ammunition and explosives.

TWAM also includes the disarmament of excombatants when the preconditions for a DDR programme are not in place, including in support of reintegration as part of the sustaining peace approach.

Tap here to read more about this in IDDRS 4.11 (internet connection required)







1. Disarmament of ex-combatants when the preconditions for a DDR programme are not in place.

Precondition/context

- Preconditions for a DDR programme are not in place.

Potential activities

 Collection, documentation, control and disposal of arms, ammunition and explosives voluntarily handed over by excombatants.

2. Support the improvement and implementation of national arms control legislation.

Precondition/context

- Existing relevant legislation, including provisions for weapons ownership, reflecting regional and international legally binding instruments.
- Communities where former combatants and persons formerly associated with armed groups are returning.











Potential activities

- Facilitate capacity building for national actors regarding international arms control policies, provisions and standards.
- Activities to raise awareness of national legislation.
- Registration of weapons in compliance with national regulations.

3. Limit/delay access to weapons and ammunition to prevent interpersonal armed violence and accidents.

Precondition/context

- Disarmament is not an option.
- Misuse of individually owned weapons and ammunition identified as a key concern by the community.
- Communities where former combatants and persons formerly associated with armed groups are returning.

Potential activities

- Raise awareness of the risks of keeping weapons in the home, including genderand age-specific programmes.











- Store arms and ammunition separately.
- Install individual lockers at home.
- Conduct activities on the safe and secure handling and temporary storage of weapons.

4. Increase community oversight of weapons and ammunition ownership.

Precondition/context

- Armed groups are community-based.
- Strong sense of mutual trust within the community.
- Existence of commonly recognized and accepted authorities responsible for oversight.
- The community does not feel threatened by immediate security or safety risk.

Potential activities

- Community-based storage facilities.
- Support the development of basic WAM capacity.
- Store explosives away from inhabited areas.











- Community-based registration of firearms and ammunition: "registration first, collection later" type programmes.
- Storage of heavy weapons and supporting platforms.
- Creation of gun-free zones.

5. Decrease the number of illicit weapons and ammunition in circulation.

Precondition/context

- Strong understanding of security issues and types of weapons and ammunition held by communities.
- Close coordination with communities to identify the appropriate approach and focus for collection (types of weapons and ammunition, quantities, etc).
- Communities where former combatants and persons formerly associated with armed groups are returning.

Potential activities

- Collect and destroy surplus items (considered hazardous or obsolete).











- Encourage the community to hand over a certain quantity of weapons and ammunition as a precondition for benefiting from a community violence reduction programme.
- The individual eligibility for community violence reduction to the handover of serviceable weapons.

6. Support the development of national WAM capacity.

Precondition/context

- Existing national small arms and light weapons or DDR mechanisms to coordinate efforts, with the possibility also for regional cooperation, as appropriate.
- Need to be in line with national arms control policy and strategy.
- Need to be in line with regional and international regulatory frameworks.

Go to section 'Normative framework' to read more about international frameworks









- Communities where former combatants and persons formerly associated with armed groups are returning.

Potential activities

- Marking and record-keeping of weapons as an entry point for larger operations focusing on national arsenals.
- Build capacity on disposal, including the destruction of arms and ammunition.
- Renovate or construct new storage facilities for DDR materiel.
- Review/update national arms control legislation.

Efforts focused solely on weapons, ammunition, and explosives are proven to have a limited impact on improving stability. DDR practitioners should seek to address other conflict drivers in parallel.

For example, through the use of DDR-related tools such as DDR support to mediation, pre-DDR, community violence reduction or DDR support to transitional security arrangements.











Gender and age-responsive **TWAM**

To ensure gender- and age-responsive TWAM:

- Involve both men and women at all stages of TWAM.
- Involve children and youth where appropriate.
- Collect sex-and age-disaggregated data and gender and age analysis as a baseline for understanding challenges and needs. (For detailed guidance, see the Office for Disarmament Affairs' Training Manual on gender- mainstreaming Small arms control (forthcoming).
- Measure progress through the development of age- and gender-sensitive indicators.
- Enhance gender competence and commitment to gender equality among programme staff and national partners.
- Ensure organizational structures, workflows and knowledge management are responsive to different environments.













Gender and age-responsive TWAM

- Work with partners –including networks and organizations for women, men and youth–to strengthen both age and gender responsiveness.
- Establish gender and age-sensitive programme monitoring and evaluation frameworks.
- Read more on this in IDDRS 5.10, MOSAIC 06.10, and MOSAIC 06.20.

Tap here to access IDDRS 5.10 (internet connection required)

Tap here to access MOSAIC 6.10 (internet connection required)

Tap here to access MOSAIC 6.20 (internet connection required)













TWAM and DDR-related tools

DDR support to mediation

Pre-DDR

Community violence reduction

DDR support to transitional security arrangements







DDR support to mediation

DDR practitioners can provide advice on how to engage with armed forces and groups on DDR issues and contribute to the attainment of agreements.

- In non-mission settings, the UN peace and development advisers deployed to the office of the UN Resident Coordinator advise the Resident Coordinator and the Government on how to engage and address armed groups.
- DDR practitioners assigned to UN mediation support teams may also:
 - Draft DDR provisions of ceasefires, local peace agreements and comprehensive peace agreements.
 - Make proposals on the design and implementation of DDR processes.

This DDR-related tool can be implemented whenever mediation processes or peace negotiations are initiated towards a ceasefire or peace agreement.









DDR support to mediation

TWAM in support of peace mediation efforts should ensure the following:

- That disarmament/WAM aspects are appropriately addressed in negotiations.
- That related provisions are implementable and in line with international arms control standards and guidelines, including relevant regional instruments.

This would contribute to achieving the following:

- -Enhancing overall weapons control and reducing armed violence.
- Building confidence in the process.
- Generating a better understanding of the weapons arsenals of armed forces and groups.
- Preparing the ground for the transfer of responsibility for WAM later in the DDR process either to the United Nations or to the national authorities.
- Read more about how DDR practitioners can support mediation processes in IDDRS 2.20.

Tap here to access IDDRS 2.20 (internet connection required)











Pre-DDR is an interim. time-limited stabilization mechanism, aimed at creating the required political and security conditions for negotiation/ implementation of peace agreements.

Pre-DDR activities can include the following:

- Labour-intensive projects focusing on improving community assets with immediate incentives (e.g., cash for work).
- Vocational training in line with local economic dynamics.
- Awareness-raising activities around reconciliation, the upcoming DDR programmes or risks related to the possession of arms at home.

Context for implementation

- Preconditions for a DDR programme are present.
- DDR programme is delayed.
- Interim initiative.
- Limited duration.











Eligibility criteria

- Same as the eligibility criteria for a DDR programme.

Go to section 'Determining eligibility criteria'

- It must be gender-responsive, and non-discriminatory towards women.
- Ineligible persons can be enrolled in a community violence reduction program.

Go to section 'Community violence reduction'

Pre-disarmament

Depending on the context, pre-DDR can include the handing over of weapons and ammunition by members of armed groups and armed forces. In this case, this is referred to as 'predisarmament'. It involves collecting, registering and storing materiel in a safe location.









Depending on the context and agreements in place it could focus on certain types of materiel, including larger crew-operated systems in contexts where warring parties are very well equipped.

Handovers can be:

- Temporary: Materiel is recorded and stored properly but remains under the joint control of armed forces, armed groups, and the UN through a dual-key system with well-established roles and procedures.
- **Permanent**: Materiel is handed over, registered, and ultimately disposed of.

In both cases, unsafe ammunition must be destroyed. The destruction process must follow the safety and security procedures and be fully transparent.

Pre-disarmament should accomplish the following:

- Build and strengthen the confidence of combatants and civilians in the wider DDR programme.









- Improve perceptions of peace and security.
- Raise awareness about the dangers of illicit weapons and ammunition.
- Build knowledge of armed groups' arsenals.
- Allow DDR practitioners to identify and reduce risks that may arise during disarmament in the future DDR programme.
- Encourage members of armed groups to voluntarily disarm.













CVR is a DDR-related tool that directly responds to the presence of active and/or former members of armed groups in communities. It is designed to promote security and stability in both mission and non-mission contexts.

CVR programmes are typically short- to medium-term interventions and are intended as a bottom-up measure that should be crafted at the local level. These programmes:

- Aim to prevent further recruitment by directly engaging ex-combatants and youth through activities like:
 - Labour-intensive projects.
 - Business incubation.
 - Community dialogue forums.
- They are also an opportunity to rebalance unequal gender relations at the community level.
- They should be implemented before, after, or during a DDR program in both mission and non-mission settings.
- They require pre-activity analysis and continuous monitoring, evaluation and adjustments.









Beneficiaries

- Former combatants waiting for reintegration support as part of an existing DDR program.
- Members voluntarily leaving armed groups who are ineligible for a DDR programme because their group has not signed a peace agreement.
- Non-members at risk of recruitment by armed groups.
- Communities that are susceptible to outbreaks of violence, close to cantonment sites, or likely to receive newly reinserted and reintegrated former combatants.
- Eligibility must be developed in consultation with target communities, and communicated clearly.

Combining TWAM and CVR

When CVR targets members of armed groups who are not formally eligible for a DDR programme, because their group is not a signatory to a peace agreement, or in the absence of a DDR programme, individual eligibility for CVR may be tied to the handover of serviceable weapons.









If TWAM activities as part of a CVR programme are conducted at the same time as the disarmament component of a DDR programme, it is critical that these activities are strategically seauenced.

When collecting weapons is not possible, encouraging communities to control their weapons, ammunition and explosives can help reduce the risk of incidents and accidents involving weapons and ammunition.

Willingness of community members to surrender or restrict access to weapons will depend on:

- Perceptions of security.
- Existence of security threats (internal and external).
- Quality of formal security provisions.
- Absence of criminal prosecution for illicit arms possession.

In communities where possession of arms and ammunition is a primary security threat, possible arms control components are:













- Collection of unwanted or hazardous weapons and ammunition.
- Development of a basic weaponsmanagement capacity in the community.
- Registration of weapons by local authorities in accordance with national legislation.
- Creation of gun-free zones to normalize the absence of gun carriage (starting with hospitals, schools, and other public places).

Awareness-raising activities regarding the following:

- The risks associated with the possession of arms and ammunition.
- Participation in weapons-collection programmes, including DDR collections.
- National laws relating to weapons and ammunition ownership.

Read more about CVR in IDDRS 2.30.

Tap here to access IDDRS 2.30 (internet connection required)













Transitional security arrangements is a DDRrelated tool geared towards security-related confidence-building measures as part of ongoing negotiations, ceasefire or peace agreements.

Arrangements that might be considered include the following:

- Acceptable third-party actor(s) capable of securing the DDR process.
- Joint units, patrols, or operations involving the parties to a conflict, with a third-party presence.
- Local security actors like community police are accepted by the community as neutral and not viewed as a foreign force.
- Deployment of the national police. May require prior consent and the presence of a third-party actor.

DDR practitioners are advised to consult extensively with women on the design of security arrangements that seek to address or prevent sexual and gender-based violence and to gain their support for any future disarmament.









Implementation context

- During peace negotiations when working towards the preconditions for a DDR programme.
- Vital for building confidence especially since warring parties are losing their military capacity and ability to defend themselves.
- Can be conducted alongside pre-DDR, CVR, TWAM and DDR mediation support.
- Usually in a mission-context.
- Often designed to aid integration of excombatants into the national security sector subject to relevant conflict resolution frameworks.

Combining TWAM and DDR support to transitional security arrangements

- Formulate a robust plan for management of weapons and ammunition used by joint patrols/units or local security actors.
- Include detailed SOPs for conducting activities and identifying precise responsibilities.











- Also include guidance on handling arms and ammunition captured/collected/found during operations.
- All actors must be governed by a clear legal framework and abide by these procedures.
- In case of joint units/patrols, members of armed groups may be disarmed or retain use of their weapons which should be recorded and safely stored when not in use.

Goals of these initiatives

- Improve levels of constructive engagement with armed groups.
- Build trust between armed groups and the Government.
- Pave the way for the integration of former combatants into the national security sector.
- Develop a security context that is increasingly conducive to a future DDR programme.
- Provide employment and incentives to combatants.











- Safely store and manage weapons belonging to armed groups, including through joint control by the armed group, national forces, and the UN. Using a dual key system, for example.
- Assess the size and nature of armed groups' arsenals.

Consideration while supporting WAM capacity of armed actors

In contexts where implementation of transitional security arrangements involves direct support to the WAM capacity of non-State armed actors, including armed groups or local security actors, **extreme caution** should be exercised.

Risks include:

- Reinforce the fighting capacity of non-State armed actors.
- Legitimize their status.
- Tarnish the United Nations' reputation which could threaten wider DDR objectives.



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Thus, considerations for any approach that supports development of non-State actors' WAM capacity include the following:

- It must align with the broader DDR strategy approved by national authorities as an integral part of a peace process or an alternative conflict resolution strategy.
- It must be in line with the overall UN mission mandate and objectives of the UN mission (if a United Nations mission has been established).

Engagement with armed groups shall follow UN policy on this matter. Which are:

- UN mission policy, including standard operating procedures on engagement with armed groups where they have been adopted.
- UN's Aide Memoire: Engaging with Non-State Armed Groups for Political Purposes.
- UN Human Rights Due Diligence Policy.

This approach shall be informed by a robust risk assessment and be accompanied by appropriate and effective risk mitigation measures.











If all of the above conditions are fulfilled, DDR support to WAM capacity-building for non-State armed actors may include:

- Storing ammunition stockpiles away from inhabited areas and in line with the IATG.
- Destroying hazardous ammunition and explosives as identified by armed groups.
- Providing basic stockpile management advice, support, and solutions.

Read more on DDR support to transitional security arrangements in IDDRS 2.20.

Tap here to access IDDRS 2.20 (internet connection required)













WAM cross-technical guidelines

















Accounting

Information management

Information to record

Maintaining the database

Sharing the data

Effective photography







Information management

It is critical to the effective management of weapons and ammunition, to ensure the transparency of the DDR process, and to monitor activities and prevent diversions.

It is relevant for the following actions:

- Provide enough information to identify and track the movement of materiel from the point of collection to the point of disposal (close-up and full-frame photographs of each item, if possible).
- Build an information management system according to the infrastructure of the region of operations.
- Create a fully networked system that immediately updates records. If impossible, create a basic system (handwritten records, a simple database/computer spreadsheets).
- Consider a comprehensive system for large collections of weapons and ammunition.
- Decide on the ownership of data (UN, the national authorities or both) in advance.
- Consider any potential risk for individuals whose data is collected.
- Build a Standard Operating Procedure (SOP).







Information to record

For each weapon:

- Make
- Model
- Calibre
- Serial number
- Country of manufacture (or most recent import if the weapon bears an import mark)
- Year of manufacture
- Other markings, including their location on the weapon (barrel, slide, etc.)
- Name or information management system registration number of combatant

- Armed group of origin (if relevant)
- Location of collection
- Storage code or location
- DDR tag number
- Transfers (dates, new custodian)
- Destruction (date, location, method, entity who conducted the destruction, entity who verified destruction)

Tap on the coloured items to read more about them.











Information to record

For each item of ammunition or explosive materiel:

- Category
- Type
- Quantity
- Calibre (if relevant)
- Headstamp markings for small arms and machine gun ammunition
- Lot and batch number
- Manufacturer
- Country of origin
- Condition

- Name or information management system registration number of combatant
- Armed group of origin (if relevant)
- Location of collection
- Storage code or location
- Transfers (dates, new custodian)
- Destruction (date, location, method, entity who conducted the destruction, entity who verified destruction)

Tap on the coloured items to read more about them.











Maintaining the database

DDR officers in charge at mission headquarters and regional levels should be clearly designated and thorough handovers completed to ensure continuity.

A DDR officer with WAM experience, including weapons and ammunition identification skills, should be responsible for developing the tool, maintaining the central database and verifying data provided by the regional bureaux.

If DDR officers do not have the required skills, offer training (through UNMAS or other specialists).

UNMAS or specialized subcontractors may develop their own separate registration tools. Nonetheless, the DDR section still needs to pursue its own registration efforts. The reasons for this are:

- Supplementary databases may capture a different set of data.
- Technical partners may not be operational throughout the full DDR mandate of the mission.
- Technical partners may not cover the full spectrum of locations.







Sharing the data

Depending on each host country's DDR legal framework, data collected may belong to the national authorities.

To the greatest extent possible, the DDR section should also share all relevant data with the Joint Mission Analysis Centre and the United Nations panels of experts in countries under embargo to allow for the tracing of materiel, as well as with the United Nations police, as required.

Go to section 'Markings' to read more about materiel tracing







Effective photography

Follow these instructions:

- In order to support effective registration, close-up and full-frame photographs should be taken of each piece of materiel wherever possible.
- Use a digital camera, good light, and a steady hand. Retake the picture if the initial result is blurry.
- Be absolutely safe.
- Photographs of the items taken during disarmament operations should be kept on file and clearly referenced.

Photographing arms and weapons

Photographing ammunition







Photographing arms and weapons

Photograph the following items:

- Make/type.
- Model.
- Calibre.
- Serial number.
- Country of manufacture or most recent import.
- Any significant markings of weapon.

Where on the arms is this information?

The location of marks varies with the type and model of the arms or weapons.

For **assault rifles**, essential marks are usually on the **receiver**, which houses the operating parts (e.g., trigger mechanism, magazine port)



Rifle receiver











Photographing arms and weapons

For **handguns**, critical marks are usually found on the **frame**.



Handgun frame

Additional characteristics and markings may be located on the **fire-selector switch** and the **rear-sight**.

If a serial number marked on the frame/receiver differs from a serial number marked on another part, the arm or weapon is assembled from parts of two or more different arms, or contains replacement parts. In such cases, the serial number marked on the frame/receiver will be the primary source for identification.

Learn how to take the right photos of arms and weapons



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How to take the right photos of arms and weapons

Photo 1: Complete weapon, side 1





Photo 2: Close-up of receiver/frame with markings, side 1

Photo 3: Complete weapon, side 2





Photo 4: Close-up of receiver/ frame with fire-selector switch marks, side 2

Photo 5: Rear sight marks (if present)



Additional photos, as available:

Close-ups of other identifying marks, if present (e.g., on the barrel, bolt, another part of the frame, etc.).







Photographing ammunition

Photograph the following items:

Items that allow trained personnel to identify the country and year of production.

- Calibre.
- Headstamp marks.

Additional information:

- Lot number.
- Batch number.

Where on the ammunition is this information?

- Ammunition rounds typically have headstamp marks on the base of cartridge cases.
- Other information can be derived from markings on the packaging and from the overall length and calibre of the ammunition.

Learn how to take the right photos of ammunition







How to take the right photos of ammunition

Photo 1: Headstamp marks







The cartridge can be pushed into soft ground or held between fingers when taking the photo. If several rounds or shells bear identical marks, a photo of one such round or shell suffices. If marks differ, photos that show marks of each round or shell with "unique" marks are required.



Photo 2:
The cartridge
placed next to a
ruler or measure
(or pen)

Photo 3: Packaging











Marking

Weapons get marked at the time of manufacture, import, transfer from government stocks to permanent civilian use, deactivation or permanent confiscation by the State.

Markings allow record-keeping and the tracking of materiel: country of manufacture or most recent import, international transfers, changes in ownership, etc. They also help to deter the weapon's point of diversion from the licit to the illicit market.

DDR weapon markings

Marking of DDR weapons to be destroyed

Marking of DDR weapons to be incorporated into national stocks

Marking and registering weapons as part of TWAM interventions

Weapon tracing







DDR weapon markings

Markings on DDR weapons include some/all of the following:

- A symbol or International Organization for Standardization.
- Code identifying the country of manufacture (click here to access a list of codes).
- An alphanumeric serial number (which is unique to the manufacturer for that model of weapon).
- Make/name of manufacturer.
- Model of weapon.
- Calibre of weapon.
- Country of import.
- Year of import.

Any weapons without marking shall be marked or destroyed.

Read more about weapon marking and recordkeeping in MOSAIC 5.30

Tap here to access MOSAIC 5.30 (internet connection required)







Marking of DDR weapons to be destroyed

Marking materiel destined for destruction is unnecessary and expensive. It can delay the destruction of weapons and increase the risk of diversion.

To prevent this, ensure the destruction of weapons is verified by an entity that is independent of the entity that carries out the destruction.

If destruction verification procedures are not sufficient, apply simple marking to the weapons. For example:

- "D" for destruction.
- The ISO code of the country where the destruction is to be carried out.
- The year of destruction.

If a weapon destined for destruction is subsequently found, either in the same country or a different one, it will be possible to identify its point of diversion.







Marking of DDR weapons to be incorporated into national stocks

National authorities sometimes decide to incorporate serviceable DDR weapons into national stockpiles. The DDR section should seek the advice of the UN mission's legal officers prior to any such transfers.

In these cases, in addition to markings made at the time of manufacture, the following markings should be applied:

- A marking selected by the authorities to identify that the weapon was collected during a DDR process (e.g., "DDR").
- International Organization for Standardization country code of the confiscating State.
- Year of confiscation.
- On weapons that do not bear a serial number or that have had it altered or removed, a serial number unique in relation to the points above should also be applied or the item should be destroyed.









Marking of DDR weapons to be incorporated into national stocks

- Additional marking may include:
 - Regional organization logo, if relevant.
 - Name of security agency using the weapon.

Markings should have the following characteristics:

- Positioned on a flat, exposed surface on the frame or receiver.
- Conspicuous.
- Easily readable.
- Durable.
- Recoverable (as far as technically possible).













Marking and registering weapons as part of TWAM interventions

The marking and registration of weapons represent a first step towards weapons control in contexts where disarmament or collections of weapons is not possible.

In these cases, marking and recording, including information related to the owner, could pave the way for further control measures (weapons collection or legalization through licensing).







Weapon tracing

Tracing is the systematic tracking of illicit weapons found or seized.

Although tracing is not a DDR activity, the accurate registration and marking of DDR weapons will facilitate effective tracing of these weapons if they are recovered under illicit circumstances.

The tracing of a weapon starts with accurate identification based on its **physical characteristics** and **markings**.

The data is then included in the trace request sent to the country of manufacture or most recent known import to request information about the chain of transfer.

Tracing requests can also be done through the Illicit Arms Records and Tracing Management System (iARMS) network of the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL).

DDR officers are not responsible for conducting tracing, however, data they record should be shared with the national authorities, as relevant-, the UN Joint Mission Analysis Centre (JMAC) and UN Panels of Experts.









Weapon tracing

Read more about tracing illicit small arms and light weapons in MOSAIC 5.31.

> Tap here to access MOSAIC 5.31 (internet connection required)

Ammunition

While the process is similar for ammunition. cartridges of small arms ammunition generally do not bear sufficient information for successful tracing.

Information contained on ammunition packaging is therefore crucial, but this represents a challenge concerning DDR materiel as most ammunition collected has changed hands numerous times and has generally been removed from its original packaging.













Transportation

Transportation of weapons

Transportation of ammunition and explosives







Transportation of weapons

Make sure to follow these instructions:

- Undertake a full risk assessment prior to any movement of weapons.
- Plan and check in advance transport routes.
- Treat as classified details of the route and timings for the move.
- Agree upon handover/takeover protocols and documentation prior to any transportation of weapons.
- Strictly adhere to the protocols so that there is an audit trail for custody of the weapons throughout.
- Do not transport weapons in the same vehicle as the ammunition.
- If possible, do not transport weapons and ammunition in vehicles travelling together.
- If regular movement of weapons occurs between two identified locations, consider varying the routes and timings to avoid creating identifiable movement patterns.
- Security of transportation should be ensured by the UN military component in mission settings, or by national security forces or designated security officials in non-mission settings.







Transportation of weapons

- A WAM Technical Advisor inspecst the weapons and ensures that the working parts and magazine (where applicable) have been removed.
- The advisor cares for the correct documentation and adequate procedures.
- The weapons are secured in suitable containers for transportation.
- Magazines and working parts are secured in separate vehicles.

On arrival at destination:

- The recipient carries out a 100% check of weapons received against the documentation accompanying the consignment.
- Any discrepancies are investigated according to the standard operating procedure.

Tap here to read more about this in MOSAIC 5.20 (internet connection required)









Transportation of ammunition and explosives

The transportation of dangerous goods involves safety and security concerns that should minimize the risk of people's/animals' death or injury and/or damage to property, equipment and the environment.


All movement of ammunition and explosives on United Nations missions shall be undertaken in accordance with IATG 08.10 on the transport of ammunition.

Tap here to access IATG 08.10 (internet connection required)

Where the operational circumstances or local conditions make it difficult to comply with this guidance, an assessment is to be undertaken by ammunition technical staff and the risk accepted and authorized by the relevant leadership.

Tap here to read more about this in IATG 02.10 (internet connection required)

An adequate military and police escort shall be requested to avert the risk of diversion of the weapons and/or ammunition transport.










Transportation of ammunition and explosives

Preparation

- 1. Responsibilities of the person that will inspect the material prior to transportation.
 - Prior to transportation, a WAM Technical Advisor shall inspect the ammunition and explosives to confirm they are safe to move. This means:
 - The ammunition and explosives are not showing any visible signs of deterioration.
 - The ammunition and explosives are correctly packaged.
 - The correct documentation for an appropriate mode of transport has been prepared.
 - The vehicle, aircraft or vessel is suitable, and there is a fully trained and authorized crew and appropriate equipment available to respond to incidents during transit.









Transportation of ammunition and explosives

- The organization/location to which the ammunition and explosives are to be moved has been informed and has agreed to accept to receive them.
- If the ammunition and explosives cannot be safely transported, they should be destroyed in situ. If this would cause unacceptable damage, it should be moved the minimum distance by explosive-ordnance-disposal-qualified staff to a safe location for destruction.

2. Responsibilities of the person in charge of the movement of the material.

- Ensure that the transport has been correctly arranged, including obtaining confirmation that it is authorized for the movement of ammunition.
- Ensure that the crew of the vehicle. aircraft or vessel has the appropriate training and authority to undertake transportation of ammunition.











Transportation of ammunition and explosives

- Confirm that an appropriate route has been selected and that, where necessary, permission has been obtained for all sections of the journey.
- Plan the timing of the move such as to reduce the hazard to members of the public and those undertaking the movement.
- Ensure that appropriate safety and security measures have been put in place to minimize the potential for incidents to affect the transportation of ammunition and explosives.
- Adequate security arrangements shall be made to reduce the possibility of theft of ammunition and explosives, including a potential armed attack on the vehicles. This should include escort vehicles and armed personnel when necessary. Where the host nation has an effective police or military security system, transportation security should be planned in conjunction with the local authorities.









Transportation of ammunition and explosives

On arrival

At the destination explosives storage area, the consignee shall be responsible for the following:

- Provide a safe and secure reception area, where the ammunition and explosives may be held, pending formal receipt.
- The receipt of the ammunition and explosives shall not be unnecessarily delayed.
- Check the consignment against the accompanying documentation. Any discrepancies shall be notified to the consignor and an investigation initiated.
- If no discrepancies are identified, stocktaking of the ammunition and explosives and placing them in storage.
- Ammunition and explosives handed over during DDR activities should be isolated in storage until a full technical inspection can be undertaken by qualified technical staff to confirm its safety for storage, pending a decision on its disposal.



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Storage management

Weapon storage management

Ammunition storage management







Weapon storage management

Materiel should be stored in purpose built armouries and ammunition depots. Since DDR programmes rarely have appropriate storage, you may have to build your own temporary structures using (e.g.) shipping containers. In these cases, use support by UNMAS or other WAM Technical Advisors.

In addition to facilitating the management of materiel, storage should protect against the risk of the following:

- Diversion (i.e., theft) and onward illicit proliferation.
- Unplanned explosions.
- Damage of materiel.

Temporary storage areas

Basic security measures

Inventory management

Storage of arms

Tap here to read more about this in MOSAIC 5.20 (internet connection required)







Temporary storage areas

The planning phase should be performed by qualified WAM Technical Advisors who will determine the size, location, organizational structure and equipment required based on projections of the types and quantity of materiel to be stored.

Location

- Actors responsible for securing the storage will determine the perimeter of the location for the storage (usually on the site of a secure UN camp).
- **Topography**: storage facilities should be constructed on stable, level soil, away from flood plains and wooded areas.
- WAM Technical Advisors conduct a risk assessment to confirm the optimum location for the storage facility and identify priorities to adopt security measures.
- This includes identifying the following:
 - Potential threats posed by the storage facility to the local population and UN staff (e.g., the level of fatalities and structural damage expected in the event of an unplanned explosion).









Temporary storage areas

- Risks linked to potential loss and theft.
- Risks linked to market or strategic value of materiel and attacks by armed groups or violent extremist entities.
- Risks linked to the environment, such as floods or earthquakes.

Separation distances and accessibility

- Arms and ammunition shall be stored separately.
- In the field, 1 or 2 containers should be used for weapons, and 1 or 2 containers should be used for ammunition.
- Other containers should be used for storing hazardous ammunition, and highrisk weapons, separately from each other.
- Specific formulas are to be applied defining the distance of ammunition storage from access routes, inhabited buildings and other infrastructure.

Tap here to read more about this in IATG 02.10 (internet connection required)









Basic security measures

Protection against

1. Weather conditions.

- Containers protect materiel against rain. heat, wind, extreme temperatures and rainfall.
- Add a roof to avoid direct sunlight.
- Containers should not be touching the ground for humidity protection.

2. Theft, security breaches, attacks.

- Locate the storage in a secure area with fencing (e.g., UN camp, with armed guards and patrols).
- Use bar locks and kevs held by those responsible for securing and managing the storage.
- Restrict access to those with authorization.
- -Based on the security assessment. recommend the procurement of armoured containers.













Basic security measures

- 3. Fire / the spread of fire.
 - The WAM specialist should:
 - Ensure that each storage facility is equipped with basic fire-fighting equipment.
 - Assess the risk.
 - Establish a fire safety plan.

Tap here to read more about this in IATG 2.50 (internet connection required)

4. Impact of explosions.

- Berm or Hescos Bastion barricades should be erected around storage containers.













Inventory management

Make sure to follow these instructions:

- Check the contents and verify regularly against the DDR registration database of materiel. Use support from the UN Peacekeeping Force and/or UNMAS.
- Report any suspected loss/theft immediately. An investigation should be launched.

Tap here to read more about this in MOSAIC 5.20 (internet connection required)

Every week

- For armouries, check a physical stock by number and type of arms.
- Check no less than 10% of arms by serial number.
- For ammunition, check a physical stock by quantity and type of ammunition.

Every 6 months

- Check a 100% physical stock by quantity, type, serial/lot number.
- Keep records of every stock check.



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Inventory management

Exit of materiel

Before transfer, each party involved in the transportation of the materiel shall verify the list and signs a handover declaration including:

- Date.
- Storage facility.
- Number and type of items collected.
- Serial number.
- Purpose of transfer.
- Onward destination.













Storage of arms

The storage of weapons is less technical than that of ammunition. The primary risks are loss and theft.

Make sure to follow these instructions:

- Intruder detection systems (i.e., alarms) are unlikely to be used in the field.
- To prevent/delay theft, use container fixed racks to secure weapons with chains/ steel cables affixed with padlocks.
- Use racks for inventory management: organize weapons per type.
- WAM Technical Advisors should deal with light weapons with explosive components (e.g., portable air defence systems). Store them with other explosive materiel.
- Tag collected weapons with handwritten tags with the serial number and a tag number registered in the DDR database. Use:
 - Various tag colours to distinguish serviceable from unserviceable weapons.
 - Purpose-made bar code tags for electronic reading (e.g., with a smartphone).
 - Radio frequency identification.







Make sure to follow these instructions:

- Do not store weapons and ammunition together.
- If impossible, secure weapons and ammunition in separate buildings/containers on the same site.
- Ammunition and explosives storage should be managed in accordance with the principles of the IATG with technical advice and direction provided by WAM Technical Advisors and the Senior Ammunition Technical Officer for the mission.
- The storage of ammunition and explosives requires highly qualified personnel because of high risks and nonoptimal conditions.
- An Ammunition Technical Officer must carry out a thorough risk assessment of ammunition storage facilities.
- All recovered ammunition should be stored by quantity, Hazard Division and Compatibility Group according to IATG 01.50 on the UN explosive hazard classification system and codes.

Tap here to access IATG 01.50 (internet connection required)









- Keep all ammunition storage facilities at a minimum of Risk Reduction Process Level 1 compliance, according to the IATG. This includes:
 - Basic causes of explosions are addressed although others remain (e.g., chemical stability of ammunition cannot be determined).
 - Basic security precautions are in place to reduce diversions, including stocktaking of ammunition, basic system of identifying loss and theft.
 - Store boxes of ammunition on pallets. There should be no touching of the wall/roof of the container.

In violent extremism areas, one might be exposed to explosives and heavy ammunition in improvised explosive devices. Remember that:

- Collected ammunition is unlikely to have been stored in optimal storage conditions.
- Exposure to high temperatures and high humidity accelerate the deterioration of ammunition and make it unsafe.
- There should be a demolition and burning area at all ammunition storage facilities for urgent demolition of unsafe ammunition.



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Accounting and store checks

- Prior to placing ammunition and explosives into a store, record and enter full details into the appropriate accounting system.
- Check a physical store by quantity and type of ammunition weekly.
- Keep records of all store checks for audit purposes.

Safety considerations

Only qualified WAM Technical Advisors should plan and implement safe storage. The principal considerations include:

1. Security.

- No individual gains sole access to an ammunition and explosives storehouse. At least 2 people shall be present.
- Keep a logbook at the entrance of the storage area. Record who, when and why accessed the materiel.
- Respect and apply the requirements related to Quantity Distances and Explosive Limit Licensing.









2. Fire safety.

- The risk of fire in an explosives storage area is significant.
- All personnel shall do all in their power to prevent fire in an explosives storage area.
- In the event of a fire, all non-essential personnel should evacuate to a predetermined, safe distance immediately.
- First aid fire-fighting equipment should be provided (e.g., fire extinguishers, fire beaters, water and/or sand buckets, etc.) at regular points around the explosive area.
- If the fire has spread to a site containing explosives, all personnel shall retire immediately.
- Fires in which explosives have become involved should not be fought.

3. Thunderstorm.

- Electrostatic lightning discharges involved in thunderstorms represent real threats.
- Adequate lightning protection must be provided in all storage facilities.



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Disposal

Destruction is the preferred method of disposal of weapons and ammunition collected through DDR. Obtaining the agreement from the appropriate authorities to proceed may take some time, particularly if a DDR National Commission is not yet in place.

Disposal methods should therefore be decided upon with the national authorities at an early stage in the process and clearly stated in the DDR plan in order to prevent delays.

Transparency in the disposal of weapons and ammunition collected from former warring parties is key to building trust in DDR.

Make sure to keep records of all arms and ammunition date and method of disposal accurately.

Importance of destroying DDR materiel

Disposal of weapons

Disposal of ammunition







Importance of destroying DDR materiel

Destroying DDR material is important because:

- International and regional agreements promote the destruction of illicit weapons and ammunition.
- Destruction reduces the international flow of illicit arms and ammunition.
- Destruction removes the risk of material being diverted.
- Arms, ammunition and explosives surrendered during DDR operations by armed groups are in an unknown state and likely hazardous.
- Important markings may have been altered/removed.
- The destruction of DDR arms and ammunition is a strong symbolic act.
- Destruction is cheaper than storing and guarding weapons.







Disposal of weapons

Destruction

Disposal of heavy weapons

Transfer to stockpiles of national authorities

Deactivation







Destruction of weapons

Planning destruction

Methods of destruction

Tap here to read more about this in MOSAIC 5.50 (internet connection required)







Planning destruction

- Establish a plan for destruction with the support of UN WAM Technical Advisors.
- Establish the type and quantity of weapons to be destroyed.
- Examine and select the most suitable destruction method.
- Obtain formal authorization for destruction from the appropriate government authority, including authorization for a public destruction ceremony, if one is foreseen.
- Select an appropriate destruction location.
- Consider recovery, recycling and reuse options for the resultant scrap metal.
- Establish the financial costs of all destruction- related activities.
- Develop a security plan for the movement of weapons and destruction operations.
- Update WAM standard operating procedures as necessary.
- Develop a public-information and awareness-raising campaign, and organize a public ceremony.













Planning destruction

- Update the DDR weapons-registration database with the following information for each item:
 - Date.
 - Method of destruction.
 - Location of destruction.
 - Entity that carried out the destruction.
 - Entity that verified the destruction.













Methods of destruction

Identify the most suitable method for destroying small arms and light weapons with the support of WAM Technical Advisors.

Selection criteria

- Type of weapons.
- Quantity of weapons.
- Availability of funds (for equipment, training and staff).
- Available level of WAM expertise.
- Availability of local resources and technology.
- Available infrastructure.
- Security constraints.
- Local customs and references.

Recommended methods

- 1. Cutting by rotating disc: the cutting of small arms and light weapons into unusable pieces using a bandsaw or rotating disc.
 - Advantages: simple and effective.
 - **Disadvantages:** equipment to procure, labour intensive. (minimum of 3 cuts per weapon), large quantities of scrap involved.











Methods of destruction

- 2. Cutting by oxyacetylene or plasma torch: the use of high-temperature cutting technology to render the weapon inoperable.
 - Advantages: cheap and simple, very effective, limited training requirement.
 - Disadvantages: equipment to procure, labour intensive. (minimum of 3 cuts per weapon), large quantities of scrap involved.
- **3. Cutting by hydraulic shears:** the use of hydro-abrasive cutting technology.
 - Advantages: limited training requirement, effective, rapid, environmentally benign.
 - **Disadvantages:** transfer of equipment and knowledge to the country of operation, medium costs.
- **4. Smelting:** the use of an industrial steel smelting facility to melt down weapons.
 - Advantages: simple, cheap, very efficient, minimum labour required, highly visible and symbolic.
 - **Disadvantages:** suitable industry facility required.











Methods of destruction

5. Other methods of destruction:

- burning (with kerosene).
- crushing (with tracked vehicles).

They are not effective. Weapons and component parts may still be serviceable and must undergo a further process to ensure destruction.













Disposal of heavy weapons

Demilitarization by dismantling and recycling is the preferred method. This technique involves the cleaning and dismantling/cutting of the vehicle but results in significant quantities of scrap.

If a large quantity of heavy weapons is to be destroyed, financial planning could include the value of the scrap recovered.

It is also important to maintain strict control over weapons designated for destruction to prevent the risk of their entry into the illicit market before the destruction takes place.







Transfer of weapons to stockpiles of national authorities

International good practice encourages the destruction of all illicit weapons and ammunition. In addition, a number of legally binding regional instruments require the destruction of materiel collected in caches left over from conflicts.

Go to section 'Normative framework' to read more about legally binding instruments

National authorities could decide to integrate DDR weapons into their stockpiles for the following reasons:

- Lack of resources to acquire new weapons.
- Desire to regain control over materiel looted by armed groups during the conflict.
- Imposition of an arms embargo.

The national authorities should record the weapons in line with international standards.













Transfer of weapons to stockpiles of national authorities

Before transferring the materiel

- Take account of all obligations under relevant regional and international instruments and seek the advice of the mission's legal adviser.
- Check the Security Council resolutions and arms embargo provisions.
- Consult the UN team/panel of experts monitoring sanctions, if any.
- WAM Policy Officers / WAM Technical Advisors should explain to the national authorities the negative consequences of incorporating DDR weapons: legal, technical, financial implications.
- Weapons should bear markings made at the time of manufacture. Good practice recommends the destruction or proper remarking of weapons whose original markings have been altered or erased.









Transfer of weapons to stockpiles of national authorities

Conditions to not transfer the material

- The host State is prohibited from using/ possessing certain weapons or ammunition (e.g., anti-personnel landmines or cluster munitions). In this case, destroy the material.
- The receiving entities have committed grave violations of international humanitarian, human rights or refugee law (see UN Human Rights Due Diligence Policy).
- The country where the DDR section is operating is under a United Nations arms embargo.
 - Exemptions to the embargo depend on the sanctions regime. In these cases, the host State sends a request to the relevant UN Security Council sanctions committee via its diplomatic representation to the UN in New York, informing about the materiel, its use and end users, providing supporting documentation.













Deactivation of arms

The deactivation of arms means:

- Rendering the weapon incapable of expelling or launching a projectile by the action of an explosive.
- The weapon cannot be readily restored to its previous functionality.
- The weapon was marked as deactivated by a competent State authority.

Deactivation could be stipulated as part of a peace agreement where some of the collected weapons would be used in museum settings, or to create "peace art" or monuments.

Deactivation requires that all pressure-bearing components of a weapon be permanently altered in such a way that renders the weapon unusable. This includes:

- Barrel - Slide

- Bolt - Firing pin

- Cylinder - Receiver/frame

Weapons that have not been properly deactivated represent a significant threat, as they may be reactivated and used by criminals and terrorists.







Disposal of ammunition

Destruction

Transfer to stockpiles of national authorities

Tap here to read more about this in IATG 10.10 (internet connection required)







Destruction of ammunition

Strict technical guidelines must be followed, and highly qualified personnel are required. Including:

- UNMAS personnel.
- The explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) capacity of the UN Peacekeeping Force.
- External subcontractors with relevant expertise.

Planning destruction

- Ammunition may need to be destroyed either at the collection point, because it is unsafe, or after being transferred to a secure DDR storage.
- The logistics of ammunition destruction requires a strict planning phase by the WAM Technical Advisor/EOD specialist.
- The advisor should seek to do the following:
 - Identify priorities.
 - Obtain authorization from the national authorities.
 - Select the most appropriate location and method for destruction.
 - Develop a risk assessment and security plan for destruction.











Destruction of ammunition

Considerations to identify priorities

Destroy the following ammunition as a priority if:

- It poses the greatest risk in terms of explosive safety
- It is attractive to criminal and violent extremist groups
- It must be destroyed to satisfy international legal obligations.
- They are small arms and machine gun ammunition less than 20 mm.

Methods of destruction

The WAM Technical Advisor/EOD specialist will select the method according to the following factors:

- Type and quantity of ammunition to be destroyed.
- Availability of qualified human power.
- Location and type of destruction sites available.
- Distance from storage and destruction sites and accessibility.
- Resources available (explosives, budget, etc.).
- Environmental impact.











Destruction of ammunition

Most common methods of destruction are:

- **Open burning:** used for the destruction of propellants and pyrotechnic compositions. Might cause significant environmental impact.
- Open detonation: uses serviceable explosives as charges to destroy ammunition and requires a large cordon to ensure protection from the blast. It is labour intensive and may not destroy all ammunition, requiring post-blast EOD clearance.

These methods are regarded as the easiest ways to destroy ammunition and the most cost-effective solution. They are also highly symbolic and can serve as effective mechanisms for building confidence in the DDR programme.













Transfer of ammunition to stockpiles of national authorities

Ammunition collected during DDR processes should be destroyed. When serviceable ammunition needs to be handed over to national authorities consider that it should always be done in compliance with:

- Binding regional and international instruments.
- Provisions of the arms embargo if the host State is under sanctions.

Take into account:

- Only the ammunition of small arms and machine guns (less than 20 mm) in their original packaging, can be handed over to national authorities.
- Other types of ammunition need to be chemically analyzed by international experts.
- The DDR section needs to look into any legal implications before any transfer.

Go to section 'Normative framework' to read more about legal implications



