Effective Weapons and Ammunition Management in a Changing Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Context

A handbook for United Nations DDR practitioners

Second Edition
Effective Weapons and Ammunition Management in a Changing Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Context

A Handbook for United Nations DDR Practitioners

Second Edition
NOTE
This Handbook was developed by the United Nations Department of Peace Operations and the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs.

The views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the United Nations.

Symbols of United Nations documents are composed of capital letters combined with figures. These documents are available in the official languages of the United Nations at http://ods.un.org. Specific disarmament-related documents can also be accessed through the disarmament reference collection at www.un.org/disarmament/HomePage/library.shtml. For queries or comments, contact conventionalarms-unoda@un.org and unhqddr@un.org.

Made possible by the financial support of Germany.

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COVER PHOTO
Weapons laid down by the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia-People’s Army (FARC-EP) are deactivated as part of the peace agreement between the Government of Colombia and FARC-EP. The arms laydown process—a major component in the peace agreement—includes five distinct steps: registration and identification of weapons; monitoring and verification of the holding of weapons; reception and storage of arms; neutralization of arms to ensure that they will never again be used as firearms; and extraction of arms from camps. Weapons are marked prior to being destroyed. (UN photo/Renata Ruiz, 2017)

This publication is available from https://www.un.org/disarmament/ddr-handbook-2ed.

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Printed in New York
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FOREWORD

Integrated disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) processes increasingly take place in environments characterized by well-equipped armed groups and high levels of illicit weapons, ammunition and explosives. Whether operating as part of United Nations peacekeeping operations, special political missions or in non-mission settings, DDR practitioners face rising challenges related to illicit weapons and ammunition flows. The widespread circulation of weapons and ammunition among armed groups and within communities impedes progress towards sustainable peace and development.

The United Nations has developed innovative tools to complement traditional DDR processes, including community violence reduction as well as transitional weapons and ammunition management, to better respond to these risks. These DDR-related tools reduce the number of illicit weapons, ammunition and explosives in circulation, thus supporting broader responses to the drivers of conflict.

The Secretary-General has repeatedly underscored the importance of weapons and ammunition management in advancing lasting political solutions, preventing conflict, protecting civilians, and building and sustaining peace. In his 2019 report on small arms and light weapons (S/2019/1011), he highlighted the multitude of cross-cutting implications of illicit arms flows, noting that they “not only play a major role in the death toll from armed conflict, but also endanger peacekeepers and civilian personnel and impede the delivery of humanitarian assistance.”

In line with the goals set out in the Secretary-General’s Agenda for Disarmament and his Action for Peacekeeping (A4P) initiative, the United Nations is committed to promoting more effective weapons and ammunition management in peace operations, including when part of or linked to DDR processes.

Against this backdrop, this Handbook, first published in 2018, constitutes a key component of an innovative, first-of-its-kind joint initiative between the Department of Peace Operations (DPO) and the Office for Disarmament Affairs (ODA) on “Effective Weapons and Ammunition Management in a Changing DDR Context”.
This second edition of the Handbook reflects developments at the policy level since 2018, including the launch of the revised Integrated DDR Standards, as well as ensures consistent gender mainstreaming and systematic integration of youth considerations.

The joint DPO-ODA initiative, including the publication of this Handbook, seeks to enhance the United Nations capacity to develop relevant state-of-the-art disarmament and weapons and ammunition management initiatives as part of integrated DDR processes, including through the use of DDR-related tools such as community violence reduction.

Through our sustained cooperation over the last five years, we have developed expert resources and practical training to support DDR practitioners in the design and implementation of tailored weapons and ammunition management activities that are guided by the highest existing international standards and guidelines and in compliance with conventional arms control instruments.

To support the operationalization of resources and training materials, a standing technical assistance mechanism was established in 2019. Through this framework, the United Nations continues to assist the national authorities in Haiti in establishing a comprehensive arms control framework. This mechanism also facilitated a study on weapons and ammunition dynamics in the Sudan to support the start-up of the United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in Sudan (UNITAMS) in 2020.

While this cutting-edge guidance targets practitioners in the United Nations system, it is our hope that the Handbook will continue to also serve Security Council members in adopting mandates that better link DDR with arms control instruments and policy. Furthermore, in non-mission settings, the Handbook will aid in efforts to promote the inclusion of arms and ammunition considerations into the common country analysis and the United Nations Sustainable Development Cooperation Frameworks. Finally, we believe that the Handbook will also be useful in fostering greater collaboration with civil society organizations and regional and sub-regional organizations, such as in the framework of the close partnership that has already been forged on weapons and ammunition management with the African Union in support of its Silencing the Guns initiative.

We are confident that this joint project will continue to contribute to the achievement of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development,
in particular Goal 16 on peace, justice and strong institutions. Moving forward, we must continue to advance more comprehensive integration and bridge the gap between policy and practice, thus bringing norms closer to the realities on the ground.

By working at every level to better control and manage weapons and ammunition, we can curtail violence, reduce human suffering and lay the groundwork for inclusive political solutions and a more peaceful future.

Jean-Pierre Lacroix
Under-Secretary-General for Peace Operations

Izumi Nakamitsu
Under-Secretary-General and High Representative for Disarmament Affairs
Why this Handbook?

United Nations disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) sections\(^a\) across the world are increasingly required to operate in complex environments, characterized by political instability, acute violence, a myriad of armed actors—including violent extremists—and a prevalence of weapons, ammunition and explosives. This Handbook aims to equip United Nations DDR practitioners with the resources and knowledge necessary for the effective and safe design, planning, implementation and monitoring of weapons and ammunition management (WAM) activities as part of DDR interventions.

This Handbook is a living document and is designed to be updated regularly. This second edition is underpinned by the most recent developments in DDR and WAM policy and technical frameworks, as well as good and innovative practices from the field. This Handbook also incorporates gender-specific considerations for WAM in DDR contexts. By providing guidance on programming activities and technical requirements related to WAM along the whole DDR process continuum, this Handbook serves as one of the key tools for the effective implementation of the new “United Nations approach to DDR” in accordance with the updated Integrated DDR Standards\(^b\) (see p. xx).

This Handbook is also part of the ongoing effort by the United Nations system to strengthen the coherence of conventional arms control and United Nations peace operations,\(^c\) as well as to enhance the role conventional arms control plays in supporting the transition of

\(^a\) United Nations mission DDR components may have different names depending on their size and the nature of the mission. For ease of reference, the term “DDR section” will be used, for the purpose of this Handbook, to refer to all DDR and community violence reduction components in United Nations peace operations and regional offices.

\(^b\) See [www.un DDR.org](http://www.un DDR.org).

\(^c\) See, for instance, the 2016 report of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations ([A/70/19](https://undocs.org/A/70/19)), in which the Special Committee recognized the need for the proper control, disposal and management of weapons collected from ex-combatants while implementing DDR programmes, as well as transparency
host States to a post-conflict setting, particularly in tackling illicit flows of arms and ammunition. By further integrating WAM considerations into DDR processes, the United Nations system aims to increase the coherence of arms control across the peace continuum, including the formulation, harmonization and implementation of sound provisions in peace agreements and Security Council resolutions.

Who is this Handbook for?

This Handbook provides United Nations DDR practitioners with practical guidance regarding disarmament and WAM activities at both programmatic and technical levels, adaptable to the context in which they are operating. The aim is not to turn DDR practitioners into WAM experts responsible for handling materiel but to enable them to understand the technical requirements necessary for effectively planning and implementing WAM activities, encourage them to engage individuals and partners with the appropriate WAM expertise early in the process, and support their work appropriately.

Although this tool was originally designed for DDR practitioners operating in United Nations peace operations, it is also relevant to those working in non-mission settings. This Handbook can also be a useful tool for national DDR officers or those working on DDR processes implemented by regional organizations, as well as WAM advisers operating in support of these actors.

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d This aligns with one of the key outcomes of the sixth Biennial Meeting of States under the United Nations Programme of Action on small arms, held in June 2016 (A/CONF.192/BMS/2016/2), as well as with the 14 December 2016 General Assembly resolution on the consolidation of peace through practical disarmament measures (71/64, para. 3). Finally, effective DDR WAM contributes to the realization of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, particularly by supporting States in conflict and post-conflict situations to significantly reduce illicit arms flows (target 16.4).

What topics are covered?

This Handbook covers three main areas:

1. It offers guidance and tools to build an effective, robust and evidence-based DDR WAM plan.

2. It provides guidance on disarmament as part of a DDR programme, as well as transitional weapons and ammunition management activities, including in support of other DDR-related tools such as DDR support to mediation, pre-DDR, community violence reduction and DDR support to transitional security arrangements.

3. It presents WAM technical guidelines covering the management of weapons, ammunition and explosives throughout the life cycle of DDR materiel, from collection to disposal, through storage and transportation, in line with the most recent international standards and guidelines.

Methodology

The information provided in this Handbook is based on reviews of relevant legal instruments and agreements, as well as international standards and guidelines such as the Modular Small-arms-control Implementation Compendium (MOSAIC), the International Ammunition Technical Guidelines (IATG) and the Integrated DDR Standards (IDDRS), desk research of programmatic documentation, interviews with DDR and WAM practitioners, and field missions to observe live DDR WAM operations.

For the first edition, the author conducted interviews with more than 45 specialists, including current and former United Nations DDR officers, United Nations Mine Action Service staff, United Nations Peacekeeping Force staff supporting DDR activities and other relevant United Nations staff, as well as representatives of national DDR institutions in Côte d’Ivoire, the Central African Republic and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

These interviews and detailed feedback from over 20 DDR practitioners, including those who have used the Handbook and participated in the annual training course on “Effective WAM in a Changing DDR Context” held in November 2020, ensure that the
objectives, structure, form and content of this second edition respond appropriately to practitioners’ needs, particularly while operating in the field.

In addition to the United Nations Department of Peace Operations and the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, the main partners involved in the design and implementation of DDR WAM interventions—including the United Nations Mine Action Service, the Office of Military Affairs, the United Nations police and the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, as well as the Ammunition Management Advisory Team of the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining—have also provided feedback on the various revisions of the document and on how it could best support their work.

Queries and comments on the Handbook should be sent to conventionalarms-unoda@un.org and unhqddr@un.org.
Introduction
The new United Nations approach to disarmament, demobilization and reintegration

Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) have typically been associated with DDR programmes in contexts where a peace agreement has been signed between armed groups and a national Government, and where a United Nations peacekeeping mission has been deployed. However, the United Nations is increasingly engaged in settings characterized by the multiplication of armed groups, some of which sign peace agreements while others refuse. Responding to these developments, the United Nations conducted a comprehensive review of its Integrated DDR Standards (IDDRS) and launched its new approach to DDR in 2019, which provides guidance to DDR practitioners working in both mission and non-mission settings, as well as for DDR efforts within and outside the framework of comprehensive peace agreements across the peace continuum (for more information on the IDDRS see p. 13). The IDDRS provide guidance not only on DDR programmes but also on a range of other options for DDR practitioners under the umbrella of a DDR process.

A DDR process may consist of any combination of the following:

- **DDR programmes** (set of related measures falling under the operational categories of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration)
- **DDR-related tools** (pre-DDR, transitional weapons and ammunition management, community violence reduction, DDR support to mediation, DDR support to transitional security arrangements)
- **Reintegration support**, including when complementing DDR-related tools.
**Introduction**

DDR programmes can be implemented only when the following preconditions are in place:

- The signing of a negotiated ceasefire and/or peace agreement that provides a framework for DDR
- Trust in the peace process
- The willingness of the parties to the armed conflict to engage in DDR
- A minimum guarantee of security.

When **preconditions for DDR programmes are in place**, DDR-related tools may also be used before, during and after DDR programmes as complementary measures.

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**Figure 1**

Menu of options for integrated DDR processes

When the **preconditions for a DDR programme are not in place**, **DDR-related tools** may be used to contribute to stabilization, to make the returns of stability more tangible and to generate more conducive environments for peace processes, possibly even paving the way for a DDR programme if necessary. **Reintegration** may be supported in line with the sustaining peace approach, alongside, following or in the absence of DDR-related tools.

The new emphasis on DDR processes recognizes the need for innovative and adaptive DDR responses. Many of such responses will differ from the sequenced DDR often associated with DDR.
programmes. Careful risk assessment and risk management will be necessary to address the challenges of working in contexts where peace agreements have not been signed. One particularly important challenge in this regard may be the lack of a pre-existing political-operational framework for DDR.

As such, DDR processes include two arms control components:

**Disarmament**
as part of a DDR programme
(IDDRS 4.10)

**Transitional weapons and ammunition management**
as a DDR-related tool
(IDDRS 4.11)

The disarmament component of a DDR programme is usually broken down into four main phases: (a) operational planning; (b) weapons collection operations; (c) stockpile management; and (d) disposal of collected materiel. The overarching aim of the disarmament as part of a DDR programme is to control and reduce arms, ammunition and explosives held by combatants before demobilization in order to build confidence in the peace process, increase security and prevent a return to conflict.

Transitional weapons and ammunition management (TWAM) is a DDR-related tool and includes a series of interim arms control measures. The TWAM component of a DDR process is primarily aimed at reducing the capacity of individuals and groups to engage in armed violence and conflict and to reduce accidents and save lives by addressing the immediate risks related to the possession of weapons, ammunition and explosives. TWAM also includes the disarmament of ex-combatants when the preconditions for a DDR programme are not in place, including in support of reintegration as part of the sustaining peace approach.

**Mission and non-mission settings**

The United Nations has previously initiated its engagement in DDR processes within the context of a ceasefire or a comprehensive peace accord. This engagement has typically been undertaken in mission settings, i.e., in those contexts where peace operations mandated
by the Security Council are deployed through peacekeeping operations, special political missions, or good offices engagements by the United Nations or a regional organization. For the first time, the revised IDDRS now provide guidance related to both mission and non-mission settings. In the latter case, United Nations DDR support may be provided when requests for assistance are made either by a national Government and/or a United Nations Resident Coordinator.
Joint Department of Peace Operations-Office for Disarmament Affairs initiative on effective weapons and ammunition management in a changing DDR context

The destabilizing accumulation, illicit transfer and misuse of conventional weapons and ammunition continue to initiate, sustain and exacerbate armed conflict. In addition, poorly controlled weaponry and associated ammunition are impeding sustainable development and negatively impacting humanitarian assistance. As a result, weapons and ammunition management (WAM) is becoming an increasingly critical tool of the United Nations to address these issues.

In 2016, the United Nations Department of Peace Operations (DPO) and the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (ODA) initiated a joint project to provide expert resources and guidance, as well as training, technical assistance and support to DDR practitioners in the design and implementation of tailored WAM activities as part of integrated DDR processes in line with the highest international arms control standards and guidelines.

In the framework of this project, in 2018, DPO and ODA published the first edition of this Handbook in English and French. This informed the subsequent review of the IDDRS modules on disarmament (4.10) and transitional weapons and ammunition management (4.11), as well as the development of a new Modular Small-arms-control Implementation Compendium (MOSAIC) module on small arms and light weapons control in the context of DDR (2.30).

To further enhance the United Nations capacity to design and implement state-of-the-art DDR initiatives, DPO and ODA, in collaboration with the United Nations Institute for Training and Research, have been delivering an annual training course on WAM
for DDR practitioners based on this Handbook, while also creating a “Community of Practice” (WAM and DDR Hub) to facilitate exchanges of knowledge and good practice between relevant policy, field and technical specialists.

An ad hoc Technical Assistance Mechanism has also been established in the framework of the joint DPO-ODA project. Under this mechanism, Technical Assessment Missions can be deployed to provide guidance about conducting effective DDR WAM activities at the strategic, policy and technical levels. The Mechanism can also provide remote support, including through the provision of research on weapons and ammunition dynamics to identify priority areas of intervention, for example.

Finally, to support United Nations missions in implementing efficient, safe and secure DDR WAM processes, and to facilitate their implementation by all actors involved in respective operations, DPO and ODA have designed a template for a standard operating procedure for WAM activities as part of DDR. These procedures are based on relevant international standards and guidelines, namely MOSAIC and the International Ammunition Technical Guidelines, to provide users with step-by-step direction from receipt to ultimate disposal. The procedures can be tailored to the implementation of each specific mandate and operational requirements of a specific mission or non-mission context.

For more information about this project or for any requests for assistance, please contact conventionalarms-unoda@un.org and unhqddr@un.org.

Weapons and ammunition management (WAM) is the oversight, accountability and management of arms and ammunition throughout their life cycle, including the establishment of frameworks, processes and practices for safe and secure materiel acquisition, stockpiling, transfers, tracing and disposal. WAM focuses not only on small arms and light weapons but also on a broader range of conventional weapons, including ammunition and artillery.¹

¹ See IDDRS Module 4.11 on transitional weapons and ammunition management.
Normative framework

1. Arms control regulations

All DDR WAM activities conducted in countries that have ratified legally binding instruments aimed at preventing and combating the illicit trade of arms, ammunition and/or related components, shall comply with any such instruments. These instruments cover a wide spectrum of arms control measures, including transfers, management, disposal and security of materiel obtained from seizures, as well as from collections and voluntary handovers conducted as part of most DDR programmes.

Such instruments are directly relevant as they include obligations regarding the following:

- Seizures and collection of illicit weapons and ammunition in general, or during peacekeeping operations and/or the implementation of peace accords
- Marking, record-keeping, management and disposal of illicit materiel.

1.1 Global instruments

1.1.1 Legally binding


- The Arms Trade Treaty, adopted in 2013, regulates the international trade in conventional arms and seeks to prevent and eradicate the illicit trade and diversion of conventional arms by establishing international standards governing arms transfers.
United Nations human rights conventions, such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, as interpreted by their universal oversight mechanisms, require States to curb the proliferation of small arms and regulate access to them as part of the duty to protect the right to life.

Other binding global instruments may be relevant, including the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention, the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons and the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

### 1.1.2 Politically binding for United Nations Member States

- The Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects was adopted in 2001.
- The International Instrument to Enable States to Identify and Trace, in a Timely and Reliable Manner, Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons (International Tracing Instrument) was adopted in 2005 to operationalize the marking, record-keeping and tracing obligations contained in the Programme of Action.


### 1.2 Regional instruments

#### 1.2.1 Legally binding

In addition to the global instruments listed above, several regional, legally binding agreements have been adopted in Europe, Latin America and Africa to support the implementation of the Programme of Action (see map on the next page).

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2 The Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction is also known as the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention.

3 The Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects is also known as the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons.
Abbreviations: CIFTA=Inter-American Convention Against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives, and Other Related Materials; ECCAS=Economic Community of Central African States; ECOWAS=Economic Community of West African States; EU=European Union; OAS=Organization of American States; RECSA=Regional Centre on Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Great Lakes Region, the Horn of Africa and Bordering States; and SADC=Southern African Development Community.

Source: UNODA, 2017; the various instruments can be found via www.un.org/disarmament.
1.2.2 Politically binding

A range of politically binding road maps and agendas include provisions related to arms control. For example, the following initiatives are particularly relevant:

- **The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development:** With its associated Sustainable Development Goals, the 2030 Agenda is the global community’s centralized effort to address sustainable socioeconomic development. One of the 2030 Agenda’s most important aspects is a focus on measurability, including the establishment of targets and of coherent indicators to measure progress towards achieving them. Goal 16 promotes “peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development”, in part by committing States to “significantly reduce illicit ... arms flows” by 2030 in line with target 16.4. Indicator 16.4.2 focuses on the “proportion of seized, found or surrendered arms whose illicit origin or context has been traced or established by a competent authority in line with international instruments”.

- Silencing the Guns: Following the 2013 pledge to “Silence the Guns” in Africa by 2020, the African Union adopted the **Lusaka Master Road Map** in 2016, which identifies practical steps towards achieving this goal (the Road Map has since been extended to 2030). Objectives of the Road Map include ensuring the non-proliferation of small arms and light weapons, particularly through effective DDR programming. The Silencing the Guns initiative is undertaken as part of the broader developmental blueprint of Agenda 2063. Adopted in 2013, the Agenda is a strategic framework for the socioeconomic transformation of the continent. It states that Africa should have ended the illicit trade in and proliferation of small arms and light weapons by 2063.

1.3 National arms control legislation

Most countries have domestic legislation regulating the life cycle of weapons and ammunition, including manufacture, marking, import, export, record-keeping and civilian possession.
Countries will usually have the provisions of global and regional instruments they have ratified reflected in their own national legislation. However, the degree to which national legislation has either been adopted or updated can vary greatly from country to country.

1.4 United Nations arms embargo measures

DDR practitioners shall undertake no action in violation of United Nations arms embargoes. They shall also consider arms embargo provisions when advising the national authorities on the planning and implementation of DDR processes. The existence of arms embargo measures targeting the country in which the DDR process is being implemented will result in potential restrictions concerning any transfers of custody of DDR weapons to the national authorities. Another possible restriction would be on the provision of any security sector related training, including on WAM. If there is any doubt whether or not DDR activities are compliant with arms embargo provisions, DDR practitioners should seek guidance from a legal adviser at the mission or at the Headquarters level.

2. DDR normative framework

Integrated DDR is guided by several policies and agendas that frame the United Nations’ work on peace, security and development, including those promoting gender equality and the empowerment of women (see section 3 of IDDRS 2.10 on the United Nations Approach to DDR for a comprehensive overview).

DDR practitioners should be familiar with the source and scope of their mandate, including specific United Nations Security Council resolutions for peace operations in mission settings. In non-mission settings, the work of United Nations DDR practitioners should be in line with the United Nations Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework. If a peace agreement exists, it should be one of the first documents that DDR practitioners consult to understand the framework in which they will carry out the DDR process (see Unit 2 for more details).
DDR processes are also undertaken in the context of a broader international legal framework and should be implemented in a manner that ensures that the relevant rights and obligations under that broader legal framework are respected. For an overview of the international legal framework that may be relevant to DDR processes supported by the United Nations system, see IDDRS Submodule 2.11 on the legal framework for United Nations DDR.

2.1 Integrated DDR Standards

The IDDRS are a comprehensive and detailed set of policies, guidelines and procedures for undertaking DDR. They cover over 30 thematic areas within DDR, ranging from planning, design, monitoring and evaluation, to the protection of specific groups such as children, youth and women, and mainstreaming of cross-cutting issues such as health, gender and youth. The IDDRS also cover linkages with other processes, such as security sector reform and transitional justice. The IDDRS are a repository of lessons and best practices drawn from the experience of all United Nations entities involved in supporting DDR.

The IDDRS were originally developed in 2006 to provide guidance in post-conflict contexts where DDR forms an integral part of comprehensive peace agreements, usually where peace operations have also been established and mandated to support national DDR efforts. Following the 2017-2019 IDDRS review, the new United Nations approach to DDR provides guidance to DDR practitioners working in both mission and non-mission settings, as well as for DDR efforts within and outside the framework of comprehensive peace agreements across the peace continuum (see p. 3).

The updated IDDRS include two modules on arms control issues—Module 4.10 on disarmament and Submodule 4.11 on transitional weapons and ammunition management—which underpin this second edition of the Handbook.
3. Weapons and ammunition management standards and guidelines

The United Nations developed two sets of guidelines for effective WAM: the International Ammunition Technical Guidelines (IATG) and the Modular Small-arms-control Implementation Compendium (MOSAIC). Their development was closely coordinated, and both sets of guidelines are mutually reinforcing.

The challenge is to operationalize those guidelines in DDR settings where the context is unstable and resources are very limited. Technical aspects of the Handbook therefore draw on the IATG and MOSAIC to the extent possible but are also complemented by good practices from the field.

3.1 International Ammunition Technical Guidelines

By its resolution 63/61 of 2008, the General Assembly requested the United Nations to develop guidelines for adequate ammunition management to ensure that the United Nations consistently delivered high-quality advice and support. In response, the IATG were developed in 2011, with the aim of reducing the dual risks of unplanned explosions and illicit diversion from ammunition stockpiles. The United Nations SaferGuard Programme was established as the corresponding knowledge management platform. The United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs manages the Programme, overseeing the dissemination of and ensuring the highest technical quality of the IATG.

The IATG consist of 12 volumes, which provide practical guidance for a “through-life” approach to ammunition management, and offer an incremental approach that allows for adaptation according to the setting and circumstances. Three levels of ascending comprehensiveness are offered in the IATG, referred to as Risk-Reduction Process Levels (RRPLs). Given that DDR WAM activities are generally implemented in the field with very limited resources, the Handbook applies RRPL Level 1 (basic) to stockpile management processes; application of RRPL Level 2 (intermediate) or 3 (advanced) can be made if additional resources become available. The latest version of the IATG was released in early 2021. Unofficial translations of various modules
are available in Arabic, French, German, Portuguese, Russian and Spanish.

To support the application of the IATG, three practical IATG support guides have also been published under the United Nations SaferGuard Programme—Critical Path Guide to the International Ammunition Technical Guidelines,4 A Guide to Developing National Standards for Ammunition Management5 and Utilizing the International Ammunition Technical Guidelines in Conflict-Affected and Low-Capacity Environments.6 For more information on the IATG, visit www.un.org/disarmament/ammunition.

3.2 Modular Small-arms-control Implementation Compendium

Launched in 2012, MOSAIC (originally named the International Small Arms Control Standards) includes 24 modules that provide practical guidance on all aspects of small arms and light weapons control, including legislation, programme design and operational support, as well as cross-cutting issues such as youth and gender. In 2020, MOSAIC Module 2.30 on small arms and light weapons control in the context of DDR was released, the content of which is firmly based on IDDRS Module 4.10 and Submodule 4.11.


MOSAIC was developed and continues to be improved by a broad coalition of small-arms-control specialists drawn from the United Nations, Governments, international and regional organizations, civil society and the private sector. The initiative is overseen by the United Nations internal mechanism known as the Coordinating Action on Small Arms.

5 Ibid.
MOSAIC includes an electronic assessment tool that allows users to compare existing operational small arms and light weapons controls with international standards in order to identify and prioritize areas that require strengthening.

In line with other international standards, MOSAIC offers an incremental approach, designated by the language used in introducing provisions (shall, should, may and can). “Shall” provisions, being the basic requirements of MOSAIC, are prioritized in the Handbook.

Today, the United Nations and other partners use MOSAIC in more than 100 countries to help strengthen national capacities on arms management.

For more information, go to www.un.org/disarmament/convarms/mosaic.

4. Frameworks supporting a gender and youth sensitive approach to DDR WAM

4.1 Gender and WAM

The IDDRS that underpin this Handbook promote the application of a gender-sensitive approach to the planning, implementation and monitoring of DDR processes. Gender has been mainstreamed throughout the IDDRS and IDDRS Module 5.30 focuses specifically on women, gender and DDR.

Regarding DDR WAM, gender mainstreaming has two interconnected components: considering what the impacts are for women, men, girls and boys at every phase of the life-cycle management of weapons and ammunition processes; and ensuring that men and women have equal opportunities to participate in the development and implementation of policies and practices.7

The gender mainstreaming of WAM has a firm basis in several international normative developments related to the following:

- **Women, peace and security agenda.** In the landmark United Nations Security Council resolution 1325 (2000), which

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forms the foundation of the women, peace and security agenda, the Council calls for the increased participation of women at all levels of security-related decision-making and for enhanced efforts to address the security of women and girls in conflict, among other targets. The agenda includes nine other subsequent resolutions, namely Security Council resolutions 1820 (2008), 1888 (2009), 1889 (2009), 1960 (2010), 2106 (2013), 2122 (2013), 2242 (2015), 2467 (2019) and 2493 (2019). Together they form the international policy framework on women, peace and security and should be implemented by all Member States and relevant actors, including United Nations entities and parties to conflict.

- **Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women**, adopted in 1979. The Convention’s Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women has recognized violence against women and gender-based violence as forms of discrimination (general recommendation No. 19, 1992); highlighted the need to consider discrimination against women in conflict prevention, conflict and post-conflict situations (general recommendation No. 30, 2013); and elaborated international standards on gender-based violence against women, recognizing the need to rigorously apply these standards as a legal and moral obligation (general recommendation No. 35, 2017).

- **The Agenda 2030 for Sustainable Development and its Sustainable Development Goals** are the global community’s centralized effort to address sustainable socioeconomic development. In the context of the Goals, development was first linked to peace, security and arms control (see Goal 16). Gender equality is considered to be an “accelerator”—meaning that improving gender equality will help to achieve all the Sustainable Development Goals (see Goal 5).

- **Small arms and light weapons and other conventional arms control frameworks**, including the following:
  - In the Outcome Document of the third Review Conference on the Programme of Action on small arms and light weapons, strong and explicit linkages to gender equality and gender mainstreaming are
made not only by referring to the gendered impacts of arms and armed violence but also by calling for the increased participation of women in addressing illicit arms and armed violence, as well as for the collection of sex-disaggregated data. The implementation of the Programme of Action is also linked to efforts to prevent gender-based violence.

- The Arms Trade Treaty is the first legally binding treaty in which the link between the arms trade and gender-based violence is recognized, including not only conflict-related gender-based violence but also femicides, “honour killings” and intimate partner violence. With the inclusion of article 7.4 in the Treaty, the risk of gender-based violence has been established as an essential criterion in the export assessment that must precede the authorization of any export of arms.

4.2 Youth, peace and security agenda

DDR processes are often conducted in contexts where the majority of combatants are youth, an age group defined by the United Nations as those between 15 and 24 years of age. Youth should be involved in all stages of planning, implementing and monitoring of DDR WAM activities (see IDDRS 5.30 on youth and DDR).

The youth, peace and security agenda has gained momentum in recent years and marks a shift in the understanding of who young people are and their role in peace and security. United Nations Security Council resolution 2250 (2015) is the first international policy framework that recognizes the positive role young people play in preventing and resolving conflict, countering violent extremism and building peace. In the resolution, the Council recognized “the important and positive contribution of youth in efforts for the maintenance and promotion of peace and security" and affirmed "the important role youth can play in the prevention and resolution of conflicts and as a key aspect of the sustainability, inclusiveness and success of peacekeeping and peacebuilding efforts”. In its subsequent resolution 2419 (2018) on youth, peace and security, the Council further recognized the positive role young people could play in negotiating and implementing peace agreements and urged stakeholders to take young people’s views into account and facilitate their equal
and full participation in peace and decision-making processes at all levels. In the third such resolution adopted by the Council (2535 (2020)), Member States were encouraged to support and integrate youth into decision-making processes, and the unique role youth could play in strengthening the national, local and community-based capacities in conflict and post-conflict situations was recognized. The Council also called for increased engagement in the implementation of its resolutions 2250 (2015), 2419 (2018) and 2535 (2020) to institutionalize the agenda and develop guidance on the protection of young people. Peace and security is also a fundamental pillar of the United Nations Youth 2030 Strategy, which acts as an umbrella framework to guide the entire United Nations as it steps up its work with and for young people in all contexts.

In his Agenda for Disarmament, issued in May 2018, the Secretary-General recognized young people as a tremendous force for change in the world who have “proved their power time and again in support of the cause of disarmament”. The important and positive contribution that young people can make in sustaining peace and security was reaffirmed by the United Nations General Assembly through its unanimous support for a new resolution entitled “Youth, disarmament and non-proliferation” (74/64), adopted on 12 December 2019. In the resolution, the Assembly encouraged the participation of young people in discussions on disarmament and non-proliferation, called upon countries and international organizations to consider developing relevant policies and programmes for youth engagement, and stressed the importance of education and capacity-building of young people in the area. Recognizing the importance of young people to bring about change, the Office for Disarmament Affairs launched its youth outreach initiative, #Youth4Disarmament, in 2019 to engage, educate and empower young people with the aim of facilitating their meaningful and inclusive participation in the field of disarmament and non-proliferation.
Planning for weapons and ammunition management in a DDR context
On 27 June 2017, the United Nations Mission in Colombia stored 7,132 arms, the totality of FARC-EP individual registered arms. A UN International Observer in the process of storing the weapons in the Transitory Point of Normalization. (UN Photo/Laura Santamaria)
Unit 1

Developing a DDR weapons and ammunition management plan

This first section of this Handbook will provide DDR practitioners with practical guidelines for designing and planning efficient and safe DDR-related WAM activities as part of disarmament operations of a DDR programme or transitional weapons and ammunition management (TWAM) as a DDR-related tool (see the section entitled “The new United Nations Approach to DDR”).

Designing, implementing and adjusting a DDR WAM plan should adhere to the main guiding principles of the United Nations Approach to DDR (see IDDRS 2.10), specifically that activities be voluntary, people-centred, gender-responsive and inclusive, conflict-sensitive, nationally and locally owned, and safe and secure. These principles are further discussed below.

Voluntary

Disarmament and TWAM activities shall be voluntary to lay the foundation for an effective DDR process and sustainable peace. Removing or controlling weapons forcibly risks creating a security vacuum and a power imbalance that may generate increased tensions and lead to a resumption of armed violence.

Voluntary disarmament should be facilitated through strong sensitization and communication efforts. It should also be underpinned by firm guarantees of security and immunity from prosecution for the illegal possession of a weapon (or weapons) handed in.
People-centred: Unconditional release and protection of children

Agreeing on child-specific disarmament procedures reduces the risk of further possible abuse and exploitation of children, especially for political or tactical gain, and prepares children for separate and specific children-related demobilization and reintegration processes (see IDDRS 5.20 on children and DDR).

Specific attention should also be given to the disarmament of youth and their inclusion in the design, implementation and monitoring of TWAM activities (see IDDRS 5.30 on youth and DDR).

Gender-responsive and inclusive

Disarmament and TWAM activities must not reinforce discriminations based on sex, race, ethnicity, religion or other arbitrary criteria that may create or exacerbate existing inequalities, vulnerabilities and power imbalances. All stages of initiatives must integrate gender and age considerations, including the different impacts and perceptions of such processes on women, men, girls and boys. Such an approach requires gender expertise, gender analysis, the collection of sex- and age-disaggregated data, an inclusive approach to integrate different views and needs into all programmes and policies, and the meaningful participation of women at each stage of the process.

A gender-sensitive approached actively examines, questions and attempts to change unequal gender norms and imbalances of power. A gender-sensitive DDR process should acknowledge, incorporate and address messages on masculinities and violence, including the linkage between masculinities and weapons ownership. Gender-sensitive DDR processes should also ensure that there are both male and female United Nations personnel in all roles, including leadership roles, during the implementation of WAM activities. Ideally, gender-sensitive DDR processes are part of a broader gender-transformative approach in which gender is a central programming element, and underlying drivers and root-causes of inequality are addressed. Such an approach aims to transform unequal gender relations to promote shared power, control of resources, decision-making and support for women’s empowerment, as well as includes ways to transform harmful gender norms, roles and relations.
Conflict-sensitive
Disarmament or TWAM operations shall not increase the vulnerability of communities, groups or individuals to internal or external threats. Disarmament and TWAM strategies should therefore be based on a thorough analysis of the security context, relevant actors and their military capabilities to avoid creating a security imbalance or vacuum, leading to further tensions or jeopardizing the implementation of a peace agreement.

Nationally and locally owned
National Governments have the right and responsibility to apply their own national standards to all disarmament and TWAM operations on their territory and shall act in compliance with international arms control instruments and applicable legal frameworks. The support and specialist knowledge of the United Nations are placed at the disposal of a national Government to ensure that planning and implementation of WAM activities are conducted in accordance with international arms control instruments, standards and guidelines, including those of the IDDRS, the IATG and MOSAIC. Strong national and local ownership is critical, including where the United Nations is supporting DDR WAM activities in non-mission settings and at a community level. Building national and local institutional and technical capacity is essential for the effective, successful and sustainable continuation of disarmament and TWAM efforts.
Safe and secure

Handling weapons, ammunition and explosives comes with high levels of risk. The involvement of technically qualified WAM advisers in the planning and implementation of disarmament and TWAM operations is critical to the safety and success of these activities. Technical advisers shall have formal training and operational field experience in ammunition and weapons storage, marking, transportation, deactivation, and the destruction of arms, ammunition and explosives, as relevant (see Box 1).

Steps in the development of a DDR WAM plan are as follows:

- **Identifying the legal framework of the plan** (see the section entitled “Normative framework” and Unit 2)
- **Conducting assessments to inform the plan** (see Unit 3)
- **Determining beneficiaries and participants** (see Unit 7)
- **Developing standard operating procedures** (see Unit 4)
- **Monitoring plan activities** (see Unit 5).
- **Communicating about planned activities** (see Unit 6)
WAM specialists supporting DDR processes in mission and non-mission settings

What is a WAM Policy Officer?

A WAM Policy Officer provides advice to DDR processes at strategic, policy and programming levels. She/he supports the design, planning, implementation and monitoring of disarmament operations and TWAM activities, as well as ensures that they are in line with international standards and guidelines, such as MOSAIC, the IATG, the IDDRS, and applicable international and regional arms control instruments. The WAM Policy Officer shall work in close coordination with WAM Technical Advisors.

What is a qualified WAM Technical Advisor?

The involvement of qualified WAM Technical Advisors in the planning and implementation of disarmament operations and TWAM activities is critical to the success of the process. Depending on the type of activities involved, WAM Technical Advisors shall have the qualifications of an Ammunition Technical Officer (or equivalent). They shall also have operational field experience in ammunition and weapons storage, inspection, transportation and destruction/disposal, including in fragile settings, as well as experience in the development and administration of new storage facilities. If the DDR component does not include such profiles among its staff, it may rely on support from other specialist United Nations agencies or non-governmental organizations. The WAM Technical Advisor shall, among other things, advise on explosive safety, certify that ammunition and explosives are safe to move, identify a nearby demolition site for unsafe ammunition, conduct render-safe procedures on unsafe ammunition, and determine safety distances during collection processes.

REFERENCES FOR THIS UNIT

IDDRS 2.10 The UN Approach to DDR
IDDRS 4.10 Disarmament
IDDRS 4.11 TWAM
Unit 2

United Nations mandate and national normative framework for DDR

What is the mandate of the United Nations mission in which the DDR section operates?

DDR is often a priority area for the United Nations Security Council when setting the mandate of a United Nations peace operation. Levels of detail vary but relevant provisions usually start by requiring the mission to assist national authorities in developing and implementing a DDR process, sometimes in establishing a specific DDR programme and/or implementing DDR-related tools.

The Security Council has been increasingly requesting the implementation of WAM measures in DDR processes, including as part of TWAM and community violence reduction (CVR) in addition to disarmament operations as part of DDR programmes. Mandates may include detailed provisions regarding DDR WAM, such as requesting the mission to support the authorities in collecting, registering, securing and disposing of weapons held by armed forces and groups.

United Nations missions’ mandates may also include other WAM activities, such as those related to illicit civilian possession of weapons, monitoring arms embargoes or the seizure of weapons from warring parties following United Nations military operations. While this may not form part of the official remit of the DDR section, all WAM activities conducted by the United Nations mission and underpinning standard operating procedures, including the management of United Nations troops’ own materiel, should be coherent and in compliance with global standards, including MOSAIC and the IATG.

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What is the basis for the United Nations DDR support in non-mission settings?

In countries where there is no United Nations peace operation mandated by the Security Council, United Nations DDR support will be provided when either a national Government and/or United Nations Resident Coordinator requests assistance. The disarmament and demobilization components of a DDR programme will be undertaken by national institutions with advice and technical support from relevant United Nations entities, the United Nations country team, regional organizations and bilateral actors. Where relevant, weapons considerations should be integrated into the common country analysis, and DDR and WAM should be reflected in the Sustainable Development Coordination Frameworks. When the preconditions for a DDR programme are not in place, the implementation of specific DDR-related tools, such as TWAM and/or reintegration support, may be considered. Decision-making and accountability for United Nations-supported DDR rest, in this context, with the United Nations Resident Coordinator, who will identify one or more United Nations lead agency/agencies in the United Nations country team based on in-country capacity and expertise. The United Nations Resident Coordinator should establish a United Nations DDR Working Group co-chaired by the lead agency/agencies at the country level to coordinate the contribution of the United Nations country team to integrated DDR, including on issues related to gender equality,
women’s empowerment, youth and child protection, and support to persons with disabilities. DDR programmes, DDR-related tools and reintegration support, where applicable, will require the allocation of national budgets and/or the mobilization of voluntary contributions, including through the establishment of financial management structures, such as a dedicated multi-donor trust fund or catalytic funding provided by the Peacebuilding Fund.

What is the national normative framework in place for the DDR WAM strategy?

1. The framework is under construction in a country with no ongoing peace process: the national authorities are elaborating a national DDR strategy focusing on DDR-related tools and reintegration support. The preconditions for a DDR programme are absent.

   WAM Policy Officers and/or Technical Advisers could support the national authorities in developing their strategy to incorporate relevant TWAM components, including linkages to other DDR related tools (see Unit 12 on TWAM and CVR).

2. The framework is under construction in a country with an ongoing peace process: the peace accord, or any other relevant national agreement, is still in the negotiating phase and there is no national DDR plan. The preconditions for a DDR programme are absent.

   Negotiators or advisers with DDR and WAM expertise should be involved to ensure that peace agreements include appropriate WAM provisions (see Unit 10 on TWAM and mediation support).

   DDR-related tools, such as CVR or DDR support to transitional security arrangements (see Units 12 and 13), could support this sensitive phase by creating security and political space.
3. **A national agreement has been signed: this should contain the framework for the design of the DDR national strategy, including its WAM components, as well as of the relevant national institutional framework.**

A national DDR institution should be developed with the support of the United Nations DDR section; the inclusion of national WAM experts within this institution is critical.

A national DDR strategy should be developed by the national DDR institution with the support of the DDR section, WAM Policy Officers and Technical Advisors.

The implementation of DDR-related tools, including CVR, pre-DDR and TWAM could help secure buy-in from armed groups in the agreement, as well as create political space for encouraging groups that may not have signed up to it yet (see Units 10–13).

4. **A national agreement and national plan for a DDR process are in place: the legal and institutional basis for a DDR programme should be complete.**

Depending on the sequencing of the DDR process components selected by the national authorities, disarmament and demobilization may be the first activities to be implemented and will be key in building the foundations for the success of the whole DDR process.

If the implementation of a DDR programme is delayed for political, security or funding reasons, DDR-related tools that include TWAM activities can help generate the right conditions in which to launch the DDR programme.

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**REFERENCES FOR THIS UNIT**

IDDRS 2.10 *The UN Approach to DDR*

IDDRS 2.11 *The Legal Framework for United Nations DDR*

IDDRS 2.20 *The Politics of DDR*
Unit 3

Data collection and assessments

Initial planning should be based on careful data collection and analysis of the armed forces and groups to be disarmed, disaggregated by sex and age, as well as an analysis of the dynamics of armed violence and illicitly held weapons and ammunition. DDR processes are increasingly implemented in environments with a myriad of armed forces and groups whose alliances are fluid or unclear, often within a context of weak State institutions and fragile or absent rule of law. Solid analysis informed by continuous data gathering and assessment is essential to navigate these challenging, rapidly changing environments.

Integrated assessments and weapons surveys are the two main ways to collect evidence-based data to plan and design disarmament and TWAM activities. Both tools can also serve as a baseline to identify performance indicators and potential objectives against which to monitor and evaluate DDR processes, including the disarmament and TWAM components in particular (see Unit 5). In addition, risk assessments should be conducted at a strategic level and for each specific WAM activity to ensure the safest working environment possible.

1. Integrated assessment

A DDR integrated assessment should start as early as possible in the peace negotiation process and the pre-planning phase (see IDDRS 3.11 on integrated assessments). Among other objectives, this assessment should contribute to determining whether disarmament or any TWAM interventions are desirable or feasible in the current context, as well as identifying the potential positive and negative impacts of any such activities.

The collection of information is an ongoing process that requires sufficient resources to ensure that assessments are updated
throughout the life cycle of a DDR process. DDR practitioners, with support from the information technology unit of the United Nations mission or lead United Nations agency/agencies, should employ information management systems and data protection measures from the start. The collection of data relating to weapons and those who carry them is a sensitive undertaking and can present significant risks to DDR practitioners and their sources. United Nations security guidelines shall be followed at all times, particularly with regard to protecting sources by maintaining their anonymity.

What is being analysed during an integrated assessment?

Integrated assessments should include information related to the political and security context and the main drivers of armed conflict. In addition, in order to design evidence-based, age-specific and gender-sensitive disarmament operations and TWAM interventions, the integrated assessment should include the following:

- A gender-responsive mapping of armed forces and groups (number, origin, age, sex, rank, etc.) and their arsenals (estimates of the number and the type of weapons, ammunition and explosives)
- An understanding of the WAM capacity of armed forces and groups
- An analysis of the patterns of weapons in possession among men, women, boys, girls and youth
- A mapping of the locations and access routes to materiel and potential caches (to the extent possible)
- An understanding of the power imbalances and disparities in weapons possession between communities
- An analysis of the use of weapons in the commission of serious human rights violations or abuses and grave breaches of international humanitarian law, as well as crime, including organized crime
- An understanding of cultural and gendered attitudes towards weapons and the value of arms and ammunition locally
- The identification of sources of illicit weapons and ammunition, as well as possible trafficking routes
Planning for WAM in a DDR context

- Lessons learned from any past disarmament or weapons collections initiatives
- An understanding of the willingness of and incentives for armed forces and groups to participate in DDR
- An assessment of the presence of armed groups not involved in DDR and the possible impact these groups can have on the DDR process.

Methods to gather data, including desk research, media reviews, telephone interviews and face-to-face meetings, should be adapted to the resources available, as well as to the security and political context. For more information on how to collect information, see IDDRS Module 4.10. Information should be centralized and managed by a dedicated focal point.

Once sufficient and reliable information has been gathered, collaborative plans can be drawn up, outlining the intended locations and site requirements for disarmament operations and TWAM initiatives, the logistics and staffing required to carry out activities, and a timetable for operations. Such plans can be developed by the National DDR Commission and the United Nations DDR section in mission settings, or the National DDR Commission and lead United Nations agency/ agencies in non-mission settings.

UN DDR officers meet with representatives from a violence affected community to collect information for a technical assessment on CVR and WAM, Haiti, 2019.
2. Weapons survey

A weapons survey is the collection and analysis of quantitative and qualitative data about weapons and ammunition, which is conducted within a specific geographical area and used to provide evidence upon which to design tailored, safe and effective arms control interventions, including DDR disarmament and TWAM operations. For specific guidance on how to conduct a small arms and light weapons survey, see MOSAIC 5.10 on conducting small arms and light weapons surveys.

A weapons survey enables the accurate definition of the extent of the disarmament or TWAM operations, allowing for planning of the collection and future storage and destruction requirements, as appropriate. The more accurate and verifiable the initial data is regarding the specifically identified armed forces and groups participating in the conflict, the better the capacity of the United Nations will be to make appropriate plans or provide national authorities with relevant advice. Weapons surveys are opportunities to build capacity for continuous data gathering and analysis, as well as to establish baseline indicators to support monitoring and evaluation (see Unit 5). Data disaggregated by sex and age is a prerequisite for understanding age- and gender-specific attitudes towards weapons, ammunition and explosives, and their age- and gender-specific impacts. This type of data is also necessary to design responses that are evidence-based, as well as age- and gender-sensitive (for more guidance on how to design and conduct gender-sensitive weapons surveys, see the Office for Disarmament Affairs’ Training manual on gender-mainstreaming small arms control (forthcoming)).

When should a weapons survey be conducted?

Complementary to the integrated assessment, a weapons survey should be implemented as early as possible in the planning of DDR operations; however, it requires significant resources, access to sensitive and often unstable parts of the country, buy-in from local authorities and ownership by national authorities, all of which can take considerable amounts of time to pull together and secure.

A weapons survey can require a lot of resources and take more than a year from the time resources are allocated and mobilized to the completion and the publication of results and recommendations.
Who should implement the weapons survey?

While DDR sections and the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) can secure funding and coordinate the process, it is critical to ensure that ownership of the project sits at the national level due to the sensitivities involved, and so that the results have greater legitimacy in informing any future national policymaking on the subject. For example, this could be through the national coordinating mechanism on small arms and light weapons or the national DDR commission. Buy-in must also be secured from local authorities on the ground where research is to be conducted. Such authorities must also be kept informed of developments for political and security reasons.

Weapons surveys are often subcontracted out by United Nations entities and national authorities to independent and impartial research organizations and/or an expert consultant to design and coordinate the survey components. The survey team should include a gender-balance of independent experts and surveyors who are nationals of the country in which the DDR section is operating and who speak the local language(s). Survey teams should include gender specialists and all surveyors should have gender training. The implementation of weapons surveys should always serve as an opportunity to develop national research capacity.

What information should be gathered during a weapons survey?

Weapons surveys can support the design of multiple types of activities related to small arms and light weapons control in various contexts, including those related to DDR. The information collected during this process can inform a wide range of initiatives and it is therefore important to identify other United Nations stakeholders with whom to engage when designing the survey to ensure efforts are not being duplicated.

Components

- Contextual analysis (conflict analysis; mapping of armed actors; and political, economic, social, environmental and cultural factors)
- Weapons and ammunition distribution assessment (types; quantities; possession by women, men and children;
movements of small arms and light weapons; and illicit sources of weapons and ammunition)

- Impact survey (impact of weapons on men, women, children, vulnerable groups, DDR beneficiaries, etc.; social and economic developments; and number of acts of armed violence and victims)
- Perception survey (attitudes of various groups towards weapons; reasons for armed groups holding weapons; trust in security forces; and alternatives to weapons possession, etc.)
- Capacity assessment (community, local and national coping mechanism; legal tools; and security and non-security responses).

**Methodology**

The survey should draw on a variety of research methods and sources to collate, compare and confirm information—e.g., desk research, collection of official quantitative data (including crime and health data related to weapons), and interviews with key informants such as national security and defence forces, community leaders, representatives of civilian groups (including women and youth) affected by armed violence, non-State armed groups, foreign analysts and diplomats. In addition, information on the WAM capacity, processes and procedures of the national authorities is key to identifying the needs, opportunities and requirements with regard to the planning of DDR WAM activities. The geographical area and target population for the survey should be defined in a context-specific manner on a case by case basis. The main component of the survey should be the perception survey (see above)—i.e., the administration of a questionnaire. A representative sample is to be
determined according to the target population. The questionnaire should be developed and administered by a research team including male and female nationals ensuring respect for ethical considerations, and gender and cultural sensitivities. The questionnaire should not take more than 30 minutes to administer and careful thought should be given on how to frame the questions to ensure maximum impact (see Annex C of MOSAIC 5.10 for a list of sample questions).

A survey can help the DDR section to identify interventions related not only to the disarmament of combatants or ex-combatants but also to community violence reduction and other DDR-related tools.

Among others, the weapons survey will help identify the following:

- Communities particularly affected by weapons availability and armed violence
- Communities particularly affected by violence related to ex-combatants
- Communities ready to participate in community violence reduction and TWAM and the types of programming they would like to see developed
- Types of weapons and ammunition in circulation and in demand
- Groups holding weapons and the profiles of combatants
- Cultural and gender attitudes towards weapons
- Local monetary values of weapons and ammunition
- Security concerns and other negative impacts linked to potential interventions.

### 3. Risk assessments

The planning of DDR programming is based on certain assumptions, including timeline, types and number of participants, funding, the political and security context, etc. Any uncertainty related to these assumptions is a source of risk. During a risk assessment, risks are analysed, considering likelihood and impact, as a basis for determining how they should be responded to. The main objectives are to identify risks to the DDR process, its personnel,
participants and beneficiaries, so they can be appropriately managed or mitigated.

Risk assessments should be conducted with the support of qualified WAM Technical Advisors and implemented at strategic and operational levels:

At the strategic level, a risk assessment is part of the operational planning of the DDR process and should be conducted as part of the integrated assessment (see IDDRS 3.11). The most common risks are political, security and programmatic. A careful risk assessment will be particularly necessary to address the challenges of working in contexts where peace agreements have not been signed and where there is no pre-existing political or operational framework for DDR.

At the operational level, a risk assessment would support the planning of a specific activity, such as the collection of weapons from a specific community, the storage of collected weapons and ammunition or the destruction of obsolete ammunition from a specific DDR storage. Such an assessment should focus on the primary safety and security risks related to WAM activities including diversion through theft or loss of materiel, unplanned explosions of ammunition and misuse of weapons during activities. The level of risk is partly dependent on the mitigations that have been put in place. As not all aspects can be mitigated, the aim is to ensure the safest possible working environment by, for instance, recruiting appropriately skilled staff or respecting the safety distances with regard to ammunition management. A range of techniques for estimating the level of risk is contained in IATG 2.10 on an introduction to risk management principles and processes.

**REFERENCES FOR THIS UNIT**

- IATG 2.10 Introduction to Risk Management Principles and Processes
- IDDRS 3.11 Integrated Assessments
- IDDRS 4.10 Disarmament (Annex C in particular)
- MOSAIC 5.10 Conducting SALW Surveys
Unit 4

Developing mission-specific weapons and ammunition management standard operating procedures for DDR

What is a DDR WAM standard operating procedure?

A DDR WAM standard operating procedure (SOP) is a set of mandatory step-by-step instructions designed to guide DDR practitioners in the management of weapons, ammunition and explosives during disarmament or TWAM activities. The development of DDR WAM SOPs is becoming a common practice across United Nations DDR processes as it allows for coherence in the delivery of activities, ensuring greater safety and security, as well as adherence to regulations, standards and guidelines.

An SOP should identify the precise responsibilities of the various United Nations components involved in DDR WAM activities, including, among others, DDR officers, the United Nations Peacekeeping Force, UNMAS and military observers for each procedure. All components should agree on the content of the SOP and the document should be reviewed by the United Nations Office of Legal Affairs.

The development of the WAM SOP is led by the DDR section and is signed off by the Head of the United Nations mission. All staff from the DDR section, national counterparts, as well as Force members supporting DDR activities, UNMAS staff and other implementing partners, shall be familiar with the SOP.

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10 In order to secure the buy-in of the Force, in certain settings, the SOP should also be signed by the Force Commander.
How to develop a DDR WAM SOP?

The Department of Peace Operations and the Office for Disarmament Affairs have developed the United Nations Template SOP on WAM in DDR Processes (forthcoming). The objective is to provide DDR sections in peace operations with standardized guidance which can be tailored to specific settings through mission-specific SOPs on the handling, storage and destruction of weapons, ammunition and explosives in the context of DDR. The template is based on United Nations guidelines and policies on WAM and DDR, including the IDDRS, MOSAIC and the IATG, as well as existing mission-specific SOPs on WAM. Although not the primary purpose, this template may be used by national Governments to help develop a framework capability for WAM where no such national capability currently exists. United Nations personnel supporting national authorities in a non-mission setting may also utilize this template as appropriate.

The mission’s DDR WAM SOP should be developed by the DDR section with the support of technical experts drawn from UNMAS, the Force and military observers, depending on availability and expertise within the mission.

The SOP should be informed by the integrated assessment and the weapons survey, be tailored to the national DDR strategy, and be in line with international norms and technical guidance, as well as relevant national legislation (see the section entitled “Normative framework”). It should cover all procedures for each DDR
WAM activity and include two lines of management procedures—
(i) ammunition and explosives, and (ii) weapons systems—due to the
different levels of technical and logistical management requirements,
as well as related safety risks.

Depending on the nature of activities planned under the DDR
programme, a WAM SOP could include the following sections:

- Reception of weapons and/or ammunition in static
disarmament camps or mobile units (including diagram) (see
  Unit 8)
- Compliance with DDR programme eligibility criteria (e.g.,
  what is considered a serviceable weapon?) (see Unit 7)
- Weapons storage management (see Unit 18)
- Ammunition and explosives storage management (see
  Unit 19)
- Accounting for weapons (see Unit 14)
- Accounting for ammunition (see Unit 14)
- Transportation of weapons (see Unit 16)
- Transportation of ammunition (see Unit 17)
- Reporting and investigations of loss or theft
- Disposal of weapons (see Unit 20)
- Disposal of ammunition and explosives (see Unit 21).

**Materiel covered by the DDR WAM SOP**

United Nations peace operations are increasingly deployed in conflict
areas with mandates allowing for offensive military operations, during
which illicit weapons and ammunition are retrieved or confiscated.
The DDR WAM SOP should therefore clearly state which arms
and ammunition collection efforts are considered part of the DDR
process—and therefore covered by the SOP—and which are not.
Materiel collected by other mission components, such as weapons
seized from armed groups during military operations or recovered
from caches by United Nations troops or national forces, should be
explicitly excluded from the DDR WAM SOP and managed in line with
international standards and guidelines. The DDR WAM SOP should
refer to and be coherent with any other WAM SOPs adopted by the
mission.
Updating the DDR WAM SOP

The content of all SOPs must be kept up-to-date. The DDR Chief should appoint a DDR officer with an appropriate background to manage the process of reviewing and updating the DDR WAM SOP. The officer should keep the content of the SOP current by conducting periodic reviews and making amendments, as required.

Unqualified staff shall not handle any weapons or ammunition at any time.

REFERENCES FOR THIS UNIT

IDDRS 4.10 Disarmament
IDDRS 4.11 TWAM
UN Template SOP on WAM in DDR Processes (forthcoming)
Unit 5

Monitoring and evaluation of weapons and ammunition management activities

What are monitoring and evaluation?

Monitoring and evaluation involve tracking progress according to specific indicators and assessing the impact of interventions based on identified goals, objectives and accomplishments. They are a critical mechanism for determining whether a project or process is working as expected and, if not, identifying where changes in approach are required based on evidence. Although intrinsically linked, the primary differences between monitoring and evaluation are their scope and timing.

- **Monitoring** is a continuous process of gathering and analysing data to support programme management, track implementation progress and allow for regular reporting, with a particular focus on timelines, outputs, budgets, compliance with guidelines, etc.

- **Evaluation** is conducted at specific points in time—generally the mid- and end-points of a programme—and focuses more on building an assessment of the efficiency, performance and impact of a programme, as well as determining its added value to the general objectives of the mission. Evaluations can be performed internally or by external actors, including consultants, to ensure greater objectivity.

Why are monitoring and evaluation important?

Monitoring and evaluation are crucial to enabling effective implementation and management of DDR activities and ensuring accountability. Specifically, they allow for the following:
UNMAS WAM expert inspecting a DDR temporary weapons storage, Mali, 2018. (Photo credit: MINUSMA)
Assessing the progress of activities based on evidence
Improving the management process and timekeeping
Confirming that activities are conducted in line with guidelines and good practice
Adjusting programming based on findings and in line with the evolution of the context on the ground
Producing accurate and timely reporting to the host State, donors and other stakeholders
Objectively verifying the outcomes and impact of the overall programme in line with the core objectives of the mission’s mandate
Ensuring accountability for effective and efficient use of resources
Sharing lessons learned and building institutional memory.

When technical WAM activities are implemented as part of DDR by partners, including UNMAS or specialized subcontractors, the DDR section should request the partner(s) to monitor activities and provide relevant data and feedback on a regular basis. Evaluations of DDR WAM activities should preferably be conducted by DDR monitoring and evaluation staff or a third party rather than the implementing partner.

Planning monitoring and evaluation of DDR WAM activities

A suitable monitoring and evaluation system should be designed during the planning phase of the DDR process. Key factors to consider include the following:

- Deciding what change(s) to measure and how to measure them
- Fitting monitoring and evaluation systems to context
- Scheduling key activities
- Allocating suitable resources
- Assigning specific roles and responsibilities
- Establishing a baseline.
Monitoring and evaluation should involve and promote a participatory approach and involve a wide range of stakeholders within the context of an open and democratic process. Particular care should be given to eliciting the views of intended beneficiaries of any interventions, including those affected negatively by weapons misuse. This will require prior analysis of these target groups and of any particular needs and issues in terms of accessibility, inequality and structural disempowerment and marginalization, which necessitates special measures and tools to capture their views (see MOSAIC Module 4.40 on monitoring, evaluation and reporting).

In order to be gender-sensitive, the following shall be incorporated in monitoring and evaluation activities:

- Considering the different needs, positions and resources available to men and women to voice their concerns
- Seeking ways to involve both women and men in information/data collection and analysis
- Including both men and women in monitoring and evaluation teams
- Considering the gendered aspects of objectives and indicators used
- Including gender-sensitive indicators in monitoring and evaluation systems
- Using and producing sex- and age-disaggregated data and recommendations.

**Defining performance indicators for DDR WAM activities**

Standardized indicators should be identified early in the programme to allow for comparison over time and geography. The selection of indicators should be driven by the objectives of the programme, tailored to the local context and be gender-responsive. Indicators may be set at different levels, so as to measure activities, outputs, outcomes or final impacts.

Regarding WAM activities, the DDR monitoring and evaluation specialist should select a combination of quantitative and qualitative indicators.
Quantitative indicators could, for example, be developed in line with specific technical outputs, providing very clear measures and allowing for comparisons:

- Number of weapons and rounds of ammunition collected from men/women and recorded
- Number of items destroyed
- Number of items stolen or lost in the process
- Number of men/women killed or injured and human rights abuses by sex and age resulting from the use of weapons
- Armed criminality rates in the target area
- Local prices of weapons and ammunition.

Qualitative indicators to assess DDR WAM activities might include the following:

- The extent to which MOSAIC and IATG are adhered to
- Perceptions of security by women and men
- The perceived need for arms ownership for self-protection by men and women
- Visible prevalence of weapons among female and male community members

Monitoring and evaluation should also verify the following:

- Gender- and age-specific risks to men and women have been adequately and equitably addressed.
- Women and men participate in all aspects of the initiative—design, planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation.
- The benefits of the initiative are shared equally among men and women.

REFERENCES FOR THIS UNIT

- IDDRS 3.50 Monitoring and Evaluation
- IDDRS 4.10 Disarmament
- MOSAIC 04.40 Monitoring, Evaluation and Reporting
- MOSAIC 06.10 Women, Men and the Gendered Nature of SALW
Public information and strategic communication play a crucial role in the overall success of DDR processes. They are key support activities used to inform DDR participants, beneficiaries and other stakeholders of the process (public information) and to influence attitudes towards DDR (strategic communications) (see IDDRS 4.60 on public information).

There are four principal objectives of public information and strategic communication:

1. **Inform** by providing accurate information about the DDR process
2. **Mitigate** the potential negative impact of inaccurate and deceptive information that may hamper the success of DDR and wider peace efforts
3. **Sensitize** members of armed forces and groups, as well as communities, to the DDR process
4. **Transform** attitudes in communities in such a way that is conducive to DDR.

Dealing with arms and ammunition in conflict or post-conflict settings is a very sensitive matter. In addition to the risks associated with handling this materiel, the symbolic (and monetary) value of the items involved could make WAM operations, including disarmament and TWAM efforts, a significant challenge, with the potential for misinterpretation and negative coverage. Effective communications prior to and during DDR WAM operations is therefore key. Clear messaging about the outcomes is also imperative to ensure
transparency, increase public buy-in and secure support for the work of the mission. It is very important to pay attention to the manner in which DDR is spoken about. This includes the process of disarmament and the “surrender” of weapons, as well as the terms and expressions used with ex-combatants and persons formerly associated with armed forces and groups.

Communications efforts related to WAM should align with the DDR section’s strategy for public information and strategic communication designed in parallel with the national DDR strategy. The DDR communications strategy on WAM interventions should align with the mission’s broader communications policy. Efforts shall be made by DDR practitioners to ensure that key messages, communications material and information campaigns are gender-responsive, taking into account the need for tailored messaging that addresses the specific needs of women, men, girls and boys. Materials and messages should be pre-tested to ascertain their impact and reception before wider use and dissemination.

SRSG Martin Kobler addresses a ceremony in Goma to mark the destruction of weapons and ammunition collected during DDR, DRC, 2013. (Photo credit: MONUSCO)
Planning the strategy for public information and strategic communication for DDR WAM activities

DDR practitioners should take the following key factors into account:

- Who are the primary and intermediary target audiences?
- What behavioural/attitudinal change is the public information and strategic communication strategy trying to bring about?
- How can this change be achieved (taking into account literacy rates, the presence of different media, etc.)?
- What are the different networks involved in the dissemination of information? Which members of this network have the greatest degree of influence?
- What language does the information need to be delivered in (also taking into account possible foreign combatants)?
- What other organizations are involved in supporting DDR WAM activities and what are their public information and strategic communication strategies?
- How can the public information and strategic communication strategy be monitored?
- Where are disinformation and misinformation coming from?
- Who are the key local influencers/amplifiers?
- What dominant media technologies are in use locally and by what segments/demography of the population?

In order to ensure that the DDR public information and strategic communication strategy fits local needs, DDR practitioners should understand the social, political and cultural context and identify factors that shape attitudes towards weapons (see Unit 3). It will then be possible to define behavioural objectives and design messages to help bring about the social change that is required.

Media

Once the public information and strategic communication strategy is created, the resulting messages and activities can be channelled using the different media outlined below. The decision of which type of media to use should be based on a thorough analysis of the geographic availability of that media, as well as which form of media
best suits the content to be disseminated. Any combination of the following media can be used:

- Online and web presence
- Local, national, international radio stations
- Print media
- Visual media (TV, video, billboards)
- Interactive mechanisms (theatre, debates, seminars)
- Local town hall events
- Hotlines

With regard to WAM, such an approach could be used to achieve the following:

- Leveraging the influence communities may have on armed combatants to disarm
- Building awareness of the eligibility criteria related to the possession of weapons and ammunition and providing information on alternative options if individuals do not meet the criteria to enter a DDR programme. It is important to manage expectations.
- Warning communities of disarmament operations or destruction operations in their area to avoid exacerbating tensions
- Raising awareness in communities regarding the dangers related to the possession of weapons and ammunition, as well as focusing on particularly hazardous items (e.g., mines and grenades)
- Publicizing positive outcomes regarding DDR WAM efforts to increase the perception of security, encourage further buy-in for DDR projects and inform the population of efforts supported by the United Nations. This can include sharing data on the numbers of weapons and ammunition collected and destroyed, or other relevant indicators as required (see Unit 5). Such efforts can also involve the organization of a public weapons or ammunition destruction ceremony (see Unit 20).

REFERENCES FOR THIS UNIT

IDDRS 4.60 Public Information and Strategic Communication in Support of DDR
Weapons and Ammunition Management activities in DDR processes
Demobilization process begins in Anyama, outside Abidjan, Côte d'Ivoire, 2012. (UN Photo/Basile Zoma)
Planning disarmament

The overarching aim of the disarmament component of a DDR programme is to control and reduce arms, ammunition and explosives held by combatants before demobilization in order to build confidence in the peace process, increase security and prevent a return to conflict. This voluntary handover of weapons, ammunition and explosives is a highly symbolic act in sealing the end of armed conflict and in concluding an individual's active role as a combatant.

Conditions for disarmament should be discussed during peace negotiations and included in the peace agreement (see IDDRS 2.20 on the politics of DDR). The operational planning of disarmament should be framed in the national DDR strategy issued by the national authorities, which sets out all phases of the DDR programme from disarmament to reintegration.

Disarmament usually consists of four phases, set out in Table 1 below.

Table 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phase</th>
<th>Components</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Operational planning</td>
<td>Information collection, including weapons survey and gender-responsive context analysis (see Unit 3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Risk assessment (see Unit 3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Gender- and age-sensitive disarmament interventions (including child- and youth-specific DDR procedures)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Eligibility criteria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Standard operating procedures (see Unit 4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Disarmament team structure (that is gender-balanced and has gender expertise)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
When to implement disarmament operations?

The disarmament component is often the first stage of the entire DDR programme and shall not be designed in isolation from the rest of the programme. Disarmament as part of a DDR programme can be implemented in contexts where the preconditions for such programmes are present (see IDDRS 2.10 on the United Nations Approach to DDR). These preconditions include the following:

- A negotiated ceasefire and/or peace agreement
- Sufficient trust in the peace process
- The willingness of the parties to the armed conflict to engage in DDR
- A minimum guarantee of security.

Timelines for the implementation of the disarmament component of a DDR programme should be developed by taking the following factors into account:

- The provisions of the peace agreement or the ceasefire agreement
- The availability of accurate information about demographics, including sex and age, as well as the size of the armed forces and groups to be disarmed
- The location of the armed forces’ and groups’ units and the number, type and location of their weapons
The nature, processing capacity and location of mobile and static disarmament sites

The time it takes to process each ex-combatant or person formerly associated with an armed force or group (this could be anywhere from 15 to 20 minutes per person). The simulation exercise will help to determine how long individual weapons collection and accounting will take.

The minimum possible time should be taken to safely process combatants and persons associated with armed forces and groups through the disarmament and demobilization phases, and then integration back into the community. This swiftness is necessary to avoid a loss of momentum and to prevent former combatants and persons formerly associated with armed forces and groups from settling in temporary camps away from their communities.

National arms control efforts encompass more than just disarmament. Therefore, disarmament operations should be planned, sequenced and conducted in coordination with, and in support of, other conventional arms control measures, including small arms and light weapons control.

Operational planning

In order to effectively implement the disarmament component of a DDR programme, meticulous planning is required. Planning for disarmament operations includes the following:

- Information collection (see Unit 3)
- A risk assessment (see Unit 3)
- Identification of eligibility criteria
- The development of standard operating procedures (see Unit 4)
- The identification of the disarmament team structure
- A clear and realistic timetable for operations

It is essential to determine the capability needed to carry out disarmament operations, and then to compare this with the current capacity available to deliver it. Requests for further assistance from the United Nations mission’s military and police components shall be made as early as possible in the planning stage (see IDDRS 4.40
on United Nations military roles and responsibilities and IDDRS 4.50 on United Nations police roles and responsibilities). In non-mission settings, requests for capacity development assistance for disarmament operations may be directed to relevant United Nations entity/entities and national institutions.

**How to determine eligibility criteria for disarmament?**

Establishing rigorous, unambiguous and transparent criteria that allow people to participate in DDR programmes or pre-DDR is vital to achieving the objectives of DDR. Eligibility criteria must be carefully designed and agreed to by all parties, and screening processes must be in place in the disarmament stage. Eligibility for a DDR programme must be gender-inclusive and shall not discriminate based on age or sex.

Depending on the context, eligibility criteria for a DDR programme may or may not include specific weapons and ammunition-related criteria. Eligibility criteria for disarmament or pre-DDR generally include the following:

- **Age:** Over 18 (minors are dealt with separately\(^{11}\))
- **Status:** Proof that the combatant is a member of an armed group or force that has signed a peace agreement or is eligible for DDR activities (e.g., she/he knows how to handle a weapon and/or is recognized by a group commander)
- **Materiel to be handed over:** Combatants active in contexts where manufactured military weapons are mostly used should be required to hand over serviceable manufactured arms and/or ammunition. Hunting rifles and shotguns should be excluded to ensure that illicit military items are taken out of circulation. In those settings where non-military weapons are more prevalent, serviceable hunting rifles and shotguns, including craft weapons, can be permitted.

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\(^{11}\) As outlined in IDDRS 5.20 on children, eligibility for participants under 18 years old shall not be made conditional on the possession and handover of a weapon or ammunition. Instead, there shall be no conditions of any kind for the participation of children associated with armed forces and groups in child DDR which is a separate process from adult DDR. If there is doubt as to whether an individual is under 18 years old, an age assessment shall be conducted (see Annex B in IDDRS 5.20 on children and DDR).
Considerations for youth

DDR programmes are often implemented in contexts where the majority of former combatants are youth, an age group defined by the United Nations as those between 15 and 24 years of age (see IDDRS 5.30 on youth). Individuals within this age bracket have a unique set of needs and do not easily fit into pre-determined categories. Those under 18 are regarded as children associated with armed forces and armed groups and are treated as children (see IDDRS 5.20 on children and DDR). Those above the age of 18 are treated as adults in DDR processes despite the fact that, if recruited as children, their emotional, social and educational development may have been severely disrupted. Legally, youth up to the age of 18 are covered under the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child and other protective frameworks (see section 5 of IDDRS 5.20 on children and DDR). Youth who disarm when they are over the age of 18 fall under the same legal frameworks as adults, regardless of whether or not they were recruited as children.

Gender must be considered when working on youth engagement. Although an increasing number of young women and girls are involved in conflicts, young men and boys are still over-represented in armed forces and groups. This pattern is most often a result of societal gender expectations that value aggressive masculinity and peaceable femininity. Such societal expectations may have implications for the roles of young women and men in conflict, as well as how they may (re)integrate following conflict (see IDDRS 5.10 on gender and DDR).

How to determine arms- and ammunition-related eligibility criteria?

Based on a thorough understanding of the context and of the arsenals of armed groups and forces, eligibility criteria related to weapons and ammunition shall be consistent and stringent if effective disarmament is to be achieved. Failing this results in the inclusion of non-combatants and the collection of poor-quality materiel while serviceable materiel remains in circulation.
The integrated assessment and the weapons survey are key to determining relevant and effective eligibility criteria by identifying the following:

Profiles of combatants: Understanding age and gender composition of armed groups allows for better planning and support of vulnerable groups in accessing DDR programmes, including patterns of weapons possession among women combatants. Irrespective of whether they present themselves with a weapon, child combatants should be enrolled in the programme designed for minors.

Quality, type and quantities of materiel held by groups to be disarmed: This is key to determining the type and status (serviceable vs. non-serviceable) of materiel that a combatant should bring along in order to be enrolled in the programme. Depending on the setting, armed groups’ arsenals vary in size, quality and types of weapons.

Ownership of weapons: Depending on the context, groups could consider weapons as belonging to the unit or to individual fighters. This categorization could differ between types or size of weapons.

Weapons- and ammunition-related eligibility criteria include the following:

- Types of weapons or ammunition
- Quantity
- Status (serviceable vs. non-serviceable)
- Weapons procedure test.

According to the context, the ratio of arms and ammunition to individual combatants can vary and may include small arms and most light weapons, as well as heavy weapons and ammunition. An increasing number of armed groups in areas of conflict across the world use light and heavy weapons, including heavy artillery or armoured fighting vehicles. Dealing with heavy weapons presents both logistical and political challenges. In certain settings, heavy weapons could be included in the eligibility criteria for a DDR programme, and the ratio of arms to combatants could be determined based on the number of crew required to operate each

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12 For categories of major conventional arms, see United Nations Register of Conventional Arms, “Categories of major conventional arms”.
specific weapons system. However, while small arms and most light weapons are generally seen as an individual asset, heavy weapons are often considered a group asset and thus may not be surrendered during disarmament operations that focus on individual combatants and persons associated with armed forces and groups. To ensure comprehensive disarmament and avoid the exploitation of loopholes, peace negotiations and the national DDR programme should determine the procedures related to the arsenals of armed groups, including heavy weapons and/or caches of materiel.
Table 2
Example of the ratio of arms or ammunition per combatant in Mali

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Weapons system</th>
<th>No. of combatants given access to the programme</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Handgun or assault rifle</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rocket-propelled grenade (RPG)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Light machine gun</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60-mm mortar launcher</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>80/81/82-mm mortar</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>120-mm mortar</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>106-mm recoiless gun</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>155-mm Howitzer</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ammunition and explosives</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2 grenades</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 PG rocket</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>250 rounds of small arms and light weapons ammunition (any calibre)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Combatants may also need to take a weapons procedures test, which will identify their ability to handle weapons. Children with weapons should be disarmed but should not be required to take this test to be admitted to a DDR programme (see IDDRS 5.20 on children and DDR). Participants in DDR programmes may include individuals in support and non-combatant roles or those associated with armed forces and groups who may not be eligible for disarmament but will be eligible for demobilization and reintegration (see IDDRS 3.21 on participants, beneficiaries and partners). All weapons and ammunition brought by ineligible individuals as part of a disarmament operation shall be collected.

Historically, women who are eligible to participate in DDR programmes have not been aware of it or have been deprived of their weapons to the benefit of men seeking to enter the DDR programme. DDR practitioners should ensure proper sensitization with commanders and potential female participants.

Eligibility criteria should be communicated clearly to members of armed forces and groups, as well as the wider population. Legal implications should also be explained, for example that the
submission of weapons and ammunition will not result in prosecution for illegal possession (see Box 4 of IDDRS 4.10 and IDDRS 4.60 on public information in support of DDR).

Figure 2
Female eligibility criteria

How to select the best disarmament approach?

The planning of disarmament operations should be initiated at the peace negotiations stage when the appropriate modus operandi for disarming combatants and persons associated with armed forces and groups will be set out. The United Nations should support the national authorities in identifying the best disarmament approach. Mobile and static approaches have been developed to fit different contexts and constraints, and they can be combined to form a multi-strand approach.
The selection of the approach, or combination of approaches, should be based on the following:

- Findings from the integrated assessment and weapons survey
- Discussions and strategic planning by the national authorities
- Exchanges with leaders of armed forces and groups
- Risk assessment
- Gender analysis
- Financial resources.

**Static or site-based (cantonment) disarmament** uses specifically designed disarmament sites to carry out operations. These require detailed planning and considerable organization and rely on the coordination of a range of implementing partners. The establishment and management of disarmament sites should be specifically included in the peace agreement to ensure that former warring factions agree and are aware that they have a responsibility under the peace agreement to proceed to such sites. Depending on the disarmament plan, geographic and security constraints, combatants and persons associated with armed forces and groups can move directly to disarmament sites, or their transportation can be organized through pick-up points (see IDDRS 4.10 for more information on activities conducted at pick-up points).

**Mobile disarmament**, which usually consists of a group of modified road vehicles, has the advantage of decreased logistical outlay, increased flexibility, reduced cost, and rapid deployment and assembly. A mobile approach can be used when weapons are concentrated in a specific geographical area, when moving collected arms or when assembling scattered members of armed forces and groups would be difficult or trigger insecurity.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Methods</th>
<th>Advantages</th>
<th>Disadvantages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Static (cantonment)</td>
<td>Combatants and persons associated with armed forces and groups are in one location and therefore more easily controlled. Disarmament logistics easier to plan. Security easier to ensure for the DDR team and participants. An arms and ammunition storage facility can be created and kept on-site, which increases transparency over WAM. Infrastructure can be transformed afterwards to be used by communities (e.g., social centres).</td>
<td>Costly to construct and maintain, especially when taking into account the needs of special groups. Female combatants and women associated with armed forces and groups may experience security issues in cantonment. Risk of temporary camps becoming longer-term or even permanent if operations are delayed. Potential security risks for communities living close to camps and added pressure on local resources. Movements of armed combatants and persons associated with armed forces and groups require significant transportation logistics. Sites could become a target for armed violence.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mobile disarmament</td>
<td>Flexible approach. Limited movement of armed individuals who remain in their communities. Often more accessible to women, children, youth, elderly, persons with disabilities and persons with chronic illnesses. Limited movement of unsafe ammunition.</td>
<td>Requires several disarmament teams (see below) and significant logistics. Security more difficult to ensure for DDR teams, participants and beneficiaries. More dependent on the willingness of combatants and persons associated with armed forces and groups to participate in DDR. Transportation of collected weapons and ammunition requiring safety management and security by the force.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Notwithstanding the selection of the specific disarmament approach, all combatants and persons associated with armed forces and groups should be informed of the following:

- The time and date to report and the location to which to report
- Appropriate weapons and ammunition safety measures
- The activities involved and steps they will be asked to follow
- The level of the United Nations or military security to expect on arrival.

Participants of a pilot project on disarmament, demobilization, rehabilitation and reintegration (DDRR) for ex-combatants in the Central African Republic. (UN Photo/Herve Serefio)

REFERENCES FOR THIS UNIT

IDDRS 4.60 Public Information and Strategic Communication in Support of DDR
IDDRS 3.21 Participants, Beneficiaries and Partners
IDDRS 4.10 Disarmament
IDDRS 5.10 Women, Gender and DDR
IDDRS 5.20 Children and DDR
IDDRS 5.30 Youth and DDR
MOSAIC 2.30 SALW Control in the Context of DDR
UN Template SOP on WAM in DDR Processes (forthcoming)
Unit 8

Disarmament procedures

Prior to disarmament, combatants should be made aware of the location, security requirements and steps to complete the process. This can be done directly through group commanders or intermediaries such as community liaison officers. Particular care and attention must be given to inform children, youth and women about what they can expect to happen, including regarding alternatives to the DDR programme for non-eligible individuals.

Any movements of armed combatants or explosions in a conflict zone are likely to be interpreted as related to violence and may generate stress, tension and confusion. It is therefore critical that local communities are made aware of any planned disarmament operations and whether the destruction of ammunition is likely to take place (see Unit 6).

What constitutes a Disarmament Team?

The Disarmament Team is responsible for implementing all operational procedures for disarmament: physical verification of arms and ammunition, registering of materiel, issuance of disarmament cards/certificates, storage of materiel, and the destruction of unsafe ammunition and explosives.

A Disarmament Team, led by the DDR section, should include a gender-balanced composition:

- DDR practitioners
- A representative of the national DDR commission (and potentially other national institutions)
- An adequately sized technical support team from a specialized United Nations entity or non-governmental organization, including a team leader/WAM Technical Advisor (IMAS Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) Level 3), weapons inspectors to identify weapons and assess the safety of items, registration officers, store men/women and a medic
Military observers and representatives from the Protection Force

National security forces armament specialists (police, army and/or gendarmerie)

A representative from the mission’s component for child protection

A national gender specialist from the national authorities or civil society organizations

A national youth specialist from the national authorities or civil society organizations.

Depending on the provisions of the ceasefire and/or peace agreement and the national DDR policy document, commanders of armed groups may also be part of the Disarmament Team.

Disarmament teams should receive training on the DDR WAM standard operating procedures (SOPs) (see Annex 4) and be made fully aware of the chain of procedures involved in conducting disarmament operations, entering data into the registration database, and the types of arms and ammunition they are likely to deal with and their safe handling. Training should be designed by the DDR section with the support of WAM/EOD-qualified force representatives or a specialized United Nations entity or non-governmental organization. DDR practitioners and other personnel who are not arms and ammunition specialists should also attend the training to ensure that they fully understand the chain of operations and security procedures involved; however, unless qualified to do so, staff shall not handle weapons or ammunition at any stage. Before the launch of operations, a simulation exercise should be organized to test the planning phase and to support each stakeholder in understanding his or her role and responsibilities. The DDR section, the specialized United Nations entity and the military component should identify liaison officers to facilitate the implementation of disarmament operations.

In non-mission settings, the conduct and security of disarmament operations may rely on national security forces, joint commissions or teams, and national specialists with technical support from the relevant United Nations entity or entities, multilateral and bilateral partners. The United Nations and partners should support the organization of training for national disarmament teams to develop capacity.
Layout of the site

The exact layout of the site will depend on geographical considerations and the amount of real estate available. The layout of the site should be planned to enable ease of access for combatants while providing security for the staff operating the site. Separate collection and storage areas within the site shall be established for weapons and ammunition. Written approval on the disarmament site needs to be obtained by the national authorities. The following principles should be considered when constructing a disarmament site:

- The site must provide a secure area for the Disarmament Team to operate. This should include adequate fencing and barriers. In remote or mobile sites, security may be reliant solely upon the presence of force protection elements provided by the United Nations Peacekeeping Force and United Nations police. Additional support may be provided by the national security forces.

- As close as possible to the entrance, a loading and unloading bay shall be constructed to promote the safe handling of weapons.

- Secure storage shall be provided for weapons handed over by members of armed forces and groups. For mobile and remote sites, consideration should be given to how the recovered items will be transported to the permanent storage location pending disposal. Use of International Organization for Standardization containers may be appropriate and the numbers required should be calculated according to the anticipated quantity of weapons to be collected.

- Safe and secure storage shall be provided for ammunition and explosives handed over by members of armed forces and groups. Small arms ammunition of Hazard Division 1.4 may be stored no less than 100 m from working and/or accommodation sites. Ammunition and explosives of other Hazard Divisions should be stored according to the hazard and quantity received (see Annex 3). The WAM Technical Advisor shall identify the location and any protective measures that may be required.

- A demolition/burning area, for the destruction of any items of ammunition and explosives that are assessed to be...
unsafe for storage or transportation, shall be identified at a safe distance from all other activities. The WAM Technical Advisor will specify the location for this area, based upon the principles contained in Annex D of IATG 10.10.

Reception of weapons and ammunition

A disarmament SOP should state the step-by-step procedures for receiving weapons and ammunition, including identifying who has responsibility for each step and the gender-responsive provisions required. The SOP should also include a diagram of the disarmament site(s) (either mobile or static) (see Annex 6 for an example). Written approval on the disarmament site needs to be obtained by the national authorities. Procedures, to be adapted to the context, are generally as follows.

Before entering the disarmament site perimeter:

- Combatants should be treated with respect and courtesy when arriving at a holding area adjacent to the disarmament site. Firm and fair dealings with combatants can help build trust at a difficult and stressful time. A briefing on the disarmament process should be delivered to the combatants. Members of armed forces and groups should then be invited to commence the disarmament process one by one.
The individual is identified by his/her commander at the verification desk and physically checked by the designated security officials. Special measures will be required for children (see IDDRS 5.20 on children and DDR). Since both women and men will be checked, there should be male and female officers available from among United Nations military/DDR staff in mission settings and national security/DDR staff in non-mission settings.

If the individual is carrying ammunition or explosives that might present a threat, she/he will be asked to leave them outside the handover area, in a location identified by a WAM Technical Advisor/EOD specialist for inspection and, if required, disposal.

The individual is asked to enter the disarmament site with his/her weapons pointing towards the ground, the catch in the “safe” position and with fingers away from the triggering/firing mechanism.

After entering the perimeter:

The individual is directed to the unloading bay, where she/he will proceed with the clearing of his/her weapon under the instruction and supervision of a military observer or representative of the United Nations military component in mission settings or designated security official in a non-mission setting. If the individual is under 18 years old, child protection staff shall be present throughout the process.

Once the weapon has been cleared, it is handed over to a military observer or representative of the military component in a mission setting or designated security official in a non-mission setting, who will ensure that it is safe to handle and confirm that it meets the eligibility criteria. Consideration for serviceability includes the following factors:

- Is the weapon complete, including all its working parts (e.g., breech block, firing pin etc.)?
- Does the weapon appear to be well maintained? Is there corrosion inside the breech and/or barrel?
If the individual is also in possession of ammunition, she/he will be asked to place it in a separate pre-identified location, away from the weapons. A WAM Technical Advisor shall inspect the ammunition to ensure it is safe for handling, storage and transportation.

The materiel handed in is recorded by a DDR practitioner with guidance on weapons and ammunition identification from weapons and ammunition specialists, along with information on the individual concerned. Photographs should be taken of each weapon to aid identification and tracing. Photographs of ammunition should be taken by technical staff (see Unit 14).

The individual is provided with a receipt that proves he/she has handed in a weapon and/or ammunition. The receipt indicates the name of the individual, the date and location, the type, the calibre, the status (serviceable or not) and the serial number of the weapon.

Weapons are tagged with a code to facilitate storage, management and record-keeping throughout the disarmament process until disposal. Information on the tag should include the serial number, the date and the location of the reception.

Weapons and ammunition are stored separately or organized for transportation under the instructions and guidance of a WAM Technical Advisor. Ammunition presenting an immediate risk, or deemed unsafe for transport, shall be destroyed in situ by qualified EOD specialists.

**Processing heavy weapons and their ammunition**

Processing heavy weapons and their ammunition requires a high level of technical knowledge. Heavy weapons systems can be complex and require specialist expertise to ensure that systems are made safe, unloaded and all items of ammunition are safely separated from the platform. Conducting a thorough weapons survey is vital to ensure the correct expertise is made available (see Unit 3.2 on weapons survey). The United Nations DDR section in mission settings or United Nations lead entity/entities in non-mission settings should provide advice with regard to the collection, storage and disposal of heavy weapons, as well as support the development of any related SOPs.
Procedures regarding heavy weapons should be clearly communicated to armed forces and groups prior to any disarmament operations to avoid unorganized and unscheduled movements of heavy weapons that might foment further tensions among the population. Destruction of heavy weapons requires significant logistics; it is therefore critical to ensure the physical security of these weapons to reduce the risk of diversion.

**Spontaneous disarmament outside of official disarmament operations**

In some contexts, in order to encourage individuals to leave armed groups, a modus operandi for receiving individual combatants and persons associated with armed groups at any time may be established. This may include the identification of a network of reception points, such as DDR offices or peacekeeping camps, or the deployment of mobile disarmament units. Procedures should be communicated to authorities, members of armed groups and the wider community on a regular basis to ensure all are informed and sensitized (see Box 4 of IDDRS 4.10 and IDDRS 4.60 on public information and strategic communication in support of DDR).

In cases where peacekeeping camps are designated as reception points, the DDR section, in coordination with the military component and the battalion commander, should identify specific focal points within the camp to deal with combatants and persons associated with armed groups. These focal points should be trained in handling and disarming new arrivals, including taking gender-sensitive approaches with women and age-sensitive approaches with children, as well as registering and storing materiel until DDR practitioners take over. Unsafe items should be stored in a pre-identified or purpose-built area as advised by WAM Technical Advisors until specialized United Nations agency personnel or force EOD specialists can assess the safety of the items and recommend appropriate action.
REFERENCES FOR THIS UNIT

IDDRS 3.21 Participants, Beneficiaries and Partners
IDDRS 4.10 Disarmament
IDDRS 5.10 Women, Gender and DDR
IDDRS 5.20 Children and DDR
IDDRS 5.30 Youth and DDR
MOSAIC 2.30 SALW Control in the Context of DDR
UN Template SOP on WAM in DDR Processes (forthcoming)
Unit 9

Introduction to transitional weapons and ammunition management

Transitional weapons and ammunition management (TWAM) is a DDR-related tool and includes a series of interim arms control measures that can be implemented by DDR practitioners before, after and alongside DDR programmes. TWAM can also be implemented when the preconditions for a DDR programme are absent.

Figure 1
Menu of options for integrated DDR processes

The TWAM component of a DDR process is primarily aimed at reducing the capacity of individuals and groups to engage in armed violence and conflict. TWAM also aims to reduce accidents and save lives by addressing the immediate risks related to the possession of weapons, ammunition and explosives.

TWAM may be used in combination with other DDR-related tools, including programmes for community violence reduction, particularly
when these programmes include former combatants or individuals at risk of recruitment by armed groups (see IDDRS 2.30 on community violence reduction). Finally, TWAM may also be used in combination with activities that support the reintegration of former combatants and persons formerly associated with armed groups (see IDDRS 2.40 on reintegration as part of sustaining peace and 4.30 on reintegration).

While TWAM should always aim to remove or facilitate the legal registration of all weapons in circulation, the reality of weapons culture and the desire for self-protection and/or empowerment should be recognized, with transitional WAM options and objectives identified accordingly.

Table 4  
Typology of TWAM interventions

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<th>Potential activities</th>
<th>Context/Preconditions</th>
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<tr>
<td>Disarmament of ex-combatants when the preconditions for a DDR programme are not in place, including in support of reintegration as part of the sustaining peace approach</td>
<td>Collection, documentation, control and disposal of arms, ammunition and explosives voluntarily handed over by ex-combatants</td>
<td>Preconditions for a DDR programme are not in place</td>
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<tr>
<td>Support the improvement and implementation of national arms control legislation</td>
<td>Facilitate capacity building for national actors regarding international arms control policies, provisions and standards</td>
<td>Existing relevant legislation, including provisions for weapons ownership, reflecting regional and international legally binding instruments</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Activities to raise awareness of national legislation</td>
<td>Communities where former combatants and persons formerly associated with armed groups are returning</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Registration of weapons in compliance with national regulations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4  
Typology of TWAM interventions
| Limit/delay access to weapons and ammunition to prevent interpersonal armed violence and accidents | Raise awareness of the risks of keeping weapons in the home, including gender- and age-specific programmes |
| | Store arms and ammunition separately |
| | Install individual lockers at home |
| | Conduct activities on the safe and secure handling and temporary storage of weapons |
| | Disarmament is not an option |
| | Misuse of individually owned weapons and ammunition identified as a key concern by the community |
| | Communities where former combatants and persons formerly associated with armed groups are returning |

| Increase community oversight of weapons and ammunition ownership | Community-based storage facilities |
| | Support the development of basic WAM capacity |
| | Store explosives away from inhabited areas |
| | Community-based registration of firearms and ammunition: “registration first, collection later” type programmes |
| | Storage of heavy weapons and supporting platforms |
| | Creation of gun-free zones |
| | Armed groups are community-based |
| | Strong sense of mutual trust within the community |
| | Existence of commonly recognized and accepted authorities responsible for oversight |
| | The community does not feel threatened by immediate security or safety risk |

| Decrease the number of illicit weapons and ammunition in circulation | Collect and destroy surplus items (considered hazardous or obsolete) |
| | Encourage the community to hand over a certain quantity of weapons and ammunition as a precondition for benefiting from a community violence reduction programme (see Unit 12) |
| | Tie individual eligibility for community violence reduction to the handover of serviceable weapons |
| | Strong understanding of security issues and types of weapons and ammunition held by communities |
| | Close coordination with communities to identify the appropriate approach and focus for collection (types of weapons and ammunition, quantities, etc.) |
| | Communities where former combatants and persons formerly associated with armed groups are returning |
Support the development of national WAM capacity

Marking and record-keeping of weapons as an entry point for larger operations focusing on national arsenals

Build capacity on disposal, including the destruction of arms and ammunition

Renovate or construct new storage facilities for DDR materiel

Review/update national arms control legislation

Existing national small arms and light weapons or DDR mechanisms to coordinate efforts, with the possibility also for regional cooperation, as appropriate

Need to be in line with national arms control policy and strategy

Need to be in line with regional and international regulatory frameworks (see the section entitled “Normative framework”), and guidance (IATG and MOSAIC)

Communities where former combatants and persons formerly associated with armed groups are returning

Efforts focused solely on weapons, ammunition and explosives are proven to have a limited impact on improving stability. Therefore, DDR practitioners should seek to address other conflict drivers in parallel, for example, through the use of DDR-related tools such as DDR support to mediation, pre-DDR, community violence reduction or DDR support to transitional security arrangements.

How to ensure gender- and age-responsive TWAM?

DDR practitioners should involve women, men, girls and boys from affected communities in the planning, design, implementation, and monitoring and evaluation phases of TWAM. These different groups can play an instrumental role, including through encouraging family, community members and members of armed forces and groups to participate. Women can, for example, contribute to raising awareness of the risks associated with weapons ownership and ensure that rules adopted by the community, in terms of weapons control, are effective and enforced. As the owners and users of weapons, ammunition and explosives are predominantly men, in particular young men, communication and outreach efforts should focus on dissociating arms ownership from notions of power, protection, status and masculinity.
To ensure that TWAM is gender- and age-responsive, DDR practitioners should focus on the following areas of strategic importance:

- Involving both men and women at all stages of TWAM, as well as children and youth, where appropriate
- Collecting sex- and age-disaggregated data and gender and age analysis as a baseline for understanding challenges and needs (for detailed guidance on this, see the Office for Disarmament Affairs’ Training Manual on gender-mainstreaming Small arms control (forthcoming))
- Measuring progress through the development of age- and gender-sensitive indicators
- Enhancing gender competence and commitment to gender equality among programme staff and national partners, including the national DDR commission and other relevant bodies
- Ensuring organizational structures, workflows and knowledge management are responsive to different environments
- Working with partners—including networks and organizations for women, men and youth—to strengthen both age and gender responsiveness
- Establishing gender- and age-sensitive programme monitoring and evaluation frameworks.\(^\text{13}\)

REFERENCES FOR THIS UNIT

| IDDRS 2.10 | The UN Approach to DDR |
| IDDRS 4.11 | TWAM |
| IDDRS 5.10 | Women, Gender and DDR |
| IDDRS 5.30 | Youth and DDR |
| MOSAIC 2.30 | SALW Control in the Context of DDR |

\(^{13}\) Specific guidance can be found in IDDRS 5.10 on women, gender and DDR, as well as in MOSAIC Module 06.10 on women, men and the gendered nature of small arms and light weapons, and MOSAIC Module 06.20 on children, adolescents, youth and small arms and light weapons.
Unit 10

Transitional weapons and ammunition management and DDR support to mediation

What is DDR support to mediation?

DDR practitioners—as members of mediation support teams or mission staff in an advisory role to the Special Representative to the Secretary-General, the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General or Special Envoys—can provide advice on how to engage with armed forces and groups on DDR issues and contribute to the attainment of agreements. In non-mission settings, the United Nations peace and development advisers deployed to the office of the United Nations Resident Coordinator play a key role in advising the Resident Coordinator and the Government on how to engage and address armed groups. DDR practitioners assigned to United Nations mediation support teams may also draft DDR provisions of ceasefires, local peace agreements and comprehensive peace agreements, as well as make proposals on the design and implementation of DDR processes.

When can DDR support to mediation be implemented?

This DDR-related tool can be implemented whenever mediation processes or peace negotiations are initiated towards a ceasefire or peace agreement. It can be applied alongside pre-DDR, community violence reduction, TWAM and DDR support to transitional security arrangements, particularly in the following situations:

- The national authorities and the United Nations are working towards the preconditions for DDR programmes (i.e., when peace negotiations are ongoing).
- Non-signatory armed groups are present in settings where other groups are participating in a DDR programme.
Armed groups lose trust in a peace agreement or renege on the terms related to DDR.

For more guidance on how DDR practitioners can support mediation processes, see IDDRS Module 2.20 on the politics of DDR and IDDRS Module 6.20 on DDR and transitional justice.

**TWAM and DDR support to mediation**

TWAM in support of peace mediation efforts should ensure the following:

- That disarmament/WAM aspects are appropriately addressed in negotiations
- That related provisions are implementable and in line with international arms control standards and guidelines, including relevant regional instruments.

This would contribute to achieving the following:

- Enhancing overall weapons control and reducing armed violence
- Building confidence in the process

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A delegation of the Democratic Republic of Congo negotiates with Ituri militia groups on the disarmament of combatants and their integration in the government armed forces, 2006. (UN Photo/Martine Perret)
Generating a better understanding of the weapons arsenals of armed forces and groups

Preparing the ground for the transfer of responsibility for WAM later in the DDR process either to the United Nations or to the national authorities.

Disarmament can be associated with defeat and a significant shift in the balance of power, as well as the removal of a key bargaining chip for well-equipped armed groups. Disarmament can also be perceived as the removal of symbols of masculinity, protection and power. Pushing for disarmament while guarantees around security, justice or integration into the security sector are lacking will have limited effectiveness and may undermine the overall DDR process. The use of TWAM concepts, measures and terminology provides a solution to this issue and lays the ground for more realistic arms control provisions in peace agreements.

TWAM can also be the first step towards more comprehensive arms control, paving the way for full disarmament once the context has matured. Mediators and DDR practitioners supporting the mediation process should have strong DDR and WAM knowledge or at least have access to expertise that can guide them in designing appropriate and evidence-based DDR-related transitional WAM provisions. TWAM as part of community violence reduction and pre-DDR can also enable relevant parties to engage more confidently in negotiations as they maintain ownership of and access to their materiel. Finally, in instances where relationships between negotiating parties break down or peace talks are derailed, TWAM and other DDR-related tools can be used as confidence-building measures and offer entry points for the resumption of negotiations.
Disarmament/WAM related provisions can be found in the DDR sections of various peace and ceasefire agreements, such as the following: the Peace Accords for Angola (1991); the Ceasefire Agreement between the Transitional Government of Burundi and the Conseil national pour la défense de la démocratie-Forces pour la Défense de la démocratie (2002); the Final Act of the Paris Conference in Cambodia (1991); the Final Agreement for Ending the Conflict and Building a Stable and Lasting Peace in Colombia (2016); the Peace Agreement between the Government of El Salvador and the Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional (1992); the Juba Agreement for Peace in the Sudan (2020); the Comprehensive Peace Agreement Between the Government of Liberia and the Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) and the Movement for Democracy in Liberia (Model) and Political Parties (2003); the Libyan Political Agreement (2015); the Comprehensive Peace Agreement between the Government of Nepal and the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) (2006); the Zinguinchor Peace Agreement between the Government of Senegal and MFDC\textsuperscript{14} (2004); and the Uganda Peace Talks Agreement for the Restoration of Peace to the Sovereign State of the Republic of Uganda (1985).

\textsuperscript{14} Movement of the Democratic Forces of Casamance.
Unit 11

Transitional weapons and ammunition management and pre-DDR

What is pre-DDR?

Pre-DDR is an interim, time-limited stabilization mechanism aimed at creating the necessary political and security conditions to facilitate the negotiation and/or implementation of peace agreements and pave the way towards a full DDR programme. Activities can include the following:

- Engaging combatants in labour-intensive projects focusing on improving community assets with immediate incentives (e.g., cash for work)
- Vocational training in line with local economic dynamics
- Awareness-raising activities around reconciliation, the upcoming DDR programmes or risks related to the possession of arms at home.

Pre-DDR was first implemented in the Central African Republic in 2015 where the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic introduced pre-DDR operations as an interim measure aimed to ensure stability during the electoral period and maintain dialogue between the Government and armed groups. Pre-DDR activities were designed to stabilize communities by engaging combatants in income-generating activities, decrease insecurity, support social cohesion and lay the foundations for the DDR programme.
Who can participate in pre-DDR?

Pre-DDR is designed for those who are eligible for a national DDR programme. The eligibility criteria for both DDR and pre-DDR will therefore be the same and could require individuals, among other things, to prove that they have combatant status and are in possession of a serviceable manufactured weapon or a certain quantity of ammunition (see Unit 7). The eligibility criteria shall be gender-responsive and not discriminate against women. Depending on the specific circumstances, individuals who do not meet the eligibility criteria could be enrolled in a community violence reduction programme (see Unit 12). Pre-DDR is most likely to be implemented in mission settings.

When can pre-DDR be implemented?

Pre-DDR is a DDR-related tool that can be implemented when the preconditions for a DDR programme are present, but the actual implementation of a national DDR programme is delayed. It is an interim initiative and should be limited in time. The DDR programme should be initiated as rapidly as possible to take advantage of the momentum and to avoid a relapse into violence.

Symbolic destruction of weapons collected during pre-DDR in CAR, 2018. (Photo credit: MINUSMA)
What does pre-DDR consist of?

Depending on the context, pre-DDR can include the handing over of weapons and ammunition by members of armed groups and armed forces. In order to avoid confusion, this phase could be named “Pre-disarmament” rather than “Disarmament”, which will take place at a point in the future.

Pre-disarmament involves collecting, registering and storing materiel in a safe location. Depending on the context and agreements in place with armed forces and groups, pre-disarmament could focus on certain types of materiel, including larger crew-operated systems in contexts where warring parties are very well equipped.

Handovers can be either of the following:

- **Temporary**: Materiel is recorded and stored properly but remains under the joint control of armed forces, armed groups and the United Nations through a dual-key system with well-established roles and procedures.
- **Permanent**: Materiel is handed over, registered and ultimately disposed of (see Units 7, 14 and 20).

In both cases, unsafe ammunition shall be destroyed, and all activities must be carried out in full transparency and with respect for safety and security procedures during the destruction process.

Pre-disarmament should accomplish the following:

- Build and strengthen the confidence of armed forces, armed groups and the civilian population in any future disarmament process and the wider DDR programme
- Reduce the circulation and visibility of weapons and ammunition
- Contribute to improved perceptions of peace and security
- Raise awareness about the dangers of illicit weapons and ammunition
- Build knowledge of armed groups’ arsenals
- Allow DDR practitioners to identify and mitigate risks that may arise during the disarmament component of the future DDR programme
• Encourage members of armed groups, with consent of their leadership, to voluntarily disarm in view of a full DDR programme.

REFERENCES FOR THIS UNIT

IDDRS 2.10 The UN Approach to DDR
IDDRS 2.20 The Politics of DDR
IDDRS 4.10 Disarmament
IDDRS 4.11 TWAM
MOSAIC 2.30 SALW Control in the Context of DDR
Unit 12

Transitional weapons and ammunition management and community violence reduction

What is community violence reduction?

Community violence reduction (CVR) is a DDR-related tool that directly responds to the presence of active and/or former members of armed groups in communities. It is designed to promote security and stability in both mission and non-mission contexts. CVR programmes are typically short- to medium-term interventions and are intended as a bottom-up measure that should be crafted at the local level. CVR encompasses a range of activities—from labour-intensive projects to business incubation and community dialogue forums—directly engaging with former members of armed forces and groups and children and youth at risk to prevent further recruitment. CVR also presents an opportunity to rebalance unequal gender relations at the community level and can therefore be part of a gender-transformative approach to DDR.

By tackling the drivers of armed violence and improving perceptions of security, CVR programmes can have a direct impact on the demand for and misuse of weapons, as well as on the creation of favourable conditions for future disarmament initiatives.
The concept of CVR was developed in Haiti in 2006 as an alternative to DDR. It was focused on gang-related violence and specifically on at-risk youth and households in hot spots neighbourhoods of Port-au-Prince. Through providing alternatives to criminality and unemployment, CVR has clearly contributed to the reduction of violence in targeted communities. It has emerged as a second programmatic pillar of DDR and is now included in the mandate of numerous United Nations missions.

When to implement CVR?

In situations where the preconditions for a DDR programme exist, CVR may be pursued before, during or after a DDR programme. CVR may also be implemented when the preconditions for a DDR programme are absent. In this context, it can contribute to security and stabilization and create more conducive environments for national and local peace processes. CVR requires pre-activity analysis and continuous monitoring, evaluation and adjustments. It can be used in both mission and non-mission settings.

After disarming voluntarily, ex-combatants will attend professional and technical training as part of CVR, Bangui, 2018. (Photo credit: SCIP/UN-MINUSCA/Leonel Grothe)
Who are the beneficiaries?

The target groups for CVR may vary according to the context; however, the following four categories are especially relevant:

1. Former combatants who are part of an existing United Nations-supported or national DDR programme and are waiting for reintegration support
2. Members voluntarily leaving armed groups who are not formally eligible for a DDR programme because their group is not a signatory to a peace agreement
3. Individuals who are not members of an armed group but who are at risk of recruitment by such groups
4. Designated communities that are susceptible to outbreaks of violence, close to cantonment sites, or likely to receive newly reinserted and reintegrated former combatants.

Eligibility criteria for CVR should be developed in consultation with target communities and communicated in the most transparent manner.

TWAM and CVR

When CVR targets members of armed groups who are not formally eligible for a DDR programme, because their group is not a signatory to a peace agreement, or in the absence of a DDR programme, individual eligibility for CVR may be tied to the handover of serviceable weapons. TWAM and potential CVR arms-related eligibility criteria should be set in line with the disarmament component of a DDR programme, if applicable, as well as other national arms control initiatives. If weapons and ammunition collection as part of a CVR programme is conducted at the same time as the disarmament component of a DDR programme, it is critical that these activities are strategically sequenced and that a robust public awareness strategy based on clear messaging accompanies these efforts.

At the community level, although the surrender of weapons need not always be a precondition for participation in a CVR programme, one approach may be to make participation conditional on voluntary community collection efforts. The full WAM cycle should be transparent and accountable from collection through to disposal.
Weapons and ammunition collected during CVR should be destroyed (for more information on disposal, see IDDRS 4.10 on disarmament).

When collecting weapons is not possible, encouraging communities to control their weapons, ammunition and explosives—for example through awareness-raising campaigns, registration and the development of community storage facilities—can help reduce the risk of incidents and accidents involving weapons and ammunition. Such activities can also mitigate the use of weapons in interpersonal disputes and intimate partner violence against women. The willingness of community members to surrender or restrict immediate access to weapons, ammunition and explosives will depend greatly on perceptions of security, the existence of internal or external security threats, the quality of formal security provisions and the absence of criminal prosecution for illicit arms possession.

When CVR programmes target communities susceptible to outbreaks of violence and where the possession of arms and ammunition is perceived to be a primary security concern, DDR practitioners could consider including community arms control components in the project such as the following:

- Collection of unwanted or hazardous weapons and ammunition
- Development of a basic weapons-management capacity in the community
- Registration of weapons by local authorities in accordance with national legislation
- Creation of gun-free zones to normalize the absence of gun carriage (starting with hospitals, schools and other public places)
- Awareness-raising activities regarding the following:
  - The risks associated with the possession of arms and ammunition
  - Participation in weapons-collection programmes, including DDR collections
  - Awareness-raising activities regarding national laws relating to weapons and ammunition ownership.
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Unit 13

Transitional weapons and ammunition management and DDR support to transitional security arrangements

What is DDR support to transitional security arrangements?

Transitional security arrangements is a DDR-related tool geared towards security-related confidence-building measures as part of ongoing negotiations, ceasefire or peace agreements. Transitional security arrangements vary in scope depending on the context, levels of trust and what might be acceptable to the parties involved (see IDDRS 2.20 on the politics of DDR for more information). Options that might be considered include the following:

- Acceptable third-party actor(s) who are able to secure the process
- Joint units, patrols or operations involving the parties to a conflict, often alongside a third-party presence
- Local security actors such as community police who are acceptable to the communities and the actors, as they are considered neutral and not a force brought in from outside
- Deployment of national police. Depending on the situation, this may have to occur with prior consent for any operations within a zone or be done alongside a third-party actor.

DDR practitioners are advised to consult extensively with women on the design of security arrangements that seek to address or prevent sexual and gender-based violence and to gain their support for any future disarmament.
When is DDR support to transitional security arrangements implemented?

Transitional security arrangements may be implemented during peace negotiations when working towards the preconditions for a DDR programme. This transition phase is vital for building confidence at a time when warring parties may be losing their military capacity and their ability to defend themselves. DDR support to transitional security arrangements can be conducted alongside pre-DDR, community violence reduction, TWAM and DDR mediation support, and usually in mission contexts. Transitional security arrangements are often designed to facilitate the integration of ex-combatants into the national security sector in line with relevant conflict resolution frameworks.

How to combine TWAM and DDR support to transitional security arrangements?

The management of the weapons and ammunition used by joint patrols/units or local security actors such as community police shall be governed by a clear legal framework and will require a robust plan agreed by all actors. This plan shall also be underpinned by detailed standard operating procedures for conducting activities and identifying precise responsibilities. All relevant actors shall abide by such procedures (see Unit 4), which should also include guidance on how to handle arms and ammunition captured, collected or found during operations.

With regard to joint units/patrols and depending on the context and the positions of stakeholders, members of armed forces and groups will likely be disarmed and demobilized or may retain use of their own arms and ammunition, which should be recorded and safely and securely stored when not in use.

Such initiatives can contribute to the following goals:

- Improving levels of constructive engagement with armed groups
- Building trust between armed groups and the Government
- Preparing the ground for the integration of former combatants into the national security sector
Developing a security context that is increasingly conducive to a future DDR programme

Providing employment and incentives to combatants

Safely storing and managing weapons belonging to armed groups, including through joint control by the armed group, national forces and the United Nations, using a dual key system, for example

Contributing to an assessment of the size and nature of armed groups’ arsenals.

In some contexts, the implementation of transitional security arrangements may involve direct support to the WAM capacity of national security forces, as well as non-State armed actors, including armed groups or local security actors. DDR practitioners should exercise extreme caution when supporting WAM capacity of such actors, as this support carries certain risks and may inadvertently reinforce the fighting capacity of non-State armed actors, legitimize their status and tarnish the United Nations’ reputation, all of which could threaten wider DDR objectives. As a result, any decision to support the development of non-State armed actors’ WAM capacity shall consider the following:

Registration of mixed patrols by signatories, Operational Coordination Mechanism, Gao, Mali, 2016. (Photo credit: MINUSMA)
This approach must align with the broader DDR strategy agreed with and approved by national authorities as an integral part of a peace process or an alternative conflict resolution strategy.

This approach must be in line with the overall United Nations mission mandate and objectives of the United Nations mission (if a United Nations mission has been established).

Engagement with armed groups shall follow United Nations policy on this matter (i.e., the United Nations mission policy, including standard operating procedures on engagement with armed groups where they have been adopted; the United Nations’ Aide Memoire: Engaging with Non-State Armed Groups for Political Purposes (see its Annex B); and the United Nations Human Rights Due Diligence Policy).

This approach shall be informed by a robust risk assessment and be accompanied by appropriate and effective risk mitigation measures.

If all of the above conditions are fulfilled, DDR support to WAM capacity-building for non-State armed actors may include storing ammunition stockpiles away from inhabited areas and in line with the IATG, destroying hazardous ammunition and explosives as identified by armed groups, and providing basic stockpile management advice, support and solutions.

In Mali, the “Mécanisme opérationnel de coordination” (MOC) was established in 2015 following the signing of the Peace Accord to facilitate the implementation of the transitional security arrangements, in particular the deployment of mixed patrols comprising elements of the signatory armed movement and the soldiers from the Malian Defence and Security Forces (MDSF). These mixed patrols were deployed to key locations such as Gao, Kidal, Mopti and Timbuktu to provide security to the cantonment process and the deployment of the interim local authorities. The key objective of the MOC was to serve as a confidence-building mechanism to
enhance trust between signatory movements and the MDSF elements. In 2018, it was decided to facilitate the redeployment of the so-called “reconstituted units” to the northern part of Mali, though the implementation of the first phase of the Accelerated DDR and Integration process for elements of the MOC. As of January 2021, over 1,700 MOC elements were disarmed, demobilized and integrated into the reconstituted units of the Malian Defence and Security Forces, which are currently deployed in Gao, Kidal, Mopti, Ménaka and Timbuktu. In 2020, the redeployment of the “reconstituted units”, composed of personnel from the MDSF and individuals from non-State armed movements that have been disarmed, demobilized and integrated into the national security apparatus represented an essential step towards the restoration of State authority and security in northern Mali. The DDR section of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali has been supporting this arrangement, including through the provision of logistical support for the registration and safe storage of weapons of integrated elements. This redeployment of national forces will allow the United Nations Mission to hand over security of the cantonment sites, which will be used for the national DDR programme.

REFERENCES FOR THIS UNIT

IDDRS 2.20 The Politics of DDR
IDDRS 4.10 Disarmament
IDDRS 4.11 TWAM
IDDRS 6.10 DDR and Security Sector Reform
3 DDR weapons and ammunition management cross-technical guidelines
Weapons laid down by the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia are taken from storage for deactivation as part of the peace agreement with the Government, 2017. (UN Photo/Renata Ruiz)
The following technical guidelines aim to introduce DDR practitioners to the technical requirements associated with conducting DDR WAM activities so they can effectively and safely design and implement such activities in line with international WAM guidelines and standards. This technical guidance is to be implemented with the support of WAM Technical Advisors and is not intended to transform non-specialists into WAM experts. Nevertheless, equipping DDR officers with an understanding of the basic principles of DDR WAM will better enable them to identify skills gaps, recruit WAM Policy Officers and Technical Advisor early on in the process and support them more effectively.
Unit 14

Accounting for weapons and ammunition in DDR processes

Accounting for weapons, ammunition and explosives is critical to the effective management of this materiel, to ensure the transparency of the DDR process, and to monitor activities and prevent diversion. Information management systems used by DDR sections and the lead United Nations agency/agencies supporting national authorities for registering combatants and accounting for weapons should provide sufficient information to allow for precise identification and tracking of the movement of materiel from the point of collection to the point of disposal. In order to support effective recording, close-up and full-frame photographs should be taken of each item of materiel wherever possible.

UNMAS officer identifies a handgun collected during DDR, Mali, 2018. (Photo credit: MINUSMA)
How to manage information?

The DDR section in peacekeeping operations should implement an information management system appropriate to the infrastructure available within the region of operations. The ideal solution is a fully networked system that will immediately update records as new data are entered, but this will not be possible in many cases. In such cases, a more basic system may be necessary, incorporating both handwritten records and a basic form of a database or simple computer spreadsheets. A standard operating procedure should underpin the accounting efforts of the DDR section and detailed related procedures (see the United Nations Template Standard Operating Procedure on WAM in DDR Processes (forthcoming)).

DDR sections and the lead United Nations entity/entities should dedicate appropriate resources to the development and ongoing maintenance of this database and consider the establishment of a more comprehensive and permanent information management system, especially for operations that foresee the collection of thousands of weapons and ammunition. The issue of ownership of data—whether by the United Nations, the national authorities or both—should be addressed ahead of the launch of operations, taking into consideration any potential impact or risk for individuals whose data is collected throughout the process.

What information should be recorded?

For each weapon, the following information should be recorded:

- Make
- Model
- Calibre
- Serial number
- Country of manufacture (or most recent import if the weapon bears an import mark)
- Year of manufacture
- Other markings, including their location on the weapon (barrel, slide, etc.)
- Name or information management system registration number of combatant
- Armed group of origin (if relevant)
- Location of collection
- Storage code or location
- DDR tag number (see Unit 14)
- Transfers (dates, new custodian)
- Destruction (date, location, method, entity who conducted the destruction, entity who verified destruction).

For each item of ammunition or explosive materiel, the following information should be recorded:
- Category
- Type
- Quantity
- Calibre (if relevant)
- Headstamp markings for small arms and machine gun ammunition
- Lot and batch number
- Manufacturer
- Country of origin
- Condition
- Name or information management system registration number of combatant
- Armed group of origin (if relevant)
- Location of collection
- Storage code or location
- Transfers (dates, new custodian)
- Destruction (date, location, method, entities who conducted and verified destruction).

**Maintaining the database**

In order to ensure the accuracy and the quality of the database, the DDR section should dedicate appropriate resources to its development and ongoing maintenance. DDR officers in charge
at mission headquarters and regional levels should be clearly designated and thorough handovers completed to ensure continuity. A DDR officer with WAM experience, including weapons and ammunition identification skills, should be responsible for developing the tool, maintaining the central database and verifying data provided by the regional bureaux. In situations where DDR officers do not have the required skills to identify weapons and ammunition accurately, training or identification support should be offered by UNMAS or other adequate specialists.

UNMAS or specialized subcontractors may develop their own separate registration tools to manage their operations. Nonetheless, the DDR section should still pursue its own registration efforts since these supplementary databases may capture a different set of data, and technical partners such as UNMAS are not necessarily operational throughout the full DDR mandate of the mission, nor do they cover the full spectrum of locations.

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<th>SER NO</th>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>CALIB</th>
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<td>Kalashnikov</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Records of weapons handed-in by ex-combatants, Mali, 2018. (Photo credit: MINUSMA)
Sharing the data

Depending on each host country’s DDR legal framework, data collected may belong to the national authorities. To the greatest extent possible, the DDR section should also share all relevant data with the Joint Mission Analysis Centre and the United Nations panels of experts in countries under embargo to allow for the tracing of materiel (see Unit 15), as well as with the United Nations police, as required.

Effective photography

Data input is subject to human error and mistakes can be made. In order to support effective registration, close-up and full-frame photographs should be taken of each piece of materiel wherever possible (see Annex 5). At a minimum, these should include the serial number and any significant markings of a weapon (see Unit 15), as well as a clear image of the headstamp or lot/batch number of any ammunition.

It is difficult to include large quantities of images in an Excel spreadsheet; however, photographs of the items taken during disarmament operations should be kept on file and clearly referenced, including, for example, the serial number of the weapon and its DDR tag number (see Unit 14).

REFERENCES FOR THIS UNIT

MOSAIC 05.30 Marking and Recordkeeping
UN Template SOP on WAM in DDR Processes (forthcoming)
Unit 15

DDR weapons and marking

In accordance with international obligations, weapons are usually marked at the point of manufacture with information that allows them to be uniquely identified (e.g., serial number, make/model identifier, calibre, etc.). Weapons should also be marked at the time of import, at the time of transfer from government stocks to permanent civilian use, deactivation or permanent confiscation by the State.

Why are markings important to DDR WAM?

Markings are essential for record-keeping and the tracking of materiel. Weapons that do not bear any marking shall be marked or destroyed. Markings also contribute to deterring diversion during the DDR process by rendering the weapons identifiable and increasing the likelihood of illicit transfers being uncovered.

In addition, markings allow for identifying the origin and specific points throughout the life cycle of the weapon (e.g., country of manufacture or most recent import, international transfers, changes in ownership, etc.), as well as the illicit weapon’s point of diversion from the licit to the illicit market (see Box 3 on tracing).

Markings found on DDR weapons may include some or all of the following:

- A symbol or International Organization for Standardization code identifying the country of manufacture (see list of codes)
- An alphanumeric serial number (which is unique to the manufacturer for that model of weapon)
- Make/name of manufacturer
- Model of weapon
- Calibre of weapon
- Country of import
- Year of import.
Should DDR weapons be marked?

There are several instances where national authorities and United Nations DDR practitioners may decide to mark weapons collected or accounted for during DDR activities. The following should be taken into consideration.

*Marking collected DDR weapons to be destroyed*

Marking materiel destined for destruction is generally considered unnecessary and expensive. It can also delay the destruction of weapons, thereby increasing the risk of diversion. However, in previous DDR programmes, diversion has occurred between the disarmament and the destruction phases. To prevent this, it is necessary to ensure that the destruction of weapons is verified by an entity that is independent of the entity that carries out the destruction.

If the DDR section believes that destruction verification procedures are not sufficient to detect theft and diversion, a simple marking could be applied to the weapons (e.g., “D” for destruction, the International Organization for Standardization code of the country in which the destruction is to be carried out and the year.

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of destruction). If a weapon destined for destruction is subsequently found, either in the same country or a different one, it will be possible to identify its point of diversion.

**Marking DDR weapons to be incorporated into national stocks**

While destruction shall be the preferred method of disposal of weapons and ammunition collected through DDR (see Unit 20), national authorities sometimes decide to incorporate serviceable DDR weapons into national stockpiles. The DDR section should seek the advice of the United Nations mission’s legal officers prior to any such transfers (see Unit 20).

If transfers proceed, it is essential to ensure that such weapons are properly marked. In addition to markings made at the time of manufacture, the following markings should be applied to weapons to be incorporated into national stocks:

- A marking selected by the authorities to identify that the weapon was collected during a DDR process (e.g., “DDR”)
- International Organization for Standardization country code of the confiscating State
- Year of confiscation.

On weapons that do not bear a serial number or that have had it altered or removed, a serial number unique in relation to the points above should also be applied or the item should be destroyed.

Additional markings that national authorities usually apply to government weapons shall also be applied to DDR weapons incorporated into national stocks. Depending on which regional instruments have been ratified (e.g., Economic Community of West African States Convention) and each State’s own legislation, this might include the following:

- Economic Community of West African States logo
- Name of security agency using the weapon.

Markings should have the following characteristics:

- Positioned on a flat, exposed surface on the frame or receiver
- Conspicuous
- Easily readable
- Durable
- Recoverable (as far as technically possible).

**Marking and registering weapons as part of TWAM interventions**

The marking and registration of weapons represent a first step towards weapons control and the promotion of responsible ownership in contexts where disarmament or collections of weapons is not possible. This might be because the pre-conditions for a DDR programme are not in place (e.g., no peace agreement), or security guarantees are insufficient for communities to lay down their weapons. Marking and recording, including possible information related to the owner, could pave the way for further control measures, including future weapons collection or legalization through licensing.\(^{16}\)

**Box 3**

**Tracing weapons**

Although tracing is not a DDR activity, DDR practitioners need to understand why it is important and what it entails. Tracing is the systematic tracking of illicit weapons found or seized on the territory of a State from the point of manufacture or most recent legal import, through the lines of supply, to the point at which they became illicit.

Weapons recovered in a breach or suspected breach of national and/or international law should be traced to identify the point in the transfer chain at which they entered the illicit market.

Tracing efforts have developed over the past 10 years and are now supported by the International Tracing Instrument (see the section entitled “Normative framework”), which promotes the tracing, in a timely and reliable manner, of illicit weapons and provides a framework and modus operandi for international tracing cooperation. The Instrument excludes ammunition tracing, which is more challenging since the standardization of ammunition marking at the point of manufacture is still a work in progress.

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While DDR sections are not responsible for conducting tracing themselves, the accurate registration and marking of DDR weapons will facilitate effective tracing of these weapons should they be recovered under illicit circumstances.

DDR weapons and ammunition data recorded in the registration database (see Unit 14) should be shared with the national authorities and the United Nations Joint Mission Analysis Centre unit, as well as with any relevant United Nations panel of experts. These stakeholders should also be given access to weapons, ammunition and explosives collected. In the context of DDR materiel, investigations will not look into the individual(s) handing over the weapons and ammunition but rather to the chains of custody prior to their transfer to this/these individual(s).

Marking, record-keeping and cooperation are key to successful international tracing efforts. The tracing of a weapon starts with accurate identification based on its physical characteristics and markings. The data is then included in the trace request sent to the country of manufacture or most recent known import to request information about the chain of transfer. Tracing requests can also be done through the Illicit Arms Records and Tracing Management System (iARMS) network of the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL),¹⁷ to which each country’s police has access through its INTERPOL National Central Bureau.¹⁸

While the process is similar for ammunition, cartridges of small arms ammunition generally do not bear sufficient information for successful tracing. Information contained on ammunition packaging is therefore crucial, but this represents a challenge concerning DDR materiel as most ammunition collected has changed hands numerous times and has generally been removed from its original packaging.

¹⁷ The iARMS is a tool facilitating investigative cooperation between law enforcement agencies across the globe, which can be used to record and search for illicit firearms.

¹⁸ The INTERPOL Firearms Programme provides dedicated tools to ensure the accuracy of firearm identification and allow successful international tracing by law enforcement officers. The INTERPOL Firearms Reference Table is an interactive online tool available to authorized users worldwide, which provides resources on firearm markings, references and images—all of which help support law-enforcement officers around the world to accurately identify a firearm.
REFERENCES FOR THIS UNIT

MOSAIC 05.30 Marking and Recordkeeping
MOSAIC 05.31 Tracing Illicit SALW
Transportation of DDR weapons

Transportation of weapons is principally a security consideration, as there are no direct safety considerations. Diversion of weapons is a security concern such that the movement of weapons should be carefully planned, including transportation for final destruction.

How to plan for transportation?

A full risk assessment shall be undertaken prior to any movement of weapons. Transport routes should be planned and checked in advance and details of the route and timings for the move shall be treated as classified. If regular movement of weapons occurs between two identified locations, consideration shall be given to varying the routes and timings to avoid creating identifiable movement patterns.

Security of transportation should be ensured by the United Nations military component in mission settings, or by national security forces or designated security officials in non-mission settings.

Blue helmets securing the transportation and destruction of weapons collected during DDR operations, CAR, 2018. (Photo credit: MINUSCA)
Handover/takeover protocols and documentation shall be agreed upon prior to any transportation of weapons. These protocols are to be strictly adhered to so that there is an audit trail for custody of the weapons throughout.

Weapons shall not be transported in the same vehicle as the ammunition used in the weapon and, if possible, should not be transported in vehicles travelling together.

Prior to transportation, a WAM Technical Advisor should inspect the weapons and ensure that the working parts and magazine (where applicable) have been removed. The advisor should also ensure that the correct documentation of the transportation of the weapons has been prepared, and adequate procedures have been put in place. The weapons should then be secured in suitable containers for transportation, and magazines and working parts should be secured in separate vehicles.

On arrival at the destination, the consignee shall carry out a 100 per cent check of weapons received against the documentation accompanying the consignment. Any discrepancies shall be investigated according to the standard operating procedure.

REFERENCES FOR THIS UNIT

MOSAIC 05.20 Stockpile Management: Weapons
IDRRS 4.10 Disarmament
Unit 17

Transportation of DDR ammunition and explosives

The transportation of dangerous goods, which includes ammunition and explosives, involves safety and security concerns and should be regulated to minimize the risk of accidents that might cause death or injury to people or animals and/or damage to property, equipment and the environment. Transportation of ammunition and explosives may be by road, rail, air or sea. There are accepted international agreements that relate to transportation by each of these modes.\(^9\)

All movement of ammunition and explosives on United Nations missions shall be undertaken in accordance with IATG 08.10 on the transport of ammunition. Where the operational circumstances or local conditions make it difficult to comply with this guidance, an assessment is to be undertaken by ammunition technical staff and the risk accepted and authorized by the relevant leadership (see IATG 2.10 on an introduction to risk management principles and processes).

At all stages of the transportation activity, it is essential that the ammunition and explosives remain safe and secure. Any time responsibility for the ammunition and explosives transfers from one individual or organization to another, a handover/takeover procedure shall take place with the individual/organization receiving the ammunition and explosives officially confirming receipt and resumption of responsibility.

An adequate military and police escort shall be requested to avert the risk of diversion of the weapons and/or ammunition transport. United Nations police advice shall be sought to determine the level of potential risk on the itinerary and to engage community leaders and notables of the areas through which the transport will proceed.

\(^{19}\) See United Nations SaferGuard, “IATG – References”.

Preparation

1. Prior to transportation, a WAM Technical Advisor shall inspect the ammunition and explosives to confirm they are safe to move. The inspection shall provide confirmation of the following:
   a. The ammunition and explosives are not showing any visible signs of deterioration.
   b. As it is likely that ammunition handed over during DDR processes will not be in its original packaging, the advisor shall ensure that the ammunition and explosives are correctly packaged.
   c. The correct documentation, appropriate to the mode of transport, has been prepared.
   d. The vehicle, aircraft or vessel shall be suitable for the carriage of ammunition and explosives, with fully trained and authorized crews and appropriate equipment to respond in the event of an incident occurring during transit.
   e. The organization/location to which the ammunition and explosives are to be moved has been informed and has agreed to accept the consignment.

2. If the ammunition and explosives cannot be safely transported, they should be destroyed in situ. If this would cause unacceptable damage, it should be moved the minimum distance by explosive-ordnance-disposal-qualified staff to a safe location for destruction.

3. The person with responsibility for the movement of the ammunition and explosives shall take charge of the following:
   a. Ensure that the transport has been correctly arranged, including obtaining confirmation that it is authorized for the movement of ammunition.
   b. Ensure that the crew of the vehicle, aircraft or vessel has the appropriate training and authority to undertake transportation of ammunition.
c. Confirm that an appropriate route has been selected and that, where necessary, permission has been obtained for all sections of the journey.

d. Plan the timing of the move such as to reduce the hazard to members of the public and those undertaking the movement.

e. Ensure that appropriate safety and security measures have been put in place to minimize the potential for incidents to affect the transportation of ammunition and explosives.

f. Adequate security arrangements shall be made to reduce the possibility of theft of ammunition and explosives, including a potential armed attack on the vehicles. This should include escort vehicles and armed personnel when necessary. Where the host nation has an effective police or military security system, transportation security should be planned in conjunction with the local authorities.

On arrival

At the destination explosives storage area, the consignee shall be responsible for the following:

1. Providing a safe and secure reception area, where the ammunition and explosives may be held, pending formal receipt. The receipt of the ammunition and explosives shall not be unnecessarily delayed.

2. Checking the consignment against the accompanying documentation. Any discrepancies shall be notified to the consignor and an investigation initiated.

3. If no discrepancies are identified, stocktaking of the ammunition and explosives and placing them in storage.

Ammunition and explosives handed over during DDR activities should be isolated in storage until a full technical inspection can be undertaken by qualified technical staff to confirm its safety for storage, pending a decision on its disposal.

REFERENCES FOR THIS UNIT

IATG 08.10 Transport of Ammunition
Unit 18
Weapons storage management

Introduction
Global guidelines stipulate that materiel should be stored in purpose-built armouries and ammunition depots. However, DDR programmes very rarely have appropriate storage infrastructure at their disposal. Therefore, most DDR programmes are often required to build their own temporary structures using shipping containers, for example.

Conventional weapons and ammunition can be stored effectively and safely in these temporary storage facilities if certain procedures are adhered to. The DDR section should be supported by UNMAS or other WAM Technical Advisors on this matter.

In addition to facilitating the management of materiel, storage should protect against the risk of the following:
- Diversion (i.e., theft) and onward illicit proliferation
- Unplanned explosions
- Damage of materiel.

Planning of temporary DDR materiel storage areas
The planning phase is crucial as the facility may be used for several months and may need to be expanded. This task should be performed by qualified WAM Technical Advisors who will determine the size, location, organizational structure and equipment required based on projections of the types and quantity of materiel to be stored (see Unit 3).

What does a temporary DDR storage facility look like?
Arms and ammunition shall be stored separately since they require different risk assessment and management procedures, and also to mitigate the risk of simultaneous theft of weapons and their accompanying ammunition.
In the field, good practice often requires the use of two to four separate containers in one storage area, depending on the resources available: one container for weapons and another for ammunition, as a minimum. Other containers should be used to store the working parts of particularly high-risk weapons (e.g., portable air defence systems) separately from each other, or for storing hazardous ammunition away from the rest of the materiel.

How to determine the location of a temporary DDR storage facility?

- **Location:** Actors responsible for securing the storage, as identified in the DDR agreement and/or the DDR WAM standard operating procedure will determine the perimeter of the location where the storage will be built, usually on the site of a secure United Nations camp.

- **Separation distances and accessibility:** Specific formulas defining the distance of ammunition storage from access routes, inhabited buildings and other infrastructure should be applied (see International Ammunition Technical Guidelines, IATG 2.20 on quantity and separation distances).

- **Topography:** Storage facilities should be constructed on stable, level soil, away from flood plains and wooded areas.

A risk assessment shall be conducted by WAM Technical Advisors to confirm the optimum location for the storage facility and identify priorities in terms of security measures to be adopted. This includes identifying the following:

- Potential threats posed by the storage facility to the local population and United Nations staff (e.g., the level of fatalities and structural damage expected in the event of an unplanned explosion)
- Risks linked to potential loss and theft
- Risks linked to market or strategic value of materiel and attacks by armed groups or violent extremist entities
- Risks linked to the environment, such as flood or earthquakes.

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20 See also United Nations SaferGuard, *Quantity-Distance Map.*
What are the basic security measures to take?

Physical security

- **Protection of the storage facility against weather conditions**: Containers protect materiel against rain, heat and wind. DDR programmes are mostly implemented in the southern hemisphere where temperatures and rainfall can be extreme. A roof to protect the container from direct sunlight should be added and containers should not be touching the ground to protect them from humidity.

- **Protection of the facility against theft, security breaches and attacks**: The storage area should be located in a secure area surrounded by fencing, such as a United Nations camp, with armed guards and patrols. Containers should be locked with container bar locks and keys held by those responsible for securing and managing the storage. Access should be restricted to those with authorization. Based on the security assessment, the procurement of armoured containers may be recommended.

- **Prevention of fire or the spread of fire**: Appropriate measures should be taken to reduce the risk of fire and prevent its spread. The WAM specialist shall establish a fire safety plan (see IATG 02.50) based on the risk assessment and ensure that each storage facility is equipped with basic fire-fighting equipment.

- **Mitigation of the impact of explosions**: Berm or Hescos Bastion barricades should be erected around storage containers.

**Inventory management**

The contents of the storages shall be checked and verified regularly against the DDR registration database of materiel (see Unit 14). This task could be conducted by DDR officers with support from the United Nations Peacekeeping Force and/or UNMAS.

For armouries, a physical stock check by number and type of arms should be conducted weekly, as well as no less than 10 per cent of arms by serial number. For ammunition, a physical stock check by quantity and type of ammunition should be conducted weekly.
Every six months, a 100 per cent physical stock check by quantity, type and serial/lot number is to be conducted. Records of every stock check should be kept for review and audit purposes.

Any suspected loss or theft shall be reported immediately and investigated according to the DDR WAM standard operating procedure (see MOSAIC 5.20 for the investigative report template).

- **Exit of materiel**: Upon collection of any materiel from DDR storages before transfer to another storage or demolition/cutting site, each party involved shall verify the list and sign a handover declaration, which includes the following information: date, storage facility, number and type of items collected, serial numbers, purpose of transfer and onward destination.

**Storage of arms**

The storage of weapons is less technical than that of ammunition, with the primary risks being loss and theft due to poor management.

Container used to store weapons collected during DDR activities in DRC, 2017. (Photo credit: MONUSCO).
Intruder detection systems (i.e., alarms) are unlikely to be used in the field; therefore, to prevent or delay theft, containers should be equipped with fixed racks on which weapons can be secured with chains or steel cables affixed with padlocks. Racks also help with inventory management since weapons can be organized per type, and it is easier to count them and to notice if one is missing.

Some light weapons that contain explosive components, such as portable air defence systems, will present explosive hazards and should be dealt with by WAM Technical Advisors and stored with other explosive materiel.

Finally, to allow for more effective management and stocktaking, weapons that have been collected should be tagged. Most DDR programmes use handwritten tags, including the serial number and a tag number, which are registered in the DDR database (see Unit 14); for instance, various tag colours may also be used to distinguish serviceable from unserviceable weapons. However, in more recent contexts, DDR sections have been using purpose-made bar code tags allowing for electronic reading, including with a smartphone, which is significantly more efficient. Radio frequency identification could also be used.

REFERENCES FOR THIS UNIT

MOSAIC 5.20 Stockpile Management: Weapons
UNMAS Technical Booklet for Temporary Armouries
UN Template SOP on WAM in DDR Processes (forthcoming)
Ammunition storage management

As a fundamental principle, weapons and ammunition shall not be stored together. If this is an impossibility due to field conditions, weapons and ammunition shall be secured in separate buildings or containers on the same site. Ammunition and explosives storage should be managed in accordance with the principles of the IATG with technical advice and direction provided by WAM Technical Advisors and the Senior Ammunition Technical Officer for the mission.

The storage of ammunition and explosives requires highly qualified personnel, as the risks related to this materiel are substantial, particularly in temporary storage facilities where security conditions are not optimal (e.g., absence of ventilation in containers).

A thorough risk assessment of ammunition storage facilities must be carried out by an Ammunition Technical Officer. A range of quantitative and qualitative methods for this assessment are available (see IATG 2.10 on an introduction to risk management principles and processes).
All recovered ammunition shall be stored in an appropriate facility by quantity, Hazard Division and Compatibility Group in accordance with specific rules (see IATG 01.50 on the United Nations explosive hazard classification system and codes). In accordance with the IATG, all ammunition storage facilities should be at a minimum of Risk-Reduction Process Level 1 compliance, specifically the following:

- Basic causes of explosions are addressed (e.g., external fires, smoking, mobile phones, etc.), although others remain (e.g., chemical stability of ammunition cannot be determined). Fatalities and injuries may still occur.

- Basic security precautions are in place to reduce diversions, including stocktaking of ammunition and a basic system of identifying loss and theft.

Most ammunition collected in DDR programmes is for small arms and machine guns and does not represent a high explosive risk; it is therefore easy to store. Boxes of ammunition shall be stocked on pallets and should not touch the wall or the roof of the container.

With the development of DDR operations in areas where groups may dispose of more light and heavy weapons systems and/or in areas affected by violent extremism, DDR programmes may be more exposed to explosives and heavy ammunition, such as those used in improvised explosive devices.
Ammunition collected during a DDR process is unlikely to have been stored in optimal storage conditions. Exposure to high temperatures and high humidity have the effect of accelerating the deterioration of ammunition and rendering it potentially unsafe. All ammunition should be inspected by a WAM Technical Advisor to determine its safety for storage, pending destruction. A demolition and burning area is required at all ammunition storage facilities for urgent demolition of unsafe ammunition.

**Accounting and store checks**

Prior to placing ammunition and explosives into a store, full details should be recorded by DDR staff and entered into the appropriate accounting system (see Unit 14).

Store checks are an important element of storage management:

- A physical store check by quantity and type of ammunition is to be undertaken weekly
- Records of all store checks are to be kept for audit purposes.

**Safety considerations**

The safety requirements for ammunition and explosives storage facilities are complex and require qualified WAM Technical Advisors to plan and implement safe storage. Some of the principal considerations include the following:

- **Security:** No individual shall be able to gain sole access to an ammunition and explosives storehouse; at least two people shall be present. A logbook is to be kept at the entrance of the storage area, recording who, when and why people have accessed the materiel.

- It is critical to the safety of United Nations staff and the local population that the requirements related to Quantity Distances and Explosive Limit Licensing are all respected and applied.

- **Fire safety:** The risk of fire in an explosives storage area is significant.
  - All personnel shall do all in their power to prevent fire in an explosives storage area.
In the event of a fire, all non-essential personnel should evacuate to a pre-determined, safe distance immediately.

First aid fire-fighting equipment (e.g., fire extinguishers, fire beaters, water and/or sand buckets, etc.) should be provided at regular points around the explosive area. These are to control the spread of the fire. If the fire has spread to a site containing explosives, all personnel shall retire immediately. Fires in which explosives have become involved should not be fought.

- **Thunderstorms**: Electrostatic lighting discharges involved in thunderstorms represent real threats. Adequate lightning protection should be provided in all storage facilities.

REFERENCES FOR THIS UNIT

- IDDRS 4.10 Disarmament
- IATG 01.50 United Nations Explosive Hazard Classification System and Codes
- IATG 02.10 Introduction to Risk Management Principles and Processes
- IATG 02.50 Fire Safety
- IATG 03.10 Inventory Management
- IATG 09.10 Security Principles and Systems
- IATG 12.20 Small Unit Ammunition Storage
- UN Template SOP on WAM in DDR Processes (forthcoming)
Unit 20
Disposal of DDR weapons

Destruction shall be the preferred method of disposal of weapons and ammunition collected through DDR. Obtaining the agreement from the appropriate authorities to proceed may take some time, particularly if a DDR National Commission is not yet in place. Disposal methods should therefore be decided upon with the national authorities at an early stage in the process and clearly stated in the DDR plan in order to prevent delays and related risks of diversion or unplanned explosions. Transparency in the disposal of weapons and ammunition collected from former warring parties is key to building trust in DDR.

Destruction of ammunition will be detailed in Unit 21.

1. Destruction of weapons

*Why destroy DDR weapons and ammunition?*

- Legally binding and politically binding international and regional agreements promote the destruction of illicit weapons and ammunition (see the section entitled “Normative framework”).
- Destruction reduces the flow of illicit arms and ammunition in circulation across the globe, which is in support of the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals (target 16.4 on the reduction of illicit arms flows).
- Destruction removes the risk of materiel being diverted.
- Arms, ammunition and explosives, in particular, surrendered during DDR operations by armed groups, are in an unknown state and likely hazardous. In addition, markings, which are key to enabling effective WAM (see Unit 15), may have been altered or removed.
- The destruction of DDR arms and ammunition is a highly symbolic gesture and serves as a strong confidence-building
measure if performed and verified transparently. Destruction is usually cheaper than storing and guarding weapons according to global standards.

All arms and ammunition must be recorded and information about the date and method of disposal accurately logged (see Unit 14).

**How to plan the destruction of weapons?**

A clear plan for destruction should be established by the DDR section, with the support of United Nations WAM Technical Advisors. Collectively, they should do the following:

1. Establish the type and quantity of weapons to be destroyed
2. Examine and select the most suitable destruction method (see below)
3. Obtain formal authorization for destruction from the appropriate government authority, including authorization for a public destruction ceremony, if one is foreseen (see below)
4. Select an appropriate destruction location
5. Consider recovery, recycling and reuse options for the resultant scrap metal
6. Establish the financial costs of all destruction-related activities
7. Develop a security plan for the movement of weapons and destruction operations
8. Update WAM standard operating procedures as necessary
9. Develop a public-information and awareness-raising campaign, and organize a public ceremony (invite media, observers and civil society who could also serve as monitors of destruction)
10. Update the DDR weapons-registration database with the following information for each item:
   - Date
   - Method of destruction
   - Location of destruction
   - Entity that carried out the destruction
   - Entity that verified the destruction (which should be different from the one above) (see Unit 14).
**How to select the most suitable method of destruction**

There are multiple techniques for destroying small arms and light weapons, which vary in complexity, cost and results. The DDR section will be responsible for identifying the most suitable method with the support of WAM Technical Advisors.

Selection criteria include the following:

- Type of weapons
- Quantity of weapons
- Availability of funds (for equipment, training and staff)
- Available level of WAM expertise
- Availability of local resources and technology
- Available infrastructure
- Security constraints
- Local customs and references.

In most DDR programmes, cutting is the preferred method of destruction, although not necessarily the most efficient. See below for the pros and cons of this and other possible techniques.

"Deactivation" of a weapon, Colombia, 2017. (Photo credit MisiónONUColombia)
Table 5
Recommended methods of destruction

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Technique</th>
<th>Advantages</th>
<th>Disadvantages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cutting by rotating disc: the cutting of small arms and light weapons into unusable pieces using a bandsaw or rotating disc</td>
<td>Simple and effective</td>
<td>Equipment to procure, labour intensive (minimum of 3 cuts per weapon), large quantities of scrap involved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cutting by oxyacetylene or plasma torch: the use of high-temperature cutting technology to render the weapon inoperable</td>
<td>Cheap and simple, very effective, limited training requirement</td>
<td>Labour intensive, transfer of equipment, knowledge of use to the country of operation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cutting by hydraulic shears: the use of hydro-abrasive cutting technology</td>
<td>Limited training requirement, effective, rapid, environmentally benign</td>
<td>Transfer of equipment and knowledge to the country of operation, medium costs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Smelting: the use of an industrial steel smelting facility to melt down weapons</td>
<td>Simple, cheap, very efficient, minimum labour required, highly visible and symbolic</td>
<td>Suitable industry facility required</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Other methods of weapons destruction, including burning (with kerosene) and crushing (with tracked vehicles), are sometimes used for their highly visible and symbolic impact. Although simple and relatively low cost, these methods are not effective, as weapons and component parts may still be serviceable and must therefore undergo a further process to ensure destruction.

With regard to heavy weapons, demilitarization by dismantling and recycling should be the preferred disposal option for the majority of these systems. The market for conversion to civilian use is very limited, as sale is a proliferation risk and reputable end users are rare. The demilitarization by dismantling and recycling technique involves the cleaning and dismantling/cutting of the vehicle but results in significant quantities of scrap. If a large quantity of heavy weapons is to be destroyed, financial planning could include the value of the scrap recovered. It is also important to maintain strict control over
weapons designated for destruction to prevent the risk of their entry into the illicit market before the destruction takes place.

2. Transfer of DDR weapons to stockpiles of national authorities

International good practice encourages the destruction of all illicit weapons and ammunition. In addition, a number of legally binding regional instruments, such as the Nairobi Protocol for the Prevention, Control and Reduction of Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa (see the section entitled “Normative framework”), require the destruction of materiel collected in caches left over from conflicts.

However, there could be instances when national authorities decide to integrate collected weapons into their national stockpiles. Primary reasons for this include the following:

- Lack of resources to acquire new weapons
- Desire to regain control over materiel previously looted from national stockpiles by armed groups during the conflict
- Imposition of an arms embargo.

Before transferring any military materiel to the national authorities, the DDR section shall take account of all obligations under relevant regional and international instruments (see the section entitled “Normative framework”) and should seek the advice of the mission’s legal adviser. If the host State is prohibited from using or possessing certain weapons or ammunition (e.g., anti-personnel landmines or cluster munitions (see the section entitled “Normative framework”)) such materiel shall be destroyed. Furthermore, in line with the United Nations Human Rights Due Diligence Policy, weapons cannot be transferred where there are substantial indications that the receiving entity has committed grave violations of international humanitarian, human rights or refugee law.

If the country where the DDR section is operating is under a United Nations arms embargo, any transfer of military materiel to the national authorities could be in violation of the embargo, subject to the approval of the Security Council, or could require prior notification of the Security Council or a designated Council body. Procedures for requesting exemptions to the embargo will depend on the provisions of the sanctions regime. In general, the host State is required to send
a request to the relevant United Nations Security Council sanctions committee via its diplomatic representation to the United Nations in New York, providing specific information about the materiel, its use and end users, along with supporting documentation.\(^{21}\)

The DDR section should have a thorough understanding of the relevant Security Council resolutions and arms embargo provisions. The relevant United Nations monitoring team or panel of experts in charge of monitoring sanctions can also be consulted.

WAM Policy Officers or WAM Technical Advisors should explain to the national authorities the potential negative consequences of incorporating DDR weapons into their stockpiles. This includes not only the symbolic connotations of using conflict weapons but also any legal or technical, or financial implications. Specifically, they should be made aware of the costs and resources involved in managing materiel that may differ from their standard equipment, as well as any special maintenance requirements and sourcing of spare parts and ammunition, which can have a significant impact on operational efficiency. National security forces should engage their logistics departments on the subject.

Weapons handed over to national authorities should bear markings made at the time of manufacture. Good practice recommends the destruction or proper re-marking of weapons whose original markings have been altered or erased (see Unit 15). Weapons should be recorded by the national authorities in line with international standards.

### 3. Deactivation of weapons

The deactivation of arms involves rendering the weapon incapable of expelling or launching a shot, bullet, missile or other projectile by the action of an explosive. In addition, deactivation means that the weapon cannot be readily restored to its previous functionality and has been certified and marked as deactivated in compliance with international guidelines by a competent State authority. Deactivation requires that all pressure-bearing components of a weapon be permanently altered in such a way that renders the weapon unusable; this includes modifications to the barrel, bolt, etc.

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\(^{21}\) Specific information can be found on the web pages of the relevant sanctions committees (United Nations Security Council, “Sanctions”).
cylinder, slide, firing pin and/or receiver/frame. Weapons that have not been properly deactivated represent a significant threat, as they may be reactivated and used by criminals and terrorists.22

While the destruction of weapons should be the preferred method of disposal, deactivation could be stipulated as part of a peace agreement where some of the collected weapons would be used in museum settings, or to create “peace art” or monuments, to symbolically reflect the end of armed conflict. The process of deactivation should occur rapidly after a peace agreement so that weapons do not remain indefinitely in stores, incurring unnecessary costs and raising the risk of diversion.

REFERENCES FOR THIS UNIT

IDDRS 4.10 Disarmament
MOSAIC 05.40 Collection of Illicit and Unwanted SALW
MOSAIC 05.50 Destruction: Weapons
OSCE Guide: Minimum Standards for National Procedures for the Deactivation of SALW

1. **Destruction**

The destruction of ammunition is the most desirable method of disposal, but the process is far more complex than the procedures for weapons. Risks inherent in ammunition destruction are significant if the procedure does not comply with strict technical guidelines. The destruction of ammunition requires highly qualified personnel, such as those from UNMAS, the explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) capacity of the United Nations Peacekeeping Force or external subcontractors with relevant expertise to complete the process.

In a DDR programme, ammunition may need to be destroyed either at the collection point, because it is unsafe, or after being transferred to a secure DDR storage.
Planning destruction of stored ammunition

The logistics of ammunition destruction can be particularly challenging and require a strict planning phase by the WAM Technical Advisor or EOD specialist. The advisor should seek to do the following:

- Identify priorities (see below)
- Obtain authorization from the national authorities
- Select the most appropriate location and method for destruction
- Develop a risk assessment and security plan for destruction.

What ammunition should be destroyed as a priority?

The following ammunition should be destroyed as a priority:

- Ammunition that poses the greatest risk in terms of explosive safety
- Ammunition that is attractive to criminal and violent extremist groups
- Ammunition that must be destroyed to satisfy international legal obligations (anti-personnel mines and cluster munitions for States that are party to the relevant treaties)
- Small arms and machine gun ammunition less than 20 mm, as the proliferation of this ammunition is particularly undesirable.

How to select the appropriate method of destruction?

The WAM Technical Advisor/EOD specialist will select the method according to the following factors:

- Type and quantity of ammunition to be destroyed
- Availability of qualified human power
- Location and type of destruction sites available
- Distance from storage and destruction sites and accessibility
- Resources available (explosives, budget, etc.)
- Environmental impact.
The most commonly used methods in DDR settings are open burning and open detonation:

- **Open burning** is generally used for the destruction of propellants and pyrotechnic compositions and has the potential to cause significant environmental impact.

- **Open detonation** uses serviceable explosives as charges to destroy ammunition and requires a large cordon to ensure protection from the blast. This method is labour intensive and may not destroy all ammunition, requiring post-blast EOD clearance.

These methods are regarded as the easiest ways to destroy ammunition and often present the most cost-effective solution. They are also highly symbolic and can serve as effective mechanisms for building confidence in the DDR programme.

*Transfer of DDR ammunition to national stockpiles*

While good practice stipulates the destruction of all DDR ammunition, some circumstances may require that serviceable ammunition is handed over to national authorities.

This should be done in compliance with binding regional and international instruments, such as the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention and the Convention on Cluster Munitions, as well as with the provisions of the arms embargo if the host State is under sanctions (see the section entitled “Normative framework”; see also discussion on arms embargoes under Unit 20).

Transfers of ammunition also represent a significant challenge, as it is difficult to know the conditions in which the ammunition was stored previously and to assess its current state. In this case, only ammunition for small arms and machine guns (less than 20 mm) in their original packaging should be handed over to national authorities. In terms of other types of ammunition, a chemical analysis should be conducted by international experts, which is time-consuming and resource-intensive. Finally, the DDR section shall look into any legal implications prior to any transfers of military materiel to the national authorities (see the section entitled “Normative framework” and Unit 20).

**REFERENCES FOR THIS UNIT**

IATG 10.10 *Demilitarization and Destruction of Conventional Ammunition*

IMAS 11.20 *Principles and Procedures for Open Burning and Open Detonation Operations*
Annexes
## Annex 1

### Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CVR</td>
<td>community violence reduction</td>
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<tr>
<td>DDR</td>
<td>disarmament, demobilization and reintegration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPO</td>
<td>Department of Peace Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EOD</td>
<td>explosive ordnance disposal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IATG</td>
<td>International Ammunition Technical Guidelines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDDRS</td>
<td>Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMAS</td>
<td>International Mine Action Standards</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ODA</td>
<td>Office for Disarmament Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOSAIC</td>
<td>Modular Small-arms-control Implementation Compendium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SALW</td>
<td>small arms and light weapons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOP</td>
<td>standard operating procedure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TWAM</td>
<td>transitional weapons and ammunition management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMAS</td>
<td>United Nations Mine Action Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WAM</td>
<td>weapons and ammunition management</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Annex 2
Terms and Definitions

In line with the IDDRS, the words “shall”, “should”, “may”, “can” and “must” are used to indicate the intended degree of compliance with the guidance laid down. This use is consistent with the language used in the International Organization for Standardization standards and guidelines:

1. “Shall” is used to indicate requirements, methods or specifications that are to be applied to conform to the standard.

2. “Should” is used to indicate the preferred requirements, methods or specifications.

3. “May” is used to indicate a possible method or course of action.

4. “Can” is used to indicate a possibility and capability.

5. “Must” is used to indicate an external constraint or obligation.

Selected key terms

**DDR programme** is a set of related measures falling under the operational categories of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) with common results frameworks.

**DDR-related tools** are immediate and targeted measures. They include pre-DDR, transitional weapons and ammunition management, community violence reduction, initiatives to prevent individuals from joining armed groups designated as terrorist organizations, DDR support to mediation, and DDR support to transitional security arrangements. In addition, support to programmes for those leaving armed groups designated as terrorist organizations may be provided by DDR practitioners in compliance with international standards. DDR-related tools may be used (a) before, after or alongside DDR programmes; (b) when there is no DDR programme; and (c) alongside reintegration support.
**Demobilization** is the separation of combatants and persons associated with armed forces and groups from military command and control structures and their transition to civilian status. Formal demobilization is the controlled discharge of members of armed forces and groups in designated temporary sites and requires the existence of a national DDR framework outlining the political, legal, institutional and programmatic parameters for the transition from military to civilian status.

**Disarmament** is the collection, documentation, control and disposal of arms, ammunition and explosives voluntarily handed over by combatants, persons associated with armed forces and groups, and sometimes also the civilian population. Disarmament aims to reduce the number of illicit arms, ammunition and explosives in circulation and/or prevent their diversion to unauthorized users.

**Diversion** is the movement—physical, administrative or otherwise—of a weapon and/or its parts, components or ammunition from the legal to the illicit realm.

**Explosive ordnance disposal** (EOD) is the detection, identification, evaluation, rendering safe, recovery and final disposal of unexploded explosive ordnance.

*Note 1:* It may also include the rendering safe and/or disposal of explosive ordnance that has become hazardous through damage or deterioration when such tasks are beyond the capabilities of personnel normally assigned responsibility for routine disposal.

*Note 2:* The presence of ammunition and explosives during disarmament operations inevitably requires some degree of EOD response. The level of EOD response will be dictated by the condition of the ammunition or explosives, their level of deterioration and the way in which the local community handles them.

**Integrated DDR processes** are multi-stakeholder efforts composed of different, interlinked combinations of DDR programmes, DDR-related tools and reintegration support. They are part of the United Nations system’s multidimensional approach that contributes to the entire peace continuum, from prevention, conflict resolution and peacekeeping, to peacebuilding and development. Integrated DDR processes do not include all ongoing stabilization and recovery measures, but only those that respond to the presence of active and/or former members of armed forces and groups.
Light weapons are any portable lethal weapon designed for use by two or three persons serving as a crew (although some may be carried and used by a single person) that expels or launches, is designed to expel or launch, or may be readily converted to expel or launch a shot, bullet or projectile by the action of an explosive. They include, inter alia, heavy machine guns, hand-held under-barrel and mounted grenade launchers, portable anti-aircraft guns, portable anti-tank guns, recoilless rifles, portable launchers of anti-tank missile and rocket systems, portable launchers of anti-aircraft missile systems, and mortars of a calibre of less than 100 mm, as well as their parts, components and ammunition.

Reinsertion is transitional assistance offered for a period of up to one year as part of demobilization and prior to reintegration. Reinsertion assistance is offered to combatants and persons associated with armed forces and groups who have been formally demobilized.

Reintegration is the process through which ex-combatants and persons formerly associated with armed forces and groups transition sustainably to live as civilian members of society in communities of their choice. Reintegration takes place at the individual, family and community levels and has social, psychosocial, economic, political and security dimensions. Reintegration processes are part of local, national and regional recovery and development, with the international community playing a supporting role if requested. Where appropriate, dependants and host-community members may be provided with reintegration support.

Reintegration support may be provided as part of a DDR programme or when there is no DDR programme in place. In addition, reintegration support may also complement broader security sector reform or DDR-related tools.

Small arms are any portable lethal weapon designed for individual use that expels or launches, is designed to expel or launch, or may be readily converted to expel or launch a shot, bullet or projectile by the action of an explosive. They include, inter alia, revolvers and self-loading pistols, rifles and carbines, submachine guns, assault rifles and light machine guns, as well as their parts, components and ammunition.

Transitional weapons and ammunition management (TWAM) is a series of interim arms control measures that can be implemented by DDR practitioners before, after and alongside DDR programmes.
TWAM can also be implemented when the preconditions for a DDR programme are absent. The TWAM component of a DDR process is primarily aimed at reducing the capacity of individuals and groups to engage in armed violence and conflict. TWAM also aims to reduce accidents and save lives by addressing the immediate risks related to the possession of weapons, ammunition and explosives.

**Weapons and ammunition management** (WAM) is the oversight, accountability and management of arms and ammunition throughout their life cycle, including the establishment of frameworks, processes and practices for safe and secure materiel acquisition, stockpiling, transfers, tracing and disposal. WAM does not only focus on small arms and light weapons but also on a broader range of conventional weapons including ammunition and artillery.
## Annex 3

### Explosive hazard classification system

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hazard Division</th>
<th>Label</th>
<th>Sign</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.1</td>
<td><img src="image" alt="Explosives 1.1" /></td>
<td><img src="image" alt="1" /></td>
<td>Ammunition that has a mass explosion hazard.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2</td>
<td><img src="image" alt="Explosives 1.2" /></td>
<td><img src="image" alt="2" /></td>
<td>Ammunition that has a projection hazard but not a mass explosion hazard.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.3</td>
<td><img src="image" alt="Explosives 1.3" /></td>
<td><img src="image" alt="3" /></td>
<td>Ammunition that has a fire hazard and either a minor blast hazard or a minor projection hazard or both, but not a mass explosion hazard.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.4</td>
<td><img src="image" alt="Explosives 1.4" /></td>
<td><img src="image" alt="4" /></td>
<td>Ammunition that presents no significant hazard.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.5</td>
<td><img src="image" alt="Blasting Agents 1.5" /></td>
<td><img src="image" alt="1" /></td>
<td>Very insensitive substances, which have a mass explosion hazard.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.6</td>
<td><img src="image" alt="Explosives 1.6" /></td>
<td><img src="image" alt="2" /></td>
<td>Extremely insensitive articles which do not have a mass explosion hazard.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Annex 4

Weapons handling and security training

**Trainers**: WAM Technical Advisers (UNMAS, force or specialized subcontractor)

**Participants**: Disarmament team members, which might include the following, depending on mission settings and context:

- Military observers
- United Nations Peacekeeping Force
- United Nations police
- National forces
- DDR officers from the United Nations and national institutions
- Other United Nations mission members who may attend the disarmament (e.g., child protection officers, gender specialists, etc.).

**Duration**: 1 to 2 days

**Objectives**:

Training should be developed in accordance with the mission’s WAM standard operating procedure. Each actor should leave with a clear understanding of the chain of operations, their role in the process and security requirements.

The training aims at harmonizing practice between those qualified to handle small arms and light weapons (military and police backgrounds) but does not provide instruction to personnel not qualified to do so (DDR officers). These individuals will not be handling materiel but need to know what the disarmament process entails and to be aware of security procedures to ensure they are implemented.
Training should provide an opportunity for the various components to learn to work together, learn about each other’s responsibilities, and develop a collective, team spirit.

Training should involve a mixture of theory and practical modules, safe handling of weapons, group exercises and simulation of the disarmament process.

**Potential training components:**

- Understanding the operational organization of the disarmament/other relevant DDR WAM activity
- Understanding the structure of a disarmament site
- Behaviour in the handling of small arms and light weapons
- Security rules
- How to react in case of an incident
- Identification of hazardous items
- Small arms and light weapons manipulation
- Maintenance and functional control of small arms and light weapons
- Small arms and light weapons markings and identification of main weapons in circulation in the host country
- DDR weapons and ammunition registration database (see [Unit 14](#))
- Ammunition basic principles and identification of main items in circulation in the host country
- Behaviour in handling ammunition
- Visual quality control of ammunition.

Sections of this training could be built on the training course on “Effective WAM in a Changing DDR Context” developed by the Department of Peace Operations, the Office for Disarmament Affairs and the United Nations Institute for Training and Research (contact wam-ddr@unitar.org for further information).

*Source: Small arms and light weapons induction training organized by UNMAS, Gao, Mali, 2017*
Annex 5

Documenting arms and ammunition

The physical characteristics of arms or weapons, and in particular their markings, set them apart from others as unique objects whose history can be traced. Ammunition can be more difficult to trace but already basic information about its calibre and markings can provide critical insights into likely transfer chains.

For a successful trace, photos must comply with proper standards. Use a digital camera, good light, and a steady hand. Retake the picture if the initial result is blurry.

Include photos and accompanying information specifying the date, location and circumstances of the documentation in the relevant information management system (see Unit 14).

1. Be absolutely safe
   - **Never** point a weapon at anyone, even if you are sure it is unloaded.
   - **Ensure** the safety mechanism is in the “safe” position.
   - **Remove** the magazine from the weapon.
   - **Remove** the round of ammunition in the breech (if present).
   - Larger ammunition can be particularly dangerous. **Do not** approach or handle cartridge-based ammunition in the following cases:
     - If its overall length is more than 160 mm
     - If it is larger than 14.5 mm in calibre
     - If the bullet/projectile is completely painted
   - **When in doubt**, always ask a qualified ammunition technical officer.

Source for Annex 5: UNMAS
2. Photographing arms and weapons

To correctly identify an individual arm or weapon, photos that allow trained personnel to establish, as far as possible, the arm’s or weapon’s make/type, model, calibre, serial number, and country of manufacture or most recent import are required.

Where on the arms is the information?

Some of the required information may be marked on the arms or weapons. The location of marks varies with the type and model of the arms or weapons. For assault rifles, essential marks are usually on the receiver, which houses the operating parts (e.g., trigger mechanism, magazine port) and to which other components of the weapon are attached (e.g., barrel, stock). For handguns, critical marks are usually found on the frame.

Rifle receiver

Handgun frame

Additional characteristics and markings that can help to identify an arm or weapon may be located on the fire-selector switch and the rear-sight. If a serial number marked on the frame/receiver differs from a serial number marked on another part, the arm or weapon is assembled from parts of two or more different arms or weapons, or the arm or weapon contains replacement parts. In such cases, the serial number marked on the frame/receiver will be the primary source for identifying the arm or weapon.
How to take the right photos

Photo 1:
Complete weapon, side 1

Photo 2:
Close-up of receiver/frame with markings, side 1

Photo 3: Complete weapon, side 2

Photo 4:
Close-up of receiver/frame with fire-selector switch marks, side 2

Photo 5:
Rear sight marks (if present)

Additional photos:
Close-ups of other identifying marks, if present (e.g., on the barrel, bolt, another part of the frame, etc.) [as available]
3. **Photographing ammunition**

The minimum usually required to establish possible transfer chains of ammunition is the ammunition’s calibre and markings that allow trained personnel to identify the **country and year of production**. Additional information that can greatly assist in tracing the ammunition’s pathway is its lot and/or batch number. Not all the information may be available, especially if ammunition rounds were removed from their original packaging. Notwithstanding, even only calibre and **headstamp marks** (see below) can provide critical information about origins and allow for targeted investigations into possible transfer paths.

**Where on the ammunition is the information?**

Ammunition rounds typically have headstamp marks, that is, alphanumeric characters and/or symbols that are applied to the **base of cartridge cases**. Other information can be derived from markings on the **packaging** and from the overall length and calibre of the ammunition.
How to take the right photos

**Photo 1:**
Headstamp marks

![Image of bullet headstamp marks](image1)

**Photo 2:**
The cartridge placed next to a ruler or measure (or pen)

![Image of cartridge with ruler](image2)
Photo 3: Packaging

The cartridge can be pushed into soft ground or held between fingers when taking a photo of headstamp marks. If several rounds or shells bear identical marks, a photo of one such round or shell suffices. If marks differ, photos that show marks of each round or shell with “unique” marks are required.
Example of a disarmament camp diagram

**Annex 6**

- **UNSERVICEABLE AMMUNITION (1.1, 1.2, 1.3)**
- **SERVICEABLE AMMUNITION (1, 2, 1.3)**

**Ammo and Explosives Handover Area**

**SERVICEABLE AMMUNITION FOR SMALL ARMS (1.4)**

**UNSERVICEABLE AMMUNITION (1.4)**

**Temporary Daily Ammo Storage Area and Triage**

**Ammo Checking and Registration**

**Registration Area**

**Security Check Area**

**Weapons Unloading Bay/Table**

**Weapons Handover Area**

**Guard**

Permanent guards

Temporary guards - while “collection” activities are ongoing

**EMERGENCY DISPOSAL/ STORAGE PIT**

**GATE**

**Access**
1. All stores are made in ISO metallic sea container 20’.

2. Ammunition containers will be mandatory painted in white color.

3. Ammunition containers will contain 3 lines/levels of dismantlable shelves (60 cm large made of wood) on 3 walls in order to store loose/unpacked ammunition.

4. Weapons containers will contain gun racks for individual weapons (like AK47), shelves and metallic boxes to store bigger size weapons (machine guns 7.62 mm; 12.7 mm; 14.5 mm; mortars 60–82 mm; RPG launchers).

5. The gun racks and shelves for weapons containers will be made of metal.

6. The containers for ammunition will have metallic roof/protection against sun heat.

7. The fence will be chain link fence, minimum 2.5 m high constructed with chain link fabric and a barbed wired topping. Supporting posts may be either reinforced concrete or tubular steel.

8. “Unserviceable ammunition” is ammunition in poor condition and not in its proper packaging but is safe to store until ready for disposal and is safe to transport to a disposal site. It won’t be fully compliant with IATG so will require additional controls. It shall be disposed of as soon as reasonably practicable.

   “Serviceable ammunition” is ammunition in good condition and in its proper packaging. It can be stored and transported in compliance with IATG.

   Unsafe ammunition should not be stored. It should be disposed of immediately

9. Emergency disposal/storage pit to be used for the immediate disposal of unsafe ammunition i.e. Ammunition that is deemed too dangerous to store or transport.

   In situations where unsafe ammunition cannot be disposed of immediately, it should be stored separate of other ammunition items.

   To be sited at a suitable distance as determined by ammunition technical personnel (this may be outside the site boundary).

   The emergency disposal pit shall be used to dispose of single items that are deemed too dangerous to store or transport.
Annex 7

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Assessments and weapons survey

Conflict Armament Research: www.conflictarm.com/.

Group for Research and Information on Peace and Security: www.grip.org/.

Small Arms Survey: www.smallarmssurvey.org/.

South Eastern and Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of the Small Arms and Light Weapons: www.seesac.org/.


Community violence reduction


Gender and arms control


**Marking and tracing**

**Weapons and ammunition stockpile management**


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