PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

OVERVIEW

	Total Personnel (Approved 2022/23)	Budget Appointment 2022/23 Thousand USD
UNTSO	229	37,474.7
UNDOF	1,395	64,544.5
UNMOGIP	74	9,769.9
UNISFA	4,206	259,663.2
UNIFIL	13,845	502,920.5
MINUSCA	19,199	1,074,387.7
MINURSO	532	61,111.7
MINUSMA*	17,172	1,245,045.1
MONUSCO	18,558	1,030,269.9
UNMIK	374	41,947.3
UNFICYP	1,092	54,327.3
UNMISS	21,928	1,116,609.0

At the request of the Transitional Government of Mali, the Security Council terminated MINUSMA's mandate under resolution 2640 (2022) on 30 June. As per resolution 2690 (2023), MINUSMA immediately ceased its operations and this Headquarters and the mission are focusing on the transfer of its tasks, as well as the orderly and safe drawdown and withdrawal of its personnel, with the objective of completing this process by 31 December 2023.

The designations employed and the presentation of the material on this map do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the Secretariat of the United Nations concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city, or area or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries. Also, the boundaries and names shown, and the designations used in this publication do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations. Final status of the Abyei area is not yet determined. Final boundary between the Republic of Sudan and the Republic of South Sudan has not yet been determined. Source: UN Geospatial

PRIORITY 1 — COLLECTIVE COHERENCE BEHIND A POLITICAL STRATEGY

Six out of twelve active peacekeeping missions have specifically articulated political strategies, bringing on board Member States, regional partners, and other actors. Below are some highlights of their efforts to take them forward within the reporting period.

Presence of a specifically articulated political strategy

UNFICYP

UNFICYP's political strategy aims to facilitate conducive conditions on the ground towards the eventual resumption of negotiations. The mission works closely with the Secretary General's good offices mission in Cyprus to foster intercommunal cooperation and facilitate trust and confidence-building measures, including through the bi-communal technical committees.

UNMIK

UNMIK's political strategy is directed towards supporting the Mission's engagement to strengthen relations and trust between communities and between communities and institutions. Although rising tensions during the reporting period affected the impact and sustainability of inter-community trust-building efforts, especially in northern Kosovo[1], UNMIK continued to work with local partners and international actors in Kosovo to provide space for inclusive and meaningful exchanges.

UNMISS

UNMISS continues to provide support to institutions of transition which work towards bringing together key stakeholders involved in the political process led by IGAD. The mission undertakes joint efforts and coordination of messaging to the peace parties to positively influence the implementation of the Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS). It is also providing technical support to meet key legislative benchmarks that would lead to possible elections in the final phase of the transition period.

MONUSCO

MONUSCO continued to employ its good offices to support inclusive elections scheduled for December 2023, as well as to advance the Nairobi process and the implementation of the Luanda roadmap. In view of the Mission's transition, MONUSCO is pursuing high-level and technical engagements with the Government on the revision of the joint transition plan around a limited set of benchmarks directly related to the creation of the security conditions for MONUSCO's responsible withdrawal.

MINUSCA

MINUSCA pursued efforts to support the implementation of the 2019 Peace Agreement, emphasizing local ownership of the peace process by facilitating meetings of the prefectural monitoring mechanisms and by encouraging armed groups to return to the peace process and disassociate themselves from violent struggle, including through DDR. In February 2023, following the stabilization of Sam Ouandja, in Haute - Kotto Prefecture, the Special Representative visited the remote area with the Prime Minister, other Government officials and international development partners to mark the return of state authority after decades of control by armed groups. MINUSCA endorsed a new political strategy in May 2023.

MINUSMA

MINUSMA's political strategy focused on supporting the advancement of the 2015 Peace and Reconciliation Agreement and the political transition, including preparations leading up to the constitutional referendum that took place on 18 June 2023. The withdrawal of the signatory movements from the monitoring mechanisms in December 2022 exacerbated deep-seated distrust among signatories. The good offices of MINUSMA, together with international mediation redoubled efforts to overcome blockages and rebuild trust and prevent the resumption of hostilities between the signatory parties of the Peace Agreement.

No specifically articulated political strategy

| UNISFA | UNIFIL | UNDOF | UNTSO | MINURSO | UNMOGIP |

Missions with a ceasefire observation mandate (**MINURSO, UNDOF, UNMOGIP, UNTSO**) do not have an articulated political strategy.

[1]All references to Kosovo in this document should be understood to be in the context of United Nations Security Council resolution 1244 (1999)

PRIORITY 2   STRATEGIC AND OPERATIONAL INTEGRATION

PROGRESS ON INTEGRATED PLANNING AND REPORTING

Missions have made progress in the development and utilization of planning tools (approved mission plans, CPAS frameworks) but with varying reported impact on integration: 4 out of 11 missions (36%) with SRSG-approved plans report significant or great impact on integration, 6 out of 12 using CPAS frameworks report similar improvement on integration.

SRSG-approved Mission Plans

11 (92%) missions
Have SRSG approved Mission Plans

9 (75%) missions
have SRSG approved Mission Plans **informed by the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda and gender considerations**

Self-reported impact on mission integration (number of missions)

No changes (2)

Slightly improving (5)

Significantly improving (3)

Greatly improving (1)

CPAS frameworks

12 (100%) missions
use CPAS frameworks
to implement a whole of mission results-based approach

11 (92%) missions
use CPAS frameworks **informed by the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda and gender considerations**

Self-reported impact on mission integration (number of missions)

Slightly improving (6)

Significantly improving (4)

Greatly improving (2)

Source: Inputs from missions

PRIORITY 3 | CAPABILITIES & MINDSETS

To ensure UN Peacekeepers have the right skills and equipment to deliver on their mandates, several initiatives have been put in place to deliver training and deploy new contingents to match mission requirements. **The Triangular Partnership Programme and Peacekeeping Capabilities Readiness System have been key to delivering on these efforts**. Also notable are the **efforts made to bolster Peacekeeping-Intelligence capabilities** across relevant missions

PEACEKEEPING-INTELLIGENCE

Seven missions have Peacekeeping-Intelligence mechanisms established and functioning

✓	UNISFA
✓	UNIFIL
✓	MINUSCA
✓	MINUSMA
✓	MONUSCO
✓	UNFICYP
✓	UNMISS

Source: PICT & mission reports

Peacekeeping missions continued to strengthen internal architecture and processes to support Peacekeeping-Intelligence (PKI). The primary mechanism for cross-mission PKI collaboration, **the Mission Peacekeeping-Intelligence Coordination Mechanism (MICM), has been established in seven missions** including all multidimensional missions.

Of note, MINUSCA established the 'Action Plan for the Enhancement of Peacekeeping-Intelligence and Early Warning Capacity' in April 2023. The Action Plan establishes priorities and timeframes to strengthen PKI capacity across all relevant mission components and will be implemented in a phased approach with Headquarters support.

TRIANGULAR PARTNERSHIP PROGRAM (TPP)

The TPP aims to enhance peacekeepers' capacity in engineering, medical and C4ISR & camp security through provision of training and operational support. Once trained, these troops are better equipped to deliver high value and priority requirements, improving the ability of UN missions to operate more effectively on the ground. In 2023, TPP paused programming to conduct an assessment with 37 survey responses, 27 briefing participants and 19 workshop participants.

Contributions to the TPP in 2022

Trainees 347 (incl. 91 women)
Courses 22

Supporting member states:

Trainers 11
Hosts 5
Donors 8

Data source: DOS

PEACEKEEPING CAPABILITIES READINESS SYSTEM DEPLOYMENTS (PCRS)

The completion of the UNISFA and MINUSCA reconfiguration were all supported by new units deployed from the PCRS. MONUSCO and MINUSCA also benefited from new capabilities that were required and generated from the system during the reporting period.

PCRS Deployments

UNISFA 2
MINUSCA 1
MINUSMA 1 # of units deployed
MONUSCO 1

All new units deployed were deployed from the PCRS.

Source: Strategic Force Generation Cell

UNDECLARED CAVEATS:

MINUSMA is the only mission that reported undeclared caveats (2) during the reporting period, compared to a total of 8 reported in 2022, of which 7 were reported by MINUSMA and 1 by MINURSO. DPO is currently working on an SOP to trace and identify undeclared caveats and outline the working parameters to manage them with T/PCCs.

Source: Inputs from missions

PRIORITY 3 — CAPABILITIES & MINDSETS

PARTICIPATION OF WOMEN IN PEACEKEEPING

The deployment of uniformed women is stable or growing across all categories. **All categories exceeded the targets of the Uniformed Gender Parity Strategy (UGPS) except for military contingents.** Missions are working to strengthen the enabling environment by improving facilities, infrastructure, health care, support services, and feedback mechanisms for women in peacekeeping.

Deployment of uniformed women over time (% of deployed personnel)

Bar chart values:
- Military contingents: 6%
- Staff officers & Military observers: 21%
- Formed police units: 16%
- Individual police officers: 31%
- Justice & Corrections GPP: 40%

Military contingents
- Dec-18: 4% → Apr-23: 6.5%
- Target, 10%

Staff officers + Military observers
- Dec-18: 11% → Apr-23: 21.5%
- Target, 20%

Formed police units
- Dec-18: 9% → Apr-23: 15.8%
- Target, 13%

Individual police officers
- Dec-18: 22% → Apr-23: 31.4%
- Target, 24%

Data refers to all uniformed personnel deployed by the UN (SPMs and PKOs). Source: UGPS

Creating an enabling environment for women peacekeepers

Several missions took forward gender-responsive infrastructure projects supported by the DOS Elsie Initiative for Field Missions project and the Elsie Initiative Fund.

MINUSCA: For the existing 66 camps, efforts are made to create accommodation clusters for uniformed women to the extent possible. The mission is implementing two pilot projects for outdoor and indoor recreation activities for women peacekeepers within their living accommodation areas.

MONUSCO: 17 projects are implemented to improve accommodation for military and police women peacekeepers. 164 women are direct beneficiaries. As a result, the ratio of shared ablutions has improved, living accommodations were refurbished, and dedicated recreational areas constructed.

UNFICYP: An outdoor and indoor recreational space was refurbished. Women's accommodation and ablution facilities have been established, and a gender audit is set up to standardize feedback during each military rotation.

UNISFA: A living accommodation cluster was constructed for military women. The project consists of new facilities for living accommodations, shared ablutions, laundry, and outdoor and indoor recreational spaces.

PRIORITY 4 — ACCOUNTABILITY TO PEACEKEEPERS

### SAFETY AND SECURITY OF PEACEKEEPERS

Security situation of countries with highest number of peacekeeping fatalities: While the number of violent incidents remained relatively steady in CAR and South Sudan since 2017, Mali and the DRC have seen relative increases, with Mali seeing a spike in 2022

**Violent incidents* in host countries of largest Peacekeeping missions**

Source: ACLED. * Incidents incl: Battles, Explosions/Remote violence, Protests, Riots & Violence against civilians | Data as of 16 July 2023

Conflict related fatalities in CAR, South Sudan, DRC, and Mali (2021-2022)

	2021	2022
CAR	1708	↓ 839
SOUTH SUDAN	2160	↔ 2244
DRC	6214	↔ 6404
MALI	1913	↑ 4867

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
Peacekeeping fatalities: Malicious acts remain the second highest cause of peacekeeping fatalities among uniformed personnel. Illness remains the highest cause. In 2023, illness accounted for 45% of fatalities, whereas malicious acts were responsible for 1/3rd. An increasing proportion of peacekeeping fatalities resulting from malicious acts are caused by explosive ordnance (EOs), including improvised explosive devices (IEDs). In 2023, MINUSMA and MONUSCO account for 83% and 17% of all fatalities, respectively.

Causes of uniformed Peacekeeping fatalities (2017 – 2023*)

- Malicious Act
- Illness
- Others

Source: NOTICAS | * All data as of 15 July 2023

Causes of uniformed Peacekeeping fatalities in 2023*

Malicious Act 33%
Illness 45%

Total uniformed Peacekeeping fatalities from malicious acts and % of those fatalities caused by EOs/IEDs (2017 – 2023*)

Peacekeeper fatalities due to Malicious Acts — % caused by IEDs

PRIORITY 4 — ACCOUNTABILITY TO PEACEKEEPERS

COUNTER IED AND EO* EFFORTS IN MISSIONS MOST AFFECTED

Significant progress has been achieved in implementing the recommendations of the Security Council-requested independent strategic review (ISR) on the UN response to explosive ordnance threats (S/2021/1042). This includes by **enhancing the mandates of the most affected missions, improving the training and equipping of uniformed contingents, strengthening peacekeeping intelligence capabilities, and supporting national capacities in countering IEDs and deploying the requisite IED Disposal (IEDD)/EO Disposal (EOD) units.** To enable this progress, ten statements of unit requirements for units deploying to MINUSMA, MONUSCO, and MINUSCA were revised to refine the requisite skills and equipment required to effectively operate within this threat environment.

Maneuver units with trained search and detect teams

MINUSMA: **100%**
MINUSCA**: **50%** — 4
MONUSCO: **0%** — 14

Total units in mission: 9

■ Maneuver units with trained search and detect teams

EO/IED Awareness Training among uniformed personnel (%)

MONUSCO **3%**
MINUSMA **100%**
MINUSCA** **40%**

EOs detected in missions with an explosive threat environment (%)

MONUSCO **45%**
MINUSMA **45%**
MINUSCA **25%**

IEDD/EODD units deployed

MINUSCA	✓ **1x** force level EOD platoon ✓ **4x** embedded EOD elements in sector engineer units

| MINUSMA	✓ **2x** force level EOD companies ✓ **1x** embedded EOD team in combat convoy company ✓ **1x** UNMAS response team

MONUSCO	✓ **1x** force level EOD platoon ✓ **1x** UNMAS response team

Source: UNMAS, data for current reporting period (Nov 2022 – April 2023); * The term Explosive Ordnance (EO) is referring to the use of other types of EO such as military munitions and explosives, while the subset term Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) describes the use of homemade or non-standard explosive devices. | ** MINUSCA data refers to **Western Sector only** (3,000 uniformed personnel) and not total number of uniformed personnel in mission. Western Sector is considered affected by IED and EO threat

CONTEXT: EO and IED* threat in peacekeeping settings most affected

The missions in CAR, DRC, and Mali are those most affected by EO and IED threats. While EO incidents in **CAR** decreased since 2021, 2022 witnessed the first peacekeeper fatality caused by EOs and the first clear case of a device made with homemade explosives. Since 2021, **DRC** reports significant levels of IED activity. Additionally, a change in tactics by some armed actors to target civilians increases risks to MONUSCO personnel. **Mali** experiences high levels of IED activity directed at MINUSMA, and terrorists circumvent electronic countermeasures.

Incidents and Casualties (Injury + fatality) caused by EOs/IEDs

CAR***
■ Incidents ■ PK Casualties ■ Civilian Casualties

DRC
■ Incidents ■ PK Casualties ■ Civilian Casualties

Mali
■ Incidents ■ PK Casualties ■ Civilian Casualties

*** Data for CAR includes other Explosive Ordnance (EO) intentionally emplaced. | Source: UNMAS; Data as of end of April 2023

PRIORITY 4 — ACCOUNTABILITY TO PEACEKEEPERS

IMPROVED MEDICAL CARE

Ensuring that systems to enhance safety and security, including medical facilities, are fit for purpose is key to mitigating the consequences of these risks. This includes ensuring peacekeepers have timely evacuation in the event of an injury to receive appropriate care. **Efforts to prosecute perpetrators of crimes against peacekeepers are also important to deter attacks in the first place**.

Illness is the highest cause of fatalities among peacekeeping personnel. Several initiatives such as a new CASEVAC policy are being rolled out across missions to improve response time to medical emergencies.

Note: This time period covers the global COVID pandemic, which increased fatalities due to illness/ injury.

MONUSCO	83
MINUSCA	71
MINUSMA	61
UNMISS	53
UNAMID	35
UNISFA	13
UNIFIL	9
UNDOF	5
UNMIL	4
MINURSO	4
UNOCI	1
UNMIK	1

340 civilian and uniformed peacekeeper fatalities (49%) resulting from illness (2017-2023)

Medical facilities ✚

	# Hospitals	# of reports due in the period	% Hospitals with evaluation received	CASEVAC SOP Updated following new policy in 2020	# CASEVAC exercises Nov 2022 – April 2023
MINURSO	1	1	0%	✓	2
MINUSCA	4	1	100%	Under Review	0
MINUSMA	4	1	100%	✓	15
MONUSCO	4	3	100%	✓	3
UNDOF	1	1	100%	✓	5
UNIFIL	2	2	100%	✓	15
UNISFA	1	0	N/A	Under Review	3
UNMISS	6	4	75%	Under Review	3

Note: DHMOSH regularly reviews and analyzes the information and data from the UN peacekeeping hospital evaluation tool to improve healthcare delivery to UN Peacekeepers. Level 1+, Level 2 and Level 3 Hospitals in Peacekeeping Operations are evaluated on a rolling basis based on their rotation dates. Not all hospitals may be due to be evaluated in a reporting period, this is indicated by N/A. Hospitals with two evaluations submitted during the reporting period are counted only once.

Source: NOTICAS as of 1 July 2023

Source: DHMOSH | Inputs from missions

PRIORITY 4   ACCOUNTABILITY TO PEACEKEEPERS

IMPROVED CAMP DEFENSE AND SECURITY OF TEMPORARY OPERATING BASES (TOBs)

On 1 Jan 2023, a new **Policy on the Integration of Capabilities for Defence of Bases (IBD)** went into effect and is being rolled out across missions. Some examples include the following:

In **MINUSMA**, the Mopti Regional Office established a "Joint Base Defence Plan Approval Committee" to exercise oversight of its "Joint Base Defence Plan." This plan was developed in an integrated manner with uniformed and civilian components.

In **MINUSCA**, an IBD governance mechanism was established under the authority of the Force Commander to ensure the effective integration of all systems of protective security across mission components.

89% of all TOBs have improved force protection*

62% of all camps across the 12 missions have improved base defense and integrated security initiatives

* Standards and status of force protection for TOBs can defer according to the operational environment of respective Missions and duration of deployment. | Source: Inputs from Missions; OMA/CMOS; FPS

INVESTIGATION AND PROSECUTION OF CRIMES AGAINST PEACEKEEPERS

The Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions (OROLSI) tracks the judicial processes relating to crimes committed against peacekeepers. Data is available from 2013 for MONUSCO, MINUSCA and MINUSMA, the three mission settings with the highest number of fatalities caused by malicious acts and is reported cumulatively. In the case of MONUSCO, statistics include investigations, detentions and convictions relating to the high-profile assassination of two UN experts in 2017, noting that they were not peacekeepers.

128 (46%) of cases reported have been investigated by host state authorities

TOTAL	46%	276
MONUSCO	70%	53
MINUSMA	27%	172
MINUSCA	88%	51

71 (52%) of alleged perpetrators from individual cases brought before courts of host state were convicted

TOTAL	52%	136
MONUSCO	58%	86
MINUSMA	100%	10
MINUSCA	28%	40

237 (81%) of alleged perpetrators identified were detained

Total	81%	294
MONUSCO	68%	85
MINUSMA	100%	43
MINUSCA	82%	166

Source: OROLSI/ Justice and Corrections

## PRIORITY 5 — ACCOUNTABILITY OF PEACEKEEPERS

PERFORMANCE

Peacekeepers have a responsibility to deliver on the mandate entrusted to them with the highest level of commitment. They are also expected to demonstrate respect towards the population of the host country. **To track progress on 'Accountability of Peacekeepers', we look at three components: performance of peacekeeping personnel, efforts to address misconduct among peacekeepers, and mission efforts on environmental management.**

Military Performance (% units evaluated)

During the reporting period, 81 evaluations of military units were submitted across 7 missions. Given rotation timelines, a unit may be evaluated more than once during a given reporting period. Not all units are scheduled to be evaluated in any given 6 month cycle.

Number of unit evaluations submitted, November 2022 – April 2023

	MINUSCA (37)	UNIFIL (43)	MONUSCO (41)	UNMISS (32)	UNDOF (12)	UNFICYP (8)	MINUSMA (44)
Evaluations	27	15	10	10	9	9	1

Total units in Mission shown in parentheses.

Work is ongoing to improve and revise the current military unit performance evaluation system. In-mission measures to improve performance include Performance Improvement Plans (PIPs) and tailored training. As part of remedial measures, UNHQ may engage with TCCs and help identify options for pre-deployment training and equipment provision. Military Skill Validations in TCCs can be triggered to ensure UN military performance standards are incorporated and lessons learned integrated in following rotations.

Source: Office of Military Affairs

Civilian Performance (2021-2022 Performance Management Cycle)

Eight-seven percent of eligible civilian personnel in peacekeeping missions and DPO HQ were who were eligible for evaluation in the 2021-2022 performance management period, were assessed as either meeting or exceeding expectations. 13% of eligible personnel were not evaluated. <1% of eligible personnel were assessed as having partially met or did not meet expectations.

Exceeded Expectations	Met Expectations	Partially met Expectations	Not Evaluated
30.9	55.7	0.5	12.9

Source: DMSPC/ Office for Human Resources

Police Performance (% units receiving rating)

The Police Division undertakes Quarterly Performance Reviews and conducts Annual Performance Assessments. During the reporting period (1 Nov 2022 – 30 Apr 2023), 35 of 36 (97%) of police units in MINUSCA, MINUSMA, MONUSCO, and UNMISS were evaluated. MONUSCO FPU performance assessment and evaluation reports, although conducted, were not included. FPUs implement recommendations emanating from performance assessments and evaluation reports to address any shortfalls together with police contributing countries as needed – particularly related to contingent owned equipment or command and control.

	UNMISS	MINUSMA	MINUSCA
Outstanding			
Excellent			
Good		71%	
Satisfactory	67 %	29%	100%
Needs Improvement	33 %		
Needs significant improvement			
Unsatisfactory			

Note: as of 1 February 2023, the evaluation systems changed from the old 4-point scale tool to the new 7-point scale tool (outstanding, excellent, good, satisfactory, needs improvement, needs significant improvement, unsatisfactory). For the completion rate, numbers were calculated using both the old and new tools. For the evaluation results, only the new tool was used.
Source: Police Division

PRIORITY 5 ACCOUNTABILITY OF PEACEKEEPERS

IMPROVED ENVIRONMENTAL ADAPTATION AND MITIGATION MEASURES

ENGAGEMENT WITH MEMBER STATES TO STRENGTHEN THE CONDUCT OF PEACEKEEPING PERSONNEL

The Department of Operational Support (DOS) tracks overall performance of missions using a Mission Environment Management Scorecard. All missions, except for UNMIK had an improved performance in FY 2021/22, compared to FY 2020/21.

	Mission Environmental Scorecard 2021/22, relative to 2020/21	% mission sites where wastewater is assessed to pose minimum risk (as of June 2022)	Generators fuel consumption (L/ per Capita/day) (as of June 2022)
UNTSO	86 ↑	64%	1.48
UNFICYP	91 ↑	100%	0.05
MINURSO	61 ↑	77%	4.03
UNMOGIP	72 ↑	100%	0.42
UNIFIL	85 ↑	100%	4.62
UNDOF	86 ↑	100%	4.28
MINUSMA	74 ↑	77%	6.35
UNISFA	84 ↑	76%	5.49
MONUSCO	82 ↑	100%	1.79
MINUSCA	74 ↑	31%	2.66
UNMIK	88 ↓	25%	0.04
UNMISS	74 ↑	52%	3.96

Source: DOS/ Environmental Section

106 Member States — *Signatories to the Secretary General's voluntary compact on eliminating sexual exploitation and abuse*

17 Projects — *Supported by the Trust Fund on support to victims of Sexual Exploitation and Abuse*

24 Member States — *Provide voluntary contributions to the Trust Fund on support to Victims of Sexual exploitation and abuse*

39 Member States — *Shared good practices related to conduct and discipline with secretariat*

Source: DMSPC/ Conduct & Discipline

PRIORITY 6 — STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION

STRENGTHENING PROACTIVE COMMUNICATION

A global communications campaign was launched to strengthen understanding of mission roles, responsibilities, and capacities, demonstrate the tangible impact of peacekeeping, and address mis-disinformation. The campaign harnessed compelling human-focused storytelling from the field, including testimony from peacekeepers and the communities we serve. During the reporting period, #PeaceBeginswithMe was mentioned 21,300 times by 16,900 unique users, resulting in 211,300 engagements. For the first time, a peacekeeping host country, South Sudan, featured among the top 10 engagement locations.

The first-ever Strategic Review of Strategic Communication by UN Peacekeeping was reported to the Security Council, identifying several priority areas for improvement. In response, 10 strategic communications trainings were delivered to mission leaders, Force Commanders, Police Commissioners, and uniformed officers to improve capabilities. Eight of the 12 missions now have approved communication strategies in place, and efforts are underway to also strengthen understanding of perceptions of missions to better shape communication responses, as per the UNMISS example below.

ADDRESSING MIS- and DISINFORMATION

A survey of missions analyzing the impact of mis-disinformation (below) revealed that it continues to be among the biggest challenges, including on the communication front. A dedicated DPO team is rolling out guidance as well as digital tools and training to help detect, analyze, and respond. The team visited MINUSCA and MINUSMA to help develop action plans. Missions have also stepped up their efforts. In the reporting period:

- **MONUSCO** provided training to parliamentarians and media and launched a Relay Club for university students to promote sharing of accurate content on social media.
- **UNMIK** conducted three workshops for fact-checkers and journalists, four media literacy sessions for youth, produced six television programmes, and facilitated 51 articles debunking false information.
- **UNISFA** held training workshops with media and local communities to strengthen understanding of their mandate.
- **MINUSCA** conducted a sustained campaign to strengthen awareness through public meetings and radio shows and UNFICYP hosted 12 media visits.

Results from Annual Perception and Public Opinion Surveys commissioned by UNMISS on local perspectives of the mission

% of respondents who have a positive assessment of UNMISS' performance in protecting civilians and building a durable peace — 83% (2019), 92% (2020), 87% (2021), 95% (2023)

% respondents who believe that Radio Miraya is an impartial radio station that provides fair, balanced and accurate information — 56% (2019), 76% (2020), 79% (2021), 92% (2023)

% of respondents who believe that the presence and activities of UNMISS make women feel safer — 52% (2019), 63% (2020), 60% (2021), 75% (2023)

Source: UNMISS. *Surveys were conducted by an independent firm on the basis of a sample distributed proportionally to the population size within the 10 states in South Sudan*

Peacekeeping Personnel survey on the occurrence and impact of mis- and disinformation in peacekeeping settings

Impact on safety and security — 49% (2022), 66% (2023)
Impact on activities — 48% (2022), 65% (2023)
Occurrence — 47% (2022), 53% (2023)

% respondents from 5 largest missions who reported a critical/ severe impact of mis- and disinformation

Source: Source: Mis/Disinfo surveys for PKM Personnel: Jun'23 with n = 261; Mar'22 with n = 242 (excluding ~380 duplicated, erroneous, or non-organic responses).

PRIORITY 7 COOPERATION WITH HOST COUNTRIES

STATUS OF FORCE AGREEMENTS

Seven missions reported a total of 174 violations of Status of Force Agreements (SOFA) during the current reporting period, with important variations across missions, owing to the vastly differing operational and political contexts, mission sizes and mandates of current peacekeeping operations. Missions and HQ are proactively seeking to address them, but doing so often requires the support of Member States.

UNIFIL continues to request the Lebanese authorities to ensure the mission has unrestricted freedom of movement, and that the safety and security of peacekeepers is ensured, to facilitate the full implementation of its mandate. The mission reported seventeen SOFA violations.

MINURSO reports that violations are raised regularly, including in yearly reports of the Secretary-General to the Security Council. The mission reported six SOFA violations.

MINUSMA* reported ten SOFA violations.

MINUSCA continued its engagement with national authorities to proactively address compliance with the status-of-forces agreement, in particular impediments to freedom of movement, restrictions on the utilization of aviation assets, and detention of United Nations personnel. Sustained engagement by MINUSCA leadership with national authorities resulted in the lifting of the ban on night flights for medical and casualty evacuations and for support to MINUSCA or national security and defence forces engaged in operations. The mission reported fifty-six SOFA violations.

In **UNISFA**, issues include the presence of security forces from Sudan and South Sudan inside the Abyei area, which UNISFA has worked to address by engaging with both governments to end this presence, monitoring and limiting the actions of these elements, and raising the issue to the attention of the Security Council through the periodic SG reports. The mission reported three SOFA violations.

In **UNMISS**, most of incidents are related to restrictions of movement and interference with the implementation of the mandated tasks. Of note were restrictions of movement imposed by the South Sudan People's Defence Forces and National Security Service on UNMISS patrols to assess civilians' security situation and safety. This information is conveyed to the Security Council through regular reporting. The mission reported seventy-one SOFA violations.

MONUSCO reported fourteen SOFA violations.

The designations employed and the presentation of the material on this map do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the Secretariat of the United Nations concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city, or area or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries. Also, the boundaries and names shown, and the designations used in this publication do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations. Final status of the Abyei area is not yet determined. Final boundary between the Republic of Sudan and the Republic of South Sudan has not yet been determined. Source: UN Geospatial

*At the request of the Transitional Government of Mali, the Security Council terminated MINUSMA's mandate under resolution 2640 (2022) on 30 June. Source: Inputs from missions and Regional Desks, HQ