Improving Security of United Nations Peacekeepers
Action Plan for Implementation of Fatalities Report

9 April 2018

Part I: Actions Taken

At the Field Level

1. Changing Mindset:
   - Command and control (C2) arrangements at all levels strengthened, including through visits of Force Commanders, Police Commissioners and other senior leadership to high-risk field locations to instruct personnel to take a more proactive posture, by improving communications infrastructure at high-risk locations; and by reviewing decision-making and crisis-management mechanisms;
   - Centralized/integrated planning and coordination between United Nations (UN) components (civilian, military, police) and national entities clarified and in place, leading to coordinated or joint operations and actions to enhance security that included arrest of suspected attackers and area control operations;
   - Contingency planning for Formed Police Units (FPU) completed and enhanced; and
   - Proactive/integrated operations to dominate vulnerable areas/security zones undertaken, targeting zones where attacks against peacekeepers and civilians appear to be on the rise;
   - Engaged T/PCCs responsible for executing tasks essential to security to ensure the proper mindset for high-risk tasks and remediate shortcomings in operational readiness

2. Improving Capacity:
   - Shortfalls in Contingent-Owned Equipment (COE) identified and reported (including critical equipment that impact on safety and security);
   - Medical support arrangements reviewed with the goal of meeting the 10-1-2 concept;
   - Mission-specific training requirements submitted by missions and disseminated to Troop- and Police-Contributing Countries (T/PCC); and
   - In-mission training guidance/methodologies reviewed to address operational needs.

3. Threat-Oriented Mission Footprint:
   - Operational deployment/mission footprint review is ongoing, including during strategic reviews;
   - Force protection measures in priority operational deployment locations enhanced; and
   - Safety and security audit of all deployment areas and Main Supply Routes (MSR) commenced, enhancing physical security measures within current resourcing priorities.

4. Enhancing Accountability:
   - Action initiated to identify contingents/units and officials with significant performance issues; and
   - Two persons suspected of attacking UN peacekeepers in CAR arrested by MINUSCA police; MINUSCA supported national authorities in successfully extraditing suspects in fatal attacks on peacekeepers.
5. **Miscellaneous:**
   - Increased coordination with host-state police to enhance security awareness, and re-emphasise host-state responsibilities.

   **At Headquarters Level**

1. **Changing Mindset:**
   - Guidance to missions on operational readiness, mindset and proactive actions issued, through a visit by the Deputy Military Adviser to CAR; monthly high-level videoconferences; written guidance by code cable, and at a workshop in Entebbe convening all five missions;
   - Visit to MINUSCA and MINUSMA to gauge key challenges faced by missions in implementing the Action Plan undertaken; and
   - Strategic communication to reduce fatalities undertaken, through public information releases, discussion with key member states, policy and academic institutions, and other constituencies.

2. **Improving Capacity:**
   - T/PCCs briefed and sensitised on the need for:
     - Improving military/police skills and mission-specific training;
     - Making-up COE shortfalls; and
     - Addressing caveats.
   - Member States providing capacity-building support engaged for strengthening pre-deployment training delivery to T/PCCs; and to address shortfalls/deploy specialized equipment;
   - Member States sensitised on the concept of Specialised Police Teams;
   - Centre of Excellence for Stability Police Units (COESPU) reached out to conduct FPU Commanders and Coordinators Courses;
   - Strengthened the role of military and police gender and protection advisers supported by trained gender focal points embedded within Office of Military Affairs and Police Division;
   - Casualty Evacuation (CASEVAC) Policy approved;
   - Working Group established to review the Terms of Reference for Headquarters and Field 'COE MOU Management Review Boards' (CMMRB) with focus on addressing TCC/PCC equipment shortfalls that impact on safety and security of peacekeepers;
   - Official communication to 20 T/PCCs with units experiencing material gaps of at least 10%. Includes top contributing Member States and those new to UN peacekeeping; and
   - A military sector commanders course conducted in Entebbe to emphasis action plans.

3. **Threat-Oriented Mission Footprint:**
   - Review of operational deployment/mission footprint, including during strategic reviews, commenced.

4. **Enhancing Accountability:**
   - Detailed draft paper prepared with recommendations on the way forward to address impunity and ensure accountability for crimes against peacekeepers;
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• Orientation of mission footprint to threats considered by MINUSCA joint military and police capability study; and
• Outreach to Member States commenced.

5. Miscellaneous:
• Missions supported in re-emphasising safety and security of peacekeepers; and tracking and reporting progress;
• An implementation support workshop organised in Entebbe, bringing together implementation teams from Headquarters and five high-risk missions in strategizing and implementing concrete steps in improving safety and security of peacekeepers; and
• The first TCC pre-deployment visit planned to measure performance.

Part II: Actions in Progress

Actions at the Field Level

1. Changing Mindset:
a. By end May 2018:
   • Analyse political strategy and engagement to determine linkages to security problems;
   • Develop/revise mission plans and gender-responsive and protection oriented threat analysis that identify specific security vulnerabilities, threats and risks to women and men;
   • Establish integrated and coordinated surveillance and response measures;
   • Institute measures to improve situational awareness; and
   • Generate actionable, tactical, peacekeeping intelligence, emphasizing the need for contingents to carry out peacekeeping intelligence activities.

b. June 2018 and beyond:
   • Enhance peacekeeping intelligence in mission planning and decision-making processes;
   • Undertake peacekeeping intelligence-led operations primarily for the security of uniformed personnel and protection of civilians;
   • Systemize analysis and identification of early warning indicators that inform mission security planning and strategies; and
   • Improve outreach and engagement with communities – particularly women and the youth groups/associations/leadership as it contributes to more holistic situational awareness and intelligence.

2. Improving Capacity:
a. By end May 2018:
   • Support Headquarters level pre-deployment operational verification readiness visits/activities;
   • Identify and report requirement of mission-specific additional capabilities (night vision, counter improvised explosive device [IED], protected mobility, etc.) to Headquarters;
- Strengthen IED threat mitigation project (MINUSMA specific);
- Strengthen Joint Operations Centre (JOC) and Joint Mission Analysis Centre (JMAC) role and functions;
- Organise specialised in-mission training, exercises and simulations to address identified performance issues, ensure maintenance of key contingent/unit skills, and stress-test threat mitigation and crisis response measures;

b. *June 2018 and beyond:*
- Provide to Headquarters the final assessment of staff officers or field commanders on their suitability for future UN employment;
- Deploy gender, women, and child protection advisers/focal points to Sector Headquarters level to strengthen prevention and response measures against serious human rights violations and in particular, sexual violence including conflict-related sexual violence (CRSV), specifically against women and children; and
- Ensure sustained quality/timely logistics support to enhance operational effectiveness.
- Strengthen Integrated Mission Training Cells (IMTC) to deliver advanced level in-mission refresher and remedial training to uniformed personnel;
- Combine/synchronize COE verification inspection together with stress testing of operational employment of the equipment and personnel i.e. Operational Readiness Inspections (ORI); and
- Analyse and simplify in-mission procedures for timely provision of support services.
- Introduce military and police Female Engagement Teams (FET) to conduct mixed patrols to strengthen community engagement and situational awareness;

3. **Threat-Oriented Mission Footprint:**
   a. *By end May 2018:*
   - Complete safety and security audit of all deployments and MSR;
   - Issue instructions on force protection, emphasizing contingent/unit responsibility;
   - Prioritise provision of defence stores and enabling capacity for high-risk deployment locations; and
   - Conduct troops/police to task review for logistics support activities in high-risk missions.

   b. *June 2018 and beyond:*
   - Re-adjust mission footprint/deployments to optimise operational effectiveness; and
   - Ensure effective levels of force protection standards for static and temporary deployments and mobile columns.

4. **Enhancing Accountability:**
   a. *By end May 2018:*
   - Identify and report on contingents/units/officials with significant performance issues;
   - Report on formal/informal operational “caveats” to Headquarters; and
   - Increase mission’s technical and material support to national justice and law enforcement authorities for the investigation and prosecution of serious crimes committed against peacekeepers.
b. \textit{June 2018 and beyond}:  
- Increase political and technical engagement with host countries to address impunity and ensure accountability for crimes against peacekeepers; and  
- Continue to take measures to bring perpetrators of attacks, including those against UN peacekeepers, to justice.

5. \textbf{Miscellaneous:}  
   a. \textit{By end May 2018}:  
      - Stress-test mission operational and contingency plans.
   
   b. \textit{June 2018 and beyond}:  
      - Submit report on progress of implementation and outstanding issues.

\section*{Actions at Headquarters level}

1. \textbf{Changing Mindset:}  
   a. \textit{By end May 2018}:  
      - Review strategic guidance documents and issue directives to the five high-risk missions;  
      - Support operational and tactical planning in the field missions;  
      - Issue Force Commanders Directives and updated TCC Guidelines; and  
      - Engage with T/PCCs deploying to Chapter VII missions to incorporate in training programs issues related to mindset, operational challenges and mandated tasks to ensure only operationally ready and capable units are deployed in complex peacekeeping environments.
   
   b. \textit{June 2018 and beyond}:  
      - Strengthen the selection, training and mentoring system for senior mission leadership;  
      - Develop guidance on mobile peacekeeping operations in coordination with missions;  
      - Address peacekeeping intelligence-related issues through the implementation of the Peacekeeping Intelligence Policy, including the development of operational guidance documents on military intelligence, intelligence-led policing, acquisition of intelligence, handling and security of intelligence and the use of UAS; and  
      - Strengthen advocacy with T/PCC’s to increase the number of women in deployments to enhance building trust, outreach to communities and operational effectiveness.

2. \textbf{Improving Capacity:}  
   a. \textit{By end May 2018}:  
      - Review the Statement of Unit Requirements (SUR), Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) and Letter of Assist (LOA) to cover, among others, self-sustainment for force protection measures and embedding of peacekeeping intelligence capability within contingents/units;  
      - Ensure the most up-to-date SURs, MOUs, and LOAs are systematically shared with respective Missions;  
      - Review the need for and propose initiatives for the coherent use of technology solutions/systems for better force protection;
b. June 2018 and beyond:

- Reform the force generation and selection process based on revised baseline standards; and apply stringent scrutiny of all contingents and units as well as individually deployed military and police officers to be generated;
- Develop an enhanced military and police pre-deployment verification model to ascertain the operational readiness of contingents and advise on necessary remedial measures; and commence pre-deployment verification for deployments to high-risk missions;
- Facilitate external pre-deployment training support for identified T/PCCs;
- Support identified T/PCCs and field missions through enhanced Mobile Training Teams;
- Restructure Force/Police Headquarters in coordination with high-risk missions;
- Develop and execute a Battalion Commanders Course based upon UN Infantry Battalion Manual and other operational guidance;
- Develop an in-mission training programme to strengthen the military decision-making process of military staff officers;
- Based on operational guidance, develop training for the police and military planners in the missions to incorporate peacekeeper security and protection considerations in their tactical and operational plans;
- Review the COE reimbursement mechanism and propose to Member States tying reimbursement rates to performance and usage, and explore whether further penalties can be leveraged for key critical operational deficiencies;
- Consider pre-payment of COE reimbursement for T/PCC to speed-up procurement and pre-deployment training and preparations;
- Identify sourcing solutions for additional capabilities (night vision, counter IED, protected mobility, etc.);
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- Narrow the gap between the SUR and the finalized MOU and seek mission agreement on any waiver of capability accepting reduced operational capacity with an impact on security;
- Consider deploying UN Owned Equipment (UNOE) to support T/PCCs to address shortfalls in operationally critical equipment (consider training, operating, maintenance requirements as well);
- Generate and deploy only mission capable and fully verified contingents and units;
- Explore a mechanism to address Urgent Operational Requirements (UORs) emerging from changing field dynamics that require amendment to the COE manual without waiting the full 3-year COE Working Group cycle;
- Strengthen the role of Headquarters and Field CMMRB to address operational impact of COE shortfalls directly with T/PCC including timely feedback to Missions; and
- Identify and replace unutilised or heavily underutilised equipment and those vehicles/equipment that cannot be airlifted for strategic mobility.

3. Threat-Oriented Mission Footprint:
   a. By end May 2018:
      - Develop and implement operational standards for joint force protection and security coordination of integrated operational bases; and
      - Recommend a threat oriented mission-footprint through joint military and police capability studies of MINUSMA, MONUSCO and UNMISS.

   b. June 2018 and beyond:
      - Support adoption of measures to adjust footprint, including according to recommendations of strategic reviews.

4. Enhancing Accountability:
   a. By end May 2018:
      - Include performance history in the Military and Police Capabilities Studies conducted in support of strategic reviews;
      - Continue engagement with T/PCCs on accountability to address COE and self-sustainment shortfalls, preventive maintenance, repairs and timely deployment/replacement;
      - Initiate remediation measures to address performance and capacity issues of officials, contingents and units;
      - Issue detailed guidance to field missions to address impunity and ensure accountability for crimes against peacekeepers; and
      - Request host countries to provide information on the outcome of investigative and prosecutorial processes in the cases of crimes against peacekeepers.

   b. June 2018 and beyond:
      - Increase advocacy measures for serious crimes committed against peacekeepers; and
      - Develop interim guidance for support to national authorities for the investigation and prosecution of serious crimes against peacekeepers, political follow-up strategies and the establishment of monitoring procedures and follow-up mechanisms.
5. **Miscellaneous:**

a. *By end May 2018:*
   - Implement mechanism for stress-testing Mission leadership planning, execution and response to operational crisis situations, including CASEVAC operations.

b. *June 2018 and beyond:*
   - Review/revise the current civilian leadership performance assessment tools (Head of Mission Compact/Head of Mission Performance Assessment); and
   - Issue revised “Authority, Command and Control” Policy.