For information on the events preceding the establishment of UNTAC please see the United Nations Advance Mission in Cambodia (UNAMIC)

Paris Agreements signed, Political agreement, Sovereignty and rehabilitation, Implementation plan, Initial period (March-April 1992)

Announcement of phase II, Tokyo Conference, Negotiation with PDK, Situation by the end of July 1992, Adoption of the electoral law, Efforts to persuade PDK fail, Suspension of phase II

Deteriorating security situation, Relations with SNC, Continuing difficulties, Registration of voters and political parties, Protection of natural resources

Campaigning begins, Elections

Head of State chosen, Withdrawal plans, Mandate ends, United Nations liaison team

Electoral component, Human rights, Military component, Mine clearance, Civil administration, Civilian police, Repatriation, Rehabilitation, Information/education activities



Paris Agreements signed

The Agreements on a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict were signed in Paris on 23 October 1991 at the final meeting of the Paris Conference on Cambodia. They were the culmination of more than a decade of negotiations in which the United Nations had been closely involved from the outset. The Agreements, also known as the Paris Agreements, invited the Security Council to establish the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) and to provide it with the mandate set out in the Agreements. The Council fully supported the Paris Agreements in its resolution 718 (1991) of 31 October 1991 and requested the Secretary-General to prepare a detailed plan of implementation.

The final session of the Paris Conference on Cambodia met from 1 to 23 October 1991. Cambodia was represented by the Supreme National Council (SNC), with Prince Sihanouk as its Chairman. Also present were the five permanent members of the Security Council, the six members of ASEAN, Australia, Canada, India, Japan, Laos and Viet Nam. Yugoslavia attended in its capacity as Chairman of the Non-Aligned Movement. The peace plan that emerged from the Paris Conference became known as the Agreements on a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict. The Agreements consisted of a Final Act and three instruments: the Agreement on a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict; the Agreement concerning the Sovereignty, Independence, Territorial Integrity and Inviolability, Neutrality and National Unity of Cambodia; and the Declaration on the Rehabilitation and Reconstruction of Cambodia.

Political agreement

The first instrument consisted of 9 parts, with 5 detailed annexes, including one which set out the mandate of UNTAC. It also defined a transitional period beginning with the entry into force of the Paris Agreements, i.e. 23 October 1991, and ending when a Constituent Assembly, elected in conformity with the Agreements, approved the new Cambodian Constitution and transformed itself into a legislative assembly, creating a new Cambodian Government. SNC was declared the Aunique legitimate body and source of authority in which, throughout the transitional period, the sovereignty, independence and unity of Cambodia are enshrined. SNC would represent Cambodia externally and would occupy the seat of Cambodia at the United Nations. The members of SNC were Acommitted to the holding of free and fair elections organized and conducted by the United Nations as the basis for forming a new and legitimate government.

The United Nations Security Council was to establish a transitional authority, UNTAC, and the Secretary-General would designate a Special Representative to act on his behalf. SNC would delegate to the United Nations Aall powers necessary to ensure the implementation of the Agreement. SNC would offer advice to UNTAC, which would comply provided there was consensus among the members of SNC and provided the advice was consistent with the objectives of the Agreement. In the absence of consensus, the Chairman of SNC would be entitled to make the decision on what advice to offer to UNTAC, taking fully into account the views expressed in SNC. Should the Chairman be unable to make such a decision, his power of decision would transfer to the Secretary-General's Special Representative, who would make the final decision, taking fully into account the views expressed in SNC. Similar provisions applied to any power to act regarding the implementation of the Agreement. In all cases, the Secretary-General's Special Representative or his delegate would determine whether the advice or action of SNC was consistent with the Agreement. The Special Representative would attend the meetings of SNC and of any subsidiary body which might be established by it and give its members Aall necessary information on the decisions taken by UNTAC.

Administrative agencies, bodies and offices which could directly influence the outcome of elections would be placed under direct United Nations supervision or control. In that context, special attention would be given to foreign affairs, national defence, finance, public security and information. The Special Representative of the Secretary-General was given power to issue directives to those agencies, bodies and offices, with binding effect and to install United Nations personnel with unrestricted access to information and administrative operations, and to remove existing officers or reassign them. The civil police was to operate under UNTAC supervision and control. In consultation with SNC, UNTAC was also to supervise other law enforcement and judicial processes throughout Cambodia. Further, UNTAC was empowered to investigate and take remedial action on complaints and allegations against existing administrative structures regarding actions that were inconsistent with a comprehensive political settlement or worked against it.

A ceasefire and disengagement of forces, to be effected immediately after the signature of the Agreements, would be followed by the provision of information to UNTAC about the total strength of forces, their deployment, armaments, and locations, including the detailed record of mine fields and booby-traps. All forces were committed to refrain from all hostilities and from any deployment, movement or action which would extend the territory they controlled or which might lead to renewed fighting. Any foreign forces, advisers, and military personnel remaining in Cambodia, together with their weapons, ammunition, and equipment would be withdrawn from the country with verification by UNTAC. The forces of the Cambodian parties would be regrouped and restricted to cantonment areas, their weapons and ammunition stored, under arrangements verified by UNTAC, which was also charged with the investigation of violations. Prisoners of war and political prisoners would be released, and displaced Cambodians resettled. To ensure the smooth performance of all these functions, the Agreement called for the establishment of a mixed military working group with representatives of all Cambodian parties.

In consultation with SNC, UNTAC was to establish a system of laws, procedures and administrative measures necessary for the holding of a free and fair election in Cambodia. Included were an electoral law and a code of conduct regulating participation in the election in a manner consistent with respect for human rights and prohibiting coercion or financial inducement in order to influence voter preference. Existing laws which could defeat the objectives and purposes of the Agreement would be nullified. UNTAC was to design and implement a system of registering individual voters and parties, a system of balloting to ensure a free and fair vote, and arrangements to facilitate the presence of foreign observers of the campaign and voting. UNTAC would investigate complaints of electoral irregularities, take appropriate corrective action and determine whether the voting was free and fair. It would then certify the list of people duly elected. The duration of the whole process was not to exceed nine months from the commencement of voter registration.

In other provisions of the Agreement, Cambodia undertook to ensure respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and their observance in Cambodia. UNTAC was to develop and implement a programme of education to promote understanding of human rights and to provide for general human rights oversight during the transitional period. It would investigate complaints of abuse, taking corrective action when appropriate. The Agreement also set out the right of Cambodian refugees and displaced persons to return to their homes, as well as commitments by all signatories and acceding States to implement the Agreement. In the event of a violation or threat of violation, the two Co-Chairmen of the Paris Conference were committed, upon the request of the Secretary-General and without prejudice to the prerogatives of the Security Council, to Aimmediately undertake appropriate consultations with a view to taking appropriate steps to remedy the situation.

Sovereignty and rehabilitation

In the second of the three instruments, Cambodia undertook to Amaintain, preserve and defend its sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and inviolability, neutrality and national unity and to refrain from action that might affect the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and inviolability of other States, and to refrain from entering into any military alliances or other military agreements with other States that could be inconsistent with its neutrality. It also committed itself to refrain from permitting the introduction or stationing of foreign forces, including military personnel, in Cambodia unless it was done so pursuant to United Nations authorization for the implementation of the political settlement.

In the declaration on the rehabilitation and reconstruction of Cambodia, it was agreed that implementation of an international aid effort would have to be phased in over a period that acknowledged realistically the political and technical imperatives. The United Nations Secretary-General could help in the first phase by appointing a coordinator to meet immediate needs and lay the groundwork for future action. Longer term priorities for reconstruction were left to the government of Cambodia after the elections. Nevertheless, seeing the need to harmonize and monitor contributions, the Paris Conference suggested the formation of an International Committee on the Reconstruction of Cambodia (ICORC) and asked the Secretary-General to make special arrangements to support ICORC.

Implementation plan

The Secretary-General informed the Security Council of the adoption of the Paris Agreements on 30 October 1991. The Council welcomed the Agreements and noted the intention of the Secretary-General to send a survey mission to Cambodia to prepare a plan for the Council's approval. The Council also asked for a detailed estimate of the cost of UNTAC, Aon the understanding that this report would be the basis on which the Council would authorize the establishment of the Authority, the budget of which is to be subsequently considered and approved in accordance with the provisions of Article 17 of the Charter of the United Nations.

On 9 January 1992, Mr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, having succeeded Mr. Pérez de Cuéllar as Secretary-General, appointed Under-Secretary-General Yasushi Akashi (Japan) as his Special Representative for Cambodia. On 18 January 1992, in a letter to the President of the Security Council, the Secretary-General noted the widely recognized need for the urgent deployment of UNTAC and recalled the considerable lead time required to launch an operation. He had therefore decided to submit to the General Assembly a proposal for an initial appropriation of $200 million, which, upon approval of the implementation plan by the Security Council, should be made immediately available to pay for accommodation, transportation, communication and other support equipment and services. The General Assembly acceded to this request on 14 February 1992.

On 19 February 1992, the Secretary-General submitted to the Security Council the implementation plan for UNTAC. The mission would consist of seven distinct components: human rights, electoral, military, civil administration, civilian police, repatriation and rehabilitation.

Human rights component. The human rights component would concentrate its efforts in encouraging SNC to ratify relevant international human rights instruments, conduct an extensive campaign of human rights education, investigate allegations of human rights abuses and exercise general oversight of human rights aspects of every component of UNTAC. A human rights office would be established to be the central policy-making and coordinating body. Staff would include specialists in human rights advocacy, civil education and investigation.

Electoral component. The Paris Agreements entrusted UNTAC with organizing and carrying out free and fair elections in Cambodia. The Special Representative would be assisted in these responsibilities by a Chief Electoral Officer. Other personnel needs included 198 international staff operating from headquarters and from 21 provincial and municipal centres, and some 400 United Nations Volunteers operating from each of 200 districts. These personnel would undertake duties related to electoral operations, information, training, communications, compliance and complaints, and coordination. They would be supplemented by some 4,000 Cambodian personnel during the registration process, and, during the polling process, by 1,000 international supervisors and 56,000 Cambodian personnel organized into 8,000 polling teams. To maximize efficiency and minimize costs, the electoral process would be computerized.

The Secretary-General recommended that registration of voters begin in October 1992 and proceed for three months, discretion being allowed to the Special Representative to extend that period if necessary. Elections would be scheduled for the period extending from the end of April to the beginning of May 1993.

Military component. Information provided by the Cambodian parties to the military survey mission sent by the Secretary-General in November - December 1991 indicated total forces of over 200,000 deployed in some 650 separate locations. In addition, militias totalling some 250,000 operated in almost all villages. These forces were armed with over 350,000 weapons and some 80 million rounds of ammunition.

Based on this and other information, the Secretary-General recommended that UNTAC have a military component of 15,900 all ranks to be headed by a Force Commander. Personnel would include headquarters staff (204), a military observer group (485), an infantry element (10,200), an engineer element (2,230), an air support group (326) to operate and maintain 10 fixed-wing aircraft and 26 helicopters, a signals unit (582), a medical unit (541), a composite military police company (160), a logistics battalion (872), and a naval element (376) to operate 6 sea patrol boats, 9 river patrol boats, 3 landing craft and 12 other boats. Force headquarters would be in Phnom Penh. For operational reasons, Cambodia would be divided into nine sectors, two of them with separate sector headquarters.

The military component would have four main functions: (1) to verify the withdrawal and non-return of all categories of foreign forces and their arms and equipment; (2) to supervise the ceasefire and related measures including regroupment, cantonment, disarming and demobilization; (3) to control weapons, including monitoring the cessation of outside military assistance; and (4) to assist in mine-clearing, including training and mine awareness programmes. The Secretary-General recommended that the military component be fully deployed by the end of May 1992 and that the regrouping and cantonment process, as well as demobilization of at least 70 per cent of the cantoned forces, be achieved by the end of September 1992.

The Agreements provided that all forces of the parties, with their weapons, should be regrouped and cantoned. This activity, however, would require massive deployment of UNTAC military personnel for an extended period and entail a serious disruption of the social and economic life of Cambodia, since most militia members were also engaged in farming and other civilian activities. In order to achieve economy of operation of UNTAC and avoid crippling the economy of Cambodia, the Secretary-General reported that practical arrangements had been worked out and agreed by the parties whereby the militia forces would not be physically cantoned but would report to locations designated by UNTAC to hand over their weapons. UNTAC would transfer the weapons to more secure centralized storage areas.

In consultation with the parties, the number of regrouping areas for regular forces was set at 95, reduced from 325 as originally proposed. The number of cantonment areas was set at 52, down from 317. Of these, 48 of the regrouping areas and 33 cantonment sites were designated for the forces of the Government of the State of Cambodia (SOC), the Cambodian People's Armed Forces (CPAF). The forces of the Party of Democratic Kampuchea (PDK) (also known as the Khmer Rouge), the National Army of Democratic Kampuchea (NADK), would regroup in 30 centres and canton in 10 others. Eight regroupment centres and 6 cantonment sites were designated for the forces of the Khmer People's Liberation Front (KPNLF), the Khmer People's National Liberation Armed Forces (KPNLAF). The forces the United National Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful and Cooperative Cambodia (FUNCINPEC), the National Army of Independent Kampuchea (ANKI), would regroup in 9 areas and be cantoned at 3 locations. The number of cantonment centres was later revised upward to 55 (33 for CPAF, 14 for NADK, 5 for KPNLAF, and 3 for ANKI); CPAF naval forces, totalling some 4,000 and equipped with 18 naval and 38 river vessels were to be dealt with in the same manner as the land forces, except that a few would be retained to patrol coastal and river areas under the close supervision and control of UNTAC. Engineer and logistic units of the regular forces would also be subject to special arrangements in view of their role in the de-mining programme, as well as in supplying and supporting the cantoned forces.

The Secretary-General informed the Security Council that all the Cambodian parties would need scrupulously to fulfil their commitments and extend full cooperation to the UNTAC military component, which would require freedom of movement and communication. The successful accomplishment of the component's tasks would depend on the timely availability of resources and the capacity of the infrastructure, including roads, airfields, ports, fuel supply, power supply, communications, warehousing space and personnel accommodation. Considering the state of the country's infrastructure, the Secretary-General saw the need for a Asizeable and concerted engineering effort to be deployed urgently for basic repair before the onset of the rainy season in May.

Civil administration component. The civil administration functions envisioned in the Paris Agreements provided for UNTAC to exercise control over existing administrative structures having impact on the outcome of the elections. The Secretary-General proposed establishing offices to deal with those areas under direct UNTAC control, that is foreign affairs, national defence, finance, public security and information. An office would also be established to deal with areas under less direct control, and other offices would deal with training and complaints and investigation. Twenty-one provincial offices would parallel the existing administrative structure in the country. At each centre, international staff would be assigned duties under the civil administration mandate, in addition to other related duties, such as dissemination of UNTAC information and human rights. The civil administration component and the human rights component would together consist of some 224 specialists assisted by 84 international support staff. In terms of implementation, UNTAC would rely upon codes of conduct and guidelines and would maintain liaison officers in the various areas. Furthermore, UNTAC had been accorded the right to issue binding directives as necessary.

Civilian police component. The Paris Agreements stipulated that the Special Representative, in consultation with the parties, would determine those civil police required to perform law enforcement in the country. While the management of the civil police would remain the responsibility of the Cambodian parties, their operation would come under UNTAC supervision and control. The Secretary-General recommended a total of some 3,600 UNTAC civilian police monitors. At that number, and based on UNTAC's preliminary estimate of 50,000 Cambodian civil police, there would be one UNTAC monitor for every 15 local civil police. The structure of the component would include a policy and management unit at headquarters, 21 units at the provincial level and 200 district-level units. The main function of the UNTAC police monitors would be to supervise or control the local civil police in order to ensure that law and order were maintained effectively and impartially, and that human rights and fundamental freedoms were fully protected. To assist the monitors, use would be made as appropriate of codes of conduct and other operational guidelines developed by the United Nations. Monitors would also assume other responsibilities relating to the elections and to security requirements within UNTAC itself.

Repatriation component. According to the Paris Agreements, all Cambodian refugees and displaced persons had the right of voluntary return to Cambodia, to the place of their choice, in full respect for their human rights and fundamental freedoms. The Agreements also reaffirmed the Secretary-General's designation of UNHCR as lead agency in this respect. UNHCR had determined that there were more than 360,000 potential returnees, of whom over 90 per cent were under the age of 45 and almost half under the age of 15. Some 60 per cent of them originated from the provinces along the Thai-Cambodian border, and over two thirds of them had lived in the refugee camps along the border for over a decade.

An objective had been set for returning the refugees and displaced persons from the camps within a period of nine months. It would be necessary to identify and provide agricultural and settlement land for 360,000 returnees and to provide them with installment assistance as well as reintegration assistance and food supplies for an average of one year. Provision would also have to be made for food and installation assistance for up to 30,000 spontaneous returnees. The Secretary-General, on the recommendation of UNHCR, would appoint a director to head the repatriation and resettlement, which would be funded from voluntary contributions.

Rehabilitation component. Urgent needs to be met during the rehabilitation phase included humanitarian needs, such as food, health, housing and other essential needs, particularly of the disadvantaged, the handicapped, women and children; resettlement and reintegration needs, including those of the returnees, some 170,000 displaced persons and the estimated 150,000 or more Cambodian military forces to be demobilized; and essential restoration, maintenance and support of basic infrastructure. The Secretary-General would appoint a coordinator who would make ongoing assessments to ensure that requirements were being met without duplication or overlap. From $9 million to $14 million would be required for reintegration assistance in respect of demobilized military forces, to be funded as part of UNTAC's regular budget. With regard to other activities undertaken in the rehabilitation phase, the Secretary-General estimated that resource needs would amount to about $800 million, to be funded from voluntary donor contributions.

Other aspects. Given the magnitude of UNTAC's mandate, all UNTAC components would need to be computerized. The Secretary-General suggested that elements be integrated to enhance efficiency and control. At the same time, components would have specific information needs that could not be met under existing conditions in Cambodia. Furthermore, information would have to be provided to Cambodians to acquaint them with the Paris Agreements, with UNTAC, its purposes, activities and goals. The Secretary-General therefore suggested the establishment of an information office at UNTAC headquarters to act as the sole production point and conduit for information to be disseminated to the Cambodian people by UNTAC.

UNTAC components would be assisted by an estimated 7,000 locally recruited support personnel, including some 2,500 interpreters and by additional temporary staff as might be required.

By resolution 745 (1992) of 28 February, the Security Council established UNTAC for a period not to exceed 18 months. Meanwhile, the United Nations Advance Mission in Cambodia (UNAMIC), which had been established immediately after the signing of the Agreements in October 1991, continued to function until UNTAC became operational, at which time the Mission and its functions were subsumed by UNTAC.

Initial period, March - April 1992

The initial phase of UNTAC's deployment began on 15 March 1992 with the arrival in Phnom Penh of the Secretary-General's Special Representative accompanied by his senior aides, including the Force Commander, Lieutenant-General John Sanderson (Australia).

UNTAC established a constructive working relationship with SNC and its President, Prince Sihanouk. For this purpose, UNTAC used the Secretariat of SNC, which SNC had created to deal with administrative and procedural matters. In addition, a Ahot line service linked the Special Representative and the Force Commander with a representative of each of the four Cambodian parties beginning on 1 April.

The Special Representative, in close consultation with Prince Sihanouk, took the initiative in drawing up agendas for SNC meetings and in making proposals for consideration. Of the 21 ordinary meetings of SNC held during the UNTAC period, five were held between the beginning of UNTAC's deployment and the end of April 1992. On the advice of the Special Representative, it established a number of technical advisory committees to be chaired by an UNTAC official to deal with a major area of UNTAC responsibility. A draft electoral law drawn up by UNTAC was presented to SNC on 1 April, followed by a series of consultations.

Following reports of violent incidents involving political figures, the Special Representative issued a statement on 19 March 1992 stressing UNTAC's determination to foster an environment in which human rights would be assured so as to permit the exercise of fundamental freedoms. Members of the human rights, civil administration and police components established a quick response mechanism for investigating alleged human rights violations. The first training programme in human rights also got under way, initially provided to UNTAC police monitors.

By the end of April 1992, the number of UNTAC troops deployed to Cambodia had risen to 3,694. In Kompong Thom, where the situation had remained highly volatile, UNTAC deployed some 240 troops, which effectuated a ceasefire. With regard to the incident of 26 February involving the United Nations helicopter, UNTAC's investigation implicated members of NADK, although NADK denied responsibility.

Progress was also made in the establishment of regroupment and cantonment areas. Although a total of 52 cantonment areas had been foreseen, it was agreed, following discussions with the Cambodian parties, to establish a total of 55 sites: 33 for CPAF, 14 for NADK, 5 for KPNLAF and 3 ANKI.

In accordance with the mandate, UNTAC military observers were to verify the withdrawal and non-return of foreign forces. It had been envisaged to undertake this task by establishing a total of 24 check-points. Of these, 18 would be along the country's borders: 9 on the border with Viet Nam, 7 on the border with Thailand, and 2 on the border with Laos. There would be one each at the ports of Kompong Som and Phnom Penh and the airports at Phnom Penh, Battambang, Siem Reap and Strung Treng. There would also be a number of mobile monitoring teams. During UNTAC's initial period of deployment, three check-points were set up along the border with Viet Nam.

UNTAC deployed six mine-clearing training teams in north-western Cambodia by the end of April and another four teams were about to begin work. It was planned that some 5,000 Cambodians would be trained in mine detection and clearance by the end of the year, many of them demobilized soldiers of the four Cambodian parties. Their new skills were to aid in efforts at rehabilitation and creation of employment.

Repatriation of refugees began on 30 March 1992 with the return to Cambodia of 526 men, women and children. They were welcomed at the reception centre at Sisophon in north-west Cambodia by Prince Sihanouk and the Special Representative. By the end of April, 5,763 people had returned. Concerns were being raised, however, that because of the difficulty of finding suitable mine-free land for the returnees, the congestion of urban areas, the unsatisfactory health situation within the country and the delays expected during the rainy season, a number of the returnees would be unable to take part in the electoral process. The Secretary-General saw the need for Amaximum flexibility in the search for viable options for reintegration if the returnees were to register in time for the elections. A geographical widening of land settlement options and diversification of non-agricultural solutions offered to returnees were being actively pursued.

By the end of April 1992, a total of 193 civilian police monitors had arrived in Cambodia. Priority in their deployment was given to Sisophon and Battambang where refugees and displaced persons were being resettled. Further deployments were to be made in consultation with UNHCR as the repatriation proceeded. Police monitors were also deployed during this time to the three border check-points established by UNTAC's military component and to the Phnom Penh area. In all, plans called for 3,600 UNTAC police monitors. Their role was foreseen to be crucial in creating an environment conducive to the holding of free and fair elections. However, as of the end of April, there was a substantial shortfall in commitments from Member States to provide the monitors.

The civil administration component drew up operating procedures for the exercise of the right of assembly and freedom of association which were presented to SNC by the Special Representative on 6 April. Recruitment to the component was slow in the first weeks, however, owing in particular to the high degree of specialization of its functions. Control of the agencies, bodies and offices dealing with Cambodian information media began in late April 1992, once the technical means for monitoring Cambodian broadcast news media were in place.

To provide information to the Cambodian people, UNTAC arranged access to existing radio transmission facilities in South-east Asia for the broadcast of UNTAC information and educational programmes. An UNTAC information bulletin was also initiated.

The Secretary-General visited Cambodia from 18 to 20 April 1992, attending a meeting of SNC on 20 April at which the members signed the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. During his visit, the Secretary-General formally launched an appeal for $593 million in international aid for Cambodia to fund the broad-based rehabilitation effort. The funds were to be used for food, health services, shelter, education, training and the restoration of the country's basic infrastructure, public utilities and support institutions to initiate the process of rehabilitation during the transition period. Included in the aid figure was $116 million, estimated to be the cost of repatriating refugees from Thailand, which had been the subject of an earlier appeal.

On 1 May 1992, in his report to the Security Council, the Secretary-General told the Security Council that UNTAC had made a Agenerally good start.


Announcement of phase II

On 9 May 1992, UNTAC announced that phase I of the ceasefire, in effect since the signing of the Paris Agreements, would be followed on 13 June by phase II, the cantonment, disarming and demobilization phase. The Force Commander took this step in consultation with the four Cambodian parties and after having obtained from each of them assurances that it would grant freedom of movement to UNTAC personnel, vehicles and aircraft; mark minefields in the areas under its control; provide to UNTAC by 20 May information on troops, arms, ammunition and equipment; and adhere to the Paris Agreements, in particular not interfere with troops moving to regroupment and cantonment areas, and inform its troops of the plan for regroupment and cantonment.

However, following this announcement, it became clear that of the four signatory parties PDK was not cooperating. In particular, there was interference with UNTAC's freedom of movement. At a meeting of SNC on 26 May, the Special Representative called on the parties to show their readiness to comply with phase II by taking twelve steps, including, among others, permitting full and unrestricted freedom of movement to UNTAC, marking minefields, providing detailed information on troops to be cantoned, and undertaking a phased and balanced demobilization of at least 70 per cent of their forces. Three of the parties responded positively, but PDK did not provide the information requested. On 30 May, senior UNTAC officials, including the Special Representative and the Force Commander, were prevented by PDK from proceeding through PDK areas.

The Secretary-General then addressed a personal appeal to Mr. Khieu Samphan, President of PDK, urging that PDK take the necessary steps to enable UNTAC to begin implementation of phase II on 13 June. The reply did not contain the requested assurances. A further appeal for full compliance with the provisions of the Paris Agreements was made by the Special Representative at the SNC meeting on 5 June. On 9 June, PDK informed the Special Representative by letter that it was not in a position to allow UNTAC to proceed with deployment in areas under its control. PDK again failed to respond positively when, at the SNC meeting on 10 June, the Special Representative called on PDK to meet in full its obligations under the Paris Agreements, to comply with the 12 points and to enter phase II of the ceasefire on 13 June.

In explanation of its position, PDK asserted that foreign military personnel remained present in Cambodia. Its own security required deferring compliance with phase II until the withdrawal and non-return of foreign forces had been verified by UNTAC. PDK also raised concerns regarding the effective control of existing administrative structures.

UNTAC rejected this view but took a number of steps designed to meet the concerns of PDK. It established a total of ten check-points C one more than foreseen C on the Cambodian border with Viet Nam at an earlier date than planned. It also invited the four parties to participate in manning those checkpoints. Mobile teams were launched empowered to carry out investigations, including allegations of the presence of foreign forces. Although PDK presented UNTAC with a list in writing of allegations regarding the presence of foreign forces, it did not provide personnel to accompany UNTAC's investigations.

On 30 May 1992, Viet Nam confirmed in writing to UNTAC that its forces, volunteers and all equipment had been completely withdrawn from Cambodia by 26 September 1989 and that they had not been reintroduced. Viet Nam also stated that military assistance to Cambodia had ended in September 1989 and no country had been allowed to use Vietnamese territory to provide such aid to the Cambodian parties.

Phase II of the ceasefire depended critically on the cooperation of all parties. However, despite the lack of cooperation from PDK, the Secretary-General concluded that phase II should commence on 13 June as scheduled. In his view, as related to the Security Council on 12 June 1992, any delay would result in a loss of momentum and would jeopardize UNTAC's ability to organize and conduct elections by April or May 1993. The Special Representative was consulting with the other three parties to ensure that the process of regrouping and cantonment of forces would minimize any military disadvantage they would suffer vis-à-vis PDK. This could, however, be only a short-term solution; it was imperative that all efforts be made to persuade PDK to join the other parties in good faith in implementing the comprehensive political settlement. The Secretary-General concluded that the Security Council itself might wish to consider what action it could take to achieve this objective. For its part, the Council, in a Presidential statement, reaffirmed the importance of the full and timely implementation of the Paris Agreements and stressed the need that the second phase of the military arrangements should begin on 13 June 1992.

Tokyo Conference

A Ministerial Conference on the Rehabilitation and Reconstruction of Cambodia met in Tokyo on 20 and 22 June 1992. Participating were Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Canada, China, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Laos, Malaysia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Philippines, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Russian Federation, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, United Kingdom, United States and Viet Nam. A number of inter-governmental organizations were also represented, including the European Community and the programmes of the United Nations system.

The Conference issued two declarations which were adopted by consensus. One focused on the peace process, the other on rehabilitation and reconstruction of Cambodia. In the latter, the participants agreed to establish a consultative body to be called the International Committee on the Reconstruction of Cambodia. Under the chairmanship of Japan, it was to be the coordinating mechanism of the international community with the democratically elected government of Cambodia on matters of medium- and longer-term reconstruction of the country. Pledges of aid to Cambodia amounted to $880 million, surpassing the $593 million appeal.

The Conference also drew up an informal proposal for discussion, setting out a number of measures designed to meet some of the concerns expressed by PDK. On the same day, 22 June, at an extraordinary meeting of SNC convened in Tokyo, the four Cambodian parties were asked to respond to the proposal. Three of them accepted it; PDK promised to consider the proposal and make known its views at a later time.

Negotiation with PDK

On 2 July, at a working session of SNC, PDK introduced its own proposals regarding the role and powers of SNC and the administrative structures in the zone under the control of SOC. On 7 July, the Secretary-General addressed a letter to Mr. Khieu Samphan, assuring him that the Special Representative would pursue his efforts to take into account, on the basis of the Tokyo proposal, the legitimate concern expressed by PDK as well as those of the other three parties. At the SNC meeting on 8 July, Mr. Khieu Samphan repeated the PDK proposals and took the same position in a letter dated 9 July addressed to the Secretary-General.

In addition to meetings of SNC, the Special Representative met three times with Mr. Khieu Samphan to secure PDK's agreement to the Tokyo proposal and to persuade it to take the necessary steps to comply with the Paris Agreements. At the meetings, PDK elaborated its positions and, in particular, called for the dissolution of the main institutions and structures established in the zones under SOC control. In response, the Special Representative explained that, according to the Paris Agreements, UNTAC's control should be exercised through the existing administrative structures of each of the four Cambodian parties, of which the Phnom Penh authorities formed part.

Situation by the end of July 1992

During this time, UNTAC accelerated its efforts to recruit and deploy its civil administration staff, in order to exercise its mandate under the Agreements of direct control over the five areas of foreign affairs, national defence, finance, public security and information, and supervision of other areas, of the existing administrative structures. UNTAC also sought agreement with PDK on the establishment of a mechanism for keeping the four Cambodian parties informed and involved with regard to UNTAC's exercise of direct control over the five areas. Comprehensive plans to introduce this control throughout the territory of Cambodia were announced by the Special Representative on 26 June. Control over SOC administrative structures dealing with foreign affairs and national defence was established on 1 July. Plans called for the progressive introduction of control in finance between 1 July and 1 September, and in public security the staff concerned was to be fully deployed by 15 July. A Media Working Group composed of representatives of the four parties was established on 10 June 1992.

UNTAC's military component was almost fully deployed by July, with some 14,300 troops in the country and the remainder en route. There were 1,780 UNTAC civilian police monitors deployed throughout the country to supervise the fair and impartial enforcement of law and order. Some 100 cases of human rights violations had been investigated in SOC zones, and investigations would soon begin in the zones of the other two parties.

Following the beginning of phase II on 13 June, UNTAC was to have completed the regroupment and cantonment process within four weeks, i.e. by 11 July. As of 10 July, of the estimated 200,000 troops, the numbers of cantoned troops were as follows: CPAF, 9,003; ANKI, 3,187; KPNLAF, 1,322. However, reflecting PDK's position of non-cooperation, no NADK troops were cantoned.

In light of the situation, the Secretary-General, in a report to the Security Council on 14 July, pointed to two possible courses of action: to suspend the operation until all parties complied with the Paris Agreements, or to pursue the process, thus demonstrating the international community's determination to assist the Cambodian people despite the lack of cooperation from PDK. Considering the latter approach to be appropriate, he had requested his Special Representative to press forward with the regrouping and cantonment process, albeit cautiously and selectively, taking great care to maintain security in the countryside and concentrating on areas where there was no military confrontation. The main questions were how to persuade PDK to comply with its obligations, how to underscore the determination of the international community to implement the Agreements and how to obtain the full and active support of the signatories for UNTAC efforts to carry out its mandate.

By resolution 766 (1992) of 21 July, the Security Council approved the efforts of the Secretary-General to continue implementing the Paris Agreements despite the difficulties. It demanded that PDK permit the deployment of UNTAC in the areas under its control and implement phase II of the ceasefire as well as other aspects of the Agreements. It also requested the Secretary-General to ensure that international assistance to the rehabilitation and reconstruction of Cambodia from then on benefit only the parties fulfilling their obligations under the Agreements and cooperating fully with UNTAC.

At the end of July 1992, the Special Representative wrote to the Secretary-General that the military situation had somewhat worsened, with aggressive action by NADK in the north and parts of the centre and south, while the acceptance of cantonment by the three parties had created a vacuum. At the same time, some NADK soldiers had shown interest in being cantoned and joining their families, but their leaders had managed to keep tight control. Although UNTAC had addressed issues of genuine concern to PDK, no cooperation had been forthcoming. PDK would be satisfied with no less than a radical Adepolitization dealing a crippling blow to the Phnom Penh regime, thus gaining what it had been unable to obtain either on the battlefield or in the Paris negotiations. In the meantime, PDK radio was broadcasting allegations linking UNTAC with SOC and Viet Nam.

There were other problems as well. In the countryside, the security situation had worsened. The economic situation was precarious, and hyper-inflation was imminent. UNTAC was grappling with the task of keeping the country afloat and having Cambodians focus on their common national priorities. The prospects were daunting, but the Special Representative remained basically optimistic. There was a substantial reservoir of resources and goodwill, as well as the unanimous support of the entire international community. Furthermore, the great majority of Cambodians wanted to build a new, peaceful country.

Adoption of the electoral law

The electoral law, which had been submitted to SNC by UNTAC on 1 April 1992, was adopted by SNC on August 5 and promulgated on 12 August. The law differed from the 1 April draft in two respects. In order to meet the concern expressed by the Cambodian parties that the franchise be restricted to ACambodian persons, the text of the Paris Agreements would be interpreted as giving the right to register to Aevery Cambodian person, defined as follows: (a) a person born in Cambodia, at least one of whose parents was born in Cambodia; or (b) a person, wherever born, at least one of whose parents was a Cambodian person within the meaning of paragraph (a). Secondly, the draft law was amended to permit overseas Cambodians to vote at one polling station in Europe, one in North America and one in Australia. However, registration of voters was still to take place exclusively in Cambodia.

PDK, however, did not withdraw its objection. The Special Representative decided to exercise his power under the Paris Agreements, and the draft law was adopted at the SNC meeting despite the objection of PDK.

The adoption of the electoral law was followed on 15 August by the beginning of the provisional registration of parties. The Secretary-General remained convinced that the electoral process should be carried out in accordance with the implementation timetable. UNTAC was also studying a proposal to hold a presidential election. While much support for the election had been voiced by the Cambodian parties and by Prince Sihanouk himself, such an election was not provided for in the Paris Agreements.

Efforts to persuade PDK fail

Notwithstanding the continuing refusal of PDK to grant UNTAC access to its zones of control or to commit its forces to cantonment, the Secretary-General reported to the Security Council on 21 September 1992 that UNTAC had acquired a powerful momentum. Its presence had already achieved a Aprofound and probably lasting impact on Cambodia. UNTAC was close to full deployment over most of the territory of Cambodia, including a strong police presence extending down to village level. Supervision and control over the administrative structures of the country had been established and progressively strengthened, and Cambodians continued to be informed and educated on human rights issues. More than 115,000 refugees and displaced persons had been repatriated.

UNTAC consistently stressed that the door remained open for full and constructive participation by PDK in the peace process. However, the persistent failure of PDK to meet its obligations under the Paris Agreements continued to obstruct their full implementation. In his 21 September report, the Secretary-General suggested that the Security Council consider further action to impress upon the parties the international community's firm determination to press ahead with the implementation of the Paris Agreements. He also indicated his intention, subject to Security Council approval, to request the co-Chairmen of the Paris Conference C the Foreign Ministers of France and Indonesia C to undertake, within a definite time-frame, consultations with the aim of finding a way out of the impasse or, if that should prove impossible, exploring appropriate steps to ensure the realization of the fundamental objectives of the Agreements.

On 13 October, the Security Council, by its resolution 783 (1992), confirmed that the electoral process should proceed according to the implementation timetable. The Council, among other things, demanded that PDK fulfil immediately its obligations under the Paris Agreements, and invited the Governments of Japan and Thailand, which had been actively involved in finding solutions to the current problems, to continue their efforts and to report the results to the Secretary-General and to the co-Chairmen of the Paris Conference. The Council also invited the Secretary-General to ask the co-Chairmen immediately on receipt of that report to undertake appropriate consultations with a view to implementing fully the peace process. It requested the Secretary-General to report to the Council no later than 15 November 1992 on the implementation of resolution 783 (1992).

The Governments of Japan and Thailand undertook consultations with PDK on 22 and 29 October 1992, but concluded that tripartite consultation was no longer the appropriate means to address the impasse. On 7 and 8 November, the Co-Chairmen of the Paris Conference met in Beijing with Prince Sihanouk, members of SNC representing the four Cambodian parties and representatives of the five permanent members of the Security Council, as well as Australia, Germany, Japan and Thailand. The Special Representative also participated. The Co-Chairmen subsequently informed the Secretary-General that PDK was still not prepared to cooperate in the further implementation of the Paris Agreements. Furthermore, PDK had indicated its intention not to take part in the electoral process so long as, in its view, a neutral political condition was not ensured.

Suspension of phase II

Voter registration opened in Phnom Penh on 5 October 1992, in four other provinces on 19 October, and progressively in the other provinces. In the first weeks, about a million Cambodians registered to vote. When Radio UNTAC began broadcasts on 9 November 1992, the programmes concentrated on information regarding voter registration and the electoral process.

As for the cantonment process, which had begun in June with the declaration of phase II, some 55,000 troops of the three participating factions, or approximately a quarter of the estimated total number of troops, entered the cantonment sites and handed over their weapons. This process, however, had to be suspended, due to the non-compliance by PDK and the deterioration of the military situation. Some 40,000 cantoned troops were subsequently released on agricultural leave, subject to recall by UNTAC.

Reporting to the Security Council on 15 November 1992, the Secretary-General said that the difficulties encountered in implementing phase II of the ceasefire had led to the effective suspension of the cantonment, disarmament and demobilization process. Although he concurred with the Co-Chairmen that the implementation of the peace process should continue and the timetable be maintained, he expressed his concern that the elections would take place with the two largest armed forces mostly intact, and with some of the forces of the other two parties still in the field.

The Secretary-General nevertheless continued to believe that patient diplomacy remained the best means of getting the peace process back on track. He stated that UNTAC would continue its dialogue with PDK in an effort to meet that party's concerns and persuade it to comply with its obligations under the Paris Agreements. In the circumstances, however, the projected reduction of the strength of the military component was no longer feasible until after the elections. It would also be necessary to adjust deployment in order to foster a general sense of security among the Cambodian people and enhance the component's ability to protect the voter registration and polling processes, particularly in remote or insecure areas.

The issue of foreign residents and immigrants was another matter that deeply disturbed many Cambodians. Killings of Vietnamese-speaking villagers had aroused serious concerns about public security and had implications for the creation of a neutral political environment. UNTAC investigations indicated that units of NADK had been responsible for two such incidents.

On 30 November, the Security Council in resolution 792 (1992) confirmed that the elections for a constituent assembly in Cambodia would be held no later than May 1993, and noted the Secretary-General's instruction for contingency planning for a presidential election. It condemned PDK for failing to comply with its obligations under the Paris Agreements and demanded, among other things, that it immediately fulfil those obligations, facilitate full deployment of UNTAC in the areas under its control, and not impede voter registration or the activities of other political parties in those areas. The Council determined that UNTAC should proceed with preparations for the holding of elections in all areas of Cambodia to which UNTAC had full access as at 31 January 1993. It requested the Secretary-General to consider the implications which the failure by PDK to canton and demobilize its forces would have for the electoral process and, accordingly, to take all appropriate steps to ensure the successful implementation of the process.

The Security Council also supported the 22 September decision of SNC to set a country-wide moratorium on the export of logs from Cambodia in order to protect the country's natural resources, and requested UNTAC to take appropriate measures to secure the implementation of this moratorium. The Council requested SNC to consider adopting a similar moratorium on the export of minerals and gems. In addition, it called for measures to prevent the supply of petroleum products from reaching areas occupied by any Cambodian signatory party not complying with the military provisions of the Paris Agreements. The Council invited UNTAC to establish all necessary border checkpoints, as recommended by the Secretary-General.


Deteriorating security situation

With the onset of the dry season, ceasefire violations increased, mostly in Kompong Thom, Siem Reap and Battambang provinces in central and north-west Cambodia. The violations typically took the form of artillery duels, which drove villagers from their homes without causing extensive casualties on either side. SOC, claiming that NADK had made territorial gains, called on the Special Representative to restore the military balance. Reports from UNTAC military observers indicated that CPAF was attempting to recover territory over which NADK had extended its influence during the rainy season, while NADK was attempting to consolidate its gains and interrupt CPAF's communications.

The Special Representative had issued a call for military restraint on 4 November, and the Secretary-General had appealed to all parties to respect the ceasefire in his 15 November report to the Security Council. Ceasefire violations continued, however, and in December, two serious violations occurred. Frequent exchanges of shelling took place between NADK and CPAF throughout the month in the Bavel area of Battambang province, causing about 15,000 local residents to flee their homes. On 24 and 25 December, NADK artillery shells landed near a location occupied by UNTAC troops from the Bangladesh battalion in Siem Reap province. The area came under shelling again on 31 December.

Since December 1992, there were several incidents of temporary detention of UNTAC personnel by NADK units. On 20 December, PDK informed the Special Representative by letter that UNTAC should not enter PDK-controlled zones without prior authorization and that UNTAC must assume full responsibility for incidents that occurred as a result of its failure to obtain such authorization. The Special Representative and the Force Commander replied on 22 December, pointing out the distortion contained in the declaration. The President of the Security Council also issued a statement in which the Council strongly condemned the illegal detention of UNTAC personnel by elements of NADK.

Other problems surfaced as well. The inability of UNTAC to gain access to the administrative structure of PDK gave rise to a hardening of the position of SOC led by Mr. Hun Sen regarding supervision and control by UNTAC of SOC administrative structures. This growing reluctance, while having emerged as early as October 1992, became particularly evident as the military situation deteriorated and applied to nearly all fields of control and supervision entrusted to UNTAC.

Furthermore, a spate of violent incidents C Apolitically-motivated attacks on political party offices and staff, attacks on Vietnamese-speaking persons, and killings having no particular political motivation C heightened a sense of insecurity among Cambodians. The Secretary-General's Special Representative had stated publicly in November that free and fair elections could not be held in circumstances where people faced threats to their lives, property and personal security for attempting to exercise their political rights. However, political parties, and in particular FUNCINPEC and the Buddhist Liberal Democratic Party (BLDP), the political wing of KPNLF, subjected to attacks on their offices and workers, complained that they were not provided with effective protection by local administrative structures.

In addition to investigating these incidents, UNTAC's civilian police, military, and civil administration components, together with the human rights component, developed measures to prevent and deal with threats to public order. UNTAC announced that it would give priority to ensuring freedom from intimidation, freedom of party affiliation and freedom of action for political parties. On 6 January 1993, the Special Representative issued a directive establishing procedures for the prosecution of persons responsible for human rights violations; as a result, UNTAC assumed powers to arrest, detain and prosecute suspects in cases of serious violations. For this purpose, the Special Representative established the office of the Special Prosecutor.

Relations with SNC

Since September 1992, Prince Sihanouk had intermittently stayed in Beijing for medical treatment. The Special Representative, in order to keep close relations with SNC, organized working sessions of SNC in Phnom Penh, with the approval of the Prince. Through the working sessions, UNTAC continued to consult with SNC members on subjects related to the implementation of the Paris Agreements.

On 20 December, Prince Sihanouk announced that SNC membership would be increased by one, to 13, to allow for a second FUNCINPEC representative.

On 4 January 1993, citing persistent violent attacks on FUNCINPEC staff, Prince Sihanouk informed the Special Representative that he could no longer cooperate with UNTAC or SOC. Prince Norodom Ranariddh, the leader of FUNCINPEC, also said he would suspend working relations with UNTAC until effective measures were taken to put an end to the climate of violence. The Special Representative met with both leaders to inform them of measures taken by UNTAC to promote a neutral political environment. Both leaders showed their understanding. Prince Ranariddh subsequently expressed gratitude for UNTAC's efforts to address this problem and stressed that FUNCINPEC had always cooperated with UNTAC and would continue to do so. Prince Sihanouk used the occasion of a special SNC meeting on 28 January in Beijing to express publicly his renewed support for UNTAC. He assured the meeting of his continuing cooperation with the United Nations in the implementation of the Paris Agreements.

Prince Sihanouk had also confirmed to the Special Representative on 4 January that he would be a candidate in presidential elections. However, at the meeting of SNC on 28 January the Prince announced his decision not to advance his candidacy. Instead, he wished to wait until the new Constitution had been adopted before holding the elections, so that the President could be elected in accordance with the modalities, the term of office and powers laid down in the Constitution.

At the 28 January meeting, SNC set the dates of the constituent assembly elections for 23 to 25 May 1993. These dates were later expanded to allow for polling at mobile stations on 27 and 28 May. Prince Sihanouk also issued, in his own name and in the name of SNC members belonging to FUNCINPEC, KPNLF and SOC, a statement condemning violence against Cambodians or foreign persons in Cambodia and any act which threatened the dignity, fundamental freedoms, rights, security and personal safety of any member of UNTAC.

Continuing difficulties

In January and February 1993, ceasefire violations continued, including exchanges of artillery and mortar fire between CPAF and NADK and movement of troops. CPAF forces launched attacks on NADK forces in a number of districts and moved closer to the PDK-held district town of Pailin in the province of Battambang. UNTAC protested the moves as exceeding the bounds of self-defence. The Special Representative called on SOC to desist from violating the ceasefire and to exercise self-restraint. In the meantime, PDK tightened restrictions on the UNTAC team deployed in Pailin, subjecting them at one point to virtual house arrest.

An attack by NADK on a village in Siem Reap province in January resulted in eight casualties, four of them UNTAC personnel. Two Cambodian women, members of an UNTAC voter registration team, died from their wounds. In January, February and March, six UNTAC military and civilian personnel were injured and two were killed by hostile action against UNTAC, including a Bangladeshi soldier killed by a mortar believed to be fired by NADK.

Incidence of violence and intimidation, which had peaked in December 1992, fell significantly in January 1993. However, political violence increased somewhat in early February. Many of the incidents were concentrated in the provinces of Battambang and Kompong Cham, and the victims in the vast majority of cases were members of FUNCINPEC.

While PDK radio had commonly attacked UNTAC, and its broadcasts had become increasingly hostile, the Phnom Penh authorities also undertook a media campaign against UNTAC, asserting that only SOC could defend the country against PDK and so deserved electoral support, while UNTAC could not be trusted to protect Cambodians.

Attacks against Vietnamese-speaking Cambodians also continued. On 10 March, members of an NADK unit attacked a floating village in Siem Reap province, killing 33 people, including 12 children, and injuring 24. The village was inhabited primarily by Cambodian-born persons of Vietnamese descent. On 24 March, a group of assailants attacked fishing boats in Kompong Chhnang Province resulting in 8 deaths, including three children. And on 29 March in Phnom Penh, a coordinated attack with hand-grenades on four premises frequented or owned by Vietnamese-speaking persons resulted in 2 deaths and at least 20 injuries.

Registration of voters and political parties

On 21 December, the Special Representative announced that the voter registration period would be extended to 31 January 1993. At its completion, over 4.6 million people, or some 96 per cent of the estimated eligible population, had been registered. Returnees were given the opportunity to be registered on their return to Cambodia, either in their final destination or in six reception centres. As the end of the registration period approached, a special arrangement was made between UNTAC's repatriation and electoral components to enable registration of the remaining eligible population in the border camps. They were temporarily listed in Thailand during the month of January and received their registration cards upon return to Cambodia.

As for the political parties, on 27 January 1993, 20 out of the 22 provisionally-registered political parties had applied for official registration, in accordance with the Electoral Law, by submitting a list of at least 5,000 registered voters who were members of the party. Neither PDK nor its political party, the National Unity of Cambodia Party formed in November 1992, filed official registration to take part in the elections.

At a meeting of SNC on 10 February, UNTAC announced its decision that the electoral campaign would begin on 7 April 1993 and end on 19 May, followed by a four-day cooling-off period before polling. During the campaign, UNTAC would make its information and broadcasting facilities available to all political parties in order to ensure fair access to the media. On 11 March, the Special Representative met with the leaders of the 20 political parties to inform them of their rights and responsibilities as party leaders under the Electoral Law.

Protection of natural resources

In its resolution 792 (1992), the Security Council had adopted a number of measures aimed at protecting Cambodia's natural resources, particularly timber, minerals and gems. An appeal by UNTAC to Cambodia's neighbouring countries resulted in announcements by Laos, Thailand and Viet Nam that they would impose a complete ban on the import of logs from Cambodia beginning 1 January 1993. UNTAC deployed border guards to monitor the situation on land and sea. However, numerous and large-scale violations by both routes continued. Personnel of all the Cambodian parties were involved in the export of logs, but because PDK refused to allow UNTAC monitors in the zone it controlled, it had not been possible to obtain figures for the bulk of log exports from there.

At the SNC meeting on 28 January 1993, UNTAC proposed that the moratorium on log exports be extended to minerals and gems. At the initiative of FUNCINPEC, the moratorium was widened to include the commercial extraction of mineral resources onshore and offshore. This proposal was supported by three of the Cambodian parties. The matter was raised again at the SNC meeting of 10 February, when the moratorium was adopted despite the continued objections of PDK.


Campaigning begins

On 4 April 1993, PDK formally announced to SNC its decision not to participate in the elections, asserting that AVietnamese forces of aggression continued to occupy Cambodia and that a neutral political environment did not exist. On 13 April, the President of PDK wrote to Prince Sihanouk that his party could no longer attend SNC meetings in Phnom Penh because there was insufficient security. PDK would therefore withdraw temporarily from the city.

The electoral campaign officially began on 7 April, and the 20 political parties participated actively. During his second visit to Cambodia on 7 and 8 April, the Secretary-General told SNC that, in his judgement and in all due caution, the basic acceptable conditions for the conduct of an electoral campaign did exist. He was encouraged that electoral campaigning was being conducted peacefully with the participation of tens of thousands of Cambodians.

Despite these encouraging signs, violence and intimidation remained a major challenge to the creation and maintenance of a neutral political environment. Victims included members of all four Cambodian parties. Many acts of violence had apparent political or ethnic overtones, but some killings had no identifiable motivation and took place in an environment where, after years of war, there was an oversupply of weapons.

As a result of the series of attacks on Vietnamese-speaking persons, several thousand members of the Vietnamese community in Cambodia began to migrate from their homes towards the Vietnamese border, many by boat. Between 21 March and 28 April, 21,659 people were recorded crossing the border into Viet Nam at border checkpoints manned by UNTAC personnel. UNTAC naval units and civilian police closely monitored these movements to ensure that the local authorities assumed their responsibility to protect the migrants.

During his visit to Cambodia, the Secretary-General issued an urgent appeal for an end to violence. Prince Sihanouk issued a strong declaration demanding that his Aarmed compatriots refrain from acts of violence against UNTAC. His declaration was endorsed by SOC, KPNLF and FUNCINPEC.

All units of UNTAC's military component in all locations had been directed to increase vigilance and enhance security measures and procedures. UNTAC further refined and strengthened measures to help ensure the security of the electoral process and the safety of the Cambodian political parties and of UNTAC staff under conditions of instability. Teams of military observers worked with UNTAC civilian police in monitoring political rallies and gatherings throughout the country. Personnel from both components assisted electoral staff with the civil education campaign. The military component's defensive positions, particularly in Siem Reap and Kompong Thom provinces, were reinforced and expanded to allow the construction of bunkers and overhead protection as well as firing bays, defensive pits from which soldiers could return fire.

It was also decided that, during the election itself, no polling would be conducted in areas controlled by PDK, to which UNTAC had not been permitted access, nor in some remote areas in which NADK had been operating. Other parts of the country were designated as high-, medium-, and low-risk areas. Different levels of security measures were established for each level of risk. In high-risk zones, it was decided to station armed UNTAC military personnel at and around polling stations and to issue protective gear to UNTAC staff. Quick reaction forces and medical support units were identified for the high-risk sites. In response to the heightened threat in one province, UNTAC civilian personnel were withdrawn from some locations and the number of polling sites was reduced. Security at UNTAC headquarters was also strengthened.

Despite initial indications of a relative decline in violence during April, deaths and injuries from violence continued. Many of the casualties resulted from attacks on civilians and on SOC by NADK, and by unidentified groups, and attacks on other political parties by SOC and unidentified groups.

Further attacks also took place against UNTAC personnel. In April, seven UNTAC personnel were killed and fifteen injured by hostile action against UNTAC. The killing of a Japanese United Nations Volunteer and his Cambodian interpreter was a shocking incident. In Kompong Speu, in three separate incidents, four Bulgarian military personnel were killed and nine wounded. In two incidents in early May, UNTAC vehicles were attacked in Kompong Cham and Banteay Meanchey, resulting in thirteen military and civilian police personnel wounded and one civilian police monitor (a Japanese) killed. On 21 May in Kompong Cham province, an attack by NADK on an SOC police station resulted in the death of two UNTAC military observers when a rocket overshot its target and hit the Chinese Engineer Company compound nearby.

The Security Council, by its resolution 826 (1993) of 20 May 1993, condemned all acts of violence committed on political and ethnic grounds, intimidation and attacks on UNTAC. At the same time, the Council commended those participating in the election campaign in accordance with the Paris Agreements despite the violence and intimidation. It expressed its satisfaction with the arrangements made by the United Nations for the elections and fully supported the decision of the Secretary-General that the elections be held as scheduled. At the same time, the Council demanded that all parties abide by the Paris Agreements and give UNTAC the full cooperation required under it.


The elections were the focal point of the comprehensive settlement. As stipulated in the Agreements, the election of 120 members to the constituent assembly was held throughout Cambodia on a provincial basis in accordance with a system of proportional representation. Every Cambodian person 18 years of age or older was eligible to vote. The Agreements provided for a multi-party electoral system. Voting was for political parties, and all political parties were registered by UNTAC in order to participate in the elections. The list of party candidates for each province was published before the elections.

The Special Representative promulgated a number of minor revisions to the Electoral Law in order to respond to security or other considerations as they arose or were anticipated. The process to register over 4.7 million Cambodian voters, beginning on 5 October 1992 for a three-month period and subsequently extended until 31 January 1993, was scrutinized by representatives of the political parties with the right to challenge registrants whom they deemed to be unqualified. Voters' lists were complied by UNTAC's computer support system, designed to store up to 5.2 million voter registration records. UNTAC was not given access to PDK-controlled areas, which were considered to be populated by about 5 per cent of the total population of Cambodia.

During the electoral campaign, from 7 April to 19 May 1993, scores of political meetings and rallies were held daily and peacefully with the participation of tens of thousands of people in virtually all parts of Cambodia. UNTAC itself organized multi-party meetings.

On 21 April at a meeting of SNC, the Special Representative expressed the view that the freeness and fairness of the elections would be judged in accordance with three main criteria: the extent to which the campaign and voting were marred by violence, intimidation and harassment; the extent to which SOC, which controlled the largest zones and had the most extensive administrative structure, enjoyed unfair advantages; and the technical conduct of the poll. UNTAC raised the issue of the separation of party and State several times both in public and in private meetings with the Phnom Penh authorities, particularly regarding access of other political parties to the media and their right to freedom of movement. All political parties had access to Radio UNTAC and to UNTAC video productions. Three political parties requested and received assistance from UNTAC with air transport facilities for campaign purposes.

The election took place from 23 to 28 May 1993. During the first three days of the elections, some 1,400 large, medium and small fixed polling stations operated throughout the country, as well as 200 mobile teams in remote or difficult areas. A Cambodian presiding officer was in charge of each station, with support and assistance from an international polling station officer. Some fixed stations were converted to mobile operations on 26 May and worked as mobile teams on 27 and 28 May. Mobile teams operated for the entire six-day period. Counting of the ballots by UNTAC began on the morning of 29 May. The Special Representative declared the conduct of the poll free and fair in a statement made on behalf of the Secretary-General and the United Nations at a meeting of SNC on 29 May.

The Security Council endorsed this declaration in resolution 835 (1993) of 2 June and called upon all parties to stand by their obligations to respect fully the results. Reporting on 10 June 1993 on the holding and the results of the elections, the Secretary-General informed the Council that three of the four Cambodian parties signatory to the Paris Agreements had taken part in the electoral process C SOC, through the Cambodian People's Party (CPP); FUNCINPEC; and KPNLF/BLDP. PDK, the fourth Cambodian signatory party, had failed to register as a political party, had taken no part in the election and had threatened to disrupt it with violence. Aside from a few incidents, however, polling was conducted in a peaceful and often festive atmosphere, with voters sometimes walking several miles to cast their ballots, apparently undaunted by threats of violence or banditry, by rough terrain or the heavy rain that swept much of the country.

A total of 4,267,192 voters, representing 89.56 per cent of the registered voters, had turned out to vote. The count of the 4,011,631 valid ballots indicated that, nationwide, FUNCINPEC had won 1,824,188 votes, or 45.47 per cent, to CPP's 1,533,471 votes, or 38.23 per cent. BLDP won 152,764 votes, or 3.81 per cent, and the other 17 political parties won the remainder. The number of seats won in the constituent assembly was 58 for FUNCINPEC, 51 for CPP, 10 for BLDP and 1 for a fourth political party, MOLINAKA. At a meeting of SNC, held on 10 June and presided by Prince Norodom Sihanouk, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General issued a statement declaring, on behalf of the Secretary-General and the United Nations, that the elections as a whole had been free and fair.

The Security Council endorsed the results of the elections by resolution 840 (1993) of 15 June. It also expressed full support for the newly elected, 120-member Constituent Assembly, which was to draw up a constitution and then transform itself into a legislative assembly to establish a new government for all Cambodians. The Council emphasized the necessity for the assembly to complete its work as soon as possible and within the three-month time-frame stipulated in the Agreements. It requested UNTAC to continue to play its role in conjunction with SNC during the transitional period.


Head of State chosen

Notwithstanding the successful holding of the elections and the creation of a Constituent Assembly, the post-election period was not without difficulties. Despite the fact that CPP, at the 29 May meeting of SNC, issued a statement of its satisfaction at the excellent result of the electoral process, CPP began to make numerous allegations of electoral irregularities as the counting proceeded. It also requested UNTAC to hold new elections in seven provinces. At the 10 June meeting of SNC, CPP announced that it could not recognize the result of the elections and demanded an investigation of the irregularities.

UNTAC conducted intensive discussions with CPP in this regard, asking it to provide details to support the allegations. Every concrete allegation was promptly investigated by UNTAC. The Special Representative and his associates also corresponded with the President of CPP, Mr. Chea Sim, listing all the measures UNTAC had taken to rectify anomalies of which it was aware. UNTAC also made it clear that the alleged irregularities did not amount to fraud and that none of CPP's allegations, even if true, would affect the outcome of the elections. UNTAC firmly maintained that its own actions were impartial and that the elections were free and fair.

In early June, some elements of SOC declared a Asecession in three eastern provinces: Kompong Cham, Prey Veng and Svay Rieng. As tension increased in those provinces, there were anti-UNTAC demonstrations and a number of attacks against UNTAC personnel and property. This led UNTAC to withdraw its non-essential civilian personnel on 12 and 13 June. The Special Representative requested Prince Sihanouk to cooperate with UNTAC in calming the situation, and also contacted the leaders of CPP and FUNCINPEC. On 12 June, the Prince made an appeal for the peaceful settlement and normalization of the situation. The Special Representative also encouraged a dialogue between SOC and FUNCINPEC.

The duly elected Constituent Assembly began work on 14 June 1993. At the inaugural session, it adopted a resolution to make Prince Sihanouk Head of State retroactive to 1970, thus making the coup d'état of 18 March 1970 null and void. The Assembly gave the Prince full powers as head of State. The following day, Prince Sihanouk proposed the formation of an Interim Joint Administration (GNPC) with Prince Ranariddh and Mr. Hun Sen as Co-chairmen.

During the course of these developments, CPP gradually softened its position. With support for the secession dissipating, the secession collapsed. On 21 June, CPP issued a statement recognizing the result of the elections, while suspending judgement regarding the alleged electoral irregularities. UNTAC agreed to form a committee of inquiry (the Electoral Advisory Committee) in order to deal with this issue. PDK also declared that it would accept the outcome of the elections. By 24 June, CPP, FUNCINPEC and BLDP had agreed to the proposal to form GNPC and the list of the cabinet was submitted to the Constituent Assembly.

On 30 June, the Constituent Assembly elected its President and two Vice-Presidents and adopted its Rules of Procedure. It also established two permanent committees: the Committee for Drafting the Constitution and the Committee on Rules of Procedure. At the request of the Cambodian parties, UNTAC provided logistical and operational assistance, as well as technical advice, to the Assembly. The Assembly held a vote of confidence on 1 July 1993.

The Secretary-General informed the Security Council that the establishment of GNPC, although not foreseen under the Paris Agreements, provided for a cooperative framework between all parties which held seats in the Constituent Assembly. The Administration, which would operate during the transitional period, should be viewed as an attempt to fuse three of the existing administrative structures, with Prince Sihanouk as head of State. Furthermore, tentative discussions took place between the parties participating in the Administration and PDK aimed at achieving national reconciliation.

Withdrawal plans

Although the main body of troops and civilian staff remained in Cambodia after the elections, a substantial number had already been withdrawn as their functions came to an end. The whole of the repatriation component and the great majority of the staff of the electoral component had already been withdrawn by June 1993. Due to security considerations, the timing of the withdrawal of the civilian staff from the district and provincial levels was closely coordinated with the military withdrawal plan. The latter was difficult to implement because it involved moving thousands of troops at the height of the rainy season over severely degraded infrastructure. Furthermore, the security situation was anything but settled, for banditry was rife. According to the Secretary-General's withdrawal plan, physical preparations for withdrawal were to end by 31 July, and the phased movement of troops out of the country to be completed by 15 November 1993.

In putting forward his proposal for the final withdrawal of UNTAC, the Secretary-General noted that Cambodia clearly required continued international assistance and support. The country still faced enormous problems of security, stability, mine-clearance, infrastructure improvement and general economic and social development. Future assistance, however, should be clearly separate from the UNTAC presence. UNTAC was an operation with a clearly defined mandate and duration and specific resources. In order to coordinate the full range of civilian activities that would be undertaken by various agencies of the United Nations system, in accordance with their existing mandates, to promote development, provide humanitarian assistance and foster respect for human rights in Cambodia, the Secretary-General reiterated his intention to establish in Phnom Penh an integrated office headed by a United Nations representative. The office would also deal with a number of residual issues arising from the Paris Agreements and UNTAC's presence in the country. The Secretary-General would not recommend at that stage the retention of United Nations military personnel in Cambodia after the departure of UNTAC, but would give careful consideration to such a request if the new Government were to make one.

On 27 August 1993, the Security Council in its resolution 860 (1993) approved the UNTAC withdrawal plan and set 15 November 1993 as the deadline for the completion of the process. However, acting on the recommendation of the Secretary-General, the Security Council, in its resolution 880 of 4 November, extended the period of withdrawal of the Mine Clearance and Training Unit until 30 November 1993. It also extended until 31 December at the latest the withdrawal period for elements of the military police and medical components. The Secretary-General had noted that, in view of the deterioration of security conditions in Cambodia, a number of military police officers and members of a medical unit were needed in order to ensure the safety and security of UNTAC personnel and equipment as the withdrawal was being completed. Between 16 and 30 November, 71 military police officers were required, along with 10 members of a medical unit. In December, the number was reduced to 30 and 8 respectively.

Mandate ends

On 21 September 1993, the Constituent Assembly adopted the new Constitution. The vote was 113 in favour and 5 against, with two abstentions.

The mandate entrusted to UNTAC was concluded on 24 September 1993 when Prince Norodom Sihanouk formally promulgated the new Constitution of the Kingdom of Cambodia, making the country a constitutional monarchy, independent, sovereign, peaceful, neutral and non- aligned. The same day, Prince Sihanouk was elected King of Cambodia by the Royal Council of the Throne. In accordance with the Constitution and the Paris Agreements, the Constituent Assembly was transformed into a legislative assembly. The King appointed Prince Norodom Ranariddh, leader of FUNCINPEC, first Prime Minister in the new Government and Mr. Hun Sen, leader of CPP, second Prime Minister. The Special Representative left Cambodia on 26 September 1993.

The Council expressed its satisfaction at the auspicious developments that had taken place in Cambodia since the holding of the elections and stressed the importance of the continued support of the international community to the consolidation of peace and democracy and the promotion of development in Cambodia.

United Nations liaison team

On 26 September 1993, the First and Second Prime Ministers of Cambodia jointly requested the Secretary-General to consider the possibility of dispatching some 20 or 30 unarmed United Nations military observers to Cambodia for a period of six months following the end of UNTAC's mandate. The two Prime Ministers subsequently reiterated to the Secretary-General their conviction that such a presence would strengthen confidence among the people and thus enhance the stability of Cambodia and its new Government at a critical time. The Security Council indicated its agreement in principle and asked the Secretary-General to submit a detailed proposal on the matter.

The task of a military liaison team, as recommended by the Secretary-General, would be to maintain close liaison with the Government and report to the Secretary-General on matters affecting security. The team would also help the Government in dealing with residual military matters related to the Paris Agreements. It would consist of 20 unarmed military officers and be headed by a Chief Military Liaison Officer (CMLO) designated by the Secretary-General with the consent of the Security Council. The team, based in Phnom Penh, would be distinct from the integrated United Nations office the Secretary-General intended to establish, although in practice, the CMLO would maintain regular contact with the United Nations representative. By its resolution 880 (1993) of 4 November, the Security Council decided to establish a military liaison team for a single period of six months.

The United Nations Military Liaison Team was set up in Phnom Penh on 15 November 1993, with Colonel Muniruz Zaman (Bangladesh) as CMLO. Liaison was conducted at the ministerial, executive and ambassadorial levels by the CMLO, and at the functional level by other officers, who reported daily to United Nations Headquarters on security conditions and developments. Officers were also dispatched in mobile teams to observe areas outside Phnom Penh when requested by the Government and when the CMLO deemed that the issue related to the mandate.

In the meantime, on 29 March 1994, the Secretary-General appointed his representative in Cambodia. On 2 May, the Government requested an extension of the Team's mandate for a further period. However, as an alternative, the Council decided to endorse the Secretary-General's proposal to attach three military advisers to the office of the representative to assist him in fulfilling his mandate. Three military advisers were retained in Cambodia for this purpose following the Team's departure when it ceased operations on 15 May 1994. After April 1995, one military adviser was attached to the representative's office.


Each UNTAC component had a distinctive role, including, as discussed above, that of the Special Representative and his Office in maintaining relations with SNC and the Cambodian parties. The activities of the components were coordinated as necessary to allow for the most efficient and cost-effective use of resources. The level of activity in each case varied during the course of the transitional period.

Electoral component

The activities of the electoral component and the central importance of the electoral process have already been related in detail. Special mention, however, should be made of the 465 United Nations Volunteers (UNVs) serving as district electoral supervisors, many of them in remote, and sometimes contested, areas. They played a vital role in the programme of civic education about the election as well as in convincing the electorate that their vote was secret. Among their other duties was the training of Cambodian electoral staff. Following an incident on 8 April 1993 in which a district electoral supervisor was killed, UNTAC instituted emergency provisional arrangements to improve security. UNVs in areas considered to present security risks were instructed to withdraw from the countryside and not to travel without an armed escort until further notice.

Prior to UNTAC's establishment, compilation of socio-demographic and cartographic data was initially undertaken by the Advance Election Planning Unit, set up in late 1991. That unit was subsequently integrated into the electoral component. Other electoral staff were progressively deployed throughout the country. Staff at head- quarters during the registration period included about 280 Cambodian data entry clerks, working in three 8-hour shifts.

Following the elections, a skeleton staff remained in Phnom Penh to advise the Special Representative's Electoral Advisory Committee on CPP complaints and, subsequently, to assist with the establishment of the Constituent Assembly and with its work on the constitution, as requested.

Human rights

The Paris Agreements gave UNTAC the responsibility during the transitional period for fostering an environment in which respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms were ensured and where free and fair elections might take place. UNTAC activities in this regard comprised three aspects: a human rights education programme; general human rights oversight of all existing administrative structures in Cambodia; and the investigation of allegations of human rights abuses occurring during the transitional period.

The UNTAC human rights component was active in three broad areas. First, it encouraged SNC to adhere to relevant international human rights instruments and undertook a review of the existing judicial and penal systems in the light of international provisions. Secondly, it conducted an extensive human rights information and education campaign in close cooperation with the Information/Education Division of UNTAC. Thirdly, it investigated human rights-related complaints and took corrective measures where necessary. Human rights officers were progressively deployed in all 21 provinces in Cambodia, including in the zones controlled by FUNCINPEC and KPNLF. However, the component had no access to the zones controlled by PDK.

On 20 April 1992, SNC ratified the International Covenants on Civil and Political Rights and on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. On 10 September, it agreed to accede to the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment; the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women; the Convention on the Rights of the Child; and the Convention and Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees.

UNTAC developed a human rights education programme with particular reference to teacher training, dissemination of relevant international instruments, education of health professionals, training of public and political officials and support for local human rights organizations. Educational materials, posters, leaflets, stickers and other printed materials were disseminated throughout the country. Human rights training was introduced into the Cambodian education system, and human rights studies were incorporated in the curriculum of Phnom Penh University's Law School and Medical Faculty. Collaboration with local human rights organizations was an important aspect of UNTAC's work. UNTAC provided them with materials, training and expertise as well as small grants for basic office expenses. It organized an International Symposium on Human Rights in Cambodia from 30 November to 2 December 1992, and conducted a special course for human rights advocates, including a training programme on United Nations human rights procedures and a special training programme dealing with human rights issues in the electoral process.

As part of the effort to promote the development of an independent judiciary, a major programme of training for judges, defence lawyers and public defenders was initiated. Training sessions for officials of the existing administrative structures and professional or activist groups were undertaken in almost every province. Participants included representatives of political parties, members of human rights associations, teacher trainees, justice officials and police. UNTAC closely monitored conditions of detention in civil prisons throughout Cambodia and pressed local authorities to improve the situation to the extent possible within the means available to the prison administration. It investigated all cases of prisoners whose detention might be politically motivated.

On 19 February 1993, the United Nations Commission on Human Rights adopted a resolution providing for the first time for the operational involvement of the United Nations Centre for Human Rights in Cambodia in the post-UNTAC period. One of the major tasks of UNTAC's human rights component was to prepare for this operational presence. In 1996, this presence continued to be a factor in Cambodia's political life.

Military component

The objectives of the military arrangements during the transitional period were to stabilize the security situation and build confidence among the parties to the conflict. Achieving those objectives was a necessary precursor to the successful conduct of the functions of the other components. In addition to its tasks related to the ceasefire and the cantonment process, the military component also carried out other tasks, including weapons control and assistance to other components such as the repatriation component. It carried out activities related to essential engineering, de-mining, logistics and communications, and patrolling and observation, and participated in a border control mechanism established by UNTAC. The military component also undertook civil action programmes.

Between the beginning of the phase II cantonment process in June 1992 and mid-November 1992, UNTAC cantoned some 55,000 troops of the three cooperating parties. However, the refusal of PDK to enter phase II of the ceasefire resulted in the suspension of the cantonment, disarming and demobilization process.

Under these circumstances, the Secretary-General proposed that the level of deployment of the military component be maintained until the elections. The deployment pattern, which was originally based on the requirements of regrouping and cantonment, was realigned to correspond with the borders of the Cambodian provinces. This deployment, which also conformed to the deployment of the electoral teams, reflected the component's new priority task of enhancing UNTAC's ability to protect voter registration and the electoral and polling processes, particularly in areas with a higher potential for conflict.

During the registration period, military observers accompanied electoral teams in order to negotiate, where necessary, with local authorities or forces that tried to hinder registration. Security of the polling stations and their vicinity was provided by UNTAC alone. However the military component concluded agreements with the armed forces of SOC, FUNCINPEC and KPNLF. The armed forces of the factions assisted UNTAC, conveyed information on possible or actual threats to the elections and ensured security in the zones under their control.

UNTAC devoted serious attention to the question of the possible presence of foreign forces in Cambodia. It repeatedly requested the Cambodian parties to provide it with verifiable information relating to foreign forces, but none did so. It also established Strategic Investigation Teams to follow up on allegations. UNTAC found no evidence of the presence of any formed units of such forces in areas to which it had access, although some seven men were identified as Aforeign forces within the meaning of the definition approved by SNC.

Mine clearance

UNTAC took over the landmine programmes begun by UNAMIC and expanded them. For its part, SNC on 20 April 1992 decided to establish the Cambodian Mine Action Centre (CMAC) under the Presidency of Prince Norodom Sihanouk and the Vice Presidency of the Special Representative. Each were to appoint five members to a ten-member Governing Council. CMAC would then undertake long-term programmes in mine-awareness, marking and clearance. The Governing Council held its first meeting on 4 November 1992.

UNTAC's Mine Clearance Training Unit (MCTU), comprising some 183 officers and men, taught Cambodians to identify, locate and destroy land mines and to mark minefields, and promoted mine awareness among the general public. The Unit was organized into mine clearance training teams and mine clearance supervisory teams. Towards the end of its mandate, MCTU worked to equip CMAC to function after UNTAC's withdrawal.

By August 1993, as a result of the work done by UNTAC, in collaboration with the Cambodian parties and with non-governmental organizations, more than 4 million square metres of Cambodian territory had been cleared of mines. About 37,000 mines and other unexploded ordnance had been destroyed, and some 2,300 Cambodians trained in mine-clearance techniques. CMAC continued this work in the post-UNTAC period. In this regard, the Secretary-General appealed to the international donor community to render assistance. Pending alternate funding arrangements acceptable to donors and in consultation with the new Cambodian Government, he intended to maintain the United Nations Trust Fund for Demining Programmes in Cambodia.

Civil administration

UNTAC's civil administration component used three complementary means of control. One was control and appraisal, achieved through the receipt of all documentation dealing with the operation of the existing administrative structures, including the lines of decision-making, personnel policies and questions. A second form of control was achieved through the authority to obtain prior knowledge of decisions reached by the administrative structures, as well as the authority to change decisions dealing, for instance, with personnel, finance and the sale of assets. A third form of control involved the proposal of improvements in the operations of the existing administrative structures. On a day-to-day basis, these three means of direct control were exercised in various ways, including the physical presence of civil administration personnel alongside their highest-ranking counterparts in the existing administrative structures, regular meetings between UNTAC staff and these officials and the establishment of clear lines of decision-making.

On 1 July 1992, the civil administration component began to exercise full control over the five key areas in the Phnom Penh administration, as specified in the Paris Agreements: foreign affairs, national defence, public security, finance and information. By 15 July, UNTAC civil administration offices had been established in all 21 provinces, although, like the other components of UNTAC, civil administration personnel were denied access to PDK-controlled areas. In addition, UNTAC established optional control over other administrative structures identified as having direct influence over the outcome of elections. In accordance with the implementation plan, the civil administration component requested the four Cambodian parties to submit a list of their current laws for review by UNTAC. With the exception of PDK, all parties complied. At the initiative of UNTAC, SNC adopted laws enshrining the rights of freedom of association and of assembly, and approved a set of principles relating to the legal system, penal law and penal procedure with a view to establishing uniform standards for the judiciary and for substantive law that would be applicable throughout Cambodia.

In the area of foreign affairs, UNTAC had control over the receipt and distribution of foreign aid and the issuance of passports and visas. It also exercised control over the various border functions, such as immigration, customs and the implementation of SNC moratoriums on timber, gems and minerals. A border control unit was established with responsibility for liaison between UNTAC components and the existing administrative structures.

In the area of defence, UNTAC inspected the defence structures of the three parties and established other modalities, including the monitoring of incoming and outgoing correspondence, in order to control any actions that might impair the neutrality of the political environment. The leaders of the armed forces of the three factions complying with the Paris Agreements signed the directive prepared by UNTAC regulating the political activity of military personnel. At the request of UNTAC, the SOC ministry of defence established a committee to investigate allegations of illegal activity on the part of CPAF armed forces.

UNTAC's activities with regard to public security included the training of judges, prosecutors and police officers of the existing administrative structures in the implementation of the Penal Code adopted by SNC on UNTAC's initiative, and a programme of regular prison visits. Working groups on road safety and banditry were established. The Special Representative issued a directive prohibiting the illegal possession and carrying of weapons and explosives.

In the area of finance, UNTAC worked with the administrative structures to put in place controls over expenditure, sources of revenue, central bank functions and the sale of public assets. SNC adopted a financial control directive prepared by the Special Representative on the transfer of public assets in order to introduce orderly and transparent procedures into the process of privatization of property owned by the existing administrative structures.

Another dimension of UNTAC's work was the effort to stabilize the country's economy in order to reduce possible causes of unrest that might have an adverse effect on the electoral environment. Control teams were set up to supplement the regular supervision that UNTAC exercised over the existing administrative structures, particularly outside Phnom Penh. Each team was headed by an inspector assisted by Finance and Public Security Services staff, representatives of the military and civilian police components, and analysts and interpreters from the Information/Education Division.

Following the elections, the component streamlined its activities to help ensure a smooth transition from the existing administrative structures to the new Government. At the provincial level, civil administration staff maintained their contacts with the personnel of the existing administrative structures, promoted dialogue and national reconciliation, monitored any sale, transfer or disposal of public assets, followed up on allegations of human rights violations or political intimidation, and facilitated the work of United Nations agencies. On the national level, civil administration staff focused their efforts on the judiciary and the administration of justice, on monitoring the implementation of SNC moratoria on timber, gems and minerals, on border and customs control, and on the control and safeguarding of public funds and State assets. Financial control activities continued through the transitional period at both the national and provincial levels.

Civilian police

UNTAC's civilian police component worked in close cooperation with the human rights, electoral, military, civil administration and repatriation components. The police presence, like that of the military, helped assure Cambodians of UNTAC's commitment to the peace process. It also promoted the creation of a neutral political environment by making Cambodians aware that the arbitrary abuse of power would not be tolerated.

Much of the daily work of the 3,600 UNTAC civilian police focused on its main function, the supervision or control of local police activities. In carrying out this function, the component provided local police with training in basic police methods, including operations, traffic control, human rights observance, criminal law, criminal investigation, crime prevention, and demonstration and riot control. It also provided local police with basic information on the roles of UNTAC and the civilian police component. Special instruction was provided to police officers and judges in the implementation of the new penal code adopted by SNC.

Priority in initial deployment was given to areas were Cambodian refugees and displaced persons were being resettled. The component eventually extended its activities to all provinces. Police monitors were posted at border check-points and cooperated with the military component in arrangements concerning supervision of checkpoints and patrols operated by local police forces in sensitive areas. Joint checkpoints manned by UNTAC and local police resulted in the confiscation of a large number of unauthorized firearms. The component also directed the efforts of local police against the growing problem of banditry in the interior.

Some 60 per cent of UNTAC civilian police were directly involved in assisting the voter registration process. During the electoral campaign, following the steep rise in attacks against the offices of political parties, UNTAC civilian police, in collaboration with other components, launched a special operation which included intensive patrols and static guard duty to curb the attacks. UNTAC civilian police also monitored political rallies and meetings. During the voting, they were present at all polling stations.

The police component undertook independently hundreds of investigations into serious crimes, particularly those considered to be politically or ethnically motivated. In a number of those cases, the Special Prosecutor had enough evidence to issue a warrant. Where cases involved political or ethnic considerations, the Special Representative also raised the matter with SNC or in private meetings with party leaders.


Some 365,000 Cambodian refugees and displaced persons from camps on the Thai border and elsewhere were repatriated under United Nations auspices in an inter-agency effort under the overall authority of UNTAC. UNHCR acted as lead agency and oversaw the movement of returnees, the provision of immediate assistance and food, and a reintegration programme. The repatriation component of UNTAC was headed by a director, appointed by the Secretary-General and reporting to the Special Representative as well as to the High Commissioner for Refugees.

The repatriation exercise began on 30 March 1992. On 30 March 1993, the largest and last of the refugee camps, Site 2, was closed at an official ceremony presided by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. Some 365,000 refugees and displaced persons had returned to Cambodia under United Nations auspices. The monthly rate of return rose from 4,000 in April to 20,000 in June. By July, some 30,000 Cambodians were returning home each month. Difficult travelling conditions during the rainy season were largely overcome by the use of rail and, in some cases, waterways. By November, the rate of return rose to 35,000 a month and reached a peak of 40,000 in the months of January and February 1993. Though the great bulk of the returnees came from Thailand, some 2,000 were also repatriated from Indonesia, Viet Nam and Malaysia. Most refugees chose to settle in areas controlled by the Phnom Penh authorities. Of the rest, about 33,000 chose to settle in the KPNLF zone, while several thousand settled in the PDK and FUNCINPEC zones.

In addition to rations for 400 days and a domestic kit, returnees had the choice of several forms of assistance, including agricultural land, a housing plot and a cash grant in lieu of building materials. Most returnees, some 88 percent, chose the cash grant. UNHCR advised returnees on the situation prevailing in their communes of final destination, particularly when they were unsafe or inaccessible. In cooperation with other UNTAC components, United Nations agencies and non-governmental organizations, UNHCR established a country-wide mechanism for monitoring the condition of returnees. Quick-impact projects were also implemented to help communities absorb the returnees. These included road and bridge repair, mine-clearance, agricultural development, digging of wells and water ponds and improvement and construction of sanitation, health and education facilities. All eligible returnees were given the opportunity to register to vote, either in their final destination along with the local population or in the six reception centres. In January 1993, as the deadline for the end of the electoral registration period was approaching, a special arrangement was made between UNTAC's repatriation and electoral components to enable registration of the remaining eligible population in the border camps whereby they were temporarily Alisted in Thailand and received their registration cards upon return to Cambodia.


The rehabilitation phase ran from the signing of the Paris Agreements and the establishment of UNTAC until the formation of a new Cambodian Government following free and fair elections. UNTAC's rehabilitation component focused on food security, health, housing, training, education, the transport network and the restoration of Cambodia's basic infrastructure, including public utilities. The component's director, appointed by the Secretary-General and reporting to the Special Representative, ensured effective coordination of rehabilitation activities, and made ongoing assessments of needs. Shortly after the establishment of UNTAC in Cambodia, a technical advisory committee of SNC was set up under the chairmanship of the UNTAC Director of Rehabilitation in order to facilitate the approval of projects by the Cambodian parties. In addition, the director had responsibilities related to raising resources through donor contributions.

On 23 July 1992, SNC established a technical advisory committee to review and assess existing contractual arrangements relating to the exploitation of natural resources such as timber stock and gem mines. On the committee's recommendation, SNC, on 22 September, instituted a country-wide moratorium on the export of logs C a decision supported by the Security Council in its resolution 792 (1992). Compliance with the moratorium was monitored by the rehabilitation component, in close coordination with UNTAC military observers, civil administration and civilian police personnel deployed at border checkpoints. On 10 February 1993, SNC adopted supplementary measures aimed at discouraging further tree felling by reducing the volume of sawn timber allowed to be exported from Cambodia. In March 1993, SNC approved the UNTAC draft action plan on the implementation of the Declaration on Mining and Export of Minerals and Gems from Cambodia. The Declaration placed a moratorium on the commercial extraction of mineral resources on land and offshore and on the export of minerals and gems from Cambodia, effective 28 February 1993. Also in 1993, SNC approved the proposal made by UNTAC in collaboration with the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization for the establishment of a National Heritage Protection Authority of Cambodia to coordinate efforts aimed at protecting and administering the physical cultural heritage of Cambodia.

Of the nearly $880 million pledged at the Ministerial Conference on the Rehabilitation and Reconstruction of Cambodia in Tokyo, the Secretary-General reported that the actual level of disbursements by early 1993 stood at no more than $95 million. Further, the lack of funding for certain specific sectors, including training and maintenance of essential social services, also gave rise to concern that these deficiencies might compromise the overall rehabilitation effort. These issues of concern were discussed at a meeting of donors in Phnom Penh on 25 February 1993. The participants recognized the need for speedy disbursement of the commitments made in Tokyo. They reviewed the emerging priority needs and agreed that arrangements be made for meetings, following the elections, of the International Committee on the Reconstruction of Cambodia. As of mid-August 1993, approximately $200 million had been disbursed. A meeting of the Committee was held in Paris on 8 and 9 September 1993 at which new pledges amounting to $120 million were made.

Towards the end of the transition period, the rehabilitation component concentrated on the implementation of small-scale rehabilitation projects yielding quick results. These projects involved the repair and maintenance of public utilities and education and health facilities. Most projects were highly labour-intensive, thus creating jobs. Donor response to the component's initiative to implement these projects was relatively positive after the elections had taken place.

Information/education activities

After two decades of fighting and isolation, many Cambodians were little aware of the international community's efforts to assist their country. Many were skeptical about the applicability in Cambodia of basic concepts of human rights, including free and fair elections and multi-party political campaigning. The flow of information between UNTAC and the people of Cambodia was thus considered essential to UNTAC's operation. The arrangements in this regard was another unprecedented aspect of UNTAC.

The Information/Education Division of UNTAC was responsible for producing information material in the Khmer language and disseminating it to the Cambodian people. It published media guidelines aimed at lifting legal restrictions and encouraging the operation of a free and responsible press, and launched a Cambodian Media Association of all Cambodian journalists. It pursued efforts to exercise control over the administrative structures dealing with information. The Special Representative issued a directive on fair access to the media during the electoral campaign, and UNTAC made its own television/video, radio and other information facilities available to the 20 political parties participating in the elections.

UNTAC had its own radio station. On 9 November 1992, the station began broadcasting from a Phnom Penh-based transmitter loaned by SOC for UNTAC's exclusive use. By April 1993, relay stations brought the UNTAC message to all parts of the country and, by early May, programming had expanded to 15 hours per day. In addition, under arrangements made with the Thai Foreign Ministry and Voice of America (VOA), UNTAC materials were broadcast via a VOA transmitter in Thailand at prime time twice daily. The broadcasts concentrated on information regarding the electoral process, human rights and other aspects of the UNTAC mandate. During the electoral campaign particular emphasis was given to the secrecy of the ballot. In accordance with the directive of the Special Representative on fair access to the media during the electoral campaign, Radio UNTAC offered weekly segments to each political party for the broadcast of political material and allowed a Aright of response to a political party, candidate or official in cases of unfair attack or misrepresentation of public statements.

UNTAC also produced a variety of videos, posters, information leaflets, flyers, banners, billboards and advertisements for public display to illustrate the work of UNTAC and to inform Cambodians of the events of the electoral process and encourage their full participation in it. Activity during the campaign included disseminating information on various political party platforms, building confidence in the secrecy of the ballot and instructing voters in voting procedures. Information videos, including round-table discussions involving representatives of the 20 political parties contesting the elections, were shown in Phnom Penh and distributed throughout the country. Translations and analyses of the Khmer-language radio and print output of all four Cambodian parties signatory to the Paris Agreements were provided to the Special Representative and all UNTAC components. Information officers conducted regular opinion surveys among Cambodians to assess the impact of UNTAC's information programme and to monitor the attitude of the people towards UNTAC and its implementation of the peace process.


In its resolution 880 (1993) of 4 November 1993, the Security Council noted with great satisfaction that, with the conclusion of UNTAC's mission, the goal of the Paris Agreements C restoring to the Cambodian people and their democratically elected leaders their primary responsibility for peace, stability, national reconciliation and reconstruction C had been fulfilled. The Council paid tribute to the work of UNTAC, whose success constituted a major achievement for the United Nations. The Secretary-General believed the international community could take satisfaction in the fact that, despite serious difficulties, UNTAC was able to accomplish its central task of holding a free and fair election in Cambodia and laying a sound foundation for the people of Cambodia to build a stable and peaceful future.


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