Rwanda - UNAMIR

Prepared by the Department of Public Information, United Nations - as of September 1996.

Not an official document of the United Nations.



Fighting between the Armed Forces of the Government of Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF) first broke out in October 1990 across the border between Rwanda and its northern neighbour, Uganda. Despite a number of cease-fire agreements thereafter, hostilities resumed in the northern part of the country in early February 1993. These interrupted comprehensive negotiations between the Government of Rwanda and RPF, which were supported by the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and facilitated by the United Republic of Tanzania.

In support of resumption of the negotiations, Rwanda and Uganda, in separate letters to the President of the Security Council on 22 February 1993, called for the deployment of United Nations military observers along the 150-kilometre common border in order to prevent the military use of the area, especially the transportation of military supplies. RPF control of the border area had been extensive.

Following consultations of the Security Council on 24 February concerning these letters, United Nations Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali decided to send a goodwill mission to Rwanda and Uganda. He instructed the mission to examine all major aspects of the peace process including the possibility of deploying military observers along the border. The goodwill mission carried out this mandate from 4 to 18 March 1993.

Meanwhile, efforts by OAU and Tanzania led to a meeting between the Government of Rwanda and RPF from 5 to 7 March at Dar-es-Salaam, the capital of Tanzania. In a closing joint communiqu‚, the Government of Rwanda and RPF pledged their commitment to a negotiated settlement and agreed to reinstate the cease-fire on 9 March and to the resumption of peace talks in Arusha, Tanzania. They also committed themselves to providing adequate security and protection to displaced persons.

On 12 March 1993, the Security Council, by its resolution 812 (1993), called on the Government of Rwanda and RPF to respect the renewed cease-fire, to resume negotiations, to allow the delivery of humanitarian supplies and the return of displaced persons, and to fulfil the obligations and commitments the parties had made in the past. The Council also welcomed the goodwill mission the Secretary-General had sent to Rwanda and Uganda. Finally, it asked him to examine the requests of those two countries for the deployment of observers along their common border.

The Secretary-General dispatched a technical mission to the border area between Rwanda and Uganda which visited Uganda from 2 to 5 April and Rwanda on 6 April. It reported that it would be possible to deploy United Nations military observers to monitor the border between Uganda and Rwanda and verify that no military assistance - lethal weapons, ammunition and other material of possible military use - was being provided across it. It was decided that deployment of the observers would be on the Ugandan side of the border only.

On 22 June 1993, the Security Council, by its resolution 846 (1993), authorized the establishment of the United Nations Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda (UNOMUR) on the Uganda side of the common border, for an initial period of six months, subject to review every six months. The Council decided that the verification would focus primarily on transit or transport, by roads or tracks which could accommodate vehicles, of lethal weapons and ammunition across the border, as well as any other material which could be of military use.

The Council welcomed the Secretary-General's decision to support the peace-keeping efforts of OAU by putting two military experts at its disposal to help expedite the deployment of OAU's expanded Neutral Military Observer Group (NMOG)1/ to Rwanda. It also urged the Government of Rwanda and RPF to conclude quickly a comprehensive peace agreement, and requested the Secretary-General to report on the contribution the United Nations could make to assist OAU in implementing this agreement and to begin contingency planning in the event that the Council decided that such a contribution was needed. As requested by resolution 846 (1993), the United Nations undertook consultations with the Government of Uganda with a view to concluding a status of mission agreement for UNOMUR. The agreement was finalized and entered into force on 16 August 1993. This opened the way to deployment of an advance party which arrived in the mission area on 18 August. By the end of September, UNOMUR had reached its authorized strength of 81 military observers and was fully operational. Observers were provided by the following countries: Bangladesh, Botswana, Brazil, Hungary, Netherlands, Senegal, Slovak Republic and Zimbabwe. The mission also included 10 international and six local civilian support staff.

Meanwhile, the Arusha talks on a comprehensive peace agreement between the Government of Rwanda and RPF had reconvened on 16 March 1993. The United Nations Secretary-General was represented by Mr. Macaire P‚danou, head of the United Nations goodwill mission that visited Rwanda earlier that month.

The talks covered military issues, refugees and displaced persons, and outstanding political matters, including the amendment of the constitution, as well as the duration of the transitional period. Early in the talks, the parties also began to discuss an international neutral force to oversee the implementation of key aspects of the peace agreement and to create confidence during the transition period.

The talks in Arusha were successfully concluded on 4 August 1993 with the signing of a comprehensive peace agreement, which called for a democratically elected government and provided for the establishment of a broad-based transitional Government until the elections, in addition to repatriation of refugees and integration of the armed forces of the two sides. The two parties called for a neutral international force to help implement the agreement.

In a joint request to the Security Council from Arusha on 11 June, the two parties had called on the United Nations to send a reconnaissance mission to Rwanda. This mission would prepare for the quick deployment of a neutral international force as soon as the peace agreement under negotiation was signed. The request welcomed the OAU suggestion that the United Nations should assume responsibility for and command of such a force. The parties asked that the force should assist in the maintenance of public security and in the delivery of humanitarian aid. It would also assist in searches for weapons caches, neutralization of armed bands, demining, disarmament of civilians and the cessation of hostilities. The parties also requested that the international force oversee the demobilization of existing armed forces and of all aspects of the formation of the new National Army and National Gendarmerie.

A United Nations reconnaissance mission visited Rwanda from 19 to 31 August 1993. Its senior officials also visited Dar-es-Salaam on 1 and 2 September and Addis Ababa on 3 September for consultations with the Government of Tanzania and the Secretary-General of OAU respectively.

On the basis of the mission's findings, the Secretary-General submitted to the Security Council, on 24 September, a report, in which he recommended the establishment of a United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR), with the mandate of "contributing to the establishment and maintenance of a climate conducive to the secure installation and subsequent operation of the transitional Government".

According to the Secretary-General, the principal functions of UNAMIR would be to assist in ensuring the security of the capital city of Kigali; monitor the cease-fire agreement, including establishment of an expanded demilitarized zone (DMZ) and demobilization procedures; monitor the security situation during the final period of the transitional Government's mandate leading up to elections; and assist with mine-clearance. The Mission would also investigate alleged non-compliance with any provisions of the peace agreement and provide security for the repatriation of Rwandese refugees and displaced persons. In addition, it would assist in the coordination of humanitarian assistance activities in conjunction with relief operations.

The Secretary-General proposed that the military observers of UNOMUR come under the command of the new Mission, while maintaining their separate monitoring tasks on the Uganda-Rwanda border. The Mission would also incorporate elements of NMOG II which was mandated by OAU to supervise the cease-fire until 31 October 1993.

The Secretary-General recommended that the operation be conducted in four phases. The first phase would begin on the day the Security Council established UNAMIR and would end on D-Day, the day on which the transitional Government was installed. It was estimated that the transitional Government might not be installed until the end of 1993. The objective of the Mission would be to establish conditions for the secure installation of such a Government. By the end of that phase, the strength of UNAMIR would total 1,428 military personnel.

During phase two, expected to last 90 days or until the process of disengagement, demobilization and integration of the Armed Forces and Gendarmerie began, the build-up of the Mission would continue to a total of 2,548 military personnel. During this phase, UNAMIR would continue to monitor the DMZ, to assist in providing security in Kigali and in the demarcation of the assembly zones, and to ensure that all preparations for disengagement, demobilization and integration were in place.

During phase three, which would last about 9 months, the Mission would establish, supervise and monitor a new DMZ. Security would also continue to be provided in Kigali. The disengagement, demobilization and integration of the Forces and the Gendarmerie would be completed in this stage, and the Mission would reduce its staff to approximately 1,240 personnel.

Phase four, which would last about four months, would see a further reduction of the Mission's strength to the minimum level of approximately 930 military personnel. UNAMIR would assist in ensuring the secure atmosphere required in the final stages of the transitional period leading up to the elections.

In order to verify that law and order were maintained effectively and impartially, the Secretary-General proposed to deploy a small United Nations civilian police unit in Kigali and the nine prefecture capitals of Rwanda and in specific police installations.

UNAMIR was established on 5 October by Security Council resolution 872 (1993) for an initial period of six months with the proviso that it would be extended beyond the initial 90 days only upon a review by the Council. In connection with this, the Secretary-General would report on any substantive progress made towards the implementation of the Arusha Peace Agreement.

The Council noted that UNAMIR's mandate would end following national elections and the installation of a new government in Rwanda, events which were scheduled to occur by October 1995, but no later than December 1995. In that context, the Council authorized the Secretary-General to deploy a first contingent to Kigali, which, when fully in place, would permit the establishment of the transitional institutions and implementation of the other relevant provisions of the Peace Agreement.

By resolution 872 (1993), the Council also urged the parties to implement the Arusha Agreement in good faith and called upon Member States, United Nations specialized agencies and non-governmental organizations to provide and intensify their economic, financial and humanitarian assistance in favour of the Rwandese population and of the democratization process in Rwanda.

The Council welcomed the intention of the Secretary-General to appoint a Special Representative who would lead UNAMIR in the field and exercise authority over all its elements.

UNOMUR established its headquarters in Kabale, Uganda, about 20 kilometres north of the border with Rwanda. It also established observation posts at two major crossing sites and three secondary sites on the Ugandan side of the border. The mission monitored the border area through mobile patrols and enhanced its operational capability with airborne coverage.

The Secretary-General, in his 15 December 1993 report to the Security Council, noted that UNOMUR had been "a factor of stability in the area and that it was playing a useful role as a confidence-building mechanism". He therefore recommended to the Council that the mandate of the mission be extended for a period of six months.

The Security Council, by its resolution 891 (1993) adopted on 20 December 1993, extended UNOMUR's mandate by six months. The Council expressed its appreciation to the Government of Uganda for its cooperation and support for UNOMUR and also underlined the importance of a cooperative attitude on the part of the civilian and military authorities in the mission area.

The UNAMIR Force Commander, Brigadier-General Romeo A. Dallaire (Canada), arrived in Kigali on 22 October 1993, followed by an advance party of 21 military personnel on 27 October. On 1 November, as foreseen in the Secretary-General's report, NMOG II was integrated into UNAMIR. The demilitarized zone sector headquarters was established upon the arrival of the advance party and became operational on 1 November 1993 when the NMOG II elements were absorbed into UNAMIR.

The deployment of a UNAMIR battalion in Kigali that was composed of contingents from Belgium and Bangladesh was completed in the first part of December 1993. The Kigali weapons-secure area was established on 24 December.

The Secretary-General's Special Representative for Rwanda, Mr. Jacques-Roger Booh-Booh, former Minister for External Relations of Cameroon, arrived in Kigali on 23 November 1993 and established his headquarters in the Rwandese capital.

At a meeting on 10 December 1993, initiated by the Special Representative, the Government and RPF issued a joint declaration reaffirming their commitment to the provisions of the Arusha Peace Agreement. They agreed to set up a broad-based transitional Government and the Transitional National Assembly before 31 December 1993.

In his 30 December 1993 report to the Security Council, the Secretary-General pointed out that most of the projected tasks of phase I of the implementation plan had been accomplished. He underlined that, despite signs of mutual intransigence, the parties had continued to show good will and cooperation in their contacts with each other and with the United Nations. The cease-fire was also respected.

The Secretary-General recommended that the Security Council agree that UNAMIR should continue to implement its mandate. In this regard, he intended to proceed with the implementation plan, including the early deployment of the second battalion in the DMZ.

The Security Council, by its resolution 893 (1994) of 6 January 1994, endorsed these proposals. The Council strongly urged the parties to cooperate with UNAMIR in furthering the peace process, to comply fully with the Arusha Peace Agreement and, in particular, to establish a broad-based transitional Government at the earliest opportunity.

In accordance with the Arusha Peace Agreement, which provided that the incumbent head of State would remain in office until the elections, Major-General Juv‚nal Habyarimana was sworn in as President of Rwanda on 5 January 1994. However, expectations that the transitional Government and the Transitional National Assembly would also be installed on that same day could not be met because of the inability of the parties concerned to agree on several issues, including the lists of members of these bodies.

The failure to set up the transitional institutions not only delayed the completion of phase I of the implementation plan, but also contributed to a deterioration of the security situation in the country and posed a threat to the peace process. January and February 1994 saw increasingly violent demonstrations, roadblocks, assassination of political leaders and assaults on and murders of civilians.

Following an upsurge in violent incidents in late February, culminating in the assassination of two prominent political leaders and the ambush of a UNAMIR-escorted RPF convoy, the Government imposed a curfew in Kigali and in a number of other cities. Subsequently, the security situation began to stabilize, especially following the increased support provided to the National Gendarmerie by UNAMIR military and civilian police components.

In the course of January-March 1994, the Secretary-General and his Special Representative, supported by a number of Governments both within and outside the region, as well as the OAU Secretary-General and the observer States to the peace process, continued to promote agreement among the parties on the setting up of the transitional institutions. However, notwithstanding some progress in the negotiations, all attempts to install those institutions failed.

On the positive side, despite the increased tensions and insecurity engendered by the political impasse, the cease-fire was generally holding. UNAMIR forces, whose operational capacity was enhanced with the deployment of additional personnel and equipment, continued to play a stabilizing role.

Although the persistent stalemate on the establishment of the transitional institutions delayed the start of phase II operations, UNAMIR forces earmarked for that phase were in place and ready to begin operations on short notice. In addition, preparations for phase III, which would involve the actual disengagement, demobilization and integration of the armed forces of the parties, had begun.

With the arrival of the UNAMIR Police Commissioner, Colonel Manfred Bliem (Austria), on 26 December 1993 and of the police units in January and February 1994, the UNAMIR civilian police contingent (CIVPOL) set up its headquarters in Kigali and reached its authorized strength of 60 civilian police monitors. In carrying out its mandate, which was to assist in maintaining public security through the monitoring and verification of the activities of the Gendarmerie and the Communal Police, CIVPOL worked closely with both bodies in Kigali.

On 15 April 1993, the United Nations launched an inter-agency appeal for international assistance to Rwanda to cover the period from April to December 1993, amounting to $78 million to meet the needs of over 900,000 war-displaced people, or approximately 13 per cent of the nation's population. The appeal was the result of a request by the President of Rwanda to the Secretary-General earlier in 1993, following a three-fold increase in the number of the displaced persons, whose emergency needs had overwhelmed local capacity to supply them.

Most of the displaced people were living in and around 30 camps where serious malnutrition and disease were prevalent. The situation was exacerbated by Rwanda's already precarious economic condition, overpopulation and rapidly declining agricultural production.

An inter-agency mission, led by the United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs, had been fielded between 18 and 25 March 1993 to prepare a consolidated appeal with all concerned United Nations agencies. The appeal presented priority emergency relief projects focusing on food, nutrition, health, water and sanitation, shelter and household items and education. As of the end of November 1993, contributions in cash and in kind amounting to some $33 million had been made available to the United Nations agencies carrying out humanitarian activities in Rwanda.

With the signing of the Arusha Peace Agreement, it was estimated that some 600,000 individuals had returned home, thus easing the emergency situation that had prevailed earlier in the year; as a result, the emphasis of the humanitarian assistance efforts had shifted to meeting the needs of the displaced returning home. At the same time, some 300,000 people who remained displaced continued to rely on emergency assistance in the camps.

In recommending the establishment of UNAMIR, the Secretary-General had stated that humanitarian assistance to displaced persons and refugees, as well as to demobilized soldiers, would have to be coordinated with the Mission's activities. Mine-clearance had been earmarked as a priority to ease the threat to displaced persons and to humanitarian agencies seeking to deliver assistance.

The Secretary-General again reported to the Security Council on the situation in Rwanda on 30 March 1994. He stated that continued international support for UNAMIR would depend upon the full and prompt implementation of the Arusha Peace Agreement by the parties concerned and urged them to make a determined effort to reach agreement on the establishment of the broad-based transitional Government and the Transitional National Assembly.

The Secretary-General was encouraged by the fact that, in spite of increasing tensions, the parties had maintained the process of dialogue. He believed that UNAMIR should continue to support the dialogue to resolve the remaining differences in order to complete phase I of the implementation plan and to facilitate phase II operations. Therefore, the Secretary-General recommended that the Council extend the mandate of UNAMIR for a period of six months, during which time he would keep the Council informed of the pace of progress in the implementation of the Arusha Peace Agreement. However, in the event that the transitional institutions were not installed within the following two months and if sufficient progress in the implementation of the next phase of the agreement had not also been achieved, the Council should then review the situation, including the role of the United Nations.

On April 5, 1994, the Security Council, by its resolution 909 (1994), expressed its "deep concern at the delay in the establishment of the broad-based transitional Government and the Transitional National Assembly" and, stating that it was "concerned at the deterioration in security in the country, particularly in Kigali," decided to extend the mandate of UNAMIR until 29 July 1994. It noted that it would review the situation within six weeks if the Secretary-General informed it that the transitional institutions provided for under the Arusha Peace Agreement had not been established and that insufficient progress had been made for implementation of phase II of UNAMIR's activities.

On 6 April 1994, a plane carrying President Juv‚nal Habyarimana of Rwanda and President Cyprien Ntaryamira of Burundi crashed at Kigali airport, killing all those on board. The cause for the crash could not be determined without a full investigation, which has not taken place.

Following the deaths of the two Presidents, widespread killings having apparently both ethnic and political dimensions began in Kigali and also in other parts of the country. A civil war broke out after the air crash which led to country-wide massacres of the Hutu opposition and intelligentsia, as well as members of the Tutsi minority and other RPF supporters.

Within two weeks, the deaths were considered to number tens of thousands. According to reports at the time, the killings were started by unruly members of the Presidential Guard, and then spread quickly throughout the city. RPF units subsequently became involved in the fighting. After the provisional Government disintegrated, an interim Government was proclaimed on 8 April 1994, but it left the capital on 12 April 1994 as fighting between the armed forces and RPF intensified and established itself in Gitarama, 40 kilometres south-west of Kigali.

Victims in the violence included Prime Minister Agathe Uwilingiyimana and 10 Belgian members of UNAMIR. The Secretary-General condemned the acts of violence and attacks on the members of UNAMIR in the strongest terms.

Following the murder of the Belgian soldiers and threats to Belgian nationals, the Government of Belgium decided to withdraw its battalion from UNAMIR. UNAMIR found it impossible to carry on with its original mandate, and instead concentrated on: securing an agreement on a cease-fire to be followed by political negotiations; protecting civilians in all possible ways; negotiating a truce with the two parties to permit the evacuation of expatriates; assisting in evacuations; rescuing those trapped in the fighting; and providing humanitarian assistance to large groups of displaced persons under UNAMIR protection.

On 14 April, the Secretary-General discussed with the Security Council possible ways of dealing with the situation.

Despite direct contacts between the two sides under the auspices of UNAMIR on 15 April, both adopted rigid positions, undermining negotiations for a cease-fire. Violence continued in the streets, as did fighting between Rwandese Government Forces (RGF) and RPF forces. UNAMIR headquarters was hit on 19 April, although there were no casualties.

On 20 April 1994, the Secretary-General reported to the Security Council that UNAMIR personnel "cannot be left at risk indefinitely when there is no possibility of their performing the tasks for which they were dispatched."

The military personnel in UNAMIR stood at 1,515 on that date, down from 2,165, while military observers numbered 190, down from 321.

The Secretary-General proffered three alternatives to the Security Council.

Assuming there was no realistic prospect of the two sides agreeing on an effective cease-fire in the immediate future, combat and massacres could only be averted by an immediate and massive reinforcement of UNAMIR and a change in its mandate to allow it to coerce opposing forces into a cease-fire. This would require several thousand additional troops and could require that UNAMIR be given enforcement powers under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter.

Alternatively, a small group, headed by the Force Commander, would remain in Kigali to act as an intermediary between the two parties in an attempt to bring them to an agreement on a cease-fire. This effort could be maintained for a period of up to two weeks or longer, should the Council so prefer. The total military personnel would number about 270. But a full relief effort would be impossible without a cease-fire under this arrangement, the Secretary-General pointed out.

Finally, the Secretary-General noted that UNAMIR could be completely withdrawn, although he did not favour this alternative. The cost of withdrawal in human lives could be very severe, the Secretary-General cautioned.

In presenting the alternatives, the Secretary-General emphasized that the Government of Rwanda, or its successor, and the RPF bore responsibility for seeking peace. He also expressed sympathy for bereaved Rwandese families, offered condolences to the Government of Belgium and the families of the Belgian peace-keepers who were killed, and recorded his high commendation to the personnel of UNAMIR, his Special Representative and the Force Commander for their work.

On 21 April 1994, the Security Council decided in its resolution 912 (1994) to reduce UNAMIR to the numbers recommended by the Secretary-General in his second alternative. It also adjusted the mandate of UNAMIR so that it would act as an intermediary between the parties in an attempt to secure their agreement to a cease-fire; assist in the resumption of humanitarian relief operations to the extent feasible; and monitor developments in Rwanda, including the safety and security of civilians who sought refuge with UNAMIR. In the resolution, the Security Council also stressed that the Arusha Peace Agreement remained central to the peace process in Rwanda, strongly condemned the attacks against UNAMIR and other United Nations personnel, and demanded an immediate cessation of hostilities between the forces of the Government of Rwanda and RPF.

The Secretary-General's Special Representative participated in the Arusha talks on 22 and 23 April where a cease-fire statement was presented. Although cease-fire negotiations could not take place, the meeting contributed to a unilateral declaration of a cease-fire by RPF.

Because of the deterioration in the security situation, the evacuation of humanitarian personnel was recommended on 9 April 1994, and humanitarian activities were temporarily suspended. However, the United Nations agencies participating in the United Nations Disaster Management Team in Rwanda recommenced their coordination efforts in Nairobi within days of the evacuation, under the aegis of the newly-created United Nations Rwanda Emergency Office (UNREO). Efforts at limited cross-border humanitarian assistance proved possible, primarily from Uganda but also from Burundi. The World Food Programme (WFP) was able to carry out limited food distribution from existing WFP stocks in southern Rwanda.

As fighting continued in and around Kigali, Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs Peter Hansen led an inter-agency Advance Humanitarian Team (AHT) into the city on 23 April 1994. Composed of members of the Department of Humanitarian Affairs, the United Nations Development Programme, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) and the World Health Organization, the team assessed needs in the Kigali area and, in conjunction with United Nations and other humanitarian agencies operating out of Uganda, in most RPF-controlled areas as well. Aid efforts in Kigali, such as the provision of UNICEF medical and health kits and high nutrition biscuits, were immediately initiated by the AHT in close collaboration with UNAMIR. Efforts by members of the humanitarian team to obtain access to WFP food stocks held in warehouses in Kigali, however, were repeatedly blocked by hostile fire.

Within a week of the humanitarian team's mission, a sub-office of UNREO was set up in Kabale, Uganda. Staffed with personnel seconded by UNHCR and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), the Kabale office helped coordinate cross border relief efforts into Rwanda. Uganda-based efforts to provide humanitarian aid in RPF-controlled areas expanded rapidly as security conditions allowed. These coordinated efforts included a number of international NGOs and were coordinated closely with the work of the International Committee of the Red Cross. Access to most of the needy population in RGF-controlled areas, where the number of internally displaced people was estimated to be as many as a million, continued to prove virtually impossible due to severe security problems. United Nations agencies based in Burundi, especially UNHCR, UNICEF and WFP, continued efforts to obtain first-hand information on needs in these areas, and to provide aid whenever the security situation allowed. On 25 April, the Department of Humanitarian Affairs launched a "flash appeal" on behalf of United Nations agencies for immediate emergency operations and contingency actions related to Rwanda. This appeal, for $8 million, received a mixed response from donors.

Soon after the launch of the "flash appeal", the humanitarian situation changed dramatically. In the most rapid exodus of this scale UNHCR had ever recorded, more than 250,000 Rwandese refugees poured across the Rusumo Falls border crossing point into Tanzania within 24 hours. Although UNHCR had pre-positioned food, blankets, and other relief supplies for 50,000 persons, the continued exodus along this border forced the creation of a massive relief operation. The international relief community, with overall coordination by UNHCR, rushed to help the Tanzanian Government and local residents cope with the massive influx of refugees. UNHCR made an urgent appeal to donors for an additional $56 million to meet the needs of refugees in the region, and particularly those crossing into Tanzania.

On 29 April 1994, the Secretary-General wrote to the Security Council that the situation had further deteriorated in Kigali and other parts of Rwanda. The capital city was effectively divided into sectors controlled by RGF and RPF, the Secretary-General wrote, with frequent exchanges of artillery and mortar fire between the two sides. UNAMIR reported strong evidence of preparations for further massacres of civilians in the city, while massacres continued on a large scale in the countryside, especially in the south.

The developments raised serious questions about the viability of the revised mandate which the Security Council gave to UNAMIR on 21 April. It had become clear that UNAMIR did not have the power to take effective action to halt the continuing massacres, and would be unable to protect threatened people in Kigali if a new wave of massacres were to start. According to some estimates, as many as 200,000 people had died over the previous three weeks.

While some of the massacres had been the work of uncontrolled military personnel, most of them had been perpetrated by armed groups of civilians taking advantage of the complete breakdown of law and order in Kigali and many other parts of Rwanda, the Secretary-General continued, and they could be prevented only if law and order were restored. The Secretary-General urged the Security Council to consider again what action, including forceful action, it could take or could authorize Member States to take, in order to end the massacres.

Although such action would require a commitment of human and material resources on a scale which Member States had so far proved reluctant to contemplate, the Secretary-General said the scale of human suffering and its implications for the stability of neighbouring countries left the Security Council with no alternative but to examine this possibility.

The Secretary-General continued to provide daily briefings to the Security Council, including details on Rwanda's security situation. This had rapidly deteriorated, with large-scale massacres taking place.

On 30 April 1994, the President of the Security Council issued a statement demanding that the interim Government of Rwanda and RPF take effective measures to prevent any attacks on civilians in areas under their control. It called on the leadership of both parties to condemn publicly such attacks and to commit themselves to ensuring that persons who instigate or participate in such acts are individually responsible, noting that the killing of members of an ethnic group with the intention of destroying such a group in whole or in part constitutes a crime punishable under international law.

The Security Council also called on all States to assist UNHCR and other humanitarian and relief agencies operating in the area in meeting the urgent humanitarian needs in Rwanda and its bordering States, and asked bordering States, working with OAU, to provide appropriate protection to refugees and to facilitate transfer of goods and supplies to meet the needs of the displaced persons within Rwanda.

It appealed to all States to refrain from providing arms or any military assistance to the parties to the conflict, and stated its willingness in principle to consider promptly the application of an arms embargo to Rwanda.

Along with other requests, the Council asked the Secretary-General, in consultation with the Secretary-General of OAU, to report further on how to help restore law and order in Rwanda and provide security for displaced persons and to explore urgently ways of extending humanitarian relief assistance to refugees and displaced persons.

Among other measures in response to the Security Council's statement, the Secretary-General wrote to a number of African countries and to the Secretary-General of OAU to explore ways through which such countries could contribute troops to help resolve the tragic situation in Rwanda.

On 3 May 1994, the Secretary-General sent a letter to the President of the Security Council in which he informed him of the action he had taken with respect to communications sent to African leaders, and also mentioned that he had personally spoken with President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt, Chairman in Office of OAU, about the problems in Rwanda, in addition to discussing the matter with the OAU Secretary-General.

In a subsequent letter, dated 6 May 1994, the President of the Security Council asked the Secretary-General to prepare contingency plans to deliver humanitarian assistance and support of displaced persons in Rwanda, and indicated that the Council might later seek indications on logistics and financial implications of an expanded United Nations or international presence in Rwanda.

The Secretary-General reported on 13 May 1994 to the Security Council that UNAMIR had been reduced to 444 all ranks in Rwanda, with 179 military observers at Nairobi pending repatriation or redeployment to the Mission. He also stated that the situation in Rwanda remained "highly unstable and insecure, with widespread violence." A "major humanitarian crisis" had developed, with nearly 2 million people having been displaced.

He noted that in collaboration with other United Nations organizations, the Department of Humanitarian Affairs had established UNREO to coordinate humanitarian relief activities. Medical and nutritional supplies from UNICEF had been distributed in parts of Kigali where access was possible, he noted, while WFP had been able to deliver more than 500 tons of food in the north and 840 tons of food in the south.

UNAMIR, UNREO, the operational United Nations agencies and NGOs working in Rwanda agreed on a division of labour for humanitarian assistance and on a set of principles to serve as the basis for humanitarian operations in Rwanda. These included ensuring the security of relief efforts; joint identification of distribution sites by responsible authorities and United Nations humanitarian organizations; clear identification of interlocutors to represent the authorities for discussion of humanitarian operations; acceptance by authorities of the monitoring and reporting responsibilities of the United Nations organizations regarding the distribution and use of relief materials; and an understanding that aid should be provided based on need, regardless of race, ethnic group, religion or political affiliation. Both sides subsequently agreed on the principles.

The Secretary-General recommended to the Security Council that it provide a new mandate to create UNAMIR II, which would include 5,500 troops. UNAMIR II would, inter alia, support and provide safe conditions for displaced persons and other groups in Rwanda and would help with the provision of assistance by humanitarian organizations. The force would work on behalf of displaced persons in the interior of the country, as well as on the border.

Displaced persons in the interior of the country outnumbered those in border areas or in neighbouring countries by a factor of five, the Secretary-General pointed out. In addition, if humanitarian efforts were concentrated on border areas, the protected sites could act as a magnet to people in need in the interior of the country and increase the number of displaced persons.

UNAMIR II would also monitor border crossing points and the two parties' deployment. While its rules of engagement would not envisage enforcement action, it could be required to take action in self-defence against those who threatened protected sites and populations and the means of delivery and distribution of humanitarian relief.

Deployment of UNAMIR II would be conducted in three phases over a one-month period. During the first phase, which would last for one week following the adoption of the enabling resolution by the Security Council, one full-strength battalion would ensure the protection of Kigali International Airport and other sites in the city where thousands had sought refuge. In the second phase, extending for two weeks after the adoption of the resolution, two more battalions would be deployed, along with advance elements of a support battalion and all of the force headquarters and signal squadron. The rest of the support battalion and two other infantry battalions would be deployed during the third phase, to be completed one month after adoption of the enabling resolution. The Secretary-General estimated that deployment of approximately 5,500 troops for a six-month period would cost about $115 million.

On 17 May 1994, the Security Council in resolution 918 (1994) demanded that all parties to the conflict immediately cease hostilities and agree to a cease-fire. It expanded UNAMIR's mandate to enable it to contribute to the security and protection of refugees and civilians at risk, through means including the establishment and maintenance of secure humanitarian areas, and the provision of security for relief operations to the degree possible.

It authorized the expansion of UNAMIR to 5,500 troops, and requested the Secretary-General to redeploy immediately, as a first phase, the UNAMIR military observers from Nairobi to Rwanda, and to bring up to full strength the infantry battalion currently in the country. The Secretary-General was asked to report as soon as possible on the next phase of UNAMIR's deployment, including updates on cooperation of the parties, progress toward a cease-fire, availability of resources and the proposed duration of the mandate for further review.

At the same time, the Council imposed an arms embargo on the country. It also asked the Secretary-General to present a report as soon as possible on the investigation of serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in Rwanda during the conflict and invited the Secretary-General and his Special Representative, in coordination with OAU and countries in the region, to continue their efforts to achieve a political settlement in Rwanda within the framework of the Arusha Peace Agreement.

Shortly after the Security Council adopted its resolution, Mr. Iqbal Riza, Assistant Secretary-General for Peace-keeping Operations, and Maj.-Gen. J. Maurice Baril, Military Adviser to the Secretary-General, left on a special mission to Rwanda. The purposes of the mission were to move the warring parties towards a cease-fire, to ascertain from them their views on and intentions towards the implementation of resolution 918 (1994) and to review with UNAMIR the modalities of the operations outlined in the Secretary-General's report of 13 May 1994.

On 31 May 1994, the Secretary-General reported to the Security Council that the special mission had been in the area from 22 to 27 May 1994, and had met with officials from both sides, and with UNAMIR officials. Although both sides had given assurances that they would observe an informal truce during the visit, firing and shelling continued, especially in and around Kigali, causing the special mission to lose much time.

The special mission was informed that those responsible for the killings in Rwanda included members of the Rwandese government forces, but in the main were drawn from the Presidential Guard and the interhamwe, the youth militia recruited and formed by the late President's party. Allegations by representatives of the interim Government and the Rwandese Armed Forces and the Gendarmerie that the RPF bore equal culpability for the killings were not corroborated by other sources.

The mission also found that the RPF zone was virtually empty. In the zones controlled by the Rwandese government force, however, increasing numbers of displaced persons were fleeing the RPF advance and were seeking refuge in camps in subhuman conditions. This exodus was in part due to alarming radio broadcasts from Rwandese government forces zones, especially Radio Mille Collines, which also broadcast incitements to eliminate RPF supporters.

On 31 May 1994, the Secretary-General reported to the Security Council that the special mission had been able to obtain the agreement of the two sides to initiate talks for the establishment of a cease-fire as called for by resolution 918 (1994). RPF's insistence that it would not deal, directly or indirectly, with the de facto authorities in Gitarama was accepted by the other side. A working paper, to serve as a basis for the talks, was prepared by the special mission and the Force Commander, and the first meeting was held between military staff officers on 30 May at UNAMIR headquarters with the Deputy Force Commander acting as intermediary.

During discussions with the mission, both sides had recognized that only a political settlement could bring stability to Rwanda and there could be no military solution. However, while both sides declared that the principles of the Arusha Peace Agreement remained valid as a framework, each stated that the new circumstances would necessitate renegotiation of certain parts of the agreement.

Since national reconciliation was unlikely to be swift, the Secretary-General recommended that UNAMIR's expanded mandate be authorized by the Council for at least six months, with the anticipation that at least another six-month renewal would be required. He also declared his intention to establish a special trust fund to support effective rehabilitation programmes in Rwanda.

As for deployment of the expanded UNAMIR, the special mission had secured assurances from both parties of cooperation with the mandate established by resolution 918 (1994), although these would later need formalization as operations were initiated. The implementation of phase 1 of the deployment remained urgent and had to be commenced even before a cease-fire was effected, the Secretary-General reported. He also stated that the Government of Ghana was prepared to dispatch troops immediately, but these were waiting for necessary equipment, especially armoured personnel carriers, to be made available by other Member States. It was estimated that phase 1 would not be operational for another four to six weeks, depending on how soon the resources required were made available by Member States and delivered on the ground. Considering the projected delays in deploying the troops and equipment for phase 1, the Secretary-General recommended that phase 2 should be initiated immediately, in close synchronization with phase 1, while urgent preparations for phase 3 should continue.

The repercussions of the convulsions in Rwanda were enormous, the Secretary-General said, with displaced persons in the range of 1.5 million and an additional 400,000 refugees in bordering countries. These figures would mean that over a quarter of Rwanda's population had been afflicted. Neither United Nations agencies nor non-governmental organizations had been able to begin an effective humanitarian assistance programme, beyond sporadic deliveries where possible, in zones controlled by Rwandese government forces, where authority beyond Gitarama, Gisenyi and Butare appeared to be uncertain. More systematic humanitarian assistance programmes had begun in the RPF zone, but worked under strict RPF controls. The special mission had emphasized to the de facto authorities in Gitarama and to the Rwandese government forces military commanders the urgency of assuring conditions that would allow humanitarian assistance programmes to begin areas controlled by them.

In his report, the Secretary-General noted that while the information on human rights violations obtained by the special mission carried prima facie credibility in the light of circumstantial evidence, only a proper investigation could establish the facts and definite culpability. The efficacy of such an exercise would diminish as time weakened evidence and dispersed living witnesses.

The international community's delayed reaction to the genocide in Rwanda "demonstrated graphically its extreme inadequacy to respond with prompt and decisive action to humanitarian crises entwined with armed conflict," the Secretary-General added. He also noted that while attempting to redeem the failings in the Rwandese crisis, the entire system required review to strengthen its reactive capacity.

There was little doubt that the killing in Rwanda constituted genocide, since there had been large-scale killings of communities and families belonging to a particular ethnic group, but the continuing hostilities impeded a full investigation into the massacres. The Secretary-General noted that the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Mr. Jos‚ Ayala Lasso, had visited Rwanda in early May, and the Commission on Human Rights had subsequently designated Mr. Ren‚ D‚gni-S‚gui as Special Rapporteur for Rwanda.

In its resolution 925 on 8 June 1994, the Security Council endorsed the Secretary-General's recommendations for the deployment of an expanded UNAMIR, invited the international community to contribute generously to the trust fund for Rwanda, and demanded that all parties to the conflict cease hostilities.

Subsequently, in its resolution 935 of 1 July 1994, the Security Council, expressing its grave concern at reports of violations of international law, including genocide, requested that the Secretary-General establish as a matter of urgency an impartial Commission of Experts that would provide him with its conclusions about the evidence of these violations.

The Commission could obtain information through its own investigations or through the efforts of others, including the Special Rapporteur. The Council also called on States, relevant United Nations bodies and organizations to inform the commission within the next 30 days of substantiated grave violations.

Initially, UNOMUR had restricted its monitoring activities in Uganda along the area of the border with Rwanda controlled by RPF. After RPF gained control of the entire Uganda-Rwanda border, the Mission extended its observation and monitoring activities to that area. This necessitated the readjustment of tasks and the reassignment of United Nations military observers.

UNOMUR carried out its tasks essentially through patrolling, monitoring and surveillance of the whole stretch of the operational area, involving both mobile and fixed observations as well as on-site investigations of suspected cross-border traffic. The arrival in the mission area of three helicopters in early April 1993 strengthened UNOMUR's overall operational capacity.

On 16 June 1994, the Secretary-General submitted to the Council his second progress report on UNOMUR, in which he reiterated that UNOMUR had continued to be a factor of stability in the area and had been particularly critical in recent months as UNAMIR had sought to defuse tensions resulting from the resumption of hostilities.

Nevertheless, he noted that there appeared to be little rationale for monitoring one of Rwanda's borders and not the others. As UNOMUR's activities allowed UNAMIR to address, at least to some degree, the issue of outside interference in the Rwandese civil war, he believed that UNOMUR should continue its monitoring activities until an effective cease-fire was established. The Secretary-General therefore recommended that UNOMUR's mandate be renewed for a period of three months. During that period, the number of military observers would be reduced by phases, adjusting to operational requirements. UNOMUR would be closed down by 21 September 1994.

On 20 June 1994, the Security Council adopted resolution 928 (1994) endorsing the Secretary-General's recommendations and requesting him to report to the Council on the termination of UNOMUR before the completion of its mandate.

The Secretary-General reported to the Security Council on 19 September, informing it that UNOMUR would be officially closed on 21 September 1994. He stated that while the tragic turn of events in Rwanda prevented UNOMUR from fully implementing its mandate, the Observer Mission had played a useful role as a confidence-building mechanism in the months following the conclusion of the Arusha Peace Agreement and during UNAMIR's initial efforts to defuse tensions between the Rwandese parties and to facilitate the implementation of that agreement.

The Secretary-General expressed his appreciation to the Government of Uganda for the cooperation and assistance it had extended to the Mission. He commended both the military and the civilian personnel of UNOMUR for the dedication and professionalism with which they had carried out their tasks.

Meanwhile, on 19 June 1994, the Secretary-General, in a letter to the President of the Security Council, reiterated the need for an urgent and coordinated response by the international community to the genocide which had engulfed Rwanda. He enumerated the offers which the United Nations had received after over 50 potential contributing countries had been approached for contributions to UNAMIR, in anticipation of the expansion of the UNAMIR mandate, as authorized by the Council in its resolution 918 (1994), and explained that the United Nations expected, in the best of circumstances, to complete the deployment of the first phase of UNAMIR in the first week of July 1994.

The Secretary-General indicated that the Security Council might wish to consider the offer of the Government of France to undertake a French-commanded multinational operation, subject to Security Council authorization, under Chapter VII of the Charter, to assure the security and protection of displaced persons and civilians at risk in Rwanda. Such an operation would last until UNAMIR was brought up to the necessary strength to take over from the multinational force. This would imply that the multinational force should remain deployed for a minimum period of three months. The activities of the multinational force and those of UNAMIR would be closely coordinated by the respective force commanders.

In his letter, the Secretary-General stressed that the efforts of the international community to restore stability in Rwanda were directed at the resumption of the Arusha peace process. In that connection, his new Special Representative for Rwanda, Mr. Shaharyar Khan, former Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Pakistan, planned to take up his assignment shortly.

On 22 June 1994, the Security Council, by its resolution 929 (1994), welcomed the Secretary-General's letter and agreed that a multinational operation might be set up for humanitarian purposes in Rwanda until UNAMIR was brought up to the necessary strength, and decided that it would be limited to two months following the resolution, unless the Secretary-General determined before then that an expanded UNAMIR was able to carry out its mandate. Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, the Council authorized Member States to conduct the operation using all necessary means to achieve their humanitarian objectives; costs of implementing the operation would be borne by the Member States concerned.

The French initiative, named Operation Turquoise, was launched on 23 June 1994. On 2 July, France announced that Operation Turquoise would establish a "humanitarian protected zone" in the Cyangugu-Kibuye-Gikongoro triangle in south-western Rwanda, covering about one fifth of Rwandese territory. While expressing its strong opposition to the French move, RPF did not seek confrontation with French forces which, on their side, avoided provocation.

From the start, close cooperation at all levels was established between UNAMIR and Operation Turquoise with frequent contact between both force commanders. Resolution 929 (1994) had authorized the deployment of the French force until 21 August 1994, and, on 11 July, the Prime Minister of France informed the Security Council and the Secretary-General of the French Government's decision to commence its withdrawal by 31 July.

In the first week of July an UNREO/Department of Humanitarian Affairs officer was dispatched to the French military base of operations at Goma in order to establish communications and ensure liaison between the command of Operation Turquoise, United Nations agencies and some 30 NGOs engaged in humanitarian assistance in the region.

UNHCR, with field staff in Goma, had been stockpiling relief supplies for as many as an additional 500,000 needy people in the entire region. UNHCR and other agencies increased their staff in the field and mobilized emergency stocks, both from facilities in the region and from warehouses in Europe. Needs exceeded resources available to the United Nations agencies, however. UNHCR resources were already strained by an outflow of more than 600,000 Rwandese refugees since late April, and another 500,000 Burundi refugees dependent on the agency for assistance. WFP, which had also begun redirecting food stocks, transport and personnel to deal with the massive flow to Zaire, was already providing 40,000 tons of food per month to Rwanda, Burundi, Tanzania, Zaire and Uganda to cover a caseload estimated at 2.5 million people. On 14 July, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees urgently appealed for trucks, water tankers, aircraft and funds to meet the crisis. UNICEF, which had pre-positioned some stocks of essential relief items in anticipation of new population movements, released $1 million from its emergency programme fund to secure additional supplies.

On 1 July 1994, the Secretary-General called for a halt to military operations in Rwanda, warning that the mass exodus of civilian populations could otherwise destabilize the region. Another call for a cease-fire was issued on 14 July 1994 by the President of the Security Council, who, in his statement, expressed the Council's alarm at the continuation of fighting in Rwanda.

The exodus of the population from the fighting could lead very quickly to a further humanitarian disaster, the President said, and could endanger the stability of the region. The Council demanded an immediate and unconditional cease-fire, urged the resumption of the political process in the framework of the Arusha Peace Agreement, and also urged Member States, United Nations agencies and non-governmental organizations to mobilize all available resources in order to provide humanitarian assistance.

On 18 July, RPF unilaterally declared a cease-fire, effectively ending the civil war which had broken out immediately after the deaths of the presidents of Rwanda and Burundi on 6 April. On 19 July, a broad-based Government of national unity was formed.

Meanwhile, on 22 July 1994, the Secretary-General launched a $434.8 million consolidated inter-agency appeal for the Rwandese crisis. Noting that UNREO had been constantly engaged in coordinating humanitarian activities, he said the deterioration of the situation was now beyond the resources and capacity of the United Nations humanitarian agencies and non-governmental organizations. The immediate priority was to take care of the refugees who had left the country and provide humanitarian assistance for those who were still in Rwanda, he said.

While contingency planning by United Nations agencies, UNAMIR and NGOs was an ongoing process, as the consolidated inter-agency appeal was prepared in June a particularly intensive exercise was undertaken. Possible scenarios requiring a humanitarian response were considered, including the potential "nightmare scenario" of a flow of a million or more refugees into Zaire. Contingency measures such as identifying and positioning needed equipment and supplies were undertaken. It was recognized, however, that such a massive influx into Zaire would present tremendous logistics and security problems in a location with few viable sites for refugee camps, a weak infrastructure and considerable ethnic tensions of its own.

The Secretary-General also noted that clandestine radio broadcasts which were fanning the hatred and fear had aggravated an already dramatic situation. In addition, he said, retreating soldiers had urged and forced whole populations to leave their homes and follow them into exile, while in some cases, massacres had even been perpetrated deliberately in order to create situations of panic, chaos and fear.

He also announced that he was immediately sending the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs to Rwanda and the surrounding region to assess the situation and satisfy himself that coordination arrangements were in place.

The Under-Secretary-General, together with senior representatives of all principal United Nations humanitarian organizations and other international organizations, visited Rwanda from 24 to 28 July. On 2 August, he chaired the donors' pledging conference at Geneva, which resulted in contributions amounting to some $137 million against the $434.8 million July Appeal.

As the emergency evolved, the consolidated inter-agency appeal was revised to reflect increasing needs. By 30 November 1994, the Department of Humanitarian Affairs reported that total requirements for United Nations agencies and the International Organization for Migration to provide assistance had risen to $585 million, against which contributions totalling $483.5 million had been received.

On 25 July, the Secretary-General sent to the President of the Security Council a report by the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on the investigation of serious violations of international humanitarian law in Rwanda, in response to the Council's request for such information in resolution 918. The report included information on the visit of the Special Rapporteur, which took place from 9 to 20 June 1994.

On 26 July 1994, the Secretary-General reported to the Council that he had established a Commission of Experts pursuant to the Council's request in resolution 935 (1994). The Commission would provide the Secretary-General with its conclusions on the evidence of grave violations of international humanitarian law committed in Rwanda, including the evidence of possible acts of genocide. The Secretary-General had taken note of the similarity of the Commission's mandate to that of the Special Rapporteur, and he would take administrative steps to ensure continuing collaboration between the two. The Commission would be located at the United Nations office in Geneva, where it could benefit from the resources of the office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights.

The first stage of the Commission's work would be to review available information and carry out its own investigations in Rwanda. In the second stage, it would draw up its conclusions on the evidence of specific violations of international humanitarian law, and, in particular, of acts of genocide, on the basis of which identification of persons responsible for those violations could be made. In the light of those conclusions, the Commission would examine the question of the jurisdiction, international or national, before which such persons should be brought to trial.

The Secretary-General on 29 July 1994 announced that he had appointed three members to the Commission. He designated Mr. Atsu-Koffi Amega, a former President of the Supreme Court and former Foreign Minister of Togo, as Chairman of the Commission; other members were Mrs. Habi Dieng, Attorney-General of Guinea, and Mr. Salifou Fomba, Professor of International Law from Mali and a Member of the United Nations International Law Commission.

The Secretary-General on 1 August 1994 wrote to the Security Council that even though two and a half months had elapsed since the adoption of resolution 918 (1994), UNAMIR was as far from attaining the authorized troop strength as it was at the time of the adoption of the resolution, even though the Council had urged Governments to respond urgently to his request for resources for UNAMIR in resolutions 925 (1994) and 929 (1994).

While several Governments had responded positively, their offers were conditional and entailed complicated efforts to match troops from one country with equipment from another, the Secretary-General said. The result was that as of 25 July, fewer than 500 were on the ground apart from a number of military observers. While it was understandable that the appalling events in Rwanda constituted a strong disincentive against involvement, it had to be recognized that the hesitations and consequent delays had contributed to the catastrophe.

The need for reinforcements for UNAMIR remained urgent. The Secretary-General added that he was convinced that resources to help Rwanda did exist, and what was required was the political will in the countries around the world coalescing into a collective political will at the United Nations.

On 3 August 1994, the Secretary-General reported to the Security Council that RPF had established military control over most of the country, and recalled that about 1.5 million Rwandese had sought refuge in Zaire over a two-week period in July. The swift RPF advance had had the effect of causing large numbers of civilians to take flight from the areas of combat, but this displacement might well have been containable had not panic been caused by deliberately inflammatory broadcasts from radio stations controlled by elements of the former Government.

The protracted violence in Rwanda had created an almost unprecedented humanitarian crisis. According to the estimates at that time, of a total population of approximately 7 million, as many as 500,000 had been killed, 3 million displaced internally and more than 2 million had fled to neighbouring countries. The international community was confronted with four basic humanitarian challenges: to respond to the immediate life-saving needs of refugees; to facilitate the early return of those who had fled their homes; to restore basic infrastructure in Rwanda; and to ensure a smooth transition in the humanitarian protected zone established by French forces.

Among those who had fled Rwanda, an outbreak of cholera had already claimed as many as 20,000 lives, and remained a continuing threat, while the logistics of arranging the daily supply and distribution of 30 million litres of drinking water and 1,000 tons of food were daunting. It was essential to promote and facilitate the early return of Rwandese to their homes, given the conditions in the refugee camps and the need within the next two weeks to harvest the crops there.

Meanwhile, short and medium-term rehabilitation was essential for the absorption of the returnee population as well as the resettlement of the internally displaced, including at the least restoration of electricity, the water supply and telecommunications. It was also important to restore the capacity of the Government to carry out its responsibilities.

In addition, as many as 2 million internally displaced persons were estimated to be in the humanitarian protected zone in south-west Rwanda. To prevent an outflow of this group into Zaire, it was necessary to ensure the capacity of UNAMIR to take over responsibility in the area and to increase the humanitarian presence and activities there.

During his visit to Rwanda from 24 to 28 July, the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs had met with senior officials of the new Government in Rwanda to discuss how humanitarian aid could be delivered to all parts of the country and the urgent steps required to re-establish a climate conducive to the return of refugees and displaced persons. The new Government had indicated its commitment to encourage people to return to Rwanda, to ensure their protection and to permit full access to all those in need throughout the country. UNREO, headquartered in Kigali and with offices in Goma, Kabale and Bujumbura, continued to work with the United Nations agencies and the growing number of humanitarian NGOs to identify needs in Rwanda by sector and region.

UNAMIR's main tasks now were to ensure stability and security in the north-western and south-western regions of Rwanda; to stabilize and monitor the situation in all regions of Rwanda to encourage the return of the displaced population; to provide security and support for humanitarian assistance operations inside Rwanda; and to promote, through mediation and good offices, national reconciliation in Rwanda. UNAMIR had already deployed a company along the border near Goma, Zaire, as well as a number of observers in that region and in the zone controlled by Operation Turquoise. In the expectation that UNAMIR would eventually receive the 5,500 troops authorized by the Security Council, the Force Commander had planned deployment in five sectors. The Force headquarters would remain at Kigali, with the minimum units required for protection, along with specialized units for communications and logistics, as well as the field hospital. United Nations military observers and United Nations civilian police monitors would be deployed in all sectors according to operations requirements.

The principal areas of concern were in the north-west to resettle returning refugees, and in the south-west to avert possible outbreaks of violence. In the north-west, substantial numbers of the former Rwandese government forces and militia, as well as extremist elements suspected of involvement in the massacres of the Hutu opposition and RPF supporters, were mingled with the refugees in Zaire, and were reportedly trying to prevent their return. In the south-west a more volatile situation prevailed where armed elements of the Rwandese government forces had sought refuge in the French-protected zone; this situation was particularly pressing in view of the anxiety of the French Government to complete its withdrawal by 21 August. In discussions with UNAMIR, the new Rwandese Government had indicated that it would not insist on taking control of this area immediately, provided that UNAMIR would ensure its stability.

The Secretary-General said that by its failure to intervene sooner in Rwanda, the international community had acquiesced in the horrifying loss of human life and the suffering of an entire people. To make amends, the international community at the very least should ensure that those individuals responsible in their personal and official capacities for unleashing and instigating this cataclysm were brought to justice, he said.

To avoid problems of coordination, all foreign forces engaged in support of humanitarian efforts in the area should ideally be part of UNAMIR. If this was not possible, deployment of foreign forces should be authorized by the Security Council even if their mandate was purely humanitarian, and formal liaison arrangements should be established between them and UNAMIR, as had been the case with Operation Turquoise.

The Secretary-General also urged the newly installed Government to commit itself to genuine and full reconciliation. The ultimate political aim must be the installation of a broad-based system of government that would give all elements of society, irrespective of ethnic origin or social level, a sense of security and a stake in the country. The Arusha Agreement still provided principles and a broad framework for establishing such a system, the Secretary-General said.

In a statement by its President issued on 10 August, the Security Council stated that the most immediate task was to respond to the massive humanitarian crisis in Rwanda created by the population movements. It urged the country's former leadership and those who had assumed political responsibility in refugee camps to cooperate with the new Rwandese Government in reconciliation and repatriation efforts and to cease propaganda campaigns inducing refugees to stay in exile. The Council called upon the new Government to ensure that there were no reprisals against those wishing to return to their homes and resume their occupations.

The Council encouraged the new Government to cooperate with the United Nations in ensuring that those guilty of atrocities, in particular the crime of genocide, were brought to justice through an appropriate mechanism which would ensure fair and impartial trials in accordance with international norms of justice. In this connection it welcomed the Government's recent statement supporting the establishment of an international tribunal and welcomed the report of the Secretary-General of 26 July 1994 on the establishment of the Commission of Experts.

Welcoming the Secretary-General's intention to adapt the practical tasks of UNAMIR to the evolving situation in the country, the Council stated that it was essential that the contingents to be part of UNAMIR be deployed without further delay and the technical assistance they required be provided as soon as possible.

The Council also reaffirmed that the 1993 Arusha Peace Agreement constituted an appropriate frame of reference for promoting reconciliation in Rwanda.

The Commission of Experts began its work on 15 August 1994 and, after a series of meetings in Geneva, conducted a field mission to Rwanda and some neighbouring countries from 29 August to 17 September. On 1 October, the Secretary-General transmitted to the Security Council the Commission's interim report. The main conclusions were the following:

(a) Individuals from both sides of the armed conflict had perpetrated serious breaches of international humanitarian law;

(b) Individuals from both sides of the armed conflict had perpetrated crimes against humanity in Rwanda;

(c) Acts of genocide against the Tutsi group had been perpetrated by Hutu elements in a concerted, planned, systematic and methodical way. These acts of mass extermination against the Tutsi group as such constituted genocide within the meaning of article II of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. The Commission had not uncovered any evidence to indicate that Tutsi elements perpetrated acts committed with the intent to destroy the Hutu ethnic group as such.

The Commission recommended that the Security Council take action to ensure that the individuals responsible for the grave violations of human rights in Rwanda during the armed conflict were brought to justice before an independent and impartial international criminal tribunal. The Commission further recommended that the Council amend the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia so that it could consider crimes under international law committed during the armed conflict in Rwanda.

On 6 October, the Secretary-General submitted to the Security Council his report on the progress of UNAMIR in the discharge of its mandate, the safety of population at risk, the humanitarian situation and progress towards a cease-fire and political reconciliation. In his report, the Secretary-General stated that there were signs that the situation in Rwanda was stabilizing. He cited the broad efforts undertaken by the Rwandese Government towards national reconciliation, and urged the international community to support those efforts.

He also endorsed the recommendation made by the Commission of Experts that trails of individuals suspected of serious breaches of international humanitarian law, crimes against humanity and acts of genocide be carried out by an international criminal tribunal and that the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia be expanded to cover crimes in Rwanda.

The Secretary-General urged the Government to maintain an open dialogue with all other political interest groups in Rwanda, including former government officials, except for individuals who were directly implicated in acts of genocide.

Stating that Rwanda needed extensive external technical and financial assistance, the Secretary-General urged donor Governments and international bodies urgently to implement their assistance for Rwanda. He further asked them to communicate with the United Nations about bilateral assistance programmes so there could be a coordinated response to Rwanda's needs.

Political Aspects.
The Secretary-General believed that there was steady progress in efforts to normalize the situation inside Rwanda and that the Government had also begun to put civilian administrative structures in place at the central, provincial and local levels.

The Secretary-General noted that in order to create a stable and lasting peace in Rwanda, the Government seemed to recognize the need to include all its citizenry, regardless of ethnicity, within its administrative and security structures. The Government encouraged members of the former Rwandese government forces to join the new national army. Members of the Government made several visits to the refugee camps in Zaire in an attempt to encourage the refugees to return voluntarily to their places of origin.

The Secretary-General also stated that while initial progress had been made in normalizing the situation, the Government was faced with the arduous task of rebuilding a country and establishing safety and security for all while it suffered from a severe lack of basic resources.

Human Rights.
According to the Secretary-General's report, the Government urged the Commission of Experts to conclude its work expeditiously and also urged that an international tribunal be created. The Government gave assurances that it would make every effort to prevent summary trials, revenge executions and other acts of violence and it would arrest those accused of such crimes.

The United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights deployed human rights officers to Rwanda to assist the Special Rapporteur in investigating violations of human rights and humanitarian law; monitoring the ongoing situation; helping redress existing problems and prevent possible human rights violations from occurring; and implementing programmes of technical cooperation in the field of human rights, particularly the administration of justice.

Military Aspects.
The Secretary-General reported that the military situation in Rwanda had been relatively calm since the 18 July cease-fire. At that time, the armed forces of the new Government, the Rwandese Patriotic Army (RPA), had established control over the entire country, with the exception of the humanitarian protection zone in the south-west, which was under the control of Operation Turquoise.

UNAMIR began deploying troops in the zone on 10 August 1994 and on 21 August it assumed responsibility from Operation Turquoise. UNAMIR troops established a presence throughout the zone, ensuring stability and security and providing support for humanitarian relief operations. The Government also launched a concerted effort to reassure the population. As a result, a new major exodus of civilians to Zaire was averted. Civil administration in the humanitarian protection zone was being restored as a first priority and RPA troops were gradually being deployed there.

The Secretary-General noted that the main objective of the UNAMIR deployment was to promote security in all sectors of Rwanda and to create a climate conducive to the safe return of refugees and displaced persons, as well as to support humanitarian operations. Relations between UNAMIR and the RPA were cordial and cooperative. However, movement restrictions were sometimes imposed on UNAMIR troops.

Civilian Police.
Speaking of the activities of UNAMIR's civilian police component, the Secretary-General noted that initially it had been envisaged that its main task would be to maintain liaison with the local civilian authorities on matters relating to public security. However, as a result of the civil war and the ensuing collapse of the country's administrative structures, no real police force or gendarmerie remained in place when the new Government was established on 19 July. The Government sought the urgent assistance of UNAMIR in establishing a new, integrated, national police force. UNAMIR responded positively to that request and, on 16 August, initiated a training programme with students selected by the Government as volunteers from different social and ethnic groups. The activities of the civilian police component thus evolved from liaison to assisting the Government in the creation of a new police/gendarmerie. The component has also been charged with monitoring the activities of local police and gendarmerie and those of the civil authorities with regard to human rights violations, and assisting UNAMIR military observers and troops in dealing with police matters.

Humanitarian Aspects.
In the report, the Secretary-General stated that the first priority in Rwanda remained the resolution of the humanitarian crisis. According to the estimates, Rwanda's pre-war population of 7.9 million had fallen to 5 million. Estimates of internally displaced persons ranged from 800,000 to 2 million. There were more than 2 million refugees in Zaire, the United Republic of Tanzania, Burundi and Uganda. At the same time, it was estimated that some 360,000 refugees had returned to Rwanda spontaneously since the cease-fire on 18 July. The victims of the genocidal slaughter could number as many as 1 million.

The Secretary-General noted that the Government was concerned about elements in the refugee camps who continued to incite people to flee from Rwanda, and to threaten those who might return home. The Government was engaged in efforts to find a solution to these problems, with the support of United Nations agencies and programmes on the ground, coordinated by the Secretary-General's Special Representative. In addition, reports and preliminary investigations suggested that returning refugees might have been subjected to reprisals by Government troops. Therefore, determined efforts would have to be made by the Government to create conditions under which the refugees and displaced persons could return in safety and dignity.

As the country strove to return to normalcy, the Secretary-General continued, increasing attention must be given to the transition from emergency relief to rehabilitation. It was vital that the international community provide quick and efficient rehabilitation assistance. In that connection, the Special Representative and the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs distributed among donor countries, agencies and NGOs the Rwanda Emergency Normalization Plan, outlining the initial areas requiring both financial and technical assistance. The Secretary-General believed that without national reconciliation among the various parties to the conflict, it was likely that humanitarian operations would be protracted and difficult.

After having considered the Secretary-General's progress report, the Security Council, through a Presidential statement issued on 14 October, expressed concern at the plight of millions of refugees and displaced persons in Rwanda and the countries of the region. It deplored the continuing acts of intimidation and violence designed to prevent refugees from returning home and called on the Governments of the neighbouring countries to do all in their power to ensure the safety of both the refugees and the international personnel providing humanitarian assistance.

The Council affirmed the importance it attached to the avoidance of reprisals against returnees and to the safeguarding of their property rights. It also welcomed the Government's efforts to facilitate the return of refugees and to begin the process of national reconciliation and reconstruction.

The Council took note of the Secretary-General's view that the most effective way to ensure the safety of the refugees would be the separation of the political leaders, former RGF soldiers and militias from the rest of the camp population. It also reaffirmed its view that those responsible for serious breaches of international humanitarian law and acts of genocide must be brought to justice, and stated that it was considering the recommendations of the Commission of Experts on the establishment of an international tribunal and would act expeditiously on the matter.

In the meantime, security conditions in refugee camps outside Rwanda continued to deteriorate. On 21 October, UNHCR expressed grave concern about the worsening situation which was particularly dangerous in the camps around Goma, Zaire. The threatening presence and activities of former Rwandese Army, militia, and civilian leaders in the camps seriously disrupted humanitarian operations. In some camps, the former authorities virtually took control of all food and relief distribution in order to consolidate their power and to dominate and manipulate the camp population. The lives of relief workers were repeatedly threatened, and refugees who expressed desire to repatriate were terrorized and some even killed. The law and order enforcement agents in the countries of asylum were not adequately equipped to cope with the situation.

The Secretary-General's Special Representative, after visiting some camps, also reported increasing politization and intimidation of refugees.

On 8 November 1994, the Security Council, by its resolution 955 (1994), decided to establish an international tribunal to prosecute persons responsible for genocide and other violations of international humanitarian law committed in Rwanda and Rwandese citizens responsible for such acts in neighbouring States between 1 January and 31 December 1994, and to this end to adopt the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. It requested the Secretary-General to make practical arrangements for the effective functioning of the International Tribunal, including recommendations to the Council as to possible locations for the seat of the Tribunal.

On 18 November 1994, the Secretary-General submitted to the Security Council a report in which he described the worsening situation in the refugee camps and outlined three major military options for addressing the problem of security in the camps.

The Secretary-General noted that according to UNHCR estimates there were approximately 1.2 million Rwandese refugees in the camps in Zaire. The camps were overcrowded, chaotic and increasingly insecure. The refugees were completely dependent on United Nations and relief agencies for basic needs assistance.

The former Rwandese political leaders, Rwandese government forces soldiers and militia, the Secretary-General continued, controlled the camps. They were determined to ensure by force, if necessary, that the refugees did not repatriate to Rwanda, and also made it difficult for relief agencies to carry out their work in safety. It was believed that these elements might be preparing for an armed invasion of Rwanda and that they might be stockpiling and selling food distributed by relief agencies in preparation for such an invasion. In addition, security was further undermined by general lawlessness, extortion, banditry and gang warfare between groups fighting for control of the camps. As a result, NGOs responsible for the distribution of relief supplies had begun to withdraw.

It was estimated that there were approximately 230 Rwandese political leaders in Zaire, including former ministers, senior civilian and military officials, members of parliament and other political personalities, many of whom were living in good conditions outside the refugee camps. The number of former Rwandese government forces personnel in Zaire was estimated at about 50,000 persons, including dependants. As to the armed militia, it was difficult to determine their exact number as they neither wore uniforms nor carried any insignia that would distinguish them from the rest of the refugee population. However, some estimates indicated that their number could amount to some 10,000 or more.

The Secretary-General stated further that in August and early September 1994, an estimated 200,000 refugees had returned to Rwanda. This movement, however, had been interrupted by the activity of militia and political leaders opposed to voluntary repatriation. As a result, since September, the number of refugees returning home had fallen drastically. At the same time, some 400,000 refugees of mainly Tutsi origin, many of whom had been in exile in Uganda and Burundi for decades, had returned to Rwanda and, in many cases, settled on land belonging to those who had fled most recently.

The Secretary-General noted that the refugees' fear of reprisals by the new Government for atrocities committed against Tutsis and moderate Hutus seemed to be another main reason for their hesitancy to return to Rwanda. In expressing their distrust of the Government, refugees indicated a desire for their security to be guaranteed by a neutral body or for their own leaders to participate in the new Government.

In order to improve security in the camps in Zaire, the Secretary-General identified three major military options, namely:

(a) A United Nations peace-keeping operation, set up in accordance with normal procedures, to establish security progressively in the camps, area by area, over a period of time;

(b) A United Nations force, set up under Chapter VII of the Charter, to separate the former political leaders, military personnel and militia from the ordinary refugee population of the camps, thereby ensuring their security;

(c) A multinational force, authorized by the Security Council under Chapter VII of the Charter but not under United Nations command, to carry out those functions.

Other measures which could be associated with any of the above options would be the provision of foreign security experts to train and monitor the local security forces and an appropriate public information campaign.

The Secretary-General underlined that any operation conducted without parallel efforts towards national reconciliation in Rwanda would be futile, and could even lead to an intensification of extremist activities in the camps. National reconciliation would require both a political understanding between the former leadership of the country and the present Government and the establishment of conditions in the camps, and in Rwanda itself, conducive to the return of the refugees.

The Secretary-General believed that, under the circumstances, the United Nations peace-keeping operation might be the most realistic way of progressively improving security in the camps. However, it would be a difficult, complex and, to some extent, unprecedented enterprise. Member States would have to provide the necessary human, financial and logistical resources in a timely manner for it to be effective.

Describing the tasks of such a peace-keeping force, the Secretary-General said that it would provide security for international relief workers, protection for the storage and delivery of humanitarian assistance and safe passage to the Rwandese border for those refugees who wished to return. From the border, UNAMIR troops would then provide assistance in returning the refugees to their home communities. The force would have a mandate separate from that of UNAMIR but would be under the operational control of, and supported logistically by, UNAMIR.

The Secretary-General noted that given the dimensions of the problem, the incremental approach to establishing security would have to be adopted. Depending on the situation in the camps and the rate of repatriation, it was estimated that, given a force strength of 3,000 all ranks, it would take 24 to 30 months to complete the operation. However, with an additional 2,000 troops, it was estimated that the duration of the operation could be reduced by about 10 months.

At the same time, the Secretary-General continued, the new Government of Rwanda must be assisted in creating conditions inside the country under which large-scale repatriation and reintegration of refugees and internally displaced people could take place. The Government indicated its commitment to creating such conditions and requested assistance from the international community for this purpose. This would require the rehabilitation of the basic economic and social infrastructure, the establishment of a fair and effective judicial system, the maintenance of law and order, and the resolution of the issue of property rights.

The Secretary-General said that his Special Representative had formulated and presented to potential donors a Rwanda emergency normalization plan, outlining areas in which the assistance was urgently required. In addition, the Department of Humanitarian Affairs was preparing a new consolidated inter-agency appeal covering both continuing emergency requirements and short-term rehabilitation needs.

In concluding his report, the Secretary-General stressed that, given the crucial importance of establishing secure conditions in the Rwandese refugee camps in Zaire, as well as the pressing need for financial and technical assistance to reach the Government of Rwanda, he would concentrate all the efforts of the United Nations system on those immediate priorities. Once progress had been made on those two fronts, he would work with OAU to address the wider problems of the subregion.

On 30 November 1994, the Security Council, in a statement by its President, condemned the actions being taken by former Rwandese leaders, and by former Rwandese government forces and militias to prevent the repatriation of refugees. It also condemned the interference by those groups and individuals with the provision of humanitarian relief, actions which had led to the withdrawal of some non-governmental relief agencies from the camps.

The Council expressed alarm that those same groups might be preparing for an armed invasion of Rwanda and deplored the fact that food distributed by relief agencies for those in the camps was apparently being misappropriated to support such an invasion. It condemned those actions and warned those persons, many of whom might have been implicated in the genocide and other serious violations of international humanitarian law, that their actions would only reinforce the determination of the international community to ensure that such persons were brought to justice.

The Council stated that the options described in the Secretary-General's report for tackling the problem of security raised complex issues which required further elucidation. It requested the Secretary-General to consult potential troop contributors to assess their willingness to participate in a possible peace-keeping operation to create secure areas within large camp sites. Further, the Council encouraged the Secretary-General to assess initial measures for immediate assistance to the Zairian security forces in the camps, including the possibility of deploying security experts, from member Governments or through contract arrangements, to train and monitor the local security forces.

The Council recognized that the Government of Rwanda needed immediate and major financial assistance, and called upon the international community to provide the resources required. Given the urgent need to take forward the political process, the Council requested the Secretary-General to consider acceleration of preparations for the proposed joint United Nations/OAU conference to address a range of political and other issues in order to identify long-term solutions to ensure peace, security and development in the subregion.

On 25 November, the Secretary-General submitted to the Security Council his further report on the situation in Rwanda, as well as his recommendations for the continuing role of the United Nations in that country.

Political Aspects.
Speaking of the political aspects of the situation, the Secretary-General noted that since his last report dated 6 October 1994, the situation in Rwanda had witnessed both positive and negative developments. The Broad-Based Government of National Unity continued to place emphasis on creating conditions that would allow the Rwandese refugees and the displaced persons within the country to return home. In that regard, it was concentrating its efforts on ensuring public security, restoring the civil administration and reconstructing the country's social and economic infrastructure. However, in the aftermath of the civil war, the Government was facing severe financial and material resources obstacles in achieving those objectives.

While unstable and insecure conditions still prevailed in many parts of the country, the Secretary-General continued, there had been some progress in the private sector and the education field, but the reactivation of the public sector remained constrained by a severe lack of resources, including supplies such as telephones, computers, means of transport, office equipment and fuel. Cash reserves were also inadequate to pay salaries or to meet other essential payments. Moreover, it had not been possible to restore public utilities or deal with the nearly 1 million mines believed to be planted in the countryside.

The Government continued to advocate publicly the fair treatment of returning refugees and displaced persons, as well as reconciliation between all political groups. A further measure towards national reconciliation had been the incorporation of over 2,000 soldiers of the former RGF into the RPA.

The Secretary-General noted further that while the lack of financial resources had been a major factor in impeding activities towards national reconciliation, there were some reasons to believe that the Government could do more to ensure that all Rwandese were part of the political process. The President of Rwanda assured the Secretary-General's Special Representative that efforts were continuing to make the Government more inclusive by inviting into it some members of the Mouvement r‚publicain national pour le d‚veloppement (MRND), which was the only major political party not represented in it.

The Secretary-General went on to say that there was a growing problem of land tenure and rival claims to property rights. Almost 400,000 long-standing refugees had returned home since mid-July and were claiming property they once held. Some refugees who had fled more recently were returning home to find their property held by others. Although the Government had emphasized that the wrongful occupation of another person's home or property was unlawful, it was increasingly difficult to implement that policy.

In response to the need for factual and objective information on the situation both in the refugee camps and in Rwanda, as well as on United Nations activities in the country, the Secretary-General said, UNAMIR was in the process of establishing a broadcasting facility to cover the city of Kigali and the western part of the country, with plans for more powerful transmitters capable of covering the entire country, as well as the refugee camps. The report noted, however, that despite repeated efforts, the Government had still not approved UNAMIR's request for formal authorization to broadcast and for a frequency allocation.

Human Rights.
The Secretary-General also informed the Security Council that the Special Rapporteur, Mr. Ren‚ D‚gni-S‚gui, had visited Rwanda from 15 to 22 October and had also travelled to the United Republic of Tanzania and Zaire. The Commission of Experts had visited Rwanda from 29 October to 10 November. The human rights field operation in Rwanda launched by the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights had established seven regional offices and about 60 human rights officers and special investigators, out of a planned total of 147, had arrived in Rwanda. Another 40 human rights observers and teams of forensic experts were expected by the end of December 1994. The Secretary-General stated that he expected to receive the findings of the Special Rapporteur and of the Commission of Experts on their investigations of alleged reprisal killings by RPA forces.

The Secretary-General was also actively pursuing the completion of practical arrangements for the effective functioning of the International Tribunal for Rwanda, and in particular its investigations/prosecutorial unit in Kigali, the appointment of a Deputy Prosecutor unit and support and administrative staff, and the election of judges. The High Commissioner for Human Rights had placed the services of the special investigations unit, established within the framework of the human rights field operation, at the disposal of the Prosecutor of the International Tribunal, with a view to pursuing the investigative work initiated under the mandate of the Special Rapporteur and the Commission of Experts.

Military Aspects.
On the military aspects of the situation, the Secretary-General said that UNAMIR had reached its full authorized strength of 5,500 all ranks. The troops and military observers were deployed in six sectors: Sector 1 (north-east), Sector 2 (south-east), Sector 3 (south), Sector 4 (south-west), Sector 5 (north-west) and Sector 6 (Kigali City).

The Secretary-General noted that UNAMIR continued to assist with the transport of refugees and internally displaced persons returning voluntarily to their homes, while maintaining protection for populations at risk in various areas and at displaced persons camps in Rwanda. UNAMIR was currently working with the humanitarian agencies and the Government of Rwanda to develop and implement a strategy to close the displaced persons camps in Rwanda gradually by ensuring the voluntary return of the occupants to their homes. UNAMIR troops and observers had also intensified their monitoring, observation and patrol duties.

Civilian Police.
Continuing, the Secretary-General said that since no real police force or gendarmerie remained in place when the Government had been established on 19 July, police functions were entrusted to an embryonic gendarmerie consisting mainly of RPA soldiers. At the request of the Government, the UNAMIR civilian police component had initiated training of candidates nominated by the Government to serve in the two services that make up Rwanda's police structure, namely, the Gendarmerie nationale and the Police communale. The component was also involved in efforts to restore and reform the penal system within the framework of the implementation of the Rwanda Emergency Normalization Plan. In addition, the component was helping to restore and reform the penal system.

Humanitarian Aspects.
The humanitarian situation within Rwanda, the Secretary-General went on, presented the international community with a pressing and unusually complex crisis. In the conventional sense, the emergency within Rwanda had abated, though at least 1.5 to 2 million displaced persons remained dependent upon assistance from aid agencies. However, the country at large faced a clear emergency as government institutions found themselves unable to sustain the nation's basic infrastructure and provide for the welfare of its people.

Surrounding Rwanda were over 2 million Rwandese refugees in camps along the borders in Zaire, Burundi and the United Republic of Tanzania. Although the voluntary return of those refugees was critical to the normalization of the situation in Rwanda, violent harassment and misinformation in the refugee camps, especially in Zaire, prevented many of the bona fide refugees from returning home.

The Secretary-General pointed out that the situation of the internally displaced persons in Rwanda paralleled that of the refugees on the country's borders. The urgent need to bring internally displaced persons back to their home communities was thwarted by intimidation within the camps and fear of reprisals. In addition, a perception in the areas around the camps that those within the camps had better lives than those outside was generating increased tension between local and camp populations. At the same time, the camp sites occupied much-needed farmland and were increasingly an ecological hazard. In that regard, the Secretary-General said that his Special Representative, in close collaboration with the Government, and through the United Nations Emergency Relief Coordinator, was in the process of finalizing an integrated humanitarian response to address the issue of the internally displaced persons.

The Secretary-General indicated that international and other concerned organizations continued to provide much-needed assistance to the displaced and other vulnerable sectors of society. In addition, many humanitarian organizations had made efforts to strengthen the capacity of the Government. Efforts were being made to restore some semblance of institutional structure through the provision of vehicles and basic office equipment, and quick disbursement of funds to re-establish the generation of electricity and similar activities.

The Secretary-General stated that the international community would have to provide the support needed to ensure that the army did not become a disruptive social force. At the same time, if the human rights of the internally displaced and returnees from outside Rwanda were to be protected on a lasting basis, rapid assistance must be provided to restore the country's police force and judicial system. In parallel, government authorities concerned with the welfare of the Rwandese people must be restored.

In concluding his 25 November report, the Secretary-General stated that the situation in Rwanda remained critical and the country continued to face daunting problems. While he was encouraged by the Government's efforts to stabilize the situation, new threats and challenges continued to emerge, in particular, the creeping militarization of the refugee camps. In that regard, the Secretary-General referred to his report of 18 November, in which he set out ideas on action that could be taken to address the problem of insecurity in the camps and ensure that the humanitarian efforts to protect the refugees and bring about their eventual safe and voluntary repatriation would not be fatally undermined.

The Secretary-General called on the Government of Rwanda to ensure that its proclaimed resolve to promote conditions conducive to safe and voluntary repatriation and national reconciliation was translated into concrete action and programmes, notwithstanding its lack of adequate financial resources. He also called on the international community to respond to the Government's need for assistance for the rehabilitation and reconstruction of Rwanda. He believed that if the unsettled situation was not addressed promptly by both the Government and the international community, the residual problems and emerging threats might not only endanger what had been achieved, but could push Rwanda backward and revive the spectre of renewed conflict.

Speaking of UNAMIR, the Secretary-General noted that it was firmly in place, as a focal point of the international community's effort in Rwanda, to provide the coordinated leadership necessary to move forward the overall process of peace and reconciliation. He recommended that the mandate of the Mission be extended for a further six months. During that period, UNAMIR would continue its mandated functions and strengthen its good offices role in order to facilitate more expeditious movement towards peace and national reconciliation. It would also continue to support efforts towards a regional approach to the problems created by the crisis in Rwanda.

On 30 November, the Security Council extended the mandate of UNAMIR to 9 June 1995. It also expanded the mandate to enable the Mission to contribute to the security in Rwanda of personnel of the International Tribunal for Rwanda and for human rights officers, including full time protection of the Prosecutor's office. UNAMIR would also assist in the establishment and training of a new, integrated, national police force.

The Council strongly urged the Rwandese Government to continue cooperating with UNAMIR in the implementation of its mandate and in particular in ensuring unimpeded access to all areas in the country by UNAMIR forces, personnel of the International Tribunal and human rights officers.

The Council called on the international community to provide resources needed to meet the immediate needs of the Government, directly or through the Trust Fund for Rwanda. It requested the Secretary-General to report to it on UNAMIR's discharge of its mandate, the safety of populations at risk, the humanitarian situation and progress towards repatriation of refugees. The Council also asked him to recommend possible steps that the United Nations could take to promote effective mine clearance.

Originally, the authorized peak military strength of UNAMIR was 2,548 military personnel, including 2,217 formed troops and 331 military observers. As of 31 March 1994, UNAMIR had a strength of 2,539 military personnel from the following countries: Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Canada, Congo, Egypt, Fiji, Ghana, Malawi, Mali, Netherlands, Nigeria, Poland, Romania, Russian Federation, Senegal, Togo, Tunisia, Uruguay and Zimbabwe. At that time, the Mission also comprised 60 civilian police monitors from Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Guyana, Mali and Togo, while it was authorized to have 110 international and 61 locally recruited civilian staff.

Following the outbreak of violence in April 1994, the Security Council adjusted UNAMIR's mandate and decided to reduce the Mission to 270 military personnel. After the situation in Rwanda further deteriorated, the Council authorized an expansion of UNAMIR's mandate and authorized an increase of the UNAMIR force level up to 5,500 troops. The larger mission was to include five infantry battalions numbering some 4,000 all ranks, a force support battalion of approximately 721 personnel, a military observer group of 320 officers, 219 headquarters personnel, a helicopter squadron of some 110 all ranks and 16 helicopters, 50 military police personnel and a force of 90 civilian police.

UNAMIR is headed by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Rwanda, Mr. Shaharyar M. Khan (Pakistan). Mr. Khan succeeded Mr. Jacques-Roger Booh-Booh (Cameroon), who had served as the Secretary-General's Special Representative and Head of Mission from October 1993 to June 1994. Two military officers have served as UNAMIR Force Commander: Major-General Romeo A. Dallaire (Canada), from October 1993 to August 1994; and, currently, Major-General Guy Tousignant (Canada) who took up his duties on 19 August 1994.

As of 30 November 1994, UNAMIR included 5,442 military personnel and 80 civilian police officers from the following countries:

Argentina, , , 1

Australia, , 308,

Austria, , , 15

Bangladesh, , , 29

Canada, , 376, 20

Chad, , 132,

Congo, , 38,

Djibouti, 15, ,

Ethiopia, , 805,

Fiji, , , 1

Ghana, 10, 829, 57

Guinea, , , 15

Guinea Bissau, 20, 35,

India, , 326, 16

Jordan, 5, ,

Malawi, , 170, 10

Mali, 10, 200, 29

Niger, , 43,

Nigeria, 10, 338, 15

Poland, , , 2

Russian Federation, , , 15

Senegal, , 241,

Tunisia, , 844, 10

United Kingdom, , 7,

Uruguay, , , 24

Zambia, 10, 455, 10

Zimbabwe, , , 26

TOTAL, 80, 5,147, 295

Figures may vary from month to month due to rotation. "Troops" include any infantry, logistics, engineering, air, medical, mov-con, staff, etc.

The rough cost to the United Nations of UNAMIR in 1994 (including costs related to UNOMUR) was approximately $197.5 million. Costs are met by the assessed contributions from United Nations Member States. As at 30 November 1994, total contributions outstanding to the Special Account of UNAMIR (including UNOMUR) for the period from the inception of the operation to 31 October 1994 amounted to approximately $18.2 million.

1/ From July 1992 to July 1993, the OAU Neutral Military Observer Group (NMOG I), made up of 50 observers from OAU countries, monitored the cease-fire in Rwanda. In early August 1993, it was replaced by an expanded NMOG II force, composed of some 130 personnel.

Return to the Completed Mission List