STATEMENT BY MARTHA AMA AKYAA POBEE, SPECIAL REREPRESENTATIVE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL
SECURITY COUNCIL BRIEFING
New York
16 MAY 2023
I thank you, Madam, for giving me the opportunity to address the Security Council.
Since I last briefed the Security Council on the Group of Five for the Sahel (G-5 Sahel) (see S/PV.9194), the security situation in the region has remained very worrisome. Non-State armed groups continue to carry out large-scale attacks against civilian and military targets and to engage in confrontations over access to resources, territorial control and influence. Terrorists and violent extremist groups frequently target border areas, in particular the tri-border area of Burkina Faso, Mali and the Niger — the Liptako-Gourma. In that regard, we also observed an upsurge in clashes between the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara and Jama‘at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin earlier this year. The security crisis is exacerbating an already dire humanitarian situation. In Burkina Faso, there are growing humanitarian challenges as a result of the violence, with roughly 4.7 million people in need of humanitarian assistance and more than 2 million people displaced internally this year, compared to the 3.5 million people who needed humanitarian assistance in 2022. In Mali, a staggering 8.8 million people will need humanitarian assistance this year, compared to 7.5 million people who required such assistance in 2022. Women and children still bear the brunt of the violence and the food insecurity.
The G-5 Sahel Joint Force has made steady progress in its operationalization. Joint Force units have gained practical experience and developed enhanced efficiency in their operations, particularly in the areas of coordination and responsiveness. Against the background of strategic and operational shifts in the Sahel, including the reconfiguration of the European and French forces, and also in the context of Mali’s withdrawal from the G-5 Sahel and the intensification of threats in the border area, the Joint Force is restructuring in response to those new realities. Although the reconfiguration of the Joint Force has resulted in the cessation of major military operations since January, G-5 Sahel member States seem determined to strengthen intraregional cooperation, including by establishing bilateral and multilateral cooperation mechanisms with the Malian armed forces in the fight against terrorism, as demonstrated by the recent strengthening of bilateral military cooperation between Mali and Burkina Faso and between Mali and the Niger.
However, despite those efforts, insecurity in the triborder area continues to grow. The tripartite agreement between the European Union, the G-5 Sahel and the United Nations is expected to end in June. I wish to warmly thank the European Union for its invaluable support under that agreement, which provided funding for the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) to deliver life-support consumables to the Joint Force. With the expiration of the tripartite agreement, MINUSMA’s logistical and operational support to the Joint Force, as part of its mandate, will cease to be in effect.
MINUSMA has spared no effort in providing operational and logistic support to the Joint Force whenever it was requested, in accordance with its mandate to support the Joint Force. That included fuel, rations, medical evacuation and engineering support such as building camps. In total, MINUSMA has provided more than 275,000 individual ration packs and 83,000 litres of lubricants and 6 million litres of fuel. That support helped to fill critical gaps hindering the mobility and operational tempo of the Joint Force.
Unfortunately, the international community’s efforts have fallen short of what is required to render the Joint Force fully operational and autonomous, with the capacity to help stabilize the Sahel region. A lack of consensus among partners and donors on the most effective support mechanism for the Joint Force has proved a significant obstacle to its operationalization. The admittedly limited support provided by MINUSMA to the Joint Force did not fundamentally change the situation.
Be that as it may, the end of the tripartite agreement among the European Union, the G-5 Sahel and the United Nations presents an opportunity to reflect on how the international community should renew its approaches to supporting regional security mechanisms. The upcoming deliberations in the Council later this month, on the Secretary-General’s report on the implementation of resolutions 2320 (2016) and 2378 (2017) and considerations related to the financing of African Union peace support operations mandated by the Security Council, will undoubtedly provide a timely opportunity for the Council to consider the issue.
Through the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, the United Nations has pursued its support to the Joint Force in operationalizing its international human rights and humanitarian law compliance framework. Important institutional, legal and behavioural progress and changes have been recorded. Notably, the Joint Force currently has an internal mechanism that enables it to attribute responsibility for incidents, analyse patterns, take necessary remedial action and adapt its operational conduct. Looking ahead, continued human rights work with regional and national security actors in the Sahel will remain critical in the context of the deteriorating security situation. Indeed, the G-5 Sahel countries must ensure that their military strategies to counter terrorism and violent extremism are fully anchored in respect for human rights and place the protection of every population at their core. That is necessary if the desired results are to be achieved.
In that context, the political and operational support of partners remains essential to the stabilization of Mali and the Sahel. It is urgent to address the challenges faced by the Sahel in a sustainable and effective manner and support national actors in their efforts to implement the initiatives that they themselves have devised. Multifaceted support will prevent the crisis in the Sahel from upsetting the fragile political balances in the region, and will help prevent further spillover of insecurity into the coastal countries. For its part, the United Nations stands ready to further support the efforts of the G-5 Sahel, including through capacitybuilding support in areas such as the prevention of violent extremism and radicalization and the promotion of the rule of law and border-security management.
Regardless of the support extended to the G-5 Sahel, stabilizing the region hinges on aligning our policies and approaches and putting the people of the region at the forefront of our efforts. The United Nations is committed to working with all partners to ensure that governance structures are more democratic and open and that the people of the Sahel have more confidence in their institutions. If we are to achieve durable peace in the region, we must address its underlying governance, development, human rights and humanitarian challenges. It was in that spirit that the African Union, the Economic Community of West African States, the G-5 Sahel and the United Nations established the Independent High-Level Panel on Security and Development in the Sahel. Under the leadership of Mahamadou Issoufou, the former President of the Niger, the Panel is actively working to help us reshape our approaches in the region and maximize our collective impact through innovative, coherent and coordinated action.
We desperately need to see resolute advances in the fight against terrorism, violent extremism and organized crime in the Sahel. Without significant gains, it will become increasingly difficult to reverse the security trajectory in the Sahel and the further expansion of insecurity towards the West African coastal countries. The recent instability in the Sudan, in the eastern part of the Sahel, is yet another cause for concern. The devastating effects of continuing destabilization would be felt far beyond the region and the African continent.